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Citizens’ responses to populists in the borderland between tolerance and intolerance

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Having predominantly focused on the vertical relation between the state and (groups of) citizens, the literature on political toleration has neglected the practice of toleration in the horizontal relations between citizens and parties. This article remedies this in the context of discussing what practicing toleration implies in responses by civil society actors and pro-democratic parties to populist parties, who have an ambiguous commitment to the principles of liberal democracy. The article develops the basic features of a theory of political toleration covering both ideal and non-ideal circumstances. In continuation of the empirical cases analysed in this special issue, it argues that what can be considered tolerant responses varies with the circumstances and the nature of the political process, and, further, that there is an intermediary conceptual space, a borderland, between toleration and non-toleration, which indicates that toleration and non-toleration are not a matter of a clean dichotomous difference. The justifiability of responses, which are placed in this borderland and even beyond, increases when it becomes clear that populists do not merit toleration.
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Vol:.(1234567890)
Comparative European Politics (2023) 21:866–884
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-023-00342-8
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Citizens’ responses topopulists intheborderland
betweentolerance andintolerance
ToreVincentsOlsen1
Accepted: 4 February 2023 / Published online: 16 February 2023
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited 2023
Abstract
Having predominantly focused on the vertical relation between the state and (groups
of) citizens, the literature on political toleration has neglected the practice of tol-
eration in the horizontal relations between citizens and parties. This article reme-
dies this in the context of discussing what practicing toleration implies in responses
by civil society actors and pro-democratic parties to populist parties, who have an
ambiguous commitment to the principles of liberal democracy. The article develops
the basic features of a theory of political toleration covering both ideal and non-ideal
circumstances. In continuation of the empirical cases analysed in this special issue,
it argues that what can be considered tolerant responses varies with the circum-
stances and the nature of the political process, and, further, that there is an interme-
diary conceptual space, a borderland, between toleration and non-toleration, which
indicates that toleration and non-toleration are not a matter of a clean dichotomous
difference. The justifiability of responses, which are placed in this borderland and
even beyond, increases when it becomes clear that populists do not merit toleration.
Keywords Populism· Political tolerance· Democratic defence· Non-ideal theory·
Parties· Civil society
Introduction
The case studies reported in this special issue analyse tolerant and intolerant modes
of engagement with populists. In relation to populists, the question of tolerance
emerges for two reasons. The first is that some might object to the policies that pop-
ulists propose, for example with regard to immigration, family and education, just as
they would with any other political opponent. The other reason is that some popu-
lists, as discussed by Bourne (2023), Malkopoulou and Moffitt (2023) and Tuovinen
(2023) in this issue, do not have an unequivocal commitment to the principles of
* Tore Vincents Olsen
tvo@ps.au.dk
1 Department ofPolitical Science, Aarhus University, Bartholins Allé 7, 8000Aarhus, Denmark
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
... The analysis of interviews shows that the IoPPs of civil society are deliberately situated in a borderland between tolerance and intolerance (Olsen 2023). Actions are mostly tolerant in the terms of Bourne's typology, but actors "do not conceive of populists as legitimate members of society and want to eliminate their views completely, but do not violate their rights or seek to remove them" (Ibid.). ...
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