ArticlePublisher preview available

Mediation and Transcendence: Balancing Postphenomenological Theory of Technological Mediation with Karl Jaspers’s Metaphysics of Ciphers

Authors:
To read the full-text of this research, you can request a copy directly from the author.

Abstract

The purpose of the present article is to contribute to the postphenomenological theory of technological mediation by introducing a new type of ‘human-technology’ relation named ‘transcending mediation’. Previously postphenomenology didn’t pay much attention to the role technology plays in mediating human relation to Transcendence. This was because of empirical turn and pragmatism that are anti-metaphysical in their nature. In the present paper, however, I will show that the empirical element of technology can be balanced by some metaphysical findings. Keeping this in mind, I will rely on Karl Jaspers’s metaphysics of ciphers in order to demonstrate how technology mediates not only our relation to the world but also shapes human’s relation to Transcendence. As I am going to show in the present paper, this sort of mediation becomes possible because technologies are actively participating in so-called self-transcending practices. The latter, according to Karl Jaspers, are practices through which humans can elucidate one’s true self (e.g., become an Existenz). In this article, I will take a case of Smart education as a particular type of self-transcending practice and will show how contemporary AI educational systems enable and disable particular forms of becoming true self (Existenz).
Vol.:(0123456789)
Human Studies (2023) 46:405–422
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-023-09666-6
1 3
THEORETICAL / PHILOSOPHICAL PAPER
Mediation andTranscendence: Balancing
Postphenomenological Theory ofTechnological Mediation
withKarl Jaspers’s Metaphysics ofCiphers
DmytroMykhailov1
Accepted: 30 January 2023 / Published online: 15 February 2023
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2023
Abstract
The purpose of the present article is to contribute to the postphenomenological
theory of technological mediation by introducing a new type of ‘human-technology’
relation named ‘transcending mediation’. Previously postphenomenology didn’t
pay much attention to the role technology plays in mediating human relation to
Transcendence. This was because of empirical turn and pragmatism that are anti-
metaphysical in their nature. In the present paper, however, I will show that the
empirical element of technology can be balanced by some metaphysical findings.
Keeping this in mind, I will rely on Karl Jaspers’s metaphysics of ciphers in
order to demonstrate how technology mediates not only our relation to the world
but also shapes human’s relation to Transcendence. As I am going to show in the
present paper, this sort of mediation becomes possible because technologies are
actively participating in so-called self-transcending practices. The latter, according
to Karl Jaspers, are practices through which humans can elucidate one’s true self
(e.g., become anExistenz). In this article, I will take a case of Smart education as
a particular type of self-transcending practice and will show how contemporary
AI educational systems enable and disable particular forms of becoming true self
(Existenz).
Keywords Postphenomenology· Technological mediation· Karl Jaspers· Existenz·
Transcendence· Smart education· AI adaptive educational system
* Dmytro Mykhailov
101300137@seu.edu.cn; faeton60@gmail.com
1 School ofHumanities, Southeast University, Nanjing211189, China
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
... Heidegger profoundly influenced contemporary philosophy of technology, especially in postphenomenology (Reijers 2019;Ihde 2010Ihde , 2021. Beyond this, Jaspers's philosophy (1932) offers 'new conceptual coordinates', enriching the temporal subjectivities of Heidegger's sense-making and resolute, Dasein and Sartre's subject that wills to will, which are used to reflect on the limitations of technological mediation (Mykhailov 2023;Lagerkvist 2020). Existence means to be in a situation (Jaspers 1932). ...
... Through the cyclic situation of design and use, artifacts construct the subject's essence and also gain their own transcendent identity, which is a particular unity of objective and historical reality related to humans. Technology provides us with a new access to the world (Aydin and Verbeek 2015), a material limit through which 'infinite' transcendence can be open to Existenz (Mykhailov 2023), and even a set of affordances for self-transcending through the notion of multistability (de Boer 2021a; Wellner 2020c). ...
Article
Full-text available
The advent of the posthuman era has blurred the boundary between the body and artifacts. Further, external materials and information are more deeply integrated into the body, making emerging technologies, especially artificial intelligence (AI), a key driving force for shaping posthuman existence and promoting bodily evolution. Based on this, this study analyses the transformation process of three technological forms, namely tools, machines, and cyborgs, and reveals the construction of bodies and artifacts. From the phenomenological perspective, the essences of body and artifact existences are reflected upon, and the ‘existence is construction’ viewpoint is proposed. Furthermore, a technological design concept, ‘bodioid’, is proposed to meticulously depict the characteristics of integrating similarities and differences toward unity between the body and artifacts, based on the theoretical foundation of technological mediation and the materialization of morality. Finally, through analogising the organizational form of language, the two key forms and specific mechanisms of ‘bodioid’ construction, namely ‘extension’ and ‘mirroring’, are indicated. Moreover, the posthuman existence landscape is discussed to provide theoretical insights into the study of the underlying philosophical principles of technological design.
... While post-phenomenology promises to reveal the profound influences operated by technology on human experience, critics of this approach complain about "insensitivity to broader contexts, for instance, the social or political contexts, of human being with technology" (Ritter, 2021a). According to Ritter's analysis, this is the meeting point of the two main criticisms levelled against the school of thought founded by Ihde, namely the "existentialist" criticism advocated, among others (see Lagerkvist, 2020;Mykhailov, 2023), by Robert C. Scharff, and the "ontological" criticism by Jochem Zwier, Pieter Lemmens and Vincent Blok (Ritter, 2021b), which we will analyse later. These philosophers also object to the empirical turn of the philosophical studies on technology for rejecting the traditional philosophy on this subject, considering it legitimate to rehabilitate past non-empirical approaches as a framework for analysing concrete situations (Bosschaert & Blok, 2022). ...
Article
Full-text available
This paper aims to engineer the concept of biomimetic design for its application in agricultural technology as an innovation strategy to sustain non-human species’ adaptation to today’s rapid environmental changes. By questioning the alleged intrinsic morality of biomimicry, a formulation of it is sought that goes beyond the sharp distinction between nature as inspiration and the human field of application of biomimetic technologies. After reviewing the main literature on Responsible Innovation, we support Vincent Blok’s “eco-centric” perspective on biomimicry, which considers the human and natural worlds as indistinguishable parts of a shared Earth. We propose this approach as a complement to the “evomimetic” critique, which warns biomimetic research against the limits of adaptationism. By merging these two reframing of the biomimicry concept, we thus pave the way for a new understanding of the use of human-inspired technology (such as artificial intelligence) to help the “evolution” of domesticated species into (semi)autonomous natural-technological hybrids. In particular, the examples we consider concern the potential of AI-enabled robotic bases in technological beekeeping.
... In "Mediation and Transcendence: Balancing Postphenomenological Theory of Technological Mediation with Karl Jaspers's Metaphysics of Ciphers," Dmytro Mykhailov analyzes the relation between technology and transcendence (Mykhailov, 2023). Dmytro Mykhailov introduces a new type of 'human-technology' relation named 'transcending mediation' and shows that today's technologies can change not only our relation to the world we live in but also to transcendence. ...
... Postphenomenology has been primarily occupied by mediation within humantechnology relations (Verbeek, 2005;van den Eede, 2010;de Boer et al., 2020;Mykhailov, 2023). This philosophical focus goes with several shortcomings, namely, such an approach does not provide the key to the technology itself because each time technologies are reduced either to subjective or to objective poles. ...
Article
Full-text available
This paper revives phenomenological elements to have a better framework for addressing the implications of technologies on society. For this reason, we introduce the motto “back to the technologies themselves” to show how some phenomenological elements, which have not been highlighted in the philosophy of technology so far, can be fruitfully integrated within the postphenomenological analysis. In particular, we introduce the notion of technological intentionality in relation to the passive synthesis in Husserl’s phenomenology. Although the notion of technological intentionality has already been coined in postphenomenology, it is “in tension” with the notion of technological mediation since there are still no clear differences between these two concepts and studies on how they relate one to another. The tension between mediation and intentionality arises because it seems intuitively reasonable to suggest that intentionality differs from mediation in a number of ways; however, these elements have not been clearly clarified in postphenomenology so far. To highlight what technological intentionality is and how it differs from mediation, we turn the motto “back to the things themselves” into “back to the technologies themselves,” showing how the technologies have to be taken into consideration by themselves. More specifically, we use the concept of passive synthesis developed by Husserl, and we apply it to technologies to show their inner passive activity. The notion of the passive synthesis enables to demonstrate how technologies are able to connect to a wider (technological) environment without the subjects’ activity. Consequently, we claim that technologies have their pole of action, and they passively act by themselves.
Article
Full-text available
In the present paper, I take findings from the postphenomenological variation of instrumental realism to develop an ‘environmental framework’ to provide a philosophical answer to the ‘problem of representation.’ The framework focuses on three elements of the representational environment, image-making technology, image as a representational device, and scientific hermeneutic strategies occurring within the image interpretation process in the laboratory set-up. The central idea in this regard is that scientific images do not produce meanings without their instrumental environment or that an image becomes representational through the interplay between three framework elements. In the second part of the paper, I apply the framework to contemporary debates on fMRI imaging. I show that fMRI images receive meaning not in isolation but within a complex instrumental environment.
Article
Full-text available
During the second half of the twentieth century, several philosophers of technology argued that their predecessors had reflected too abstractly and pessimistically on technology. In the view of these critics, one should study technologies empirically in order to fully understand them. They developed several strategies to empirically inform the philosophy of technology and called their new approach the empirical turn. However, they provide insufficient indications of what exactly is meant by empirical study in their work. This leads to the critical question of what counts as an empirically informed philosophy of technology in the empirical turn. In order to answer this question, we first elaborate on the problems that the empirical turn philosophers tried to address; secondly, we sketch their solutions, and, thirdly, we critically discuss their conceptions of empirical study. Our critical analysis of the empirical turn contributes to new efforts to engage in an empirically informed philosophy of technology.
Article
Full-text available
This paper aims to highlight the life of computer technologies to understand what kind of ‘technological intentionality’ is present in computers based upon the phenomenological elements constituting the objects in general. Such a study can better explain the effects of new digital technologies on our society and highlight the role of digital technologies by focusing on their activities. Even if Husserlian phenomenology rarely talks about technologies, some of its aspects can be used to address the actions performed by the digital technologies by focusing on the objects’ inner ‘life’ thanks to the analysis of passive synthesis and phenomenological horizons in the objects. These elements can be used in computer technologies to show how digital objects are ‘alive.’ This paper focuses on programs developed through high-order languages like C++ and unsupervised learning techniques like ‘Generative Adversarial Model.’ The phenomenological analysis reveals the computer’s autonomy within the programming stages. At the same time, the conceptual inquiry into the digital system’s learning ability shows the alive and changeable nature of the technological object itself.
Article
Full-text available
Postphenomenology was envisaged to lay bare the black box of technology through a phenomenological approach. The vision, in this sense, was to identify how technology might mediate both the subjectivity of its immediate user and the world around her. In this paper I will argue that to cognize technology’s effects fully, we need to enrich postphenomenology with further insights. In particular, SCOT and ANT may be integrated into postphenomenology. While the former can provide a historical narrative of how technology has evolved throughout time, the latter may embed technology within a network where the interplay of the technology, the first user, other individuals and the society, on the whole, can be depicted. After a preliminary theoretical discussion, I will go through some case studies to articulate how SCOT and ANT can make a contribution to a systematic investigation of technology.
Chapter
Full-text available
The previous chapters explored how four (interacting and overlapping) continental approaches (dialectics, dialectical materialism, psychoanalysis and phenomenology) offer hints and guidance for coming to terms with the revolutionary dynamics and disruptive impact of contemporary technoscience. Hegelian dialectics provides a conceptual scaffold for developing a comprehensive view of the terrestrial system and even for addressing the Cambrian explosion currently unfolding in laboratories around the globe, as a result of technoscientific developments such as synthetic biology and CRISP-Cas9. Dialectical materialism likewise offers a conceptual framework for addressing the rapidly aggravating disruption of the metabolism between nature and global civilisation, and the ongoing convergence of biosphere and technosphere, exemplified by the synthetic cell. Francophone psychoanalysis, closely aligned with dialectical thinking, adds to our understanding of the specificity of technoscience, both as a practice and as a discourse, where technoscientific research emerges as a questionable vocation driven by a desire to control, but at the same time ostensibly out of control. The dialectical methodology of psychoanalysis was exemplified with the help of case histories, moreover, involving Majorana particles, gene drives, malaria mosquitoes and nude mice. The latter represent technoscientific commodities, exemplifying the assembly-line production of human-made organisms (the commodification of life as such). Subsequently, we demonstrated how Heideggerian phenomenology entails important methodological hints for understanding technoscientific artefacts against the backdrop of technoscience as a mobilising force and as a global enterprise. And finally, we outlined how Teilhard’s views on the genesis of consciousness, self-consciousness and hyperconsciousness retrieve the historical (dialectical) dimension of phenomenology, thus allowing us to assess the present as a global unfolding of the noosphere.
Article
Full-text available
A central issue in postphenomenology is how to explain the multistability of technologies: how can it be that specific technologies can be used for a wide variety of purposes (the “multi”), while not for all purposes (the “stability”)? For example, a table can be used for the purpose of sleeping, having dinner at, or even for staging a fencing match, but not for baking a cake. One explanation offered in the literature is that the (material) design of a technology puts constraints on the purposes for which technologies can be used. In this paper, I argue that such an explanation—while partly correct—fails to address the role of the environment in which human beings operate in putting constraints on technology use. I suggest that James Gibson’s affordance theory helps highlighting how stabilities in technology use arise in the interaction between human being and environment. Building on more recent approaches in affordance theory, I suggest that the environment can be conceptualized as a “rich landscape of affordances” that solicits certain actions, which are not just cued by the environment’s material structure, but also by the normativity present in the form of life in which a human being participates. I briefly contrast the approach to affordances developed in this paper with how Klenk (2020) and Tollon (2021) have conceptualized the “affordance character” of technological artifacts, and highlight how a focus on the situated nature of affordances augments these earlier conceptualizations.
Article
Full-text available
We live in a world where it is impossible to exist without, and beyond, technologies. Despite this omnipresence, we tend to overlook their influence on us. The vigorously developing approach of postphenomenology, combining insights from phenomenology and pragmatism, focuses on the so-called technological mediation, i.e., on how technologies as mediators of human-world relations influence the appearing of both the world and the human beings in it. My analysis aims at demonstrating both the methodological weaknesses and open possibilities of postphenomenology. After summarizing its essentials, I will scrutinize, first, its ability to turn to the technological things themselves and, second, the so-called empirical turn as realized by postphenomenology. By assessing its conceptual framework from the phenomenological perspective, I hope to demonstrate that postphenomenology needs philosophical clarification and strengthening. In short, it needs a more phenomenological, and less pragmatic, approach to technology in its influence on human experience.
Article
Full-text available
Ever since Achterhuis designated American philosophy of technology “empirical” there has been a Continental “push-back” defending the first generation of European—mostly Heidegger’s essentialistic “transcendental”—philosophy of technology. While I prefer a “concrete” turn—to avoid confusing with British “empiricism”—in a belief that particular technologies are different from others—this is a quibble. I admit I was very taken by Richard Rorty’s “anti-essentialism” and “non-foundationalism” in his version of pragmatism, and have adapted much of that stance into postphenomenology. In this contribution I reply to the comments of Lars Botin and Robert Rosenberger.
Article
Full-text available
My effort to address the comments made by the two distinguished scholars (to “negate their negations” as it were), consists of three steps. I will start with a brief resume of Hegel’s dialectical logic, to provide a scaffold for the debate. Subsequently, I will address the comments made. In the case of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, I will focus on his reference to Althusser. In the case of Bart Gremmen, I will focus on the dialectics of biology (on biology as an inherently dialectical science), notably on his reference to Mendel. Finally, I will address the tension between the conceptual and the empirical dimension of philosophical scholarship.