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Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology ISSN: 2691-5928
Online First: January 12, 2023 DOI: 10.5840/techne2023111166
Vincent Blok, Associate Professor, Philosophy Group, Wageningen University, Holland-
seweg 1, 6707 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands; info@vincentblok.nl
Technology as Mimesis: Biomimicry as
Regenerave Sustainable Design, Engineering,
and Technology
Vincent Blok
Abstract: In this article, we investigate how to explain the difference between tra-
ditional design, engineering, and technology—which have exploited nature and put
increasing pressure on Earth’s carrying capacity since the industrial revolution—and
biomimetic design—which claims to explore nature’s sustainable solutions and
promises to be regenerative by design. We reect on the concept of mimesis. Mimesis
assumes a continuity between the natural environment as a regenerative model and
measure for sustainable design that is imitated and reproduced in biomimetic design,
engineering, and technology. We conceptualize mimesis in terms of two interdepen-
dent boundary conditions: differentiation and participation. We subsequently develop
four characteristics of biomimicry as regenerative design, engineering, and technol-
ogy: technological mimesis is 1) a participative differentiation of nature; 2) supple-
mental to natural mimesis in biomimetic design; 3) the participative differentiation of
technological mimesis is constitutive of nature; 4) the participative differentiation of
technological mimesis is always limited.
Key words: Biomimicry, design, ethics of technology, regenerative development,
technology
1. Introducon
In present-day society, the exploitation of nature is so disruptive that the future of
human existence on planet Earth is threatened. In order to ensure the sustainability
of Earth’s life-support systems for human life on Earth, a concept of sustainability
is required that integrates the triple bottom line of People, Planet, Prot in our
production and consumption processes. This trend is supported by innovations
Technology as Mimesis
in design, engineering, and technology that enable the reduction of waste and the
improvement of resource efciency in the development of a circular biobased
economy. In this context, biomimetic design, engineering, and technology is con-
sidered a promising way forward (Blok 2017).
Biomimicry or biomimetics refers to the “philosophy and interdisciplinary
design approaches taking nature as a model to meet the challenges of sustainable
development (social, environmental, and economic)” (BSI 2015). Biomimetic
technologies imitate natural design—e.g., a termite mound—to solve technical
problems—e.g., temperature regulation in the built environment. As the natural en-
vironment provides sustainable solutions—e.g., nature recycles everything, nature
is locally attuned and responsive, nature banks on diversity, and so on (Baumeister
et al. 2013)—biomimetic technologies provide, creative solutions that prove effec-
tive in nature. Importantly, the more these biomimetic technologies are embedded
in and mutually benet both the design and the natural ecosystems of planet Earth,
the more they can claim to be sustainable technologies, i.e., reduce negative envi-
ronmental impacts and contribute to regenerative development (Hayes, Desha, and
Baumeister 2020). Regenerative design can be dened as design that prevents the
destruction of the Earth’s ecosystems while actively renewing and progressively
reconstructing them.
According to Peter Sloterdijk, traditional technologies are based on principles
that are heterogeneous to natural design. They can be associated with the domina-
tion and exploitation of nature (Sloterdijk 2011). Contrary to these heterogeneous
technologies that have put increasing pressure on Earth’s carrying capacity since
the industrial revolution (Sloterdijk and Heinrichs 2006), biomimetic or homeo-
technologies are based on principles homogeneous to natural design. They can
be associated with learning and the exploration of nature’s sustainable solutions.
Proponents like Janine Benyus (2002) claim that biomimetic technologies could
potentially underpin a new industrial revolution, because they no longer exploit
nature. Instead, they learn from nature and could pave the way for a genuine ap-
proach to regenerative sustainable design, engineering, and technology.
This raises the question of how exactly to explain the difference between
the two types of technology, and whether this difference can in fact account for
high ecological performance of biomimetic technologies in contrast to traditional
technologies. Is it really the case that traditional designers aim to exploit the Earth
while biomimetic designers opt to explore nature? It seems logical to point to the
mimetic nature of biomimetic technologies, which assumes a continuity between
nature and technology, i.e., a continuity between the natural environment as a re-
Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology
generative model and measure (Baumeister et al. 2013) for sustainable design, and
new technologies that imitate and reproduce this model and measure and can then
also claim to be a regenerative sustainable design.
Closer inspection, however, reveals all kinds of difculties with the notion of
mimesis. 1) If biomimetic technologies are real imitations of nature, why should
we invest in technology when we could also ‘grow’ the natural design? In other
words, what would the added value of biomimetic technology be if nature itself
could do the job? 2) At a conceptual level, biomimicry may claim to be regen-
erative, but, in practice, most biomimetic technologies focus on efciency and
optimization and not on sustainable performance, even if most cases of biomi-
metic design provide opportunities to reduce waste, improve efciency in resource
use, and so on (Hayes, Desha, and Baumeister 2020). In other words, mimesis
may be a necessary condition for regenerative design, but is not yet a sufcient
condition. 3) Biomimicry does not simply imitate nature in technological design,
because our technological problems pre-structure the way we see and understand
nature (Bensaud-Vincent 2011). It is only because we have a problem with energy
intensive air conditioning systems that a termite mound appears as a natural air
conditioning system. Furthermore, biomimicry practitioners argue that a direct
imitation of a biological prototype in a technological design is rarely successful
and requires a translation from biology to technology (Vincent et al. 2006). Can
we claim to mimic nature if technological problems pre-structure our understand-
ing of the natural environment and require translation? 4) Earth system sciences
show that the natural environment is unstable and volatile (Clark 2011). What are
the consequences of the instability of the natural environment for the desirability
of technologies that mimic nature?
These difculties with the theory and practice of mimesis in biomimetic de-
sign, engineering, and technology show that the continuity between the natural
environment as a regenerative model and technological design can be questioned,
and, with this, the sustainability claims involved. Biomimicry cannot consist in a
simple imitation and reproduction of nature’s model in technological design but
requires translation and management. For this reason, authors like Peter Forbes
reject the name biomimicry, as it involves a “slavish copying of Nature” (Forbes
2005, 18–19). Instead, they argue for bio-inspiration, highlighting the newness of
technological design beyond natural design (Forbes 2005, 18–19). But if techno-
logical design is only inspired by nature and mimics only selected features of an
organism—e.g., a wasp sting that inspires a self-propelling Ovipositor Device for
surgery—the difference between the two types of technology—e.g., the claim that
Technology as Mimesis
biomimicry could pave the way for a genuinely approach to regenerative sustain-
able design—becomes questionable.
If we dene biomimicry as mimesis of nature in the literal sense of the word,
then we understand how nature can function as a model for regenerative techno-
logical design and how this model can account for the difference between the two
types of technology. In reality, nothing corresponds with this idea. If, however, we
dene biomimicry more loosely as bio-inspiration, then almost all technologies
can count as bio-inspired—genetic modication of plants and animals can be seen
as inspired by the natural way in which DNA duplicates over generations—and
it is no longer clear how these bio-inspired technologies are differentiated from
traditional technological exploitations of nature.
How can we dene mimicry and mimesis to differentiate between both
simple imitation and mere inspiration for inventions and guide regenerative sus-
tainable design? In answering this question, we cannot expect help from material
scientists, engineers, and designers working in the eld of biomimicry. They often
engage in actual new product development without considering its conceptual-
ity, or their potential contribution to sustainable development (Hayes, Desha, and
Baumeister 2020). In this article, we reect philosophically on the nature of mime-
sis in biomimetic design, engineering, and technology, building on the emerging
eld of the philosophy of biomimicry (Dicks 2016; Blok and Gremmen 2016).
Philosophy questions dominant conceptualizations, claries conceptual ambigui-
ties, and engages in conceptual engineering to advance theory and practice in the
interdisciplinary eld of biomimicry.
In §2, we set the stage by discussing how mimesis is conceptualized in
the philosophical tradition. We show that the concept cannot be understood with
reference to classical categories like imitation and invention, but rather concerns
a completely new category. We conceptualize this new category in terms of the
supplementarity of mimesis. We dene the supplementarity of mimesis in terms
of two interdependent boundary conditions: differentiation and participation. In
§3, we apply this concept in the context of technological mimesis to characterize
biomimicry as regenerative sustainable design. We develop four characteristics of
technological mimesis as design, engineering, and technology. We draw conclu-
sions in §4.
Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology
2. The Opportunies of Mimesis as Regenerave Design, Engineering, and
Technology
In order to assess the opportunities and limitations of biomimicry as an imitation
of the model of nature, we consult the philosophical tradition. The idea of biomim-
icry as an imitation of nature can be traced in Plato’s work, for whom mimesis can
mean a variety of things: representation, copy, reproduction, expression, and so
on. Although Plato is famous for his rejection of art because of its mimetic nature,
it is good to consider that he does not reject mimesis as such, like he does not reject
art as such (Blok 2020). He only rejects the mimesis of art in light of his concept
of truth as homoiosis (likeness, resemblance, correctness). Plato’s famous con-
demnation of art consists in the fact that the artistic mimesis attempts to mimic the
real tree in a painted tree for instance, but it does not succeed in this effort. This is
why Plato condemns artistic mimesis: its effort to copy nature as a representation
of the original model always leads to degeneration, i.e., to a decient imitation of
perfect nature. Whereas the ideal of mimesis is to imitate nature, its reality consists
in degeneration with respect to the original. In this regard, we might argue that
some of the issues that we have raised regarding mimesis, just like its condemna-
tion as a slavish copy of nature by people like Forbes (see §1), can be traced in the
philosophical tradition.
We can contrast the negative assessment of mimesis in Plato’s case with a
more positive conceptualization in the case of his apprentice Aristotle. According
to Aristotle, art and technology imitate (mimeitai—mimesis), accomplish, or per-
fect what nature is not capable of effectuating itself (Aristotle 1980, 199a20–25).
Now, when a thing is produced by Nature, the earlier stages in every case
lead up to the nal development in the same way as in the operation of
art, and vice versa, provided that no impediment balks the process. The
operation is directed by a purpose; we may, therefore, infer that the natural
process was guided by a purpose to the end that is realized. Thus, if a house
were a natural product, the process would pass through the same stages that
it in fact passes through when it is produced by art; and if natural products
could also be produced by art, they would move along the same line that the
natural process actually takes. (Aristotle 1980, 199a8–20)
According to Aristotle, the technological construction of a house mimics natural
principles and processes. This does not mean that the house itself is an equivalent
of nature. It means that if nature were able to build a house, it would follow the
same building processes and stages as our technological constructions.1 For Aris-
Technology as Mimesis
totle, the imitation of nature is possible. We call this conceptualization of mimicry
the imitation of the naturally given.2
This naturalistic account of mimicry can be found in various biomimetic prac-
tices that imitate natural forms or processes (Hayes, Desha, and Baumeister 2020).
The naturalism of this conceptualization of mimesis consists in the imitation of the
physical shape of natural phenomena in technological design, e.g., mimicking the
kingsher bird in the design of the nose cone of the Japanese bullet train to reduce
the air friction caused by trains moving into and out of tunnels. The imitation can
also concern natural processes. For instance, imitating organic growth and healing
processes in the development of self-healing and self-repairing concrete.
Besides imitating nature, mimesis can progressively supplement the capacity
of nature, according to Aristotle—particularly, in cases where mimesis accom-
plishes and perfects what nature is not capable of effectuating itself. We call this
the supplementary nature of mimesis: when something is added to the original in
order to complete or perfect nature. What is it that nature cannot effectuate itself
according to Aristotle? Nature provides access to all kinds of sensory phenomena
that we encounter in the world; however, it does not extend to general patterns
or universals that constitute concepts like ‘tree,’ ‘man,’ and so on. The mimetic
perfection of nature articulates such general patterns or universals like ‘tree’ and
‘man.’ Aristotle provides examples of the perfection of nature within artwork: Art,
such as poems or paintings, are capable of conveying general patterns of human
life—e.g., the tragic nature of human life—that cannot be observed directly
through the use of poetic ction (Aristotle, 1995: 1448a1–5). This ction is not
inductively derived from natural phenomena, but rather the product of a mimetic
act that actively constitutes a type or category that subsumes individual humans
under a generic term (Dicks 2017). At the same time, this mimetic act is not a free
invention because it re-enacts what is already there in natural phenomena, albeit
in an underarticulated manner. The mimetic perfection of nature consists in the
articulation of general patterns, types, or categories in these natural phenomena.
We call this the poetic concept of mimicry as perfection of the naturally given.
This poetic account of mimicry can be found in biomimetic practices at
system level that mimic general patterns and principles adopted in ecosystems
(Hayes, Desha, and Baumeister 2020; Marshall and Lozeva 2009). Benyus, for
instance, identies several life principles like ‘nature runs on sunlight’ or ‘nature
recycles everything’ that can guide technological design. These principles are not
inductively derived from natural phenomena. Rather, they are the product of a
mimetic act that constitutes life principles like ‘nature runs on sunlight.’ While the
Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology
naturalistic account of mimicry indicates the biomimetic imitation of a naturally
given form or process—e.g., the symbolic imitation of the form of the gecko’s
toes or the imitation of wound-healing processes—the poetic account of mimicry
indicates the biomimetic articulation of life principles that govern ecosystems like
‘nature demands local expertise’ or ‘nature uses only the energy it needs’ in tech-
nological design (Benyus 2002).
Contrary to Plato, Aristotle’s conceptualization of mimesis is positively
framed as perfection with respect to the original. In fact, we see a reversal between
Plato’s and Aristotle’s appreciation of mimesis to the extent that art and technology
are no longer seen as degenerative with respect to perfect nature as the original.
Instead, nature is decient because it cannot accomplish or effectuate everything
and needs art and technology to become perfect.
To what extent does Aristotle’s conceptualization of mimesis help us to un-
derstand and eventually solve the issues with mimesis mentioned in the introduc-
tion to this article? The rst issue encountered was that it is not clear why we
should invest in technology if biomimetic technologies are seen as real imitations
of nature. Why should we invest in technology when we could also ‘grow’ the
natural design? According to Aristotle, nature and technology are essentially the
same as we have seen, meaning that natural growth follows the same principles
as articial construction. The only difference between the two is that the starting
point for the operation of these principles in natural design is found internally (the
development of natural entities is determined from within themselves). In the case
of technological design, it is found externally in the human designer. A house does
not grow naturally; we do not grow a house; we invest in its construction.
But if mimesis supplements the capacity of nature according to Aristotle, how
can we distinguish between a mimetic supplement of nature and a nature-inspired
invention of something completely new? Given that we are interested in a concept
of mimesis beyond simple imitation and mere inspiration, we now ask how the
supplementary nature of the poetic account of mimesis has to be understood.
Philosophically, the supplementarity of mimesis involves a twofold principle:
A as original and A1 as supplement of the original that cannot be lifted by any
mimesis. Why? ‘Sup-’ means to add from the bottom up, so an addition (A1) to
the original (A). This addition cannot be identical with the original. Otherwise,
a sup-plement of the original would be neither possible nor necessary.3 In other
words, the supplementarity of mimesis shows that biomimicry always involves a
twofold between natural design and technological design that cannot be bridged.
Mimesis always involves change (A → A1), and change explains why practitioners
Technology as Mimesis
nd that the direct imitation of a biological prototype in technological design is
rarely successful and requires interpretation, translation, and management. If mi-
mesis always involves change (A → A1), it is better understood as a variant of the
original.4
But if the mimesis of the natural original (A) always involves change (A1),
how can we distinguish between change as a mimetic variant of A (A1) and change
as a nature-inspired invention of something completely new (B)? Our poetic
account of mimesis might help us here: The mimetic variant of A differentiates
a general pattern (principle, type, or category) from the original—natural phe-
nomena—but remains embedded in and participates with this original, which it
perfects.5 This embeddedness and participation in natural phenomena can help to
distinguish mimesis and invention because a mimetic variant differentiates from
the original but remains embedded in and participates with this original—it adds
something to the original,6 whereas, the invention of something completely new
consists in a differentiation without such remaining embeddedness.7 The poetic
account of mimesis as a supplementary variant of the original is dependent on the
naturalistic account of mimesis as an imitation of the original at form, process, or
system level, as it limits this mimetic variant to those differentiations that remain
embedded, and participate, in the original. If then, and only then, is it a variant and
not something invented completely anew. At the same time, we can argue that the
naturalistic account of mimesis as an imitation of the original is dependent on the
poetic account. If the mimesis of the natural original (A) involves the constitution
of a supplement (A1), then the poetic account limits the mimetic variant to those
differentiations that move beyond a slavish copy of nature. However, this proves
difcult, if not impossible, in practice.
By consulting the philosophical tradition, we can now properly conceptu-
alize mimesis. We move beyond Aristotle’s narrow interpretation of mimesis as
imitation and perfection. We reconceptualize them as two boundary conditions
that constitute the supplementarity of mimesis: differentiation and participation.
This conceptualization of mimesis enables us to differentiate between biomimicry
(A → A1) and strict imitation of nature (A=A) on the one hand and nature-inspired
invention (A → B) on the other. With this, it becomes clear that mimesis cannot be
conceptualized with the help of common categories like imitation and invention
but introduces a new category.
If we apply the conceptualization of mimesis that we have developed so far
to biomimetic design, engineering, and technology, we can dene biomimicry as
differentiation of a technological design beyond Earth’s biosphere or ecosystems
Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology
that at the same time remains embedded, and participates, in these ecosystems.
Such a denition holds that biomimetic technologies mimic life’s principles, such
as ‘nature rewards cooperation’ or ‘nature uses only the energy it needs’ (Benyus
2002), in technological design. Due to their mimetic nature, biomimetic design,
engineering, and technology take Earth’s ecosystems as their point of departure in
the development of new technological design and are at the same time responsive
to the wider ecological context on which these technologies depend (Blok 2017).
With this, we also provide a criterion to distinguish between traditional, ex-
ploitative technologies and biomimetic, exploratory technologies that can claim
to be regenerative based on their mimetic nature. Many technologies that mimic
natural forms or processes cannot claim to be sustainable solutions, even if they
provide opportunities to reduce waste, improve efciency in resource use, and so
on. Regenerative design not only requires us to mimic natural forms and processes,
but should also be responsive to these natural ecosystems by renewing and recon-
structing them, and by being responsive to these ecosystems (Marshall and Lozeva
2009). Our concept of mimesis—as differentiation of a technological design be-
yond Earth’s biosphere or ecosystems, which at the same time remains embedded
in and participates with these ecosystems—operationalizes this necessary and
sufcient condition for biomimicry as regenerative design. This conceptualization
of mimesis in biomimicry helps us to criticize efforts both to imitate particular
features or mechanisms of organisms and to invent features or mechanisms that
are inspired by nature but are not embedded in Earth’s ecosystems. At the same
time, this conceptualization of mimesis helps us to operationalize biomimicry as
regenerative sustainable design.
3. The Limitaons of Mimesis as Regenerave Design, Engineering, and
Technology
The second issue raised in the introduction with regard to mimesis was that earth
system sciences show that the natural environment is unstable and volatile (Clark
2011). This raises questions regarding the limitations of biomimetic technologi-
cal design. The instability and volatility of the natural environment is differently
conceptualized in various disciplines. For instance, in philosophy it is conceptual-
ized as steresis. According to Aristotle, the withdrawal of nature belongs to its
self-emergence. In biology, it is conceptualized in terms of a terra incognita; many
varieties of microbes, plants, and animals are still unknown to us. In bio-inspired
design practice, it is experienced in practice, as most of the original functions
and mechanisms of natural design are unknown to the designer. No matter how
Technology as Mimesis
this instability is conceptualized, the question is raised of how to embed biomi-
metic design in the ecosystems of planet Earth if these ecosystems withdraw at
an epistemic level. In this section, we rst return to the concept of mimesis to
conceptualize nature as terra incognita that is mimicked in technological design.
Subsequently, we sketch the consequences of nature as terra incognita for our
concept of biomimicry as regenerative design, engineering, and technology.
Building on Aristotle’s work, Jacques Derrida pointed out that technological
mimesis remains embedded in a natural mimesis:
At the beginning of the Poetics mimesis in a way is posited as a possibility
proper to physis. Physis is revealed in mimesis, or in the poetry which is a
species of mimesis, by virtue of the hardly apparent structure which con-
strains mimesis from carrying to the exterior the fold of its redoubling. It
belongs to physis, or, if you will, physis includes its own exteriority and its
double. In this sense, mimesis is therefore a ‘natural’ movement. (Derrida
1982, 237)
Here, mimesis is seen as a natural movement because the ability to mimic is em-
bedded in the nature of human being. Nature, itself, allows the possibility of its
mimesis by technology. It is also a doubling movement because mimicry neces-
sarily doubles nature in technological design. In this sense, the supplementarity of
technology is natural in two senses of the word according to Derrida: allowed by
nature and doubling nature.
But we can go a step further: If nature and technology are essentially the
same ( as Aristotle argued [1980, 199a10–20]) and the essence of technology is
found in a mimesis of nature, then technological mimesis may be rooted in, and
derived from, an original natural mimesis. Nature allows for technological mime-
sis as a doubling variant of nature—i.e., nature as the appearance of natural forms,
processes, and ecosystems that can be mimicked in technological design. Nature
is not mere appearance, but primarily an unpredictable, indeterminable, and un-
fathomable elementary sphere (Blok 2019) from which a variety of natural enti-
ties emerge in the evolutionary process of trial and error of new variants that can
turn out to be the ttest to survive or not. Mimesis then concerns the ontogenetic
process in which a new supplementary variety emerges and shows itself as such
a variety of its predecessor (Blok 2016a). Mimesis primarily shows something.
Natural mimesis then shows a natural supplement that remains embedded, and
participates, in this ontogenetic process of nature that is itself indeterminable and
unfathomable, i.e., that remains a terra incognita as a background condition for
Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology
each and every mimetic variety in the foreground. It is the natural supplement—a
gecko foot, a healing wound, a natural ecosystem like a forest—that is mimicked
in a technological supplement, not the elementary nature out of which these sup-
plements emerge.8
The concept of mimesis enables us to understand nature as terra incognita in
terms of the supplementary nature of natural mimesis. Natural mimesis involves
a distinction between nature as mimetic variety that can be mimicked in techno-
logical design, and nature as terra incognita, which is the origin of any natural
mimesis. Nature as terra incognita cannot be mimicked in technological design
because it is unfathomable and unpredictable at an ontological and epistemologi-
cal level (Blok 2019). However, any natural mimesis remains embedded in nature
and supplements it when acting as terra incognita. The duality of nature involved
in the supplementarity of natural mimesis explains, on the one hand, why the
evolutionary process of new variant emergence will never end in a static form,
process, or ecosystem but will always adapt under pressure from internal and ex-
ternal factors and which constitute Earth’s dynamic ecosystems. This means, on
the other hand, that the technological mimesis embedded in Earth’s ecosystems
has to be understood as an integral part of these dynamic ecosystems.
If we consider differentiation and participation as a rst characteristic of
the supplementary nature of mimesis that can inform a regenerative concept of
biomimetic design, engineering, and technology, then a second characteristic is
revealed: a regenerative concept of technological mimesis that remains embedded
in natural mimesis. All technological mimesis remains embedded in natural mime-
sis as an ontogenetic process in which natural forms, processes, and ecosystems
emerge but also remain embedded in unfathomable and unpredictable nature as
terra incognita.
The duality inherent to the concept of natural mimesis between the natural
forms, processes, and ecosystems as the mimetic outcome of the ontogenetic pro-
cess, and nature as the origin of these supplementary forms and processes, opens a
new perspective on mimesis as the perfection of nature encountered in the previous
section. One can argue that the conceptual duality of natural mimesis enables us to
reject the idea of technology as the perfection of nature. Nature does not have to
be associated with a lack or a aw that can be remedied by human technological
design. It withdraws itself at an epistemic and ontological level in the process of
natural and technological mimesis. Natural and technological mimesis do not per-
fect the imperfect; rather, natural mimesis constitutes natural forms, processes, and
Technology as Mimesis
ecosystems for the rst time. Without such a constitutive mimesis, nature would
remain a terra incognita.
This constitutive role of mimesis is conrmed by one of the most impor-
tant philosophers of mimesis: Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. According to Lacoue-
Labarthe, there is no xed, real original that can subsequently be mimicked in
mimesis, as classical philosophers of mimesis like Aristotle assumed. The original
is only accessible via mimesis; therefore, it is only a supplement of this original.
The original supplementarity of mimesis means that the original is only given
in the supplementarity of mimesis. According to Lacoue-Labarthe, this original
supplementarity is at stake in all our relations with the world:
In reality, we have to wrest mimetism away from the classical conceptions
of imitation and rethink it in the light of a rigorous mimetology. The struc-
ture of original supplementarity is the very structure or the relation between
techné and physis. (Lacoue-Labarthe 1990, 83)
Although this idea may be counterintuitive, it is conrmed and substantiated by our
notion of nature as terra incognita. In which, the origin of natural mimesis embeds
natural forms and processes. Because nature as terra incognita is inaccessible at
an epistemological and ontological level, it is only via a mimetic supplement that
we have access to this origin. In this respect, mimesis is not a re-presentation or
re-production of the original. Instead, mimesis constitutes this original for the rst
time. This is what Lacoue-Labarthe calls the original supplementarity of mimesis
(Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 1990; Peperstraten 2005).
The constitutive nature of the supplementarity of mimesis holds that the rela-
tion between the natural forms, processes, and ecosystems constituents the mimet-
ic process, and nature is the origin of these supplementary forms and processes.
Further, it holds that the relation between the natural forms and processes are
supplemented by technological design. Technological mimesis brings something
new to natural mimesis, a supplement, and only this technological supplement
provides access to the natural forms, processes, and ecosystems as the origin of
technological mimesis, just like a natural supplement provides access to nature
as origin of these supplementary natural forms and processes of natural mimesis.
With this, we encounter a third characteristic of the supplementary nature of
mimesis that can inform a regenerative sustainable concept of biomimetic design,
engineering, and technology: the constitutive nature of the supplementarity of
natural and technological mimesis. The constitutive nature of the supplementarity
of mimesis enables us also to address the third issue raised in the introduction
Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology
regarding the nature of mimesis: biomimicry does not simply imitate nature in
technological design because our technological problems pre-structure the way in
which we see and understand nature (Bensaud-Vincent 2011). On the one hand,
technological mimesis is not inductively derived from nature but rather the product
of a mimetic act that constitutes a general pattern or principle, as we have seen.
On the other hand, it is only because we have a problem with energy, for instance,
that makes ‘nature runs on sunlight’ appear as a potential solution. We can even
broaden the argument and argue that these principles of nature can only appear as
a natural model and measure for technological mimesis after technological media-
tions (laboratories, microscopes, and so on) reveal this principle as a principle of
nature. The constitutive nature of the supplementarity of mimesis conrms that
mimetic technology pre-structures the way in which we understand nature. At the
same time, our conceptualization of mimesis can address the issue that technol-
ogy pre-structures nature before it is mimicked. On the one hand, the constitutive
nature of technological mimesis holds both for natural and technological mimesis.
On the other hand, the constitutive nature of technological mimesis is not prob-
lematic as long as it is accompanied with the rst characteristic of mimesis that
we have introduced, as it guarantees that the constitutive nature of technological
mimesis remains embedded, and participates, in Earth’s ecosystems.
The duality in the concept of natural mimesis between natural forms, pro-
cesses, and ecosystems as mimetic outcome of the ontogenetic process, and nature
as origin of these supplementary forms and processes, opens a new perspective on
the deciency of nature encountered in the previous section. One can argue that
the duality of the concept of natural mimesis enables us to reject the idea of a de-
ciency of nature: nature does not have to be associated with a lack or a aw that
can be remedied by human technological design. Nature can also be understood
in terms of an abundance that gives rise to multiple possible forms, processes, and
ecosystems in the course of natural mimesis. It is not nature itself that is decient,
but only our mimetic access to it. Technological mimesis has access only to the
forms, processes, and ecosystems that emerge in the course of natural mimesis,
but not to nature as origin of these supplementary forms and processes, i.e., nature
as terra incognita. The deciency of nature concerns a deciency in our access to
nature as origin of natural mimesis, which remains a terra incognita for us, in con-
trast to nature as a mimetic form, process, or ecosystem that is accessible in tech-
nological mimesis (Blok 2019; Zwier, Blok, and Lemmens 2018). This deciency
of technological mimesis indicates not only an epistemic limitation on the lessons
that can be drawn from nature, but also an ontological limitation: the dynamic
Technology as Mimesis
complexity of Earth’s ecosystems indicates that nature’s mechanisms, principles,
and processes are highly complex, evolving, and therefore always uncertain.
The fundamental uncertainty of technological mimesis resulting from the
deciency of our access to natural mimesis introduces a fourth characteristic of
the supplementary nature of mimesis that can inform a regenerative sustainable
concept of biomimetic design, engineering, and technology. If the origin of natu-
ral and technological mimesis withdraws itself in the supplementarity of mimesis,
that is, shows itself for the rst time thanks to the supplementarity of mimesis,
this supplement is always improper with regard to its origin: it is modied or
supplemented by it. In other words, the constitutive nature of the supplementarity
of mimesis implies not only that there is a duality between the mimetic form,
process, or ecosystem that can be mimicked properly or improperly and its origin
(terra incognita), but also that all mimesis will always be improper with regard
to this origin (Lacoue-Labarthe 1999). We call this the structural limitation of
technological mimesis.
A concrete example can be found in the Eastgate Centre in Harare, a green
building in Zimbabwe modelled on termite mounds. After the building was n-
ished, it turned out that the engineers based their design on an improper concep-
tion of how termite mounds actually work (Turner and Soar 2008). This example
of an improper technological mimesis with regard to the original shows the uncer-
tainty and limitation of biomimetic technologies in their effort to mimic nature.
Although the ambition of mimesis is to mimic (un)differentiated nature, the de-
ciency of nature at an epistemic and an ontological level makes any constitution
of biomimetic design a temporary and nite solution in light of (un)differentiated
nature. This does not necessarily mean that an improper biomimesis is a bad thing:
the temperature in the Eastgate Centre is successfully regulated without conven-
tional air-conditioning and heating, and, with this innovation, the centre actually
emits signicantly less CO2.
The structural limitation of technological mimesis can be found in various
forms. For instance, direct imitations of biological prototypes—e.g., the imita-
tion of birdwings in a biomimetic technology that enables humans to y—often
fail. Another indication of limitation can be found in successful biomimetic tech-
nologies that can claim to be more efcient, less toxic, and so on, but are not yet
as regenerative as their natural counterparts. An example is Sto SEA Lotusan, a
self-cleaning facade paint that mimics the lotus leaf. The painted surface remains
clean because dirt particles are unable to obtain a hold. Although the paint suc-
cessfully mimics the lotus leaf as facades remain clean, it is also criticized because
Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology
toxic nanoparticles are emitted to the environment. The structural limitation of
technological mimesis is also indicated by successful biomimetic technologies
that mimic one particular biological strategy or function to achieve one particular
result—e.g., a sticky adhesive, a self-cleaning surface—but are not embedded in,
and mutually benecial for, both the design and the natural ecosystems of planet
earth like their natural counterparts. An example can be found in biomimetic solar
panels that mimic the function of leaves: although a solar panel produces much
more energy than the leaf of a tree, leaves do much more because they also pro-
duce oxygen, transport water, and are fully biodegradable.
These examples of the structural limitation of technological mimesis bring
us to the conclusion that biomimetic design can always be criticized and should
be open to revision—especially if new insights into the workings of nature show
that the design is not responsive to Earth’s ecosystems, let alone regenerative
by design. The structural limitation of mimesis is the fourth characteristic of the
supplementarity of mimesis that can inform a regenerative concept of biomimetic
design, engineering, and technology. Although technological mimesis as differ-
entiation of a technological design beyond the biosphere that remains embedded
in and participates with this biosphere is a necessary and sufcient condition for
biomimicry as regenerative design, every design remains (in principle) open to
criticism and improvement.
From our reections in this section, we can characterize biomimicry as re-
generative sustainable design, engineering, and technology with the following
four characteristics:
1. Technological mimesis is a participative differentiation of nature. It dif-
ferentiates a technological design beyond the biosphere while remaining
embedded, and participating, in this biosphere. It is participative to the
extent that technological mimesis does not invent something completely
new but instead nds its point of departure in the ecosystems of planet
Earth and remains embedded therein;
2. The participative differentiation of mimesis is not restricted to techno-
logical mimesis; technological mimesis supplements natural mimesis in
biomimetic design;
3. The participative differentiation of technological mimesis is constitutive
of nature (forms, processes, ecosystems, principles);
Technology as Mimesis
4. Because of the constitutive role of mimesis, the participative differen-
tiation of technological mimesis always remains limited in its effort to
mimic nature.
4. Conclusion
In this article, we raised the question of how to explain the difference between tra-
ditional design, engineering, and technology—which have exploited nature and put
increasing pressure on Earth’s carrying capacity since the industrial revolution—and
biomimetic design—which explores nature’s sustainable solutions and promises to be
regenerative by design. To answer this question, we reected on the concept of mime-
sis, as it assumes a continuity between the natural environment as a regenerative model
and measure for sustainable design that is imitated and reproduced in biomimetic de-
sign, engineering, and technology.
We rst discussed how mimesis is conceptualized in the philosophical tra-
dition to show that the concept cannot be understood with reference to classi-
cal categories like imitation and invention and instead introduces a completely
new category. We conceptualized the supplementarity of mimesis in terms of two
interdependent boundary conditions: differentiation and participation. In §3, we
applied this conceptualization in the context of biomimicry and developed four
characteristics of the supplementarity of biomimesis in biomimicry.
The four characteristics of technological mimesis developed in this article en-
able us to conceptualize biomimicry as a genuinely circular approach to regenera-
tive sustainable design. These four characteristics of technological mimesis also
enable us to distinguish between traditional exploitative design and biomimetic
explorative design. Although a technological mimesis of natural forms or process-
es potentially leads to the reduction of waste and the improvement of resource ef-
ciency, regenerative sustainability is not yet guaranteed in theory or practice. The
four characteristics of technological mimesis developed in this article provide such
a necessary and sufcient condition for biomimicry as regenerative sustainable
design, as it requires biomimetic technologies to participate with and be embed-
ded in earth’s ecosystems. Furthermore, our concept of technological mimesis was
able to address three critical issues around the concept of mimesis in biomimicry
that have emerged in theory and practice. In this regard, our concept of technologi-
cal mimesis enables both theory and practice in biomimicry to look beyond current
approaches that focus narrowly on mimesis of natural forms and processes without
taking advantage of the opportunities for regenerative design provided by nature,
and to engage in biomimicry as regenerative sustainable design.
Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology
Future empirical research should further operationalize and validate these
four characteristics of technological mimesis. New avenues for future conceptual
research are also opened by the ndings in this article: First, future research should
analyse the relation between biomimicry and innovation. Although biomimicry
may still give the impression of being oriented on the past—as it starts with what is
given in natural mimesis that is subsequently mimicked in technological design—
biomimetic innovation is also radically futural, as it creates something completely
new. Future research should therefore consider the four characteristics of techno-
logical mimesis from the perspective of innovation. Second, future research should
analyse the level of analysis in biomimetic design, engineering, and technology.
Biomimicry is often considered at the level of forms, processes, and ecosystems,
but philosophers of technology argue that artefacts always interact with a milieu
or environment in which they can emerge and operate. Future research should
consider in more detail the role of this biomimetic design milieu. Third, even if
technological mimesis can claim to be regenerative sustainable design, it is not
necessarily ethically preferable. Natural mimesis is the result of 3.8 billion years
of trial and error, with the consequent loss of generations that did not succeed
in the struggle for existence. Technological mimesis would require management
practices to prevent the death and despair involved in natural processes (Rolston
1979). These management practices have already moved beyond natural mimesis
in technological mimesis (Blok and Gremmen 2016) because, contrary to nature,
a genuinely circular approach to regenerative sustainable design, engineering, and
technology should also be ethical.9
Notes
This work is part of the research programme Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technolo-
gies, which is funded through the Gravitation programme of the Dutch Ministry of
Education, Culture, and Science and the Netherlands Organisation for Scientic Re-
search under Grant number 024.004.031.
1. It is important to note that Aristotle does not explain which natural principles
are mimicked in the construction of a house, but argues the other way around. “If, then,
articial processes are purposeful, so are natural processes too; for the relation of an-
tecedent to consequent is identical in art and in Nature” (Aristotle 1980, 199a 20–25).
Thus, the natural principles are in fact derived from technological principles. This is
not a problem if it is assumed that nature and technology are essentially the same, as
Technology as Mimesis
is the case in Aristotle, but becomes questionable if we do not accept such a continuity
between natural and technological processes, as argued for in this article.
2. Aristotle refers to the notion of purpose, which is at odds with the Darwinian
view on evolution. This is not problematic for our argument, as the naturalistic concept
of mimicry we introduce here is not necessarily teleological but indicates the imitation
of the naturally given, whether this given is teleological or not.
3. The same twofold can be found in traditional conceptualizations of mimesis
as re-presentation and re-production of nature. Re- means ‘again,’ ‘anew,’ ‘once more,’
and therefore always involves a supplementary A1 in addition to the original A. So,
even if one rejects our previous argument against the technological conceptualization
of nature (auto-poiesis) and prefers the reproductive nature of mimesis, the same two-
fold principle is at stake.
4. This idea is supported by the history of the concept. In history, mimesis is not
always seen just as a copy of the original, but also as a variant of the original (Godin
2015, 228). The contrast between imitation and invention, for instance, is a relatively
recent conceptual development, because, originally, imitation was not opposed to in-
vention but involved a variation of the original (Godin 2008). Only from the perspec-
tive of the modern idea of the ‘new’ does imitation become a mere copy.
5. The conceptualization of mimesis as participation can already be found in
Plato’s Republic, in which he introduces mimesis as methexis (participation) of beings
in the world in the eternal idea (Plato 1935). We transpose this idea of participation to
the ecosystems of planet Earth in which each and every technological design remains
embedded.
6. This embeddedness in natural phenomena also explains the remaining dif-
ference between techné (mimesis) and episteme (science) from an Aristotelian per-
spective. Whereas episteme turns away from natural phenomena in order to reect on
general patterns (eidos, idea, type, category) and achieves this stance by abstracting
from these phenomena, techné (mimesis) articulates these general patterns insofar as
they remain embedded in these natural phenomena. Techné (mimesis) does not primar-
ily make and produce an artefact, but brings forth this general pattern in the artefact,
like the shoemaker brings forth the eidos of a shoe in the fabricated shoe (Heidegger
2000).
7. The notion of participation is contested in contemporary philosophy. Accord-
ing to philosophers like Levinas, participation is always participation in a generality
that reduces the singularity of ourselves and the other, and should therefore be reject-
ed. Although one can argue that mimesis as perfection articulates such a generality—a
type or category that reduces the singularity of the natural phenomena that are sub-
sumed under these general terms—participation means something different in the con-
text of mimesis, namely, the acknowledgement of the embeddedness of each mimetic
variant in the original, i.e., in Earth’s ecosystems as ontic-ontological condition for our
Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology
being-in-the-world, to which our technologies have to be responsive to preserve our
being-in-the-world (Blok 2016b).
8. This alternative conceptualization of technological mimesis, which remains
embedded in a natural mimesis, has consequences for the unique connection between
mimesis and human existence, as assumed by Derrida and others. We can no longer
argue that only human beings are characterized by the ability to mimic, because tech-
nological mimesis remains embedded in a natural mimesis. The further elaboration of
our conceptualization of mimicry for the human condition is beyond the scope of this
article.
9. I am very grateful to Saskia van den Muijsenberg for the information about
recent advances in biomimetic technology development.
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