Dynamics of Violent Extremism in South Asia: Nexus between State Fragility and Extremism
Abstract
This book offers a comprehensive analysis of the multifaceted dimensions of violent extremist groups in South Asia, attending especially to the relationships between the local and regional forces influencing their emergence and activities. In addition, research in the book shows how political, security-sensitive events and processes are framed, and the factors responsible for such framing. Similarly, it discusses prevalent discourses on anti-violent extremism policy and the on-the-ground militarized preventive/reactive interventions they guide, which are inspired by ideologies that increasingly reflect controversial understandings of the experiences of people within conditions of state fragility. In doing so, the book balances attention to local conditions that frame the rise and fall, or persistency, of incidences of violent extremism. The systems-based ecological framing of issues in the book is influenced by a concern for the broader questions of securitization, global governance, poverty, (under)development, and armed conflicts in South Asia.
That said, this book is distinctive in as much as it constitutes the first-ever attempt to analyze South Asian countries through the lens of the state fragility framework and to examine how issues of state fragility contribute to violent extremism. Through case studies drawn from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, this collection suggests that fragile states have not only created conditions for extremist groups but that some states at times also adopt violent populist policies to marginalize minorities, pushing those minorities to resort to
violent means.
... In the aftermath of Osama bin Laden's death in 2011, Ayman Al Zawahiri took over the leadership of Al-Qaeda and decided to expand the organization's operations into South Asia, including Bangladesh (Mostofa, 2023b). With the aid of the internet, Al Zawahiri began to urge Bangladeshi Muslim youths to join AQ, as seen in an online video message published by As Sahab media in January 2014 (Zawahiri, 2014). ...
Although Islamist militancy has been on the rise over the past decade, there is limited research available on the activities of Ansar Al Islam (AAI). However, this chapter utilizes primary and secondary sources to conduct a discourse analysis of the group’s history. AAI is an Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) affiliated Islamist militant organization in Bangladesh that originally operated under the banner of Jamaatul Muslemin until mid-2014. AAI gained political prominence when the Awami League party-led government banned the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) in early 2015. In response, AAI began using narratives that emphasized martyrdom to gain political support from urban youths and work towards establishing an Islamic state free from the injustices of political secularism and neoliberal capitalist exploitation. The chapter argues that AAI utilizes cyberspace for recruitment and propaganda, focusing on various themes such as end-time narratives, war narratives like Gazwatul Hind, India’s perceived hegemony towards Bangladeshi Muslims, global persecution of Muslims, societal decay due to sexual violence and postmodern gender identities. AAI also promotes Jihad and uses the life stories of prophets, martyrdoms, and Al-Qaeda leaders to motivate youths to fight for Islam.
... Some parties have also resorted to violence and terrorism as a means to achieve their political objectives. This strategy has been adopted by groups such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS and the Taliban, which have carried out numerous attacks against civilians and government targets in pursuit of their Islamic goals (Mostofa, 2023). ...
Political Islam, or Islamism, is a term that describes diverse movements and ideologies that seek to apply Islamic principles to social and political realms. This broad concept covers a range of groups, including both peaceful activists and violent extremists. The term has become more controversial in recent years due to the rise of Islamist movements in many Muslim-majority nations, which have been accused of promoting anti-democratic and intolerant policies. This modern phenomenon has emerged as a response to the perceived shortcomings of secular ideologies, such as nationalism and socialism, which failed to deliver on their promises of anti-imperialism and prosperity. Political Islam seems not to be a uniform movement and encompasses various interpretations, strategies and tactics. That being said, Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority country, has seen the emergence of many political parties and movements that aim to promote Islamic principles and values in its politics. Since its independence, Political Islam has played a significant role in the country. However, the rise of Islamist militancy and terrorist attacks has shed light on the challenges that Bangladesh faces in balancing its Islamic identity with its commitment to secularism, democracy and human rights. Political Islam in Bangladesh is too a multifaceted phenomenon with various interpretations and implications. While some view it as a form of resistance against authoritarianism and imperialism, others see it as a threat to democracy and human rights. The relationship between political Islam and violence is also a matter of debate, with some arguing that Islamists use violence to achieve their goals, while others claim that some groups reject violence altogether. However, case studies across the world reveal that political Islam can manifest differently in different nations, emphasizing the need for a context-specific analysis.
... However, in the specific case of Pakistan, less attention has been paid to the dissolution of the political process of democratization (even though this took place very late in the country's history) alongside the ongoing rise of religious extremism aided by far-right and terrorist organizations. The literature on religious authorities and their role in society generally highlights militarism and the extremist views of the ulema-state alliance (see, e.g., Abbas, 2005;Ahmed, 2012;Haqqani, 2005;Jalal, 2008;Mostofa, 2023). Zaman (2002) underscores the flexibility of the religious leadership to modern challenges, but his study focuses on those religious leaders or scholars who have excelled in their training surrounding religious texts and Islamic jurisprudence. ...
This article analyzes the extent of involvement of religious political leaders and their apparent, rather reluctant, acceptance by the Pakistani public seen in recent times. The study also analyzes the role of religious leaders in giving way to right‐wing extremism or Islamic militarism and how this challenges the writ of the state. I hope to shed light on the state‐religious scholars' nexus, forging a lasting impression in the minds of the public of their coexistence. Religious leaders have been seen to support or gain currency at the time of autocratic rulers, which is evident in the history of the martial law regimes of General Zia ul Haq and General Pervez Musharraf. This study also examines the compromise of weak democratic parties in the intervening period between the two dictatorships as well as the recent rise of political as well as religious extremism. I examine the coexistence of the state‐religious scholars' nexus where religious sentiments, often leading to extremist views, are being played for political gains by the religious political leaders.
... In a startling turn of events, she detonated her suicide vest during the operation, marking an unprecedented act in Bangladesh at that time. It was later revealed that she was indoctrinated by her husband, Rashid-ur Rahman Sumon, a convicted member of Neo-JMB (Marjan and Mostofa 2023;Mostofa 2023c). ...
This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the intricate dynamics surrounding female involvement in jihadism in Bangladesh. Drawing on expert interviews and surveys, the study uncovers a multifaceted picture of this phenomenon. Three distinct categories of factors-push, pull, and facilitating-emerge as central in explaining the surge in female participation within militant groups in the region. Push factors, which encompass grievances and vulnerabilities arising from personal crises, poverty and family breakdown, create an environment ripe for radicalisation. The concept of "humiliation by proxy," where global Muslim victimisation serves as a motivating force, further deepens our understanding of this process. Pull factors reveal that ideological allure, the pursuit of glory, adventure, and the evolving gender roles offered by groups like the Islamic State play a significant role in attracting women to extremist ideologies. The article underscores that the desire for paradise is not confined to men alone but extends to women. Facilitating factors, such as influential family members and online platforms, are pivotal in shaping female radicalisation. Cultural loyalty, particularly from husbands and fathers, empowers them to influence women towards extremism. The internet acts as a powerful tool, facilitating exposure to radical ideologies and virtual group bonding, creating echo chambers that reinforce extremist beliefs.
This book examines the socio-political histories, religio-political agendas and politico-militant (and for some, non-violent) strategies of institutions of political Islam in Bangladesh. Focusing on Jammat-e-Islami, Hefazet-e-Islam, Jammatul Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB), Ansar al Islam, Neo-Jammatul Mujahedeen Bangladesh (Neo-JMB), Tablighi Jamaat, and Islami Andolon Bangladesh, it shows how these groups are key actors in the securitization of the postcolonial socio-cultural, economic, and political histories (and future) of Bangladesh.
The volume illustrates the complex ways in which every day lived experiences of peoples of Bangladesh, and securitized political and cultural pathways of state governance have shaped and impacted the histories and activities of these groups, and the strategies and agendas of these groups to gain political and socio-religious legitimacy within (and sometimes, beyond) the secularized cultural landscapes of Bangladesh. Moreover, the book argues that even though these Islamist groups bear the same agenda of transforming Bangladesh into an Islamic state, their strategies are different and unique. It also discusses the connections of some of these groups to other transnational institutions of political Islam and extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS).
This book will be a major intervention in the field of politics, religion, and South Asian studies.
Afghanistan holds a crucial position in the geopolitical landscape not only for South Asia but also for Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. The country’s political dynamics have a global impact due to its strategic importance.
Prison radicalization poses a significant and evolving threat in Bangladesh's correctional facilities. This research article delves into the conditions fostering radicalization, including corruption, overcrowding, violence, and the lack of essential amenities. Drawing on extensive analysis of secondary data and expert interviews, this article argues that these conducive conditions have transformed Bangladeshi prisons into breeding grounds for radical ideologies, allowing militants to establish networks and plan attacks within and beyond prison confines. This article also points out the transformation of prisoners, even those with minimal radical tendencies, into militant leaders, along with the shift of non‐radical individuals toward extremism. Moreover, it underscores the lack of de‐radicalization programs within the current prison system as a crucial gap in countering this escalating issue. Furthermore, the research identifies societal denial, limited post‐release opportunities, and mistreatment by security forces as factors exacerbating radicalization post‐incarceration. As such, this study emphasizes the urgent need for comprehensive strategies to address prison radicalization.
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Do women combatants experience war and post-war “peace” in the same way? Existing studies on gender and war treat women combatants as a homogeneous group with similar identities, interests, and statuses experiencing the war uniformly. I argue that women combatants’ experiences of war and post-war “peace” cannot be detached from their multiple statuses, positions, and identities. I follow the stories of five women ex-combatants in the Maoist insurgency in Nepal at different spatial and temporal spaces out of thirty-nine semi-structured interviews that I conducted in Nepal (2017–2018). The women ex-combatants come from the same rank but from different caste, class, ethnicity, marital status, social status, education status, and geographical location. I use a feminist intersectional framework inspired by “matrix of domination” while using intersectionality also as a method. My research shows that women ex-combatants’ experiences of the insurgency and post-insurgency lives have been molded by their intersectional positions and identities in complex ways. This work not only contributes to the holistic understanding of the war in its complexity but also has implications for designing the policy interventions aimed at the prevention of armed conflict and building sustainable post-war “peace.”
¿Las mujeres combatientes experimentan la guerra y la “paz” de la posguerra de igual manera? En estudios existentes sobre género y guerra, se considera a las mujeres combatientes como un grupo homogéneo, con identidades, intereses y estatus semejantes, que experimentan la guerra de manera similar. En esta investigación, sostengo que las experiencias de las combatientes sobre la guerra y la “paz” de la posguerra no pueden desvincularse de sus diferentes identidades, posiciones y estatus. Realicé un recorrido por las historias de cinco excombatientes de la insurgencia maoísta en Nepal, en diferentes situaciones espaciotemporales, mediante treinta y nueve entrevistas semiestructuradas que llevé a cabo en Nepal (2017–2018). Las excombatientes tenían el mismo rango, pero diferían en ciertos aspectos como su casta, clase social, etnia, estado civil, estado social, nivel de educación y ubicación geográfica. Utilicé un marco interseccional feminista inspirado en la “matriz de dominación” en combinación con la interseccionalidad como método de análisis. En mi investigación, demuestro que las identidades y posiciones interseccionales de las excombatientes moldearon, de manera compleja, sus experiencias de vida en la insurgencia y posinsurgencia. Este trabajo no solo contribuye a lograr una comprensión integral de la guerra, en toda su complejidad, sino que además tiene implicancias para diseñar intervenciones sobre políticas que eviten conflictos armados y construyan una “paz” de posguerra sostenible.
Les femmes combattantes vivent-elles la guerre et la « paix » d'après-guerre de la même manière ? Les études existantes sur le genre et la guerre traitent les femmes combattantes comme un groupe homogène dont les membres ont des identités, des intérêts et des statuts similaires et vivent la guerre d'une manière uniforme. Je soutiens que les façons dont les femmes combattantes vivent la guerre et la « paix » d'après-guerre ne peuvent pas être détachées de leurs multiples statuts, positions et identités. J'ai suivi les histoires de cinq femmes ex-combattantes de l'insurrection maoïste au Népal à différents moments et en différents lieux par le biais de trente-neuf entretiens semi-structurés que j'ai menés au Népal (2017–2018). Ces ex-combattantes avaient le même grade mais leur caste, leur classe, leur ethnicité, leur situation maritale, leur statut social, leur niveau d’étude et leur origine géographique n’étaient pas identiques. J'ai employé un cadre féministe intersectionnel inspiré de la « matrice de domination » ainsi qu'une méthode d'intersectionnalité. Ma recherche montre que les façons dont les ex-combattantes ont vécu l'insurrection et l'après-insurrection ont été modelées de manières complexes par leurs identités et positions intersectionnelles. Ce travail contribue non seulement à la compréhension holistique de la guerre dans sa complexité, mais a également des implications pour la conception des interventions politiques visant à prévenir les conflits armés et à établir une « paix » durable après la guerre.
Violence after civil war is a challenge to sustainable peace. Many armed conflicts today are recurrences of previous wars and much of the literature on violence after war explains why armed groups return to the battlefield. But even if peace prevails, many other types of violence take place in postwar environments. This postwar violence is likewise subject to a growing multidisciplinary literature. Using citation network analysis, we show that research on war recurrence and postwar violence has developed in relative isolation from each other—although these phenomena are interrelated. This compartmentalization leads us to overlook important similarities and differences in the drivers of different forms of violence after war. We demonstrate this by reviewing the literature in both of these closely related fields. While war recurrence and postwar violence share a set of common risk factors, some factors can have opposite effects on the two outcomes. Because these insights only emerge when systematically comparing the two strands of literature, we propose a novel framework for the study of violence after wars that aims at overcoming the compartmentalization of research within these two fields. The framework serves both as a conceptual lens and an analytical tool to categorize and compare different forms of violence after war. We then outline how the framework aids scholars in pursuing an integrated research agenda, with concrete suggestions for research questions that should be studied to expand our understanding of violence after wars.
Of the several by-products of terrorism that have affected the Pakistani state and society, the threat of violent extremism is the most potent one. It has damaged the country"s tolerant cultural and religious ethos. The killing of 132 school children in Peshawar on 16 December last year is a sobering reminder that extremism poses an existential threat to Pakistan. To overcome the challenge of growing extremism, Pakistan should introduce a national Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) policy, in addition to the ongoing de-radicalization programmes in different parts of the country. The CVE policy should comprise of individual-focused de-radicalization, and environment-focused counter-radicalization strategies. In this regard, a contextual understanding of the extremist challenge in Pakistan"s ethnically heterogeneous and religiously diverse society is essential to formulate the right-kind-of CVE policies. In Pakistan violent extremism is a multifaceted and multi-layered phenomenon. Given the multifaceted scope and magnitude of the problem, Pakistan needs to fight both the reality and ideality of the challenge through a whole of community approach. A joint state-society response is indispensable for creating an environment that helps people to resist the appeal of militant ideologies. The ongoing narrow-focused de-radicalization interventions in Pakistan will gradually lose their efficacy, as long as a moderate environment hostile to terrorism and militancy is not created through a comprehensive national level CVE policy.
The paper offers an overview of Pakistan’s militant rehabilitation program and outlines its efficacy and limitations. The paper posits that without a corresponding counter-radicalization strategy, de-radicalization and militant rehabilitation alone are insufficient in the fight to overcome religious extremism in Pakistan.
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Though women’s radicalisation is not a new area of research in Bangladesh, the country
has witnessed an escalation of female participation in jihadism since the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack. Women have even acted as suicide bombers in Bangladesh,
which some scholars observe as a new trend of militancy in the country. Against this
backdrop, this article uncovers some key drivers of female radicalisation in Bangladesh.
It argues that the so-called Islamist model of obedience to one’s husband, ideological
conviction, Muslim victimhood narratives and crises in life, among others, drive women
towards radicalisation in Bangladesh.
Fragility in governance and armed conflict are directly linked and are the causes and consequence of each other. This study aimed to understand pre and during conflict scenarios of fragile governance in Swat. This research used qualitative research design and conducted in depth interviews from multiple stakeholders ranging from government officials to men and women in the community. The results showed that weak legislation and legal plurality led to the fragility in governance that later on transformed into armed conflict. The findings reveal that the fragile administrative governance was the root cause in the initiation of armed insurgency in Swat.
This book focuses on the indicators of fragility and the resilience of state-led interventions to address them in sub-Saharan Africa. It analyzes the ‘figure’ of fragile states as the unit of analysis and situates the study of fragility, governance and political adaptation within contemporary global and local political, economic and socio-cultural contexts.
The chapters offer an indispensable, econometrically informed guide to better understanding issues that have an impact on fragility in governance and nation-building and affect policy-making and program design targeting institutions in various circumstances. These issues, as they relate to the indicators of fragility, are the contexts and correlates of armed conflicts on statehood and state fragility, the poverty-trap, pandemics and household food insecurity, and child labor. Case studies from across 46 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries are assessed to offer clear, broad and multidisciplinary views of what the future holds for them and the international donor communities at large. Regarding state-led interventions, the authors utilize insightful statistical methods and epistemologies to explain the correlates of behavioral language frames and conflict de-escalation on battle-related deaths across the conflict zones within the sub-region, the regional and country-level interventions to end child labor, the institutional frameworks and interventions in the advancement of food security and health.
This book will be of interest to scholars of economics, development, politics in developing countries, Area and African Studies, peace, conflict and security studies.
Cyber technology is widely used for the sharing of information and data and to create a communication to an almost limitless audience. The development of this technology has created a global network. Cyber technology is multifunctional and has the potential to use as a modern tool in the warfare. It may also be used by the religious extremist organizations for the propagation of their religious ideology. The aim of the propagation is to gain the support among the masses and disseminates the message about the terrorist cause. Cyber technology is relatively cheap and easy to search and recruit the like-minded people from all over the world. It also helps in the financing, propaganda, training and incitement to commit acts of terrorism. Through the use of cyber technology the access to the youth is very easy and they are vulnerable to be radicalized in a few minutes. The benefits of the cyber technology are numerous, starting with its unique suitability for sharing information and ideas, which is recognized as a fundamental human right. It must also be recognized that the same technology may be used for the terrorist purpose or to disseminate the hatred and violence in the society. The use of cyber technology for the purposes of radicalization and terrorism creates a challenge in the fight against terrorism.
The decline of the Islamic State (IS) terrorist
group in the Middle East and the dilapidation
of its Pakistan Chapter (Walayat-e-Khurasan)
have provided Al-Qaeda Central (AQC)
enough space to reassert itself in Pakistan. It
appears that the AQC policy of ‘wait and see’
has worked and the group is now making
calculated moves to stage a comeback. The
AQC in Pakistan is launching new auxiliary
organisations and capitalising on IS
returnees from Iraq and Syria to revive.
Since its formation in 2014, terrorist attacks
and violent incidents linked to the Islamic
State (IS) terrorist group have risen steadily
in Pakistan. IS in Pakistan has been active,
with varying degrees, in all four provinces of
the country and has forged tactical alliances
with like-minded local militant groups.
Looking ahead, IS is likely to assert its
dominance through local affiliates in urban
centres of Pakistan, specifically the Punjab
province.
AbstractIn the aftermath of 9/11 scenario, the US and its coalition forces designed a joint strategy to eradicate Al-Qaeda and their supporting Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Being coalition partner against ‘war on terror’ (WoT), Pakistan deployed its military andsecurity agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) in order to ensure and maintain her hold in these areas. Removal of Taliban regime in Afghanistan pushed these terrorists and their supporters to flee away and find out hideouts in bordering areas such as Bajaur Agency. Consequently, the insurgents and terrorists with the support of local tribesmen launched terrorist activities in Afghanistan from the soil of Pakistan and also challenged the writ of the state of Pakistan. Realizing the sensitivity of the situation, terrorist attack on security forces and public places, Pakistan’s armed forces launched considerable military
Post-Conflict Reconstruction: From Extremism to Peaceful Co-Existence is a comprehensive presentation on the root causes of state fragility, which provides an enabling environment for violent religious extremism. It addresses various security, political, socio-economic and external factors that contribute to state fragility, which is further enhanced in a conflict environment. The book deals closely with the use of violence due to ideological, religious and political reasons. By analyzing the situations in the post-conflict states of Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, Nigeria and Libya, the book establishes the co-relationship between state fragility and religious extremism in post-conflict settings.
The book emphasizes the need to address the grievances of marginalized sections in all countries with fragile state structures that usually take to violence to make their voices heard. It also highlights the imperative for swift rehabilitation of poor people―who typically bear the brunt of conflicts and are often displaced forcefully―for restoring peace and security, and averting future disturbance.
The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) located in the southeastern part of Bangladesh occupy a physical area of 5,093 square miles, constituting 10 per cent of the total area of Bangladesh. The region comprises three districts: Rangamati, Khagrachari and Banderban and is strategically located, surrounded by the Indian states of Tripura to the north, Mizoram to the east and the Chittagong district to the west. It is home to thirteen ethnic groups: Chakmas, Marmas, Tripura, Khumis, Mro, Murang, Lushai, Bawm, Pankhos, Pankhos, Kukis, Tanchangya, Chak, and Riang (Mohsin, 1997, pp. 5–11). The CHT has witnessed over two and a half decades of armed insurgency beginning in the mid-1970s and formally ending on 2 December 1997, with the signing of an accord, popularly known as the CHT Accord between the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) and the Parbattya Chattogram Jana Shonghoti Samity (PCJSS), the political body which had carried on the movement for autonomy of the CHT within the state of Bangladesh. Although a peace accord was signed, peace remains elusive in the region. This chapter is an attempt to analyze the political dynamics in the CHT. It is divided into two major sections, one examining the pre-accord period, and the other the landscape of the post-accord CHT.
Concerns over Dhaka’s growing ties to China may underlie Washington’s decision.
Living in the age of globalization, it cannot be said that local factors constitute the only causes for Islamist militancy. This chapter explores both ideological and global factors for the growth of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. It is argued in this chapter that the lack of a model Muslim state with a strong political ideology, the failure of democratic politics and diaspora militant linkages have provided radical Islamists with solid ground for attracting urban youths. So have the growth of Islamophobia, western interference in Muslim countries, the persecution of Muslims in different parts of the world and the impact of modernity. It is these global factors, which continue to impact on the attitudes of Muslim youths particularly with respect to the inability of Muslim states to do much to counter these challenges, that when combined with local level frustrations are the perfect recipe for radicalization. Against a backdrop of both local and global level grievances, radical Islamist ideology, which encompasses a utopian society based on Islam, offers a ready-made solution. More importantly, radical ideology justifies violence through a particular interpretation of Jihad, advances an exclusive worldview of a triumphant Caliphate, and offers eschatological salvation in advance of approaching end-time.
The contest within Islam, as shown in the previous chapter, has fostered the Islamization of Bangladeshi society from below. This Islamization from below accelerates Islamization from above, because Islam becomes a tool for the legitimization of the dominant ruling elites. The ruling elites foster the Islamization process because they recognize the keen Islamic consciousness of the people. As Islam becomes a tool for legitimization of state actors, Islamists have seized the opportunity to Islamize the state and society and implant the idea of an Islamic state. As a result, the country has seen the rise of fundamentalism. Society is then pushed to accept the radical version of Islam and this inspires some of the fundamentalists to establish an ‘Islamic state’ through the quick method of violent struggle in the service of God. The Islamization of Bangladesh from both below and above transforms Islamists/fundamentalists into king-makers. This chapter argues that the Islamization of Bangladeshi society has fostered the growth of fundamentalism, thereby accelerating the rise of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh.
Historically, the Bengal region of the sub-continent, constituting Bangladesh, had been ruled by followers of almost all major religions of the world—Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity—each of which had a strong influence upon the people of this region. This had played a key role in an emerging heterodoxy in religious ideas. Due to this religious heterodoxy, Sufi Islam was accepted and merged with local beliefs and culture, which fostered the acculturation of Islam in Bengal. This, in turn, allowed Bengali culture to be influenced by the puritan or revivalist movement started in India by Shah Waliullah. This chapter examines from a historical perspective the existence in Bangladesh of variants within Islam, their nature, recruitment strategy and basic features. It also explains how these contrasting traditions have left religious issues unresolved to this day and how these unresolved issues have made society vulnerable to radicalization by creating what could be described as an enabling context. This chapter also argues that conflicts within Islam lead to competition within various groups of Islam, which accelerates the Islamization of Bangladesh both from below and from above.
The book sets out to uncover the causes of growing Islamist militancy in Bangladesh, by investigating the vast secondary literature, by collecting data from two leading newspapers as papers of record and finally by interviewing a range of experts and informed observers of radicalization in Bangladesh. The study finds that middle-class youths have been increasingly targeted by militant groups because of their lack of religious knowledge, their accessibility through social media, their vulnerability to unemployment, their sense of injustice and Muslim victimization, their personal grievances, their perception of moral degradation and their personal experiences of corruption. All these factors have led to a widening gap of disillusionment between expectations and reality. This disconnection renders a younger middle-class generation vulnerable to ideological radicalization. The purpose of this chapter is to construct a ‘pyramid root cause’ model for youth radicalization based on an exhaustive reading of the relevant literature and the data collected during almost a year of fieldwork in Bangladesh.
Terrorist groups resident in weak states are comprised of tribal-like entities conducting numerous attacks against persons and property in developing or struggling regions of the world where socio-economic conditions and governmental controls are problematic. To better understand the environmental conditions and potential impacts that such attacks have on business interests, this paper examines terrorist attack data from 2018. The study utilises a correlative analysis of relationship strengths between predictor variables commonly associated with weak and fragile states experiencing a high volume of terrorist attacks. The study also examines the impact of terrorism on a state's economic and entrepreneurial environment.
This chapter reviews the genealogy of Salafism in South Asia from the seventeenth century onwards. It focuses on Salafis that are known as Ahl-e Hadith in South Asia and have relatively few followers in Pakistan, where they have been active since the nineteenth century. The Salafis have maintained close ties with the Saudi religious establishment since the 1960s, ties which were reinforced when thousands of Arabs came to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The chapter also deliberates the Ahl-e Hadith movement and its jihadi expression in Kashmir. The Jama'at Ahl-e Hadith, an elitist politico religious movement aimed at islah, originated in the early 1870s.
The Balochistan Insurgency is an enduring armed and nationalist struggle between Baloch Insurgents and the Pakistani government, embroiling Pakistan in five insurgencies since 1948. This research aims to analyze why the current insurgency has outlasted its predecessors by over two-fold, with over fifteen years passing since the most recent conflict erupted. Using historical primary source news articles from 1973-1977, secondary research, insurgency trend data, and the data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD); this study examines the evolution of the current conflict and analyzes how and why the contemporary insurgency is far more resilient. This study finds that the support base for the ongoing insurgency has become more robust and expansive, and suggests that this aspect unique to the current conflict is the major contributor to the insurgency’s endurance. The findings suggest the following reasons for an increased support base that in turn contribute to the resilience of Balochistan insurgence: first, the movement is now lead by an expanding middle class; second, there is no violent inter-group rivalry among the separatist actors; third, the support platform has expanded to include cyberspace and social media; fourth, the current insurgency adds the Gwadar Port as an additional and urbanized grievance; and fifth, pre-existing grievances have yet to be resolved. The current insurgency’s distinct manifestation reflects a change in Balochistan’s status quo through a wide-ranging engagement of popular support in contrast to the past.
The role of religious seminaries (madrassas) and mainstream schools in developing religious extremism and sympathy toward Taliban (the most dangerous militant group in Pakistan) has received little, if any, scholarly attention. This study has empirically investigated the role, if any, played by religious seminaries (madrassas) and mainstream schools in promoting religious extremism, and especially sympathy toward the Taliban. The study compared attitudes among secondary school students, on the one hand, and madrassa students, on the other, and found school type to be a strong predictor of religious extremism. On the whole, madrassa students tend to hold the most extreme views. However, an individual’s religiosity appears to increase the likelihood of them becoming a Taliban sympathizer, meaning that it is religiosity rather than school type that affects sympathy toward the Taliban. The findings of this study are in line with other recent research, namely that education amplifies frustrated ambitions among individuals who then find gratification in taking extremist attitudes and/or actions.
Over the last fifteen years, Pakistan has come to be defined exclusively in terms of its struggle with terror. But are ordinary Pakistanis extremists? And what explains how Pakistanis think? Much of the current work on extremism in Pakistan tends to study extremist trends in the country from a detached position-a top-down security perspective, that renders a one-dimensional picture of what is at its heart a complex, richly textured country of 200 million people. In this book, using rigorous analysis of survey data, in-depth interviews in schools and universities in Pakistan, historical narrative reporting, and her own intuitive understanding of the country, Madiha Afzal gives the full picture of Pakistan’s relationship with extremism. The author lays out Pakistanis’ own views on terrorist groups, on jihad, on religious minorities and non-Muslims, on America, and on their place in the world. The views are not radical at first glance, but are riddled with conspiracy theories. Afzal explains how the two pillars that define the Pakistani state-Islam and a paranoia about India-have led to a regressive form of Islamization in Pakistan’s narratives, laws, and curricula. These, in turn, have shaped its citizens’ attitudes. Afzal traces this outlook to Pakistan’s unique and tortured birth. She examines the rhetoric and the strategic actions of three actors in Pakistani politics-the military, the civilian governments, and the Islamist parties-and their relationships with militant groups. She shows how regressive Pakistani laws instituted in the 1980s worsened citizen attitudes and led to vigilante and mob violence. The author also explains that the educational regime has become a vital element in shaping citizens’ thinking. How many years one attends school, whether the school is public, private, or a madrassa, and what curricula is followed all affect Pakistanis’ attitudes about terrorism and the rest of the world. In the end, Afzal suggests how this beleaguered nation-one with seemingly insurmountable problems in governance and education-can change course.
Historically, women in Pakistan’s northwestern territories bordering Afghanistan have played a critical role in providing money and men to jihadist organizations such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (ISIS). Lack of education, too little exposure and a male-dominated conservative milieu constitute some of the ingredients of support for these outfits. This was true for over three decades and the phenomenon remained restricted to the rural, backward northwestern regions. But since the early 1990s, outfits such as the Al-Hudda Foundation – an exclusively women-focused organization – began serving as the initial hooks for middle- and upper-class women whom the Foundation targets. It brainwashes women into using hijab , and also into believing that they need to forge an alliance against the West and work for an Islamic, Sharia-based state. This advocacy turns many affluent women into religious radicals who can potentially work as the first line of recruits for extremist outfits like Daesh/IS. However small their numbers, these women represent a big threat to the global liberal values of society.
The embrace of markets and globalization by radical political parties is often taken as reflecting and facilitating the moderation of their ideologies. This article considers the case of Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva , in India. It is argued that, rather than resulting in the moderation of Hindu nationalism, mainstream economic ideas are adopted and adapted by its proponents to further the Hindutva project. Hence, until the 1990s, the Hindu nationalist political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), its earlier incarnation, the Jana Sangh, and the grass-roots organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), adopted and adapted mainstream ideas by emphasizing the state as the protector of (Hindu) society against markets and as a tool of societal transformation for its Hindu nationalist support base. Since the 1990s, Indian bureaucratic and political elites, including in the BJP, have adopted a view of the market as the main driver of societal transformations. Under the leadership of Narendra Modi, in particular, the BJP has sought to consolidate a broader support base and stimulate economic growth and job creation by bolstering the corporate sector and recreating the middle and ‘neo-middle’ classes as ‘virtuous market citizens’ who view themselves as entrepreneurs and consumers but whose behaviour is regulated by the framework of Hindu nationalism. These policies, however, remain contested within the Hindu nationalist movement and in Indian society generally. The BJP's discourse against ‘anti-nationals’ and the use of legal sanctions against dissent is an attempt to curb these challenges.