To read the full-text of this research, you can request a copy directly from the author.
Abstract
The personalization of politics (the process of politicians’ strengthening at the expense of political parties) has long been studied. This study focuses on online personalism in the consumption of political parties and their leaders on Twitter and Facebook and aims to find its explaining factors. Following the normalization/equalization debate, it sets hypotheses regarding the relationship between variables from offline to online personalized politics. Using multilevel analysis of Facebook and Twitter data of more than 140 parties from 25 democracies, it finds that the leaders’ position significantly affects online personalism in most of the consumption aspects of social media. It also shows that country’s offline personalization, leader’s tenure, party populism, party age, party’s governmental status, vote share, and the leadership selection method have effects on some of the indicators for online personalism on the consumption side. It concludes that offline political power is reflected online.
To read the full-text of this research, you can request a copy directly from the author.
... Prior media studies (McAllister & Quinlan, 2019;Zamir, 2024) indicated increased personalization of politics in online media where political leaders are becoming more important in the news coverage than the political parties they represent. The news articles on the energy crisis also contained a lot of appeals to the opinions of specific political leaders: ...
As the issues of the world’s overreliance on fossil fuels still remain unresolved, mainstream media play a central role in influencing public attitudes towards energy sources. This article aimed to consider Aristotle’s rhetorical appeals as manipulation means in the news coverage of the 2021–2022 global energy crisis. Using computer-aided text analysis, media framing, discourse, and rhetorical analyses, this paper analyzes 600 news articles published on the websites of the four mainstream media sources from the key countries that were affected by the crisis. The results confirmed emotionalization of the news coverage that occurred through the use of similar rhetorical appeals and emotive language means aimed at inducing positive or negative feelings and shaping public opinion. The UK and US mainstream media appeared to rely more on the opinions of political, business, and energy authorities, highlighting a high level of politicization of their coverage. The findings also indicated polarization of the attitudes in the coverage, with mainly negative narratives about fossil fuels and more positive narratives about renewable energies, which contributed to public opinion manipulation and energy decision-making. This study opens up perspectives for future research on media emotions and rhetorical appeals as powerful manipulation means in applied linguistics, rhetoric, and journalism.
... The content posted by the parties in general is excluded from the scope of this study. Considering the increasing politicization of the role of the President, the content shared on the personal social media accounts of political leaders has assumed greater relevance to the public than that of the political parties themselves (Zamir, 2024). ...
Two regional elections were held in 2022, marking the start of a new electoral phase in Spain. The first election was held in February in Castilla y León, where the right-wing VOX party formed a coalition government with the right-wing Partido Popular for the first time. At the same time, the far-left party Podemos saw its parliamentary representation significantly reduced. Subsequently, in June, Andalusia held its elections, in which VOX increased its representation by two seats, marking the beginning of its rise at the national electoral level. Conversely, the extreme left, split between two parties, saw its representation decline, losing 10 seats. This study attempts to juxtapose the electoral strategies employed by the leaders of the different political parties, with a particular focus on the communication strategies of leaders and parties on X (formerly Twitter) throughout the campaign period. It is expected that discrepancies will emerge not only between political entities, but also between regions. To investigate this hypothesis, we conducted a content analysis of X accounts, selecting those associated with regional presidential candidates within each region. We distinguish between those considered ‘traditional’ political parties and those considered ‘new’, including in these two categories the main contending political parties in each region. Thanks to the analysis, the proposed objective is achieved, demonstrating the existing differences between the two types of political parties and how their leaders use the social platform X. The results show that all the elements considered in the study are present, although not uniformly across both regions analyzed. This suggests a progressive alignment between new and traditional parties, reflecting a convergence in their strategies for conducting electoral campaigns.
This article analyzes social media presence of all parties, leaders, and candidates (PLCs) during Israel’s 2015 electoral campaign, within a transformational era for online campaigns. The article adheres to the theoretical frameworks of normalisation/equalisation hypotheses and personalised politics. Its research design is based on a cross-platform analysis. Findings indicate not only a centralised personalisation trend but rather a depersonalised web sphere. Leaders are more prominent online compared to other candidates; and parties out-perform their leaders, too. Furthermore, findings point to a normalised web sphere, even when referring to new and trendy platforms, revealing that the chances of political newcomers entering the parliamentary arena are scarce.
The PopuList offers academics and journalists an overview of populist, far right, far left and Eurosceptic parties in Europe since 1989. The PopuList is supported by the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, the Amsterdam Centre for European Studies, The Guardian, and the ECPR Standing Group on Extremism and Democracy.
The PopuList dataset has been used in numerous publications in academic journals and public media.
It may be found here: https://popu-list.org
Academics are increasingly using the concept of populism to make sense of current events such as the Brexit referendum and the Trump presidency. This is certainly a welcome development, but two shortcomings can be observed in the contemporary debate. On one hand, new populism scholars often start from scratch and do not build upon the existing research. On the other hand, those who have been doing comparative research on populism stay in their comfort zone and thus do not try to link their work to other academic fields. In this article, we address these two shortcomings by discussing some of the advantages of the so-called ideational approach to the comparative study of populism and by pointing out four avenues of future research, which are closely related to some of the contributions of this special issue, namely, (a) economic anxiety, (b) cultural backlash, (c) the tension between responsiveness and responsibility, and (d) (negative) partisanship and polarization.
While research has gauged the degree to which political actors focus on their personal rather their more public sides in their communication efforts, few studies have assessed the extent to which personalized content succeeds in gaining traction among online followers. The current study does just that, focusing on the Instagram accounts operated by Norwegian parties and party leaders. Results indicate that party leaders emerge as more successful than parties in gaining attention through 'likes' and comments, and that they offer personalized content to higher degrees than the parties they represent. While personalized content might lead to increased political engagement among citizens, the fact that personalization 'works' in terms of gaining attention might also skew political PR and marketing towards excessive use of such themes.
This paper provides an empirical assessment of the relationship between media exposure and leader effects on voting through an analysis of Italy –– an ideal case for the study of the personalization of politics and its connection with political communication. The results show the dominance of leader effects among voters strongly exposed to television and a somewhat differentiated impact on Internauts. By looking at leader effects across different audiences, this paper elaborates on the missing link between electoral research and political communication, and it eventually speaks to the broader question of how important is media for the outcome of contemporary democratic elections.
Parties are adapting to the new digital environment in many ways; however, the precise relations between populist communication and social media are still hardly considered. This study compares populist communication strategies on Twitter and Facebook employed by a broad spectrum of left-wing, center, and right-wing political actors in six Western democracies. We conduct a semi-automated content analysis of politicians’ social media statements (N = 1400) and find that populism manifests itself in a fragmented form and is mostly used by political actors at the extremes of the political spectrum (both right-wing and left-wing), by opposition parties, and on Facebook.
The concept of personalization has increasingly become central to our understanding of political communication especially during election time. With the rise of social media platforms such as Twitter, which places more focus on individual politicians and opens up more direct links with voters, the opportunities for more personalized campaigning have been expanded. Although studies of personalization in politics and online campaigning have been popular avenues of research in the last 20 years, an empirically driven understanding of the nexus between the two is still underdeveloped. In this chapter, through an analysis of the ‘personal’ tweeting behaviours of British and Dutch candidates in the 2010 general election campaigns, we attempt to understand how politicians disclose aspects of their private life through social media: which aspects these are and how they are intermingled with the ‘political’.
This article analyses the effect of electoral systems, candidate selection methods and the interplay between them on individual legislative attitudes and behavioural norms, specifically on two facets of party unity: party agreement and party loyalty. Our main argument is that one must take into account the effect of inter- as well as intra-party competition, and the interaction between the two, in order to explain individual legislative attitudes and norms. Using data from 34 European parties across 10 countries, we show that under exclusive candidate selection methods, there are large differences between proportional representation and single-member district electoral systems in their effect on party agreement and party loyalty. Under inclusive candidate selection methods, however, such differences are much less apparent. In other words, the candidate selection method conditions the influence of the electoral system on legislative attitudes and behavioural norms.
The question of whether social media grant challengers a fair opportunity to compete with incumbents, thus promoting equalization rather than normalization, is a key issue in studies of the web’s contribution to democratic systems. To contribute to the current debate, whose evidence so far strongly supports the normalization hypothesis, we examined the ability of the five leading political candidates in Israel popularity to promote engagement to their messages on social media by measuring Likes and Shares on their Facebook posts during the 2013 election campaign. Surprisingly, we found that first-time candidate, Naftali Bennett, achieved statistically similar engagement levels as achieved by PM Netanyahu, measured by the two Facebook measures mentioned above, and attracted dramatically more Likes than Netanyahu during the campaign. Similarly, first-time contender Yair Lapid’s messages promoted equal levels of engagement as did the messages of opposition leader Shelly Yachimovich. The study indicates the ability of challengers to generate similar engagement levels as incumbents through social media campaigns, an encouraging result that illustrates the democratizing potential of social media.
The organization of primaries in which all party members can participate is increasingly used by political parties to select their leader. We focus here on one of the consequences of these procedures – participation rates. Based on general participation theories (mobilization theory, instrumental motivation theory and learning theory) in combination with insights into the introduction and functioning of leadership primaries, we expect that the first time a party organizes leadership primaries, participation rates will be high, but that they will decline gradually afterwards. We have focused on direct member votes for the selection of party leaders in Belgium, Israel and Canada. Our results show that participation rates are not influenced by how many times such a contest is held in a party (only first-time participation tends to be higher), but mainly by how competitive the contest is.
This article describes two opposing types of political personalization: centralizing and decentralizing personalization. The first implies the centralization of political power in the hands of a few leaders, while the latter indicates a diffusion of group power among its components: individual politicians. We start by proposing definitions of the types and subtypes of centralized and decentralized personalization and review the literature in search of evidence of their occurrence. We then demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed typology by examining personalization trends in various aspects of Israeli politics and conclude with a discussion of the challenges that personalization set for liberal democracies.
Candidate websites provide politicians with opportunities to present themselves in an individual way. To a greater or lesser extent politicians share personal information in their biographies and provide options to connect with citizens by putting links on their websites to their social networking sites (SNS). In this paper, although acting on different levels, both strategies are indicated as forms of personalization strategies used by politicians in their online communication. This cross-national study explores the use of these strategies on candidate websites in 17 countries during the elections for the European Parliament (EP) in June 2009. This is a comparative study of the personalized and individualized campaigning styles used during elections. Findings show that three general dimensions of personalization can be distinguished; ‘professional’, ‘home and family’ and ‘personal preferences’. While the first two dimensions show a higher level of use among candidates, the third dimension on private information is hardly used. Results show also that countries from Central Europe inform their citizens more about their professional and personal circumstances, and Mediterranean countries use personalization strategies the least. Furthermore, the overall findings show that SNS were not frequently used during the 2009 e-campaigning. West European countries use links to SNS more frequently than countries in other regions. In general these findings suggest cross-cultural differences regarding online personalized political campaigning.
Social media like Facebook and Twitter place the focus on the individual politician rather than the political party, thereby expanding the political arena for increased for personalized campaigning. The need to use social media to communicate a personal image as a politician and to post personalized messages online seems less obvious in a party-centred system such as the Norwegian. Within this framework, the personalized and dialogical aspects of social media may be contradicted by the political parties' structural communication strategies. The article uses data from interviews and status updates from two Norwegian election campaigns and asks for what purposes Norwegian politicians use social media as a tool for political communication. The findings show that politicians' report both marketing and dialogue with voters as motives for their social media use and their practices varied, too. Politicians' reported motive to use social media for marketing purposes was reflected in their actual use. The preferred social media platform for marketing purposes was Facebook. Twitter was more used for continuous dialogue compared to Facebook. Social media marketing was personalized and involved private exposure and individual initiatives. The article concludes by indicating hypotheses and need for further research.
This paper considers whether the use of weblogs and social networking sites (SNS) (Web 2.0 applications) by MPs has enhanced the representative process. A content analysis was conducted of MP's weblogs and SNS during May 2008. Two approaches to representation were analysed. First, whether MP's use of Web 2.0 applications was consistent with one of the four models: delegates, trustees, party and constituency. Second, whether the basis for a separate framework of `e-representation' can be said to exist. The data suggest that MP's use of Web 2.0 applications is most likely to be within the party and constituency models, although we also suggest the existence of a possible fifth model, the representation of self. There is limited evidence that a fully functioning model of e-representation currently exists, but the basis exists for such a model to develop in the future. With weblogs this is likely to be based upon a global constituency centred around issues and/or the MP's personality. For SNS it is more likely to be centred on constituency. The legacy of Web 2.0 may be that it empowers MPs to express themselves, and citizens to see MPs as accessible, ordinary people.British Politics (2009) 4, 236-264. doi:10.1057/bp.2009.2
The article explores the contribution of MKs' websites to political personalization by addressing three questions. Is it more likely that MKs who belong to parties that conduct primaries will establish a website than MKs who belong to parties which select their candidates in a more centralized fashion? Are MKs' websites richer, more interactive and more frequently updated than their respective party's websites? Finally, do MKs link their websites to the websites of their parties? We find some evidence that MKs' personal websites further support and enhance the personalization of Israeli politics.
Personalization of politics describes a process in which the power of the individual politicians rises, ostensibly at the expense of the parties. This is manifested, among other ways, by the manner politicians use parliamentary tools. In this study, we focus on one such tool, the private member bill, assessing whether its use necessarily expresses personal behavior, which weakens the party, as suggested in the literature—or not. To test this, we conducted an in-depth analysis of the way Israeli legislators use private member bills in the Knesset, which is regarded as an indicator of personalized politics. We found that partisan-oriented behavior can be found even when using such a highly personal tool. This suggests that personalized politics does not always weaken the party. We also examined under which conditions Knesset members demonstrate partisan-oriented behavior while using private member bills. Testing institutional party-level variables revealed that MKs from parties with exclusive candidate selection methods, opposition parties, and small parties are more likely to exhibit such behavior.
Our aim is to propose guidelines for the analysis of political personalization and personalized politics in general and for behavioural personalization in particular. The first guideline is based on our understanding that personalization comes at the cost of party politics. It suggests that in order to classify politics as more or less personalized, we must compare it to an alternative party-oriented politics. Based on a synthesis of existing theoretical work, the second guideline suggests three analytical dimensions to clarify the multidimensional concept of personalization: arena, level and character. Arena refers to where personalization takes place; level refers to whose power or independence is changing; and character refers to how personalization is manifested. Furthermore, we present the contributions of this special issue and explain how they follow the two guidelines and advance our understanding and knowledge of behavioural political personalization.
With the integration of social media in political communication repertoires, politicians now permanently campaign for support online. By promoting their personal agenda, politicians increasingly profile themselves independent from their associated parties on the web (i.e., self-personalization). By focusing on self-personalization as a multi-layered concept (i.e., professional, emotional, private self-personalization), this study investigates both the use and consequences of self-personalization on Facebook. A manual content analysis of politicians’ Facebook posts (N = 435) reveals that self-personalization is indeed often used as a communication style on Facebook and is most often present in visual communication. Moreover, the study shows that the use of a more emotional and private style provides a beneficial tool for politicians’ impression management. Publishing emotional and private content yields positive effects on audience engagement, suggesting audiences’ demand for more intimate and emotional impressions of public figures on the web.
The book examines two of the most prominent developments in contemporary democratic politics, party change and political personalization, and the relationship between them. It presents a broad-brush, cross-national comparison of these phenomena that covers around fifty years in twenty-six countries through the use of more than twenty indicators. It demonstrates that, behind a general trend of decline of political parties, there is much variance among countries. In some, party decline is moderate or even small, which may point to adaptation to the changing environments these parties operate in. In others, parties sharply decline. Most cases fall between these two poles. A clear general trend of personalization in politics is identified, but there are large differences among countries in its magnitude and manifestations. Surprisingly, the online world seems to supply parties with an opportunity to revive. When parties decline, personalization increases. Yet these are far from being perfect zero-sum relationships, which leaves room for the possibility that other political actors may step in when parties decline and that, in some cases, personalization may not hurt parties; it may even strengthen them. Personalization is a big challenge to parties. But parties were, are, and will remain a solution to the problem of collective action, of channeling personal energies to the benefit of the group. Thus they can cope with personalization and even use it to their advantage.
This article analyses what makes political candidates run a party-focused or personalised election campaign. Prior work shows that candidates face incentives from voters and the media to personalise their campaign rhetoric and promises at the expense of party policy. This has raised concerns about the capacity of parties to govern effectively and voters’ ability to hold individual politicians accountable. This article builds on the literature on party organisation and considers the possible constraints candidates face from their party in personalising their election campaigns. Specifically, it is argued that party control over the candidate nomination process and campaign financing constrains most political candidates in following electoral incentives for campaign personalisation. Using candidate survey data from the 2009 EP election campaign in 27 countries, the article shows how candidates from parties in which party officials exerted greater control over the nomination process and campaign finances were less likely to engage in personalised campaigning at the expense of the party programme. The findings imply that most parties, as central gatekeepers and resource suppliers, hold important control mechanisms for countering the electoral pressure for personalisation and advance our understanding of the incentives and constraints candidates face when communicating with voters. The article discusses how recent democratic reforms, paradoxically, might induce candidate personalisation with potential negative democratic consequences.
The personalization of politics has received much attention in both the political science and political communication literature, but the focus has almost entirely been on party leaders and prime ministers. This study investigates the personalization of ministerial communication in Norway, a type of decentralized personalization. It combines a survey of communication workers; in-depth interviews with politicians, communication workers, political reporters, and top-level civil servants; and ethnographic observation inside a ministry. The article goes beyond media-centered perspectives and identifies several potential drivers and barriers to personalization processes. Based on our mixed methods approach, we find that ministerial communication in Norway is strongly centered on the minister in both reactive media management and the proactive promotion of the minister and new policies. This decentralized personalization is driven by both demands from the media and the strategic adaptation by political and administrative actors within ministries. Based on the rich empirically grounded insights, the article discusses how the interplay between the logic of the contemporary commercial news media, political ambitions, internal administrative ambitions, and changes in executive government shapes the personalization of ministerial communication, and illuminates how these multiple drivers of personalization are mutually reinforcing.
Populism continues to gain traction in politics but there has been relatively little research on how it plays out on the Internet. The special issue at hand aims at narrowing this gap of research by focusing on the close relation between populism and online communication. This introduction presents an integrative definition of populism, as well as a theoretical analysis of the interplay between populist communication logic and online opportunity structures. The individual contributions discuss how populist actors may benefit from the Internet. They analyze how political leaders and extreme parties use populist online communication. The authors also shed light on how populist movements may relate to various political parties. They finally demonstrate which groups of social media users are more susceptible to populism than others and what effects populist online communication may have on citizens. We hope that this special issue will contribute to the discussion on what is arguably one of the largest political challenges currently faced by a series of nations around the globe.
Voter perceptions of the personal traits of presidential candidates are widely regarded to be important influences on the vote. Media pundits frequently explain the outcome of presidential elections in terms of the personal appeal of the candidates. Despite the emphasis on presidential character traits in the media, the scholarly investigation in this area is limited. In this book, David Holian and Charles Prysby set out to examine the effect that trait perceptions have on the vote, how these perceptions are shaped by other attitudes and evaluations, and what types of voters are most likely to cast a ballot on the basis of the character traits of the presidential candidates. Using the American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys, the authors find that traits do have a very substantial effect on the vote, that different candidates have advantages on different traits, and that the opinions expressed by media pundits about how the candidates are viewed by the voters are often simplistic, and sometimes quite mistaken. Character traits are important to voters, but we need a better and more complete understanding of how and why these factors influence voters. An essential read which provides a clear and original argument to all those interested in furthering their understanding of the importance of candidate character traits for the quality of American elections and democracy.
Historically, both Belgium and the Netherlands are archetypes of ‘consociational democracies’. These are characterized by broad multi-party coalitions, numerous power-sharing devices, and fragile checks and balances in order to ensure due influence for all relevant parties and minority groups. Hence, the overarching logic of these consensus democracies seems to represent an obstacle to a process of presidentialization.
However, we argue that the need for strong leadership resulted in more prominent and powerful positions for the (parliamentary) party leaders and Prime Ministers. We present evidence of a process of presidentialization that gained momentum a decade earlier in the Netherlands (from the 1970s onwards) than it did in Belgium (from the 1980s).
It is interesting to note that the increased autonomy of Prime Ministers is not due to constitutional amendments, but tends to be linked to the increased decision-making role for the inner cabinet, the professionalization of the Prime Minister’s Office, and the growing attention the audiovisual media give to the Prime Minister.
Similarly, parliamentary party leaders in The Netherlands and extra-parliamentary party leaders in Belgium grew stronger through an accumulation of power and resources at the leader’s office, personalized campaigning and a centralization of control over inner party selection procedures, and party leadership selection.
The election forecasting 'industry' is a growing one, both in the volume of
scholars producing forecasts and methodological diversity. In recent years a
new approach has emerged that relies on social media and particularly Twitter
data to predict election outcomes. While some studies have shown the method to
hold a surprising degree of accuracy there has been criticism over the lack of
consistency and clarity in the methods used, along with inevitable problems of
population bias. In this paper we set out a 'baseline' model for using Twitter
as an election forecasting tool that we then apply to the UK 2015 General
Election. The paper builds on existing literature by extending the use of
Twitter as a forecasting tool to the UK context and identifying its
limitations, particularly with regard to its application in a multi-party
environment with geographic concentration of power for minor parties.
In the last few decades personalization has been identified as a defining trend of contemporary political communication. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed and there are very few studies that explore more than a single-case study. This article investigates media personalization in comparative perspective by analysing the press coverage of recent general elections in Germany (2009) and the United Kingdom (2010). Was the reporting in both campaigns (equally) personalized? How and to what extent does the phenomenon vary across the two countries? What does this mean for our understanding of personalization? The analysis shows that there are at least as many differences between the countries as there are similarities; although both campaigns can be considered personalized in some respects, the form it takes is substantially different due to structural variations in the media and political systems, as well as the more transient, but key, impact of the distinctive characteristics of the campaigns and each of the candidates.
Online campaigning has become an important feature of contemporary elections. In European democracies characterized by strong political parties, Internet use also strengthens existing trends toward more candidate-centered campaigning. Focusing on the 2013 Austrian national election, this article systematically compares the use of three different online platforms: personal websites, Facebook, and Twitter. Based on candidates' sociodemographic and political characteristics as well as contextual factors, the results show that male candidates, candidates from moderate parties, and those on the first list positions are more likely to engage in online campaigning. Differences between the three platforms exist with respect to personal websites, which are primarily used by incumbents, and Twitter, which is mostly used by candidates in urban constituencies. Furthermore, young candidates are by far more likely to use both social media sites while no such generational gap exists regarding personal websites. Individualized online campaigning has thus become a strategy for a substantial number of candidates who share specific characteristics.
This study explores how candidates running for the European Parliament (EP) in 2009 used micro-blogging and online social networks – in this case Twitter (www.twitter.com) in the early stage of its adoption – to communicate and connect with citizens. Micro-blogging in general, and Twitter in particular, is one of the new and popular Web 2.0 applications, yet there has been little research focusing on the use of Twitter by politicians. After reviewing different types of campaigning strategies and introducing a new and distinct strategy, this descriptive and exploratory study focuses on political candidates' use of micro-blogging and online social networking (i.e. Twitter) from a longitudinal, social network, and ideological perspective. The results clearly show that most candidates in 2009 still used Twitter reluctantly. Those who used Twitter did so predominantly for electoral campaigning and only sparingly for continuous campaigning. Candidates from progressive parties are the most active users of Twitter as a campaigning tool, whereas conservatives are virtually absent online. Although candidates' first degree networks are still relatively small and unconnected, their second degree networks are quite extensive. Candidates from parties in opposition have more extensive first degree networks than those from ruling parties. Candidates from fringe parties show small online networks.
Populism has been on the rise for some time in Europe now, and its rise has been one of the key concerns of Peter Mair. He has linked it to the increasing erosion of the representative function of European party systems. The spectre that haunted him was ‘partyless democracy’, a democratic regime where parties had lost their representative function, which opened the door for unmediated populist protest. While largely sharing his interpretation of the overall structural trends giving rise to the populist challenges in Western Europe, the article is critical of the static character of his assessment. It suggests that there are three forms of ‘protest populism’, all of which may eventually end up transforming the West European party systems in the name of the new structuring conflicts that characterise contemporary European societies. In addition, it proposes to extend the scope of Peter’s argument to the less established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.
It is often argued that new technology will increase centralization of political parties but Internet-based technologies, especially the social media, provide individual candidates with opportunities to run campaigns more independently of the central party. This article argues that the effect of new technology depends on the contextual characteristics of the campaign, most importantly the nomination process and the electoral system. It investigates the effect of online social media on individual candidate campaigning through a study of parliamentary candidates' use of social media in the 2009 Norwegian election campaign, a campaign environment with few incentives for candidates to undertake individualized campaigning, using the 2009 Norwegian Candidate Study. Findings reveal that online social media are much appreciated by candidates and are used to a great extent. The technological effect on individual campaigning appears small as candidates who consider social media important do not focus on their own candidacy to a greater extent than other candidates. However, candidates with an individualized candidate focus are more inclined to use Facebook and consider social media important for their campaign communication. Consequently, although social media in the short run are not likely to increase individualized campaigning as such, candidates with a candidate focus have been offered a new channel for self-promotion.
A core question addressed by parties and internet scholars is whether the medium is equalising or normalising levels of inter-party competition, Are minor parties better placed to compete for voters' attention online (equalisation), or do major parties continue to dominate (normalisation)? To date, most research has supported the latter scenario through ‘supply-side’ comparisons of website content in a single election. This article re-examines the debate using Australian surveys of election candidates conducted between 2001 and 2010. As well as providing the first longitudinal study of this question, we link the supply side with voter responses and compare how well the parties recruit support through their web campaigns. Our results confirm that major parties dominate in the adoption of personal websites, although minor parties are stronger users of social media. Both strategies are effective in gaining votes, suggesting that the web may be rebalancing if not equalising party competition.
This study investigates the content characteristics of Twitter during an election campaign, and the relationship between candidates’ style of online campaigning (i.e., politically personalized and interactive communication) and electoral support for those candidates. Thereby, it provides a better understanding of the linkage between the use of Twitter by candidates and effects on preferential votes. Two data sources are used to examine this relationship: first, a quantitative computer-assisted as well as a manual content analysis of tweets posted by political candidates during the Dutch national elections of 2010 (N = 40,957) and second, a dataset containing the number of votes for electable political candidates during that period. The findings show that using Twitter has positive consequences for political candidates. Candidates who used Twitter during the course of the campaign received more votes than those who did not, and using Twitter in an interactive way had a positive impact as well.
In recent years, there has been an increase in interest in the personalization of politics. Unfortunately, the findings of studies carried out in different countries have led to inconsistent conclusions. This article argues that one of the reasons for this inconsistency is the lack of uniform conceptualization and operational definitions. The authors contend that it is helpful to make a distinction between institutional, media, and behavioral types of political personalization, and they provide specific measures of all three types. These clear distinctions should bring us closer to answering two questions: First, has there been a rise in the different types of political personalization? Second, what is the relationship between these various types of political personalization? This study shows, through a historical comparative analysis of the Israeli case (1949-2003), that political personalization can be better understood by employing Wolfsfeld's politics-media-politics (PMP) model: Institutional personalization leads to personalization in the media, which in turn leads to personalization in the behavior of politicians.
This article looks at the personalization of politics, starting with a careful examination of the evidence that leaders are becoming more important. The role of electronic media in personalizing politics and politicians is examined, along with institutions and political leadership. The concept 'political priming' is introduced, which is the process where leaders are evaluated by voters based on the leader's performance on issues considered important to the voters. The consequences of the personalization of politics and the decline of electoral participation and parties are discussed in the last portion of the article.
Abstract Since the 1980s the rise of so-called ‘populist parties’ has given rise to thousands of books, articles, columns and editorials. This article aims to make a threefold contribution to the current debate on populism in liberal democracies. First, a clear and new definition of populism is presented. Second, the normal-pathology thesis is rejected; instead it is argued that today populist discourse has become mainstream in the politics of western democracies. Indeed, one can even speak of a populist Zeitgeist. Third, it is argued that the explanations of and reactions to the current populist Zeitgeist are seriously flawed and might actually strengthen rather than weaken it.
Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov): Information on Parties, Elections and Cabinets in Modern Democracies