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POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 43 (December 2019)
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Tunisia’s Institutional Change after the Revolution: Politics,
Institutions and Change Agents
Luigi Cino
https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.43.2
Luigi Cino studied Political Science at the University of Florence, International Relations at LUISS
University (Rome), and European Studies at the College of Europe. He also studied in Morocco and Spain
and has been visiting scholar at the Centre de la Méditerranée Moderne et Contemporaine of the University
of Nice (France). E-mail: luigi.cino@santannapisa.it.
Abstract
The Arab Uprisings started with the Tunisian revolution. These events brought the country to profound
change, especially in its institutional asset. Relying on New Institutionalism theory and in particular on the
Gradual Change Theory by Mahoney and Thelen, this paper analyses three fundamental dimensions of
institutional change in order to establish which type of institutional change has occurred in post-revolution
Tunisia. The paper looks at the characteristics of the institutions, the characteristics of the political context
and the type of dominant change agent to determine the type of institutional change. In Tunisia, a low level of
discretion in the interpretation of norms and rules, weak veto possibilities for the former regime supporters and
an insurrection type of dominant change agent have resulted in a so-called “displacement” type of institutional
change, where the removal of old rules is accompanied by the introduction of new ones.
Keywords
Gradual Change; Institutional Change; New Institutionalism; Tunisia; Tunisian Revolution
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Introduction
The Arab Uprisings were initiated in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and evolved and
spread across the whole Arab world the following year. Scholars still study the effects of
these events at a global, regional and national level from many different perspectives. One
of the most relevant consequences of the Uprisings has been the process of institutional
change that has been undertaken in order to react to the protesters’ demands. Institutional
change can occur to different degrees. Sometimes it entails a new set of institutions,
sometimes institutions do not change but rules do. Understanding the type of institutional
change in Tunisia can help disentangle all the other phenomena linked to this major event.
For these reasons, this paper aims to analyse Tunisia’s institutional change. Its driving
question is: what kind of institutional change took place in Tunisia after the revolution?
Building on a model of gradual institutional change, drawn from New Institutionalism
theory, this paper analyses the characteristics of Tunisian institutions and political context
and the type of dominant change agents in order to understand the features of the change
that has occurred in the country. The claim is that the change that occurred Tunisia
represents a sort of “displacement” (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010) with the removal of old
rules and institutions and the introduction of new ones through the approval of the new
constitution in 2014.
Literature Review
Tunisia is a semi-presidential Republic, where the President of the Republic is the
Head of State and the Prime Minister, appointed by him, is the Head of Government. After
independence in 1956, Tunisia had just two presidents, Habib Bourguiba (1959-1987) and
ben Ali (1987-2011). Bourguiba ruled the country since independence in 1956, with a
personal charismatic leadership. The socialist experiment was abandoned by 1970s, but the
social agenda was still on the run, supported by a substantial economic growth in those years.
Pro-western foreign policy was accompanied by a bureaucratization of the economy and the
centrality of the Parti Socialiste Destourien
1
(PSD).
In his book, Erdle (2010: 421) demonstrates how Ben Ali’s system was made up of
people carefully picked by the President whose aim was not to reform Tunisia, but rather “to
preserve and perpetuate the decisional and distributive monopoly of the established political
order.” The system was based on a structure of patronage, where loyalty was fundamental to
the leader’s power. Opposition parties accepted in that period to participate in the elections
1
Destourien means constitutional.
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despite these were managed by the majority; in this way, they were able to enter in the
parliament, anyhow they were too weak and fragmented to propose an effective opposition
(Sassoon, 2017).
This political situation also explains the absence of the political parties during the
2011 protests that were led by Civil Society organizations and popular movements (Cavatorta
and Haugbølle, 2012), and they appeared just after. The political parties previously repressed
such as the islamists, along with many other civil society groups that proliferated with the
revolution, were able to enter the political arena because of the new momentum brought
about by the revolution. Competitive multi-party elections favoured the preparation for a
national dialogue, fundamental for the reconstruction of the social and political tissue of the
country and for the redefinition of the rules of the game. None of the politically relevant
members of the Tunisian elites had the power to govern by himself, so this favoured a climate
of dialogue and cooperation in order to avoid civil conflicts (Heydemann, 2016).
The revolution started in late 2010 with several spontaneous popular revolts in the south-
eastern region and spread, after the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouaziz, across the whole
country. The period after the fall of Ben Ali is seen by Zemni (2015: 2) as “as more than a
legal and technical process of institution-building aimed at creating a new political system,
and as more than the institutionalization of revolutionary demands”. The transition process
represents a gradual shift “from the moment in which the people exercised – through mass
mobilizations – its sovereignty directly to the moment in which political change became
institutionalized” (Zemni, 2015: 3). In this phase, there is a dialectical tension between the
“constitutional legality of the government and the revolutionary legitimacy of street politics
[…] with high levels of uncertainty and the spread of violence” (ibid.).
The set of events that brought forth the revolution and the institutional change of
Tunisia has been the object of study of several scholars; I endeavour to systematically classify
the type of institutional change that occurred based on this literature. To do so, a theoretical
framework is proposed in the next section.
Theoretical Framework
New Institutionalism is a body of literature that has developed since the 1960s. While
providing a complete literature review on the topic is an almost impossible, this section aims
to highlight the most fundamental tools and concepts developed within New Institutionalism
which can be useful for this paper’s purpose. New Institutionalist literature has produced
three schools of thought: the rational choice, the sociological and the historical
institutionalism.
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Rational-choice institutionalism emerged from economic research that focused on
behaviour. Its main assumption is that every individual seeks to maximize his/her own gain
and does so rationally, by calculating the most convenient strategy (Shepsle and Weingast,
1987). Similarly, sociological institutionalism puts emphasis on the individual but from a
different perspective. Considering cultural factors, the approach retains that institutions are
not necessarily driven by efficiency but rather are the result of socio-cultural practices.
Thirdly, historical institutionalism emphasizes how institutions matter, by looking closely at
state and formal organizations. This approach conceives of institutions as the “the formal or
informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational
structure of the polity. […] In general, historical institutionalists associate institutions with
organizations and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal organization” (Hall and
Taylor, 1996: 6-7).
Given its emphasis on formal institutions, historical institutionalism is the most
appropriate for the aims of this study, even though elements of analysis from the other two
schools might be borrowed later in the analysis. This includes Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010)
model to understand the types of institutional change. The model proposed is part of a wider
theoretical framework, the Gradual Change Theory, which – inspired by New
Institutionalism and belonging to its historical tradition – attempts to include in the analysis
both endogenous and exogenous factors of institutional change. Indeed, these scholars
underline how all types of institutionalist theories face problems in explaining institutional
change: previous theories overrate the importance of exogenous shocks underestimating the
role played by endogenous developments that gradually unfold inside the institutions.
Mahoney and Thelen (2010) consider three main aspects which may shape the type of
institutional change: the political context, characteristics of the institutions and type of
dominant change agent. It is possible to identify the mode of institutional change based on
these three dimensions. For each dimension, the authors ask a sub-question which brings
them to identify four modal types of institutional change (shown in Table 1).
For the first dimension, the question concerns which level of discretion political
actors detain in interpreting and implementing rules and norms; for the second dimension,
the question concerns whether former regime supporters hold strong or weak veto
possibilities; for the third dimension, the question concerns which the type of dominant
change agent is. Following this typology, I will now gauge the different features of Tunisian
institutional change, by analysing each dimension in order to finally classify the type of
institutional change that has occurred in Tunisia after the Arab Uprisings.
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Table 1. Types of Institutional Change and related characteristics
Type of
Institutional
Change
Characteristics of
the Institutions
(Level of Discretion)
Characteristics of
the Political Context
(Veto Possibilities)
Type of
Dominant
Change Agent
Layering
Low
Strong
Subversive
Displacement
Low
Weak
Insurrectionaries
Drift
High
Strong
Symbionts
Conversion
High
Weak
Opportunists
Source: Elaborated by the author from Mahoney and Thelen(2010).
Methodology and Data
As the aim of this paper is to historically reconstruct the institutional change in
Tunisia in order to interpret it based on the theoretical framework discussed earlier, the
methodology adopted is Process Tracing (PT). PT has been developed by historians,
comparatists and case study scholars; its aim is to get an in-depth understanding of a case
study and how certain outcomes have been produced by using a within-case inference. PT
focuses on the mechanisms of causality and effect within a single case. Its purpose is to
explain how an outcome has been produced by looking at its process.
Van Evera (1997: 64) underlines that in PT “the cause-effect link that connects
independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then the
investigator looks for observable evidence of each step.” The author finds three variants of
PT that can be distinguished based on their purpose. The first one is theory-testing: this kind
of PT wants to look at whether the causal mechanism is present and if it works as theorized.
A second one is a theory-building PT which looks at what is the causal mechanism between
the dependent and independent variables to induce a plausible hypothetical causal
mechanism. Both these variants of PT are theory-centric, while a third variant, Explaining
Outcome Process Tracing (EOPT), is more case-centric. EOPT seeks to find the causes of
a particular outcome. The ambition is to find a minimal sufficient explanation of a particular
outcome that accounts for all its important aspects. For this paper, EOPT is used to unpack
the events in order to understand institutional change.
Applying PT is not an easy task and further considerations are necessary. First, it is
important to trace all the events that occurred in the considered process. This means that it
will be necessary to investigate all the interactions between the considered actors that brought
about the institutional change of Tunisia after the revolution. Thus, it will be essential to start
by dividing the sets of events into smaller components. After that, every single part will be
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analysed through the use of descriptive inference which answers the question of what
happened between X and Y in a form of narrative, unpacking the events into smaller
observable steps. These smaller observable steps are the factors which explain the different
outcomes of the institutional change process.
As we are mainly dealing with qualitative data, and in particular historical data, their
main source is secondary literature. Following the division suggested by the theoretical
framework, the paper subsequently goes into deeper analysis by discussing the context, actors
and events of the Tunisian revolution.
Characteristics of the Institutions in Tunisia
Firstly, an understanding of the characteristics of Tunisian institutions is
fundamental: do the targeted institutions afford political actors with opportunities for
exercising discretion in the interpretation or enforcement of norms and decisions? This
section will show that because of weak opposition, constitutional rigidity, political control
and repression as well as the penetration of the party in the state apparatus, Tunisian
institutions show a low level of discretion available for political actors in the interpretation
and enforcement of norms and decisions.
Ben Ali’s regime was secure and seemed to be politically stable and as the first
president, Ben Ali is today still considered as the father of the country; his image has had an
influence in Tunisian politics for decades. President Habib Bourguiba was deposed by then-
Prime Minister Ben Ali in 1987 following the so-called medical coup d’état when, on the
basis of Article 56 of the constitution, Ben Ali asked some doctors to declare the Bourguiba
unfit for office due to health problems. This bloodless coup made Ben Ali welcomed by the
population, but the hopes for more political openness were soon betrayed. Ben Ali continued
the policies of secularism and gender equality of the previous president but was unable to
cope with the economic problems of the country, such as young graduates’ unemployment,
lack of prospects and the position of the country in the world economy. Corruption and
nepotism become traits of the regimes, along with the concentration of power in Ben Ali’s
family (Schiller, 2011).
Constitutionalism has been a fundamental character of Tunisian institutions since
1860 when it had its first Arab constitution. Constitutionalism favoured separation of
powers, at least until independence when Bourguiba’s Neo-Destour party established its
political dominance within the system with the constitutional reform of 1959. Nonetheless,
the coup of 1987 was made possible following constitutional rules, as it was justified on the
basis of Article 56. Similarly, in 2011, the transition followed constitutional rules, as
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Gannouchi’s attempt to overtake the constitution was promptly stopped by legal means. This
historical legacy of institutionalism is relevant to the political transition of Tunisia, alongside
elements of the old regime such as patterns of corruption, patrimonial behaviours and
elements of distrust towards institutions (Murphy, 2013).
When Ben Ali took the power in 1987, he maintained the status quo and expanded
his control over society and state institutions. The Destour party was changed into the
Rassemblement Constitutionel Démocratique (RCD)
2
and Ben Ali has never separated the party
from the state. The electoral democracy that he created afterwards was just another example
of managed elections where loyal opposition was allowed to participate. No genuine political
reform has taken place in Tunisia and real political opponents were not allowed to participate
or speak up. The state was also controlling economy in order to foster political control over
the population and Ben Ali’s popularity (Sadiki, 2002). However, episodes of revolt have
taken place during Ben Ali’s regime, despite the centralized state having created mechanisms
of co-optation of the young generation in order to control them and foster national identity
through programs of public administration employment (Paciello and Pioppi, 2018). He
started economic restructuring (until the end of 1990s) by introducing neoliberal reforms
that include abolishing price control and state subsidies as well as fostering privatization. Ben
Ali also promised political reforms and at the beginning he allowed the legalization of some
parties. However, these parties were those that had not challenged the regime. In the
meantime, the regime created a new image of itself by renaming the PSD as the Rassemblement
Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD). Islamist parties were not legalized, as they were seen as a
threat to the regime and secularism. However, episodes of repression were present (Murphy,
1997). The regime, since 1987, has always maintained a tight control by using mechanisms
of co-optation of opposition figures instead of attacking them directly.
Ben Ali and the RCD party enjoyed wide popular support in the beginning (1987) and the
dictator invited many figures of the opposition to join the party or be candidates on its party
lists. With the election of 1989, the RCD became more repressive, as the ministerial
appointments made by Ben Ali can attest. Likewise, at the local level, security was reinforced
in order to strengthen political control. The party started to expand into all sectors of the
state, from universities to public companies and administrative bodies. However, from 2002,
the increased personal power of Ben Ali saw him concentrating power in the hands of his
family members and closest lobbies. At the same time, he modified the constitution in order
to allow the President to rule for more than two terms. This created frustration and internal
2
Constitutional Democratic Rally.
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dissent in the party. Some scholars consider this dissent a factor for the fall of Ben Ali,
because RCD was not supportive enough of its leader after the outbreak of protests (Wolf,
2017). Ben Ali’s attempts at reforms in terms of press freedom, freedom of speech and
freedom of association were disappointing. Legal opposition was weak and not credible. The
RCD members in the Parliament were very abiding, making it almost impossible for
opposition and the same majority’s members to emend laws; in general, the legislative branch
was quite weak in relation to the executive power, being subordinated to the party-state
apparatus (Angrist, 1999).
After Ben Ali left Tunisia in January 2011, the then-Prime Minister Mohamed
Gannouchi tried to appoint himself as President of the Republic on the basis of Article 56
3
of the constitution (Murphy, 2011) in an attempt to repeat the famous coup d’état medical that
Ben Ali had previously done towards Habib Bourguiba. But the Constitutional Council, just
a few hours after, condemned this attempt and the President of the Tunisian Parliament
Fouad Mebazaa
4
was nominated President according to the constitutional reading of Article
57, during the transitional period that would have brought to the new elections within 45
and 60 days. The new parliamentary elections were held in October 2014 and the presidential
election on 23 November 2014. In December 2014, Beji Caid Essebsi
5
from the secularist
Nidaa Tounes party was elected as the new President of Tunisia, in alternation to the moderate
islamist party Ennahda.
The systematic repression and the lack of freedom of expression weakened the
opposition forces during the whole of Ben Ali’s regime. The legal opposition had no
influence over the regime’s agenda. Social policy was used as a means to maintain legitimacy
and control even during economic structural adjustments (Paciello and Pioppi 2018). All
these elements underline the low level of discretion that political actors enjoyed in Tunisia
during Ben Ali’s regime. The weak opposition, constrained by constitutional rigidity and tight
political control, was repressed for decades. At the same time, with the penetration of the
state into sectors of the economy and the state, it hampered any attempt by any political
actor to promote any change during period of Ben Ali’s rule.
Characteristics of the Political Context in Tunisia
Second, an analysis of the characteristics of the political context of Tunisia is
necessary to disentangle the institutional change that resulted in the wake of the Arab
3
About the temporary unavailability of the President of the Republic.
4
Both of them, Mebazaa and Mohamed Gannouchi, were persons close to the former dictator Ben Ali.
5
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs under Habib Bourguiba and Prime Minister in 2011 after Ben Ali’s
departure.
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Uprisings. The question here is whether the supporters of the former regime enjoyed strong
or weak veto possibilities. The proliferation of parties and civil society organizations, the
consequent multi-partitism that originated (despite the dominance of two major parties, and
the prohibition to former regime supporters to run as candidates in the election outline a
political context where supporters of the former regime enjoys very weak veto possibilities.
The introduction of a new democratic constitution also reinforces the plurality of the system
and weakens veto possibilities of detractors.
While widespread corruption, coercion and authoritarianism defined the whole of
Ben Ali’s period, his party was hegemonic, other opposition organization had little space of
manoeuvre. Moreover, the 2008 bill on presidential candidates stipulated that a candidate
has to be leader of a party for at least two years. This excluded many opposition leaders from
candidature. Tunisia claimed to have a multi-party system, but, in fact, the main party of the
post-colonial period was the Neo-Destour, renamed Constitutional Socialist Party (Parti
Socialiste Destourien) in 1964 and Rassemblement Constitutionel Democratique (RCD –
Constitutional Democratic Rally) in 1989.
The majority of parties were founded and recognized only after the revolution, with
the exception of the secular-leftist DFLL (Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties) and the
PDP (Progressive Democratic Party) (Çarkoğlu et al. 2018). In Tunisia, opposition cooperation
happened pre- and post- elections with the formation of electoral alliances (even though a
deeper analysis suggests a stronger ideological divide among opposition parties) (Lust, 2011).
During Ben Ali’s regime, Tunisian opposition failed to confront the regime not only because
of the repression, but also because of the lack of coordination among the forces, their
ideological differences and the personal rivalries of their leaders. Islamist parties such as
Ennahda had been for long repressed by Bourguiba’s regime first and later Ben Ali’s regime.
Since 1980 till the fall of Ben Ali’s regime, the relationship has been confrontational and
conflictual, despite Ennahda representing a moderate islamist party that is different from the
Salafist movements that rose in North Africa (Allani, 2009). Ben Ali was unable to co-opt
this opposition party and thus then he decided to ban the party and promoted controlled
elections where the RCD was able to win the majority. In the first post-revolution elections
however, Ennahda won the majority, thanks also to the lack of complicity with the previous
regime (Hinnebusch, 2015).
In the post-Ben Ali era, two of the major parties who are competing for power in
Tunisia are the moderate islamist Ennahda and the counter-coalition Nidaa Tounes. The latter
gathers seculars, some of the remnants of the old ruling party and components of the trade
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union movement. They favoured the dialogue during the transitional period, by avoiding
ideological polarization and believing in the new political and electoral system (Hinnebusch,
2017). The political arena in this period was characterized by competition and compromise,
especially between the two major actors Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes. The bargained
competition among them prevented the institutionalization of rules and configured a space
of action that is outside the normal institutional rules. They monopolized the political arena,
preventing more political inclusiveness and re-channelled revolutionary demands into a
reductive form of party pluralism, where islamist confront some former regime
representatives. At the beginning of the revolution, opposition parties and civil society
movements were not on the same line as to whether to cooperate with former members of
the regime or to continue with the revolution; Ennahda pushed for the marginalization of the
loyalists but at the same time bargained with them.
Ennahda and CPR were then successful in their proposal in prohibiting the
candidature of former RCD top officials in the 2011 elections. This is according to Article
15 of the proportional electoral law, which states that all senior executives of the RCD party
and those who supported publicly the candidature of Ben Ali in 2009 were forbidden to run
in the elections. Nidaa Tounes, which represents a heterogeneous group of secularist people
– some of whom were former supporters of the regime – supported the choice. With the
assassination of the second leader Mohamed Brahmi of the Popular Front in July 2014, Nidaa
Tounes was able to pressure Ennahda’s government to resign. However, the bargained
competition between these two main political actors has not brought about a compromise
on the rules of the game but has instead led to a strong polarization in the political debate.
This polarization of the Tunisian political system could however block access to politics for
many other social actors and jeopardize transparency and accountability of institutions
(Boubeker, 2016).
The process of constitution-making started in March 2011, two months after Ben Ali
left the country. The figures at the forefront of these events, who are no longer in Tunisian
politics, had a long-lasting effect on the process. The process was also pushed by protests in
the streets. Politicians and administrators in Tunisia all belong to the same elite group,
possessing similar education and service. Despite maintaining control over state apparatus
and institutions during the period of transition, they disengaged from the previous regime
and negotiated an honourable way out and a new role in post-revolutionary Tunisia (Parolin,
2015). Thus, the political context after the 2011 revolution is characterized by a presence of
several parties and civil society organizations that compete through elections in order to gain
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the power to govern. Along with the exclusion of top officials of the former regime from
the elections, these two characteristics describe a political context where the veto possibilities
for the former supporters of the regime are weak, since the democratic change enshrined by
the introduction of the new constitution in 2014 stabilized a plural feature of Tunisian
politics.
Change Agents in Tunisia
A third step to uncover the type of institutional change that resulted in Tunisia after
the Arab Uprising is to understand what type of dominant change agent there was. According
to the framework adopted by Mahoney and Thelen (2010), two questions can help identify
the type of dominant change agent: do these agents seek to preserve institutions and do they
respect existing institutional rules? By answering these two questions, it is possible to identify
four different types of change agents:
1. Insurrectionaries: does not want to preserve institution nor follow institutional rules;
2. Symbionts: seek to preserve institutions without following institutional rules;
3. Subversives: follow the rules of institutions but do not want to preserve them;
4. Opportunists: may or may not follow the rules and preserve the institutions.
In the case of Tunisia, the answer to both questions is negative. The dominant change
agents in Tunisia were not willing to preserve the institutions (they even created new ones)
and in doing so they did not follow the existing institutional rules but adopted extra
institutional rules such as revolts which sometimes included episodes of violence.
The main actors involved in the revolution were youth and labour movements which
had socio-democratic demands, such as fighting against unemployment and liberal neo-
patrimonial regimes (Hanafi, 2012). The Trade Union UGGT quickly mobilized a lot of
people in order to overthrow the regime of Ben Ali and afterwards played the role of
mediator between all the political parties and civil society organizations to favour the
transition (Cavatorta, 2015). Collective mobilization has been relevant since the 2008 protests
in Gafsa; in the wake of the 2011 uprising, collective mobilization was able to exert political
influence on the elites and institutions through conflictual action. However, the revolutionary
character of these movements was insufficient to grant them legitimacy over the whole
transition and with the election in 2014, the demands of protesters were in the end channelled
into the political and institutional system (Antonakis-Nashif, 2016).
On 20 January 2011, one week after the departure of Ben Ali, opposition forces
created the 14t January Front “that saw itself as the only legitimate authority to speak in the
name of the people and opposed the transition from above that the legal government was
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proposing. For the Front, the usage of article 57 of the constitution constrained the
possibilities for political change too much” (ibi, p.4). According to them, 60 days would have
been too short a period for organizing free and fair elections and there was the risk of a
personalization of presidential power, especially within the same constitutional boundaries
and the same parliament as Ben Ali’s rule. For these reasons, the Front requested the
dissolution of Ben Ali’s party, the RCD, and of the two chambers of the parliament in order
to elect a National Constituent Assembly. Street protests supported these actions and at the
end of the month, the RCD ministers resigned from the government.
The desire to radically change the institutional setting was supported by mass
demonstrations and extra-institutional movements that, in the informal public political space,
represented the insurrectionary character of the change agents in Tunisia. They introduced a
tension between the legality of the system and the revolutionary legitimacy, refusing to follow
the existing institutional rules that would be contrary to the aims of the revolution. The
attempt to concentrate the powers of the chambers into the hands of the President, as
proposed by Prime Minister Mohamed Gannouchi due to the deteriorated security situation
in the country, had the only effect of inciting the popular protest, which in discord with the
idea of a controlled transition led by the government, gathered in the Conseil National de
protection de la Révolution (CNPR, National Council for the Protection of the revolution). This
body grouped the 14 January Front, the Bar Association, human rights organizations and the
UGTT. The islamists too joined the 14th January Front and the Council formed by the Front,
that was recognized by the interim government despite some reluctance. The recognition of
the CNPR by the government was a necessary step to re-channel into an institutional setting
the initiative, which clearly did not follow the usual institutional rules.
However, protests continued till February 2011, when Prime Minister Mohammed
Gannouchi proposed as provincial governors 19 out of 24 former members of the RCD
party. On March 3, the President announced the elections for the new constitutional
assembly and abrogated the Tunisian constitution by passing the Law Decree n.14 on the
provisional organization of public authorities. With this, the institutional setting of Ben Ali’s
Tunisia started to collapse. The process would finish with the approval of the new
constitution in 2014. These events show that change agents in Tunisia did not want to
preserve the previous institutions and were ready to achieve these results by going against
the existing institutional rules.
According to Mahoney and Thelen (2010), these change agents are classified as
insurrectionaries. After the Law Decree n.14, a new institution was created in order to
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organize the next elections after the revolution, the Haute Instance pour la réalisation des objectifs
de la revolution, des réformes politiques et de le transition démocratique (High Authority for the
realization of the objectives of the revolution, for political reforms and democratic transition,
or High Authority). This represents a further step in the process of institutional change: the
removal of existing rules with the introduction of new ones. This corresponds to the
displacement type of institutional change. Similarly, the modification of the old bicameral
parliament, with the introduction of the NCA first and the unicameral Assembly of
Representatives later, reinforces this reading of the institutional change process in Tunisia.
Recently, the High Authority also created the ISIE (Instance Supérieure Indépendent pour les
élections), the Superior Independent Instance for the Elections, to be in-charge of supervising
the new elections.
The assassination of the Member of the Parliament (MP) Mohamed Brahmi in July
2013opened a political crisis in Tunisia. This concerns the electoral legitimacy of the National
Constituent Assembly and the Troika Government (Ben Salem, 2015). The latter ruled after
the elections in 2011 of the NCA and was formed by the islamist Ennahda party, the secular
centre-left party Congress for the Republic (CPR, Congrés pour la République) and the social
democratic party Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties (FDTL, Forum démocratique
pour le travail et les libertés, also known as Ettakatol). The crisis was solved with the constitution
of the National Dialogue (ND) composed by the Quartet that was awarded with the Nobel
Prize for Peace in 2015: the UGTT, Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens, the Tunisian
General Labour Union; the UTICA, Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat,
the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts; the LTDH, Ligue Tunisienne
des Droits de l’Homme, the Tunisian Human Rights Ligue; and the National Bar Association,
the Conseil de l’Ordre des Avocat (COA). This Quartet was able to set the rules of the political
arena through an agreement (a road map) signed for the organization of the elections. In the
meantime, the moderate social-democratic secular party Nidaa Tounes (Call for Tunisia)
emerged as an alternative for government to the Ennahda, and the Popular Front Front
Populaire (FP) was relegated to the opposition. Indeed, in the elections of 2014, the Popular
Front did not receive enough votes and along with its intransigence it could not become a
potential ally for any party. The new political alliance was formed by Ennahda, Nidaa Tounes
and Afek Tounes (a centre-right secular party).
However, new elections were held only in October 2011 and not for the renewal of
the Tunisian Parliament (which before 2011 was a bicameral one), but for the election of a
National Constituent Assembly and the President of the Tunisian Republic. The human
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45
rights activist of the Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme and founder of the political
party Congrés pour la République Mancef Marzouki, became the president and remained in
power until December 2013. The NCA was then dissolved and replaced by the new
unicameral Parliament (Assembly of the Representatives of the People) on 26 October 2014
after the new constitution was adopted in the month of January of the same year.
The events of the revolution and those subsequent to it which constitute the
transition of Tunisia to democracy illustrates that the dominant change agent, represented
by popular movements and civil society organizations, had an insurrectionary character. They
challenged the whole political process throughout threats of revolts and also created new
bodies, such as the Council for the Protection of the revolution, in order to change the
institutions and defend their demands. Doing this through an extra-parliamentary activity as
well as with episodes of violence (including the assassination of two political leaders) describe
the change agents as insurrectionaries which, in the end, the political system was able to
absorb even though minor protests are always present in Tunisia. With this last step, the
circle is complete in order to classify the type of institutional change that has occurred in
Tunisia.
Conclusion
This paper analysed Tunisia’s institutional change using an institutionalist approach,
in particular the analytical framework from Gradual Change Theory. In order to understand
institutional change, three dimensions have been taken into consideration: the characteristics
of the institutions (with their level of discretion in interpreting and implementing rules and
norms), the characteristics of the political context (with the related force of the veto
possibilities for the supporters of the former regime) and the type of dominant change
agents, the latter identified by considering whether the dominant change agents seek to
preserve institution and/or follow the rules of the institution.
The analysis of the institutional change in Tunisia after the Arab Uprisings has
uncovered a displacement type of institutional layering. Table 2 summarizes all the elements
necessary for the classification of institutional change in the Tunisian case.
As for the characteristics of the institution, Tunisia reveals a low level of discretion
in interpreting and implementing rules and norms; this is due to the penetration of the party
in the state, the political control and repression used during the former regime, a weak
opposition and a strong rigidity of the constitution which do not allow for more room of
action in the institutional context. However, when looking at the characteristics of the
political context, this paper finds weak veto possibilities for the former regime supporters.
POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 43 (December 2019)
46
This is due to a new constitution and the decision of excluding former top officials of the
RCD party from candidature in the elections. Moreover, the proliferation of parties and civil
society organizations helped promote a strong multi-party system.
Finally, this paper looked at the type of dominant change agents in Tunisia. Because
change agents did not want to preserve institutions, they promoted methods of opposition
that have not followed the former institutional rules. These two elements, along with the fact
that insurrectionaries promoted the creation of new institutions, delineate the type of
dominant change agent as insurrectionaries.
In conclusion, a low level of discretion in the institutional context, weak veto
possibilities for the former regime supporters in the political context and the presence of
insurrectionaries as dominant change agent describe the type of institutional change in
Tunisia as displacement. This finding helps us to disentangle not only which type of
institutional change has occurred in Tunisia, but even who have been the relevant actors.
Moreover, the results contribute to widen the knowledge of the national peculiarity of
Tunisia and might be useful for any comparative research who takes into account different
countries of the region. In particular, the evidences seem to underline how Arab Uprisings,
despite sharing common features, have been singular from one country to another: further
research should be directed to understand the specificities of the institutional changes
occurred in the other countries of the region, as they are deemed fundamental to understand
regional specificities and dynamics.
Table 2. Type of Institutional Change and Related Characteristics in Tunisia
TUNISIA
Characteristics of the Institutions
(Level of discretion)
LOW
• Penetration of the party in the state
• Political control and repression
• Weak opposition and constitutional rigidity
Characteristics of the Political
Context
(Veto Possibilities)
WEAK
• Exclusion of former RCD top official from
candidature
• Proliferation of parties and civil society
organizations
• New constitution
Type of Dominant Change Agent
INSURRECTIONARIES
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• Do not want to preserve institutions (create
new ones)
• Do not follow institutional rules (revolts,
episodes of violence)
Type of Institutional Change
DISPLACEMENT
Source: Author
Acknowledgements
Being this paper a re-adaptation of part of my Ph.D. Thesis at the Sant’Anna School of
Advanced Studies, I want to thank my supervisor Dr. Serena Giusti for her support in my
research activity. I want to thank as well all the Professors of the PhD Board, my Institution,
the reviewers for their fruitful comments and the editors for their kind cooperation during
the publication process.
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