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Keeping it Real: Research Program Physicalism and the Free Energy Principle

  • February 2023
  • Topoi 42(3):1-12
DOI:10.1007/s11245-022-09852-8
Authors:
Andreas Elpidorou at University of Louisville
Andreas Elpidorou
Guy O. Dove at University of Louisville
Guy O. Dove
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Abstract

The Free Energy Principle (FEP) states that all biological self-organizing systems must minimize variational free energy. The acceptance of this principle has given rise to a popular and far-reaching theoretical and empirical approach to the study of the brain and living organisms. Despite the popularity of the FEP approach, little discussion has ensued about its ontological status and implications. By understanding physicalism as an interdisciplinary research program that aims to offer compositional explanations of mental phenomena, this paper articulates what it would mean for the FEP approach to be part of research program physicalism and to corroborate a physicalist outlook. In doing so, this paper contributes both to philosophical discussions regarding the FEP approach and to the literature on physicalism. It does the former by explicating the metaphysical standing of the FEP approach. It does the latter by showing how cutting-edge research in the empirical sciences of the mind can inform our attitudes regarding physicalism.
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Topoi (2023) 42:733–744
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09852-8
Entities that are unquestionably physical are ones for which
we have excellent reasons to accept as physical—these can
be forces, assemblages of particles, chemical compounds, or
even galaxies—and can be used in attempts to explain why
some other phenomenon that is not unquestionably physical
(e.g., consciousness, global capitalism, dark matter) is
indeed physical.
Let x be a derivatively physical property and Y a set of
unquestionably physical properties. What is the relation R
such that if xRY is true then x is rendered nothing over and
above Y? This is, if not the question of physicalism, one
of the most important questions concerning physicalism.
An answer to it would allow us to determine what kind of
relationship (or relationships, if we wish to remain pluralists
about the notion of nothing-over-and-aboveness) grants
physicalism its metaphysical “power;” it explains why
seemingly dierent properties are in some deep or important
sense the same.
The literature on physicalism has been dominated by
metaphysical explications of the relationship of nothing-
over-and-aboveness that is assumed to hold between the
unquestionably physical and the derivatively physical
(Stoljar 2021; Tiehen, 2018). These include supervenience,
necessitation, realization, and grounding. In previous
1 Introduction
Physicalism is the view that any causally active entity that
contingently and concretely exists in our world is physical.
This means: (a) there are some things (objects, properties,
events, or states of aairs) tokened in our world that are
unquestionably physical; and (b) any concretely existing
and causally active thing that is tokened in our world and
which is not unquestionably physical is derivatively physical
insofar as it is nothing over and above some other thing that
is both unquestionably physical and tokened in our world.1
1 Talk of “unquestionably physical” could mean “fundamentally
physical” but it does not have to. There is no a priori guarantee that
a fundamental level exists. More importantly, fundamentality is not
necessary for physicalism (Montero, 2006; cf. Brown & Ladyman,
2009; Schaer, 2003).
Andreas Elpidorou
andreas.elpidorou@louisville.edu
Guy Dove
guy.dove@louisville.edu
1 Department of Philosophy, University of Louisville, 313
Bingham Humanities Building, 40292 Louisville, KY, USA
Abstract
The Free Energy Principle (FEP) states that all biological self-organizing systems must minimize variational free energy.
The acceptance of this principle has given rise to a popular and far-reaching theoretical and empirical approach to the
study of the brain and living organisms. Despite the popularity of the FEP approach, little discussion has ensued about its
ontological status and implications. By understanding physicalism as an interdisciplinary research program that aims to
oer compositional explanations of mental phenomena, this paper articulates what it would mean for the FEP approach
to be part of research program physicalism and to corroborate a physicalist outlook. In doing so, this paper contributes
both to philosophical discussions regarding the FEP approach and to the literature on physicalism. It does the former by
explicating the metaphysical standing of the FEP approach. It does the latter by showing how cutting-edge research in the
empirical sciences of the mind can inform our attitudes regarding physicalism.
Keywords Physicalism · Materialism · Naturalism · Free energy principle · Composition · Explanation · Research
program · Surprisal
Accepted: 15 November 2022 / Published online: 1 February 2023
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022
Keeping it Real: Research Program Physicalism and the Free Energy
Principle
AndreasElpidorou1· GuyDove1
1 3
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
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