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Working class youth transitions as a litmus test for change: labour crisis and social conflict in Arab Mediterranean countries
In this study, we explore the relationship between Egypt's agrarian transition and farmers’ perceptions of environmental risks and opportunities for climate change adaptation. Drawing from agrarian studies and rural development pathways in Egypt, we highlight structural challenges in addressing vulnerabilities of households in agrarian communities to environmental change. Our evidence comes from 350 landholders and agricultural labourers in rural Damietta, a governorate in the northeast of the Egyptian Nile Delta Region. We categorize households into three groups based on their reliance on agriculture for income, corresponding to different agrarian transition models. We find that vulnerabilities and capacities for climate change adaptation vary among these groups, with those heavily dependent on agriculture being the most vulnerable, despite having greater awareness of agricultural risks. They exhibit limited capacity to respond effectively – both in and ex situ, indicating a need for targeted support as environmental pressures increase due to climate change.
Amid widespread anti-government protests, on July 25, 2021, the Tunisian President, Kais Saied, dismissed the Prime Minister and suspended parliamentary activities. Thereafter, political parties’ leaders and key civil actors assumed shifting and, lately, conflating positions in reaction to Saied’s move. Although they often called for the formation of a united front against Saied’s unilateral takeover of state institutions, their actions remained largely uncoordinated in avoiding the risks of authoritarian backsliding. Drawing on a political party perspective, this article seeks to understand why the Tunisian political forces failed to coordinate their actions against Saied’s presidential coup. The article contends that in post-July 2021, the Tunisian opposition failed to unite effectively because political forces were primarily driven by opportunism and their past ideological stance towards Ennahda. As a result, political parties opposing Saied’s move preferred to unite selectively. The article invites us to rethink the historical legacy of Tunisian pact-making and alliance politics by concluding that Saied’s actions set distinct rules from the dynamics of opposition coordination that distinguished the Collectif du 18 Octobre (2005) and the post-Uprisings period. Yet, these rules re-echo some old pact-making patterns that characterised the Tunisian opposition under Ben Ali’s One Party state.
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