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COMMENTARY
CITIZENSHIP STRIPPING IN MYANMAR AS LAWFARE
NYI NYI KYAW*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 280
The 1982 Law and the Provision for Denationalisation ........................................ 281
‘Anti-Terrorism’ Lawfare against Resistance in Myanmar .................................. 282
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 285
INTRODUCTION
In March and April 2022,1 the military junta of the Republic of the Union of
Myanmar (‘Myanmar’), known as the State Administration Council (‘SAC’)
issued three orders to strip 33 people (‘the 33 people’) of Myanmar citizenship.
Among them were opposition politicians, (ex)-diplomats, dissidents, social media
influencers-cum-fundraisers, writers, singers, actors and beauticians who had been
leading, involved in or supportive of the (armed) resistance against the military
rule known as the Spring Revolution. These orders referred to these people as
those ‘who violated the existing laws of the State and left the country illegally
[who] were found to be committing acts that could harm the interests of
Myanmar’.2 The SAC justified its orders with s 16 of the 1982 Myanmar
Citizenship Law (‘1982 Law’). 3 Many of the newly stateless immediately
responded that it was an illegitimate use of law by the SAC4 and that they would
continue to revolt against the SAC despite their denationalisation.5 Opposition
politicians who sat in the parallel National Unity Government of the Republic of
*Nyi Nyi Kyaw is the Research Chair on Forced Displacement in Southeast Asia at Chiang
Mai University in Thailand and Honorary Fellow at the Melbourne Law School. His work on
citizenship, nationalism and constitutional change, among other topics, has appeared in
Social Identities, Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, and Review of Faith &
International Affairs.
1 ‘Termination of Citizenship’, Global New Light of Myanmar (Yangon, Myanmar, 5 March
2022) 4; ‘Termination of Citizenship’, Global New Light of Myanmar (Yangon, Myanmar,
8 March 2022) 2; ‘Termination of Citizenship’, Global New Light of Myanmar (Yangon, 2
April 2022) 10.
2 ibid.
3 ibid.
4 ‘
[Responses to the
Stripping of Citizenship]’, Democratic Voice of Burma (online, 5 March 2022)
<http://burmese.dvb.no/archives/520372>, archived at <https://perma.cc/YY6D-DBQS>; Dr
Sasa (Facebook, 10 March 2022) <https://www.facebook.com/DrSasa22222/posts/
502207124703483>, archived at <https://perma.cc/XMY4-7HFH>.
5‘ [The Revolutionary Spirit Cannot
Be Stopped by Denationalisation]’, Irrawaddy (online, 14 April 2022)
<https://burma.irrawaddy.com/article/2022/04/14/251279.html>, archived at
<https://perma.cc/4Q2K-BHLX>.
Citizenship Stripping in Myanmar as Lawfare
281
the Union of Myanmar (‘NUG’) pledged that the 1982 Law would be repealed
with the success of the Spring Revolution and the removal of the SAC.6
In this commentary, I contextualise the three orders of denationalisation against
the backdrop of the ongoing Spring Revolution against the military junta and the
latter’s brutal suppression of the former. I argue that the SAC only impulsively
and arbitrarily used citizenship stripping or revocation as part of its package of
warfare against the revolution.
THE 1982 LAW AND THE PROVISION FOR DENATIONALISATION
The 1982 Law was originally written during the rule of the xenophobic Burma
Socialist Programme Party regime (1974–88). The law divides Myanmar citizenry
into a ‘native’ component, capturing those who had settled in the country before
British colonisation (prior to 1823), and a non-native, immigrant component,
concerning those who migrated to colonial Burma, where they later settled
permanently. By according different rights to two classes of citizens, the law
effectively elevates the status of citizens of ‘native’ ancestry above the status of
citizens of immigrant ancestry.7
Why did the SAC use the pro-native 1982 Law, and s 16 in particular, in
suppressing alleged ‘terrorism’ against its rule? The short answer is because this
section contains the only provision in the Myanmar legal corpus that permits
denationalisation of citizens. Myanmar citizenship may only be revoked under one
of two conditions: where the individual leaves Myanmar permanently and/or
where the individual acquires citizenship and identity documentation, such as a
national ID or passport, of a foreign country. 8 The three SAC orders of
denationalisation stated that all of the 33 people left Myanmar, thus satisfying the
condition as required in the 1982 Law.
The 1982 Law was in effect when dissidents, activists and politicians fled
Myanmar in search of refuge in neighbouring countries9 after the military took
power in September 1988 in the aftermath of popular protests against the one-
party socialist regime. Although, while in power, the military junta used a variety
of tools to repress the opposition, they never used the denationalisation provision
in the 1982 Law.10 The military’s decision in March and April 2022 is therefore
unprecedented. This, however, was not the first attempt to denationalise or deprive
Myanmar Spring revolutionaries and opposition politicians of Myanmar identity
documentation. In 2021, the Embassy of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar,
6 See eg, Zin Mar Aung (Facebook, 5 March 2022)
<https://www.facebook.com/100011819040715/posts/1239702309767059/>, archived at
<https://perma.cc/P8Y6-K74H>; Wai Mar Tun, ‘
[Critics: Denationalisation is Human Rights
Violation]’, Radio Free Asia (Burmese) (Blog Post, 7 March 2022) <https://www.rfa.org/
burmese/program_2/myanmar-citizenship-law03072022164332.html>, archived at
<https://perma.cc/2QMN-3QXB>; Ministry of Justice (Facebook, 4 April 2022)
<https://www.facebook.com/107793768252630/posts/173910538307619/>, archived at
<https://perma.cc/J2BP-4264>.
7 Nyi Nyi Kyaw, ‘Alienation, Discrimination, and Securitization: Legal Personhood and
Cultural Personhood of Muslims in Myanmar’ (2015) 13(4) Review of Faith & International
Affairs 50.
8 Burma Citizenship Law 1982, s 16 (Burma).
9 Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy (Review Publishing Company,
1989) 196–215.
10 Wai Mar Tun (n 6).
2022 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 4(2)
282
Canberra, in the Commonwealth of Australia (‘Australia’) sent seven documents
to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, stating that the SAC
had declared the passports of about 70 people null and void, even though it was
not certain all the people in question were outside of Myanmar at that time of
notification, let alone in Australia.
11
Further, even if any of the targeted people
were in Australia, it was unclear if they had left Myanmar permanently and/or had
acquired Australian citizenship and passports.
In issuing denationalisation orders in March and April 2022, the SAC did not
provide any evidence of the 33 people having met the conditions of leaving
permanently or acquiring other citizenship, which was required for stripping them
of Myanmar citizenship. One could argue that the use of the 1982 Law by the SAC
in this case was impulsive and arbitrary.
‘ANTI-TERRORISM’ LAWFARE AGAINST RESISTANCE IN MYANMAR
The Myanmar military overthrew the democratically elected and re-elected
12
National League for Democracy (‘NLD’) party government on 1 February 2021
in a coup a few hours before the new parliament convened. Most, if not all, of the
NLD leadership, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San
Suu Kyi, were detained. A few days later, hundreds of thousands of Myanmar
people, including elected NLD representatives, activists and other dissidents, took
to the streets in protest against the coup. This included a general strike of public
sector employees, called the Civil Disobedience Movement (‘CDM’)
13
that aimed
to paralyse the bureaucracy. The protests and the CDM came to be known as the
Spring Revolution and the Revolution became an armed resistance on 5 May 2021,
declaring a war of self-defence on 7 September 2021.
11
Stephen Dziedzic, ‘Myanmar Junta Cancels Passports of High-Profile Opponents and Shadow
Government Figures, Documents Show’, ABC News (online, 2 December 2021)
<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-03/myanmar-junta-cancels-passports-of-high-
profile-opponents/100669294>, archived at <https://perma.cc/64C2-AM43>. Within
Myanmar, citizens have to produce their national IDs, known as Citizenship Scrutiny Cards,
as proof of evidence of citizenship, but it is passports that are evidence of Myanmar
nationality for people outside the country. Hence, declaring passports of Myanmar citizens
null and void is effectively denationalisation.
12
The National League for Democracy (‘NLD’) won both general elections held in November
2015 and November 2020 in a landslide. Although the military did not dispute the result of
the 2015 elections, it alleged that there was huge systemic fraud in the 2020 elections, in spite
of international and local independent observers’ conclusions that the polls were free and fair
to a satisfactory level: see, eg, PACE Myanmar, 2020 Global Elections Observation Report
(Report, 16 March 2020); Asian Network for Free Elections, The 2020 Myanmar General
Elections: Democracy Under Attack (Report, 2021).
13
On a broader understanding, boycotts of goods and services produced by military-owned and
linked enterprises by ordinary citizens, who are neither public servants nor private sector
employees, also form part of the Civil Disobedience Movement (‘CDM’). In the early days
of the CDM, several thousand employees of enterprises and businesses in the private sector
also joined the CDM. However, public servants are the core of the CDM.
Citizenship Stripping in Myanmar as Lawfare
283
The SAC responded with the suspension, revision and introduction of laws,
14
crackdowns,
15
charges of disruption of public service
16
and sedition,
17
arrests,
18
mass incarceration,
19
imprisonment,
20
extrajudicial killings,
21
the suspension,
dismissal and removal of members of CDM (‘CDM-ers’)
22
and the replacement
of CDM-ers’ positions.
23
They also froze assets and bank accounts of (alleged)
funders and financiers of the Spring Revolution,
24
branded the revolution as
terrorism and revolutionaries as terrorists
25
and commenced deadly ‘clearance’
operations against places that were (allegedly) hosting freedom fighters.
26
The legal package of repression or lawfare is particularly relevant here. The
term lawfare is defined as the use or misuse of law in waging international or
14
‘Myanmar: Post-Coup Legal Changes Erode Human Rights’, Human Rights Watch (online, 2
March 2021) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/02/myanmar-post-coup-legal-changes-
erode-human-rights>, archived at <https://perma.cc/RG5G-ND4Y>; see also ‘Myanmar:
Post-Coup Legal Changes Erode Human Rights’, International Commission of Jurists (online,
2 March 2021) <https://www.icj.org/myanmar-post-coup-legal-changes-erode-human-
rights/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/5CD3-M8WE>.
15
See, eg, ‘“Day of Shame”: Dozens of Anti-Coup Protesters Killed in Myanmar’, Al Jazeera
(online, 27 March 2021) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/27/myanmar-coup-
leaders-put-on-show-of-force>, archived at <https://perma.cc/AS8T-2NSQ>.
16
‘More than 80 Protesters at Mandalay Sit-In Charged with Violating 505a’, Myanmar
Now (online, 9 March 2021) <https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/more-than-80-
protesters-at-mandalay-sit-in-charged-with-violating-505a>, archived at <https://perma.cc/
YF8W-K5NB>.
17
‘Win Htein Indicted on Sedition Charge’, Myanmar Now (online, 16 July 2021)
<https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/win-htein-indicted-on-sedition-charge>, archived
at <https://perma.cc/PY5J-58VD>.
18
‘Daily Briefing in Relation to the Military Coup’, Assistance Association for Political
Prisoners (online, 5 August 2022) <https://aappb.org/?p=22658>, archived at
<https://perma.cc/2YTM-Z5UC>.
19
ibid.
20
ibid.
21
ibid.
22
See, eg, ‘Junta’s Investment Ministry Fires More Than 80 Staff over CDM Participation’,
Myanmar Now (online, 11 April 2021) <https://myanmar-now.net/en/news/juntas-
investment-ministry-fires-more-than-80-staff-over-cdm-participation>, archived at
<https://perma.cc/9H9B-SSG2>; Naw Say Phaw Waa, ‘Junta Suspends Thousands of
Academics, University Staff’, University World News (online, 14 May 2021)
<https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20210514110259910>, archived at
<https://perma.cc/RAT8-47BM>.
23
See, eg, ‘Military Council Tries to Replace Striking Internal Revenue Staff with Relatives of
Junta Personnel’, Myanmar Now (online, 20 August 2021) <https://www.myanmar-
now.org/en/news/military-council-tries-to-replace-striking-internal-revenue-staff-with-
relatives-of-junta>, archived at <https://perma.cc/577Y-JPJS>.
24
‘Myanmar Bank Faces Boycott After Freezing Accounts to Block Donations to
Anti-Coup Forces’, Coconuts Yangon (online, 10 August 2021)
<https://coconuts.co/yangon/news/myanmar-bank-faces-boycott-after-freezing-accounts-to-
block-donations-to-anti-coup-forces/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/YP4A-3C6Z>.
25
‘Myanmar Junta Declares National Unity Government, CRPH, Defense Forces as
“Terrorist” Groups’, Irrawaddy (online, 10 May 2021) <https://www.irrawaddy.com/
news/burma/myanmar-junta-declares-national-unity-government-crph-defense-forces-as-
terrorist-groups.html>, archived at <https://perma.cc/98AT-4FS8>.
26
‘Myanmar Junta Intensifies Arson Attacks in Resistance Strongholds’, Irrawaddy (online, 27
May 2022) <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-intensifies-arson-
attacks-in-resistance-strongholds.html>, archived at <https://perma.cc/E999-Y4D8>.
2022 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 4(2)
284
bilateral wars
27
and in discriminating and persecuting minorities.
28
I define it as
the misuse of law by governments, democratic or authoritarian, in crushing dissent
and resistance. Myanmar has been ruled by the military or military-dominated
regimes from 1962 until 2011 and from February 2022 until present. Regimes
headed by active or retired generals used a repertoire of existing laws and wrote
new laws to target those who dissented or opposed the military as a form of
repression.
29
Such laws may be said to bring about ‘material, emotional, and
psychological injurious actions that target an entire group of people with a
particular set of shared social characteristics’
30
among revolutionaries, activists
and dissidents in Myanmar. For example, enjoying impunity, a Myanmar military
soldier said that ‘when protestors refuse to listen to our orders to disperse, we shoot
at the protestors in accordance with the law’.
31
Existing laws including, but not limited to, the Penal Code,
32
the Code of
Criminal Procedure
33
and the Ward or Village-Tract Administration Law
34
have
been amended or repealed, while laws such as the Counter-Terrorism Law have
been increasingly used to punish dissidence and resistance. For example, the SAC
suspended ss 5, 7, and 8 of the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens,
which prohibits a police search of private homes without two witnesses, prohibits
the detention of anyone for more than 24 hours without a court order and requires
seizure, surveillance, spying or investigating to be conducted without affecting
citizens’ privacy, security and dignity.
35
After the suspension of ss 5,7 and 8, an
unknown number of private homes, workplaces and shops have faced raids.
36
By
adding new sub-sections to s 505 of the Penal Code, the SAC also criminalised
27
Charles J Dunlap Jr, ‘Lawfare Today: A Perspective’ (2008) 3(1) Yale Journal of International
Affairs 146, 146 quoted in Orde F Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (Oxford
University Press 2016) 1.
28
John L Comaroff, ‘Symposium Introduction: Colonialism, Culture, and the Law: A Foreword’
(2001) 26(2) Law & Social Inquiry 305, 305–306; Kari Telle, ‘Faith on Trial: Blasphemy and
“Lawfare” in Indonesia’ (2018) 83(2) Ethnos 371, 374.
29
Nick Cheesman, ‘Thin Rule of Law or Un-Rule of Law in Myanmar?’ (2009/2010) 82 Pacific
Affairs 597, 601–604.
30
Cecilia Menjívar and Leisy J Abrego, ‘Legal Violence: Immigration Law and the Lives of
Central American Immigrants’ (2012) 117(5) American Journal of Sociology 1380, 1414.
31
Pwint Htun, ‘Beyond the Coup in Myanmar: “In Accordance with the Law” — How the
Military Perverts Rule of Law to Oppress Civilians’, Just Security (Blog Post, 28 April
2021) <https://www.justsecurity.org/75904/beyond-the-coup-in-myanmar-in-accordance-
with-the-law-how-the-military-perverts-rule-of-law-to-oppress-civilians/>, archived at
<https://perma.cc/K748-UCAH>.
32
‘State Administration Council Law No (5/2021): Law Amending the Penal Code, 14 February
2021’, Global New Light of Myanmar (Yangon, Myanmar, 15 February 2021) 2 (‘State
Administration Council Law No (5/2021)’).
33
‘State Administration Council Law No (6/2021): Law Amending the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 14 February 2021’, Global New Light of Myanmar (Yangon, Myanmar, 15
February 2021) 2.
34
‘State Administration Council Law No (3/2021): Fourth Amendment of the Ward or Village-
Tract Administration Law, 13 February 2021’, Global New Light of Myanmar (Yangon,
Myanmar, 14 February 2021) 2.
35
‘State Administration Council Law No (4/2021): Amendment of Law Protecting the Privacy
and Security of the Citizens, 13 February 2021’, Global New Light of Myanmar (Yangon,
Myanmar, 14 February 2021) 1.
36
David Pierson, ‘Myanmar’s Military Sows Fear and Terror in Nighttime Raids’, Los Angeles
Times (online, 12 March 2021) <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-03-
12/myanmar-nighttime-raids>, archived at <https://perma.cc/CX4L-MKCE>. The author
also witnessed about a dozen such raids in Mandalay in February and March 2021.
Citizenship Stripping in Myanmar as Lawfare
285
encouraging government employees to join the CDM and made illegal publicly
naming and shaming government employees who do not join the CDM.
37
Harsher punitive sentences, including death penalties and life sentences, have
also been handed down under martial law declared in six townships in Yangon
since mid-March 2021.
38
By 4 March 2022, one day before the first order of
denationalisation was issued, 827 people had been sentenced (including 45 death
sentences) and 9,507 people were in detention and awaiting charges to be brought
or sentences to be handed down under one or more laws from the aforementioned
package of lawfare.
39
In February 2022, or one year after the coup, the
International Commission of Jurists noted that neither the rule of law nor judicial
independence were present in Myanmar under the SAC.
40
That said, the package of lawfare briefly reviewed in this commentary does not
include a single provision for denationalisation, even in the Counter-Terrorism
Law.
41
For this reason, the SAC has turned to the 1982 Law.
CONCLUSION
The SAC used the 1982 Law and its provision for denationalisation as part of its
package of lawfare against the Spring Revolution, despite lack of clear evidence
that the 33 people had left Myanmar permanently. While some of the 33 people
are now out of Myanmar or working from the Thai–Myanmar border — possibly
having acquired foreign citizenship and identity documentation, permanent or
temporary — the use of the 1982 Law is intended to permanently cast out
opposition to the SAC.
37
‘State Administration Council Law No (5/2021)’ (n 32).
38
‘State Administration Council: Martial Law Order 1/2021, 14 March 2021’, Global New Light
of Myanmar (Yangon, Myanmar, 15 March 2021) 1; ‘State Administration Council: Martial
Law Order 2/2021, 15 March 2021’, Global New Light of Myanmar (Yangon, Myanmar, 16
March 2021) 3.
39
‘Daily Briefing in Relation to the Military Coup’, Assistance Association for Political
Prisoners (online, 4 March 2022) <https://aappb.org/?p=20399>, archived at
<https://perma.cc/26K7-JRMY>.
40
‘Myanmar: A Year After Military Takeover, No Rule of Law or Judicial Independence’,
International Commission of Jurists (online, 10 February 2022)
<https://www.icj.org/myanmar-a-year-after-military-takeover-no-rule-of-law-or-judicial-
independence/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/N5J3-UTKL>.
41
Denationalisation has been increasingly used in countries including the United Kingdom,
Germany and Norway as a tool in combating home-grown terrorism during the War on Terror:
Milena Tripkovic, ‘Renouncing Criminal Citizens: Patterns of Denationalization and
Citizenship Theory’ (2022) Punishment & Society (advance). For ethical and practical debates
on using denationalisation as terrorism control, see Matthew J Gibney, ‘Should Citizenship
Be Conditional? The Ethics of Denationalization’ (2013) 75 The Journal of Politics 646;
Matthew J Gibney, ‘Denationalisation and Discrimination’ (2020) 46 Journal of Ethnic and
Migration Studies 2551; Christian Joppke, ‘Terror and the Loss of Citizenship’ (2016) 20
Citizenship Studies 728.
