Populism, Competitive Authoritarianism, and Foreign Policy: The Case of Uganda's 2021 Election

Abstract

Despite populism being a fast-growing field of inquiry, populist discourse in an African setting is understudied. This paper expands our knowledge of populist communication and foreign policy in a competitive authoritarian context, proposing an analysis of two Ugandan politicians—Bobi Wine and Yoweri Museveni—and their communication on Twitter before the January 2021 election. Counter to expectations, I find that thick ideology has a limited effect on the electoral discourses of both candidates in a competitive autocracy such as Uganda, and this applies also to their communication about foreign policy. When it comes to their position on foreign policy, strategic electoral communication is focused on positioning themselves in relation to the West, signaling a commitment to a strong future linkage with the West and democratization in the event of electoral victory. The content analysis of Twitter-based communication finds that the long-standing incumbent, Museveni, uses tried-and-tested populist tropes to reinforce his regime, emphasizing his government's allegedly strong capacity to maintain a linkage to Western donors and to conduct a successful foreign policy focused on receiving foreign aid and advancing its investment in economic development. In his turn, counter-candidate Wine is a contemporary populist who contests the long-standing regime and promises a truthful commitment to democratization and an authentic and corruption-free linkage with the West if successfully elected. This paper aims to broaden our understanding of how political leaders in competitive autocratic countries of the Global South make strategic use of populist communication about foreign policy to advance their political agendas.

Full text

Global Studies Quarterly (2023) 3 , 1–13
Populism, Competitive Authoritarianism, and Foreign Policy: The
Case of Uganda’s 2021 Election
CORINA LACATUS
Queen Mary University of London, UK
Despite populism being a fast-growing field of inquiry, populist discourse in an African setting is understudied. This paper
expands our knowledge of populist communication and foreign policy in a competitive authoritarian context, proposing an
analysis of two Ugandan politicians—Bobi Wine and Yoweri Museveni—and their communication on Twitter before the Jan-
uary 2021 election. Counter to expectations, I find that thick ideology has a limited effect on the electoral discourses of both
candidates in a competitive autocracy such as Uganda, and this applies also to their communication about foreign policy.
When it comes to their position on foreign policy, strategic electoral communication is focused on positioning themselves
in relation to the West, signaling a commitment to a strong future linkage with the West and democratization in the event
of electoral victory. The content analysis of Twitter-based communication finds that the long-standing incumbent, Museveni,
uses tried-and-tested populist tropes to reinforce his regime, emphasizing his government’s allegedly strong capacity to main-
tain a linkage to Western donors and to conduct a successful foreign policy focused on receiving foreign aid and advancing
its investment in economic development. In his turn, counter-candidate Wine is a contemporary populist who contests the
long-standing regime and promises a truthful commitment to democratization and an authentic and corruption-free linkage
with the West if successfully elected. This paper aims to broaden our understanding of how political leaders in competitive
autocratic countries of the Global South make strategic use of populist communication about foreign policy to advance their
political agendas.
Malgré l’intérêt croissant pour l’étude du populisme, le discours populiste dans un contexte africain reste sous-étudié. Cet
article élargit nos connaissances de la communication populiste et de la politique étrangère dans un contexte autoritaire con-
currentiel. Il propose une analyse de deux politiciens ougandais, Bobi Wine et Yoweri Museveni, et de leur communication sur
Twitter avant l’élection de janvier 2021. Contrairement aux attentes, j’observe qu’une idéologie dense n’a que peu d’effets sur
les discours électoraux des deux candidats dans une autocratie concurrentielle comme l’Ouganda, observation qui s’applique
également à leur communication sur la politique étrangère. Concernant leur position en matière de politique étrangère, la
stratégie de leur communication électorale se concentre sur leur positionnement par rapport à l’Occident : ils montrent leur
engagement en faveur de futurs liens étroits avec l’Occident et une démocratisation en cas de victoire électorale. Grâce à
l’analyse du contenu de la communication sur Twitter, nous observons que le dirigeant en exercice depuis de longues années,
Yoweri Museveni, use de tropes populistes éprouvés pour renforcer son régime. Il insiste sur la capacité a priori élevée de son
gouvernement de maintenir le lien avec les donateurs occidentaux et d’assurer la réussite d’une politique étrangère centrée
sur la réception d’aides étrangères et le renforcement de l’investissement dans le développement économique. De son côté,
son adversaire, Bobi Wine, est un populiste contemporain qui remet en question le régime en place de longue date et promet
un engagement sincère en faveur de la démocratisation et un lien authentique et exempt de corruption avec l’Occident,
en cas d’élection. Cet article vise à élargir notre compréhension de l’utilisation stratégique de la communication populiste
sur la politique étrangère par les dirigeants politiques des pays autocratiques concurrentiels de l’hémisphère Sud pour faire
progresser leur programme politique.
A pesar de que el populismo es un campo de investigación en rápido crecimiento, el discurso populista en un entorno africano
está poco estudiado. Este artículo amplía nuestro conocimiento sobre la comunicación populista y la política exterior en un
contexto autoritario competitivo, proponiendo un análisis de dos políticos ugandeses—Bobi Wine y Yoweri Museveni—y su
comunicación en Twitter antes de las elecciones de enero de 2021. En contra de lo esperado, observamos que la ideología
«gruesa» tiene un efecto limitado en los discursos electorales de ambos candidatos en una autocracia competitiva como
Uganda, y que esto se aplica también a su comunicación sobre política exterior. En cuanto a su posición en materia de política
exterior, la comunicación electoral estratégica se centra en posicionarse con respecto a Occidente, señalando un compromiso
de fuerte vinculación futura con Occidente y de democratización en caso de victoria electoral. El análisis del contenido
de la comunicación en Twitter revela que Museveni, en el cargo desde hace mucho tiempo, utiliza tropos populistas de
probada eficacia para reforzar su régimen, subrayando la supuesta gran capacidad de su gobierno para mantener un vínculo
con los donantes occidentales y llevar a cabo una política exterior de éxito centrada en recibir ayuda exterior y avanzar en
su inversión en desarrollo económico. A su vez, el contracandidato Wine es un populista contemporáneo que cuestiona el
antiguo régimen y promete un compromiso veraz con la democratización y una vinculación auténtica y sin corrupción con
Occidente si resulta elegido. Este artículo pretende ampliar nuestra comprensión sobre cómo los líderes políticos de países
autocráticos competitivos del Sur Global hacen un uso estratégico de la comunicación populista sobre política exterior para
avanzar en sus agendas políticas
Introduction
Recent years have seen extraordinary momentum in the
electoral success of populist political leaders around the
world. This global “return” of populism has generated much
academic interest in the electoral communication populists
use to advance their political agendas and to mobilize sup-
port in their electorate. However, most research on populist
Lacatus, Corina (2023) Populism, Competitive Authoritarianism, and Foreign Policy: The Case of Uganda’s 2021 Election. Global Studies Quarterly ,
https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksac081
©The Author(s) (2023). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/1/ksac081/6994369 by guest on 21 January 2023

2 Populism, Competitive Authoritarianism, and Foreign Policy
communication has focused on candidates running for elec-
tion or incumbents seeking re-election in more established
democracies. Hence, our understanding of strategic polit-
ical communication by populist politicians in more fragile
democracies, such as in competitive authoritarian settings,
is still very limited.
In fragile democracies, as has been the case in Latin
America, successful populists have been found to drive
their countries into competitive authoritarianism ( Levitsky
2017 ). Despite this key finding, we know very little about
the specific strategies, including strategic political commu-
nication, which populists in competitive authoritarian con-
texts use to advance and ultimately consolidate their politi-
cal agenda, particularly when elections take place. A type of
long-term “hybrid regime,” competitive authoritarianism is
understood to recognize some democratic institutions in the
exercise of political authority. At the same time, incumbents
in these regimes violate these rules so often and so exten-
sively that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum
standards for democracy ( Levitsky and Way 2002 ). Three
key explanatory factors can account for change (or lack
thereof) in competitive authoritarian regimes—the (global)
linkage between domestic regimes and Western states; the
leverage that Western powers have to put pressure on compet-
itive authoritarian regimes to initiate a move toward democ-
ratization; and the organizational power that each government
has to suppress the democratic opposition through the use
of coercive power, ruling party strength, and state control
over the economy ( Levitsky and Way 2010 ; Bogaards and
Elischer 2016 ).
How do populists in more fragile democracies employ
strategic communication about foreign policy to advance
their electoral agendas? This paper aims to expand our
knowledge of populist electoral communication and foreign
policy in the context of competitive authoritarianism, with
a focus on the African continent, illustrating it with a case
study of Uganda. Despite being a fast-growing field of aca-
demic inquiry, the nature, and manifestations of populism
in different national contexts on the African continent is un-
derstudied, even as populism as a political strategy and post-
truth politics have arguably been endemic in Africa in the
recent past ( Gherghina, Miscoiu, and Soare 2013 ; Trotter
and Maconachie 2018 ).
This paper draws on the literatures on populist communi-
cation, competitive authoritarianism, and populism and in-
ternational relations, to conduct a study of the strategic role
of populist communication about foreign policy, specifically
about foreign aid, in advancing competitive authoritarian-
ism during times of election. Counter to existing scholarship
on populists in the Global South, we find that left-or-right
thick ideology might have a much more limited effect on the
electoral behavior of a populist leader in a competitive au-
tocracy in an African setting. This applies also to their com-
munication about foreign policy and can hold true for both
incumbents and new presidential candidates. Regarding
their position on foreign policy and the conduct of interna-
tional relations, populist leaders selectively integrate a small
number of key international actors and mechanisms in their
public discourse about foreign policy and international
relations, usually focused on advancing economic develop-
ment. They domesticate these ideas in terms of national
politics, most of all through themes linked to local develop-
ment and at the level of public discourse strategically signal
a strong linkage to the West. In the case of incumbents,
this discourse is not matched by policy efforts toward de-
mocratization, but rather by increased coercive power and
ever stronger state control over the economy. Ultimately,
this discourse reinforces the regime in power and further
consolidates competitive authoritarianism. When it comes
to foreign policy, we expect that the populist opposition
candidate participating in an election in a nondemocratic
state centers their electoral agenda on opposing the views
advanced by the incumbent. At the same time, the op-
position candidate might use a discourse that reinforces
linkages to the West, as an electoral promise of possible
future democratization.
Empirically, I propose a qualitative content analysis of the
Twitter communication of the two main candidates—Bobi
Wine and Yoweri Museveni—prior to the Ugandan presi-
dential election on January 14, 2021. Twitter-based electoral
communication is key for the spread of populist ideas to
the domestic electorate and for strategic diplomatic use of
populist messages advancing a rhetorical commitment to a
strong linkage with the West. To Bobi Wine, Twitter and so-
cial media are the sole channels he can access during his
electoral campaign, as he is banned from any other national
mass media. The analysis finds that, despite similarities in
running “people-centered” campaigns, the content of the
two candidates’ Twitter-based communication differs signif-
icantly. As the analysis will show, Museveni came to power in
1986 as a populist figure who adopted an authoritarian lead-
ership style and converted over the years in an authoritarian
leader. Over the years, he has continued to rely on a tried-
and-tested populist discourse that granted him political suc-
cess in the first place, to continue the advancement of his
regime and to promote his election campaigns. During the
electoral campaign in 2020–2021, Twitter becomes a nor-
mative political battleground. It is the space where Musev-
eni’s decades-long regime is reinforced by a discourse that
indicates his continued rhetorical commitment to maintain
strong relationships with Western donor states, such as the
United States, and to carry on a successful foreign policy
focused on advancing the same strategy for economic devel-
opment in Uganda. This renewed commitment to a strong
linkage with the West is a rhetorical commitment to the
tropes that have ensured the provision of foreign aid over
the years and stands in stark contrast with the long-standing
reality of poverty, corruption, repression, and autocratic pol-
itics in the country. Key for the incumbent in this context is
the continued advancement of ideas that have ensured the
longevity of their leadership, including nationalist tropes
and references to the “golden era” of the first time they ac-
ceded to power.
In contrast, Wine is a different type of contemporary pop-
ulist and a challenger of Museveni’s long-standing autocratic
regime. Wine’s campaign rhetoric relates Museveni regime’s
political longevity to the West’s continued financial aid and
calls for radical change in foreign aid priorities, modifying
the direction of foreign aid toward putting an end to Musev-
eni’s regime and facilitating a true transition to democracy.
Against this background, Wine proposes to pursue the best
interest of the “people” in Uganda by removing Museveni
from power, creating genuine linkages with the West moti-
vated by the desire to instate a democratic government un-
der Wine’s leadership. Despite opposing Museveni, Wine’s
discourse on foreign policy remains centered on the United
States and the West, ultimately reinforcing the existing struc-
tures of global governance. In his electoral campaign, Wine
turns to the West to call for increased support for liberal
democracy in Uganda, supporting the removal of Museveni
and further economic development free from the “corrupt
elite.”
In what follows, I introduce populism and populist com-
munication in the context of competitive authoritarianism
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/1/ksac081/6994369 by guest on 21 January 2023

CORINA LACATUS 3
and continue with a discussion of populist communication
in African politics, with a focus on contemporary Uganda.
After introducing the methods of data collection and anal-
ysis, I present and discuss the results of my qualitative con-
tent analysis of populist discourse about foreign policy in
Uganda’s most recent election, in January 2021. I conclude
with some reflections on the broader relevance of my find-
ings for research in populist communication and for possi-
ble future directions of research.
Populism, Strategic Communication, and Foreign Policy
Populism, Competitive Authoritarianism, and Strategic
Communication
Despite widespread use, populism remains a contested con-
cept. While scholars disagree on a single definition of pop-
ulism, proposing at least four main approaches—ideational
( Mudde 2017 ), political-strategic ( Weyland 2001 ), sociocul-
tural ( Aslanidis 2015 ), and performative ( Sorensen 2021 ),
most of them agree that populism is based on a key dis-
tinction between two antagonistic groups—“the pure peo-
ple” and “the corrupt elite.” Scholarly definitions diverge
on whether populism is a “thin-centered” political ideology
( Mudde 2004 ), an electoral mobilization strategy ( Weyland
2001 ), a sociocultural frame ( Aslanidis 2015 ), or a type
of communicative process ( Sorensen 2021 ). Against the
background of this duality, what gives impetus to elec-
toral support is the expectation that politics operate ex-
clusively to give a voice to the will of “the pure people”
( Mudde 2004 ).
Writ large, populists claim to promote the interest of a vir-
tuous “people” against corrupt elites and social “others” who
threaten people’s sovereignty ( Canovan 1999 ). Often, they
promote an image of themselves as outsiders, and use a style
described to be direct, simple, emotional, and indelicate
( Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008 ; Bischof and Senninger
2018 ; McDonnell and Ondelli 2020 ). They promise to ques-
tion the dominant order, give voice to the collective will,
and pledge a new political order more closely aligned with
the true longings and aspirations of the “people” ( Moffitt
2015 ). Populists around the world, in transitional and estab-
lished democracies, conjure up images of the opposition be-
tween elites and the people, reflecting very real disaffection
and representing the voice of a “silent majority” ( Canovan
1999 ). They emphasize otherwise unheard or ignored calls
for responsiveness, authenticity, and morality in represen-
tative politics from a relatively large number of voters who
feel unrepresented. Populists’ communication is key in giv-
ing “the people” a political presence and, as such, has the
power to configure a new identity for the people they repre-
sent.
Populism is rooted in the political and cultural context
from which it emerges and which it seeks to transform,
and populists break norms and push against limitations by
challenging their legitimacy as corrupt and tied to elite
interests ( Sorensen 2021 , 11). Electoral candidates who
are new to the political scene tend to have a much easier
time creating a public image of themselves as disruptive
and different from the corrupt elites who are in power and
whom they seek to replace. Populist incumbents, however,
face a different challenge when they run for re-election.
Given their experience in office, they have a harder time
portraying themselves as “outsiders” ( Lacatus and Meibauer
2021, 2022 ; Meibauer 2021 ) when compared to a first-
time presidential candidate or a candidate with much less
experience in office.
At the level of public communication, populists’ discourse
has been found to map onto the left–right spectrum of
“thick” political ideology, at least in Europe and North
America. Right-wing populists complement this “thin” ve-
neer with a set of exclusionary political ideas. They pro-
pose a racialized, nativist view of the “people” that per-
ceives cultural, religious, linguistic, and racial minorities as
threatening ( Canovan 1999 ; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser
2013a ; Bonikowski 2017 ). They oppose “out-of-control” gov-
ernment and tend to maintain economically intervention-
ist and authoritarian, socially conservative positions ( Mudde
2017 ). On the left side of the ideological spectrum, populists
use language hostile to the rich, financial elites, and big
corporations ( Plattner 2010 ; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser
2013a , 2017 ). They promote an agenda inclusionary of the
Main Street and opposed to financial corporations and in-
terests, with a progressive social-justice agenda ( Mudde and
Rovira Kaltwasser 2017 ). In general, populist politicians on
the left tend to rely primarily on economic claims, whereas
politicians on the right favor nationalist claims ( Bonikowski
and Gidron 2016 ).
While the domestic determinants and implications of
populism have been studied extensively, the scholarship on
populism and foreign policy as well as on the intersection
of populism and international relations is still in its infancy
( Destradi and Plagemann 2019 ). Populism and interna-
tional relations are interconnected, and this relationship is
visible in the ways populist leaders engage in foreign policy,
in the electoral discourse of populist candidates about
foreign policy, and in the impact that populist politics may
have on existing institutions of global governance ( Verbeek
and Zaslove 2017 ; Destradi and Plagemann 2019 ; Lacatus
2021 ; Lacatus and Meibauer 2021 ). Some studies focus on
populist parties in coalition governments ( Verbeek and
Zaslove 2017 ) and others address the relationship between
populism and foreign policy with a clear preference for
Western politics, a more narrow focus on populist radical
right parties outside government in Europe ( Liang 2007 ),
or an emphasis on the personalities of “angry” populist
leaders ( Drezner 2017 ). Verbeek and Zaslove (2017) pro-
pose a study of populist political parties drawing from a
range of Western and Latin American cases, including a
typology of populist foreign policy positions in four areas:
regional integration, trade and finance, migration, and
“general attitude.” They find that foreign policy positions
vary across populist parties ( Verbeek and Zaslove 2017 ),
demonstrating that populists’ thick ideology matters more.
Chryssogelos proposes that populists’ notion of protecting
the “people” can explain their suspicion of international
institutions ( Chryssogelos 2017 ).
As a “thin-centered ideology,” populism is chameleonic in
nature ( Taggart 2000 ) and can be attached to other ideolo-
gies ( Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013b ). As observed in Europe
and the Americas, the three core concepts of populism (the
people, the elite, and the general will) and the two direct op-
posites (elitism and pluralism) can be integrated with other
thick (e.g., socialism or illiberalism) or thin (e.g., ecolo-
gism) ideologies to advanced political agendas on both sides
of the political spectrum ( Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013b ).
In a Latin American context, populism has been found to
increase the likelihood that fragile democracies will break
down into competitive authoritarianism ( Levitsky 2017 ). As
political outsiders, populists lack the necessary experience
to effectively utilize the institutions of representative democ-
racy and, when they have not been socialized into pursuing
goals within democratic politics, they might also lack a nor-
mative commitment to those institutions ( Levitsky 2017 ).
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/1/ksac081/6994369 by guest on 21 January 2023

4 Populism, Competitive Authoritarianism, and Foreign Policy
Moreover, successful populist candidates win elections on
the promise of burring the political establishment, hence
questioning the existing regime as not truly democratic
( Hawkins 2010 ) and promising to “re-found” the political
system ( Levitsky 2017 ). They tend to enjoy broad popular
support for such reforms once they have come to power.
Against this background, newly elected populists are not
likely to find great support for their agendas inside institu-
tions of horizontal accountability, such as supreme courts or
electoral commissions, and sometime respond to such con-
flicts with plebiscitarian strategies ( Levitsky 2017 ).
To advance our understanding of populism in competi-
tive autocracies, particularly in an African setting, I expand
on Levitsky and Way’s explanation of divergent regime tra-
jectories and propose a conceptualization of populism as
a form of strategic communication and a key intervening
factor determining regime consolidation in competitive au-
tocracies. I propose that the examination of populist com-
munication offers valuable insight into the political trajecto-
ries of competitive authoritarian regimes, including on the
African continent, complementing our existing understand-
ing of the determinants of competitive authoritarianism.
Three explanatory factors—two international and one
domestic—account for regimes moving in the direction of
(deepened) competitive autocracy or away from it, toward
democratization. First, linkage to the West refers to the link-
age between competitive autocratic regimes and Western
states, be it economic, political, multilateral, or civil society
driven. Linkage is the sole factor that can account for suc-
cessful democratization ( Levitsky and Way 2010 , 306). Sec-
ond, western leverage is the overall vulnerability that compet-
itive authoritarian regimes might have to the external pres-
sure that Western powers apply to initiate democratization.
Vulnerability alone is very unlikely to result in effective de-
mocratization. With very few exceptions, leverage is consid-
ered high in African countries. Third, organizational power
refers to each government’s capacity to suppress demo-
cratic opposition, through using state coercive power, ruling
party strength, and state control over the economy ( Levitsky
and Way 2010 ). Organizational power is an independent
variable where African states show the greatest variation
( Levitsky and Way 2010 ).
Slater (2011) argues that linkage, leverage, and orga-
nizational power do not causally interact, but they do
follow in a logical sequence, which is not truthful to all
forms of democratization taking place around the world.
Importantly, what we lack is a theory of democratization
in the context of “low linkage,” which is the case with
most African countries. In the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), for instance, Matti finds that the country
will remain a competitive autocracy and that the balance of
Western aid and Chinese investment determines whether
the country fluctuates between more democratic and more
authoritarian politics ( Matti 2010 ). More recently, scholars
have found that, along donor dynamics, domestic actors
play an equally important role in Africa, further inhibiting
democratization ( Peiffer and Englebert 2012 ) and shaping
the outcomes of elections ( Wiseman 1990 ; Lebas 2011 ;
Elischer 2013 ; Weis 2014 ; Bogaards and Elischer 2016 ).
Focusing on incumbents in competitive autocracies, a
long-standing populist leader centers their strategic com-
munication on advancing the tried-and-tested tropes that
ensured their political success for many years, including
in the realm of foreign policy ( Lacatus 2021 ; Lacatus and
Meibauer 2021 , 2022 ). Populist communication does not
map well onto a left–right ideological spectrum, at least not
in the manner in which it does in the West ( Lacatus 2019 ),
and candidates can use it strategically to signal to foreign
donors and international partners their strong linkage with
the West. This does not mean that the candidates’ promise
of a strong linkage with the West will result in a true com-
mitment to democratization after the election. In fact, the
majority of African countries have generally been consid-
ered to have “low linkage” with the West ( Bogaards and
Elischer 2016 ). What matters, however, is the rhetorical com-
mitment to the tropes that have ensured the provision of
foreign aid over the years. Far more important is the con-
tinued advancement of ideas that ensured the longevity of
their leadership, including nationalist tropes, references to
the “golden era” of the first time they acceded to power.
Their political discourse is often anchored in nationalist
tropes and a strong regional (in our case, African) iden-
tity and complemented by the promise of future economic
prosperity and development with Western support, primar-
ily through development aid.
A populist counter-candidate in a competitive autocracy
uses electoral communication strategically, to condemn the
existing ruling elites as well as to signal a strong linkage with
the West, a clear promise of democratization, and a willing-
ness to recognize the leverage that the West has in promot-
ing democracy. The long-standing incumbent and the inter-
national structures in place to support them represent the
embodiment of the corrupt and dangerous elite they seek
to replace and to secure their people from. In contrast, they
are the authentic leaders representing the will of the people
to move away from authoritarianism and in the direction
of democracy. In a sense, the candidate running against a
long-standing incumbent (as Wine did in Uganda) is com-
pelled to adopt a more “flexible” stance to his critique of
international elites, to mitigate the potential risk of estrang-
ing foreign support in the event they do win the elections. In
the event they come to power, they will require the support
of international development assistance to implement eco-
nomic programs. They are thus compelled to both critique
the international support offered to the incumbent and to
make claim to this support. As the below analysis will show,
this was the case in Uganda’s most recent election, too.
Populist Communication in African Politics
Destradi and Plagemann (2019) systematically examine
the conditions under which populist incumbents in sev-
eral countries in the Global South can contribute to more
conflict-prone bilateral relations, a weakening of global gov-
ernance and its institutions, and a more centralized and
personalized foreign policymaking. They find that populists
in power tend to reinforce existing trends in world poli-
tics rather than change course entirely. Their foreign pol-
icymaking becomes more centralized and personalized, but
strong “thick” ideologies determine it, reducing arbitrari-
ness and unpredictability. In an earlier study, Destradi and
Plagemann find that Modi’s populist government has not
had the expected impact on the substance of foreign policy;
rather, it has had an impact on the procedural aspects of
foreign policymaking as well as its communication ( Destradi
and Plagemann 2019 ).
In Africa, recent manifestations of contemporary pop-
ulism include movements such as Raila Odinga’s Orange
Democratic Movement in Kenya, Julius Malema’s Economic Free-
dom Front in South Africa, and Abdoulaye Wade’s Parti
Democratique Senegalais in Senegal. However new the social
and political problems they respond to, these contempo-
rary populist leaders and their political movements are
grounded in a decade-long tradition of populist politics in
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/1/ksac081/6994369 by guest on 21 January 2023

CORINA LACATUS 5
the sub-Saharan region. As early as the 1970s and 1980s,
coups d’etats shook the region, such as the “populist-socialist
movement” coordinated by Captain Thomas Sankara in
Burkina Faso (1983–1987) and the “social revolution” by
Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings in Ghana (1981–2000)
( Rothchild and Gyimah-Boadi 1989 ). The success of these
movements culminating in coups has largely been attributed
to their charismatic populist leaders and their successful
campaigns run on anti-corruption agendas ( Nugent 2012 ).
In other national contexts, such as Idi Amin’s Uganda
(1971–1979) and Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, populist poli-
tics exploited a discourse informed by ethno-nationalist sen-
timents, instigating xenophobia and creating rifts between
sociocultural groups in society ( Trotter and Maconachie
2018 ). Despite differences due to national context, populist
leaders in sub-Saharan Africa tend to share certain core
ideational and discursive elements with other populists
around the world. They often have a charismatic leadership
style, synonymous with their claim at a non-elite personal
background. They prove that they are closer to the “people”
they seek to represent by emphasizing that they do not orig-
inate from the existing political class ( Carbone 2005 ). Some
of the success of populists on the African continent is linked
to their capacity to use public communication to exaggerate
national problems, such as inequality, underdevelopment,
and poor economic performance, linking them to the
policies of previous governments and the unsound advice
of foreign experts ( Lemarchand, Young, and Lemarchand
1985 , 253). Like other populist leaders, they often call for
the reinstatement of the “power to the people” and employ
plebiscitarian approaches, advancing political strategies
that condemn failures of governance due to the corruption
of existing government ( Thomson 2016 ).
Populist Communication in Contemporary Uganda
In Uganda’s case, the incumbent regime has also recently
been shown to be a competitive autocracy, relying on co-
ercion to resist opposition challenges through National Re-
sistance Movement’s (NRM’s) creation of elaborate military
and paramilitary security structures meant to maintain effec-
tive command and control ( Kagoro 2016 ). From the start,
the NRM was a politically weak but militarily strong organi-
zation ( Mwenda 2007 ; Kagoro 2012 ), with Museveni largely
utilizing the military wing as a guarantor of his power and
political order ( Mudoola 1991 ). Some scholars have also
proposed that NRM’s shallow political base was the driver
of the ban on multiparty politics between 1986 and 2005
( Tr ipp 2004 ; Omara-Otunnu n.d. ).
Thirty-five years after he came to power, Museveni con-
tinues to enjoy popular support, largely thanks to his astute
use of “soft power” including his responsiveness to popular
concerns during his poverty tours and distribution of devel-
opment resources, his manipulation of popular fears about
instability and a return to the “bad old days,” and his treat-
ment of the opposition ( Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey 2016 ).
Museveni’s regime started in 1986 when the NRM entered
the capital city, Kampala, and ended a civil war that had
been going on for nearly 5 years. By the time he came to
power, he had already delivered what many Ugandans still
credit him for—a sudden and dramatic shift from chaos to
stability, moving from years of violence toward security, and
a peaceful relationship between soldiers and the citizenry
( Carbone 2005 , 5). Despite having been active in local poli-
tics in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Museveni successfully
promoted a public self-image as an outsider in politics when
he became a figure in national politics. His decision to go
to the bush and mount a guerrilla war in 1981 helped to
restyle him as a political outsider ( Carbone 2005 , 4). Musev-
eni gained in popularity during the conflict, emerging as an
almost mythic personality ( Trotter and Maconachie 2018 ).
He continued to advance a “pro-people” discourse, empha-
sizing his personal peasant background and his unique per-
sonality as a trustworthy “outsider,” who was well prepared
to make a clean break from traditional politics grounded in
corruption ( Canovan 1999 ).
Arguably unique to Museveni is his ability to foster a
public image of an authentic leader “of the people,” which
appeals to the common person and advances his own un-
paralleled national developmental narratives ( Trotter and
Maconachie 2018 ). His public discourse promotes a vision
of a transformed Ugandan society grounded in modern-
ization, infrastructural development, and equality. Recent
years have seen an intensification of Museveni’s use of “post-
truth politics” as a populist instrument, relying on an overly
optimistic discourse of his regime’s developmental achieve-
ments ( Trotter and Maconachie 2018 ). While this discourse
has helped to legitimize his leadership, his public communi-
cation ultimately failed to mask fully the observable reality of
poor governmental performance, as is the case for instance
in the electricity sector ( Trotter and Maconachie 2018 ).
Museveni’s populism is grounded in political personal-
ization based on anti-institutionalism that, in turn, leads
to further personalization of state power. His political suc-
cess has been strengthened by his institutional reform, cre-
ating new local government and legislative institutions be-
tween 1986 and 1996, which allowed him at the same time
to concentrate power and to personalize it further ( Tr ipp
2005 ; Mwenda 2007 ; Muhumuza 2009 ). These institutions
have lacked independence, serving propagandistic purposes
( Muhumuza 2009 ; Trotter and Maconachie 2018 ). Musev-
eni has increasingly disregarded the authority of institutions
such as the parliament, the judiciary, the media ( Mwenda
2007 ), and the army ( Tangri and Mwenda 2003 ) refusing
to delegate power to them. Over the years, Museveni has
used, on the one hand, force and intimidation and, on the
other, patronage ( Tangr i and Mwenda 2003 ) to silence any
dissenting voices, using state funds to “recruit support, re-
ward loyalty, and buy off actual and potential opponents”
( Mwenda 2007 ). What at first was a “no party” model of gov-
ernance justified as a transitional action to modernize the
country proved to be an effective measure to shut down all
political opposition and concentrate the country’s leader-
ship and constitution around Museveni’s personal authorita-
tive guideline ( Carbone 2005 ). In response to international
and interparty pressures, the government initiated a pro-
gram of constitutional reforms in 2005, which introduced a
multiparty system and, at the same time, removed term lim-
its on the presidency. With the open support of 213 (out of
305) members of Parliament who accepted bribes, Museveni
used the process of constitutional reform to effectively grant
himself lifelong powers ( Tr ipp 2005 ).
Voices opposing Museveni have emerged in the past two
decades, but none has been successful at defeating the long-
standing president. In 2021, the most prominent dissenting
voice was of Bobi Wine (i.e., Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu),
member of Parliament, the leader of the National Unity
Platform (NUP) political party, and a well-known hip-hop
artist. His electoral image is grounded in his otherwise hum-
ble personal background in Wine’s lack of political experi-
ence, which is presented as a guarantee of his integrity and
lack of corruption. In 2017, Wine announces his candidacy
for Parliament in a by-election for Kyandondo County East
constituency, carrying out a unique door-to-door campaign
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/1/ksac081/6994369 by guest on 21 January 2023

6 Populism, Competitive Authoritarianism, and Foreign Policy
leading to his surprising victory by a wide margin against
two experienced counter-candidates, Sitenda Sebalu (NRM)
and Apollo Kantinti of the main opposition party, Forum for
Democratic Change ( Nantume 2007 ; Zane and Bakibinga
2017 ).
In July 2019, Wine announces his presidential bid in
the 2021 general election and in 2020, he formally joins
the NUP party, growing out of the People Power move-
ment ( Athumani 2019 ). The 2021 elections were some of
the least free/fair, and most violent the country had seen
( Abrahamsen and Bareebe 2021 ). After the official nomina-
tion on November 3, 2020, Wine was arrested several times
and members of his campaign killed and arrested, events
that spurred several widespread demonstrations around the
country, resulting in over 100 deaths, multiple injured peo-
ple, and over 2,000 incarcerated ( Athumani 2019 ; Kasasira
2020 ). In his communication, Wine’s fight for survival dur-
ing the campaign is presented as symbolic of the struggle
that the country faces when seeking to remove Museveni
from power and instate a democratic state. On January 16,
the electoral commission confirms that Museveni won re-
election with 58.6 percent of the vote. Wine did not accept
the results, claiming that the election was “the most fraudu-
lent” in Uganda’s history ( Al Jazeera 2021 ).
Wine’s presidential platform advances a populist agenda
motivated by “people power” and intends to create a system
of “people-centered governance” as a solution to poverty
and inequality and, through fair and free elections, to
achieve the ultimate peaceful transition of power ( National
Unity Platform 2020 ). Aiming to stop Museveni’s rule and
highlighting the failures of its government over the years,
Wine’s electoral agenda advances liberal democratic prin-
ciples as well as economic and social development. Moti-
vating the need for political change: “It is only through
People-centred Governance that Ugandans can be guaran-
teed Equal Access to Quality Education and Health Ser-
vices, Inclusive Economic Development, Land, Natural Re-
sources & Environmental Protection and National Security
and International Relations. [. . .] Poor international rela-
tions will lead us further into debt and our economy will be
dominated by those we owe money that we cannot repay”
( National Unity Platform 2020 , 2).
I focus on Uganda for three main reasons. First, Uganda
is a postcolonial African state that is considered “not free”
but still holds elections, thus making possible some degree
of political dissent and opposition ( Freedom House n.d. ).
In its most recent election in January 2021, Uganda had two
main presidential candidates who have been described as
populist. This allows us to capture some variation in strate-
gic communication about both domestic and foreign policy,
while maintaining some similarity determined by the same
nondemocratic political context. Third, both candidates’
campaigns place the relationship with the United States and
the continued provision of foreign aid and international de-
velopment assistance as central to Uganda’s foreign policy,
even as they do so with two radically opposed electoral goals
in mind. Museveni is an incumbent that faces a gap between
voters’ expectations of what their “anti-elite” approach can
deliver, and what the messy business of foreign policy actu-
ally produces, especially in an economy that is dependent
on foreign aid tied to the spread of liberal democracy. His
strategic challenge is to convince his voters that he is un-
corrupted and “just like” them, while seeking to conduct
foreign affairs successfully and continue to receive interna-
tional support for economic development programs. In con-
trast, Wine’s populist electoral campaign is built on point-
ing out the failures of international development programs
in Uganda but places the blame partly on the corruption
Tab le 1. Descriptive details of Twitter data (November 2020–January
2021)
Number of tweets Number of coded nodes
Museveni 275 105
Wine 243 156
Tot a l 535 251
of Museveni’s regime and on the international community’s
misunderstanding of the needs of the Ugandan “people.”
Yet, his approach to foreign policy is still centered on the
United States and the West. His electoral rhetoric ultimately
results in reinforcing the existing structures of global gover-
nance, as he turns to the West to call for increased support
for liberal democracy in Uganda, supporting the removal of
Museveni and further economic development free from the
“corrupt elite.”
Methods and Data
To examine populist discourse about international politics,
this paper offers a cross-case analysis based on a qualitative
content analysis of the Twitter accounts of Yoweri Musev-
eni and Bobi Wine during the months of official campaign-
ing for Ugandan presidency (November 3, 2020–January 14,
2021), ahead of the election on January 14, 2021. The pre-
election phase was purposely selected as candidates of any
type are likely to communicate on pressing political issues
and simultaneously seek to mobilize voter support, which,
if a primary tool of their electoral strategy involves perfor-
mances of authenticity, should mean a particular prevalence
of authenticity indicators as operationalized above.
I carry out qualitative content analysis on tweets from
@HEBobiwine and @KagutaMuseveni ( table 1 ). Twitter has
become a common tool for politicians, including populists,
to communicate directly with voters ( Stier et al. 2018 ; Clarke
and Grieve 2019 ). It allows for the immediacy, intimacy, and
spontaneity that mediated accounts, even interviews, do not
( Enli and Rosenberg 2018 ; Luebke 2020 ). Recent statistics
on the Twitter’s ad reach in Uganda indicate that Twitter
had approximately 418,400 users in Uganda in early 2022,
which is the equivalent of 1.5 percent of the population over
the age of thirteen years, who have legal access to the social
media platform ( Data Reportal 2022 ). Through their per-
sonal Twitter accounts Wine and Museveni advance their
campaigns for re-election and aim to communicate with
both domestic and international audiences. Importantly,
their use of the social media platform presumably targets
not only other Twitter users, but also mass media reporting
their Twitter activity to larger audiences. Museveni makes
active use of state-owned mass media to advance his cam-
paign and uses Twitter primarily to facilitate real-time com-
munication from the campaign trail. Wine employs Twi t-
ter, however, as a sole medium of direct and uncensored
communication with his voters. Importantly, the electoral
campaigns took place during the COVID-19 pandemic and
benefitted from the public relevance of official Twitter use
in the country. In Uganda, public actors and institutions,
including President Museveni and the Ministry of Health,
used Twitter as one of the main outlets to communicate
timely updates on the progress of the pandemic ( Kirabo,
Namara, and Mcneese 2021 ). With 2.8 million followers at
the time of writing this article, @KagutaMuseveni is the ac-
count with the most followers in the country. At 1.7 million,
@HEBobiwine is also one of the topmost popular Twitter
accounts in Uganda.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/1/ksac081/6994369 by guest on 21 January 2023

CORINA LACATUS 7
Figure 1. Nodes occurring in the Twittersphere of both candidates, @HEBobiwine and @KagutaMuseveni (November 2020–
January 2021).
Figure 2. Categories of aggregate nodes occurring in the Twittersphere of @KagutaMuseveni (November 2020–January
2021).
Coders used NVIVO, content analysis software, that gen-
erates qualitative and quantitative data based on coded
texts. First, textual data were coded according to the most
appropriate thematic category. These categories consist of
“idea clusters” that share features and resist reductive es-
sentialization ( Spiro and Jehng 1990 ). Next, indicators and
codes were grouped in larger thematic categories based on
thematic similarity, which are reported below ( figure 1 ).
Coding was done manually and followed the same set
scheme for tweets by both politicians. The online appendix
includes details on the coding scheme as well as frequency
tables and intercoder reliability.
Populist Communication and Foreign Policy in Uganda
Populist Communication as Electoral Strategy for Both Candidates
The analysis finds that several themes—twenty-three coded
nodes in total—occur in the political communication of
both Wine and Museveni prior to the January 2021 election
( figures 1 and 2 ). During the campaign, the two candidates’
main aims were to mobilize supporters through three main
strategies of communication. First, the common themes
indicate that the two candidates share an interest in using
Twitter for immediate, “real-time” communication offering
their electorate a window not only into their political agen-
das, but also into carefully curated personal information,
private opinions, and feelings ( figure 1 ). To that end,
Twitter’s short and direct 280-character messages are partic-
ularly powerful for strategic campaign communication. Key
in the context of contemporary populism are the efforts to
use social media to facilitate directness, create a sense of the
candidates being approachable and relatable ( Enli 2017 ;
Clarke and Grieve 2019 ; Ernst et al. 2019 ), and harmonize
particularly well with populists’ strategies of institutional
disruption through breaches in formal speech, appearance,
or behavior. Hence, populists can turn to social media to
legitimize and gather public support for emergent and
disruptive forms of authenticity ( Sorensen 2021 ).
In the case of the January 2021 Ugandan election, Wine’s
use of Twitter aimed to share a sense of a common lived
experience of violence and, through that, to strategically
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/1/ksac081/6994369 by guest on 21 January 2023

8 Populism, Competitive Authoritarianism, and Foreign Policy
disrupt the violent conduct of Museveni’s electoral cam-
paign as well as his regime’s suppression of political opposi-
tion. As a means of electoral communication, Museveni used
Twitter to make himself be seen as an approachable leader
who, despite his age and long-standing political status, can
adapt to changes in communication and embrace social me-
dia. Both candidates create a sense of immediacy in com-
municating with their electorate, seeking to communicate
in real time with their supporters and to impart personal in-
formation relevant for their electorate to follow their pres-
idential campaign. The two leaders favor real-time commu-
nication, spontaneous communication that allows them to
share quick reactions to external events or media reporting
( figure 1 ).
Second, content-wise, both candidates relay a sense of
consistency with populist rhetoric familiar to their voters
(however different thematically, as discussed below), which
places “the people” at its center and makes meeting “peo-
ple’s needs” the goal. To that end, combatting domestic cor-
ruption is central to both their campaigns, and so is the
promotion of a nationalist identity presented as important
in the regional context of pan-African solidarity ( figure 1 ),
even as the actors who make up the corrupt elite are differ-
ent for the two candidates.
Third, Wine and Museveni grant foreign policy a central
role in their populist electoral communication, with a broad
purpose of indicating a strong linkage to the West and a
commitment to democratization as well as the recognition
of the continued leverage that the West has in shaping the
politics of the country toward democracy. This strategic ap-
proach to communicating about foreign aid is independent
of the two candidates’ true political intention of moving the
country in the direction of democratization after the elec-
tion. As I will discuss in more detail below, while they both
value foreign aid and the support of international partners
to advance politics in Uganda, Wine heavily criticizes the fi-
nancial support that the United States and other Western
donors grant Museveni’s government and points to this sup-
port as one of the main factors keeping the dictatorship alive
for so long. Still, Wine does turn to international support for
his candidacy, seeking not to alienate international donors
and presenting himself as the better candidate to support.
Museveni acknowledges international support as a badge of
honor for his presidency, legitimizing his regime.
Yoweri Museveni: The Promise of Strong Linkage and the Continued
Legitimation of His Regime
The analysis of Museveni’s Twittersphere shows that he
makes strategic use of Twitter with a two-fold goal: domes-
tically, he aims to create a public image of himself as an ap-
proachable leader, of “the people,” who has demonstrated a
long-standing capacity to keep Uganda out of cross-border
conflict; internationally, he strategically communicates his
intention to signal a strong linkage with the West and to de-
liver a future consolidated democracy in Uganda. His elec-
toral Twitter-based discourse stands in stark contrast to the
reality of decade-long competitive authoritarianism, unmiti-
gated political and military violence, or the use of organiza-
tional force described by his counter-candidate and by other
sources ( Abrahamsen and Bareebe 2021 ).
In his campaign communication on Twitter, Museveni
boasts a strong relationship with Western powers. On
November 8, reacting to the confirmed election of Joe
Biden in the United States, he states his intention to con-
tinue cooperation with the United States, motivated by
shared values and loyalty grounded in the African roots
of African–Americans, and states openly his hope to main-
tain a similar special relationship on trade and development
during the Biden administration: “Previous American Presi-
dents have already positively used these linkages by putting
in place the African Growth And Opportunity Act that has
given 6,500 types of African goods, quota & tax-free ac-
cess to the US. We salute this policy & hope that President
Biden maintains it.” He continues with the following tweets:
“President-Elect of the USA. Congratulations and greetings
from the People of Uganda. The USA, with its black popu-
lation of 47.4 m people, as well as a large Christian popula-
tion linked with us by faith, could easily be a natural ally of
Uganda and Africa.”
With the intent to signal a strong linkage with the West,
Museveni considers Uganda to be a democratic state and
actively promotes economic development ( figure 2 ) and
the continuation of international aid for the development
of Uganda’s infrastructure and food and financial secu-
rity, as well as a solution to large-scale unemployment. In
his eyes, this is a tried-and-tested approach to meet “peo-
ple’s needs”: On November 29, he tweets: “We have already
made great strides in this direction, I therefore urge our
people to elect the NRM flag bearers in the forthcoming
elections so that we complete what we started” and on De-
cember 21, he writes: “Interacted with our leaders from
Mubende, Kyankwanzi, Kiboga, Kasanda & Mityana districts.
I re-echoed the need for them to desist from divisive pol-
itics & focus on solving the needs of the people. Politics
is not a game or a joke, if handled badly, it can endan-
ger a nation.” These promises point to the continuation of
practices that have been commonplace during Museveni’s
rule—international development projects in the fields of in-
frastructural and agricultural development have tradition-
ally resulted in large handouts to individual households in
the vicinity of these projects as well as to gifts of money to
small businessmen ( Carbone 2005 ; Titeca and Flynn 2014 ).
Moreover, handouts have also been key to Museveni main-
taining the patronage system in place to secure the loyalty of
NRM politicians at the local level ( Vokes and Wilkins 2016 ).
In the months leading up to the January 2021 election,
Museveni builds an electoral campaign around an image of
his leadership as synonymous with long-standing peace and
security for Ugandan “people,” tapping into familiar tropes
linked to his participation in the guerrilla war in the 1980s.
This is also the main reason justifying international support
for his regime. On December 2, he tweets: “The mantle of
securing the future of Uganda is so great a task to play bets
on. It is not a gamble. It is a matter which requires lifelong
commitment, unending sacrifice, and vast experience.” This
electoral self-image is presumably primarily directed at a for-
eign audience of development aid donors, who may prize
the lack of an active cross-border war in an area with many
war-torn nations. At the same time, this representation ig-
nores the domestic use of organizational force and military
violence to guarantee Museveni’s regime when he came into
power in 1986 and also to consolidate political order over
the years ( Mudoola 1991 ; Kagoro 2016 ).
In populist spirit, Museveni refers to elite corruption as
a threat to the integrity of the Ugandan people. Perhaps
surprisingly, given that he is a long-standing incumbent, he
identifies corrupt elites among civil servants and business-
people, particularly those who allegedly use institutional
money that the government receives as foreign aid. This
communication is in line with NRM’s politics, which put
forward civil political structures to conceal the power of
the military and paramilitary structures and, ultimately, to
gain international legitimacy and, to a lesser extent, also
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/1/ksac081/6994369 by guest on 21 January 2023

CORINA LACATUS 9
Figure 3. Categories of aggregate nodes occurring in the Twittersphere @HEBobiwine (November 2020–January 2021).
legitimize the party’s position domestically ( Kagoro 2012 ).
Despite having three fully fledged civil political tiers of
governance—two elected branches of government at the na-
tional level, district-level institutions headed by an elected
LC5 chairperson, and subcounties headed by an elected
LC3 chairperson—the central government exerts consider-
able influence when the political stakes are high, like in
times of general elections ( Kagoro 2016 ). Moreover, par-
allel military and paramilitary structures often circumvent
and undermine civil political structures at all levels of gover-
nance ( Rubongoya 2007 ).
To create an image of himself as an approachable leader,
down to earth, capable of relating to his electorate, and giv-
ing “people” a voice, Museveni often uses Twitter to share
personal opinions and videos with curated private experi-
ences intended to offer the public a window into his private
background and life. Museveni appeals to his electorate’s
emotions, portraying himself as the military and political
hero that risked his life-saving Uganda from dictatorship
and war. On November 27, he tweets: “In our efforts to end
Idi Amin’s regime in the early 1970’s, we held a meeting in
this house and were ambushed by Amin’s soldiers. Some of
my soldiers were killed in this compound and I managed to
escape to Nashibisho forest.” Despite being an incumbent
and a long-term president, Museveni continues to present
himself as an outsider in Ugandan politics and as a hero
that narrowly escaped death and continue to fight for na-
tional freedom. On November 27, he tweets: “It is important
that our people appreciate all this is possible because of the
peace & stability guaranteed by the NRM government. At
one time, Uganda had the 4th highest number of refugees
across the world. Today, we are the second highest refugee-
hosting country in the world.”
Museveni signals to his electorate continuity and consis-
tency with familiar discourse, by anchoring his campaign in
themes linked to Uganda’s liberation that brought him vic-
tory 35 years prior. He portrays himself as experienced and
“down to earth,” a political leader with strong religious val-
ues, fully able to continue leading the country and meeting
“people’s needs.” Importantly, he legitimizes his candidacy
by boasting about his government’s capacity to create and
maintain strong relationships with Western donor states,
such as the United States, and carry on a successful foreign
policy focused on advancing economic development in
Uganda. His agenda includes primarily economic priorities,
such as increasing personal wealth through transitioning
from subsistence farming to commercial agriculture and
building infrastructure such as road and marketplaces to
facilitate local and cross-border trade.
Bobi Wine: Challenging Organized Force and Promising
Democratization
Banned from mainstream media outlets in the country, Bobi
Wine uses the immediacy of Twitter communication for radi-
cally different purposes. First, he publicly exposes the use of
organized institutional force, police brutality, and military
violence against himself, his campaign team, and to a more
limited extent also his supporters ( figure 3 ). Second, he de-
nounces the untruthfulness of Museveni’s alleged linkage
to the West and his commitment to democracy in Uganda.
Wine places “the people” at the center of his public commu-
nication ( figure 3 ). However, he does so in a manner that is
radically different from Museveni’s populist strategy to cam-
paign communication. Wine paints himself as a represen-
tative of the Ugandan people who are ready to “remove a
dictator” as the ultimate corrupt elite. As such, in his use
of public communication, violence perpetrated against him,
and his campaign become symbolic of the will of the “peo-
ple” and the pursuit of “freedom.” In response, he calls on
international allies to offer his campaign support and to stop
funding Museveni’s regime.
To Wine, social media outlets are the only means of im-
parting information about his electoral campaign to his vot-
ers and, in conjunction to Facebook, the sole avenue to mo-
bilize support for his candidacy, to ensure real-time commu-
nication with his followers, and to express personal opinions
and private information from the campaign trail. Wine’s
Twittersphere relays violence, murder, and obstruction of
electoral activity ( figure 3 ). Violence is primarily directed
at him and his campaign members but also violence more
generally in Ugandan society, targeting supporters of the
NUP as well as innocent civilians seeking political change.
On November 3, prior to the official launch of the elec-
toral campaign, a member of Wine’s team tweeted: “Right
after nomination, Bobi Wine was violently arrested outside
nomination venue! He’s been brutalised by police and
military. They’ve blocked him from proceeding to launch
his manifesto at office. It’s clear Museveni & his regime are
in so much panic. WE SHALL OVERCOME Admin.”
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/1/ksac081/6994369 by guest on 21 January 2023

10 Populism, Competitive Authoritarianism, and Foreign Policy
More than anything, Bobi Wine’s Twittersphere is a place
for him to communicate openly with his domestic and
international followers about the violence directed at him,
at his campaign, and at his followers. On November 5, at
the very start of his electoral campaign, Wine tweets: “This
morning, the military & police raided our Karamoja re-
gional office. They seized various items, arrested comrades
and vandalised our branding materials (posters, banners,
etc). While we condemn these illegal actions, they are a
good sign that the dictator is in total panic!” As the election
campaign advanced, Wine’s communication on Twitter
contained mostly messages of violence, reflecting the reality
on the ground, and leaving no room for policy-related mes-
saging or for sharing other electoral content. On December
26, for instance, Wine tweets: “For the 3rd time on the
campaign trail, armed forces opened fire at our car and
shot the tyres today. They do this to cut our speed, block
us from reaching certain places, etc. My conviction is, no
amount of intimidation can stop the yearning for change!
#WeAreRemovingADictator.” In early to mid-January 2021,
the extent of the violence directed at Wine’s campaign and
supporters increased even more and Wine was under house
arrest, as for instance on January 9: “Apart from arresting my
campaign team & security team, for over a month now more
than 2000 NUP supporters have been picked up from their
homes in the dead of the night and detained in unknown lo-
cations! Living under a dictatorship is such an experience!
#WeAreRemovingADictator.” Days prior to the election,
Wine is also reporting unmitigated attempts to obstruct
the conduct of free elections by slowing down the internet
connection, denying international media correspondents
visas to enter the country and report on the elections, and
refusing to invite or accept the application of international
observers. On January 10, Wine tweets: “Four days to the
election, the internet is already slowed down. Some ser-
vices have already been disrupted. Most people cannot
download our UVote App from Google play store. We’re en-
couraging everyone to download VPN & download UVote
from this link: https://uvote-uganda.com/download.”
On January 11, he tweets: “Lost count of how many in-
ternational journalists have told us they’ve been denied
visas of accreditation to come to Uganda and cover the
election! This is in addition to government deliberately
refusing to invite observers perceived to be very objective!
#WeAreRemovingADictator.”
Unlike Museveni’s campaign, Wine does not see Uganda’s
internationally funded economic development policies as
a sign of successful government policies or as a fortunate
result of good collaborations of government with interna-
tional donors. On January 13, he tweets: “While Museveni
calls me a foreign agent, these are the facts. [The West
helped cripple Uganda’s Democracy].” He condemns Mu-
seveni’s alleged strong linkage to the West as dishonest
and a clear danger to the survival of the Ugandan people.
On November 23, he tweets: “Health in Kyegegwa District.
(UBOS Census Report of 2014). 47.6 percent households
were found to be 5 km or more to the nearest health facility,
6.1 percent homes had access to piped water, 2,752 house-
holds had no toilet facility, 90,345 (98.8 percent) house-
holds were not living in decent dwellings.” Wine connects
the failure of adequate investment and absorption of devel-
opment funds into the Ugandan economy to the govern-
ment’s corruption. While future economic development is
important in Wine’s campaign as well, he focuses on poverty
and inequality as direct consequences of the corrupt policies
by the Museveni regime. On December 17, he tweets: “In-
creased demand and utilisation of electricity will in turn cre-
ate many job opportunities, but also increase government
revenue. If this revenue isn’t lost through corruption, it can
turn things around.” And December 18, he continues with a
series of three tweets: “When we pledge better services, e.g.,
health & educ, some people ask where the money will come
from. Truth, money is available, only misused or stolen! e.g.,
Auditor General’s reports show each year since FY 2015/16,
we lose average of shs24,909,253,883 in wasteful expendi-
ture. [. . .] This is 15 times the amount needed to supply all
girls in public schools from upper primary to tertiary with
sanitary towels for 1 year so they don’t miss school! (Wasteful
expenditure is when gov’t pays penalties or court awards for
incompetence, hence less money for services). [. . .] Elimi-
nating corruption, (not in word but action), increasing effi-
ciency in public administration as well as fostering discipline
in the management of public resources would go a long way
to improve the well being of our people. #WeAreRemovin-
gADictator.”
While he criticizes Museveni’s dishonest treatment of in-
ternational development aid and his breach of commitment
to a strong linkage with the West, Wine does not want
to alienate international support or potential future aid,
as promise for more successful economic development in
the future. Under the slogan “#WeAreRemovingADictator,”
Wine uses social media to gather public support domesti-
cally as well as international attention and endorsement for
the effort to end Museveni’s decades-long rule from power
and signals that he indeed is truthfully committed to democ-
ratization in Uganda. Writing about the efforts of voters fol-
lowing their election campaign and running into violence,
Wine tweets on November 28: “The people of Luwero have
made it unequivocal that they have a duty to remove the
dictator they helped create. For them, it has been a story
of betray and shattered hope. They are taking the leading
role in the struggle for freedom and democracy! #WeAreRe-
movingADictator.” In contrast to Museveni, he portrays him-
self as the candidate who is truly committed to Uganda’s de-
mocratization and to honestly working on strengthening the
country’s linkage with the West. On January 3, Wine tweets:
“Thank you @SenatorMenendez for this important state-
ment on safeguarding democracy in Uganda. Truly grateful
to the leaders of the world who are standing with the peo-
ple of Uganda in our pursuit for democracy and the rule
of law.” As such, he aims to be the candidate who opens
the West’s eyes to the need to stop supporting Museveni’s
regime and instead direct their support to him as the candi-
date who is genuinely intending to support democratization.
On December 22, he tweets: “Why we need to STOP LOSS,
fight corruption, end cronyism and patronage! Then we can
meaningfully invest in service delivery. #WeAreRemovingA-
Dictator.”
Despite his critique of long-standing western support for
Museveni, Wine is compelled to remain open toward the
very global governance mechanisms supporting economic
development in the country in the event he wins the elec-
tion and wants to deliver on his campaign promises of fur-
ther development. Thus, his campaign communication on
Twitter is on the one hand challenging existing power struc-
tures, calling for the removal of a 35-year dictatorship, and
on the other hand reinforcing existing systems of global gov-
ernance, without presenting a robust policymaking agenda
informed by thick ideology. In other words, in line with the
observations made by Levitsky and Way about Latin Amer-
ica, the risk of the country remaining a competitive autoc-
racy is high in the case of Wine’s potential election or the
election of a different opposition candidate with limited po-
litical experience.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/1/ksac081/6994369 by guest on 21 January 2023

CORINA LACATUS 11
Conclusion
Despite a significant increase in academic studies of pop-
ulism, the nature and manifestations of populism outside of
the Western world are under-researched, with a very small
number of studies focusing on populism on the African
continent. Researching populism outside of the Western
world, in competitive autocracies, expands our understand-
ing of what populism is, going beyond the paradigm of left-
wing and right-wing politics, and nuances our knowledge of
what the principal claims to authenticity are that substan-
tiate populist politics in nondemocratic domestic environ-
ments. The paper has sought to make a two-fold contribu-
tion to existing scholarship. It enhances our understanding
of populism in a competitive authoritarian state and of the
central role that foreign policy and attitudes toward exist-
ing systems of global governance can have in shaping pop-
ulist communication in electoral campaigns. Second, the pa-
per explores the cases of two Ugandan leaders described
as “populist”—Museveni and Wine—whose populist politi-
cal agendas are fundamentally different from one another
and not aligned with established “thick ideologies” mapping
on the left/right spectrum of politics.
This paper proposes a comparative analysis of the two
leaders’ campaign communication and foreign policy on
Twitter during the electoral campaign ahead of the January
2021 presidential election. The qualitative content analy-
sis has found that, despite similarities in running “people”-
centered campaigns and identifying corruption as a core
problem in Uganda, the content of the two candidates’
Twitter-based communication differs significantly. Musev-
eni uses electoral communication to reinforce his decades-
long regime, emphasizing his government’s capacity to cre-
ate and maintain strong relationships with Western donor
states and carry on a successful foreign policy focused on
advancing the same strategy for economic development in
Uganda. In contrast, in his Twittersphere, Wine’s campaign
rhetoric relates Museveni regime’s political longevity to the
West’s continued financial aid and calls for radical change
in foreign aid priorities, modifying its disbursement toward
putting an end to Museveni’s regime and a transition to
democracy. Against this background, the only solution Wine
proposes is to pursue the best interest of the “people” in
Uganda by removing Museveni from power and instating a
truly democratic government under Wine’s leadership.
Counter to existing scholarship on populists in the Global
South, I find that thick ideology might have a much more
limited effect on the electoral behavior of a populist leader
in a competitive autocracy, and this applies also to their com-
munication about foreign policy. When it comes to their po-
sition on foreign policy and the conduct of international re-
lations, strategic electoral communication is largely focused
on positioning themselves in relation to the West and sig-
naling a genuine commitment to a strong linkage and true
future democratization. In the case of a long-standing in-
cumbent, like Museveni, electoral communication about a
strong linkage with the West and a true commitment to de-
mocratizing the country stands in stark contrast with the
reality of poverty on the ground, the misuse of develop-
ment aid, and the conduct of autocratic politics. In their
turn, counter-candidates contesting a long-standing regime
promise a truthful future commitment to implementing de-
mocratization as well as an authentic and corruption-free
linkage with the West if successfully elected.
This paper aims to broaden our understanding of how po-
litical leaders—incumbents and opposition candidates—in
competitive autocratic countries of the Global South make
strategic use of populist communication to advance their
foreign policy agendas at election time. This analysis focuses
on a single case study—Uganda—which is a unique case of a
very long-standing competitive autocracy that has generally
enjoyed broad western support in recent decades. This case
study offers some important initial insight into when and
how populism and authoritarianism interact and about the
risks for populism to backslide into authoritarianism. How-
ever, the significance of this study’s findings spans beyond
the case of Uganda, being relevant for other countries on
the African continent as well as in other regions (see, for in-
stance, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela). This piece of research
on populist communication in a competitive authoritarian
context points to the need for scholars to dedicate much
greater attention to the theorization of the nexus between
authoritarianism and populism as well as to the implica-
tions of these political dynamics for international relations
theorizing.
Moreover, the analysis in this article focuses on Twitter-
based electoral communication, a medium that lends it-
self particularly well to the instantaneous delivery of short,
personal messages perceived by the target audience as au-
thentic and immediate. To improve the comparative di-
mension of such research and its generalizability, future
research could consider populist communication through
other channels—for instance, campaign speeches, party
manifestos, or mass media—and could also consider other
cases of competitive autocracies in Africa and beyond.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Sandra Destradi, Gustav Meibauer, and
Lone Sorensen for the careful reading of the manuscript
and very useful feedback at earlier stages of research. For
insightful discussion, the author is also grateful to the mem-
bers of the PSA Populism group and the participants in the
Populism, Political Communication and Performative Leadership
in International Politics workshop.
Supplementary Information
Supplementary information is available at the Global Studies
Quarterly data archive.
Funder Information
The author has received no funding in support of this re-
search.
References
ABRAHAMSEN, RITA, AND GERALD BAREEBE . 2021. “Uganda’s Fraudulent Elec-
tion.” Journal of Democracy 32 (2): 90–104.
AL JAZEERA . 2021. “Museveni Declared Winner of Disputed Uganda
Presidential Election.” January 17, 2021. Accessed May 17, 2021.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/16/ugandas-museveni-
declared-winner-of-presidential-election .
ALBERTAZZI, DANIELE, AND DUNCAN MCDONNELL . 2008. “Introduction: The Scep-
tre and the Spectre.” In Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of West-
ern European Democracy , edited by Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan Mc-
Donnell, 1–11. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
ASLANIDIS, PARIS . 2015. “Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New
Perspective:” Political Studies 64 (1): 88–104.
ATHUMANI, HALIMA . 2019. “Uganda’s Bobi Wine Formally Announces
Presidential Bid.” VOA News , July 24, 2019. Accessed May 17,
2021. https://www.voanews.com/africa/ugandas-bobi-wine-formally-
announces-presidential-bid .
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/1/ksac081/6994369 by guest on 21 January 2023

12 Populism, Competitive Authoritarianism, and Foreign Policy
BISCHOF, DANIEL, AND ROMAN SENNINGER . 2018. “Simple Politics for the People?
Complexity in Campaign Messages and Political Knowledge.” European
Journal of Political Research 57 (2): 473–95.
BOGAARDS, MATTHIJS, AND SEBASTIAN ELISCHER . 2016. “Competitive Authoritari-
anism in Africa Revisited.” Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft
10 (S1): 5–18.
BONIKOWSKI, BART . 2017. “Ethno-Nationalist Populism and the Mobilization
of Collective Resentment.” The British Journal of Sociology 68 (S1): S181–
213.
BONIKOWSKI, BART, AND NOAM GIDRON . 2016. “The Populist Style in American
Politics: Presidential Campaign Discourse, 1952–1996.” Social Forces 94
(4): 1593–1621.
CANOVAN, MARGARET . 1999. “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of
Democracy.” Political Studies 47 (1): 2–16.
CARBONE, GIOVANNI M. 2005. “‘Populism’ Visits Africa: The Case of Yoweri
Museveni and No-Party Democracy in Uganda.” Crisis States Research
Centre Wo rk ing Paper Series No 73.
CHRYSSOGELOS, ANGELOS . 2017. “Populism and Foreign Policy.” Accessed Jan-
uary 28, 2020. http://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/5186/1/Populism-
in-Foreign-Policy_OUP_Revised.pdf .
CLARKE, ISOBELLE, AND JACK GRIEVE . 2019. “Stylistic Variation on the Donald
Tru mp Twitter Account: A Linguistic Analysis of Tweets Posted be-
tween 2009 and 2018.” PLoS ONE 14 (9): e0222062.
DATA REPORTAL . 2022. “Digital 2022: Uganda.” https://datareportal.com/
reports/digital-2022-uganda .
DESTRADI, SANDRA, AND JOHANNES PLAGEMANN . 2019. “Populism and Interna-
tional Relations: (Un)Predictability, Personalisation, and the Rein-
forcement of Existing Trends in Wor ld Politics.” Review of International
Studies 45 (5): 711–30.
DREZNER, DANIEL W. 2017. “The Angry Populist as Foreign Policy Leader: Real
Change or Just Hot Air?” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 41 (23):
23–43.
ELISCHER, SEBASTIAN . 2013. Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Forma-
tion , 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
ENLI, GUNN . 2017. “Twitter as Arena for the Authentic Outsider: Explor-
ing the Social Media Campaigns of Trump and Clinton in the 2016
US Presidential Election.” European Journal of Communication 32 (1):
50–61.
ENLI, GUNN, AND LINDA THERESE ROSENBERG . 2018. “Trust in the Age of Social
Media: Populist Politicians Seem More Authentic.” Social Media + Soci-
ety 4 (1). https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305118764430 .
ERNST, NICOLE, SINA BLASSNIG, SVEN ENGESSER, FLORIN BÜCHEL, AND FRANK ESSER .
2019. “Populists Prefer Social Media over Tal k Shows: An Analysis of
Populist Messages and Stylistic Elements across Six Countries.” Social
Media + Society , https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051188233 .
FREEDOM HOUSE . n.d. “Uganda.” Accessed January 12, 2022.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-world/2020 .
GHERGHINA, SERGIU, MISCOIU, SERGIU, AND SORINA SOARE , eds. 2013. Contemporary
Populism: A Controversial Concept and Its Diverse Forms . Newcastle upon
Tyn e: Cambridge Scholars.
GOLOOBA-MUTEBI, FREDERICK, AND SAM HICKEY . 2016. “The Master of Institu-
tional Multiplicity? The Shifting Politics of Regime Survival, State-
Building and Democratisation in Museveni’s Uganda.” Journal of East-
ern African Studies 10 (4): 601–18.
HAWK IN S, KIRK A. 2010. Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Per-
spective , 1st ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.
KAGORO, JUDE . 2012. “Security Counterweights: A Power Maximizing Socio-
Political Strategy in Uganda.” Africa Journal for Peace and Conflict 5 (1):
1–13.
———. 2016. “Competitive Authoritarianism in Uganda: The Not So Hid-
den Hand of the Military.” Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft
10 (S1): 155–72.
KASASIRA, RISDEL . 2020. “Death To ll at 37 in Uganda Unrest after Bobi
Wine’s Arrest.” AP News , November 20, 2020. Accessed Novem-
ber 20, 2020. https://apnews.com/article/bobi-wine-kampala-health-
elections-coronavirus-pandemic-5e0f669f868431ace6102162b7fa4e8a .
KIRABO, LYNN, MOSES NAMARA, AND NATHAN MCNEESE . 2021. “The Power of the
Blue Tick (): Ugandans’ Experiences and Engagement on Twitter at
the Onset of the COVID-19 Pandemic.” In 3rd African Human–Computer
Interaction Conference , 84–93. Maputo Mozambique: ACM.
LACATUS, CORINA . 2019. “Populism and the 2016 American Election: Evidence
from Official Press Releases and Twitter.” PS: Political Science & Politics
52 (2): 223–28.
———. 2021. “Populism and President Trump’s Approach to Foreign Policy:
An Analysis of Tweets and Rally Speeches.” Politics 41 (1): 31–47.
LACATUS, CORINA, AND GUSTAV MEIBAUER . 2021. “Introduction to the Special
Issue: Elections, Rhetoric and American Foreign Policy in the Age of
Donald Trump.” Politics 41 (1): 3–14.
———. 2022. “‘Saying It Like It Is’: Right-Wing Populism, International Pol-
itics, and the Performance of Authenticity.” The British Journal of Politics
and International Relations 24 (3): 437–57.
LEBAS, ADRIENNE . 2011. From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization
in Africa . Oxford: Oxford Univ Press.
LEMARCHAND, RENÉ, CRAWFORD YOUNG, AND RENE LEMARCHAND . 1985. “Ideology
and Development in Africa.” Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue
Canadienne Des Études Africaines 19 (1): 253.
LEVITSKY, STEVEN . 2017. “Populism and Competitive Authoritarian-
ism.” Stanford University. Accessed June 1, 2022. https://fsi-live.
s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/populism_and_competitive_
authoritarianism_in_latin_america_0.pdf .
LEVITSKY, STEVEN, AND LUCAN WAY . 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid
Regimes after the Cold War . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
LEVITSKY, STEVEN, AND LUCAN AHMAD WAY . 2002. “Elections without Democracy:
The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2):
51–65.
LIANG, CHRISTINA SHORI . 2007. Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security
Policy of the Populist Radical Right . London: Routledge.
LUEBKE, SIMON M. 2020. “Political Authenticity: Conceptualization of a Popu-
lar Term.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 26 (3): 635–53.
MATTI, STEPHANIE A. 2010. “The Democratic Republic of the Congo? Corrup-
tion, Patronage, and Competitive Authoritarianism in the DRC.” Africa
Today 56 (4): 42–61.
MCDONNELL, DUNCAN, AND STEFANO ONDELLI . 2020. “The Language of Right-
Wing Populist Leaders: Not So Simple.” Perspectives on Politics 20 (3):
828–41.
MEIBAUER, GUSTAV . 2021. “Ambiguous Specificity: The Production of Foreign
Policy Bullshit in Electoral Contexts.” Politics & Governance 41 (1): 15–
30.
MOFFITT, BENJAMIN . 2015. “How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understand-
ing the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism.” Government and
Opposition 50 (2): 189–217.
MUDDE, CAS . 2004. “The Populist Zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition 39 (4):
543–63.
———. 2017. “Populism: An Ideational Approach.” In The Oxford Hand-
book of Populism , edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul A. Taggart,
Paulina Ochoa Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy, 27–47. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
MUDDE, CAS, AND CRISTOBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER , eds. 2013a. Populism in Eu-
rope and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
———. 2013b. “Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Con-
temporary Europe and Latin America.” Government and Opposition 48
(2): 147–74.
———. 2017. Populism: A Ve ry Short Introduction . New York: Oxford University
Press.
MUDOOLA, DAN . 1991. “Institution Building: The Case of the NRM and the
Military in Uganda 1986–1989.” In Changing Uganda , edited by Holger
B. Hansen and Michael Twaddle, 230–46. London: James Currey.
MUHUMUZA, WILLIAM . 2009. “From Fundamental Change to No Change: The
NRM and Democratization in Uganda, Democracy.” The East African
Review 76 (6): 22–43.
MWENDA, ANDREW M. 2007. “Personalizing Power in Uganda.” Journal of Democ-
racy 18 (3): 23–28.
NANTUME, GILLIAN . 2007. “Uganda: Tra cin g Bobi Wine’s Journey to Elective
Politics.” The Monitor , May 1, 2007.
NATIO NAL UNITY PLATFORM . 2020. “2021–2026 Manifesto.” Accessed
May 17, 2021. https://uchaguzi.go.ug/sites/default/files/2020-
12/NUP_UPLOADABLE_MANIFESTO_R3_sm%281%29.pdf .
NUGENT, PAUL . 2012. Africa since Independence , 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
OMARA-OTUNNU, AMII . n.d. “The Currency on Militarism in Uganda.” In The
Military and Militarism in Africa , edited by Eboe Hutchful and Ab-
doulaye Bathily, 399–428. Senegal: CODESRIA.
PEIFFER, C., AND P. ENGLEBERT . 2012. “Extraversion, Vulnerability to Donors,
and Political Liberalization in Africa.” African Affairs 111 (444):
355–78.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/1/ksac081/6994369 by guest on 21 January 2023

CORINA LACATUS 13
PLATTNER, MARC F. 2010. “Populism, Pluralism, and Liberal Democracy.” Jour-
nal of Democracy 21 (1): 81–92.
ROTHCHILD, DONALD, AND E. GYIMAH-BOADI . 1989. “Populism in Ghana and
Burkina Faso.” Current History 88: 538.
RUBONGOYA, JOSHUA B. 2007. Regime Hegemony in Museveni’s Uganda: Pax Mu-
sevenica , 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
SLATER, DAN . 2011. “Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the
Cold War.” Perspectives on Politics 9 (2): 385–88.
SORENSEN, LONE . 2021. Populist Communication . Switzerland: Palgrave Macmil-
lan.
SPIRO, R.J., AND J. JEHNG . 1990. “Cognitive Flexibility and Hypertext: The-
ory and Technology for the Non-Linear and Multidimensional Tr a ver-
sal of Complex Subject Matter.” In Cognition, Education, and Mul-
timedia , edited by D. Nix and R.J. Spiro, 163–205. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
STIER, SEBASTIAN, ARNIM BLEIER, HAIKO LIETZ, AND MARKUS STROHMAIER . 2018.
“Election Campaigning on Social Media: Politicians, Audiences, and
the Mediation of Political Communication on Facebook and Twitter.”
Political Communication 35 (1): 50–74.
TAGGART, PAUL A. 2000. Populism , Concepts in the Social Science. Philadel-
phia, PA : Open University Press.
TANGRI, ROGER, AND ANDREW M. MWENDA . 2003. “Military Corruption and
Ugandan Politics since the Late 1990s.” Review of African Political Econ-
omy 30 (98): 539–52.
THOMSON, ALEX . 2016. An Introduction to African Politics . London: Routledge.
TITECA, KRISTOF, AND RACHEL FLYNN . 2014. “‘Hybrid Governance,’ Legitimacy,
and (Il)Legality in the Informal Cross-Border Trade in Panyimur,
Northwest Uganda.” African Studies Review 57 (1): 71–91.
TRIPP, AILI MARI . 2004. “The Changing Face of Authoritarianism in Africa:
The Case of Uganda.” Africa Today 50 (3): 3–26.
———. 2005. “The Politics of Constitution-Making in Uganda.” In Framing
the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making , edited
by Laurel E. Miller, 158–75. Washington D.C.: The Endowment of The
United States Institute of Peace.
TROTTER, PHILIPP A., AND ROY MACONACHIE . 2018. “Populism, Post-Truth Poli-
tics and the Failure to Deceive the Public in Uganda’s Energy Debate.”
Energy Research & Social Science 43: 61–76.
VERBEEK, BERTJAN, AND ANDREJ ZASLOVE . 2017. “Populism and Foreign Policy.”
In The Oxford Handbook of Populism , vol. 1, 384–405, edited by Cristóbal
Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo and Pierre Os-
tiguy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
VOKES, RICHARD, AND SAM WILKINS . 2016. “Party, Patronage and Coercion in the
NRM’S 2016 Re-Election in Uganda: Imposed or Embedded?” Journal
of Eastern African Studies 10 (4): 581–600.
WEIS, TONI . 2014. “Dominant Parties and the Private Sector in Sub-Saharan
Africa: A Typolo gy of Approaches.” Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwis-
senschaft 8 (3–4): 263–81.
WEYLAND, KURT . 2001. “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in
the Study of Latin American Politics.” Comparative Politics 34 (1):
1–22.
WISEMAN, JOHN A. 1990. Democracy in Black Africa: Survival and Revival , 1st ed.
New York: Paragon House Publishers.
ZANE, DANIAM, AND PAUL BAKIBINGA . 2017. “Africa Highlights: Ghana Ar-
rests over ‘Mob Injustice’ Soldier Killing, Ethiopia Blocks In-
ternet.” BBC News , May 31, 2017. Accessed May 17, 2021.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-africa-39261833 .
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/1/ksac081/6994369 by guest on 21 January 2023