Recognition and The Public Sphere

Full text

1
Recognition and The Public Sphere
Introduction:
In this essay, I will look at the concept of recognition and its importance in today's society. I
will examine the different approaches to this concept and its various critiques. I also want to
focus on recognition in the "freedom of expression" and its relationship with recognition.
Should hate speech groups be recognized and be free to express racism? Suppose recognition
is a necessary principle for individual identity, self-actualization, self-esteem, justice, and
sympathy toward all minorities and various group identities; then, what is the solution for
those who present themselves as racist, and all sorts of anti-es and phobias groups, like neo-
Nazis, anti-Semitics, homophobic, Islamophobia, etc?
Many philosophers and theorists have written about recognition, including Axel
Honneth, Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser, Habermas, etc. (Lysaker, 2013, 12). This idea is
based on dialogue between different groups and identities in a situation where all parties
should be recognized and have equal rights and freedom to express themselves. Recognition
has become a keyword of our time and is a notion proving central to efforts to conceptualize
today's struggles over identity and difference. Whether the issue is indigenous land claims or
women's carework, homosexual marriage, or Muslim headscarves, moral philosophers use the
term recognition to mention these issues (Frazer, 2003, 1).
Axel Honneth emphasizes recognizing social justice and recognition of different
identities (Frazer, 2003, 3). Based on this, minorities must be respected by society for all their
diversity and differences. The government can cause suffering to minorities by violating their
rights and not recognizing them. Not only governments but also the dominant values of the
majority can cause misery for minorities. It can also cause them suffering, social isolation,
and social exclusion. Eventually, with this unjust violation, society will not be able to flourish
and provide well-being for all its citizens. In the liberal democratic society, the aim is to
recognize pluralism and defend minorities who are discriminated against and do not have a
voice. The purpose of recognition is to provide justice and freedom for discriminated groups.
Habermas attaches vital importance to recognition and extends this idea to the concept
of deliberative democracy (Mouffe, 1999, 3). For Habermas, disputes, misrecognition, and
disagreement can be resolved through equal dialogue. A consensus can be reached so that all
parties can present arguments and reasons and convince each other due to the dialogue. To
participate in the public sphere is necessary to accept a set of principles that allow for mutual

2
understanding between the parties, like freedom and equality. Finally, I will mention the
theme of freedom of speech because the issue is related to recognition and social justice.
Honneths Recognition:
It is necessary to start from the definition of recognition. Recognition is a vital human need
for society to survive and not end in violence and conflict (Lysaker, 2013, 17). Honneth
perceives recognition as a confirmation we achieve through bodily and verbal
communication. Recognition is thus based on the mutual and social relations we trade
through. Without this kind of affirmation and interaction, we cannot live a good life.
Recognition is a condition for self-realization, freedom, and the establishment of justice
(Lysaker, 2013, 12). Honneth emphasizes that the heart of the social is dialogue and
understanding through language processes or intersubjectivity between people. Therefore,
recognition is coupled with love, respect, and performance (Lysaker, 2013, 18).
The recognition theory is related to "identity," through which individuals realize their
identity and understand their essential characteristics as human beings (Tyalor, 1994, 25). The
violation of recognition causes suffering and marginalization of members of society who want
to have their own identities and are not willing to accept the majority and centralized
identities that dominate them. Because identity always makes sense in opposition to another.
In other words, identity is bifacial and two-sided (who I am and who I am not). Individuals
experience violation and injustice, either because of their culture, way of life, beliefs, or even
because of their ethnic backgrounds, which makes the conflicts of these marginalized groups
inevitable.
According to Taylor, the violation can result in a person or group being exposed to
various forms of harm; it can be about harming the person himself, relationships with other
people, or belonging to groups and institutions (Lysaker, 2013, 17). If the rights and identities
of certain minorities or groups, like ethnicity, religion, gender, different sexual orientation,
and so forth, are not recognized. In that case, there is no other way but to fight for recognition
(Lysaker, 2013, 22). The struggle for recognition, or in other words, the battle for change, can
be seen in Marx's works also and many others. Unlike Karl Marx, for Tyler and Honneth, the
struggle for recognition is not limited to the working class but involves all social groups that
have been marginalized.
Lysaker divides this lack of recognition into two
categories: misrecognition and nonrecognition. A misrecognition person holds an opportunity
to be motivated to a recognition struggle (Lysaker, 2013, 30 & Ebrahimi, 2022, 3); for

3
example, transexual groups or some religious minorities in some countries are a type of
misrecognized groups. However, nonrecognition refers to violations that make a struggle for
recognition impossible (Lysaker, 2013, 39). Nonrecognition should be understood as a radical
form of violation that can lead to the dehumanization and objectification of those individuals.
Two examples of nonrecognition are murder and statelessness. These examples of
nonrecognition result in an impossibility of the struggle for recognition, and murder can be a
massacre or war crime resulting from the dehumanization and objectification of certain
groups of people (Lysaker, 2013, 40-41 & Ebrahimi, 2022, 3).
He also talks about the three stages of "recognition" in the following. These three steps
represent the three forms of receiving oneself. The first step of recognition will be achieved in
the family (Lysaker, 2013, 23). It is important because, without this recognition, a child will
suffer from a lack of self-confidence. The second essential step in recognition is based on
individual "self-respect". In a society, everyone should consider themselves human beings
with dignity and equality with others. The nature of this recognition is essentially legal and is
crystallized in the individual's relationship with society (Lysaker, 2013, 25). It is important
because, with recognition in this stage, she will become a citizen who finds moral
responsibility towards her society. Realizing equality with others will cause the individual to
come out of a state of passivity in the face of what is happening in the community and play a
political and social role, like being active in the public sphere and could have an active role in
social discussion. The third essential step in recognition is based on individual "self-esteem".
(Honneth, 1996, 134). Although it is a continuation of the previous stage, this stage delicately
goes beyond it. At this stage, the individual is respected not because he is a human being like
all others but because she is unique with his own identity, culture, characteristics, and
distinctions.
It should be noted that the three stages in which Honneth categorizes recognition are
all of a conversational nature or reciprocity. In other words, they can also be considered a
kind of struggle in dialogue with other subjects. So, we can say that Axel Honneth and
Habermas move in the same frame of mind.
Deliberative Democracy and Recognition:
Jürgen Habermas is considered one of the most influential thinkers of the critical school.
While criticizing modernity and calling it unfinished and half-finished projects, he tried to
complete and correct it with reforms. His crucial idea in political thought has been processed
around the concepts of "deliberative democracy" and "rational consensus" (Mouffe,1999, 4). I

4
think Habermas's idea of discourse and the public sphere is vital for the struggle for
recognition. Hence, the public sphere could become a place where the misrecognized
individuals and groups could have the opportunity to fight for their rights and provide
arguments to convince other groups. In Habermas's conceptualization, the public sphere is a
spatial site where citizens' opinion- and will-formation occur through an ongoing reason-
giving, critique, and disagreement (Lysaker & Syse, 2016, 10).
His central thesis in this model is that political decisions in a society should be made
through dialogue and consultation between free and equal citizens. So, it is crucial that every
group could participate in the public sphere and can speak their mind without fear of insult
and destruction. When Habermas writes about all citizens, all marginalized groups also must
have the right to participate. By introducing the concept of public space, Habermas offers us a
solution for the recognition of marginalized groups. The struggle for recognition could solve
through discussion and does not necessarily need physical violence to reach recognition. For
example, both homosexuals and anti-LGBT groups can sit and peacefully bring arguments
and reasons for their claims in the public sphere.
The first problem will arise when a particular group of people does not have the right
to participate in the public sphere. So, there is no other way for them to protest and fight in the
streets for their rights or be hiddenly active as an isolated, marginalized group within
themselves, like the Afro-American movement, in which they did not have tribune. Therefore,
they didn't have any other way but to make practical and physical efforts and protest in the
tribunes that they created for themselves and bring their voices on the streets and sometimes
with violence to make their voices heard by the society.
The second problem arises when some do not tolerate hearing another and want to be
accepted without opposing any reason. According to Habermas, nobody has the right to
impose their opinion on another, in which case it is not acceptable. Any claims or ideas that
cannot be justified by reason become illegitimate (Habermas, 2006, 5).
Another essential point for Habermas is that all groups can participate and discuss
various issues in the public sphere, with the condition that they recognize the freedom and
equality of others. Nevertheless, there might be a problem in his presupposition for
participating. He says firstly that all citizens should participate in the public sphere. What
about non-citizens who are not recognized like stateless people? For example, Syrian or
African refugees living hardly without any citizenship and wish to have citizenship so they
can work and have an everyday life? Secondly, He mentioned that every citizen should
respect the freedom and equality of others so they can participate in the public sphere.

5
However, suppose the debate in the public sphere is the recognition of a particular
marginalized group and its legalization. In that case, the precondition of the discussion is
confused with the purpose and telos of the discussion. In other words, if all participants had
recognition for each other's identity in the first place, it would not be necessary to have
dialogue for recognition. Therefore, a discussion for recognition aims to reach freedom and
justice for all participants. For instance, if homosexuals are willing to participate and dialogue
with the anti-LGBT Christians, they want to be recognized during reasoning and participation
in the discussion. Some groups do not recognize other's identities as equal to themselves; with
Habermasian precondition, the dialogue between those people will never occur with this
default. By this presupposition, the range of topics and groups that participate and dialogue
with each other will limit to sub-topics between recognized groups, such as meeting city
council members to review the district budget or similar issues, not within the scope of the
recognitions struggle.1
There are other critiques against the logocentrism thesis of Habermas, especially by
post-structuralist thinkers. Is it possible to change other's minds with reason and argument?
Why should we eradicate pluralism and disagreement between social groups? Are all people
on one level capable of giving a reason?
These questions are very vast topics, and we cannot go through them all. Despite these
problems, I agree with emphasizing reason and argument between participating because one
can reduce bias and try to present arguments with minimum prejudice. Just as many non-
homosexual Christians accept the reasons for recognizing Christian homosexuals, and those
who are Muslim accept the reasons for Muslim feminists in support of women's rights. This
acceptance is often accepted because it is rational and acceptable to common sense. It is
possible to provide the argument to challenge the statue que and make the change for the
public good for every possible issue.
In contrast to deliberative democracy, Chantal Mouffe brings an alternative model
called Agonistic Pluralism. Instead of emphasizing dialogue, understanding, and consensus,
1 I think precondition and reason for these two values (equality and freedom) for
participating in the public sphere is that if a group sees themselves as superior and not equal
to other groups, they will never participate with inferior groups and never give them
opportunities to speak their minds and share their reason. So, all groups need to see each other
as equal in order for a conversation to take place.

6
this model emphasizes conflict, power, and language games. She thinks every consensus
exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as stabilization of power, which
always entails some form of exclusion (Mouffe,1999, 13). According to Mouffe, the question
is not how to reach a rational consensus without exclusion; that is indeed an impossibility.
The goal of agonistic pluralism is to establish the us-them discrimination in a way that is
compatible with pluralist democracy. In other words, it presupposes that "other" is no longer
seen as an enemy to be destroyed but as an adversary. An adversary is a legitimate enemy, an
enemy with whom we have in common a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of
democracy. Our disagreement cannot be solved and reached a unity through deliberation and
rational discussion (Mouffe,1999, 11-12). For Mouffe, modern democracy lies in the
recognition and legitimation of conflict and the refusal to suppress it by imposing an
authoritarian order (Mouffe,1999, 13)
As we have seen, she does not consider pluralism as a negative thing and considers the
existence of these differences and contradictions as one of the characteristics of democracy.
However, I do not think she has set a clear standard for how an enemy can become an
adversary. Will this enmity be diminished through dialogue and reasoning? What should we
do when they are two opposite groups and ideas against each other who are not recognizing
the rights of each other? For instance, how can homosexuals get their freedom and justice, and
at the same time, homophobic groups reach their interests? If she considers dialogue a
criterion, she speaks in Habermas's intellectual paradigm.
In addition, she sees equality and freedom as one the ideals of a democratic society in
which everyone should be equal and free. Mouffe believes in agonistic pluralism; there is a
certain amount of consensus and principle (Mouffe,1999, 13). The question is, how did this
consensus come about? If this consensus is reached by dialogue, why not other topics? One
can undeniably argue which side is right in a fair trial. In a court of law, the parties' lawyers
begin to present evidence and reasons, and the panel of judges can determine which party's
reasons are heavier. Different between the Habermasian public sphere and a court of law is
that there is no dominance or power in the public sphere, and it is the participators themselves
who judge themselves.
The criticism against these postmodern thinkers can level is that their view leads to
radical relativism. It finds any agreement between the parties impossible and in which it does
not legitimize any principle called truth. A relativistic view can result in Nazi behaviors
towards the Jews being defensible from their own point of view! Further, if it is impossible to
know another, the possibility of recognition and research and knowing is closed. There must

7
be a window to understand each other, and only due to understanding is it possible to speak
about recognition and justice. Therefore, to recognize others' rights and interests, there is no
way other than sitting with each other and hearing what they have in their mind.
As a result, I think this relativistic view of Postmodern thinkers will intensify the nihilistic
culture of our time. Postmodernism has helped create a cultural atmosphere where the
distinction between right and wrong - good and bad - justice and injustice - rational reasoning
and fallacy - liberalism and totalitarianism - absolute freedom and the illusion of freedom
have disappeared. This extreme relativism is characteristic of postmodernism and critics of
Habermas, which also has an internal paradox because it aims to "critique" structures.
However, criticism is impossible by eliminating between right and wrong, reason and fallacy.
They have a kind of self-defeating argument. From this point of view, the postmodern era is
the end of the general concept of justice.
Recognition of hate speech?
What about the recognition of those who disagree with the equality of people? Groups such as
neo-Nazi or racist white supremacist supporters or xenophobic groups? Do these individuals
have the right to share their opinion in the public sphere without shame? Should the law be
ethical? Should freedom of speech be limited to specific criteria? If the state reduces the
freedom of speech of certain group members, doesn't it become a contradiction with
Habermasian and Honneth approaches to recognition?
According to Lysaker and Syse, these questions exist at the intersection of law and
morality. They arguably demand that we treat the two realms together in a way that does not
disengage the law from morality and the idea of human dignity (Lysaker & Syse, 2016, 2).
However, some liberal philosophers believe that law does not necessarily have to be ethical.
Svendsen claims that it is perfectly legal to be an immoral person (Lysaker & Syse, 2016, 5). I
believe Svendsen does not distinguish between the fact that the law itself is immoral and
some individuals living their life immorally. For example, apartheid law was immoral because
it harmed and discriminated against many people in society. As a result, immoral state laws
are not defensible. But if one individual or group believes that blacks in South Africa are not
equal to whites, one is free to have that opinion and live immorally as long they do not harm
others. However, the law itself could not be against human dignity. In other words, the law
should be ethical.
Here are two approaches to freedom of expression or recognition of specific groups: 1.
Absolute freedom 2. Balance of harm. According to those who defend absolute freedom,

8
offensive statements can be relative to anyone, so they should not be restricted because the
limit is unclear, and anything can hurt someone. The best way to deal with racism is to
provide a moral and rational reason and argument against racism (Lysaker & Syse, 2016, 5).
In this view, all groups, even hate groups, should be recognized, and use the freedom of
speech. Dealing with racism is also epistemological and should be discussed in the public
sphere, and the way is not banning or limiting those groups or individuals. I think this view is
against Habermas's theory of equality in the public sphere because, for Habermas, all who
participate in the public sphere should see others as equal and consider the human dignity of
others. Therefore, Habermas could not defend absolute freedom with his presupposition.
Svendsen echoes John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, in which Mill argues that 'there ought
to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing' and that one should be legally allowed
to express oneself regardless of how immoral one's utterances may be seen to be. Mill claims
that free speech is the solution to the problem of the 'tyranny of the majority' (Lysaker &
Syse, 2016, 5). However, even Svendsen concedes that there are some instances in which hate
speech is of such a nature that it represents a clear threat, for example, to minority groups. In
such cases, Svendsen suggests, these utterances should be categorized and treated under John
Stuart Mill's 'harm principle' rather than being defined as illegal (Lysaker & Syse, 2016, 5).
According to these liberal thinkers, the law can only intervene if there is a clear threat.
For example, if a racist wants to have a scientific debate that the IQ of a specific race is higher
than another race according to genetics and survey. Although it is hated speech and pseudo-
scientific racism, it can be expressed according to absolute freedom promoters; hence it is not
based on the threat. So, society should recognize all groups as long they don’t harm or
threaten other people's rights and freedom. However, suppose a racist wants to threaten a
specific group of people to eliminate them from their rights and is a direct danger to the
existence of those minorities. In that case, this is not allowed according to pro-absolute
freedom.
The second position is that philosophers advocate the restriction of freedom of
expression. They want to create a balance of harm. If someone harasses another with hate
speech, this harassment will be neutralized by restricting their freedom of expression. In their
view, some hate speech is both immoral and illegal. Law should not allow immorality
(Lysaker & Syse, 2016, 2-4).
Regarding John Austin's speech act theory, it tells us that 'to speak is to act in the
world and to influence, preserve, or change it in specific ways (Lysaker & Syse, 2016, 7). The
harm balance argument's central core is a close connection between speech and action.

9
Creating a complete separation between words and action is a moral disclaimer of the reality
that hatred can create for people. Spreading hatred can change the life and external reality of
those people. Those who defend absolute freedom take away moral responsibility from this
phenomenon and ignore this fact (Lysaker & Syse, 2016, 8).
Consequently, the notion of dignity plays a significant role in the balance argument
(Lysaker & Syse, 2016, 8). The balance of harm argument attempts to protect human dignity.
Free speech may rightly be legally restricted in cases where respect for the social standing of
minority groups is harmed since their freedom of expression is effectively curtailed by hate
speech. In this sense, misrecognition transferred from one group to another (to hate speakers)!
I think there is a vast space for freedom of speech. Yes, freedom of expression can be
limited to very few issues that lead to social violence and violence in action. These issues are
limited, such as racism, ethnic discrimination, and intimidation. However, we have
considerable space for discussion on all matters, from criticizing politicians to economic,
social, political, philosophical, and religious spheres. If there is a red line, the red line is tiny
and narrow. Judith Butler has raised the question, "under what conditions does freedom of
speech become the freedom to hate" (Vetlesen & Bangstad, 2011, 10). Historically, we know
that the repression of Jews and other minorities has always begun with rhetoric and hate
speech. If the goal of a society is to create a good life with the human dignity of all members
of society, spreading hatred has the opposite effect. It leads the society to isolation,
polarization, and violence. Consequently, restricting freedom of expression for a higher
benefit and higher values might not contradict the principle of freedom of expression because
freedom of speech is a means to a good life.
Conclusion:
Recognition is a vital human need, and it can achieve due to dialogue and conversation
between subjects to achieve principles such as equality and freedom. In the third stage of
Honneth recognition, we understood that equality of human beings does not mean that they
are the same in all aspects. Society should recognize the differences and have respect for
diversity so that individuals can have self-esteem and be proud of their identity. Still, we must
remember that human beings have common characteristics and needs, regardless of their
differences. Demand for recognition and respect, the need for the right to live and freedom of
choice, need for equal rights regardless of their differences. Equating people in society means
giving everyone equal opportunities to participate in social life and pursue personal goals.
Kant believed that every human being is an end, not a mean, and should not be turned into a

10
tool to achieve a specific purpose. In this view, nobody is allowed to dehumanize or objectify
a certain individual and do not recognize their rights.
On the other hand, free speech debates show that not all groups can be recognized.
Recognition of hate groups such neo-Nazi and White supremacists can violate the freedoms
and rights of minority groups and individuals. So when it comes to recognition, it does not
mean that hate speech groups calling for violence, repression of dissidents, ethnic
discrimination and oppressors of religious minorities, etc., are to be recognized. However,
recognizing other groups who are not dangerous to people's freedom, for instance,
homosexuals, transgender people, extremely poor people, feminists etc, do not hinder others
and do not harm the freedom, rights, and dignity of other human beings. Therefore, it is
necessary to recognize these minorities, and everybody must realize them due to human
dignity and human rights.
Reference:
Ebrahimi, Amir Martin (2022), Recognition and Justice, Obligatorisk fremleggsseminar
Frazer, N. & Honneth, A (2003). Redistribution or Recognition? (Translated by Joel Golb,
James Ingram and Christiane Wilke) London: Verso.
Habermas, Jurgen (2006, March 14), Religion in the Public Sphere. Europeans Journal of
Philosophy. Hentet fra: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-
0378.2006.00241.x
Honneth, Axel. (1996). The Struggle for Recognition (The Moral Grammar of Social
Conflicts), (Translated by Joeal Anderson), Cambridge: Polity press
Lysaker, Odin. (2013). MENNESKEVERDETS POLITIKK, Anerkjennelse av kroppslig
krenkbarhet. Oslo: abstrakt forlag AS.
Lysaker, Odin & Syse, Henrik (2016, Aug 12), The Dignity in Free Speech: Civility norms in
post-terror societies. Nordic Journal of Human Rights Henter fra:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18918131.2016.1212691
Mouffe, Chantal (1999), Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?. The John Hopkins
University Press. Hentet fra:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40971349.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A30352cbe956c59c362b
73c0546753fdc&ab_segments=&origin=
Taylor, Charles. (1994). The politics of recognition. Multiculturalism: examining the politics
of recognitions. Amy Gutmann (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.

11
Vetlesen, Arne Johan & Bangstad, Sindre (2011, December 5), Ytringsfrihet og
Ytringsansvar. Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift. Hentet fra:
https://www.idunn.no/doi/10.18261/ISSN1504-3053-2011-04-02