Content uploaded by Kevin McDonough
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Kevin McDonough on Mar 01, 2023
Content may be subject to copyright.
Does State Secularism Require Teachers to Abstain from Wearing Religious Symbols at School?
422
P H I L O S O P H Y O F E D U C A T I O N 2 0 1 4
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 2014 | Michele S. Moses, editor
© 2017 Philosophy of Education Society | Urbana, Illinois
Does State Secularism Require Teachers to Abstain from
Wearing Religious Symbols at School?
Bruce Maxwell
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières
Kevin McDonough
McGill University
David I. Waddington
Concordia University
In 2013, the Canadian province of Québec proposed a controversial legal
framework, the Charter of Québecois Values,1 which would forbid all public sector
employees, from judges to teachers to health-care workers, from wearing “ostenta-
tious” religious symbols in the workplace. Predictably, a spirited public discussion
has ensued, which parallels past debates in France over the state’s right to impose
legal restrictions of religious symbols in public life. Similar questions about the place
of religious symbols in public space have also fuelled recent political controversies
in Germany and the Netherlands.2
From an educational standpoint, one of the most interesting facets of the Québec
debate concerns the rights and obligations of religiously committed teachers. The
proponents of the clothing ban claim that the public school is a haven from religious
inuence and suggest that teachers and administrators should refrain from wearing
religious symbols in order to better convey the state’s secular values. Opponents,
meanwhile, claim that the ban violates the rights of religious believers and miscon-
ceives the nature of the authority that teachers have. Thus, within the larger battle
over religious symbols in the public sphere, the following key question has emerged:
does state secularism require teachers to abstain from wearing religious symbols at
school? This question, which has ramications that extend well beyond the specic
context of Québec, is what we will examine in our account below.
Because the literature on this topic in English is virtually non-existent, the
approach we adopt in this paper is largely reconstructive. We begin by addressing
arguments from debates in Québec and France about state prohibition of religious
clothing. From the many, often confused and sometimes patently irrelevant and
mean-spirited, claims and counterclaims that are made in these debates, we identify
and articulate two prima facie compelling secularism-based arguments in support
of the view that the state can legitimately forbid public servants from wearing
religious symbols. After presenting and assessing these arguments, which we call
the neutrality argument and autonomy argument respectively, we show that each
has signicant weaknesses. We then extend this critique to show that debates over
religious symbols in the public service highlight important ethical questions about
wearing religious symbols in the classroom. Specically, we argue that there are cir-
cumstances in which a public school teacher might reasonably judge it best to refrain
423Bruce Maxwell, Kevin McDonough, and David I. Waddington
P H I L O S O P H Y O F E D U C A T I O N 2 0 1 4
from wearing a religious symbol at school, and we elaborate three illustrations for
this point.
Two PrinciPles of sTaTe secularism
According to a common view, state secularism serves an important purpose in
plural societies where at least two key conditions obtain: rst, a signicant number
of citizens hold religiously inected views about the good life and justice; second,
citizens adhere to diverse and potentially conicting religious doctrines.3 Under
these conditions, state secularism comprises two distinct obligations on the part of
the state: the obligation to neutrality, which requires the actions of the state to treat
all religions impartially, and the obligation to autonomy, which requires government
policy to be established and executed free from the inuence of any religious authority.4
We have two main reasons for emphasizing the distinction between state neu-
trality and state autonomy. First, these two concepts are often conated in public
debates about religious symbols, and it is hoped that this analysis will help clear
up some of this confusion. Second, and most importantly, these two concepts form
the principal axes of the debate, and the strongest arguments of the strict secularists
who wish to ban religious symbols draw upon these two concepts. If the arguments
of the strict secularists are to be examined, we must begin with an examination of
neutrality and autonomy.
Does sTaTe neuTraliTy require a Ban on religious Dress for Teachers?
Perhaps the most common argument advanced for prohibitions on religious sym-
bols in the public workplace appeals to the value of state neutrality. State secularism
assumes that because different religious traditions make competing and irreconcilable
claims about collective political norms, the state must remain as neutral as possible
between these diverse claims. In light of inevitably conicting religious claims,
the principle of state neutrality represents the secular state’s commitment to equal
respect for all citizens, regardless of citizens’ particular religious afliations. Within
the Anglo-American tradition, the origins of the principle of neutrality can be traced
back in the philosophical literature to John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration.5 In
a historical context riven by religious strife, Locke argued that the state had neither
a religious nor a democratic mandate to use force to promote one particular religion.
Locke’s argument was later taken up by key architects of the liberal democratic state,
most notably Thomas Jefferson, who drew upon it to frame the First Amendment
of the United States’ Constitution. Contemporary liberal proponents of state bans
on religious symbols also invoke this principle of state neutrality as an instrument
for defending religious freedom and for maintaining state legitimacy in the eyes of
religiously diverse citizens.
The principle of neutrality requires that state policies be impartial toward the
different religious traditions to which its citizens subscribe. “The neutral state must
not,” Micheline Milot writes, “directly or indirectly, promote any religion or put any
religion at a disadvantage.”6 Accordingly, if the state confers advantages to particular
religious groups — for instance, through laws exempting a Christian sect but no other
religious group from paying property tax on religious sites — it unfairly favors one
religious group over others and abnegates neutrality.
doi: 10.47925/2014.422
Does State Secularism Require Teachers to Abstain from Wearing Religious Symbols at School?
424
P H I L O S O P H Y O F E D U C A T I O N 2 0 1 4
In contemporary controversies, some have sought to extend the historically
non-interventionist spirit of state neutrality by arguing that the state should forbid
explicit signs of religious afliation among public servants.7 Although we later argue
that this prohibitionist argument remains philosophically unconvincing, its intuitive
appeal for contemporary debates is fairly obvious. Prohibitionist views of state neu-
trality claim that allowing public servants to display religious symbols exemplies
the sort of favoritism that the principle of neutrality forbids. This prohibitionist stance
gains plausibility from the fact that states routinely ban expressions of conscience
(e.g., a pin bearing the slogan “USA out of Afghanistan!” or “Yes to an indepen-
dent Québec!”) and political afliation (e.g., a lapel pin of the Tea Party) by those
in public service. From this perspective, permissiveness with respect to religious
symbols seems to imply an unfair double standard: the state exempts expressions
of religious freedom from restrictions applied to other expressions of conscience.
This argument directly applies to the case of teachers who wish to dress in
accordance with religious requirements. When the state permits teachers to wear
religious symbols in the classroom, it prioritizes freedom of religion over freedom
of conscience and endorses the legitimacy of religiosity over non-religiosity. A per-
missive state therefore surrenders its commitment to fundamental secular political
values in favor of manifestly religious values endorsed by certain citizens — namely,
teachers who wish to express their religious afliation at work.
State neutrality provides one important source for arguments made in favor
of prohibitions on teachers who wish to wear religious attire in the classroom. But
notice that this kind of argument can gain plausibility only through a conceptually
misleading sleight-of-hand. The principle of state neutrality begins with one question:
“How can the State adopt a non- discriminatory stance concerning personal expres-
sions of religiosity in the workplace?” The prohibitionist responds by answering a
different question: “How can the State adopt a non-discriminatory stance concerning
personal expressions of conscience tout court in the workplace?” In shifting from
one question to another, the prohibitionist interpretation changes the discourse and
makes it appear as though state neutrality is being violated.
The paramount goal of state neutrality is to establish guidelines about state
conduct precisely with respect to religious belief and practice. The question of state
conduct with respect to conicts between freedom of conscience and religion is a
separate matter. Underlying the historical basis of this interpretation, noted above, are
its epistemic roots. Religion has an irreducibly non-rational element that liberalism
has long recognized. Unlike matters of personal conscience, disagreements having
to do with religious conscience cannot be adjudicated using a common secular or
public language. Accordingly, state neutrality seems to assume that religious freedom
warrants a distinct political status from more general issues of personal conscience.
Seen in this light, the neutrality principle implies a policy of permissiveness
rather than a policy of prohibition. Broadly speaking, the neutrality principle seems
to imply that all public servants, including public school teachers, have the right
to materially express personal religious commitments, unless doing so conicts
with other imperatives such as upholding professional duties, personal safety of
doi: 10.47925/2014.422
425Bruce Maxwell, Kevin McDonough, and David I. Waddington
P H I L O S O P H Y O F E D U C A T I O N 2 0 1 4
students and school staff, or, as we discuss in the next section, the principle of state
autonomy.
We have focused in this section on critically evaluating state neutrality as a basis
for prohibitionist arguments, and have suggested that it is a poor one. Nevertheless,
we acknowledge that genuine concerns remain about fairness in establishing rules
around freedom of religion and freedom of conscience in the workplace. We also
acknowledge that concerns about freedom of conscience raise difcult questions
that need urgently to be addressed.
Does The PrinciPle of sTaTe auTonomy require a
ProhiBiTion on religious Dress?
So far, we have focused on a popular argument that arises from a questionable
understanding of the nature of state neutrality. In this next section, we reconstruct
and evaluate a second, parallel argument adduced in favor of restrictive state policies.
This argument, which in our view has substantially more philosophical bite than the
neutrality argument, appeals to the aspect of secularism we have called the principle
of state autonomy. The principle of state autonomy requires the state to operate free
from the inuence or interference of religious authorities, and also to avoid interfer-
ing in the internal affairs of religious groups. The principle of autonomy, as Milot
denes it, emphasizes “the State’s independence from various religious groups and,
reciprocally, the autonomy of religious organizations from political power.”8 This
principle captures the ideal of the secular state as a res publica, within which pro-
cesses for elaborating collective norms that promote and protect individual interests,
rights, and the common good shall not be beholden to or unduly inuenced by the
prescriptions of any religious authority.
We noted earlier the tendency to conate the principle of autonomy with the
principle of neutrality. Two examples illustrate why these principles constitute two
conceptually distinct dimensions of state secularism. Contemporary communist China
can be cited as an example of a state that seems to adhere strongly to the autonomy
principle, but that largely rejects the neutrality principle. Since the Communist
takeover, China has successfully reduced the inuence of religion on state policy
through a variety of contested means. Yet China is renowned for politically motivated
discriminatory policies against certain religious minorities in the north and east of
the country and against followers of Falun Gong. By contrast, the United Kingdom
is an example of a contemporary state that departs from the autonomy principle
while prioritizing neutrality: Anglicanism is an ofcial state religion, but citizens
have extensive religious freedom, and successive governments have worked hard to
ensure evenhandedness in the state’s treatment of religious communities. Although
Anglicanism’s inuence on state policy is admittedly nominal, it is telling that such
endorsement of one religious sect by the federal government of the United States
would be politically unthinkable. Making, say, the Church of Scientology the ofcial
state religion of the United States would lead many to reasonably suspect that it
would gain a privileged inuence on federal policy. This example illustrates why the
principle of autonomy is essential to U.S. citizens’ condence in their government
and their sense of its legitimacy.
doi: 10.47925/2014.422
Does State Secularism Require Teachers to Abstain from Wearing Religious Symbols at School?
426
P H I L O S O P H Y O F E D U C A T I O N 2 0 1 4
The principle of autonomy directly concerns teachers, who are in close contact
with pupils over long periods of time and who have a public mandate to participate
in young people’s upbringing, socialization, and education. Teachers who display
religious symbols within the school can generate two linked sets of autonomy-related
concerns. First, religious signs convey particular values, and students may see them
as a sign that teachers implicitly endorse values that contradict, and take priority
over, those of the liberal state. Second, concerns about the abuse of state power may
arise because public employees (teachers) could attempt to transmit their religious
beliefs and values to their pupils. Generally speaking, then, the wearing of a reli-
gious symbol by public school teachers raises potential concerns about conicts of
interest between teachers’ professional obligations and their religious obligations.
The principle of autonomy is at stake in both cases because religious teachers are
seen to be in a position, to borrow a phrase from David Hume, to “season [the stu-
dents’] minds with early piety.”9 Thus, in secular democratic societies, particularly
ones like Québec in which religious inuence has historically been strong, it is in
the interest of public trust that the state school system be seen as autonomous from
the inuence of religious doctrine. For this reason, state policies that permit teachers
to wear religious symbols risk appearing indifferent to potential violations of the
principle of autonomy in the classroom.
However, in this case, we suggest that appearances are deceptive; in fact, a
policy that prohibits religious symbols necessarily conicts with that other core
liberal value mentioned earlier — religious freedom. Furthermore, there is one very
important additional reason to doubt the adequacy of autonomy-based arguments
for prohibitionist policies: they rely on several questionable assumptions about
the normative psychology of religious people. First, the fact that one wears a reli-
gious symbol does not imply that one assigns ethical priority in every context to
the values that symbol represents. A parent who brings photographs of her family
to work does not thereby impugn the importance of her role at work; similarly, a
woman who wears the hijab need not thereby be committed to assigning priority
in her work role to Islamic values over secular values. Second, all public sector
employees, regardless of religiosity, potentially have normative commitments that
are incompatible with the liberal democratic state they represent and, therefore,
concerns about autonomy need not apply with heightened urgency to these work-
ers. Third, the autonomy argument seems to assume that religious teachers whose
value commitments conict with those of the state are more likely to abuse their
professional authority in the classroom than non-religious teachers are. Whether they
are religious or not, many teachers may act upon their personal reservations about
aspects of the state curriculum they are required to teach. Furthermore, anyone who
works with student teachers, religious or non-religious, will likely have observed
that they very commonly explain their career choice by referring to the valuable
opportunity that teachers have to shape the values and even the personalities of the
young people in their charge. Inevitably, the values they wish to promote are almost
always their personal values, with little thought given to the extent to which their
personal values are compatible with those they are mandated to promote. These
doi: 10.47925/2014.422
427Bruce Maxwell, Kevin McDonough, and David I. Waddington
P H I L O S O P H Y O F E D U C A T I O N 2 0 1 4
considerations suggest that the wearing of a religious symbol on the part of a public
sector employee is, at best, an unreliable guide to whether or not a civil servant can
be trusted to perform their duties impartially.
The conclusion we draw is that prohibitionist arguments from the principle of
state autonomy unfairly single out religious teachers as being more likely to harbor
“illiberal” views and abuse their position of authority. In other words, they seem
to rest on exactly the kinds of prejudices and misinformation about religiosity that
public school educators and policymakers should work to dispel, not reinforce.
religious symBols anD Teacher Professional eThics
In this nal section of this article, we shift our focus from disputes about state
prohibitions on religious symbols to the following question of teacher professional
ethics: under what circumstances might it be reasonable for teachers to choose not to
wear an otherwise obligatory religious symbol? If the arguments we have presented
in previous sections are persuasive, then the absence of convincing grounds for the
exercise of state coercion implies that decisions about whether to wear religious sym-
bols in the classroom should fall largely in the domain of professional judgment. As
such, one important implication of our argument so far is that it becomes especially
urgent to identify principles that could appropriately guide teachers’ professional
ethical judgment.
The principles of secularism discussed above serve important socio-political
purposes even if they cannot ultimately support prohibitionist policies. In debates
surrounding teachers’ wearing of religious symbols, values of state neutrality and
autonomy animate robust public support for state secularism and provide an important
vantage point for resisting a certain kind of liberal piety about the absolute priority
of religious freedom over other values. These secular principles also highlight the
educational signicance of an important value that is all too readily dismissed in the
contemporary Anglo-American political culture: that of (reasonably grounded) public
trust towards the state. Principles of state neutrality toward, and autonomy from,
religion remind us that teachers sometimes have compelling ethical and educational
reasons to prioritize public trust over religious freedom. In their role as agents of the
state, teachers sometimes face circumstances where they might reasonably believe
that a decision not to wear an otherwise obligatory religious symbol will strengthen
and sustain trust in an important public institution, the public school system.
Whereas principles of state neutrality and state autonomy fail to justify state
prohibitions on teachers’ right to display religious symbols, in this section we argue
that these same principles provide a useful heuristic for guiding teachers’ ethical
judgments. In what follows, we address two related questions. First, in what cir-
cumstances might a teacher’s decision to wear a religious symbol undermine the
neutrality of the public school system or its agents? Second, in what circumstances
might a teacher’s decision to wear a religious symbol undermine public trust in the
autonomy of the public schools system or its agents?
Three examples illustrate how these questions might bear on ethical issues
related to teacher practice.
doi: 10.47925/2014.422
Does State Secularism Require Teachers to Abstain from Wearing Religious Symbols at School?
428
P H I L O S O P H Y O F E D U C A T I O N 2 0 1 4
in Teaching aBouT religions
The most obvious circumstance in which the ethics of wearing a religious sym-
bol might be questioned is in the context of teaching about religions themselves.
Religious education in public schools is typically taught from a so-called “non-confes-
sional” perspective.10 The aim of non-confessional religious education is to promote
an understanding of religious beliefs, practices, symbols, and other expressions of
religiosity, not to instill personal religious commitment. The broader social purpose
of promoting such “religious literacy” is to promote mutual understanding between
religious groups and between religious and non-religious people. Seen this way, reli-
gious education is an aspect of citizenship education.11 Whether taught as mandated
state curriculum, as in the case of Québec’s Ethics and Religious Culture curriculum,12
or introduced as part of a social studies or cognate class (as may often be the case
in the United States), non-confessional religious education species that teachers
must refrain from promoting or denigrating the religious beliefs, practices, or rituals
they seek to explain. The aim is understanding, not moral judgment. One can see
immediately how religious symbols might compromise the teacher’s impartiality.
Most students will know — especially, one hopes, those who have had the benet of
a non-confessional religious education — that various religious traditions embody
incompatible and sometimes contradictory value judgments. To give a banal exam-
ple, in the Jewish and Islamic traditions, eating pork is frowned upon, whereas in
Christianity, eating pork is unobjectionable. Buddhists, for their part, commonly nd
eating any meat morally reprehensible. Openly displaying one’s religious afliation
by wearing a religious symbol in a religions class, then, could be seen as tacitly taking
a biased evaluative stance on particular religious practices or beliefs. The applicable
principle of secularism in these circumstances is neutrality. Presumably, the teacher
is asked to adopt a standpoint of impartiality for a good reason. Teacher impartiality
involves modeling attitudes towards religious traditions in which understanding
comes before evaluative judgments. No matter how good the teacher’s intentions
are, and no matter how open-minded she might be about other religious traditions,
wearing a religious symbol in these circumstances risks undermining the teacher’s
credibility as an impartial guide to learning about religions.
in Teaching aBouT human sexualiTy
Sexuality education provides a second circumstance in which teachers may
have good educational and ethical reasons to remove outward signs of religious
commitment. In contrast to the case of religious education, however, considerations
of teacher autonomy from religious inuence may predominate. Human sexuality is
the area in which religious values are perhaps most likely to conict with fundamental
liberal values of individual freedom and equality, at least in everyday political life. A
moment’s thought yields an impressive, but far from complete, list of controversies
that will test and surpass the pedagogical capabilities of even the most competent and
judicious teacher — debates about reproductive rights, sexual orientation, the rights
of transgendered people, marriage and the family, the permissibility of pre-marital
sexual activity, contraception, and more. Whereas one can quite easily imagine a
teacher providing students with a decent understanding of major world religions
doi: 10.47925/2014.422
429Bruce Maxwell, Kevin McDonough, and David I. Waddington
P H I L O S O P H Y O F E D U C A T I O N 2 0 1 4
without having to address potential conicts between liberal principles and religious
values, the same is not true of sexuality education. Given the particular difculties
involved in addressing issues of human sexuality in religiously diverse societies,
students may have an especially urgent need for teachers who can exemplify political
reasoning that is free from the inuence of illiberal religious values. An example
might be when Catholic religious authorities take extreme and clearly illiberal public
positions on matters of sexuality. In this case, a thoughtful teacher might wish to
make a point of removing the crucix that her students otherwise expect her to wear.
Doing so in this circumstance could vividly illustrate the teacher’s autonomy from
religious inuence, and could thus provide an important lesson for her students.
To assuage concerns aBouT aBuse of Power
A third situation in which religious teachers might identify principles of profes-
sional ethics that give them reason to refrain from openly wearing religious symbols
is when there are specic and localized concerns that teachers might abuse their
position of power to promote their religious beliefs. As noted earlier, it is generally
a bad idea to ask teachers to refrain from wearing unpopular or unfamiliar religious
symbols. Such a policy risks reinforcing ignorance and prejudice by reinforcing
misguided assumptions that everyone who displays such symbols will seek to im-
pose their views on unsuspecting students. Nevertheless, there would seem to be at
least some, probably rare, instances in which such concerns could be worth taking
seriously. One such situation is where the teacher does not belong to the religious
group of all or most of his students, especially when the teacher’s religious group
is socially or historically dominant — for example, where a Christian teacher nds
herself teaching in a school that serves a community in which recent immigrants of
the Islamic faith are in the majority. Imagine further that the teacher knows that it is
commonly believed by the adults in this community that Christians tend to hold a
dim view of Islam and that the parents are seriously apprehensive about sending their
children to public school. They are worried that what they will learn and experience
there might not be compatible with their values. Here, it is the teacher’s autonomy
from her religious tradition that is in question. The teacher’s choice not to wear a
religious symbol in this case could be seen less as a concession to prejudice than as
an important gesture of reassurance aimed at building trust towards the public school
system in full consciousness that, in these particular circumstances, trust is fragile.
conclusion
When applied to teachers, contemporary disputes about the public acceptability
of religious symbols encourage us to think more deeply about the professional obli-
gations of teachers in a secular society. A clearer understanding of these obligations,
in turn, provides avenues for addressing conicts between teachers’ religious and
professional obligations. We have suggested that a great deal of caution is required
before we conclude that the state should adopt exclusionary policies to deal with
religiously committed teachers. Teachers can and should be understood as complex
agents who seek to balance competing religious and secular obligations, and we have
offered up some preliminary suggestions according to which, in specic situations,
teachers might use the ethics of their profession to justify a choice not to wear a
doi: 10.47925/2014.422
Does State Secularism Require Teachers to Abstain from Wearing Religious Symbols at School?
430
P H I L O S O P H Y O F E D U C A T I O N 2 0 1 4
religious symbol or article of clothing. In any event, these kinds of questions are not
easily dealt with; the ethics of the wearing or display of religious symbols by teachers
is more complex than the dominant debate about “bans” and “permitting” suggests.
1. Québec, La Charte des valeurs québécoises: Cinq propositions (Québec City: Québec, 2013), http://
archive.is/TxNrI.
2. Christine Langenfeld and Sarah Mohsen, “Germany: The Teacher Headscarf Case,” International
Journal of Constitutional Law 3, no. 1 (2005): 86–94; and Sawitri Saharso, “Headscarves: A Comparison
of Public Thought and Public Policy in Germany and the Netherlands,” Critical Review of International
Social and Political Philosophy 10, no. 4 (2007): 513–530.
3. The account of secularism presented in this section is based primarily on Micheline Milot, “L’expres-
sion des appartenances religieuses à l’école public, compromet-elle la laïcité et l’intégration sociale?
[Do Expressions of Religious Afliation in Public Schools Compromise Secularism and Social Inte-
gration?],” in L’accommodement raisonnable et la diversité religieuse à l’école public [Reasonable
Accommodation and Religious Diversity in Public Schools], ed. Marie McAndrew, Micheline Milot,
Jean-Sébastien Imbeault, and Paul Eid (Montreal: Fidès, 2008). For a similar reading of secularism in
English see Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).
4. Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience.
5. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration (London: Dover,
2002).
6. Milot, “L’expression des appartenances religieuses,” 98.
7. The reconstructed argument in this section is based primarily on Daniel Baril, “La laïcité sera laïque
ou ne sera pas,” and Louise Mailloux, “Une laïcité menacée,” both published in Normand Baillargeon
and Jean-Marc Piotte, Le Québec en quête de laïcité (Montreal: Écosociété, 2011).
8. Milot, “L’expression des appartenances religieuses,” 97.
9. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (London: Penguin, 1990).
10. For authoritative statements of this approach, see American Academy of Religion’s Religion in the
Schools Task Force, “Guidelines for Teaching about Religion in K–13 Public Schools in the United States”
(American Academy of Religion, 2010); and OSCE, Ofce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,
Toledo Guiding Principles about Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools (Warsaw, 2007).
11. The compatibility of the cultural approach to teaching about religions with religious freedom has been
conrmed in legal briengs (see the American Academy of Religion statement on this) and in at least one
ruling of a superior court (S.L. v. La commission scolaire des Chênes, SCC 2012) of which we are aware.
doi: 10.47925/2014.422
