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SKHID (EAST)
2022, Vol.3, Issue 1, 5-14
https://doi.og/10.21847/1728-9343.2022.3(1).253628
r.dodonov@kubg.edu.ua © The Author(s). Published by Ukrainian
Cultural Study and Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University
Transformation of commemorative practices in
Ukrainian historical discourse
Roman Dodonov (ORCID 0000-0003-1598-499X)
Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University (Ukraine)
Introduction
One of the concepts that enriched Ukrainian socio-
philosophical thought of the new millennium is the con-
cept of “social practices”. The introduction of this concept
into the social science lexicon was caused by the need to
overcome the opposition of objective and subjective prin-
ciples, which led to a methodological crisis in sociology
and, accordingly, its division into macro- and micro-
sociological approaches and paradigms. The concept of
“social practices” differs from the category of “social rela-
tions” primarily in the fact that social relations precede
social practices: “on the one hand, the subject constructs
its practices, but this process is conditioned by previous
social relations, on the other, social relations causally
cause the practices of the subjects, but this determination
is always mediated by the practices themselves. Accord-
ingly, the social appears as a process of continuous
interiorization / exteriorization, i.e. interiorization of social
relations and the associated reverse process of exteriori-
zation are implemented only within the pre-given social
forms, with the precondition of the already-existence of
social relations” (Popov et all, 2007: 40).
The concept of “social practices” is functionally in-
tended to unite various forms of human activity by the
common denominator. In this context, we should talk
about economic, political, religious, artistic, educational
practices and so on. An important place among them is
occupied by commemorative practices aimed at objectify-
ing collective memory within social relations.
The etymology of the word “commemorative” comes
from the French comme – “how?” and memoria –
“memory”. The English word “to commemorate” refers to
an event or artifact that aims at marking something in the
past (a famous person, a memorable date, a place, etc.).
Commemorative practices involve a wide range of joint
actions (rituals, ceremonies, presentations) and objects
(monuments, burial sites, memorial complexes) that en-
shrine a particular historical narrative that is relevant to all
or part of society.
It is clear that the changeability, internal contradic-
tions, conflict of historical narrative extend to commemo-
rative practices. They cannot be defined once and for all,
social changes cause increased dynamics of commemo-
rative practices.
ABSTRACT
The article is devoted to the study of changes taking place in Ukraini-
an society in the field of content of historical memory and forms of com-
memorative practices. The purpose of the study is to identify the main
trends in transformations of the form and content of commemorative prac-
tices in the Ukrainian historical discourse. During the semi-structured,
focused interview with 51 experts representing the main regions of
Ukraine, it has been found that current commemorative practices are
based on a symbiosis of monologue and dialogue models of memory. The
remnants of the Soviet-style totalitarian worldview have led to the popular-
ity of the model of memory, in which the state’s monopoly on history pre-
vails. The idea that national memory consists of many particular com-
memorations is difficult for Ukrainian society to accept. The past is a kind
of symbolic resource, the use of which contributes to the legitimization of
Ukraine as an independent state. However, the forms of commemoration
remain largely old. Along with fundamentally new forms, primarily related
to Internet technologies and social networks, in Ukraine, just as in the
Soviet period, commemoration is focused on honoring heroes and vic-
tims. At the same time, there is a radical reassessment: the heroes of the
Soviet era have become villains, and villains have become heroes. All this
points to the “hybrid nature” of commemorative practices with an empha-
sis on the martyrological-victim component and the trauma of the social
psyche of Ukrainians.
KEYWORDS
social practices,
commemoration,
expert survey,
historical memory,
politics of memory.
R. Dodonov (Р. Додонов)
СХІД Том 3 (1) 2022
Складні проблеми історичної пам’яті в філософських та історичних інтерпретаціях
6
Moreover, from the standpoint of social construction-
ism, the correction of commemorative practices is seen
as a project. This understanding follows from the multi-
plicity of historical realities, which may be changed, re-
structured, re-evaluated, that is, transformed as well as
the future social reality. As Benedetto Croce once said,
“dead history arises, the past becomes the present when
life itself demands it” .
Projective activities to correct the content of historical
memory and relevant commemorative practices have
many points of convergence with mythmaking. But such
projectivity is also a prerequisite for the constitution of
social practice aimed at history. According to P. Corcuff,
“for constructivism, historicity is the main concept in three
dimensions. Firstly, the social world was constructed
based on past pre-constructions; in this respect, construc-
tivism follows Marx, who wrote: “People make their histo-
ry, but they do it not the way they want, in circumstances
that they did not choose, but which are directly available,
provided by them and passed from the past”. Secondly,
past social forms are reproduced, appropriated, displaced
and modified, while other forms are invented during ac-
tions and interactions (during face-to-face contacts, dur-
ing telephone, written and other interactions) that take
place. in the daily lives of actors. Third, this past legacy
and this daily work open up the field of opportunities for
the future” (Korkuf, 2002: 25).
Thus, the dynamics of the forms and content of com-
memorative practices reflects certain trends in the devel-
opment of society as a whole. This article is the result of
the study of changes in commemorative practices in
Ukrainian historical discourse 1.
The purpose
The purpose of the study is to identify the main trends
in transformations of the form and content of commemo-
rative practices in the Ukrainian historical discourse.
Achieving this purpose involves the following tasks:
1. Clarification of changes in the forms of commemo-
rative practices in modern Ukrainian society by comparing
them with the Soviet era and the period of the first years
after the restoration of Ukrainian statehood.
2. Identification of the transformation of the content of
the Ukrainian national narrative and relevant commemo-
rative practices, definition of the range of historical
events, the memory of which is fostered by the official
socio-political discourse.
3. Personalization of heroes, villains and victims in the
Ukrainian history in the 20th century, the definition of con-
troversial stories in the content of modern commemora-
tive practices.
4. Identification of the attitude of experts to the state
memory policy and ways to implement it in the political
and legal sphere.
Research methods
The main method of gathering information for the
study is an in-depth semi-structured survey of experts in
1 The research has been conducted within the research topic
“Difficult questions of historical memory of the Central-Eastern
Europe of XX-XXI centuries in the paradigm of dialogue of
Ukrainian culture” (state registration number 00116U003294),
implemented at the Faculty of History and Philosophy, Borys
Grinchenko Kyiv University. The author would like to thank the
students of the specialty “Philosophy” who helped with the
interview.
the field of the politics of memory and historical narrative.
Prior to the interview, respondents were sent an indicative
list of questions for discussion. According to the above
tasks, this list consisted of 4 sets.
The first set – the dynamics of forms of commemora-
tive practices – included the following questions:
- What forms of commemorative practices can You
name?
- Which ones are typical of our time?
- Compared to the first years of Ukrainian independ-
ence, what new commemorative practices have emerged
during this time?
- Which ones have disappeared or almost disap-
peared?
The second set consisted questions about the con-
tent of the historical narrative:
- Name 5 events in the history of Ukraine, the memory
of which is fostered today by the official socio-political
discourse?
- Name 5 events in the history of Ukraine, the memory
of which was fostered by Soviet ideology?
- What events of their past would modern Ukrainians
prefer to forget?
- What places of memory (monuments, memorial
complexes) are symbols of memorial culture of modern
Ukraine?
The third set was about personalization of charac-
ters, detection of controversial plots:
- In Your opinion, in Ukrainian history, who is
A hero
A villain
A victim
- In Your opinion, what criteria should an ideal na-
tional hero meet?
The fourth set was devoted to the attitude to the
state politics of memory:
- What were the consequences of the adoption of a
package of 4 decommunization laws by the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine on April 9, 2015 for commemorative
practices?
- Does the process of renaming toponyms and demol-
ishing monuments launched by the Law “On Condemna-
tion of Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitari-
an Regimes and Prohibition of Propaganda of Their Sym-
bols” meet European standards?
- In Your opinion, how the victory in World War II
should be celebrated?
- How would You describe the politics of memory pur-
sued by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy? How does it
differ from the policies of his predecessors?
- Your attitude to the activities of the Ukrainian Insti-
tute of National Memory. Is such an institution necessary
in the structure of the executive branch?
The interview focused on these areas was not limited
to strictly stated issues, the experts had the opportunity to
express their position freely, provided additional argu-
ments, examples from their own experience. The conver-
sation was recorded on a voice recorder, the time of one
interview varied from 30 to 45 minutes.
Total survey included 51 people. Experts were select-
ed according to their level of competence and profession-
al experience, taking into account gender, age and geo-
graphical (regional) characteristics.
Transformation of commemorative practices in Ukrainian historical discourse
Трансформація комеморативних практик в українському історичному дискурсі
SKHID Vol. 3 (1) 2022
Complex Problems of Historical Memory in Philosophical and Historical Interpretations
7
Table 1.
Regional, gender and age characteristics of respondents
Region
Gender
Age
Total
M.
F.
Under
30 years
31-40
years
41-50
years
51-60
years
Older
than 60
years
Kyiv
7
2
1
1
1
5
1
9
Lviv
3
4
1
2
2
1
1
7
Kharkiv
3
3
2
1
1
1
1
6
Odessa
3
3
1
2
1
1
1
6
Zaporizhzhia
2
4
1
-
2
1
2
6
Uzhhorod
1
2
-
1
1
1
-
3
Donetsk Region
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
5
Chernihiv
1
2
-
1
1
-
1
3
Vinnytsia
2
1
1
-
-
1
1
3
Cherkasy
1
2
1
1
-
1
-
3
Total
25
26
9
10
10
13
9
51
The sample was formed by the method of “snowball
sampling”, but there were not more than two links in one
chain. The interviewers worked in Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv,
Odessa, Zaporizhzhia, Uzhhorod, Chernihiv, Vinnytsia,
Cherkasy, and in the unoccupied districts of the Donetsk
Region. Some of the interviews were conducted in an
online format with mandatory video recording.
The methods used in the processing of primary
information is a method of identifying key narratives with
elements of content analysis.
Results and Discussion
1. Forms of commemorative practices and their
dynamics.
At the level of interviewed experts, the question about
forms of commemoration did not cause much difficulty.
The vast majority agreed that commemorative practices
should be understood as any collective action aimed at
restoring the connection between past and present
events in people’s minds. Some of the respondents men-
tioned P. Connerton’s books “How Societies Remember”
(Connerton, 2004), A. Kyrydon’s “Heterotopia of Memory”
(2016), L. Nagorna’s “Historical Memory” (2012), “Social
framework of memory” by M. Halbwachs (2007) and other
scientific sources.
Answering the question “What forms of commemora-
tive practices can You name?”, the experts both narrowed
and expanded the list of such practices:
“I can name, in particular, the construction of places of
memory, memorials, creation of sculptures, monuments, installa-
tion of memorial plaques among the forms of commemorative
practices; historical reconstructions, i.e. reconstructors’ perfor-
mances dedicated to certain historical dates, trips to places of
military glory, holiday demonstrations. These can be flash mobs,
virtual tours with the help of computer technology, relevant activi-
ty in social networks” (man, 50 years old, Vinnytsia).
“The forms of commemoration that are on the surface are re-
lated to the state memory politics. These include events (mass
rallies, demonstrations, solemn assemblies, awards, moments of
silence, memorials, declarations of government officials) to
commemorate outstanding events in the country. For example,
media coverage of the events of 1917-1921, the Holodomor, the
latest revolutions in Ukraine is useful for self-awareness, critical
understanding of national destiny, its neighbors, their evaluation,
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of our nation. At
the same time, commemorative practices are not limited to such
state measures. These should include national holidays that are
directly related to rituals, national traditional outfits, folk songs,
proverbs, cuisine, customs that appeal to the sacred, including
pre-Christian traditions, the national unconscious. Folk crafts, like
embroidery, pysanka, painting, author’s poetry and song, carv-
ing, pottery, folk dance, etc., all come from the national uncon-
scious, so these practices relate to national memory. The prac-
tice of local historiographical and ethnographic research, which is
carried out by hundreds of amateur enthusiasts, has a categori-
cally positive effect on the colorful picture of the heritage of the
national memory of Ukraine” (man, 40 years old, Donetsk
Region).
“There are no classifications of commemorative practices as
such, but if we turn to E. Durkheim’s works, we find the division
of rituals into positive and negative, depending on what function
they perform in society. Durkheim considered commemorative
practices as one of the manifestations of solidarity in society and,
in particular, wrote about implicit commemoration, i.e. visiting
sacred places of the past, pilgrimage rituals. Pierre Nora ex-
plored so-called “places of memory”. This concept has become
widespread today, including in the Ukrainian context… Another
form of commemoration is a holiday, it is also associated with
solidarity. Linking holidays to certain dates, which remind of the
events of the past important for society, contributes to the unifi-
cation of people, the formation of their identity. It is possible that
over time people forget about the content of the event to which
the holiday is dedicated, but it acquires a value-symbolic mean-
ing, becomes identified with individual experience and value
system of a particular person… So, in my understanding, forms
of commemorative practices are, first of all, rituals, secondly,
R. Dodonov (Р. Додонов)
СХІД Том 3 (1) 2022
Складні проблеми історичної пам’яті в філософських та історичних інтерпретаціях
8
places of memory and everything connected with them, and
thirdly, the system of holidays” (woman, 50 years old, Kyiv).
“Commemorative practices are the perpetuation of the
memory of heroes and historical events, in particular, in texts, in
books, in monuments, in public events, in places of memory. It
may be a cemetery, which is memory space by its purpose.
There may be a memorial complex, such as the Alley of Heaven-
ly Hundred Heroes, Babi Yar, the National Museum of the
Holodomor-Genocide. The latter, by the way, was included in the
official foreign delegation visit programmes” (woman, 40 years
old, Kyiv).
During the interviews, respondents expressed the
opinion that the forms of commemorative practices are
universal, they basically exist in all societies and perform
the same functions. The tendency to simplify commemo-
rative procedures can be traced within the process of
historical development: when, for example, in ancient
times, the memory of the fallen hero was honored with a
mass procession, rich ceremonies, monuments, today it
is just a moment of silence.
According to experts, forms of commemorative prac-
tices are more conservative and inert compared to the
content of commemoration. In modern Ukraine, this leads
to the fact that we honor the memory of those fighting
against Soviet rule in a “Soviet” way. This hybrid nature of
commemorative practices was typical of the 1990s, the
2000s, has existed until the 2004 Orange Revolution and
the beginning of President Yushchenko’s national
memory policy.
Here are some extracts from the answer to the ques-
tion “Compared to the first years of Ukrainian independ-
ence, what new commemorative practices have emerged
during this time?”:
“During the years of independence, all that was suppressed
by Soviet ideology, i.e. scientific (ethnographic, folklore, historio-
graphical) investigations of enthusiasts, began to develop rapid-
ly. A huge number of them appears then. They, one way or an-
other, reveal the truth about our coat of arms, flag, real history of
the Cossacks, authentic toponyms and their origins, real rela-
tions with neighbors, the real situation in Ukrainian education and
science, which overtook the eastern neighbor for more than a
century, etc. After the declassification of the archives, the politi-
cal and unparalleled for our nation sad topic of the Holodomor,
repressions and, in general, the consequences of foreign rule in
Ukraine is being actively promoted. The subjects of the com-
memoration showed how the Soviet government erased every-
thing original Ukrainian in science, emptied culture, replaced
national memory and self-awareness, made Ukrainians synony-
mous with illiterate peasants in ridiculous clothes” (man, 40
years old, Donetsk Region).
“Ukraine’s present is characterized by a new holidays calen-
dar, which has acquired a pronounced national complexion.
Since 1991, when the main state holiday was introduced – Au-
gust 24, Independence Day of Ukraine, or as it is now called, the
Day of Ukrainian Statehood; since 1996 – the adoption of a new
Constitution, when we celebrate Constitution Day on June 28; to
February 20, when Ukraine honors the memory of the Heavenly
Hundred Heroes… Places of memory are also being developed
in Ukraine, connected with the named and other events, which
are key events for the modern historical narrative: cenotaphs on
the Hrushevskyi Street in Kyiv, the wall of St. Michael’s Cathe-
dral, many commemorative plaques and monuments at the sites
of death and burial of participants in the Revolution of Dignity,
the war in Donbass, etc…” (woman, 50 years old, Kyiv).
“Over the past 30 years, we are witnessing the replacement
of the Soviet system of commemorative practices with older,
more traditional forms along with the process of de-
ideologisation. Religious rituals, such as prayer meetings, pro-
cessions, and the consecration of monuments, have resumed.
This is particularly true for memory of the victims of the
Holodomor and Stalin’s repressions. Even the candle we light in
memory of the dead is a church attribute. See how the victims
from the ATO zone are met in Ukrainian cities and villages – they
are met on one’s knees! I think the replacement of political and
ideological forms with religious ones is a general trend” (wom-
an, 50 years old, Cherkasy).
“Everything connected with the Internet and information
technology has appeared. A band on an avatar as a gesture of
solidarity with a certain event, a photo with a candle on Remem-
brance Day, reposts, likes, subscriptions to historical pages on
social networks, blogs and forums – all this is new, there was
nothing like that in Soviet times because of the lack of such
technologies. And the mobile Internet, and in particular social
networks, is a powerful tool of memory” (man, 20 years old,
Kharkiv).
Experts noted the disappearance (or almost total dis-
appearance) of some forms of commemoration simulta-
neously with the emergence of new forms of commemo-
rative practice:
“In my opinion, almost everything artificial, planted by ideolo-
gy, in particular, parades that glorified the greatness of the
Communist Party, the Soviet army, the abstract proletariat, has
disappeared. Signs and artificial ideological organizations of a
semi-coercive nature have disappeared” (man, 40 years old,
Donetsk Region).
“Such forms of commemoration as mass demonstrations of
workers on the main Soviet holidays, namely May 1 and October
7, have become history. It is already difficult for me to explain
how we felt during these demonstrations, how they were orga-
nized and conducted, to my students – they just have no idea
about it. I am not saying whether it was good or bad, but today
such a practice no longer exists. The alternative to the official
parade of the troops of the defenders of Ukraine on Independ-
ence Day on August 24, which is becoming traditional, has a
completely different content” (man, 40 years old,
Zaporizhzhia).
“From the Soviet era, I remember the ceremonial rituals of
admission to October, to the pioneers, to the Komsomol, which
were to symbolize the longevity of generations, the devotion of
young people to the ideals of communism. This ritual has be-
come commonplace and was perceived by the majority as
somewhat uncritical. It is clear that such forms of commemora-
tive practices have completely disappeared from modern life”
(woman, 50 years old, Kyiv).
2. Trends in changes in the Ukrainian national
narrative.
Compared to the form, the content of commemorative
practices is more flexible. Experts almost unanimously
stated the high dynamics of changes in the Ukrainian
national narrative, especially after 2014. Everything relat-
ed to the Soviet era and Russia is gradually being erased
from official discourse.
“The main slogan of the national narrative is that Ukrainians
have always wanted to be independent and autonomous. This
slogan is based on the National Liberation War led by Bogdan
Khmelnytsky, but – without the Pereyaslav Council. Modern
creators of the politics of memory turn to the events of the 17th
century, fostering the short experience of the existence of
Ukrainian statehood. They are also based on the events of the
Ukrainian revolution and liberation struggles of 1917-1921: when
the Bolshevik regime (the “dictatorship of the proletariat”) had
already been established in Russia, we have a relatively demo-
cratic European-style government in Ukraine. The Universals of
the Central Council show us the evolution of the political dis-
course of that time with a general direction from the empire, from
Russia. That is, we look for examples that strengthen the current
political course in the historical past. The second line in the na-
tional narrative is that we have enemies, and the main enemy is
our northeastern neighbor. Were it not for the events of 2014, the
insidious theft of Crimea and the war in Donbass, the majority of
the population of Ukraine may not have realized this fact. Histori-
cal memory allows us to return the facts of confrontations, con-
flicts and wars – temporary defeats and victories – of Ukraine
Transformation of commemorative practices in Ukrainian historical discourse
Трансформація комеморативних практик в українському історичному дискурсі
SKHID Vol. 3 (1) 2022
Complex Problems of Historical Memory in Philosophical and Historical Interpretations
9
with Russia from oblivion. The third line in the national narrative
is that we want to be a full-fledged European nation, that we
have European priorities, an appropriate mentality, an orientation
towards the rule of law. The desire for a dignified life, personal
well-being, democracy, civil liberties, etc. follows from this”
(woman, 40 years old, Kyiv).
Answering the question “Name 5 events in the history
of Ukraine, the memory of which is cultivated today by the
official socio-political discourse?”, experts, in general,
confirmed the above opinion.
“Everything related to the preservation and revival of the
Ukrainian nation and its cultural heritage is being cultivated to-
day. The core of the historical memory of Ukrainians, in my opin-
ion, is the history of the Cossacks, which led to the event de-
scribed in large amounts of cultural texts; then, the 1917-1920
Ukrainian national liberation struggle, a short period of Ukrainian
statehood, “Executed Renaissance”; then, the Holodomor of
1932-333; Chernobyl, although this catastrophe is not a purely
national narrative, it took place on the territory of Ukraine; finally,
current events in Kyiv, Crimea, and Donbas, from 2013/14 to the
present day. These events will determine the main content of
cultural and historical reflections in literature, art, journalism”
(woman, 50 years old, Kyiv).
“We celebrate the main historical events every year. They
are arranged into the national calendar. Firstly, it is the
Holodomor 1932-1933 Memorial Day; secondly, August 24 – the
Independence Day of Ukraine 1991; thirdly, May 8 – the Day of
Remembrance and Reconciliation; fourthly, June 28 – the Con-
stitution Day; fifthly, October 14 – the Intercession of the
Theotokos, the day of the Ukrainian Cossacks. I would like to
add the sixth item on February 20 – the Day of Remembrance of
the Heroes of the Heavenly Hundred” (man, 40 years old,
Donetsk Region).
Compared to Soviet times and the first years of
Ukrainian independence, the content of the national
commemoration has been significantly revised. Experts
emphasized the events cultivated by Soviet ideology,
including the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic
War, the October Revolution, industrialization and collec-
tivization, the first five-year plans, and the first space
flight. And also:
“Ukraine and Russia’s unification, Pereyaslav Council, 1654;
Taras Shevchenko, against serfdom, social and class context;
the civil war was the Makhnovshchina in a negative context, and
the OUN-UPA, the Sixtiers were not mentioned” (woman, 50
years old, Kyiv).
“I do not recall such events directly in the history of Ukraine,
which would be strongly cultivated by Soviet ideology. Rather,
they were All-Union dates and holidays, such as the anniversary
of the so-called Great October Revolution (October 7), Lenin’s
birthday (April 22), International Workers’ Day (May 1), Victory
Day (May 9), and International Women’s Day (March 8). Many of
these events in the Soviet calendar were not directly related to
Ukraine” (man, 40 years old, Donetsk Region).
Respondents noted that historical memory not only
preserves the events of the past, but also provides a
moral and legal assessment, striking what does not cor-
respond to the modern vision off the national narrative.
The high dynamics of commemorative practices would
not be possible without “forgetting”. Therefore, counter-
memory coexists with official memory. For Ukraine, with
the ideological and axiological split in its population, the
question of what to remember and what to forget is very
painful. Here are some answers of experts to the question
“What events of their past would modern Ukrainians pre-
fer to forget?”
“They prefer to forget collaboration with the Nazis during
World War II, the participation of Ukrainians in the executions of
Jews, including in Babyn Yar” (man, more than 60 years old,
Odessa).
“The role of Bogdan Khmelnytsky is rethought, his role as a
statesman is reinterpreted as if he defended the rights of the
Cossacks and did not aim to create an independent Ukrainian
state” (woman, 30 years old, Uzhhorod).
“In my opinion, this is a philosophical question. Ortega’s
“mass man”, which, in fact, constitutes our society, by its con-
sumer nature prefers to forget everything that is not about fun,
entertainment, laziness and euphoria. Hence, such a man does
not keep in mind everything (unnecessary) that concerns nation-
al dignity, national liberation resistance, its heroes, everything
that concerns work and the use of one’s own energy. Some
commemorative practices, like folk crafts, folk songs, dances,
some scientific research are largely forgotten “by default”. In-
stead, a person consciously seeks to develop one’s identity, to
expand the sphere of the identity, to which the national con-
sciousness belongs. Such people, on the contrary, seek to mas-
ter the national forms of commemoration close to them.
Passionarians, ideally, seek to broaden the horizons of the na-
tion to which they belong. Unfortunately, the facts lead Ukraini-
ans to recognize that our mentality has negative traits – too
much patience, weakness of resistance to fraudsters, not so
much diligence, feelings of inferiority, parochialism. Memory
should know the reasons for these traits, and the national con-
sciousness should overcome the shortcomings” (man, 40
years old, Donetsk Region).
Talking about places of remembrance as a form of
commemorative practices, respondents most often men-
tioned monuments in Kyiv dedicated to the events of the
Revolution of Dignity, the Holodomor, the events of World
War II. Here is a typical example of the answer to the
question “What places of memory (monuments, memorial
complexes) are symbols of memorial culture of modern
Ukraine?”:
“In my personal rating of historical monuments, they have the
following order: 1) Kyiv, Independence Square, Instytutska Street
– the main events of the Revolution of Dignity; 2) Kyiv, Pechersk
District, section of the Dnieper bank from the Arsenalna station to
the Paton Bridge. The Park of Eternal Glory National Museum of
the Holodomor-Genocide, Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, Local Conflicts’
Museum, Motherland Monument Memorial Complex, National
Museum of History of Great Patriotic War, Museum of the For-
mation of the Ukrainian Nation; 3) Baturyn, Chyhyryn, Khortytsia
– everything connected with the Cossacks and the period of the
Hetmanate; 4) Lviv, old town, Town Hall, Rynok Square; 5) Kruty
Heroes Memorial (Pamyatne Village)” (woman, 30 years old,
Chernihiv).
Many other places of memory have also been men-
tioned, especially in the regions, but not all of them con-
tradict the general tendencies of commemorative trans-
formations.
3. Heroes, villains and victims in the
commemorative practices of Ukrainians
The human dimension of historical events is usually
indicated in the symbolic coordinates of “hero-villain-
victim”. Proposing to personify these coordinates with
examples from the history of Ukraine, we understood well
that the answers may be controversial, depending on
whether the expert shares the logic of the official histori-
cal discourse. The same historical figures were men-
tioned by the respondents both as heroes and as villains.
Directly opposite assessments were made about the roles
of Lenin and Stalin, Bandera and Petliura, and, to a lesser
extent, I. Mazepa and P. Skoropadsky.
“In my opinion, the heroes are Stepan Bandera, the whole
Helsinki Group, Vasyl Stus, Viacheslav Chornovil, Leonid
Kadenyuk, Simon Petliura, and among the scientists – they are
R. Dodonov (Р. Додонов)
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10
Yavornytsky, Paton, Amosov. The villain is Stalin and, most So-
viet leaders, with few exceptions, but they are, so to speak, for-
eigners. From “our side”, Medvedchuk, Yanukovych with a co-
hort, modern hirelings – anti-Ukrainian propagandists – are hid-
den or overt villains” (man, 40 years old, Donetsk Region).
“We see the pantheon of Ukrainian heroes on hryvnia bank-
notes every day. These are our glorious princes Volodymyr the
Great and Yaroslav the Wise, Hetmans Bogdan Khmelnytsky
and Ivan Mazepa, figures of science and culture – Volodymyr
Vernadsky, Lesya Ukrainka, Hryhoriy Skovoroda, Ivan Franko.
Antiheroes are the enemies of Ukraine who tried to destroy the
Ukrainian state and Ukrainians: Vladimir Putin, Joseph Stalin,
Vladimir Lenin” (woman, 30 years old, Lviv).
Some experts avoided answering questions about he-
roes and victims, limiting their answers to “everything has
changed” and “those who in Soviet times presented
themselves as traitors (villains) are now considered he-
roes today – and vice versa”. Based on these considera-
tions, as well as removing our contemporaries from the
list, we created the following figure:
Fig.1. Number of positive and negative mentions of experts
in defining heroes and villains in the history of Ukraine.
Answering the question “In Your opinion, what criteria
should an ideal national hero meet?”, respondents said
that it does not have to be a military or political leader.
Some mentioned Brecht’s statement: “Unhappy is the
country that needs heroes”. They also cited examples of
Vasyl Stus and Serhii Parajanov, whose contribution to
Ukrainian culture made them national heroes.
“In my opinion, the ideal national hero should be a patriot. He
should be able to obey, even ignore his own interests for the
sake of serving Ukraine. There is a high probability that the mo-
tives of the hero’s actions will not be understood by the majority
of the population. He will face irony, criticism, cynicism, rejection.
The hero should know that large masses of contemporary socie-
ty will not appreciate, understand his contribution and laugh at
him. And he should be ready for it” (man, under 30 years,
Lviv).
“I think Ukraine needs a leader like Golda Meir. It should be
ideological but realistic, strong-willed but fair; assess the situa-
tion adequately, make complex decisions without hesitation and
be responsible for them to the history” (man, under 30 years,
Kyiv).
Experts’ answers regarding the identification of victims
in Ukrainian history were somewhat unexpected:
“Obviously, the Ukrainian people are the victims. Physical
casualties, ruined lives are a huge tragedy. But villains hit not
only the nation’s physical body. So, the victims are national con-
sciousness, memory, dignity, intellectual and critical abilities.
With each death, the nation’s gene pool becomes poorer. More
than one generation of Ukrainians will pay for the losses and
injuries of the 20th century” (man, 40 years old, Donetsk
Region).
“As for the victims, there is a very interesting socio-
psychological phenomenon. Ukrainians from experience
(dekulakization, Holodomor, resettlement, repression) had the
opportunity to see that foreign rule threatens the very existence
of the nation, that the victims are the whole nation. But the para-
dox is that Ukrainians are trying hard to survive. A typical survival
strategy at the individual level involves radical removal from the
victims. We need to distance ourselves from the unfortunate
44
41
14
30 29
18
12
8
5 6 5 4 3
1 2
17
1 1 2
7
3
6
42
25
1 1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Hero Antihero
Transformation of commemorative practices in Ukrainian historical discourse
Трансформація комеморативних практик в українському історичному дискурсі
SKHID Vol. 3 (1) 2022
Complex Problems of Historical Memory in Philosophical and Historical Interpretations
11
people as much as possible, distance ourselves from them and
get closer to power, to the strong people. The victimhood of
Ukrainian history turns into victim blaming: contempt and harsh-
ness towards the victim (“it is their fault”) and, at the same time,
tolerance of the violator. “The victim is not about me, it is about
others”. The consequence of this is the pathological unwilling-
ness of modern Ukrainians to recognize the historical trauma of
the 20th century, mark their past as colonial oppression, as a
period of injustice and offences. As a result, we are trying to
justify Stalin’s executioners (“the times were like this”), to take
solace in the military power of the superpower (“the whole world
feared and respected the USSR”), to be proud of Gagarin and
Korolyov. People of my generation are accompanied by nostalgia
for their youth, they say that people also lived then and were
happy. The strategy of distancing oneself from victims and histo-
ry is not dangerous. The logic that “we are weak”, “Putin should
not be annoyed, because power is behind him” is identical to the
logic “Ukraine did not happen as a state” and “there has never
been such a state”. Such a strategy paralyzes the will in the face
of confrontation with Russia. We must not hide behind our own
complexes and admit openly that if Ukrainians do not consoli-
date, they will become the same victims in the nearest future as
in the days of the Soviet empire” (man, more than 60 years
old, Lviv).
“Today, scientists are discussing the number of Holodomor
victims. A well-known saying is the following: the death of one
person is a tragedy; the death of one million is a statistic. Unfor-
tunately, we often forget this. The range of estimates of victims of
the artificial famine of 1932-33 starts at 2.6 and ends at 5.0 mil-
lion deaths. On average - 3.8 million, in the Ukrainian media
there is a figure of 4 million. This is a huge loss of our people, its
gene pool. But, it seems, for some, this is not enough. Recently,
there have been attempts to double or triple the sad statistics. In
particular, the book “Genocide of Ukrainians in 1932-1933 ac-
cording to the materials of pre-trial investigations” (Kyiv, 2021)
gives a fantastic figure of 10.5 million victims. In this way, the
Holodomor “overtook” the Holocaust of the Jews during World
War II and can claim first place in European history of genocide.
Former KGB General M. Herasymenko, who supervises this
“project”, insists on 10.5 million, but these figures are not sub-
stantiated by demographic or historical research. Arbitrary ma-
nipulation of the number of victims reduces the level of trust in
official institutions, in particular – in the National Museum of the
Holodomor-Genocide. It is no coincidence that on December 1,
2021, “Ukrayinska Pravda” published an Open Letter against the
falsification of the Holodomor history, signed by well-known his-
torians, sociologists, and public figures. But the scandal, which is
gaining momentum among scholars, only discredits the sacred
memory of the victims of the Holodomor” (woman, 40 years
old, Kyiv).
4. Attitude to the state memory policy
and ways of its implementation in
the political and legal framework.
The last set of questions was devoted to the content
of the state memory policy. As is known, the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine adopted a package of 4 laws in April
2015: “On the Legal Status and Honoring the Memory of
Fighters for Ukraine’s Independence in the Twentieth
Century”; “On Condemnation of the Communist and Na-
tional-Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes in Ukraine and
Prohibition of Propaganda of Their Symbols”; “On the
Perpetuation of the Victory over Nazism in World War II of
1939 – 1945”; “On Access to the Archives of the Repres-
sive Bodies of the Communist Totalitarian Regime of
1917-1991”. The media called the package
“Decommunization Laws”, although their content was
much broader. It has been more than six years since the
laws were adopted, and we have tried to find out the con-
sequences of implementing these laws for commemora-
tive practices. Here are some typical expert answers:
“There are definitely positive consequences for the develop-
ment and revival of national memory, because it has cleared the
mental and cultural space for authentic commemorative practic-
es. However, due to decades of tradition, engraving and inertia
of thinking, often the masses, especially the older people, evalu-
ate them negatively. This is associated with a separation from
the romantic and euphoric adolescence, youth, simple life, the
picture of which was painted by Soviet propaganda” (man, 40
years old, Donetsk Region).
“It should not be forgotten that decommunization began not
in 2015, but in 1991, and many Soviet monuments and place
names had already been desecrated. The sacred memory of the
Great Victory lasted the longest, but it was discredited by the
Russians and Putin personally. Therefore, the adoption of a
package of laws on decommunization only completed the spon-
taneous process of the “Leninopad”. Despite the occasional
indignation, the majority of the population accepted the disman-
tling of monuments and the renaming of streets with understand-
ing and without much emotion. At the same time, in both cases,
Ukrainians perceived decommunization not as a natural desire of
the population, but as a pro-government initiative” (woman, 30
years old, Odessa).
“I cannot accept the categorical assessments in the law
which in fact equates the Nazi and communist regimes. The first
mentioned received a verdict from the Nuremberg Tribunal and
was found guilty of crimes against peace, humanity, etc., the
second one had no legal assessment at all. The norm of this law,
which provides for sanctions for “denying the criminal nature of
the communist regime”, remains in a big question. That is, even
if I am silent and do not state anything, am I already a criminal? I
think that future lawyers will evaluate this “gem” of domestic
lawmaking” (man, more than 60 years old, Lviv).
The process of renaming toponyms and demolishing
monuments launched by the law “On Condemnation of
the Communist and National-Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian
Regimes in Ukraine and Prohibition of Propaganda of
Their Symbols” has caused considerable controversy in
Ukrainian society. We asked the experts whether this
practice meets European standards.
“I do not see much contradiction in the dismantling of monu-
ments to communist leaders with European norms. However, in
most cases this place remains empty. Even when monuments to
new heroes are being erected, there is a certain alienation –
except the monuments to the Heavenly Hundred and those killed
in the Donbas. Monuments and historical events immortalized in
monuments are often perceived as something foreign and exter-
nal. The same thing is with renaming. Few citizens know who
was the person after whom the street where he lives was named.
And how Lastovsky differs from Kovnir, Anishchenko from
Lewandowski, Ivanov from Butyshev (renaming streets in the
Pechersk District in Kyiv). The purpose of such measures re-
mains unclear without a broad public discussion. There has been
no public debate, which could be an important tool for change in
memorial culture. Probably, this happened because the destruc-
tion of communist symbols was part of not only a symbolic but
also a literal struggle for the spaces of Ukrainian cities, for their
belonging to Ukraine, in the conditions of Russian aggression.
However, even after the disappearance of the real threat of sep-
aratism, the discussion of possible formats of “elaboration of the
past”, unfortunately, has not received due attention” (man, 30
years old, Kyiv).
“I do not consider myself an expert on European norms, but
taking into account the fact that the USSR, communist ideology
brought a lot of evil and lies to our land, I am for
decommunization. For a long time, the national consciousness
was deformed, and the proud, hard-working, strong-willed spirit
of the people was replaced by the idea of the lazy peasant, the
swineherd in trousers. Real heroes, patrons, historical figures
and events were silenced, and toponyms were renamed in the
R. Dodonov (Р. Додонов)
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12
context of Soviet myths. The status quo must be restored. For
example, the city of Kadiivka was renamed Stakhanov. The myth
of this alleged hero of labor, the legendary miner, is known. In
fact, he was far from moral – an alcoholic, a polygamist. So what
is wrong with giving the city its old name back?” (man, 40
years old, Donetsk Region).
Such commemorative practice as the celebration of
the Victory in the Second World War provoked no less
discussions in Ukrainian society. The vast majority of
experts understood this issue as a victory over Nazism,
which is celebrated in Russia on May 9. Only two men-
tioned September 2 and clarified the issue. In any case,
all respondents did not agree with the norms of celebrat-
ing the Victory which entrenched in Russia.
“Today, there are widespread calls for the “Europeanization”
of Victory Day, i.e. the transition to the celebration of May 8, the
Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation under the slogan “Nev-
er Again”. On the one hand, this is in line with the sentiments of
most Europeans who did not win World War II. Even in Soviet
Ukraine, not everyone could honestly consider themselves win-
ners, Western Ukraine was seen as a victim. On the other hand,
military triumphalism is not exactly what our society needs in a
war with Russia, which considers itself the successor to the vic-
tors, and its leader declares that Russia had dealt with Germany
without Ukraine’s help. Therefore, I believe that the most ade-
quate form of celebrating victory is not “victory”, but a mournful
ritual with recalling the memory of the dead” (man, more than
60 years old, Lviv).
“Lao Tzu gave the best answer to this question. The victory
should be celebrated with a mourning procession. The so-called
“victory” should be dissected in detail. Peoples should remember
who suffered the tragedy of the war, who caused it, who resisted
and how did they do it. This date should be celebrated with in-
creased broadcasting of thematic information flows, and the
mood adequate for this event it mourning. Without festive brava-
do” (man, 40 years old, Donetsk Region).
It is well known that the state memory policy largely
depends on the beliefs and historical awareness of the
top figure. Researchers have long noted this fact (see:
Kasyanov, 2007; Skladni pytannia, 2019), but comparing
memory policies in Ukraine, they have not yet analyzed
the activities of the last President, only of his predeces-
sors. Assessing the specifics of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s
commemorative policy, experts shared their views on its
effectiveness. Some pointed to the more moderate nature
of the politics of memory, especially in comparison with
the aggressive strategies of Yushchenko and
Poroshenko, others complained about the superficiality
and ostentation of commemorative practices that turn into
shows (e.g. girl’s “run” on historical websites during Inde-
pendence Day parade in 2021). It is clear that the an-
swers to this question directly correlate with the degree of
particular expert’s support for the figure of V. Zelenskyy
as President of Ukraine in general.
“He is president only by legal fact, not in essence. Zelenskyy
is rapidly losing the informal legitimacy that was inspired by the
myth of Holoborodko. Therefore, as a non-professional, this per-
son cannot, does not know how and does not want to do any-
thing professional in the field of domestic policy. Including in the
context of commemorative practices. He lacks Ukrainian national
identity, he is too far from the idea of supporting national
memory. This actor has been making fun of Ukrainians and
Ukrainians for too long to support him suddenly. Everything that
can be done by his apparatus is to show off or borrow someone
else’s actions… In my opinion, national memory was maintained
(mostly by amateurs) during Kravchuk’s time, and noticeably
became one of the vectors of national culture under Yushchenko,
and, especially under Poroshenko (man, 40 years old, Do-
netsk Region).
“In my opinion, V. Zelenskyy’s memory policy is much health-
ier than that of his predecessors. At least, foreign policy, in par-
ticular, the establishment of relations with Poland and other
Eastern European neighbors: the promotion of theses of the
Intermarium, of a common Eastern European memory. This year,
Poland signed a joint statement to mark the anniversary of the
adoption of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, which unites
us with Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus –it is hard to imagine
such a step in Poroshenko’s time. The second moment was a
joint visit of Zelenskyy and his Polish counterpart to the tomb of
the Ostroh Prince, which was also a major step towards restoring
the common historical memory. I think these are big pluses, be-
cause we had mostly conflicts with Poles under the previous
president, and today we are friends. The situation with Hungary
is a bit more difficult, but Hungarians are not Poles, it is more
difficult to establish a common policy with them. At least now
there is an ambassador in Hungary, there was even no ambas-
sador under Poroshenko. In general, under Zelensky, the politics
of memory is not so confrontational. Domestic policy is not much
different from what happened before. Zelenskyy wants to please
everyone. At the beginning of his presidency, there were state-
ments such as “what a difference”, which were not accepted by
civil society, so such theses were edited, “what a difference”
ceased, and the theses that appeared under Poroshenko were
pursued in a somewhat softened form” (man, 40 years old,
Kyiv).
“Unlike his predecessors, President Zelenskyy has a post-
modernist view of the historical past, which does not follow a
single logic, is not centered around one idea, and does not serve
the interests of one political force. This may not be the case
when all efforts should be centered on countering Putin, but in
the long run, such a multi-subject, democratic, dialogical model
of memory is more advantageous. National memory, like an
umbrella, covers many ethnic, class memories, does not deny,
but tolerates their existence. And Zelenskyy, or rather the one
who advises him, understands this” (woman, 30 years old,
Odessa).
The attitude of experts to the Ukrainian Institute of Na-
tional Memory as the leading body for the implementation
of state memory policy was extremely positive. Only one
respondent, who, by the way, directly managed this or-
ganization, gave negative answer to the question “Is such
an institution necessary in the structure of the executive
branch?”. Other experts called for the preservation of the
institution, some, however, suggested referring it to the
parliament. Here are some examples of expert answers:
“An attitude is definitely positive. Such an institution is nec-
essary, perhaps not in the executive branch, but in the legislative
branch. At the same time, it should not only conduct professional
historical expertise, but also be able to veto any laws, decrees or
other decisions of the legislative and executive branches (both
central and local) that are contrary to Ukraine’s interests or dis-
tort historical events in which Ukraine is directly involved. I be-
lieve that the UINM should be constantly represented at the in-
ternational level, for example, by introducing positions of advis-
ers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine” (man, 40 years
old, Zaporizhzhia).
“I would say that the institute of national memory does not
“eat” a lot of money, so it does little damage. I personally would
not create such an institution, but it suits me perfectly in the for-
mat as it exists today. What happened under the previous direc-
tors of the UINM, i.e. the opposite strategies, sometimes outra-
geous ones, shows that much depends on the leader. In particu-
lar, the conflict with the Poles I mentioned is partly the fault of the
former director of the Institute, Volodymyr Viatrovych. The cur-
rent director is pursuing a more balanced policy. It is not neces-
sary to close the institution due to the fact that someone once
made mistakes. My attitude to UINM is rather positive. I am
ready to support it with my taxes” (man, 50 years old, Kyiv).
Conclusions
Summarizing the results of the study, we would like to
draw the following conclusions:
Transformation of commemorative practices in Ukrainian historical discourse
Трансформація комеморативних практик в українському історичному дискурсі
SKHID Vol. 3 (1) 2022
Complex Problems of Historical Memory in Philosophical and Historical Interpretations
13
1. All experts have demonstrated a high level of
awareness of the forms and content of commemorative
practices in modern Ukraine. They have noted the in-
crease in civil society activity in the realm of historical
memory after 2014, the use of commemoration elements
in the process of establishing the collective identity of
Ukrainians, in forming a national narrative, drawing histor-
ical parallels and even fighting political opponents. The
vast majority of experts give a positive assessment of the
directions of the state policy of memory and the activity of
the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory within the ex-
ecutive power.
2. Commemorative practices are based on appropri-
ate memory models. The remnants of the Soviet-style
totalitarian worldview have led to the popularity of the
model of memory in which the state’s monopoly on histo-
ry prevails. The past is a kind of symbolic resource, the
use of which contributes to the legitimization of Ukraine
as an independent state. Today, many decision-makers
have received higher education and made a career either
in the Soviet era or in the early years of independence,
when commemorative practices were aimed at forming
and serving a single narrative. The official view of histori-
cal events may have contributed to the objectives of pat-
riotic education, but did not provide for different interpre-
tations. Plural model of memory, which recognizes the
existence of several alternatives, “interpretations, experi-
ences as a fundamental principle, where ‘own’ and ‘cor-
rect’ is not so obvious” (Політика і пам’ять, 2018, с.226),
has not still received proper spread. The idea that nation-
al memory consists of many particular commemorations,
such as Jewish, Crimean Tatar, Polish, Hungarian com-
memoration, etc., or proletarian or aristocratic (noble)
commemoration, is accepted with difficulty even by inter-
viewed experts.
3. The transformation of commemorative practices in
modern Ukraine indicates a certain inertia of their forms
compared to the content. According to one respondent,
“Ukrainian history has been enriched with new content,
but its memory is preserved in old forms”. Along with fun-
damentally new forms, primarily related to Internet tech-
nologies and social networks, commemoration in Ukraine,
as in the Soviet period, is focused on honoring heroes
and victims. At the same time, there is a radical reas-
sessment: the heroes of the Soviet era have become
villains, and villains have become heroes. All this points
to the “hybrid nature” of commemorative practices with an
emphasis on the martyrological-victim component and the
trauma of the social psyche of Ukrainians.
4. The dominant motive of commemorative practices
in modern Ukraine is the “nationalization” of historical
narrative. The noticeable Ukrainophile renaissance, mani-
fested in the popularization of the names of many unde-
servedly forgotten figures in Ukrainian history, the return
to national symbols and religious rituals, is strengthened
by the need for ideological confrontation with Russian
hybrid aggression. Leading topics in this regard are the
Cossacks, the liberation struggle of 1917-1921, the activi-
ties of the OUN-UPA, the dissident movement, the Revo-
lution of Dignity, the modern Ukrainian-Russian war. The
tragic events of the Holodomor of 1932-33 are acquiring
ethnic tint. However, alternatives to the Ukrainian narra-
tive of memory, such as the Holocaust of the Jews during
World War II, are difficult and ambiguous for society, as
evidenced by the recent debate over the Babyn Yar Holo-
caust Memorial.
5. Experts noted a certain decrease in tension around
another trend in the dynamics of commemorative practic-
es, namely around decommunization. After the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a package of
decommunization laws in April 2015, the spontaneous
process, which has been slowly developing in most re-
gions of Ukraine since 1991, has been regulated at the
legislative level. The calendar of Soviet holidays and an-
niversaries has been revised substantially, the pantheon
of heroes has been changed, monuments to Soviet lead-
ers have been dismantled, and the communist regime
has been assessed as criminal. Ukrainian society reacted
relatively calmly to these measures, which, according to
experts, indicates the readiness of the majority of the
population to abandon Soviet values and the “overripe”
nature of Ukrainian decommunization. Even the Victory
Day over Nazism, which is the most sacred for the entire
post-Soviet memorial space, is no longer perceived as
“our” holiday in Ukraine.
6. In general, changes in commemorative practices
indicate that Ukrainian society has become more homo-
geneous since 2014. Regional differences in assess-
ments of past events no longer look radically opposite.
Experts from the southern and eastern regions and cities
sometimes take a more nation-centric and patriotic stance
than representatives of the western and central regions of
Ukraine. Apparently, the annexation of Crimea and the
occupation of Donbass have catalyzed the process of
“nationalization” of the historical memory, and commemo-
rative practices have played a role in mobilizing the popu-
lation around patriotic forces to resist Russian aggres-
sion.
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14
СХІД Том 3 (1) 2022
Складні проблеми історичної пам’яті в філософських та історичних інтерпретаціях
Трансформація комеморативних практик
в українському історичному дискурсі
Роман Додонов (ORCID 0000-0003-1598-499X)
Київський університет імені Бориса Грінченка (Україна)
Стаття присвячена дослідженню змін, що відбуваються в українському суспільстві в галузі змісту і с-
торичної пам’яті та форм комеморативних практик. Метою дослідження є виявлення основних тенденцій
формальних і змістовних трансформацій комеморативних практик в українському історичному дискурсі.
В ході напівструктурованого, фокусованого інтерв’ю 51 експерта, що представляють основні регіони
України, було виявлено, що чинні комеморативні практики ґрунтуються на симбіозі монологічної і діало-
гічної моделей пам’яті. Залишки тоталітарного світогляду радянського зразка обумовили популярність
моделі пам’яті, в якій панує державний монопогляд на історію. Ідея про те, що національна пам’ять скла-
дається з багатьох партикулярних комеморацій, важко сприймається українським суспільством. Минуле
постає своєрідним символічним ресурсом, використання якого сприяє легітимації України як незалежної
держави. Але форми комеморації багато в чому залишаються старими. Поряд з принципово новими фо-
рмами, пов’язаними, насамперед, з інтернет-технологіями і соціальними мережами, в Україні, як і в ра-
дянський період, комеморація фокусується навколо вшанування героїв і жертв. При цьому відбувається
радикальна переоцінка: герої радянської доби перетворилися на злочинців, а злочинці – на героїв. Все
це вказує на «гібридний характер» комеморативних практик з акцентом на мартирологічно-віктимній
складовій і травмованості соціальної психіки українців.
Ключові слова: соціальні практики, комеморація, експертне опитування, історична пам’ять, політика пам’яті.
Received (Надійшла до редакції): 22.12.2021,
Accepted (Прийнята до друку): 09.03.2022
Available online (Опубліковано онлайн) 01.04.2022