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International Journal of Innovative Research and Knowledge Volume-7 Issue-11, November 2022
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
INNOVATIVE RESEARCH AND KNOWLEDGE
ISSN-2213-1356 www.ijirk.com
Bodu Bala Sena’s Charges Against Muslims After the Sri
Lankan Civil War
Fatima Afra Mohamed Razak
PhD Student,
International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC), IIUM
Thameem Ushama
Professor, Department of Uṣūl al-Dīn and Comparative Religion and ISTAC,
International Islamic University Malaysia
ABSTRACT
Sri Lanka has people of many ethnicities, faiths, and languages cohabiting peacefully. The Tamils, Muslims,
and Christians comprise the remaining community members, while Buddhism makes up most of the population.
Even though Buddhist and Muslim relations have been amicable for the past century, there has been a surge in
anti-Muslim sentiment and violence in Sri Lanka following the end of the country’s civil war. Many Buddhist
Nationalist Groups have initiated negative sentiments and accusations against Muslim socio-cultural practices.
The Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) has played the most prominent role. This study focuses on the five allegations that
the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) has levelled against Muslims and the responses of Muslim organisations. The study
aims to determine the true nature of the allegations and their repercussions for Muslims and explain Muslim
organisations’ strategies to accomplish the objectives. This study followed a qualitative methodology and relied
on primary sources, such as interviews and secondary sources, which included research articles, dissertations,
books, newspaper articles, websites, activity reports, and publications.
Key Words: Buddhist-Muslim, Buddhist Nationalist Groups, Bodu Bala Sena, anti-Muslim sentiments
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INTRODUCTION
The Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), a Sinhala- Buddhist organisation, was founded in 2012. BBS means “Buddhist
Strength Army” or “Buddhist Defense Force”. The BBS was established in May 2012 (Silva, 2006). Venerable
Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara Thero, Venerable Kirama Wimalajothi Thero, two unnamed persons, and lay
Buddhist Dilanthe Withanage were the founders. Wimalojothi, the founding President of the BBS, has since
resigned, leaving Gnanasara as General Secretary, a de facto leader, and Withanage as CEO (Shirley, 2015).
According to Bruno Marshall Shirley, these two individuals are the most influential spokesmen for the Bodu
Bala Sena, and their press conferences, speeches, and interviews form the basis of the organisation.
Withanage studied information technology and worked as an advisor to the Minister of National Language and
Social Integration. Wimalajothi has known Gnanasara since they were both members of the Sinhalese Buddhist
delegation to a post-war reconciliation meeting in Norway in 2011. In 2012, he co-founded the Bodu Bala Sena
with Gnanasara and Wimalajothi. The Ministry requested his resignation in 2013, and he has since worked full-
time as the CEO of the Bodu Bala Sena (Shirley, 2015). Its founding leaders were Rev. Kirama Wimalajothi
and Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, who had broken away from the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) because it was
not militant enough to protect Buddhism (Silva, 2006). According to Venerable Professor Uttarawala
Dhammaratana Thera of the Buddhist and Pali University of Sri Lanka, the function of the Bodu Bala Sena is a
politically related organisation involved in many different political campaigns throughout the country (Zhang,
2016).
This organisation was founded and run by monks. Gnanasara claimed that they are supported by almost 80%
of the monks in Sri Lanka (Shirley, 2015). Benjamin Schonthal stated that “except for one lay member, who
also serves as the organisation’s lay coordinator, all of the other members of the organisation’s executive
committee are Buddhist monks from the deep south of Sri Lanka. Over the past several decades, the BBS has
represented a progression of politicising monks who have intended to progressively politicise Buddhism as a
rallying point for the safeguards of Sri Lanka’s Sinhala- Buddhist ethnic majority (Silva, 2006).”
The leaders of BBS claimed that as a consequence of Sri Lankan Muslims, Sri Lankans had become unethical
and had turned away from Buddhism (Why Buddhist Extremist Groups like the Bodu Bala Sena Are Targeting
Muslims in Sri Lanka — Quartz India, n.d.). Therefore, the founders of BBS established this organisation.
Dilantha Withanage, the organisation’s theoretician, mentioned their intention. They believe that “although
Sinhalese make up the majority of the population and Buddhism is acknowledged in the constitution, this is not
the case in practice. We felt it was our responsibility to safeguard the Sinhalese and Buddhism: hence, the BBS
was established... Although Sinhalese are the majority, they are becoming a global minority due to
globalisation. All embassies will raise their voices if something occurs to the Muslims and Tamils, but there is
no one to safeguard the Sinhalese if something happens to them (Zuhair, 2016).”
The BBS’s vision is “protection of Buddhism for Future Generations; the mission is ‘the BBS would bring
together the four Buddhist congregations, Bhikkhus (Buddhist monks), Bhikkhunis (Buddhist nuns), Upasaka
(layman), and Upasika (laywoman), to lead the nation in protecting, safeguarding, and sustaining Buddhist
social values in the face of dynamic global trends of change, and to organise programs and projects in this
regard in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of Sri Lanka (Bodu Bala Sena | Bodu Bala Sena
BBS, n.d.).”
BBS has its headquarters in Colombo’s Sri Sambuddhathwa Jayanthi Mandiraya. The Buddhist Cultural Centre,
which Kirsma Wimalajothi founded, also owns Sri Sambuddhathwa Jayanthi Mandiraya. The centre has a
variety of amenities, including a conference centre, modern administrative offices, and a well-stocked bookstore
with various Buddhist books from Sri Lanka and elsewhere. According to reports, the organisation is supported
by donations from the Buddhist community. It maintains close ties with Sinhala businessmen in Colombo and
Sinhala immigrant community groups in Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Europe, and North
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America (Silva, 2006). Robin Noel also stated that according to his findings, the BBS’s support base is primarily
male, young and based in urban or semi-urban areas (Robin Noel Badone Jones, 2015).
Five resolutions were enacted to safeguard Buddhism in the country while boosting the state’s support (Silva,
2006). In July 2012, the BBS held its first national convention at Bandaranaike Memorial International
Conference Hall. Until the 2015 presidential election, the BBS eschewed direct political participation. In 2015,
they returned Rajapaksa to the presidency, claiming that his campaign aligned more with the Sinhala Buddhist
interests.
BBS started its processes to safeguard the country and Buddhism from the hands of Muslim conquerors. It had
a strong claim that Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and the Maldives were previously Buddhist
countries which became Muslim countries, and currently, Sri Lankan Muslims attempt to make Sri Lanka the
next colony in a rising Muslim empire aimed at being built by the Wahhabi movement spreading from the
Middle East, Pakistan, and Malaysia (Robin Noel Badone Jones, 2015). Furthermore, they claimed that the
Muslims have multiple motherlands, which Sinhalese only see as Sri Lanka. So, they need to stand for a
Buddhist country.
In these contexts, BBS started to spread anti-Muslim sentiments and violence across the country. Anti-Muslim
sentiments of the BBS were reflected in numerous ways, such as anti- ḥalāl and Islmic law (sharīʿah)
opposition, anti-animal slaughtering, opposition to Islmic clothing (ḥijāb, niqāb), and agitations, opposition to
the practice of Islmic principles and obligations, as well as attacks on worship places, allegations against
Islmic organisations.
BBS ANTI- HALĀL OPPOSITIONS
The Arabic term ḥalāl means ‘permissible’, while the Arabic term ḥarām means ‘impermissible’. Islm made
consuming ḥalāl one of the essential obligations to the Muslims. Therefore, the main theological decision-
making body of Sri Lankan Muslims, All Ceylon Jamiyyathul Ulama (ACJU), has monitored and issued ḥalāl
certificates since 2000 (Yusoff & Sarjoon, 2017). Ḥalāl certificates are issued to verify whether foods contain
prohibited substances and export business items on national and worldwide markets.
BBS started an anti-ḥalāl campaign in February 2012 and the Bodu Bala Sena’s first major national campaign,
launched in 2013, was against ḥalāl certification, which they described as Muslims’ deliberate attempt to
“destroy Sinhalese and Buddhist food habits and culture by replacing them with ḥalāl culture (Shirley, 2015).”
BBS claimed that money from the ḥalāl food industry funds international terrorism (Violent Buddhist Extremists
Are Targeting Muslims in Sri Lanka | The Independent | The Independent, n.d.). Further, they claimed ACJU
profited from ḥalāl certification and used it for nefarious purposes. Dilantha Withanage explained, “when you
buy ḥalāl, a small portion of your money goes to Islamic groups, and we have no idea what they do with it
(Robin Noel Badone Jones, 2015).” It is argued that ḥalāl certification money was utilised to spread Islm,
develop Islmic society and construct mosques. Palitha asserted, in addition, that ḥalāl logos are considered as
a preface to more ominous developments and “it is laying the groundwork for the spread of Islām in the country;
it is the beginning of the Islāmization of Sri Lankan society (Robin Noel Badone Jones, 2015).”
BBS members had called for the boycott of ḥalāl consumer products until the entire practice was abolished.
This movement took many forms, from calls to boycott Muslim companies and ḥalāl items to rallies outside
Muslim-owned stores(Attacks on Places of Religious Worship in Post–War Sri Lanka – Centre for Policy
Alternatives, 2013). This campaign also had a solid online presence, a Facebook group, and pages on the ground.
Gnarasara further claims that ḥall certification is part of a “strategic plan” to Islmize Sri Lanka, claiming that
they wanted all Sinhalese businesspeople to acquire these certificates for their products. They persuaded all the
hotels, restaurants, and other businesses to purchase these ḥall certificates; as a result, they profited
handsomely. They attempt to replace Sinhalese and Buddhist food patterns and culture with Islmic culture.
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They accused the country appears less like Sinhalese and more like Muslim. That is what we intended to avoid
(Shirley, 2015). Michael Jerryson explained that ḥall has an impact on society’s culture. Every shop: ḥall
food, ḥall restaurant... they make up only 10% of the population. As a result, we concluded that it is... a
component of Islmification (Shirley, 2015).
The BBS believes that the ḥall logo triggers issues about food, land, and economy, all of which are linked to a
significant Muslim attempt to take over the country. Their argument against ḥall certification is that ḥall items
have already been dedicated to a god and hence, cannot be used in puja (Robin Noel Badone Jones, 2015).
These nationalist forces used the internet to organise a network of Buddhist organisations to boycott ḥall-
labelled foods. In between, meetings between the ACJU, the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce (CCC), and
Buddhist monks were held through the intervention of some Sinhala and Muslim politicians linked with the
government, and a settlement was reached on March 11, 2013. The ACJU would remove the ḥall logo from
products sold for local consumption but would keep it on when exporting to Islamic nations where it is required.
The BBS also turned down this offer, insisting on “the abolition of the entire Ḥall procedure (Silva, 2006).”
On March 13, 2013, the government declared that the ACJU had no authority to issue ḥall certificates and that
a new method of certifying ḥall products would need to be developed (No Coercion, No Logo, Assures New
Halal Body | The Sunday times Sri Lanka, n.d.). The BBS, according to Ven. Gnanasara Thera recognises the
need for ḥall-compliant export procedures, which might be implemented by the Export Bureau or the Sri Lanka
Standards Institution. The ḥall compliance procedure before certification should be implemented for local
products (No Coercion, No Logo, Assures New Halal Body | The Sunday times Sri Lanka, n.d.). The BBS
declared success in its campaign against ḥall, stating that it would no longer bring up the ḥall issue. The
Government officials failed to take any steps to quell or control anti-ḥall sentiments and protests. As a result,
hostilities between Sinhalese and Muslims have deteriorated (Yusoff & Sarjoon, 2017).
MUSLIM WOMEN’S CLOTHING
The BBS had succeeded in its anti-ḥall campaign against Muslims and expressed their happiness on the
decision over the ḥall certified logos. The BBS celebrated ḥall victory by lighting crackers in many urban
areas (Bodhu Bala Sena Begins New Campaign Against Attire of Muslim Women in Sri Lanka After Abolishing
Halal Logos – Dbsjeyaraj.Com, n.d.). Soon after this, the BBS started a campaign against women’s clothing,
such as abāyah ḥijāb and niqāb (face covering). While Muslim women in Sri Lanka wear various clothes, the
dress that has enraged the BBS covers the entire body.
Venerable Kirama Wimalajothi Thero has said that the BBS will launch a new campaign against the attire worn
by many Muslim women in Sri Lanka before March 31, 2013 (Bodhu Bala Sena Begins New Campaign Against
Attire of Muslim Women in Sri Lanka After Abolishing Halal Logos – Dbsjeyaraj.Com, n.d.). The BBS
considered these dresses’ Arabized’ dresses, and the niqāb (face covering) was termed “gonibilla”. The word
“gonibilla” used in Sinhala means ‘monster’ to scare children. They mentioned that the black colour and the
dress covering the whole body scared the children and some others, too (Farzana Haniffa, 2015). Also, this
black-coloured and full-face cover dress is considered as unlucky to them.
Furthermore, they stated that these dresses symbolise an outsider, thus, transforming Muslim women into
foreigners. This demonstrates that the Muslims are not attempting to live in harmony with the Sinhalese people
but rather wish to exist as a distinct nation. Also, Chaminda argued that the burqa was inappropriate for Sri
Lanka’s climate. He implied that Muslim women began wearing burqas to conceal their pregnancy: “I have
one theory. They are attempting to boost the population. No one will know they are pregnant if they wear a
burqa (Robin Noel Badone Jones, 2015).” Likewise, Dilantha Withanage remarked, “When I go in the street, I
have a fundamental right to see a person’s face (New Fears in Sri Lanka amid Anti-Muslim Campaign, n.d.).”
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Therefore, the BBS commenced the anti- abāyah campaign on March 17, 2013, in Kandy. They demanded the
government ban the niqb and abyah in Sri Lanka as they threatened security. Also, the attention to the dress
was purely in keeping with its putative strangeness and differences within the Sri Lankan context (Farzana
Haniffa, 2015). BBS supporters have also linked burqas to the illegal crossing of national borders. “With that
clothing, some criminal things could happen,” Rev. Samitha predicted. “They may be able to travel with illegal
weapons on occasion.” They may travel with illegal narcotics like heroin or something similar (Robin Noel
Badone Jones, 2015).”
As a result, Muslim religious leaders watching the debate over women’s dress advised Muslim women to wear
coloured abyah instead of black for security concerns. Furthermore, Muqaddasa Wahid stated in her writing
that” ‘the black abāyah and face covering (niqāb) cause friction between communities, some senior Sinhalese
intellectuals who are interested in communal unity informed me. Please tell your people to quit wearing black
abāyahs and niqābs since they are not part of Islām (Wahid, 2021) .”
In response to such a statement, the Muslim Council of Sri Lanka sent an email in 2014 stating, “The excessive
visibility of the BLACK abāyah, which attracts unnecessary attention to themselves, is one of the key drivers of
the onslaught on ḥijāb and niqāb.” Some are also concerned that an alien culture is being introduced. We must
encourage Muslim women to wear coloured (non-black) abāyah and head coverings in public and highlight our
responsibility to preserve our Sri Lankan identity (Wahid, 2021).
However, Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist forces have also pressed the government to establish limitations on
wearing Islamic identity-based attire in public areas. Also, anti- abāyah sentiments are reflected across the
country in numerous ways. Muslim girls are instructed and sometimes forced to remove their ḥijābs and long
Panjabi trousers and conceal them in their school bags in many notable towns’ schools. Similarly, in several
Sinhalese areas, there have been a few incidents of Muslim women being assaulted for wearing Islmic clothing
(Sarjoon et al., 2016).
Following the Easter Sunday assaults, Muslim women’s religious dress was especially controversial in a
pluralistic society. In slightly over a week following the Easter Sunday attacks, the state-issued additional
regulations under the Public Security Ordinance of 1947 (PSO). Wearing any garment, clothing, or another
material covering the entire face is prohibited, according to regulation 32A. (1) (a), issued in the Extraordinary
Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, No. 2121/1, on Monday, April 29, 2019 (The Gazette
of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 2019). As further illustrated in the Gazette, “Public place”
refers to any public road, any building, any enclosed or open area, any vehicle, or any other mode of
transportation; “full face” refers to a person’s entire face, including the ears; and “public road” refers to any
roadway over a public bridge, as well as any pavement, drain, embankment, or ditch belonging to or
appertaining to a public road (The Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 2019).”
Muqaddasa Wahid mentioned that male Muslim religious leaders appeared on television, asking Muslim women
not to wear the face veil and wear coloured abyahs for security reasons. On the other hand, the idea of wearing
coloured abāyahs was discussed in the Muslim community for years before the Easter Sunday attacks (Wahid,
2021).
On April 25, 2019, the All Ceylon Jamiyyathul Ulama (ACJU), Sri Lanka’s leading Muslim scholarly
organisation, started responding to the face-covering prohibition. The summary mentioned therein, “This
present situation may cause challenges for Muslim women who wear face covers in public. Thus, we must take
every precaution in this unpredictable political situation to prevent opening the path for racial elements. So, the
ACJU urges Muslim women, in particular, to avoid any potential inconveniences that wearing a face cover in
public may bring and to act responsibly and seriously in light of the current situation (Important Message with
Regard to Face Cover of Muslim Women - ACJU, n.d.).”
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HIGH BIRTH RATE OF MUSLIMS
Another claim of BBS against Muslims was about them trying to take over the country with their high birth
rate. Muslims will become the country’s majority by 2100 as the community grows faster (Facts And Fallacies
Of Muslim Population In Sri Lanka - Colombo Telegraph, n.d.), and Sri Lanka will be a Muslim country by
2050 (Islam, Contraception And Myths On Muslim Population Growth In Sri Lanka - Colombo Telegraph, n.d.).
Such misconceptions spread among the community. BBS monks mentioned in their many speeches that Sinhala
– Buddhists will lose their majority as they have family-planning abortions, and the NGOs support that.
Withange stated this to Michael Jerryson in an interview, “there is a non-governmental organisation (NGO)
that supports decreasing Sinhala- Buddhist families and abortions; also, Sinhala-Buddhist had the family plan,
but Muslims will not do so. Further, he stated, so we began this anti-family improvement against the slogan
“the small family is a golden family,” and we promoted having more children; however, because of the
government, economic structures, and other factors, it is extremely difficult for Sinhala families to have more
Children. Also, education and employment play a major role in family planning. So, he demands that Islām
exercise some population control (Shirley, 2015).”
Furthermore, BBS members claimed that Muslims have a hidden agenda to reduce the country’s Sinhala
Buddhist population. Malinga, a young BBS supporter, speculated that Muslims support family planning
programs. The government developed the concept of punchi pawula rattaran [little family is beautiful].
Muslims, on the other hand, provided the concealed concept. The ministers have collected money from Muslims
to spread this ideology (Robin Noel Badone Jones, 2015). He also stated that healthcare companies and hospitals
are profiting and promoting Sinhala people not to have children. The people are encouraged to have a C-section
so they cannot have more than three children.
Buddhist monks commonly allude to the Muslim family’s fecundity in disparaging terms; according to the
Madegoda Abhayatissa Thero, Muslims have more than three children. In a Muslim family, the grandmother,
grandchild, and mother are all pregnant simultaneously. The BBS monk stressed the significance of young
people having children to protect Sinhalese in their campaigns while emphasising Muslim women. He said, ‘if
you meet a Muslim mother, she will have one child in her hand and another in her stomach, as well as a long
line of them following her (Farzana Haniffa, 2015).’
Therefore, large and noticeable Muslim groups are portrayed as over-sized ‘nuclear families’, whose number
will lead them to displace the Sinhalese as the majority in this discourse. Also, there was an accusation across
the country that Muslims are trying to reduce the Sinhala- Buddhist population in many ways. According to one
allegation, certain Muslim-owned textile chains purposefully sell contraceptive-embedded underwear and freely
give contraceptive sweets to Sinhala women to make them barren and facilitate the extinction of the Sinhala
race (Silva, 2006).
Furthermore, the BBS has claimed that Muslim store owners have discreetly fed contraceptives to innocent
Buddhist women. So, the BBS spread the message that the Nolimit clothing store gives away free sweets (toffee)
during the new year. This toffee includes malic acid (E296), which will cause a pregnant woman’s fetus to be
aborted (Robin Noel Badone Jones, 2015). In this regard, on February 27, 2018, a Sinhalese mob stormed a
Muslim hotel in Ampara, accusing them of mixing infertility drugs (Wanda pethi) with food supplied to Sinhala
customers (‘Wanda Pethi’ My Foot! - Colombo Telegraph, n.d.).
Many followers of the BBS claimed that Muslim doctors intended to prevent Sinhala women from having
multiple children (Robin Noel Badone Jones, 2015). On May 23, 2019, the nationalist Sri Lankan newspaper
Divaina published a front-page story alleging that a Muslim doctor secretly sterilised 4000 Sinhala Buddhist
women after cesarean deliveries (Unsubstantiated Claims Muslim Doctor Sterilized Women Raise Tensions in
Sri Lanka | Reuters, n.d.). After two days, a doctor, Segu Shihabdeen Mohamed Shafi, was arrested. However,
the occurrence is unethical since the relevant authorities were not permitted to undertake an impartial
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investigation to discover the truth. These poisonous misconceptions, developed and disseminated around the
country, are intended to weaken racial harmony and incite a new wave of violence to benefit unscrupulous
politicians and others who seek to profit at the country’s expense (Facts And Fallacies Of Muslim Population
In Sri Lanka - Colombo Telegraph, n.d.).
In addition, BBS argued that Muslims’ practice of polygamy increased their overall birthrate. According to
Withanage, the fact that Sri Lankan legislation permits Muslim men to have up to four wives will limit the
options available to Sinhalese men, resulting in the extinction of the Buddhist population (Shirley, 2015). The
BBS website illustrates this with an infographic that if Muslim men can have up to four wives, some of them
must be Sinhalese women. This will deprive Sinhalese men of possible wives, contributing to the “dying out”
of the Sinhalese race.
Besides these allegations, misconceptions, and strategic intentions, there is a crucial point concerning the
Buddhist birth control practised in Sinhala. Wickrema Weerasooria reviewed the book Dreams of change: land,
labour and conflict in Sri Lanka by Sarath Amungama. He mentioned that the family planning policy was
implemented from 1977 to 1986. He stated how the population policy and implementation were introduced and
who helped to exercise the policy (Why Amunugama Is the Most Qualified to Pen ‘Dreams of Change’ | The
Sunday Times Sri Lanka, n.d.).
Furthermore, he mentioned that slogans which helped envelop the government printers ran as follows: “Punchi
Pavula Raththaran’ -Api Dennai- Daru – Dennai, which means in English “A small family is beautiful or golden
– Two parents and two children (Why Amunugama Is the Most Qualified to Pen ‘Dreams of Change’ | The
Sunday Times Sri Lanka, n.d.).” In addition, he extended his gratitude to Amunugama in this book review for
the latter’s contribution to raising awareness and achieving the goal of bringing family planning out of the
private and public spheres. This family planning approach had widespread support from policymakers,
politicians, and many ordinary Sri Lankans.
Mansur Dhalan mentioned in his interview at YA TV, “the Muslims are the cause of the declining Sinhala
population. Look at how many abortion facilities are springing up (Is Muslim Halal Prohibited (Haram) for
Non-Muslims? On Vimeo, n.d.).” Also, Chanuka Wattegama wrote an article entitled “It is a vile lie to say that
the Sinhalese may be a minority.” He mentioned the reason why he stated it as a vile lie. According to his
writing, ‘the entire objective of the Sinhala racist political parties and groups that promote this myth is to instil
dread in the naturally emotional and ancient Sinhala- Buddhist mindset and to utilise that fear to move them
further in their political path. That is why this falsehood must be exposed. That is why it is essential to uncover
what is truly going on in Sri Lanka’s population pyramid, n.d.).’ Likewise, Nimal Siripala, an adviser to the
National Statistic office on Solomon Island, wrote “facts and fallacies of the Muslim population in Sri Lanka .’
WORSHIP PLACES
BBS started another claim against Muslim places of worship (Mosques), primarily in Buddhist-majority areas.
Also, there is a claim that there are only 9800 temples in a country where Buddhists make up 71% of the
population. Muslims, on the other hand, who represent 10% of the population, have 6300 mosques (Silva,
2006). Liyanage claimed that mosques have unofficially declared the number of Muslim towns as ‘high-security
zone’s restricted to Sinhala and Tamil for social, economic, cultural and political activities (Robin Noel Badone
Jones, 2015).
BBS portrays Muslims as a cultural threat, claiming they occupy sacred (Buddhist) space in Sri Lanka. They
claimed that Muslims build mosques and residential areas near or on Buddhist religious places and destroy
Buddha’s images, which diminishes his physical and visible presence in Sri Lank (Shirley, 2015).
BBS supporters accused the Muslims have established separate Islmic zones. The minorities find it difficult to
live and practice their faith in the regions historically and religiously significant to Buddhists. They considered
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some public places sacred to Buddhists in Dambulla and Anuradhapura. There are efforts to declare them as
scared (Attacks on Places of Religious Worship in Post–War Sri Lanka – Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2013).
The Sinhala nationalist claims that the lands on these mosques were constructed and gifted to the Muslims by
the ancient Sinhala rulers (Robin Noel Badone Jones, 2015).
On April 20, 2012, a group of 2000 individuals, commanded by the Mahanayaka of the Rangiri Dambulla
chapter Venerable Inamaluwe Sumangala Thero, allegedly forced their way into the 50-year-old Masjidul
Kairiya mosque, which they said was illegal. Friday prayers at the mosque had to be cancelled, and the building
had to be evacuated under police protection [64].
In this case, they claimed that the area where they built the mosque belonged to Dambulla Raja Maha Viharaya.
So, the Sri Lankan government ordered demolishing the mosque and relocating it to another area. However,
senior Muslim politicians were outraged by the incident as the mosque was 65 years old and was legally
contributed under the Waqf Act.
Likewise, a mob of over a hundred people, allegedly led by Buddhist monks, demolished a 300-year-old Muslim
shrine at Anuradhapura. They stated that the shrine was demolished because local Muslims attempted to remodel
it into a mosque. They said the area is holy and belonged to the Buddhists as the land was given to them 2000
years ago (Attacks on Places of Religious Worship in Post–War Sri Lanka – Centre for Policy Alternatives,
2013).
According to the Attacks on ‘Places of Religious Worship in Post-War Sri Lanka’, many mosques were
damaged around the country (Attacks on Places of Religious Worship in Post–War Sri Lanka – Centre for Policy
Alternatives, 2013). Several of these incidents are still under investigation; some offenders are unknown, and
in others, Buddhist groups have claimed responsibility, particularly members of the Buddhist clergy, who are
suspected of being responsible for more than half of the attacks.
Therefore, the government created regulations to control the establishment and activities of religious places,
including mosques. Some Muslim groups have been accused of establishing mosques and madrasas without
informing the authorities. The 2008 circular states the need for authorisation from the Ministry of Buddha
Sasana and religious affairs to build new mosques (Attacks on Places of Religious Worship in Post–War Sri
Lanka – Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2013). This originated from a fear of ‘Muslim expansion’ and ‘distrust
of Muslims’ socio-religious activities.
According to the data from the Waqf Act and the Ministry of Muslim religious and cultural affairs, the registered
mosques of Muslims in Sri Lanka are below 2200. There are few unregistered worship places, such as other
religious groups in the country (Muslim Worship Places ACJU.Pdf, n.d.).
ISLAMIC ORGANISATIONS
BBS have claims against the Islmic organisations which are functioning in Sri Lanka. They accused Islmic
organisations of promoting extremism through their activities, programs and concept throughout the country.
These accusations were made strong after the Easter Sunday attacks as three Islmic organisations, National
Tawhīd Jamāʻat (NTJ), Jamaathe Millaathe Ibrahim (JMI), and Willayath As Seylani (WAS), were banned by
the Sri Lankan government following the terrible attack.
The Sri Lankan government banned another eleven Islmic Organisations, including the Islmic State (ISIS)
and Al- Al-Qaeda, for their links to extremist activities in the country (Sri Lanka Bans 11 Extremist Groups,
Including ISIS and Al-Qaeda - The Hindu, n.d.). The Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka,
dated April 13 2021, published the names of the eleven Islmic Organisations.
Moreover, BBS publicly accused the Islmic organisations of funding international terrorism with funds from
Ḥalāl-certified food industries. It was also stated that profits from Ḥalāl certification were utilised to fund the
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Islmic fundamental operations in Sri Lanka and overseas (Silva, 2006). The BBS followers accused ACJU of
these claims that they are doing these Islmic fundamental activities in Sri Lanka.
The General Secretary of the BBS gave a talk to Hiru TV on May 28, 2019, concerning Islmic organisations
in Sri Lanka. He listed all the Islmic organisations in the country and claimed that all these organisations are
Wahabi organisations, which means extremist organisations. He also presented a document: “Saudi intelligence
stated not to build on an individual as the leader of Wahabi organisations in Sri Lanka, and they are touching
with fifty-odd organisations ( Hiru News - YouTube, 2019).” The BBS supporters mentioned that there are 400
Muslim organisations in Sri Lanka now, and Saudi Arabia funds them (Robin Noel Badone Jones, 2015).
In addition to that, on July 5, 2021, there was a special media conference organised by BBS. The secretary of
BBS mentioned, “we met the president and Director of the Defense Ministry by submitting a special report to
ban all these Islmic organisations in Sri Lanka”. Further, he claimed that these organisations are divided into
Salafi and Wahhabi and made destruction in this country. He mentioned that Jamaat-e-Islām i, which started in
1954, has many branches across the country which aim to convert Sri Lanka into a Muslim country (Special
Media Conference of Bodu Bala Sena !,2021).
Following these accusations, ACJU arranged a media conference on 2013 February 8 regarding the allegations
against Islmic organisations, including ACJU. They attempted to give a clear picture regarding the activities
of Islmic organisations in the Sinhala Language, which is the country's official language (01 Allegations
Against Muslims & ACJU - YouTube, 2021). Despite the clarifications, there are still numerous complaints
against them, specifically, the sponsorship of terrorism and Islmic fundamentalist activities.
VIEWS AND RESPONSES OF ACJU AND NATIONAL SHOORA COUNCIL (NSC)
The ACJU and NSC, both Islamic organisations, regard the BBS as an agent of some internal or external
organisations or a political gain tool. Their charges against Muslims are not just their thoughts but reflections
of everyday Islamophobia, political advantage, and some baseless imaginations and proofless phobias.
However, the ACJU attempted to clarify these claims and misconceptions to the BBS, its officials, the Buddhists
and other Sri Lankan groups through various methods. They attempted to provide clear explanations by
releasing booklets, books, and declarations and interacting with essential society leaders such as religious
leaders, government officials, and intelligence agencies.
The ACJU, in particular, met with the BBS General Secretary Ven. Galagodaaththe Gnanasara Thero on
multiple occasions to clarify their claims about Islam and Muslims. In addition, booklets, publications and
online sources were used to clarify the misconceptions and accusations disseminated throughout the country.
This includes assistance from other Islamic organisations as well.
Similarly, the NSC makes efforts to outlaw the BBS by writing to the IGP. Furthermore, the NSC believes that
Sufi and X-Muslim groups promote BBS to gain more biased views about Islam and Muslims and that they
pose a threat to the Muslim community. However, the NSC maintains that they should not provide explanations
or establish discussions with the BBS since it is futile to converse with or respond to paid servants who are
mercenaries.
However, both organisations believe that most Buddhist-Muslim problems and disagreements result from the
BBS’s anti-Muslim sentiments and campaign, as evidenced by numerous research studies.
Arkam Nooramith explained that ‘it is an organisation of a foreign country or any other agent to attain specific
goals and disrupt the co-existed society in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, they aimed to create a fearful and
uncomfortable atmosphere to gain a political advantage; thus, they carefully planned and carried out all
accusations.’(Arkam Nooramith (in discussion with the Author, June 01, 2021) Similarly, Riza Yahiya stated,
‘this is a post-war invention that was paid for by geopolitical factions and international paymasters. They also
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have ties to Zionism, Israel, and others who aim to polarise people, notably Buddhists and Muslims.’ (in
discussion with the Author, June 19, 2021)
ACJU’S RESPONSE TO BBS CLAIMS
According to interviewees, when the ḥall issue arose, BBS gave two primary justifications for their
accusations: ACJU benefits in the millions from this ḥall certification and uses this money to fund terrorism.
Interviewee Two was the secretary of the ḥall division when this situation arose and was well-versed in this
subject. He noted that because this problem threatened peace and unity, ACJU authorities met the Honorable.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the former Defense Secretary, debate the matter. We spoke openly about the tariff and
profit and asked for an audit to see this. Following the request, they performed an official financial inspection
of the Ḥall certification process division and ascertained the truth. However, they again claimed that we
coerced non-Muslims to obtain this ḥall certification, that Arab countries do not require this certification, and
that only Sri Lanka requires it.
As a result, we held press conferences and debates and offered all required clarifications. During this press
conference, ACJU described the aim of the ḥall certification, its latest income and profit after expenses, and
how the income will be used to improve the international standards of the ḥall certification mechanism. ACJU
further proposed that the government take over the entire Halal certification process and urged the government
to create an acceptable structure for all stakeholders. The head of the ACJU also stated that the decision was
made to avoid a “continued debate on this sensitive matter, which could undermine the peaceful co-existence
of the people.” The ACJU further stated that the government might model the Halal certification procedure on
the systems used in Singapore and Thailand, which are implemented with the assistance of the state government
(Halal Issue ACJU Press Meet,2013). These explanations are provided in English, Sinhala, and Tamil.
Murshid Mulaffar mentioned, ‘finally, ACJU urged the government to accept ḥall certifying authority instead
of ACJU in this procedure, but the government declined. Thus, a private company is now conducting this
procedure. Therefore, we request that anyone interested in assuming control of this process come forward. (in
discussion with the Author, June 02, 2021)
According to interviewees one and Three, the ACJU conducted conversations with BBS monks to emphasise
the significance and necessity of this Ḥall certification. They all remarked that ACJU had given up ḥall
certification authority to resolve the Muslim community’s issues and ensure the country’s national unity.
MUSLIM WOMEN’S DRESS CODE
The ACJU’s Council for Coordination and Cooperation (CCC) Affairs issued the ‘Social Dialog’ book series
to encourage Sri Lankans toward peace and co-existence on some major accusations against Islam and Muslims.
Under important topics, these book series were published in both Tamil and Sinhala. According to Arkam
Nooramith, ACJU organised a group called ‘Unity Hub,’ with the responsibility of releasing books on
significant claims by BBS. (in discussion with the Author, June 01, 2021)
‘Extremist Islamic clothing’ is one of the booklet’s topics. This book clearly explains women’s clothing not
only from an Islamic perspective but also from scientific and religious perspectives of Buddhism, Christianity,
and Islam, the accusations levelled at the niqb and ḥijb, international opposition to the niqb, and more. All
interviewees cited the book written to answer every doubt and question about women’s dress, such as the ḥijb,
niqb, and burqa. What makes people fear the burqa? Should the burqa be banned? This book discusses all of
the features and points of view. This book was given to the BBS’s General Secretary, Venerable Galagoda
Aththe Gnanasara Thero, and IntelliGenesis and Authorities.
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HIGH BIRTH RATE OF MUSLIMS
Similarly, the ‘Social Dialog’ book series ‘Fear of the growth of Muslim population’ was mentioned by all the
interviewees, as this was published to answer the claims by BBS regarding the growth of the Muslim population.
According to the Interviewees, this book responds to four significant claims, including Muslims consciously
increasing their population. The Sinhalese will expand by 25.4 per cent if they grow at the same pace as
Muslims. Since Muslims are consciously advancing their population, they will be the majority race in this
country by 2040. The Muslim population has rapidly increased in a few districts.
According to Murshid Mulaffar, the booklet was released primarily to explain points made in the Sinhala book
entitled ‘In the Face of the Destruction of a Dynasty.’ We highlighted the reasons behind their population decline
by referencing the Sinhalese professors’ quotations. Furthermore, all components are statistically and
mathematically proven. (In discussion with the Author, June 02, 2021) Further, Mohamed Farhan stated that
this book had been extensively researched, appropriately presented, and distributed in hard and soft copies
around the country. (in discussion with the Author, June 07, 2021)
PLACES OF WORSHIP
According to BBS, there has been an increase in the number of Muslim places of worship in the country. They
also mentioned a statistic on Muslim places of worship. Arkam Nooramith stated that the statistics they
mentioned are false, and we provide the government with the actual statistics of the Muslim worship Places in
Sri Lanka. (in discussion with the Author, June 01, 2021)
All interviewers cited the book “Extraordinary spread in Muslim mosques,” written in reaction to the BBS’s
charges against Muslim mosques. Murshid Mulaffar summarised the book by discussing its contents. He said,
‘In that book, we discussed how our social, religious, and educational activities are built on mosques, as well as
the reasons to construct mosques nearby, Mosque Laws, and All Religious Thoughts Regarding Religious
Places. In addition, we looked at the laws governing mosques and how all religious traditions view religious
places’. He added that the information on Muslim places of worship is based on data provided by the Department
of Muslim Religious and Cultural Affairs and the Sri Lanka Wakf Board. (in discussion with the Author, June
02, 2021)
MUSLIM ORGANISATIONS
According to the BBS, Islamic organisations receive global funds and also provide funding for extremism.
Interviewees stated unequivocally that the ACJU has a firm policy of not accepting funds from overseas sources.
As a result, they have received no money so far. As a result, ACJU is not required to respond to BBS on this
matter.
According to Murshid Mulaffar, BBS accused the profits from Ḥall certification of supporting terrorism.
However, they conducted an official audit of ACJU’s accounts and learned everything they needed about
funding, income, and other matters. He stated that if we received funds from other sources, we would only
receive the funds from the banks after providing a report on the expenses. We have never received funding
from Arab countries. (in discussion with the Author, June 02, 2021)
Also, Salman. P.L mentioned that we have organised many dialogues with the General Secretary of BBS
regarding the activities and nature of ACJU and clarified that we do not encourage terrorism or extremism in
our teachings or guidance. However, he only accepts our explanation after the meeting and then claims in a
public speech that we are encouraging terrorism or extremism. Furthermore, whenever allegations or problems
occurred in Islam and unity, the ACJU took necessary actions by collaborating with the Defense Ministry and
the Chief of National Intelligence and maintaining a healthy relationship with them. (In discussion with the
Author, December 07, 2021) The author explained these five claims in the preceding chapter with clear evidence
of their actuality and the arguments against those allegations.
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GOVERNMENT’S STAND ON THE PROHIBITION OF BBS
Many studies, including those cited by the author and others, show that the BBS statements cause most
Buddhist-Muslim confrontations, yet the government has not taken any steps to ban the BBS. Many online
petitions have been started, as have several requests from Islamic organisations, research, and public pressure
to ban BBS, but the government has remained silent on the subject. However, in Sri Lanka, under a part of Sri
Lanka’s Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), the government has banned eleven Islamic extremist organisations
were considered extremist organisations.
Despite the recommendations of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) in the final report of the 2019
bombings, the BBS is categorised as a religious extremist organisation that should be prohibited. Furthermore,
certain Cabinet officials believe that the BBS organisation should not be prohibited. However, the Government
Spokesman and the Minister of Mass Media, Keheliya Rambukwella, stated: “According to the PCoI report, the
suggestions are to be adopted within the President’s prerogative and would be carried out through general action
plans. Suppose there are inadequate reasons to consider the BBS or any other institution specified for a
prescription. In that case, the President will decide according to his power (BBS, To Ban or Not to Ban: Decision
in President’s Hands, Keheliya - The Morning - Sri Lanka News, n.d.).”
In this regard, the BBS general secretary stated that they did not commit any crimes in order to be banned; they
raised their voices against Islamist extremism. He was granted a presidential pardon in the last months of former
President Maithripala Sirisena’s rule. While he has been widely accused of encouraging inter-communal
violence, including two deadly anti-Muslim pogroms in June 2014 and March 2018, he was convicted of
contempt of court for a separate event and sentenced to six years in prison.
Ethnic and religious leaders have manipulated the ethnic and religious vote to stay in power or regain power.
For fear of alienating their support base, successive governments have hesitated to take serious action against
extremist preachers and wider intolerance. For fear of alienating their support base, successive governments
have hesitated to take serious action against extremist preachers and wider intolerance.
CONCLUSION
This study focused on particular BBS allegations after the civil conflict in Sri Lanka. In addition to a brief
introduction to BBS, five major claims of BBS were examined, including anti- ḥall oppositions, opposition to
Islamic clothing (ḥijb, niqb) and agitations, a high birth rate among Muslims, attacks on religious worship
places, and allegations against Islamic organisations. In addition, the stances of the ACJU and NSC on these
five allegations and the actions they took in response to these five claims were clarified.
The most challenging obstacle for Muslim leaders and communities in Sri Lanka is overcoming the BBS’s
claims about Islam and Muslims because if they arrived to disprove an older allegation, the BBS would establish
a new one. This analysis demonstrates that BBS’s statements are more biased and primarily the product of their
imagination. Consequently, the explanations and justifications regarding their allegations have not been
clarified. On the other side, religious leaders attempted to clarify their statements and misconceptions in various
ways. Notably, ACJU adopted unique concepts to clarify allegations made regarding Muslims and their
activities.
In this context, it is suggested that the government and related authorities implement PTA laws impartially. It
should apply to both majority and minority religious problems. As with every religion, there are few extremists,
and most of the Sri Lankan community continues to seek a peaceful, harmonious, and coexisting existence with
all communities. Therefore, the Sri Lankan government should consider the BBS, a Sinhala-Buddhist extremist
organisation.
Regardless, Islamic organisations have acknowledged the necessity for a system that fosters mutual
understanding and trust across racial and religious lines, and they are pursuing various coexistence strategies in
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Sri Lanka. However, interreligious organisations and religious leaders could effectively and sustainably preach
the message of peace. Systematically, interfaith education initiatives should attempt to reconcile ethnoreligious
differences and develop a discourse of understanding. To prevent religious violence and foster social harmony
in Sri Lanka, the government should also execute the constitutional and legal framework for interreligious
coexistence.
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