The Republic of Türkiye and Ukraine: Using the Crimean Tatar Question in Foreign Policy after 2014

Abstract

In historical retrospect, the use of national issues and contradictions has repeatedly become the weakening mechanisms for some great powers in regard to others. In this case, various technologies to construct national myths and ideologies based on tribalism and national exclusiveness and superiority were applied. After the “Crimean spring” in 2014, the Crimean Tatar issue gained a new level of relevance. The Republic of Türkiye and Ukraine are actively using the Crimean Tatar factor to oppose the reintegration of Crimea into the Russian Federation and, consequently, to weaken Russia’s positions in the Black Sea and Mediterranean region. In the article the authors analyze the peculiarities of the influence of the Republic of Türkiye on the Crimean Tatars, as well as the Ukrainian initiatives in relation to the Crimean Tatars and joint Turkish-Ukrainian projects, with the target group consisting of the Crimean Tatars. The methodological basis of the research is system-based, geopolitical, civilizational and institutional approaches, which are implemented both directly and by using a number of general scientific and political science methods. The current policy of Türkiye and Ukraine on the Crimean Tatar issue has common features. Firstly, it is currently topical for the policy elites of these states, both at the domestic and international political levels. Under these circumstances, if the Crimean Tatar issue is an opportunity for Kiev to re-establish its jurisdiction over Crimea, then for Ankara the Crimean Tatar population helps to enlist the electoral support, as well as to consider Crimea and the Black Sea region as a Turkish sphere of influence. Secondly, the conditional Turkish-Ukrainian alliance presents itself as a “protector” of the Crimean Tatars from “Russian aggression.” Thirdly, Türkiye and Ukraine are projecting a positive state image by demonstrating protection of interests and observance of the Crimean Tatars rights on the territory of Russia. Fourthly, the actions of Türkiye and Ukraine in terms of the Crimean Tatar can be characterized as a double standard policy. This thesis is confirmed by the national policy of the Republic of Türkiye, and the approaches of Ukraine to the solution of the Crimean Tatar issue before the reunification of Crimea with Russia.

Full text

VestnikRUDN.InternationalRelations. ISSN2313‐0660(print),ISSN2313‐0679(online) 2022Vol.22No.4755—770
ВестникРУДН.Серия:МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕОТНОШЕНИЯhttp://journals.rudn.ru/international‐relations
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 755
INTERNATIONALSECURITY

МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯБЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ
DOI: 10.22363/2313-0660-2022-22-4-755-770

Researcharticle/Научнаястатья
TheRepublicofTürkiyeandUkraine:
UsingtheCrimeanTatarQuestioninForeignPolicyafter2014
Natalia E. Demeshko , Aleksandr A. Irkhin 1
Sevastopol State University, Sevastopol, Russian Federation
 alex.irhin@mail.ru
Abstract. In historical retrospect, the use of national issues and contradictions has repeatedly become the
weakening mechanisms for some great powers in regard to others. In this case, various technologies to construct
national myths and ideologies based on tribalism and national exclusiveness and superiority were applied. After the
“Crimean spring” in 2014, the Crimean Tatar issue gained a new level of relevance. The Republic of Türkiye and
Ukraine are actively using the Crimean Tatar factor to oppose the reintegration of Crimea into the Russian
Federation and, consequently, to weaken Russia’s positions in the Black Sea and Mediterranean region. In the
article the authors analyze the peculiarities of the influence of the Republic of Türkiye on the Crimean Tatars, as
well as the Ukrainian initiatives in relation to the Crimean Tatars and joint Turkish-Ukrainian projects, with the
target group consisting of the Crimean Tatars. The methodological basis of the research is system-based,
geopolitical, civilizational and institutional approaches, which are implemented both directly and by using a number
of general scientific and political science methods. The current policy of Türkiye and Ukraine on the Crimean Tatar
issue has common features. Firstly, it is currently topical for the policy elites of these states, both at the domestic
and international political levels. Under these circumstances, if the Crimean Tatar issue is an opportunity for Kiev to
re-establish its jurisdiction over Crimea, then for Ankara the Crimean Tatar population helps to enlist the electoral
support, as well as to consider Crimea and the Black Sea region as a Turkish sphere of influence. Secondly, the
conditional Turkish-Ukrainian alliance presents itself as a “protector” of the Crimean Tatars from “Russian
aggression.” Thirdly, Türkiye and Ukraine are projecting a positive state image by demonstrating protection of
interests and observance of the Crimean Tatars rights on the territory of Russia. Fourthly, the actions of Türkiye and
Ukraine in terms of the Crimean Tatar can be characterized as a double standard policy. This thesis is confirmed by
the national policy of the Republic of Türkiye, and the approaches of Ukraine to the solution of the Crimean Tatar
issue before the reunification of Crimea with Russia.
Key words: Russia, the Republic of Türkiye, Ukraine, Crimea, Crimean Tatars, Crimean Tatar issue, Black
Sea Region
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© Demeshko N.E., Irkhin A.A., 2022
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode

Демешко Н.Э., Ирхин А.А. Вестник РУДН. Серия: Международные отношения. 2022. Т. 22, № 4. С. 755—770
756 МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ
For citation: Demeshko, N. E., & Irkhin, A. A. (2022). The Republic of Türkiye and Ukraine: Using the Crimean
Tatar question in foreign policy after 2014. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 22(4), 755—770.
https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2022-22-4-755-770
ТурецкаяРеспубликаиУкраина:
использованиекрымско‐татарскоговопроса
вовнешнеполитическомкурсепосле2014года
Н.Э. Демешко , А.А. Ирхин 
Севастопольский государственный университет, Севастополь, Российская Федерация
alex.irhin@mail.ru
Аннотация. В исторической ретроспективе использование национальных вопросов и противоречий не
раз становились механизмами ослабления одних великих держав в отношении других. При этом применя-
лись различные технологии по конструированию национальных мифов и идеологий на основе трайбализма
и национальной исключительности и превосходства. После «Крымской весны» 2014 г. крымско-татарский
вопрос получил новый уровень актуализации. Турецкая Республика и Украина активно используют крым-
ско-татарский фактор для противодействия реинтеграции Крыма в состав Российской Федерации и, как
следствие, ослабления позиций России в Черноморско-Средиземноморском регионе. Авторы рассматривают
особенности влияния Турецкой Республики на крымских татар, анализируют украинские инициативы в от-
ношении крымских татар и совместные турецко-украинские проекты, целевой аудиторией которых высту-
пают крымские татары. Методологической основой исследования выступают системный, геополитический,
цивилизационный, институциональный подходы, которые реализованы как непосредственно, так и с ис-
пользованием ряда общенаучных и политологических методов. Современная политика Турции и Украины
по крымско-татарскому вопросу обладает общими характерными чертами. Во-первых, крымско-татарская
проблематика актуальна для политических элит данных государств как на внутриполитическом, так и на
международном уровнях. При этом, если для Киева крымско-татарский вопрос — это возможность восста-
новить свою юрисдикцию над Крымом, то для Анкары крымско-татарское население Крыма позволяет за-
ручиться электоральной поддержкой внутри Турции, а также рассматривать Крым и Черноморский регион
как турецкую сферу влияния. Во-вторых, условный турецко-украинский альянс позиционирует себя в каче-
стве «защитника» крымских татар от «российской агрессии». В-третьих, Турция и Украина конструируют
положительный имидж государств за счет демонстрации защиты интересов и соблюдения прав крымских
татар на территории России. В-четвертых, действия Турции и Украины в отношении крымско-татарского
народа можно охарактеризовать политикой двойных стандартов. Данный тезис подтверждают национальная
политика Турецкой Республики и подходы Украины к решению крымско-татарского вопроса до воссоеди-
нения Крыма с Россией.
Ключевые слова: Россия, Турецкая Республика, Украина, Крым, крымские татары, крымско-
татарский вопрос, Черноморский регион

Для цитирования: Демешко Н. Э., Ирхин А. А. Турецкая Республика и Украина: использование крымско-
татарского вопроса во внешнеполитическом курсе после 2014 года // Вестник Российского университета
дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2022. Т. 22, № 4. С. 755—770.
https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2022-22-4-755-770
Introduction
Speaking at the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) in September 2021, Turkish
President R.T. Erdoğan stated that he rejected the
“annexation” of Crimea and supported
“Ukraine’s territorial integrity.”1 Such rhetoric is
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1 Turkish President: Other Countries Must Fulfill Their
Obligations to Receive Refugees [Президент Турции: и
traditional for the Republic of Türkiye. Since
2014, Turkish-Ukrainian relations have reached a
new level of development. In addition to military
and economic cooperation, the main
consolidating factors of the union of the two

другие страны должны выполнять свои обязательства
по приему беженцев] // UN. September 21, 2021. (In
Russian). URL: https://news.un.org/ru/story/2021/09/
1410332 (accessed: 01.11.2021).

Demeshko N.E., Irkhin A.A. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 2022, 22(4), 755—770
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 757
states are the position on the statehood of
Crimea, the protection of the rights of Crimean
Tatars, and the Su-24 incident in 2015, which
temporarily cooled Russian-Turkish relations and
incentivized Türkiye to look for new allies.
However, despite the clear common position on
the Crimean issue, both states have different
goals, publicly labeling the events of 2014 as the
“annexation” of Crimea. Thus, while for Kiev
the problem is more of a territorial nature, for
Ankara it is mainly represented by the Turkic
factor of its foreign policy. The Republic of
Türkiye views Crimea and the Crimean Tatars as
an integral part of the “Turkic world,” and the
peninsula and the Black Sea region, in their turn,
are regarded by Ankara as a Turkish sphere of
influence (Avatkov, 2021, p. 222).
The collapse of the Soviet superpower and
the political conformism of the post-Soviet elite
in the early 1990s, as well as the cultural and
historical proximity of the Republic of Türkiye
to the Turkic peoples of the former Soviet Union
allowed Ankara to declare itself the “big brother”
(ağabey) of Turkic states (Irkhin, 2016,
pp. 104—105). It was during that period that
Turkish influence in the Crimean Peninsula
intensified. This was facilitated by the repatriation
of Crimean Tatars to Crimea (Shevchuk, 2007).
Türkiye, by enhancing its authority in the
Crimean Tatar community through various
projects, has increased its influence in the Black
Sea — Mediterranean region and at the same time
used the Crimean Tatar factor as an element in the
system of containment of geopolitical interests of
the Russian Federation in this direction (Irkhin &
Demeshko, 2019).
At the same time, despite its non-
recognition of the restoration of Russian
jurisdiction over Crimea and joint projects with
Ukraine to overcome the so-called “temporary
occupation,” Ankara pursues a rather flexible
policy towards Russia as well (Baranov, 2018,
p. 95). For example, Türkiye did not join the
anti-Russian sanctions because they were
contrary to its economic interests. Moreover,
some public structures of the Republic of
Türkiye establish communication with the pro-
Russian part of Crimean Tatars, while others
(Korobov & Smetannikov, 2015, p. 29) continue
to maintain and develop ties with representatives
of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People.2
The purpose of the article is to determine the
peculiarities of the development of bilateral
Turkish-Ukrainian relations in the period after
the reunification of Crimea with Russia (2014—
2021) and the place of the Crimean Tatar
question in the interaction of the Republic of
Türkiye as a regional power and Ukraine as a
state with an important geopolitical position in
the Black Sea region.
To achieve this purpose, the article
addresses the following tasks: to investigate the
mechanisms of influence of the Republic of
Türkiye on the Crimean Tatars; to analyze
Ukrainian initiatives regarding the Crimean
Tatars; to identify joint Turkish-Ukrainian
projects whose target audience are the Crimean
Tatars.
The object of the study is Turkish-Ukrainian
bilateral relations since the restoration of Russian
sovereignty over Crimea. The subject — the
Crimean-Tatar aspect of Turkish-Ukrainian
relations. The methodological basis of the
research is systemic, geopolitical, civilizational,
and institutional approaches.
The authors relies on the legal framework of
Ukraine, the materials of the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Ukraine and Türkiye,
the Ministry of Information Policy (MIP) of
Ukraine, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and
Related Communities (YTB), publications of
derneks (communities) of Crimean Tatars in
Türkiye, reports of the Turkish Cooperation and
Coordination Agency (TİKA), articles from
Ukrainian and Turkish media; the author cites
publications of Russian researchers:
V.A. Avatkov (2018; 2021), K.N. Akhmadeev
(2018), N.S. Belyakova (2015), A.A. Irkhin
(2016; Irkhin & Demeshko, 2019), A.A. Korobov,
S.S. Smetannikov (Korobov & Smetannikov,
2015). It should be noted that the results of
research of the foreign scientific expert
community on the Crimean Tatar agenda
(Allworth, 1998; Aydın, 2014; Özçelik, 2020;
Koçak, 2014; Williams, 2001; 2016; Wilson,
2017; Uehling, 2004; Fisher, 1978; 2010) deserve
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2 The organization is banned in the Russian Federation.

Демешко Н.Э., Ирхин А.А. Вестник РУДН. Серия: Международные отношения. 2022. Т. 22, № 4. С. 755—770
758 МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ
special attention, as they give an idea of political
technologies aimed at the formation of a negative
interpretation of the joint history of Russia
(Tsarist, Soviet) and Crimean Tatars, as well as the
desire to demonstrate various kinds of oppression
against this ethnic group by the Russian Federation
after 2014 (Demeshko, 2020, pp. 281—288).
TheRoleoftheCrimeanTatarIssue
inTurkishPolitics
After 2014, the Crimean Tatar question is
one of the elements in the system of checks and
balances in the interaction of the Republic of
Türkiye with the Russian Federation. This is
manifested in the formation of a Turkish-
Ukrainian military and political alliance
(diplomatic support for Kiev, Turkish military
and technical supplies to Ukraine), the non-
recognition of the current status of Crimea as
Russian territory, as well as public diplomatic
support for Crimean Tatars. At the same time,
Ankara has more significant influence on
Crimean Tatars compared to other foreign
countries because of its historical, cultural and
religious affinity to this ethnic group.
It should be noted that for the Republic of
Türkiye the Crimean Tatar issue has not only an
international dimension, but is also of interest in
terms of domestic politics, namely gaining
electoral support. This assertion is confirmed by
the active use of the Crimean Tatar factor during
the 2014 local elections (Belyakova, 2015, p. 39).
The importance of the Crimean Tatar factor
in Turkish politics is also demonstrated by
Türkiye’s systematic work in relation to this
ethnic group. The Crimean Tatar issue is most
actively raised by structures such as the
Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related
Communities (YTB), the Crimean Tatar
diaspora, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and the media.
YTB was founded in April 2010. Its mission
is to coordinate projects whose target audience is
Turks living abroad and the so-called fraternal
peoples. The main areas of work on the Crimean
Tatar agenda are mainstreaming of information
about the deportation of Crimean Tatars in 1944;
preservation of the historical heritage of the
Crimean Tatars;3 organization of events
dedicated to Crimean Tatar cultural figures.4
Turkish influence on the Crimean Tatar
issue is also conditioned by a significant diaspora
of the Crimean Tatars. There is no exact data on
the number of the Crimean Tatars living in the
Republic of Türkiye, as the policy of the Turkish
authorities is more towards the assimilation of
other ethnic groups and no data on the national
composition of Türkiye is published officially
(Akhmadeev, 2018, p. 27). For this reason, the
official resources of the authorities of the
Republic of Türkiye, as well as the Turkish
media often refer to the Crimean Tatars as
Crimean or Crimean Tatar Turks.
The channels of influence of the Crimean
Tatar diaspora in the Republic of Türkiye are the
Crimean Tatar associations (derneks). At present,
there are more than 50 Crimean Tatar derneks
operating in Türkiye. About two dozen of them
act as branches of the Crimean Turks Culture and
Solidarity Association.5 After the political events
of 2014, the Crimean Tatar diaspora, in addition
to providing humanitarian aid and organizing
cultural and educational events, began to actively
engage in anti-Russian political activities. It is
noteworthy that in 2015, 43 public organizations
united to form the Platform of Crimean Tatar
Organizations of Türkiye. The consolidation was
initiated by the central office of the Crimean
Turks Culture and Solidarity Association.6 The

3 Kırım Tatarlarının Davası YTB Tarafından Dünyaya
Duyuruluyor // Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba
Topluluklar Başkanlığı. May 16, 2015. URL:
https://www.ytb.gov.tr/haberler/kirim-tatarlarinin-davasi-
ytb-tarafindan-dunyaya-duyuruluyor (accessed: 31.10.2021).
4 Writer Cengiz Dağcı Was Commemorated on the
Centenary of His Birthday // Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba
Topluluklar Başkanlığı. March 7, 2019. URL:
https://www.ytb.gov.tr/en/news/writer-cengiz-dagci-was-
commemorated-on-the-centenary-of-his-birthday (accessed:
31.10.2021).
5 Tarihçe // Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma
Derneği. June 6, 2017. URL: http://www.kirimdernegi.
org.tr/dernek/tarihce (accessed: 01.11.2021).
6 A Meeting of the Platform of Crimean Tatar
Organizations will be Held in Ankara [В Анкаре пройдет
заседание Платформы крымскотатарских организа-
ций] // Qırım Haber Ajansı. February 2, 2016.
(In Russian). URL: http://old.qha.com.ua/ru/obschestvo/
v-ankare-proidet-zasedanie-platformi-krimskotatarskih-
organizatsii/154490/ (accessed: 01.11.2021).

Demeshko N.E., Irkhin A.A. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 2022, 22(4), 755—770
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 759
Crimean Tatar derneks mainstream the Crimean
Tatar question both within Turkish society and
internationally. The activities of these
organizations are implemented in the following
areas:
1. Meetings with representatives of the
scientific expert community to discuss the specifics
of the “reoccupation of Crimea by Russia,”
7
“violations” of the rights of Crimean Tatars on the
peninsula,8 and the significance of the national
movement of the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine.9
2. Rallies near the Russian embassy and
protests against the reunification of Crimea with
the Russian Federation.10
3. Statements with a negative reaction to the
trials of the Crimean Tatars due to the
participation of individual representatives of this
ethnic group in the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir.11
Russia is assessed by the Crimean Turks Culture
and Solidarity Association as the main threat in
the Black Sea region.12

7 “Türk Ocakları Eskişehir Şubesi Perşembe
Sohbetleri” nde Kırım’ın Rusya Tarafından Yeniden İşgali
Konuşuldu // Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma
Derneği. January 21, 2021. URL: http://www.kirimdernegi.
org.tr/haberler/1265-turk-ocaklari-eskisehir-subesi-persembe-
sohbetleri-nde-kirim-in-rusya-tarafindan-yeniden-isgali-
konusuldu (accessed: 01.11.2021).
8 Av.Namık Kemal Bayar Bilkent’te Anlattı “Kırım
Türkleri ve İşgal Altındaki Kırım” // Kırım Türkleri Kültür
ve Yardımlaşma Derneği. February 21, 2021. URL:
http://www.kirimdernegi.org.tr/haberler/1276-av-namik-
kemal-bayar-bilkent-te-anlatti-kirim-turkleri-ve-isgal-
altindaki-kirim (accessed: 01.11.2021).
9 2014 Sonrası Ukrayna Ulus İnşasına Kırım Tatar
Milli Hareketinin Etkisi // Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve
Yardımlaşma Derneği. January 31, 2021. URL:
http://www.kirimdernegi.org.tr/haberler/1270-2014-sonrasi-
ukrayna-ulus-insasina-kirim-tatar-milli-hareketinin-etkisi
(accessed: 01.11.2021).
10 They Won’t Put Up with the “Occupation” [Не сми-
рятся с «оккупацией»] // Znak. February 26, 2017.
(In Russian) URL: https://www.znak.com/2017-02-
26/v_turcii_u_sten_rossiyskogo_posolstva_proshel_miting
_protiv_prisoedineniya_kryma (accessed: 01.11.2021).
11 The organization is banned in the Russian Federation.
12 Russia Poses a Threat to the Black Sea Region —
Crimean Turks Culture and Solidarity Association in Turkey
[Россия представляет угрозу для Черноморского регио-
на — Общество культуры и взаимопомощи крымских
татар Турции] // Qırım Haber Ajansı. November 27, 2018.
(In Russian). URL: http://old.qha.com.ua/ru/politika/rossiya-
predstavlyaet-ugrozu-dlya-chernomorskogo-regiona-
obschestvo-kulturi-i-vzaimopomoschi-krimskih-tatar-
turtsii/196464/ (accessed: 01.11.2021).
4. Funds allocated by the Crimean Tatar
diaspora for the construction of mosques in
Ukraine,13 as well as humanitarian aid to
low-income families.14
5. The second World Congress of the
Crimean Tatars in 2015, organized by the
Platform of Crimean Tatar Organizations of
Türkiye. The Congress resulted in an appeal to the
UN and the world community to stop the “illegal
annexation” of Crimea, as well as a judicial
review of all the alleged “crimes” committed by
Russia, from 1783 to the present, for the
intentional “extermination” of Crimean Tatars.15
The Association also organized youth congresses
of the Crimean Tatars with the support of the
YTB, which also took place in Türkiye.16
6. Mainstreaming human rights issues and
the report on human rights violations in Crimea
and Tatarstan, prepared by the Crimean Tatar
organization, Crimean Turks Culture and
Solidarity Association.17

13 Mosques to be Built in the Henichesk District on the
Money of the Crimean Tatar Diaspora of Turkey // Vesti
Genicheska [В Геническом районе построят мечети за
средства крымскотатарской диаспоры Турции // Вести
Геническа]. March 4, 2017. (In Russian).
URL: http://genichesk.co.ua/3420-v-genicheskom-rayone-
postroyat-mecheti-za-sredstva-krymskotatarskoy-diaspory-
turcii.html (accessed: 01.11.2021).
14 600 Crimean Tatar Families Received Aid for
Ramadan [600 крымскотатарских семей получили по-
мощь на Рамазан] // Qırım Haber Ajansı. July 25, 2014.
(In Russian). URL: http://old.qha.com.ua/ru/obschestvo/
600-krimskotatarskih-semei-poluchili-pomosch-na-ramazan/
138489/ (accessed: 01.11.2021).
15 Baturin D. II World Congress of Crimean Tatars —
New Ideas and Meanings, Old Goals of the Mejlis
Leaders // International Affairs [Батурин Д. II Всемир-
ный Конгресс крымских татар — новые идеи и смыс-
лы, старые цели лидеров меджлиса // Международная
жизнь]. August 18, 2015. (In Russian). URL:
https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/13616 (accessed: 01.11.2021).
16 Crimean Tatars Will Gather in Ankara for a Youth
Congress //Crimea. Realities [В Анкаре крымские тата-
ры соберутся на Молодежный конгресс // Крым. Реа-
лии]. May 19, 2019. (In Russian). URL: https://ru.krymr.com/
a/news-ankara-molodezhnyi-kingress-krymskie-tatary/
29951076.html (accessed: 01.11.2021).
17 Işgal Altindaki Kirim’da Insan Haklari Ihlalleri ve
Rusya Federasyonu’ndaki Genel Insan Haklari Ihlalleri
Hakkinda // Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma
Derneği. December 10, 2020. URL: http://www.kirimdernegi.
org.tr/Dosyalar/Raporlar/InsanHaklari2020.pdf (accessed:
01.11.2021).

Демешко Н.Э., Ирхин А.А. Вестник РУДН. Серия: Международные отношения. 2022. Т. 22, № 4. С. 755—770
760 МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ
15
5
6
4
2
3
6
3
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Fig. 1. Dynamics of Publications on the Crimean Tatar Problematics on the Website of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, 2014 — October 2021
Source: compiled by the authors based on the data: “İşgal altindaki Kirim’da insan haklari ihlalleri ve Rusya
federasyonu’ndaki genel insan haklari ihlalleri hakkinda” rapor // The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Türkiye. December 10, 2020. URL: http://www.kirimdernegi.org.tr/Dosyalar/Raporlar/InsanHaklari2020.pdf
(accessed: 01.11.2021).
It is worth noting that after 2014 Ankara has
quite actively focused on the topic of “violations
of the rights” of the Crimean Tatar people on the
peninsula and the need to protect this ethnic
group (Demeshko, 2020, p. 133). At the same
time, Türkiye positions itself as a protector of the
Crimean Tatars. This assertion is confirmed by
the analysis of statements of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Türkiye on the Crimean Tatar
agenda and publications of the largest Turkish
news agency, Anadolu.
Monitoring of the official website of the
Turkish Foreign Ministry from 2014 to October
2021 showed that 44 publications were devoted
to the Crimean Tatar agenda. Notably, the largest
number of records with regard to Crimean Tatars
is in 2014 and amounts to 15 statements (Fig. 1).
In terms of content, the statements can be
conditionally categorized into 5 topical units:
1. Non-recognition of the reunification of
Crimea with Russia in 2014.
2. “Oppression of rights” of the Crimean
Tatars and the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar
People in Crimea by the Russian leadership.
3. Deportation of Crimean Tatars in 1944.
4. Providing humanitarian aid to Crimean
Tatars as part of Türkiye’s “soft power.”
5. Supporting Ukraine in its initiatives to
counter the reintegration of Crimea into the
Russian Federation.
The common feature of the mentioned
categories is the formation for the Republic of
Türkiye of the image of a protector of the
Crimean Tatars’ interests and indicating the
importance of the problems of the Crimean
Tatars for Ankara. This is manifested in such
semantic constructions as “Davutoğlu stated that
Crimean Tatar Turks are the main component of
Crimea and drew attention to the emphasis
Turkey places on the well-being of Crimean
Tatar Turks,”18 “The safety and well-being of
Crimean Tatar Turks is a priority for us,”19

18 The Fourth Turkish-Russian Joint Strategic Planning
Group Meeting Held in Moscow // Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye. URL:
https://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-fourth-turkish_russian-joint-
strategic-planning-group-meeting-held-in-moscow.en.mfa
(accessed: 01.11.2021).
19 No: 255, 29 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the
Treatment of Some Crimean Tatar Turk Patients in

Demeshko N.E., Irkhin A.A. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 2022, 22(4), 755—770
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 761
“Turkey, as always, will support Crimean Tatar
Turks,”20 “We have repeatedly emphasized our
sensitivity to the security and protection of
Crimean Tatar Turks,”21 “During the meeting the
situation in Ukraine and in Crimea, as well as
Turkey’s support for the Crimean Tatar Turks
were discussed,”22 “Turkey continues today, like
before, to support Crimean Tatar Turks,”23
“Turkey will not recognize the illegal annexation
of Crimea and will continue to support Crimean
Tatars.”24
A similar rhetoric can be seen in the Turkish
media landscape. Monitoring of Anadolu
Agency’s publications on the Crimean Tatar
agenda from 2014 to October 2021 made it
possible to determine the specifics of the

Turkey// Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Türkiye. URL: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-255_-29-july-
2014_-press-release-regarding-the-treatment-of-some-
crimean-tatar-turk-patients-in-turkey.en.mfa (accessed:
01.11.2021).
20 No: 231, 7 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the
Mounting Pressure and Unlawful Practices against the
Crimean Tatar National Assembly and the Crimean
Tatars // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Türkiye. URL: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-231_-7-july-
2014_--press-release-regarding-the-mounting-pressure-
and-unlawful-practices-against-the-crimean-tatar-national-
assembly-and-the-crimean-tatars.en.mfa (accessed:
01.11.2021).
21 No: 126, 23 April 2014, Press Release Concerning
the Attack against the Crimean Tatar National Assembly //
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye.
URL: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no-126-23-april-2014-press-
release-concerning-the-attack-against-the-crimean-tatar-
national-assembly.en.mfa (accessed: 01.11.2021).
22 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ambassador
Ahmet Yıldız Received Mustafa Kırımoğlu, Leader of
Crimean Tatar Turks, 4 July 2017 // Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye. URL:
https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakan-yardimcisinin-
kirimoglunu-kabulu_en.en.mfa (accessed: 01.11.2021).
23 No: 217, 19 September 2020, Press Release
Regarding the Conviction of Crimean Tatars // Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye. URL:
https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-217_-kirim-tatarlarina-
yonelik-mahkumiyet-karari-hk.en.mfa (accessed:
01.11.2021).
24 No: 62, 18 February 2021, Press Release Regarding
the Detentions That Took Place in Crimea Yesterday //
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye.
URL: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-62_-kirim-da-dun-
gerceklesen-gozalti-uygulamalari-hk.en.mfa (accessed:
01.11.2021).
interpretation of the processes taking place in
Crimea. The main topic of Turkish media
publications is human rights in Crimea. In the
Turkish media discourse Russia appears as a
state that pursues a rather harsh policy of
“intimidating” the Crimean Tatars. The
arguments include statements by the Ukrainian
Foreign Ministry,25 representatives of the Mejlis
of the Crimean Tatar People,
26 and members of
human rights organizations.27 The media put the
blame for the “violence” incidents on the
Russian authorities. And Türkiye is positioned as
the protector of the Crimean Tatars. Turkish
journalists inform the public about the negative
reaction of the Turkish Foreign Ministry to the
Russian policy in Crimea,28 about the initiatives
of the Republic of Türkiye to resolve the
Crimean Tatar issue at the diplomatic level,29 as
well as about various projects aimed at providing
material assistance to Crimean Tatars.30 The
headlines of a Turkish media outlet are also
illustrative: “Russian security forces arrested
over 50 people in Crimea,”31 “Turkey will

25 Yavuz T. Another Crimean Tatar Arrested by Russia:
Ukraine // Anadolu Agency. September 8, 2021. URL:
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/another-crimean-tatar-
arrested-by-russia-ukraine/2358938 (accessed: 01.11.2021).
26 Yavuz T. ‘Int’l Society Failed to React to
Annexation of Crimea’ // Anadolu Agency. March 16,
2021. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/intl-society-
failed-to-react-to-annexation-of-crimea/2177807
(accessed: 01.11.2021).
27 Sajid I. Rights Activist Accuses Russia of ‘Inhuman
Tactics’ against Crimean Tatars // Anadolu Agency. June
23, 2021. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/rights-
activist-accuses-russia-of-inhuman-tactics-against-
crimean-tatars/2283245 (accessed: 01.11.2021).
28 Kazancı H. Turkey Reiterates Rejection of Crimea’s
Annexation // Anadolu Agency. March 16, 2021. URL:
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-reiterates-rejection-
of-crimeas-annexation/2177783 (accessed: 01.11.2021).
29 Aydogan M. Turkey Calls for Diplomacy to Resolve
Crimea Issue // Anadolu Agency. August 23, 2021.
URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkey-calls-for-
diplomacy-to-resolve-crimea-issue/2343701 (accessed:
01.11.2021).
30 Kazancı H. Turkey to Build 500 Buildings in
Ukraine // Anadolu Agency. April 11, 2021.
URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/turkey-to-build-
500-buildings-in-ukraine-/2204916 (accessed: 01.11.2021).
31 Duz Z. N. Russian Security Forces Arrest More Than
50 People in Crimea // Anadolu Agency. September 5,
2021. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/russian-

Демешко Н.Э., Ирхин А.А. Вестник РУДН. Серия: Международные отношения. 2022. Т. 22, № 4. С. 755—770
762 МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ
continue to support Crimean Tatars,”32 “Turkey
is concerned about the political trials and arrests
of Tatars,”33 “Turkey rejects the annexation of
Crimea,”34 “Report shows violation of Crimean
Tatars’ rights by Russia,”35 “Turkey calls to
investigate the death of a Crimean Tatar.”36
It should be stressed that the modern
ideology of Türkiye’s foreign policy is a triune
system based on neo-Ottomanism, pan-Turkism
and pan-Islamism. In this system, the Crimean
Tatar issue is one of the key elements to
influence the geopolitical positions of the
Russian Federation in the Black Sea region in the
field of realpolitik. At the same time, using the
rhetoric of protecting human rights and the
interests of national minorities, Ankara subjects
Russia’s foreign policy image to considerable
criticism at various international platforms,
including the UN General Assembly. In contrast
to this criticism, Türkiye automatically becomes
the protector of the peoples of the entire “Turkic
world”, positioning itself as the leader of all
Muslims, creating a new “more just world
order.”37

security-forces-arrest-more-than-50-people-in-crimea/
2355679 (accessed: 01.11.2021).
32 Aliyev J. ‘Turkey to Continue to Stand by Crimean
Tatars’ // Anadolu Agency. May 18, 2021.
URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-to-continue-
to-stand-by-crimean-tatars/2245602 (accessed: 01.11.2021).
33 Dağ B. Turkey Concerned by Political Trials, Arrest
of Tatars // Anadolu Agency. March 13, 2021. URL:
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-concerned-by-
political-trials-arrest-of-tatars/2174571 (accessed: 01.11.2021).
34 Kazancı H. Turkey Not to Recognize Annexation of
Crimea // Anadolu Agency. June 7, 2018. URL:
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/turkey-not-to-recognize-
annexation-of-crimea/1168886 (accessed: 01.11.2021).
35 Report Shows Russian Violation of Crimean Tatars’
Rights // Anadolu Agency. June 16, 2015.
URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/report-shows-
russian-violation-of-crimean-tatars-rights/36012 (accessed:
01.11.2021).
36 Turkey Urges Investigation into Death of Crimean
Tatar // Anadolu Agency. March 19, 2014. URL:
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-urges-investigation-
into-death-of-crimean-tatar/173391 (accessed: 01.11.2021).
37 Speech by the President of the Republic of Türkiye,
Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan [Выступление президента
Турецкой Республики г-на Реджепа Тайипа Эрдогана]
// UN. September 24, 2019. P. 23—30. (In Russian). URL:
https://undocs.org/ru/A/74/PV.3 (accessed: 02.11.2021).
UkrainianPolicytowards
theCrimeanTatars
The reunification of Crimea with Russia
provoked a new level of mainstreaming of the
Crimean Tatar agenda and the use of Crimean
Tatars as an element in the system of countering the
reintegration of Crimea into the geopolitical space of
the Russian Federation. Conventionally, Ukrainian
mechanisms of influence in relation to this ethnic
group can be divided into three main directions:
— demonstration of the solution of the
Crimean Tatar issue at the legislative level after
the 2014 “Crimean spring.” The maximum
political manoeuvring in this direction comes
down to Ukrainian elite’s promises of the
prospect of acquiring the national autonomy
status, which may in turn develop into the
construction of a nation state in Crimea;
— interaction with members of the Mejlis
of the Crimean Tatar People to destabilize the
situation in the peninsula;
— formation of an information system on
“discrimination” of the Crimean Tatar people by
the Russian authorities.
The monitoring of the Ukrainian Verkhovna
Rada (VR) website database showed that
34 documents mentioning the Crimean Tatars
were published from 2014 to the present. Of
interest is the fact that 39 documents were
published from 1991 to 2014 (Fig. 2).
However, the content of the earlier
documents differs significantly from the
Ukrainian laws, decrees, and regulations, which
were adopted after 2014. In the Ukrainian period
of Crimean history, the documents concerning
the economic (allocation of funds for the
settlement of Crimean Tatars) and cultural
spheres prevailed. The exception is the 1999
decree of L.D. Kuchma on the Council of the
Crimean Tatars Representatives under the
President of Ukraine. This structure was used
quite effectively by him to establish control over
the Crimean Tatar political elite.38


38 Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the Council of
Representatives of the Crimean Tatar People” // Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine [Указ Президента України «Про Раду
представників кримськотатарського народу» // Верховна
Рада України]. August 26, 2010. (In Ukrainian). URL:
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/518/99#Text (accessed:
01.11.2021). See also: (Demeshko, 2018, p. 88).

Demeshko N.E., Irkhin A.A. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 2022, 22(4), 755—770
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 763
1
4
2
1
0
1
0
3
4 4
1
5
1 1
0
2
00
3
222
0
5
7
5
3
1
22
7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Fig. 2. Dynamics of Document Publications on Crimean Tatar Agenda in the Legislation of Ukraine Database,
1991—2021
Source: compiled by the authors based on the data: Legislation of Ukraine // Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The Parliament
of Ukraine official website [Законодавство України // Верховна Рада України. Офіційний вебпортал парламенту
України]. (In Ukrainian). URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws (accessed: 04.11.2021).
The study of the Ukrainian legal framework
of 2014—2021 in relation to the Crimean Tatars
allows to identify the innovations that were
adopted exclusively after the restoration of
Russian jurisdiction over Crimea:
1. Crimean Tatars, Karaites and Krymchaks
are recognized as indigenous peoples of Ukraine.
According to the law of 2021, members of these
national groups have broad cultural, economic,
educational, and linguistic rights in Ukraine.39
2. Ukraine annually celebrates the Day of
Fighting for the Rights of the Crimean Tatar
People40 and the Day of Remembrance of the
39 Law of Ukraine “On Indigenous Peoples of
Ukraine” // Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine [Закон України
«Про корінні народи України» // Верховна Рада
України]. (In Ukrainian). URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/
laws/show/1616-20#Text (accessed: 01.11.2021).
40 Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the Day of
Struggle for the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People” //
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine [Указ Президента України
«Про День боротьби за права кримськотатарського
народу» // Верховна Рада України]. (In Ukrainian).
URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/472/2014#Text
(accessed: 01.11.2021).
“Genocide of the Crimean Tatar People” on
May 18.41
3. The 1944 deportation of the Crimean
Tatars is recognized as “genocide of the Crimean
Tatar people.”42
4. The post of Commissioner of the
President of Ukraine for the Affairs of the
Crimean Tatar People was established.43
5. Amendments were made to the
Regulation on the Council of the Crimean Tatar
41Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “On
recognition of the genocide of the Crimean Tatar People” //
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine [Постанова Верховної Ради
України «Про визнання геноциду кримськотатарського
народу» // Верховна Рада України]. (In Ukrainian).
URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/792-19#Text
(accessed: 01.11.2021).
42 Ibid.
43 Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the
Plenipotentiary of the President of Ukraine in the Affairs
of the Crimean Tatar People” // Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine [Указ Президента України «Про Уповноваже-
ного Президента України у справах кримськотатарсь-
кого народу» // Верховна Рада України]. (In Ukrainian).
URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/656/2014#Text
(accessed: 01.11.2021).

Демешко Н.Э., Ирхин А.А. Вестник РУДН. Серия: Международные отношения. 2022. Т. 22, № 4. С. 755—770
764 МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ
People,44 namely the connection of this structure
with the Mejlis was established. For instance, the
Head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People
is appointed Chairman of the Council and he also
approves the members of the Council.45
6. The development of draft laws of Ukraine
and laws and regulations regarding national
minorities should be carried out through
consultations with the Mejlis.46
In addition to these innovations, to build
communication with this organization, the
Ukrainian elite provides its members with
positions at various levels of government. From
2014 to 2019, the former Chairman of the
banned in the Russian Federation Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar People M. Dzhemilev served as
Commissioner for the Affairs of the Crimean
Tatar People.47 His main function was to
advocate the constitutional rights of this ethnic

44 Decree of the President of Ukraine “On Regulations
on the Council of Representatives of the Crimean Tatar
People” // Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine [Указ Президента
України «Про Положення про Раду представників
кримськотатарського народу» // Верховна Рада
України]. (In Ukrainian). URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/
laws/show/573/2000#Text (accessed: 01.11.2021).
45 Decree of the President of Ukraine “Issues of the
Council of Representatives of the Crimean Tatar People” //
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine [Указ Президента України
«Питання Ради представників кримськотатарського
народу» // Верховна Рада України]. (In Ukrainian).
URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/194/2015#Text
(accessed: 01.11.2021).
46 Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “On
the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
Regarding the Guarantee of the Rights of the Crimean
Tatar People as Part of the Ukrainian State” // Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine [Постанова Верховної Ради України
«Про Заяву Верховної Ради України щодо гарантії
прав кримськотатарського народу у складі Української
Держави» // Верховна Рада України]. (In Ukrainian).
URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1140-18 (accessed:
01.11.2021).
47 Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 278/2019
“On the Release of M. Dzhemilev from the Performance of
the Duties of the Plenipotentiary of the President of
Ukraine for the Affairs of the Crimean Tatar People” //
Official website of the President of Ukraine [Указ
Президента України № 278/2019 «Про увільнення
М. Джемілєва від виконання обов’язків
Уповноваженого Президента України у справах
кримськотатарського народу» // Президент України.
Офіційне інтернет-представництво]. (In Ukrainian).
URL: https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/2782019-
27045 (accessed: 01.11.2021).
group. Representatives of the Mejlis also receive
deputy seats in the VR of Ukraine (Demeshko,
2020, pp. 170—171).
Of interest is the fact that despite all the
flirtations of the Ukrainian political elite with the
Crimean Tatars after 2014, the limits of such
political manoeuvres also became apparent, as the
former Ukrainian president P. Poroshenko never
fulfilled his promise to create the Crimean Tatar
autonomy (Grosfeld & Kharabuga, 2017, p. 58).
The next feature of Ukraine’s policy is its
desire to demonstrate the “oppressed” position of
the Crimean Tatars in the Russian Federation.
This approach is implemented to a greater extent
through the activities of the Ministry of
Information Policy of Ukraine, the Ukrainian
Institute of National Remembrance, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, non-profit
organizations and the media.
These structures hold events and
information projects48 devoted to Crimean issues
and the protection of human rights on the
peninsula.49 It is noteworthy that the Ukrainian
media, as well as reports of human rights NGOs,
constantly feature examples of “violations” of
the rights of Crimean Tatars and the
“destruction” of their cultural heritage
(Demeshko, 2020, pp. 179—180). And criminal
cases against representatives of this ethnic group
and Ukrainian radicals are interpreted
exclusively as persecution of citizens for political
reasons. However, the objective reason for their
detention was the involvement of these people in
the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir (Grosfeld &

48 The Exhibition “Stolen Crimea. History of
Deportation” to the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of
the Crimean Tatar Genocide // Ministry of Culture and
Information Policy of Ukraine [Виставка «Вкрадений
Крим. Історія депортації» до Дня пам’яті жертв
геноциду кримських татар // Міністерство культури та
інформаційної політики України]. May 20, 2019. (In
Ukrainian). URL: https://mkip.gov.ua/gallery/178.html
(accessed: 01.11.2021).
49 The Ministry of Information Policy Will Support the
Project on the Protection of the Rights of the Crimean
Tatars // Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of
Ukraine [Міністерство інформаційної політики підтри-
має проект щодо захисту прав кримських татар //
Міністерство культури та інформаційної політики
України]. October 6, 2015. (In Ukrainian).
URL: https://mkip.gov.ua/ru/news/684.html (accessed:
01.11.2021).

Demeshko N.E., Irkhin A.A. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 2022, 22(4), 755—770
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 765
Kharabuga, 2017, p. 61). The reconstruction of
the Bakhchisarai Khan’s Palace is also
interpreted exclusively in a negative way and is
positioned by the Ukrainian media as a deliberate
“destruction” of Crimean Tatar culture.50
Along with the formation of perceptions of
“discrimination” against Crimean Tatars in the
peninsula, Ukraine seeks to demonstrate the
continuity of Russian policy toward Crimean
Tatars with the national policies of the Russian
Empire and the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian
Institute of National Remembrance makes a
significant contribution to the formation of
negative image of the joint history of Russia and
Crimean Tatars (Malinovs’ka, 2019, p. 46). Other
organizations also work to distort the historical past
of Russia and Crimean Tatars. For instance, the
Crimean Institute for Strategic Studies, together
with the QHA News Agency and the Kuresh,
Crimean Tatar Center for Culture and Sports,
implemented a cultural project, “Crimea and the
South of Ukraine — the Space of Cultures,” which
aims to destroy the “myth of ‘Novorossia’.“51 The
authors of this project consider this term an
“artificially imposed” notion, which is allegedly
used for the expansion of the “Russian world” and
destabilization of the situation in Ukraine.
Kiev mainstreams the problem of
“discrimination” against the Crimean Tatar people
not only at the domestic level, but also
internationally. Since 2014, the Verkhovna Rada
has regularly appealed to the UN, Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE), Organization of the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (BSEC), and individual
representatives of the international community
regarding “violations of the rights and freedoms”

50 Shutkevich O. Cultural Heritage: Annexed, Lost,
Stolen // Day [Шуткевич О. Культурна спадщина: анек-
сована, втрачена, розкрадена // День]. October 31, 2018.
(In Ukrainian). URL: https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/den-
ukrayiny/kulturna-spadshchyna-aneksovana-vtrachena-
rozkradena (accessed: 01.11.2021).
51 “Crimea and the South of Ukraine — the Space of
Cultures”: A New Cultural Project was Presented in Kyiv
[«Крым и Юг Украины — пространство культур»: в
Киеве презентовали новый культурный проект] //
Qırım Haber Ajansı. October 24, 2018. (In Russian).
URL: http://old.qha.com.ua/ru/politika/krim-i-yug-ukraini-
prostranstvo-kultur-v-kieve-prezentovali-novii-kulturnii-
proekt/196017/ (accessed: 01.11.2021).
of Crimean Tatars by the Russian Federation
(Demeshko, 2020, pp. 165—166, 176—178).
In 2021, Ukraine reached a new level of
internationalization of the Crimean Tatar issue. In
February of that year, V.A. Zelensky decreed to
establish and approve the composition of the
organizing committee in charge of preparation
and holding of the Crimean Platform summit in
Ukraine.52 It is noteworthy that in addition to
organizational issues, the presidential decree
contains instructions for the “development” of the
Crimean Tatar language, namely to adopt an
alphabet based on the Latin script, which is also
one of the elements of weakening the cultural ties
between Russia and Crimean Tatars. The Crimean
Platform organizing committee is also of interest.
It consisted of 14 people, three of whom were
representatives of the Crimean Tatar people.
The summit opened on August 23, 2021.
Representatives from 46 states and international
organizations took part in the summit.53 The
Crimean Tatar agenda was one of the key issues
at the event. This was evidenced by the location
of the topics of panel discussions, their titles, as
well as the functioning of the official platform
website in three languages: Ukrainian, English
and Crimean Tatar.
For example, the first topic of the discussion
was directly related to the Crimean Tatars and the
organizers gave it rather a “strong”, in terms of
semantics, title: “Colonization of the 21st century:
overcoming the consequences and restoring the
rights of the Crimean Tatar people as a tool for

52 Decree of the President of Ukraine “On Separate
Measures Aimed at Deoccupation and Reintegration of the
Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol” //
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine [Указ Президента України
«Про окремі заходи, спрямовані на деокупацію
та реінтеграцію тимчасово окупованої території Авто-
номної Республіки Крим та міста Севастополя» //
Верховна Рада України]. (In Ukrainian). URL:
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/78/2021#Text
(accessed: 01.11.2021).
53 Yurchenko E. Crimean Platform Summit: In Kiev
High Delegations Discussed the Return of Crimea Under
the Control of Ukraine // Crimea. Realities [Юрченко Е.
Саммит «Крымская платформа»: в Киеве высокие де-
легации обсуждали возвращение Крыма под контроль
Украины // Крым. Реалии]. August 24, 2021. (In
Russian). URL: https://ru.krymr.com/a/sammit-krymskaya-
platforma-kiev/31423612.html (accessed: 01.11.2021).

Демешко Н.Э., Ирхин А.А. Вестник РУДН. Серия: Международные отношения. 2022. Т. 22, № 4. С. 755—770
766 МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ
de-occupation of Crimea.” During the second
discussion, “Reintegration of Crimea: through
protection of human rights and sustainable
development,” the issues of “human rights
violations” on the peninsula, “discrimination” of
Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars by the Russian
authorities were also discussed. The opening of the
Crimean Platform summit with a song performed
by a Crimean Tatar singer about the Crimean
Tatars deportation was also symbolic.54
Since 2021, the Crimean Platform has been
one of the key foreign policy instruments of
Ukraine to consolidate international efforts
aimed at the “de-occupation” of Crimea.55 In this
matter, the Ukrainian leadership relies on the
Crimean Tatar question and “oppression” of the
rights of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians.
So, after the “Crimean spring” Ukraine has
been using the Crimean Tatar agenda in every
possible way to attract the international
community’s attention to the Crimean issue and to
restore its jurisdiction over Crimea. At the same
time, Ukraine’s actions to resolve the Crimean
Tatar question are more of a manipulative nature,
because the Ukrainian political elite began taking
steps to address the Crimean Tatar agenda at the
very moment when the peninsula became part of
the Russian Federation. A similar imitation policy
is being pursued in relation to the entire Crimea.
This is evidenced by the creation by the Ukrainian
political leadership of the executive agencies of
Crimea, supposedly responsible for the
implementation of Ukrainian policy on the
peninsula (Bredikhin, 2017, p. 41). However, such
agencies do not really work for obvious reasons.
CrimeanTatarsasa“BridgeofFriendship”
betweenTürkiyeandUkraine
The importance of the Crimean Tatar factor
in Turkish-Ukrainian cooperation after 2014 is

54 Crimean Gatherings [Крымские посиделки] //
Lenta.ru. August 25, 2021. (In Russian). URL:
https://lenta.ru/articles/2021/08/25/krym_plat/ (accessed:
03.11.2021).
55 Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 117/2021 //
Official website of the President of Ukraine [Указ Прези-
дента України № 117/2021 // Президент України.
Офіційне інтернет-представництво]. March 11, 2021.
(In Ukrainian). URL: https://www.president.gov.ua/
documents/1172021-37533 (accessed: 01.11.2021).
confirmed by joint projects, the main recipients
of which are Crimean Tatars. The monitoring of
the legal framework and media materials showed
that the main areas of cooperation between
Türkiye and Ukraine on the Crimean Tatar
question are:
1. “Protection” of the rights of the Crimean
Tatars.
2. Humanitarian aid to the Crimean Tatars
by the Republic of Türkiye.
3. Projects in the sphere of culture and
education.
The Republic of Türkiye does not limit itself
solely to the verbal format of “protecting” the
rights of the Crimean Tatars, but also takes
concrete steps in this direction. For example, in
2017, R.T. Erdoğan played a key role in the
release of I. Umerov and A. Chiygoz, Deputy
Heads of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People.
A criminal case was opened against the former
for public call for violation of the territorial
integrity of the Russian Federation. As for
A. Chiygoz, he was accused of organizing mass
riots at a rally on February 26, 2014, on the eve
of the referendum on the accession of Crimea to
the Russian Federation.56 It is also noteworthy
that it was R.T. Erdoğan who was approached by
V. Zelensky57 and M. Dzhemilev, the so-called
“leader” of the Crimean Tatar people, the famous
dissident and former chairman of the Mejlis,
regarding the release of Ukrainian and Crimean
Tatar activists.58 It should be noted that the

56 Umerov and Chiygoz Met with Erdoğan [Умеров и
Чийгоз встретились с Эрдоганом] // Qırım Haber Ajansı.
October 26, 2017. (In Russian). URL:
http://old.qha.com.ua/ru/obschestvo/umerov-i-chiigoz-
vstretilis-s-erdoganom/181197/ (accessed: 01.11.2021).
57 The President of Ukraine Held a Telephone
Conversation with the President of the Republic of
Türkiye// Official website of the President of Ukraine
[Президент України провів телефонну розмову з Пре-
зидентом Турецької Республіки // Президент України.
Офіційне інтернет-представництво]. August 22, 2021.
(In Ukrainian). URL: https://www.president.gov.ua/
ru/news/prezident-ukrayini-proviv-telefonnu-rozmovu-z-
prezidentom-tu-70245 (accessed: 01.11.2021).
58 Erdoğan Personally Told Me That He Would Do
Everything Possible — Dzhemilev on the Release of
Political Prisoners // Public [Эрдоган мне лично сказал,
что сделает все возможное, — Джемилев об освобож-
дении политзаключенных // Громадське]. October 24,
2018. (In Russian). URL: https://hromadske.ua/ru/posts/
erdohan-mne-lychno-skazal-chto-sdelaet-vse-vozmozhnoe-

Demeshko N.E., Irkhin A.A. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 2022, 22(4), 755—770
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 767
Mejlis and M. Dzhemilev are rather highly
respected in Türkiye. This is actively used
by the Ukrainian side to establish effective
communication with Ankara. So representatives
of this organization are regularly included in
Ukrainian delegations for negotiations with the
Republic of Türkiye.
In addition, Türkiye has consistently
supported Ukrainian initiatives aimed at
mainstreaming of Crimean Tatars’ rights. For
example, in April 2021, the presidents of the two
states signed a declaration following the ninth
meeting of the High-Level Strategic Council.59
This document clearly states that Türkiye supports
the creation of the previously mentioned Crimean
Platform. Moreover, the countries intend to
strengthen joint actions to improve the living
conditions of the Crimean Tatars who left the
peninsula due to its supposedly “temporary
occupation.” This task is currently being
addressed through a framework agreement
between the governments of Ukraine and Türkiye
on cooperation in housing construction.60 Under
the agreement, Türkiye will assist Ukraine in the
construction of 500 apartments in Kiev, Nikolaev
and Kherson. There are 450 apartments for the
Crimean Tatars, while the rest will be given to
people entitled to benefits.
In addition, Türkiye has consistently
supported Ukrainian initiatives aimed at

dzhemylev-ob-osvobozhdenyy-polytzakliuchennykh
(accessed: 01.11.2021).
59 Joint Declaration of the 9th Meeting of the High-
Level Strategic Council between Ukraine and the Republic
of Turkey // Official website of the President of Ukraine
[Спільна декларація Дев’ятого засідання Стратегічної
ради високого рівня між Україною та Турецькою Рес-
публікою // Президент України. Офіційне інтернет-
представництво]. April 10, 2021. (In Ukrainian). URL:
https://www.president.gov.ua/news/spilna-deklaraciya-
devyatogo-zasidannya-strategichnoyi-radi-67909 (accessed:
01.11.2021).
60 Framework Agreement between the Government of
Ukraine and the Government of the Republic of Türkiye on
Cooperation in the Field of Housing Construction for
Representatives of the Crimean Tatar People and Privileged
Categories of Citizens of Ukraine // Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine [Рамкова Угода між Урядом України та Урядом
Турецької Республіки про співробітництво у сфері будів-
ництва житла для представників кримськотатарського
народу та пільгових категорій громадян України // Вер-
ховна Рада]. (In Ukrainian). URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/
laws/show/792_001-21#n2 (accessed: 01.11.2021).
actualizing the rights of Crimean Tatars. Thus, in
April 2021, the presidents of the two countries
signed a declaration following the ninth meeting
of the High-Level Strategic Council. In this
document it is clearly stated that Türkiye
supports the creation of the previously mentioned
“Crimean platform.” Moreover, the states intend
to strengthen joint actions to improve the living
conditions of the Crimean Tatars, who left the
peninsula as a result of its alleged “temporary
occupation.” This task is currently being
addressed through a framework agreement
between the governments of Ukraine and
Türkiye on cooperation in housing construction.
Under the terms of the agreement, Türkiye will
assist Ukraine in the construction of 500
apartments in Kiev, Nikolaev and Kherson.
Ankara, appealing to the need to assist the
Crimean Tatars, is also active in Ukraine, using
“soft power” and thus promoting Turkish culture.
This direction of Turkish policy is implemented
through the activities of the Turkish Cooperation
and Coordination Agency (TİKA), the Yunus
Emre Cultural Center, the Turkish Maarif
Foundation (TMF).
After the end of the Cold War, the Turkish
leadership began to apply new methods of
promoting its foreign policy. In January 1992, the
Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
(TİKA) was established. Since 1994, this structure
has overseen almost all “donor” projects of the
Republic of Türkiye (Akıllı & Çelenk, 2019). The
main activities of TİKA have not changed, but
after 2014 all projects have been implemented
exclusively in Ukraine (Irkhin & Demeshko,
2019). Since Crimea’s reunification with Russia,
TİKA has opened the Crimean Tatar Cultural
Center,61 I. Gasprinsky Research Center,62 the

61 Dzhemilev and TİKA Opened the Crimean Tatar
Cultural Center [Джемилев и TİKA открыли крымскота-
тарский культурный центр] // Qırım Haber Ajansı.
October 22, 2016. (In Russian). URL: http://old.qha.com.
ua/ru/photo/djemilev-i-tika-otkrili-krimskotatarskii-kulturnii-
tsentr/28489/#1 (accessed: 04.11.2021).
62 The First Lady of Turkey Opened a Research Center
Named after Gasprinsky // Islam in Ukraine [Первая леди
Турции открыла исследовательский центр имени
Гаспринского // Ислам в Украине]. October 10, 2017. (In
Russian). URL: https://islam.in.ua/ru/novosti-v-strane/
pervaya-ledi-turcii-otkryla-issledovatelskiy-centr-imeni-
gasprinskogo (accessed: 04.11.2021).

Демешко Н.Э., Ирхин А.А. Вестник РУДН. Серия: Международные отношения. 2022. Т. 22, № 4. С. 755—770
768 МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ
Center for Research on the History of Turkish and
Crimean Tatar Peoples,63 the House of Tatar
Culture in Kiev,64 and the Institute of Oriental
Studies at Taurida National V.I. Vernadsky
University.65 In addition, TİKA provided material
assistance to pre-school and secondary
educational institutions,66 as well as to individual
Crimean Tatar families.67
Since its inception in 2009, Yunus Emre
Institute has made an important contribution to
the promotion of Turkish language and culture
abroad. A branch of this organization also
operates in Kiev. The Institute conducts Turkish
language courses and organizes hundreds of
concerts, exhibitions, competitions, film
festivals, scientific and other events each year.
Also, the activities of the cultural center in Kiev
are clearly aimed at forming a negative
interpretation of the history of Russia and
Crimean Tatars. In 2019, this organization held
an event dedicated to the activities of the
Crimean Tatar writer, public figure, one of the
leaders and ideologists of the national liberation
movement of Crimean Tatars, C. Seydahmet
Kırımer, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the
M.A. Sulkevich government, supported by the
German military command during the Civil War.
Later, Kırımer emigrated to Türkiye and did not

63 The History of the Turkish and Crimean Tatar
Peoples Will Be Studied at the Center at the Kiev National
University [Историю турецкого и крымскотатарского
народов будут исследовать в Центре при КНУ] //
Qırım Haber Ajansı. October 19, 2018. (In Russian).
URL: http://old.qha.com.ua/ru/photo/istoriyu-turetskogo-i-
krimskotatarskogo-narodov-budut-issledovat-v-tsentre-pri-
knu/30441/#1 (accessed: 04.11.2021).
64 Turkey Keeps Breaking Records in Humanitarian
Aid and Development Assistance // TİKA. URL:
https://www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/turkey_keeps_breaking_re
cords_in_humanitarian_aid_and_development_assistance-
49351 (accessed: 04.11.2021).
65 An Oriental Studies Institute Was Established in
Ukraine’s Taurida National University // TİKA. URL:
https://www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/an_oriental_studies_instit
ute_was_established_in_ukraine%27s_taurida_national_un
iversity-48706 (accessed: 04.11.2021).
66 TİKA Supports the Education Infrastructure of
Ukraine // TİKA. URL: https://www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/
tika_supports_the_education_infrastructure_of_ukraine-
61416 (accessed: 04.11.2021).
67 Erenler Sofrası Reaches 1,500 Families in Ukraine //
TİKA. URL: https://www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/erenler_
sofrasi_reaches_1_500_families_in_ukraine-62863 (accessed:
04.11.2021).
stop writing and speaking about the “oppression”
of Crimean Tatars and other “enslaved” peoples
in the Soviet Union until the end of his days.68
The Turkish Maarif Foundation was
founded in June 2016, one month before the
attempted military coup by the Gülenist Terrorist
Organization “Parallel State Structure.” Initially,
TMV focused its efforts on bringing educational
structures opened by Gülen supporters under its
control. In 2021, Türkiye and Ukraine signed an
agreement to support the organization’s work in
Ukraine.69 At the moment, the Foundation is the
main tool for exporting Turkish education to
foreign countries.
Thus, for Türkiye, the Crimean Tatars are a
Turkic factor in both Ukraine and Russia and an
opportunity to exert a significant influence on the
balance of power in the Black Sea region. It is
noteworthy that representatives of Ukrainian
political elite also support such rhetoric. For
example, Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister,
E. Dzheppar (a Crimean Tatar by birth),
repeatedly declared “historical ties” between the
two states and noted that “Ukraine is an heir to
Turkish culture. Crimean Tatars are a bridge
between Ukraine and Turkey.”70

68 In Kyiv, at the Yunus Emre Institute, One of the
Ideologists of the National Liberation Movement of the
Crimean Tatars Jafer Seydamet was Remembered // Islam
in Ukraine [В Киеве в Институте Юнуса Эмре вспоми-
нали одного из идеологов национально-
освободительного движения крымских татар Джафера
Сейдамета // Ислам в Украине]. April 24, 2019.
(In Russian). URL: https://islam.in.ua/ru/novosti-v-
strane/v-kieve-v-institute-yunusa-emre-vspominali-odnogo-
iz-ideologov-nacionalno (accessed: 01.11.2021).
69 Joint Declaration of the 9th Meeting of the High-
Level Strategic Council between Ukraine and the Republic
of Turkey // Official website of the President of Ukraine
[Спільна декларація Дев’ятого засідання Стратегічної
ради високого рівня між Україною та Турецькою Рес-
публікою // Президент України. Офіційне інтернет-
представництво]. April 10, 2021. (In Ukrainian).
URL: https://www.president.gov.ua/news/spilna-deklaraciya-
devyatogo-zasidannya-strategichnoyi-radi-67909 (accessed:
01.11.2021).
70 It Became Known about the Accession of Ukraine to
the Turkic Countries // Ukraine.ru [Стало известно о при-
соединении Украины к тюркским странам //
Украина.ру]. October 8, 2021. (In Russian).
URL: https://ukraina.ru/news/20211008/1032426545.html
(accessed: 01.11.2021).

Demeshko N.E., Irkhin A.A. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 2022, 22(4), 755—770
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 769
Conclusion
The research conducted allows us to come
to the following conclusions.
First, Türkiye’s practices with regard to the
Crimean Tatar people can be characterized as a
policy of double standards. This point is
confirmed by the national policy of the Republic
of Türkiye, which is more aimed at the
acculturation and assimilation of representatives
of other national groups living in Türkiye. At the
same time, internationally, the leadership of the
Justice and Development Party positions itself as
a “defender” of all Muslims in the world,
including the Crimean Tatars. The ambivalent
nature of Ankara’s actions is also evident in its
interaction with both the Mejlis of the Crimean
Tatar People and pro-Russian representatives of
Crimean Tatars. Given the heterogeneity and
polarity of political preferences of the Crimean
Tatar ethnos, Türkiye is probably taking these
steps to maintain its influence in the Crimean
Tatar environment and strengthen its position
both at the domestic and international levels.
Second, Ukraine views the Crimean Tatar
issue as one of the most significant elements in
the system of countering the reintegration of
Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian
Federation. At the same time, to destabilize the
situation in Crimea, the Ukrainian leadership
relies on interaction with the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar People. However, the political
alliance of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar
political elites is situational and, apparently, not
long-term, because the simultaneous existence of
two nationalist projects is possible if there is a
common external enemy, which Russia is
declared to be.
Third, a characteristic feature of Turkish-
Ukrainian cooperation on the Crimean Tatar
agenda is constructing a negative image of
Russia through discrediting its actions with
regard to Crimean Tatars. Moreover, Ankara and
Kiev form ideas about a kind of continuity
between the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union,
and the Russian Federation in “violating” the
rights of this ethnic group. At the same time, the
conditional Turkish-Ukrainian alliance positions
itself as a “protector” of the Crimean Tatars from
the “Russian aggression.”
Fourth, the Crimean Tatar agenda will
continue to be played out by Türkiye, Ukraine
and other states and powers to weaken Russia’s
position in the Black Sea region. Under these
conditions, the political leadership of the Russian
Federation at the federal and regional levels must
continue to carry out systematic work to
integrate Crimean Tatars into the Russian space,
taking into account understanding of the
technologies of external destructive influence. In
this integration mechanism, the first stage
requires the development and implementation of
integration technologies with a long-term
political effect in “challenge-response” logic.
The second stage of these mechanisms should
leave the logic of responding to destructive
external influences and involve a proactive
program for the formation of a new all-Russian
identity in the context of the Russian leadership’s
revision of the outcome of the Cold War. At the
synthesis level, this mechanism, which has not
yet received conceptual and doctrinal
formalization in the Russian Federation, already
competes with the ideas of the Turkic world
(Türk dünyası) and the West, which are well
formalized at the conceptual and doctrinal level.
Received / Поступила в редакцию: 16.11.2021
Revised / Доработана после рецензирования: 08.10.2022
Accepted / Принята к публикации: 17.10.2022
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About the authors: Demeshko Natalia Eduardovna — PhD (Political Science), Associate Professor, Political
Science Department, Institute of Social Sciences and International Relations, Sevastopol State University; ORCID:
0000-0002-9620-2410; e-mail: natalidem93@mail.ru
Irkhin Aleksandr Anatolievich — PhD, Dr. of Sc. (Political Science), Head, Political Science Department, Institute
of Social Sciences and International Relations, Sevastopol State University; ORCID: 0000-0001-7895-550X;
e-mail: alex.irhin@mail.ru