Ocupación británica de Manila en 1762: resistencia y diferentes tipos de cautivos

Abstract

En 1762 Manila cae por sorpresa en manos británicas. A partir de ese momento comenzará una tenaz resistencia al invasor en un contexto de improvisada guerra irregular que incluyó nativos filipinos y religiosos. Tal confrontación dio pie a diferentes comportamientos respecto a los varios tipos de cautivos involucrados.

Full text

GLADIUS
Estudios sobre armas antiguas, arte militar
y vida cultural en oriente y occidente
XLII (2022), pp. 193-203
ISSN: 0436-029X; eISSN: 1988-4168
https://doi.org/10.3989/gladius.2022.12
BRITISH OCCUPATION OF MANILA IN 1762: RESISTANCE AND
DIFFERENT TYPE OF CAPTIVES*
OCUPACIÓN BRITÁNICA DE MANILA EN 1762: RESISTENCIA Y DIFERENTES
TIPOS DE CAUTIVOS
BY
Evaristo C. MartínEz-radío Garrido**
abstraCt - rEsuMEn
In 1762 Manila fell by surprise into British hands. From that moment on, a tenacious resistance to the invader
began in a context of improvised irregular warfare that included native Filipinos and members of religious orders.
Such confrontation gave rise to different behaviors regarding the various types of captives involved.
En 1762 Manila cae por sorpresa en manos británicas. A partir de ese momento comenzará una tenaz resisten-
cia al invasor en un contexto de improvisada guerra irregular que incluyó nativos lipinos y religiosos. Tal confron-
tación dio pie a diferentes comportamientos respecto a los varios tipos de cautivos involucrados.
KEywords - Palabras ClavE
Manila; The Philippines; 1762; captives; resistance; irregular warfare; Spain-United Kingdom.
Manila; Filipinas; 1762; cautivos; resistencia; guerra irregular; España-Reino Unido.
Citation / CóMo Citar EstE artíCulo
Martínez-Radío Garrido, E. C. (2022): «British occupation of Manila in 1762: resistance and different type of
captives». Gladius, 42: 193-203. https://doi.org/10.3989/gladius.2022.12
rECEivEd / rECibido: 29-04-2021
aCCEPtEd / aCEPtado: 10-04-2022
Copyright: © 2022 CSIC. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International (CC BY 4.0) License.
* This article is a result of the project “Prisoners of war between the Bourbon nations and the United Kingdom during the
18th Century: ways of life and humanity in misfortune”, based in the University of Warwick, that received funding from the Euro-
pean Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement n.º 746995.
** Centro de Investigação Transdisciplinar «Cultura, Espaço e Memória» (CITCEM), Oporto, evaristoradio@hotmail.com /
ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7015-9680

EVARISTO C. MARTÍNEZ-RADÍO GARRIDO
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Despite the presence and relevance of the Mil-
itary History of Spain during the Early Modern
Age, the phenomenon of war-derived captivity
is a eld little analyzed by Spanish historiogra-
phy until now, which is beginning to be echoed
through recent studies. Around the 18th century,
some studies have been publishing in Spanish,
more or less detailed, by authors such as Manuel-
Reyes García Hurtado, Agustín González Enciso,
Aitor Pérez Blázquez, Tomás Pérez Delgado,
Celia Parcero Torre or Evaristo Martínez-Radío.
This last author is perhaps the one who has fo-
cused the most on this eld in the last years1,
also coordinating recently a dossier together with
Antonio José Rodríguez Hernández on the sub-
ject and the Ancien Régime2. It is true that in the
immediately preceding period there is also some
study, although more of a punctual nature, with
authors such as Maximiliano Barrio Gozalo or
Antonio Jiménez Estrella. In the later one, there
are already more references from the Napoleonic
era onwards, such as María Zozaya Montes, Jean-
René Aymes or Vicente Ruiz García, among oth-
ers. However, there are fewer focused on such
a phenomenon with respect to territories as far
away as Asia and, in this case, the Philippines,
which is what these lines intend to make known.
CONTEXT
Within the framework of the Seven Years’ War
(1756-1763), Spain came into conict with the
United Kingdom in January 1762 as a result of
the so-called Third Pacte de Famille with France,
signed in August of the previous year. The British
seek to surprise the Hispanic Crown and launch a
secret plan to attack Manila trying to undermine
its ancient inuence3, improve their own and
1 Since 2012 he has been focusing on unraveling aspects
such as the very denition of what a POW was and what it
involved in the Ancien Régime, on humanity regarding prison-
ers, their worth and use of the same to obtain an advantage for
the captor, such as being a source of information, or if they
were a burden due to the duty to keep them together with the
possible rejection or source of social conict, the reasons for
deserving a dignied treatment and what regulations could ex-
ist in this regard, the importance of capitulations or exchanges,
their maintenance, etc. See Martínez-Radío Garrido, 2012;
2013; 2014; 2016; 2020; 2021; 2022.
2 In the Revista Universitaria de Historia Militar
(RUHM), vol. 9, no. 18, 2020.
3 Regarding to its origins, see Mollá Ayuso, 2019. It has
obtain commercial advantages from the hand of
the East Indies Company, which will support the
mission in exchange for dividing the loot and the
government of the area. Moreover, a month after
the taking of the city, the new invader authority
will be Dawsonne Drake, an ofcer of the same4.
Obviously, the ofcial British version is different,
as it alludes to its need in the face of the danger-
ous Bourbon pact and the consequent effort to di-
minish its power and prestige and that the Spanish
ended up accepting an agreement with the Brit-
ish. In the secret instructions to this effect given
to George Keppel, Earl of Albemarle—who, for
his part, was to attack Cuba—it’s indicated that
the British Crown was forced to declare war on
Spain, although had tried to avoid it:
[W]hereas we have been obliged by the haughty
and imperious conduct of the Court of Spain to de-
clare war against that Crown, notwithstanding the
moderation with which we have constantly endeav-
oured to avoid that extremity... nothing will so es-
sentially promote our service or so soon induce the
enemy to listen to equitable and reasonable terms of
accommodation5.
Thus, on 29 July an expedition set sail from
Madras (India), anchoring the eet commanded
to be said that, in spite of its relevance, the Philippine case in
general has less echo in Spanish historiography than the Amer-
ican one, and more commonly to come to remember the events
of the nineteenth century and does not usually involve as many
studies as in that one. Even so, there were also conferences
and studies about it, such as: Castañeda Delgado and García
Abásolo, 1997 or the XLV Jornadas de Historia Marítima, Es-
paña en Filipinas, Ciclo de Conferencias, octubre 2012, being
published its acts in the monographic n.º 66 of the Instituto
de Historia y Cultura Naval, Madrid, 2012. It has to be high-
lighted some other authors, as it can be Mª Elisa Martínez de
Vega or more recently María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso
or Antoni Picazo Muntaner. But especially José Á. del Bar-
rio Muñoz (2015), since it deals with the defensive measures
in the same scenario some decades before, in the context of
a great conict as it was the War of the Spanish Succession.
4 He has to be distinguished, however, from the military
governor, Captain William Brereton, with whom will have a
tense relationship. It is noteworthy that Simón de Anda, whom
we will refer to shortly, wrote to the King of Spain in October
1765 commenting that Captain Brereton had acted with hon-
our. National Maritime Museum (Greenwich), Personal Col-
lections, leg. BRE/1. About Brereton, see Brereton, 1919: 25;
Brereton, 1779: 83-84.
5 National Archives (Kew) [NA], Colonial Ofce, Com-
monwealth and Foreign and Commonwealth Ofces, leg.
117/1; Bush and Macomb, 1903: 439. On the causes of the at-
tack, related to the economic benets and interests of the East
India Company, see Andrés Gallego, 2003: 204-207.

BRITISH OCCUPATION OF MANILA IN 1762: RESISTANCE AND DIFFERENT TYPE ... 195
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by Admiral Samuel Cornish in Cavite, port of
Manila, on 22 September and that, with superior
forces and quality of troops6, will end up taking
the city on 6 October 1762. Simón de Anda, the
leader of the resistance, says there were 13 war-
ships, which is the gure that indicates Emilio
Bernáldez too who, in addition, further species
that the invader was a force of 6,830 attackers,
who will launch up to 25,000 projectiles in the at-
tack. The city was defended only by 1,000 men.
It will be occupied until April 17647, in a conict
that was not favourable to the Bourbon powers8
and it could have been worse if the British had
achieved their goals in the Philippines.
Due to space concerns, it is not possible to de-
tail the military operations. Therefore, this work
focuses directly on an overview of lesser-known
aspects related to prisoners and captives in those
days. To begin with, referring to the interim gov-
ernor himself, archbishop Manuel Antonio Rojo
del Río y Vieyra9, although with a certain political
power granted by the invaders, as will be seen.
THE FACTS
Focusing, then, on the different gures of
those apprehended those days, according to the
actions and facts, from the rst moment the con-
frontation begins and with it the captives appear.
Some signicant, such as that of a nephew of the
archbishop on the 24th, who will die as a result of
the wounds inicted by some Indians who didn’t
respect a parliamentary truce when approaching
with an English ofcer with dispatches for the
Spanish10.
6 In this sense, Mercedes Meade notes that Manila was
attacked by 15 warships under the command of Admiral Cor-
nish, who landed with 3,000 men under Brigadier Draper.
Meade de Angulo, 1992: 161; Bernáldez, 1857: 125; Archivo
General de Indias (Seville) [AGI], Filipinas, leg. 388, doc. 51.
7 The occupation is collected in Porter Chandler, 1987:
160-161. This episode is detailed in Mas y Sanz, 1843: 122
and ff. On the plans of the area used by the British, necessary
to collect information on the city and the information they han-
dled, more or less truthful, see Mancini, 2018: 90-94.
8 The American version presents the British as absolute
dominators everywhere. Literally, “the British were success-
ful everywhere”. Annual Reports of the War...: 439, although
Spain was not as damaged as one might expect. In this regard,
see Riera Palmero, 2015: 644; Andrés Gallego, 2003: 205-206.
9 On the archbishop and these facts, see Fernández Duro,
1895-1903: 83 and ff.; Buzeta and Bravo, 1851: 264.
10 These facts are nuanced with the information handled
by the US government, still based on the Marquis of Ayerbe:
“The English captured that day [24 September] a sampan (Chi-
Despite the adversity, the defenders didn’t
give in and on 5 October the storm was prepared
with 40 Frenchmen who had previously taken
prisoners in Pondicheri. They had to level the
moat with the ruins of the bastion, register if there
were any cuts that impeded the attackers’ passage
and report everything. They did it easily because
they certainly did not meet resistance, with which
then the nal action began11 . Given the impossi-
bility of defence, on the 6th the archbishop must
capitulate on the word of honour that he would
be respected, presenting himself to the English
generals, although, in principle and at least for
this fact, he didn’t consider himself as a prisoner,
which is a nuance to take into account12. The arch-
bishop handed over the capitulations to the win-
ner, yielding in the payment of four million pesos
in exchange for stopping the subsequent looting,
respecting the religious and public buildings and
the city itself and the use of their religion, among
other freedoms13. In case of not paying, the agree-
ment would not be respected and they would be
shipped to India as prisoners. Regarding the four
million pesos, one half was agreed to pay as soon
as possible there and the other half insured with
the Rojo del Río’s signature against the ship called
Filipino. She had to arrive from Acapulco with
the annual consignment that the Viceroy of New
Spain sent to Manila to cover the ofcial expens-
es of the archipelago, together with the money
earned by the merchants of the city by selling the
goods from China in Acapulco. In case it did not
cover the entire amount, it was owed against the
Spanish Crown14. It wasn’t the only thing. Along
with the money, the invaders demanded that the
islands be handed over to them under threat of
nese boat) of Sangleyes (Chinese traders) [...] A nephew of
the archbishop (the acting governor-general), with Captain D.
José Cerezo, a sublieutenant, and his boatswain were taken
prisoners [...] and when captured was conveying to Manila the
nephew of the archbishop with dispatches for that ofcial”.
Bush and Macomb, 1903: 448-449.
11 Mas y Sanz, 1843: 131; Bush and Macomb, 1903: 440.
12 “[C]on la condición y palabra de honor [to deal perso-
nally with the capitulations] de la indemnidad de su persona;
de que no iba Su Señoría Ilustrísima prisionera ni se tenía por
tal”. Testimony of the notary (escribano) Ramón de Orendain,
on 8 October 1762. AGI, Estado, leg. 44, n.º 66.
13 Mas y Sanz, 1843: 122-133. Carlos Vila refers to this
fact as that he surrendered before an agreement had been
reached in the ongoing talks on capitulation. Vila Miranda,
2007:181.
14 Vila Miranda, 2007:176-177 and 205-206; Mas y Sanz,
1843: 133; Andrés Gallego, 2003: 208.

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putting all the Spaniards to the sword, with which
the archbishop acceded, intimidated, requesting
obedience to the British, something he couldn’t
legally if he was captive (regardless of how he
considered himself, he wasn’t free either). It has
to be said that he ordered the silver that had been
withdrawn to be brought to the province of La-
guna de Hay, but the Franciscans Friars refused.
The archbishop’s attitude during the occupation,
temporizing with the enemy (regardless of the
pressure he might have) led to a strong confronta-
tion with Simón Anda, who even calls him a trai-
tor15. In any case, neither the occupants will get
15 It is said that his actions, despite coming from force,
caused him such sadness that it led to his death on 30 January
1764. The invaders respected him and gave him magnicent
funerals. As a curiosity, after his death, his heart was taken to
Mexico. AGI, Filipinas, leg. 388, n.º 51. Mas y Sanz, 1843:
172-174; Mercedes Meade de Angulo, 1992: 161-162; Buzeta
such a sum nor the city was spared looting, as was
the custom of the time. In the words of the bailiff
Fray Julián de Arriaga to the Marquis de Grimal-
di, Minister of State, on 12 December 1763, “that
common [population of Manila] also suffered the
violence that, without regard to capitulations, of-
fered the greed of the enemy and the confusion
of his disorderly dominion”16. In fact, in 1765,
Cornish himself will allude to the fact that the
Spanish had promised him the money from the
Filipino, obtaining evasive replies to deliver it
and even using hostages to it: “...they had even
sent hostages on our ships to convince us that we
and Bravo, 1851: 278; Vila Miranda, 2007:181-183; Andrés
Gallego, 2003:207-208; Ruiz Gutiérrez, 2013: 339-340.
16 Translated from Spanish [from now onwards, TfS].
AGI, Estado, leg. 44, n.º 66. Although such writing does not
explicitly refer to looting and could refer to a more general
situation.
Figure 1. British plan on the attack on Manila in 1762. Source: Plan of Manilla, capital of the Philippine Islands,
taken by Storm the 6. October 1762, by the English Army Commanded by Brigadier General Draper with the
united Efforts of His Majestys Squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Cornish. Royal Library (Windsor), Royal
Collection Trust, Other 18th/19th-century conicts, RCIN 733068.

BRITISH OCCUPATION OF MANILA IN 1762: RESISTANCE AND DIFFERENT TYPE ... 197
Gladius, XLII (2022), pp. 193-203. ISSN: 0436-029X; eISSN: 1988-4168. https://doi.org/10.3989/gladius.2022.12
would receive it”17. At the beginning of the year
1764, the East India Company was already aware
that those responsible for the Royal Treasury in
the Spanish Court were refusing the payment
against the King by the governor and archbishop.
That is why, when the English withdrew from the
city in April, they did so without having collected
the intended two million. The event gave rise to a
uid correspondence between the Marquis of Gri-
maldi and the Spanish ambassador in London, the
prince Masserano, regarding the British claims to
receive the money to avoid the sacking of the cap-
ital and the Spanish inconveniences to provide it.
The rst alludes to the fact that it was singular that
the English wanted to receive the amount grant-
ed (more than possible) from “prisoners or van-
quished”, something that is not worthy of “cul-
tured nations”. According to him, the archbishop
had made such an “extravagant order of payment”
(libranza) out of fear, “trembling that otherwise,
not only would the Spanish possessions suffer
cruel havoc, but also religion, which was what
most distressed him”18. Presumably, an image of
England as a nation with a taste for prey was thus
strengthened among the Spanish. Regarding the
conditions of the occupiers in terms of defeated
combatants, they are not new. It was provided that
the ofcers would be considered prisoners of war
on parole, being able to carry their swords. At the
same time, the troops would be disarmed and eve-
ryone would be treated humanely (like the Span-
ish will say for their part). No longer as prison-
ers, other captives, as they are hostages, are also
referred to as guarantors of compliance with the
demands for payment of the four million pesos in
the two mentioned payments19.
Notwithstanding, although the assailants took
the capital, they did not control the situation and a
tenacious resistance began, with the clerics play-
ing a special role. This did not escape Colonel
William Draper, commanding the Army, more that
played by the Franciscans, and tried to win them
over unsuccessfully with respect and the media-
17 TfS: “[I]ncluso habían enviado rehenes en nuestros
barcos para convencernos de que lo recibiríamos”.
18 TfS. 2 January 1764. AGI, Estado, leg. 44, n.º 28; Vila
Miranda, 2007: 204-212.
19 No longer as prisoners, other captives, as they are hos-
tages, are also referred to as guarantors of compliance with the
demands for payment of the four million pesos in the two men-
tioned payments. Signed by Cornish and Draper on 6 October.
Vila Miranda, 2007: 209-210; Bush and Macomb, 1903: 453.
tion of the archbishop. Among the rebels, the P.
exprovincial Fr. Remigio Hernández stood out20,
who did not recognize the British authority and
was active in the struggle to the extent of seeing
a price placed on his head. It cannot be lost sight
of the fact that the resistance had a strong defence
of Catholicism against Protestants and Muslims.
We have to bear in mind here that the defence
of Catholicism united with the Spanish Crown is
key. It is very evident in a response from Simón
de Anda to the archbishop on 20 October, when he
alludes to that he achieved that “all its inhabitants
are willing to admit no other religion than the one
they profess, or any other domain than that of our
Catholic monarch (may God preserve)” (trans-
lated from Spanish). The resistance becomes
more tenacious when, before knowing the Peace
of Paris, the offensive and defensive alliance re-
quested by the English with the kinglet of Jolo is
published, prisoner (with which it would not be
valid either, as we will see). It is true that the arch-
bishop had written a letter to the British govern-
ment protesting this, but he was answered that the
invaders had the right to request such an alliance
with the Joloans in the absence of compliance on
the Spanish side (not having paid)21.
On the other hand, Draper ordered the Span-
ish authorities to be brought together so that they
would cede their sovereignty to His Britannic
Majesty, what he got only under physical threat
on those people, and that it was not accepted in
any way by the rebellion embodied in a 62-year-
old man from Alava called Simón de Anda y Sala-
zar; by the taking of Manila and Cavite not all the
Philippine islands had to capitulate:
I am well aware that your Honour, my Real Audi-
encia, and the authorities of the city and the Crown
in Manila, as prisoners of war, or in the concept that
they estimate, capitulate by imperative of the cir-
cumstances, and respect what is signed, if it were
in accordance with reason and law of war; but I un-
derstand this, and it must be understood as to that
capital, Cavite and its inhabitants... By no means
regarding the rest of the provinces, which as gover-
nor, although unworthy, I will defend until the last
drop of my blood is shed22.
20 Native of Piedrahita (Ávila), they put a price for his
capture just like Simon de Anda. Pérez, 1901: 243-244.
21 Mas y Sanz, 1843: 175-176; Andrés Gallego, 2003:
212.
22 TfS: “[E]ntiendo muy bien que V.S.I., mi Real Audien-
cia, ciudad y cuerpo de reales ociales, como prisioneros de
guerra, o en el concepto que los estimen, capitulen por preci-

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For his part and with honor in this sense, the
Frenchman Monsieur Faller behaved. He served
in the capital and had fought the invaders (there-
fore, he was also a captive), and did not accept the
Zamboanga government that they offered him if
he seized it by force23. But returning to the sub-
ject we are concerned and Simón de Anda, it must
be said here how he could address the enemy in
that tone of authority. Well, on the eve of the fall
of the city and its imminent surrender, the title of
lieutenant governor was given to the most mod-
ern oidor (judge), that was him, who came out
of it such a day. Once veried, assumed all the
functions and positions of governor, captain gen-
eral and president of the Royal Court in Manila
(Real Audiencia) to maintain the sovereignty of
the King of Spain, since the rest of the authori-
ties were captive, thus being the only one with
full legitimacy until they were released. He stated
it by edict published already on 5 October24, by
specifying that the institutional representatives
were “deprived and prevented from the use, ex-
ercise and authority of their posts”, according to
the Laws 180º, 57º and 58º of the title XV, Book
II of the Laws of the Indies, being him, therefore,
the only legal authority. This is how Anda will ex-
pose it repeatedly, as in his correspondence and
edicts of 11 April and 9 July 1763 or 8 April 1764,
by stating clearly that, as the Spanish authorities
were prisoners of war, “they could not govern”25.
sión, y observen lo que se llegue a rmar, si fuese conforme a
razón y derecho de guerra; pero esto lo entiendo, y debe enten-
derse cuanto a esa capital, Cavite y sus habitantes... De ningún
modo en cuanto al resto de las provincias, que como goberna-
dor, aunque indigno, defenderé hasta derramar la última gota
de mi sangre”. Mas y Sanz, 1843: 138-147.
23 Ibíd.: 137. The question is why. The details are not
known, if by conviction or honour or having material interests
more linked to the Bourbon dynasty, whatever these were.
24 Edict published by José de Villegas Flores, royal and
public notary of the deceased’s property, also performed the
functions of Escribano de Cámara y Gobernación until the
former notaries returned, according to postliminium law and
reected in a letter from Simón de Anda on 6 June 1764. AGI,
Filipinas, 609, n.º 2.
25 TfS. AGI, Filipinas, leg. 388, ns 51 and 57; leg. 609,
n.º 2; Vila Miranda, 2007: 187-188; Díaz Arenas, 1830: chap-
ters “División territorial eclesiástica” and “Tribunal de la Real
Audiencia”. On the lack of authority of the captive authorities
at the time see Martínez-Radío Garrido, 2014: 136; Bielfeld,
1771: 307-309. It reminds the subsequent Peninsular War as
Anda acts as the boards created without a king but in his name
and in exile. In one of those edicts of 19 May, the heading is
“We, the president and oidores of the Real Audiencia, Gover-
nor of the Philippine Islands by His Catholic Majesty, &c.”
So, without wasting a moment he began in this
way to organize the resistance from Bacolor de
la Pampanga, almost without means, but with
the help of the men of religious orders who went
through the villages preaching, praying and help-
ing within their capabilities. Faced with such an
attitude, Draper let Roja y Ríos continue in the
civilian government, claiming that he dealt only
with the military, always for the British benet,
obviously. This included urging Simón de Anda
to depose his attitude, although without success,
as has been said.
This fact is paradoxically parallel to the case
of Sultan Mahamad Alimudin (called Fernando I
by the Spanish), kinglet of Jolo, in principle ally
of the Spaniards, taking up arms against the in-
vaders and who had embraced Catholicism. He
was captured by the British and then made a pact
with them. Later General Draper obtained the
island of Balambangan for the East Indies Com-
pany, north of Borneo26. The complaint of the
Spanish governor of Manila for a possible British
commercial expansion in the area, reaching 1769,
led to a reply from Alexander Dalrymple27 (appar-
ently consulted as an expert) to Lord Weymouth28
in which, in a part of his analysis, he contradicts
the own behaviour of the occupants with the
archbishop. The Spanish point out that the Brit-
ish could not agree with Alimudin as they already
had an agreement with him. However, Dalrymple
alleges that it is not valid because, when it was
done, he was in Manila and did not enjoy full free-
dom or royal dignity (thus contradicting British
conduct regarding the Rojas y Ríos case). In other
words, Dalrymple says that Alimudin was not re-
(TfS), which remembers those of the mentioned boards of the
Peninsular War. Mas y Sanz, 1843: 184-185.
26 In this sense, Simón Anda on 9 July 1763 refers to him,
commenting that the English had allied with Alimudin and his
son, Prince Israel. García de Arboleya, 1851: 28; British Li-
brary [BL], India Ofce Records [IOR] H/102: 359-360. AGI,
Filipinas, leg. 388, n.º 51.
27 He had been acting governor in Manila in March 1764,
with which it is without a doubt for that reason that he should
have been consulted in the litigation. At that time, he appropri-
ated a Spanish documentary collection of great worth, that led
to England and served for other advances and events later and
unfairly considered British discoveries. See Jáuregui-Lobera,
2018: 547-548. On Brereton, Dalryple, the campaign and the
lack of English resolution in the Philipinnes, see Fry, 2020:
145.
28 Thomas Thynne, I Earl of Bath and III Viscount of
Weymouth (1734-1796), who was appointed Secretary of
State for the Northern Department in January 1768.

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ally free, since he was under Spanish custody and
protection. And, according to him, less because
the kinglet had embraced Christianity, with which
he would be unable to carry out such an agree-
ment while Sulu was a Muslim state. That is, he
could not rule in Sulu because he was not free or
because he professed the faith of his subjects29. By
the way, it must be said that, even though he was
a prisoner of the invaders, he corresponded with
Anda and asked him to continue being maintained
by the Spanish, as he was up to that moment.
Meanwhile, Simón de Anda, with few means
and improvising, continued to organize the resist-
ance against the English at the same time that he
put down the uprising in Pangasinan, encouraged
directly and indirectly by the British presence.
It was extended from November 1762 to March
176530. He also had help from religious orders
here, coming to offer complete forgiveness to
the insurgents if they returned to order and even
offering his only son hostage as a sign of good
faith. However, the island was not taken in its en-
tirety, harassing the invader with loyal indigenous
people, also under the command of some clerics.
The fact of the active participation of these men
of God in their rebellion weighed on their captive
brothers within the walls. At the beginning, those
from the Manila convent were allowed to go out
for a walk sometimes within the city, but suddenly
they were deprived of such a concession, treating
them as traitors while they favoured Anda’s ght.
Thus, the British shipped twelve of them to Eu-
rope.
Meanwhile, he, assisted by the Asturian Pedro
José de Bustos, instructed the civilian population
in the handling of weapons regardless of social
class or sex, that also helped with what they could
with the clerics mentioned. A highlight in a co-
ordinated task between them was to seek deser-
tion in the invading ranks and to form a consider-
able force of opposition to them. In such labour
29 Response to Lord Weymouth on 1 May 1769. BL,
IOR/H/100: 177-178 and 181-188; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 609,
n.º 7.
30 The insurrection was not general: “the other provinces
of the islands were calm and remained in the obedience of
the King of Spain, under the orders of Mr. Anda”. Further-
more, those of Bulacan and Pampanga “not only kept faithful,
but they were the only resource of the Spanish” (TfS). Mas
y Sanz, 1843: 147-149, 160 and 192-193; Buzeta and Bravo,
1851:187. While the Spanish also had to face this uprising,
a war against Portugal took place. For their part, the English
were immersed in war with the Indians of North America.
and among his compatriots taken in Pondicheri,
a French sergeant stood out, who is named as
Bretaña (Brittany). In fact, he himself had defect-
ed and been made captain by Anda. That is, from
those who had come prisoners and facilitated the
storm31. The change of side of the French who had
facilitated the assault is also signicant, which in-
dicates that there were no strict control measures,
either due to British incapacity or other reasons.
In the same way, one can think of the prisoner’s
attractiveness in collaborating with one or the
other, apart from being more or less forced by the
British in the initial ght. It is possible to suspect
then that perhaps there, with the passage of time
and resistance, they considered that the winning
side would not nally be the British, as well as
that they would have more connection with the
Spanish as they came from the same dynasty,
cause and creed.
By that time a way out of the war was already
being sought, signing the preliminaries for peace
at Fontainebleau on 3 November 1762, that later
gave rise to the denitive Treaty of Paris signed
on 10 February 176332.
Even so, on the ground, the ght continued
and at the beginning of March Don Francisco Le-
andro de Viana, the public prosecutor in the Audi-
encia—who had ed the city and had just joined
Simón de Anda—, said that “the English don’t
even own what the Manila cannon has in range”33.
This statement matches with the words of Simón
de Anda himself of 9 July 1763, referring to his
own attitude of struggle:
... despite the hateful and null capitulations [which,
therefore, he does not recognize] with which the is-
lands were ceded to him, [the enemy] could only
dominate what was reached by the cannon shot
from the two strongpoints [Manila and Cavite] and
[I] reduced him to such an ignominious narrow-
ness that he had no freedom exceeding that area,
in such a way that the enemy, being the victor, suf-
fered misery, famines and oppressions in the plans
of his triumph, seeing himself compelled to main-
tain a continuous vigil for not having security even
within his walls34.
31 Mas y Sanz, 1843: 166. Regarding his nickname, it
could be because of his origin, but this is a hypothesis.
32 Gómez Ranera, 1845: 164-165. Tratado deniti-
vo...,1763.
33 “[L]los ingleses no son dueños ni aún de lo que alcanza
el cañón de Manila”. Andrés Gallego, 2003: 213.
34 TfS. AGI, Filipinas, leg. 388, n.º 57.

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Another point is that Anda was not incommu-
nicado with the Manila captives. He corresponded
with authorities and messages were sent through
religious and secular. Thus he had news about the
prosecutor Viana and the oidor Villacorta. The
latter enjoyed a certain freedom in his captivity
and, precisely, when the British authorities real-
ized that he was sending correspondence and even
money to another person, they sentenced him to
hang, although he will nally save his life thanks
to the intercession of the archbishop35. Therefore,
the city was almost under siege immersed in a war
of irregular color.
In the end, the British were unable to settle
in the Philippines or exercise effective control of
an area that interested them36. From July to Sep-
tember, the cessation of hostilities is sought in the
area and, what it comes to captives, the British
gave more freedom to those they had in the city37.
However, there were other clashes, which did
not cease until the death of the archbishop at the
end of January 1764. After the funerals, negotia-
tions began on the delivery of the city, which the
king’s rst lieutenant, Don Francisco de la Torre,
took by the hand of Anda on 17 March38. When
the invaders left, de la Torre employed English
prisoners in the troops (so these had stayed after
the signing of the peace)39. It should be also noted
that, despite the taking of the city, the British did
not get control of the area, being the correspond-
ence between rebels and captives a good proof
of this. Proof of that lack of control was the cor-
respondence between the resistance and the cap-
35 Mas y Sanz, 1843: 161-170.
36 Article 23 of the Treaty of Paris provides that all terri-
tories conquered by one power or another not included in it,
would be restored, which included Manila—even being ex-
changed for an area of Florida—, as it alludes to on 21 April
1763 Charles Wyndham, II Earl of Egremont, Secretary of
State for the Southern Department, to Richard Neville Ald-
worth-Neville, secretary to the embassy at Paris and British
plenipotentiary there (until the arrival of the Earl Hertford in
May). NA, State Paper Ofce, 78/256/118; Tratado deniti-
vo..., 1763: 199.
37 Mas y Sanz, 1843: 187-188. Meanwhile, in September
of that year the frigate of the Company of the Indies Albion
arrived in England with some Spanish prisoners taken in that
city and on the Santísima Trinidad galleon. Gaceta de Madrid,
n.º 43, 25 October 1763: 347-348.
38 Letter from Simón de Anda y Salazar on the recovery
of Manila, 8 April 1764. Buzeta and Bravo, 1851:264-265;
AGI, Filipinas, leg. 388, n.º 57; Mas y Sanz, 1843: 190-191.
39 Royal Charter of 7 June 1767, that responds to a letter
from the King’s Lieutenant, Francisco Javier de la Torre, of 21
May 1765. AGI, Filipinas, 335, L.17, F.415R-418R.
tives to give strength to the ght and undermine
the invader forces. In the case of Alimudín, even
receiving help in full rebellion. In fact, such cor-
respondence took place leading to British suspi-
cion, taking more restrictive measures and then
softened when seeing the end of hostilities.
Regarding the prisoners of war themselves,
the common thing at the time was that the ex-
penses of the captives were paid by their State of
origin. This is our case, in a procedure that was
maintained throughout the century. In Fontaineb-
leau’s preliminary articles the 24 stands out, by
which they would be reciprocally restored, pay-
ing their respective nations for the debts they
have contracted as well as the expenses of their
maintenance. In the denitive Treaty of Paris, the
issue is qualied in article 3, since it includes in
such terms the gure of the hostage along with
prisoners40. In relation to the Manila captives, the
problem was how to keep them, as they were also
civilians and Crown employees41. The archbishop
was concerned about it and had to take care of,
rst, regulate and then pay their salaries as best he
could. He left it in written on 22 December 1762.
In a delicate situation, he stated that he had re-
ceived 8,864 Spanish pesos for this purpose, with
which he had to deliver that sum to another person
who, obviously, had to be commissioned by the
British authorities in the new situation42. What is
interesting here is that, despite the looting, such
a sum was advanced by way of loan from the
British authorities “to pay the salaries of the em-
ployees in his Royal service [of Spain] that were
taken prisoners in that capital”. Obviously, to be
reimbursed by the Spanish Crown43. He will be
remembered on 1 March 1763, when he wrote to
Julián de Arriaga, Secretary of State for the King
and the Ofce of Navy and Indies, in terms that
such money was essential for the maintenance of
the captives. According to his words, it took time
to release the amount advanced by the British up
to that date, taking place on the eve of the English
40 The London Chronicle or Universal Evening Post, n.º
972, vol. XIII, from Thursday 17 to Saturday 19 March 1763:
268. Tratado denitivo..., 1763: 49, 51, 153 and 155.
41 When falling into the enemy’s hand, jobs, allowances,
businesses and salaries dependent on the Spanish Crown are
lost.
42 Copy in the Admiral Cornish documents, included in
BL, IOR, H/77: 127 and ff.
43 TfS. See in this regard Martínez-Radío Garrido, 2016:
30. On the specication of the type of captive and, specically,
by war at that time, ibíd.: 30-32 and 52.

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eet leaving Manila. However, the archbishop
recorded it in triplicate, thus avoiding that there
would be no problem in having such a fact recog-
nized and, presumably, avoiding putting himself
in compromise with the interested parties in front
of the British Crown. It is not strange either, since,
as we have just seen, the costs and payments of
salaries generally had to be paid by the captives’
own nations of origin, and the governments of the
captors could advance them. It is interesting to
give a humanitarian treatment for the enemy to do
the same and, on the other hand, an offense to the
prisoners, as representatives of their King, would
be an offense to the King himself.
CONCLUSIONS
The taking of Manila by the British in 1762,
was a blow that surprised the Spanish Crown.
During the period of the occupation there are as-
pects that recall the future Peninsular War (1808-
1814), as there is a power vacuum supplied with
an improvised government out of the capital, in
the name of legality, leading an irregular libera-
tion struggle, with a popular tinge and in defence
of Catholicism. In this context, we look at the
variety of captives that originated the occupation
and their different role, with which both attackers
and defenders/resistance had to act44. To begin
with, and among them, the gure of the governor
himself, archbishop Manuel Antonio Rojo del Río
y Vieyra, who despite this, could exercise political
functions, thus being not recognized and despised
by the resisters but appreciated by the invaders. In
his case, Draper let him continue with these func-
tions. Presumably it was not a meaningless meas-
ure of grace, but rather that it would be a Spaniard
and above all an authority of faith, thus taking
more weight before the resistant Catholic popula-
tion. That is, he would be obeyed better than if
he were an invader, also a Protestant, and that he
could also favour the spread of Islam in the area
that the British presence could make easier. His
character more submissive to the British authori-
ties, who saw in him an ally or, at least, an instru-
ment to defend their interests of control over the
area, led him to open confrontation with Simón de
Anda, who embodied the rebellious spirit for and
44 It is true that the sources seem to show a lack of infor-
mation on the captive natives.
before the Spanish Crown. It is true that Rojo del
Río was able to act protecting the private inter-
ests of the Spanish captives, as demonstrated by
his concern for the accounts of their maintenance.
Notwithstanding, it is true that the rebelliousness
that would be expected of him was not revealed
and he would not be authorized to order any
measure according to the custom of the time. Per-
haps because of his character as a religious man or
because of the pressure of the enemy and for not
making the situation worse. In front of him, Anda
acts rmly, reafrming himself in his position and
discrediting the one who, although at the time he
alluded to signing the surrender without consid-
ering himself a prisoner (which would then give
him greater power), was not free or had no choice.
Neither did the rest of the captive authorities, who,
on the eve of the fall of the city and in anticipation
of it, had given full authority to Simón de Anda.
He was very clear in his edicts by clearly stating
that, as the Spanish authorities were prisoners of
war, “they could not govern”, they didn’t have au-
thority until they were released. In a similar sense
and for their part, the clerics, present at all times,
did not escape captivity and also came to be con-
sidered prisoners of war due to the nature of the
struggle in defence of Catholicism of the resist-
ance or being collaborators with it.
As has been said, the context of the resist-
ance had an irregular character. This fact in itself
gives two types of captives, for being military or
irregular forces, before or after the capitulation.
With this and at a general level, among the g-
ures that we detect as captives, we must differen-
tiate between combatants and civilians. The rst,
on both sides (something evident), among which
there were even those who changed ranks. Among
the latter, apart from collaborators with the strug-
gle, those who depended on the grace measures of
their captors and the archbishop for their mainte-
nance. One should also refer to the gure of the
hostage, who was used as a guarantor of agree-
ments, measures of good faith, pressure on the
enemy or even as a messenger.
It should be also noted that, despite the tak-
ing of the city, the British did not get control of
the area, being the correspondence between rebels
and captives a good proof of this.
It is also signicant that the clerics within the
walls could be considered traitors due to the atti-
tude of the rebels. It is understood, therefore, that
a captive, having accepted his condition, should
maintain order and not help the resistance, be-

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cause then he is a traitor. And no matter whether
he is a man of God or not in such a considera-
tion. The question is to whom, since it would be to
continue with the resistance. Therefore, it would
be to the King of England for breaking his word
and, equally, to his own monarch as guarantor of
his honour.
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