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Do family companies invest more in internal audit function (IAF) than non-family companies?
Abstract
Purpose
Motivated by the growing interest of governance regulators and researchers on internal audit function (IAF), this study examines the influence of family ownership on the levels of investment in IAF.
Design/methodology/approach
A sample of Malaysian listed companies for the period 2009 to 2016 is used. To test our hypothesis, the authors use pooled panel data regression based on two-way cluster-robust standard errors (firm and year).
Findings
The findings show that family ownership is negatively related to investment in IAF; in particular, investment in IAF is lower for family companies than non-family companies.
Originality/value
This study contributes to existing knowledge of IAF, and it provides significant insights for regulators and managers into the variation in governance structures between family and non-family companies, particularly in emerging markets in which substantial family ownership is common.
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The worldwide spread of the coronavirus COVID-19 has significant effects on financial markets and companies, causing an unprecedented level of uncertainty in reporting and auditing companies’ financial statements. This study explores whether and how COVID-19 affects audit fees.
Using a sample of 268 firm-year observations from the Omani capital market between 2017 and 2020, the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with a robust standard error is applied to answer the research question of this study.
We find that the pandemic has a significant and positive association with audit fees and abnormal audit fees. This finding suggests that the threat of risk, complexity and legal liability circumstances resulting from the pandemic can be compensated for charging higher audit fees. In addition, we provide evidence that Big4 audit firms are those most responding to COVID-19 by charging higher audit fees. Finally, we conclude that large companies are less sensitive to the pandemic.
Users of financial reports and audit firms should anticipate changes in the audit efforts resulting in increased audit fees during COVID-19. Thus, this paper may guide practitioners and businesses in determining the audit fees and associated costs of any potential pandemic.
Our results are among the earliest empirical insights into the effect of COVID-19 on audit fees in Oman.
Attracting institutional shareholders in stock markets has drawn the attention of financial market regulators and researchers. Globally, governments are trying to attract institutional investors by reducing information asymmetry and improving governance and transparency, in order to produce a high-quality financial reporting system. Hence, this study investigates the impact of financial reporting systems quality (FRSQ) on institutional ownership. It uses all non-financial listed companies on Bursa Malaysia over the period 2009–2016. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression based on two-way cluster-robust standard errors (firm and year) is used to achieve the objective of the study. The findings show a positive relationship between institutional ownership and FRSQ, suggesting that institutional investors prefer to invest in a firm that has effective FRS. The study differs from previous research in terms of capturing the FRSQ based on a wider set of governance attributes, namely audit committee characteristics (size, independence, diligence and expertise), internal audit function (IAF) cost and sourcing arrangements, and external auditors’ attributes (audit fees, industry auditor specialist, auditor’s reputation and size) that are yet to be examined in either developed or developing countries. It offers insights for regulators in Malaysia and other emerging economies which are in the process of undertaking regulatory reforms in their corporate governance structure. Managers could learn which aspects of corporate governance should be considered to keep their firm in a strong position in terms of its ability to attract institutional investors.
In this study, we provide empirical evidence on how the relationship between industry specialist auditors and real earnings management (REM) is moderated by the auditors' independence. From a sample of Malaysian listed companies for the period 2009 to 2016, the results indicate that companies with specialist auditors are less likely to practise REM. However, this negative association is less pronounced when the independence of the specialist auditor is low, suggesting that the presence of economic bonding between the specialist auditor and the client may allow the auditor to become sufficiently lax to align with the interests of an economically important auditee. Our findings remain robust after controlling for endogeneity and self-selection bias and performing several further analyses. This study is the first to prove that auditor independence can moderate the effectiveness of industry specialist auditors in mitigating REM practices. The results have implications for policy makers to enhance the current regulation structure of auditing and accounting professions. The results also provide new insights into the association between audit quality, REM, and auditor independence in an emerging economy.
The internal audit function (IAF) has become one of the main pillars of good corporate governance. Empirical findings show that the size of the IAF varies considerably across companies. This study analyzes the relationships between selected company characteristics as determinants of intra-company information asymmetries and the size of the IAF as an indicator of intra-company monitoring. We test these relationships by analyzing comprehensive survey data obtained from chief audit executives from 283 Austrian, German, and Swiss companies. Using a nonparametric regression approach, we identify significant nonlinear relationships between company characteristics and IAF size. The empirical analysis identifies threshold levels for several metric company characteristics, such as the number of employees and the number of subsidiaries, whose relationships with the size of the IAF change its intensity.
Purpose
This study aims to investigate the monitoring role of internal audit function (IAF) on real earnings management (REM) practices. It examines the effect of investment in IAF (IIAF) and IAF sourcing arrangements on REM, unlike prior literature which has mainly examined the effects of IIAF on accrual-based earnings management.
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses a sample of 1,056 observations from an emerging market, Malaysia, between 2013 and 2016. Feasible generalised least square (FGLS) regression is used to analyse the data. To corroborate the results of this study, the authors use an ordinary least square (OLS) regression model with robust standard errors adjusted and also consider alternative REM measures.
Findings
The results of this study suggest that IIAF has a significant negative relationship with REM practices. Further, in-house IAF sourcing has a significant negative association with REM. The additional analysis supports the main results confirming the essential role of IAF in reducing REM in the Malaysian market.
Practical implications
The evidence relates to the important role of IAF in mitigating REM practices. High-quality of IAF impairs managers’ ability to manage earnings in their own interests. The findings may be useful in informing regulators, managers, shareholders and other investors, as well as researchers, about improving the role of IAF.
Originality/value
This study contributes to the existing literature by providing the first evidence of the significant role of IIAF and IAF sourcing arrangements in mitigating REM in an emerging country.
This paper compares real earnings management (REM) between Chinese family firms and U.S. family firms after the financial crisis of 2008. For the U.S. sample, there is greater REM in family firms than non-family firms, and in the post-financial crisis period than the pre-financial crisis period. For the Chinese sample, there is greater REM in family firms than non-family firms, but REM is lower in Chinese family firms relative to non-family firms in the post-financial crisis period than the pre-financial crisis period. These findings indicate that REM activities differ between U.S. and Chinese family firms in crisis and non-crisis periods.
An audit committee is viewed as an essential self-regulatory internal governance instrument that is expected to provide an overseeing role over the entire process of financial reporting. It is also one of the corporate governance cornerstones that is essential for the effective monitoring of the operating performance of internal control. To ensure its effectiveness, the audit committee monitors the resources available to the internal audit, and internal control functions should be directly reported to the audit committee. This study is set out to explore the effect of audit committee characteristics on internal audit budget in Malaysia, where data on internal audit budget is available and how well audit committee monitors the internal audit function is questionable. Our study also opens the door to an unanswered question, that is, whether audit committee effectiveness is related to internal audit budget. Data of 96 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia for a three-year period, 2012-2014, was utilized to achieve this end. The results show that audit committee meeting and index are significantly and positively associated with internal audit budget. They also indicate that audit committee tenure has a significant and negative impact on internal audit budget. The findings of the study support the recent policy initiatives in relation to audit committee and internal audit.
The internal audit literature suggests that firms can gain significant added value from internal audit in terms of improving governance processes, reducing audit fees, and detecting fraud. Nonetheless, not all firms use internal audit. A growing literature examining the determinants of internal audit has identified a number of different determinants, such as firm size, strong commitment to risk management, existence of an audit committee, and an independent board chair. This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining the effects of ownership structure on the voluntary use of internal audit. The logistic regression model of this study is based on data from 107 firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. It shows that ownership structure is a significant determinant of internal audit. Specifically, the paper shows that foreign ownership, dispersed ownership, and state ownership increase the likelihood of a firm using internal audit.
Governance regulators currently place great emphasis on ensuring the presence of financial expertise on audit committees (Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002; UK Corporate Governance Code 2010–2016). Underlying this is a belief that greater expertise enhances the effectiveness of audit committees and, by extension, the quality of the external audit. This study investigates the impact of audit committee expertise on one measure of audit quality - audit fees paid by FTSE350 companies. Our analysis finds that audit committees possessing greater levels of financial expertise are associated with higher audit fees. When we segregate financial expertise between accounting and non-accounting, we find that the positive impact identified is driven by non-accounting expertise. Furthermore, when we separate FTSE100 and FTSE250 firms we find the impact of financial expertise is confined to FTSE250 firms. Our findings are important as they highlight the usefulness of segregating financial expertise between specialists and non-specialists, something which regulators in the UK and in the USA currently do not do. Our findings also highlight the potential value of audit committee expertise in smaller as opposed to larger listed firms, suggesting that the value of expertise to audit quality depends on the specific financial reporting challenges firms face
This study empirically examines the relationship between wide-ranging board diversity and the quality of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure variables in Malaysia. We extend prior literature covering broader dimensions of board diversity (e.g., gender, education level, education background, age, tenure, nationality and ethnicity) and their impact on CSR after controlling for board and audit committee characteristics. Using 200 listed firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2009–2013 and applying both OLS and 2SLS instrumental variables (IV) approaches, we document significant positive effect of board education level and board tenure diversity on the quality of CSR disclosure. Further analysis using robust regression also shows positive association between gender diversity and CSR disclosure. Our findings also demonstrate that the quality of CSR disclosure is significantly negatively associated with board age and nationality diversity. These results remain consistent with using alternative measures for board diversity, and characteristics for board of director and audit committees as well as split samples between large and small firms. Additional tests exhibit complementary relationship of education level and nationality with gender, while substitutive relationship of age and tenure with gender in influencing CSR. These findings provide useful insights into the policy makers in setting regulations in respect of board diversity in Malaysia and other emerging economies in the Asian region. Our evidence is also useful for listed companies in setting the criteria to identify directors who can support their strategic decisions.
Despite the dominance of family-owned publicly listed companies in developing economies, prior research has paid relatively little attention to this area and the socio-economic context of these countries has been mostly ignored. This study contributes to the accounting literature by providing empirical evidence of the effects of family control and ownership on audit pricing and auditor choice in a developing economy context. Using 1058 firm-year observations of publicly listed companies in Bangladesh, where family firms are the most dominant form of public companies, we find that in comparison with non-family firms, our sample family firms pay significantly lower audit fees and choose lower quality auditors. However, for export-oriented industries, family firms seem to pay significantly higher audit fees and recruit better quality auditors compared to non-family firms. Collectively, our findings have important implications for audit markets in emerging economies in which the sustainability of family firms is crucial for overall economic development.
Purpose
– The purpose of this paper is to provide a synopsis of what academic literature says about internal audit (IA) effectiveness ten years after Bailey et al. (2003) presented research opportunities in IA. A new set of research questions that may help to bring the best out of IA is proposed.
Design/methodology/approach
– Empirical studies based on internal auditors’ self-assessments (“inside-out”) and empirical studies based on other stakeholders’ perspectives (“outside-in”) are reviewed through an “effectiveness lens”. The “outside-in” perspective is regarded as particularly valuable.
Findings
– First, common themes in the empirical literature are identified. Second, the main threads into a model comprising macro and micro factors that influence IA effectiveness are synthesized. Third, promising future research paths that may enhance IA's value proposition were derived.
Practical implications
– The “outside-in” perspective indicates a disposition to stakeholders’ disappointment in IA: IA is either running a risk of marginalization (IIA, 2013; PWC, 2013) or has to embrace the challenge to emerge as a recognized and stronger profession. The suggested research agenda identifies empirical research threads that can help IA practitioners to make a difference for their organization, be recognized, respected and trusted and help the IA profession in its pursuit of creating a unique identity. This paper wishes to motivate researchers to explore innovative research strategies and probe new theories, as well as benefit from cross-fertilization with other research streams.
Originality/value
– This paper summarizes the state of research on IA effectiveness and proposes a guide for future IA research. It provides pointed questions that may further advance the understanding of what constitutes IA and how IA can enhance its value proposition.
This study examines the association between audit committee characteristics and audit fees, using data gathered under the recent SEC fee disclosure rules. We hypothesize that audit fees will be positively associated with audit committee independence, financial expertise, and meeting frequency. We examine a sample of 492 nonregulated, Big 5-audited firms that filed proxy statements with the SEC in the period from February 5, 2001 to June 30, 2001. We find that audit committee independence (defined as an audit committee comprised entirely of outside, independent directors) and financial expertise (defined as an audit committee containing at least one member with financial expertise) are significantly, positively associated with audit fees. This is in contrast to the findings of Carcello et al. (2002a), who find that audit committee characteristics are not significant in the presence of board-related variables. Meeting frequency (defined as an audit committee that meets at least four times annually) was not associated with higher audit fees at conventional levels. This evidence is consistent with audit committees taking actions within their span of control to ensure a higher level of audit coverage.
Internal auditing has been the focus of much attention in recent years. This study examines factors associated with U.S. public companies' investment in internal auditing. Data from a survey administered to Chief Audit Executives of mid-sized U.S. public companies were supplemented with publicly available data. Based on data from 217 companies, the results indicate that total internal audit budgets (in-house plus outsourced portions) are related to several factors associated with company risk, ability to pay for monitoring, and auditing characteristics. Specifically, we find evidence that internal audit budgets are positively related to company size, leverage, financial, service, and utility industries, relative amount of inventory, operating cash flows, and audit committee review of the internal audit budget. Total internal audit budgets are negatively related to the percentage of internal auditing that is outsourced. This study contributes to our understanding of internal audit services, and it allows companies to benchmark their investment in internal auditing.
Previous studies generally suggest that internal control and external auditing can substitute for each other, so that better internal control will be associated with lower audit fees. However, their empirical results do not support this view. In contrast, previous studies of the interaction between corporate governance and external audit services often assume that they are complementary, and that improved governance is associated with higher audit fees, although the evidence about this issue is also mixed. We examine whether the ‘substitution’ or ‘complementary controls’ views apply. We find that measures of internal auditing, corporate governance, and concentration of ownership are all positively related to audit fees, consistent with the explanation that controls are complementary. The study makes a contribution by assisting regulators in understanding the effects of regulation of corporate governance, and by showing auditors and auditing standard setters that the view that internal controls can substitute for external auditing may not be helpful. We also find that these relationships hold only in a relatively less regulated environment.
This paper studies the factors associated with organizations’ internal audit sourcing decisions, building from a previous study by Widener and Selto (henceforth W&S) [Widener, S.K., Selto, F.H., 1999. Management control systems and boundaries of the firm: why do firms outsource internal audit activities? J. Manage. Account. Res. 11, 45–73]. In their study, W&S used Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to explain the governance of internal auditing. Our study seeks to replicate their results, using newly collected data from 66 companies headquartered in the Netherlands. Our findings are supportive of W&S. Like W&S, we find asset specificity and frequency (both individually and in interaction) to be significantly associated with sourcing decisions. These findings are robust against different model specifications, and they hold across variously defined samples. We conclude that the W&S results are reproducible in different conditions, enhancing the credibility of the TCE-based explanation of organizations’ internal audit sourcing practices.
This article examines the relation between internal audit function (IAF) quality and investment efficiency, a recurring value-added corporate activity critical to firm survival and profitability. We argue that an IAF, unlike other information intermediaries, is uniquely positioned to have access to firm-specific, private information—particularly related to localized, firm-specific risks. If a more competent IAF incrementally improves the information that is generated and communicated to management (while not participating directly in decision-making), we should observe more productive capital investment decisions from firms with higher quality IAFs relative to firms with lower quality IAFs. Through this enhanced information channel, we find that IAF quality is associated with investment efficiency. This result holds for both under- and overinvestment, although not in tests of all subsamples. We also document that this effect is more pronounced for firms with more complexity and for firms with greater investment opportunities. Our evidence indicates that IAF quality provides measurable and economically meaningful value to an organization.
In this study, we extend the scarce literature on audit committee leadership by examining the internal auditing outcomes of audit committee chair overlap as measured by multiple committees of the same board the audit committee chair serves on and the financial expertise of the audit committee chair. Theoretical tension exists (busyness or overcommitment versus knowledge spillover theory) about whether overlapping membership of the audit committee chair can enhance or weaken monitoring effectiveness. We leverage the 2014 annual report disclosures of the internal audit practices for a sample of the top 100 nonfinancial firms in Malaysia. Our results indicate that overlapping membership of the audit committee chair is associated with poor internal audit practices, especially the absence of disclosure on compliance with the International Professional Practices Framework and the existence of internal audit charter. In addition, we find that audit committee chair financial expertise is more likely to be associated with the adoption of risk-based internal auditing practices.
Purpose
Responding to the call for research into the behavior of family companies to provide better understanding of corporate governance, this paper aims to examine the impact of boards’ effectiveness on the investment in monitoring costs (i.e. audit fees, internal audit function budget and executive remuneration) and how this relationship is moderated by family control.
Design/methodology/approach
A sample of 2,176 firm-year observations of Malaysian listed companies is used. The ordinary least square regression is used to examine the associations. Additional sensitivity tests are performed.
Findings
The study finds that there is no relationship between boards’ effectiveness and the demand for monitoring costs for the full sample. However, the findings of sub-samples (family and non-family companies) indicate that a family company with an effective board is less likely to invest more in monitoring, suggesting that the complementary association between the board’s effectiveness and investment in monitoring is a more dominant relationship than the substitution relationship in non-family companies. These findings show that the boards of directors of Malaysian family companies perform a deficient monitoring role, where the presence of family controlling shareholders in management may reduce their independence and efficiency in performing their monitoring role. The findings remain robust after performing additional sensitivity tests.
Originality/value
This paper contributes to the literature on corporate governance in a unique setting (family companies), where conflict of interest is created between controlling insiders and minority shareholders (Type II agency problem). It provides insight for Malaysian policymakers in assessing the issue of expropriation in family companies and enhancing the policy related to its boards.
The aim of this study is to investigate how the board of directors, audit committee (AC), external auditor and management explain the outsourced internal audit function (IAF) practice. Although prior studies provide some insights into the determinants of IAF, we have little understanding of how their characteristics are associated with outsourced IAF. Using 767 observations from an emerging market, we find that board independence and AC accounting expertise are negatively associated with outsourced IAF. We also observe a positive association between board expertise, AC independence, CEO with accounting expertise, and the size of the external audit firm and outsourced IAF. Corroborating these findings, additional tests show that the type of outsourced IAF provider, either big4 or non-big4, plays a significant role in these associations. We also extend the recent literature on the governance role of an AC chair with accounting expertise and report that a chair with accounting expertise is associated with outsourced IAF if the provider is a big4 audit firm. These findings may serve a large number of stakeholders who are interested in audit practices in general and IAF practices in particular.
Purpose
This study is motivated by the lack of internal audit function (IAF) research and by the call for research on the impact of dominant owners such as family shareholders on audit fees and the demand for audit quality. This study aims to examine the impact of the IAF budget on the selection of industry-specialist auditors and on audit fees, particularly in companies with family-controlled shareholders, a feature unique to Malaysia.
Design/methodology/approach
Data of Malaysian-listed companies during the period 2009-2012 are used. To examine the relationships, logit and ordinary least square regressions are used. Several additional analyses are conducted to assess the robustness of the main results, including alternative measures of specialist auditor and family ownership, endogeneity problems and self-selection bias.
Findings
The results show that the IAF budget is positively related to hiring industry-specialist auditors and audit fees. However, family companies are less likely to support the positive association between IAF costs and engage specialist auditors than non-family companies. In addition, a complementary association between the costs of IAF and audit fees for both family and non-family companies was found. Finally, the results show that there is a negative association between family ownership and the ratio of IAF costs to audit fees, suggesting that family companies rely more upon external auditing than internal auditing.
Originality/value
The contribution of this study is to provide an empirical evidence about the tradeoff between IAF and both industry-specialist auditors and audit fees with considering the moderating impact of family-ownership shareholdings. This issue is yet to be examined, and it provides implications for policymakers and practitioners, as it offers insights into the importance of investing in IAF toward hiring industry-specialist auditors and pricing the audit services.
This structured literature review adopts a multimethod and multitheoretical approach to identify current knowledge about internal audit as well as related knowledge gaps. To that end, it provides an overview of post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act literature, organizing it under three themes: the multiple roles of internal audit, internal audit quality (IAQ), and the practice of internal audit. Despite the volume of literature published during the period covered by this review (2005 to mid-2017), the first two themes are still in development, while the third is emergent. We suggest research avenues to fill the following main gaps: (i) Given differing opinions about the expected or actual roles of internal audit, prior literature infers that the internal audit function has become the “jack of all trades” of governance, but does not clearly capture its actual roles. (ii) The viewpoint of external auditors has dominated IAQ research, leading to a misunderstanding of how actors with greater stakes in the practice of internal audit conceptualize and evaluate IAQ. (iii) Knowledge of the actual practice of internal audit and its accountability and ethical issues is fragmentary, therefore the literature's current picture of internal audit is far from comprehensive.
Purpose
This study is motivated by the competing views on whether internal governance mechanisms complement or substitute for external auditing, and how this association is affected by ownership concentration. The complementary view predicts that good internal governance mechanisms are related to high-quality audit. On the other hand, corporate governance mechanisms may be substituted for each other, so more investment in governance mechanisms leads to less investment in external auditing. Therefore, this study aims to examine the association between internal governance mechanisms and the demand for audit quality.
Design/methodology/approach
Data from Malaysian listed companies during the period 2009 to 2012 are used. Ordinary least square (OLS) regression is applied to analyse the data.
Findings
Companies with a higher concentration of ownership are less likely to demand extensive auditing. In addition, the study provides supporting evidence for the complementary association between a company’s governance and audit fees. However, the ownership concentration plays a minor role in the positive association between internal corporate governance and audit quality. Further tests are conducted and support the main findings.
Practical implications
Significant implications are provided for the audit profession in emerging economies, where concentrated ownership is common, to help policymakers and regulators in determining the power of controlling shareholders on audit quality and firm’s governance. The study’s findings open up avenues for further research.
Originality/value
This is the first work to address the role of ownership concentration in the association between corporate governance and audit quality; it suggests that the ownership structure must be considered in examining the effectiveness of corporate governance. The study also provides a comprehensive combination of internal governance mechanisms.
Based on agency theory, this study analyzes whether family firms are more compliant with corporate governance recommendations than non-family firms in the context of emerging markets. Using a unique sample of 826 observations of the highest ranked companies on the stock exchange indices of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico during the period 2004-2010, we hypothesize that family firms may adopt better corporate governance practices to substitute for the absence or inefficiency of a regulatory system and to mitigate the agency problem between majority and minority shareholders. Additionally, we propose a corporate governance compliance index considering the legal and institutional framework of the region. The empirical results indicate that family firms report a higher corporate governance index. We find that board composition (independence, size and COB-CEO duality) does not moderate corporate governance compliance of family firms but rather such variables have a direct effect on the corporate governance index.
The effectiveness of the internal audit function is important to improve performance in the public sector. This study provides insight into the drivers and measures of internal audit effectiveness. The heads of the internal audit function, senior management of public institutions and chairpersons of the audit committee, within a South African public sector context, responded to a survey based on an extensive review of the internal audit function. Exploratory factor analysis was applied to facilitate the reduction of 92 items into a meaningful number of independent (drivers) and dependent (measures) variables. The result of the study identifies a refined list of drivers and measures of internal audit effectiveness that adds to existing knowledge and presents a foundation for further research.
While the value of external audits was long considered to be minimal for private family firms, some exceptional studies indicate that external audits are demanded by these firms to reduce the agency conflicts between family and non-family members. Using a sample of Belgian private family firms, this study empirically shows that (high quality) auditors are also hired to mitigate agency conflicts among family members. Since these intrafamily agency conflicts are mainly based on emotions instead of economically rational behavior and are therefore difficult to grasp by compositional proxies, they are identified by the level of family cohesion. Moreover, this study shows that the monitoring effectiveness of the board of directors weakens the association between the level of intrafamily agency conflicts and audit (quality) demand, indicating that the audit demand effect of intrafamily agency conflicts decreases when family firms are able to reduce the related agency costs internally.
This study investigates the association between family ownership and the relative level of nonaudit service (NAS) fees paid to the incumbent auditors by public companies. Using data from S&P 1500 firms during the post-SOX period 2002-2010, the study shows that the NAS fee ratio (the NAS fees relative to the total of audit and NAS fees) is higher for family firms than non-family firms. The results suggest that family owners' close monitoring of their firms reduces the information asymmetry and agency problems between shareholders and managers, and as a result family firms tend to purchase more NAS from their auditors to appreciate the potential benefits of the auditors' knowledge spillovers. Additional analysis demonstrates that the positive association between family ownership and the NAS fee ratio is particularly pronounced for family firms without dual-class shares and for those with non-family-member CEOs.
We examine three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of 702 newly appointed outside directors assigned to audit committees during a period before implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Motivated by the SOX requirement that public companies disclose whether they have a financial expert on their audit committee, we test whether the market reacts favorably to the appointment of directors with financial expertise to the audit committee. In addition, because it is controversial whether SOX should define financial experts narrowly to include primarily accounting financial experts (as initially proposed) or more broadly to include nonaccounting financial experts (as ultimately passed), we separately examine appointments of each type of expert. We find a positive market reaction to the appointment of accounting financial experts assigned to audit committees but no reaction to nonaccounting financial experts assigned to audit committees, consistent with accounting-based financial skills, but not broader financial skills, improving the audit committee's ability to ensure high-quality financial reporting. In addition, we find that this positive reaction is concentrated among firms with relatively strong corporate governance, consistent with accounting financial expertise complementing strong governance, possibly because strong governance helps channel the expertise toward enhancing shareholder value. Together, these findings are consistent with financial expertise on audit committees improving corporate governance but only when both the expert and the appointing firm possess characteristics that facilitate the effective use of the expertise.
Family firms are characterized by less separation between ownership and control (Type 1 agency problem), but greater conflict of interest between controlling insiders and non-controlling outside investors (Type 2 agency problem). Although strong board governance is known to decrease the Type 1 agency problem, its effectiveness in mitigating the adverse consequences of the Type 2 agency problem has not been well documented in the literature. We show that strongly governed family firms are more likely to choose specialist auditors and exhibit higher earnings quality than nonfamily firms. Weakly governed family firms demand lower audit effort and exhibit earnings quality that is no different from that of nonfamily firms. Within family firms, we show that strongly governed family firms choose higher quality audits in the form of a greater use of specialist auditors and higher audit efforts, and exhibit higher earnings quality than other family firms. These findings provide consistent evidence that strong board governance can effectively mitigate the adverse consequences of the Type 2 agency problem on financial reporting and transparency in family firms.
Data Availability: The data used are available from the public sources identified in the study.
We examine auditor choice and audit fees in family firms using data from Standard & Poor's (S&P) 1500 firms. We find that, compared to non-family firms, family firms are less likely to hire top-tier auditors due to the less severe agency problems between owners and managers. Our results also show that family firms, on average, incur lower audit fees than non-family firms, which is driven by family firms' lower demand for external auditing services and auditors' perceived lower audit risk for family firms. Our additional analysis indicates that the tendency of family firms to hire non-toptier auditors and to pay lower audit fees is stronger when family owners actively monitor their firms.
We examine the effects of family firms on real earnings management (REM) and accrual-based earnings management (ABEM). Using socioemotional wealth as a theoretical framework and considering the different implications of REM and ABEM on family firms' transgenerational sustainability, we hypothesise and find for a sample of 402 German listed family firms during 1998–2008 that family firms engage less in REM and exhibit more earnings-decreasing ABEM policies as compared to a sample of 436 non-family firms. We further provide evidence that family firms as compared to non-family firms treat REM and ABEM as substitute rather than complementary tools for earnings management. Overall, our findings suggest that family firms use earnings management activities strategically, avoiding those that inhibit the firm's long-term value (i.e. REM) and engaging in those that help families retain transgenerational control (i.e. ABEM).
There has been growing recognition in recent years of the importance of corporate governance in ensuring sound financial reporting and deterring fraud. The audit serves as a monitoring device and is thus part of the corporate governance mosaic. The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of various corporate governance factors, such as the board of directors and the audit committee, on the audit process. Importantly, there is little professional guidance on how auditors should consider such factors when formulating an appropriate audit strategy, and there has been only one prior study on this issue (Cohen and Hanno 2000). Because there are no current specific auditing standards that relate to the effect of corporate governance on the audit process, we conducted a semi-structured interview with 36 auditors on current audit practices in considering corporate governance in the audit process. Reflecting on client experiences, auditors indicate a range of views with regard to the elements included in the rubric of “corporate governance”. Most significantly, auditors view management as the primary driver of corporate governance. The inclusion of top management in the “corporate governance mosaic” is inconsistent with agency theory's prescription of the board and other mechanisms serving as a means to independently oversee management's actions to protect stakeholders. Auditors consider corporate governance factors to be especially important in the client acceptance phase and in an international context. Further, despite the attention placed on the audit committee in the academic literature, in the business community, and by regulators in different countries (e.g., Canada, United States, Australia), several respondents indicated that their experiences with their clients suggest that audit committees are typically ineffective and lack sufficient power to be a strong governance mechanism. Implications for research and practice are presented.
A long-recognized phenomenon in capital markets is the underinvestment in foreign equity securities, known as equity home bias. Our study examines the effect of board independence on the firms’ ability to attract foreign equity capital. After accounting for potential endogeneity, we document that U.S. and non-U.S. foreign investors exhibit a strong preference for firms with more independent corporate boards. Further, our analysis indicates that the positive relation between board independence and foreign ownership is significantly stronger in countries with less developed legal institutions and poor external protection of investor rights. We suggest that it is in these countries that firm-determined characteristics such as independent boards can be most beneficial in attracting capital. We also find that institutional investors are more responsive to the impact of independent corporate boards than are other types of investors.
Previous research has illustrated the importance of family businesses and significant differences between family and nonfamily businesses. Such differences will likely affect auditing for family versus nonfamily businesses. The authors emphasize experimental research labeled as “audit judgment and decision making research.” They argue that some aspects of people, tasks, and environment are different between family and nonfamily businesses and that these differences affect auditor judgments. A range of theoretical frameworks applicable to auditing research related to family businesses are considered. The authors suggest potential research opportunities related to auditor judgments, auditor—client negotiations, the demand for auditing, audit quality, corporate governance, and internal audit.
In emerging markets, the agency conflicts between controlling owners and the minority shareholders are difficult to mitigate through conventional corporate control mechanisms such as boards of directors and takeovers. We examine whether external independent auditors are employed as monitors or as bonding mechanisms, or both, to alleviate the agency problems. Using a broad sample from eight East Asian economies, we document that firms with agency problems embedded in the ownership structures are more likely to employ Big 5 auditors. This relation is evident among firms that raise equity capital frequently. Consistently, firms hiring Big 5 auditors receive smaller share price discounts associated with the agency conflicts. Also, we find that Big 5 auditors take into consideration their clients' agency problems when making audit fee and audit report decisions. Taken together, these results suggest that Big 5 auditors do have a corporate governance role in emerging markets.
Agency theory is extensively employed in the accounting literature to explain and predict the appointment and performance of external auditors. Argues that agency theory also provides a useful theoretical framework for the study of the internal auditing function. Proposes that agency theory not only helps to explain and predict the existence of internal audit but that it also helps to explain the role and responsibilities assigned to internal auditors by the organization, and that agency theory predicts how the internal audit function is likely to be affected by organizational change. Concludes that agency theory provides a basis for rich research which can benefit both the academic community and the internal auditing profession.
This paper investigates whether the financial reporting practices of family firms differ from non-family firms. Results indicate family firms have lower absolute discretionary accruals, report fewer small positive earnings surprises compared to non-family firms, have more informative earnings and have less earnings restatements relative to non-family firms. Overall, the findings indicate that the financial reporting practices of family firms are of better quality than those of non-family firms. Better quality financial reporting practices in family firms is consistent with a long-run investment horizon, reputation concerns and better monitoring of managers, and is indicative of less opportunistic rent extraction.
This paper uses institutional theory to interpret the results of two questionnaires and research interviews concerned with internal audit in the Saudi Arabian corporate sector. The results show that internal audit is not well developed. Where it does exist it operates in departments that are inadequately resourced, lack qualified staff, have restrictions on their degree of independence, concentrate on compliance audit rather than performance audit, and where internal auditors are not accepted by management and auditees. Using institutional theory it is suggested that the state should play a more coercive role by encouraging organizations to establish internal audit departments and organize their activities in the manner specified in internal audit standards.
The objective of this paper is to provide a more comprehensive view of corporate governance than that considered by the traditional agency literature predominately employed in auditing and accounting studies of governance. Specifically, we discuss three widely recognized additional theoretical perspectives: resource dependence, managerial hegemony, and institutional theory. Resource dependence is developed in the strategic management literature and focuses on the contribution of governance mechanisms as a vehicle to help a firm achieve or further its strategic objectives. In contrast with the agency and resource dependence perspectives which offer a functional view of governance, the managerial hegemony perspective views the board and its attendant committees as being under the control of management and hence could be potentially viewed as dysfunctional from a stakeholder viewpoint. Finally, institutional theory, developed in the sociology of organizations and organizational behavior literatures, suggests that it is necessary to understand the substance of the interactions between different governance parties and how these parties use at times symbolic gestures and activities to maintain their form to all relevant parties. Although the value of using multiple theoretical perspectives with respect to governance has been well recognized in the economics and behavioral literatures, this is the first paper that we are aware of that examines the effect of using alternative theories of governance on auditing issues that are influenced by the governance structure of a firm. In addition, we examine how these theories provide a useful basis for reconciling conflicting findings in the existing agency-based audit-related governance literature. Finally, we provide examples of how these alternative theories provide important new insights to issues in auditing research and practice.
This research identifies those characteristics that could potentially influence a choice to create an internal audit department and tests via discriminant analysis to evaluate whether such attributes significantly distinguish between companies with and without an internal audit department. In addition, qualitative characteristics of such departments are described, as is the association of such traits with errors and the overall control environment.
A sample of 260 companies is examined. Companies with internal audit departments are observed to be significantly larger, more highly regulated, more competitive, more profitable, more liquid, more conservative in accounting policies, more competent in their management and accounting personnel, and subject to better management controls. Key discriminant variables are the degree of regulation, decentralization, size, the duration of association with present auditors, the existence of an audit committee, EDP control, and pressures by external parties on management to achieve budgetary goals.
Qualitative attributes of internal audit are systematically associated with the overall quality of the control environment, as well as errors. The most important attribute appears to be the independence of internal audit in terms of the propriety of the reporting level. An advantage of internal auditing is that external auditors report a 10 percent reduction in the number of hours incurred and greater flexibility appears to exist in the proportion of work performed in off-peak periods.
Résumé. Les auteurs dressent l'inventaire des caractéristiques susceptibles d'influer sur le choix de créer un service de vérification interne et soumettent ces attributs à des tests, par voie d'analyse discriminante, afin de déterminer s'ils permettent d'établir une distinction claire entre les entreprises ayant et n'ayant pas de service de vérification interne. De plus, ils décrivent les caractéristiques qualitatives de ces services, de même que l'association de ces carctéristiques aux erreurs et au contexte global du contrôle.
Les auteurs procèdent à l'examen d'un échantillon de 260 entreprises. L'étude révèle que les entreprises possédant des services de vérification interne sont beaucoup plus souvent des entreprises de grande taille, faisant l'objet d'une réglementation plus rigoureuse, plus concurrentielles, plus rentables, ayant davantage de liquidités, plus prudentes dans leurs conventions compatables, possédant une équipe de gestion et un personnel comptable plus compétents et soumises à de meilleurs contrôles de gestion. Les principales variables discriminantes sont le degré de réglementation, la décentralisation, la taille, la durée de l'association avec les vérificateurs actuels, l'existence d'un comité de vérification, le contrôle dans un cadre informatique et les pressions exercées par les tiers sur la direction pour l'atteinte des objectifs budgétaires.
Les attributs qualitatifs de la vérification interne sont systématiquement asociés à la qualité globale du cadre de contrôle, de même qu'aux erreurs. L'attribut le plus important semble être le degré d'autonomie du service de vérification interne, c'est-à-dire le caractère approprié de ses liens hiérarchiques. La vérification interne comporte un avantage: les vérificateurs externes font état d'une réduction de 10 pour cent dans le nombre d'heures consacrées à la vérification, et il semble exister une plus grande souplesse dans la proportion du travail de vérification effectué en dehors des périodes de pointe.
This study investigates (1) whether agency variables are associated with the relative size of the internal audit function (IAF); (2) whether the IAF is complementary to other monitoring mechanisms such as independent board members and an active audit committee; and (3) the impact of the control environment on the relative size of the IAF. We use data from a sample of Belgian firms. We find evidence of a monitoring role for the IAF in corporate governance. Specifically, the relative IAF size is positively related to management share ownership. Also, we find evidence for a substitution effect between independent board members and the IAF. Finally, it turns out that a supportive control environment also has a positive impact on the relative size of the IAF. Our results can benefit companies interested in assessing the current size of their IAF and the role that it can play in corporate governance.
We examine changes in internal auditing during the time of the Enron and WorldCom disasters and the related legislative and media focus on internal control and corporate governance. Data gathered from 271 mid-sized US public companies reveal that internal audit budgets, staffing levels, meetings with the audit committee, and meeting length increased markedly during this time. Regression analyses provide some evidence of (a) larger budget increases among smaller companies, (b) larger budget and staff increases in companies with greater financial resources (i.e., stronger operating cash flows) or with greater liquidity risk (i.e., lower current ratios), and (c) industry differences in the change in internal auditing. We encourage additional research on recent changes in internal auditing, including research in other countries.
Regulators and others recently highlighted the increasingly important role of internal auditing in supporting and interacting with the audit committee to ensure the integrity and quality of financial reporting. Likewise, one of the roles of the audit committee is to oversee the quality of monitoring mechanisms implemented by the firm, which includes the internal audit function. However, our understanding of the relationship between the audit committee and internal auditing is limited. We fill this void by providing the first empirical evidence of the association between audit committee characteristics and the investment in internal auditing. Our analyses, from a sample of 181 SEC registrants, suggest that the investment in internal auditing (internal audit budget) is negatively related to the presence of auditing experts on the committee and the average tenure of audit committee members, but positively related to the number of audit committee meetings (a proxy for audit committee diligence). These observations suggest potential complementary and substitution effects between the audit committee and internal auditing, and thus raise important implications for future research.
We review accounting and finance research on corporate governance (CG). In the course of our review, we focus on a particularly vexing issue, namely endogeneity in the relationships between CG and other matters of concern to accounting and finance scholars, and suggest ways to deal with it. Given the advent of large commercial CG databases, we also stress the importance of how CG is measured and in particular, the construction of CG indices, which should be sensitive to local institutional arrangements, and the need to capture both internal and external aspects of governance. The ‘stickiness’ of CG characteristics provides an additional challenge to CG scholars. Better theory is required, for example, to explain whether various CG practices substitute for each other or are complements. While a multidisciplinary approach to developing better theory is never without its difficulties, it could enrich the current body of knowledge in CG. Despite the vastness of the existing CG literature, these issues do suggest a number of avenues for future research.
The aim of this study is to contribute to the growing literature on the quality of accounting disclosures by family firms by investigating whether the alignment (entrenchment) effect leads to high (low) corporate transparency. Unlike previous studies, this study also examines the relationship between board composition and corporate transparency by distinguishing between the two types of nonexecutive directors, namely independent and affiliated directors. Using the enhanced segment disclosures by Malaysian firms in 2001/2002 as a proxy of corporate transparency, the results indicate that family firms are more inclined to disclose all the required items for the primary basis of segment reporting, consistent with Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan (2007) and Wang (2006). The result also indicates that firms with higher proportion of affiliated directors are more likely to make greater segment disclosures. However, no evidence is found to support the contention that independent directors and institutional investors promote corporate transparency, consistent with previous Malaysian studies.
Using proxy data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994–2000, we find that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm or as Chairman with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Our findings suggest that the classic owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms is more costly than the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-CEO firms. However, the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms.
Instrumental variable (IV) methods are commonly used in accounting research (e.g., earnings management, corporate governance, executive compensation, and disclosure research) when the regressor variables are endogenous. While IV estimation is the standard textbook solution to mitigating endogeneity problems, the appropriateness of IV methods in typical accounting research settings is not obvious. Drawing on recent advances in statistics and econometrics, we identify conditions under which IV methods are preferred to OLS estimates and propose a series of tests for research studies employing IV methods. We illustrate these ideas by examining the relation between corporate disclosure and the cost of capital.