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LIMITATIONS ON THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN THE FACE
OF CORRUPTION SCANDALS AS INSTRUMENTS OF QUASI-
MILITANT DEMOCRACY IN MALTA1
Abstract: In this paper analyses the problem of limiting the freedom of the
press in Malta after published leaks about corruption in public
administration. A turning point was murdering Daphne
Caruana Galizia in 2017, which drew the international
community's attention. The study verifies the following
hypothesis: after disclosing corruption scandals, the ruling elite
decided to use the means characteristic of quasi-militant
democracy to limit the freedom of the press against journalists
who reported that issue and recognized them as enemies of the
state. This measure was used in practice, despite the legal
framework that guarantees the protection of this freedom. The
level of using quasi-militant democracy means to limit
independent media did not decrease after Galicia’s murder,
despite pressure made by international opinion. On the one
hand, this phenomenon is the effect of solid foundations for
legitimizing corruption in domestic policy.
Therefore, public opinion did not seek to disclose abusing power
by journalists. On the other hand, NGOs' failed efforts to
increase the protection of the freedom of the press result from a
lack of efficient measures to improve media freedom. Therefore,
ruling elites only declared changes to calm down international
opinion but, in practice, adopted other, more personal, non-
direct restrictions on independent media. I decided to use quasi-
militant democracy as a theoretical category to explore the
motivations and consequences of limiting the freedom of the
press. The paper’s conclusions will be useful in analyzing
restrictions against independent media in the name of protecting
democratic regimes in semi-consolidated democracy and
explaining the reasons behind this phenomenon.
Keywords: Freedom of the press; media capture in Malta; militant
democracy
1 This paper is a result of the research project Contentious Politics and Neo-Militant
Democracy. It was financially supported by the National Science Centre, Poland [grant
number 2018/31/B/HS5/01410]
Maciej SKRZYPEK
Adam Mickiewicz University Poznań
193
Contact
details of the
authors:
E-mail: maciej.skrzypek@amu.edu.pl
Institutional
affiliation of
the authors:
Adam Mickiewicz University Poznań
Institutions
address:
ul. Wieniawskiego 1, 61-712 Poznań, Poland
Introduction
According to the 2020 Democracy Index drawn up by “The Economist”,
Malta has remained a ”flawed democracy” having an even lower score than the
previous year. Until 2018, Malta was considered a ”full democracy” but dropped
from a score of 8.21 in 2018 to 7.95 in 2019, becoming a ”flawed democracy”. In
the civil liberties category, it scored 8.241. For a better understanding of the
circumstances of the current Maltese political system, it is necessary to outline the
origins of this post-colonial state. The Republic of Malta was proclaimed on
December 13, 1974. It was a turning point in reclaiming independence and ending
control by the British on the island. Malta adopted a policy of neutrality in the
1980s and started liberalizing the country's economy. After the Cold War, Malta
was an economically and politically marginal post-colonial state2, prepared to
access the EU, which was the centre of Maltese political thought. For that purpose,
crucial was the modernization of public administration and governance, especially
in eradicating corruption and clientelist practices, signalled by the EU Commission
in 1993. Therefore, corruption has been recognized as one of the weak points of
young Maltese democracy for years.
Therefore, the Maltese post-colonial political system may be recognized as
semi-consolidated democracy, dealing mostly with public administration
corruption. This challenge is observed in the media system. There is no doubt that
the economic breakdown in 2007–2008 significantly influenced media entities’
economic conditions, especially newspaper outlets3, and strengthened corruption in
1 Kevin Schembri Orland, Malta remains a ”flawed democracy”, gets a lower score in
2020 – Economist report, https://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2021-02-05/local-
news/Malta-remains-a-flawed-democracy-gets-lower-score-in-2020-Economist-report-
6736230761, (7.06.2022)
2 Jon P. Mitchel, Corruption and Clientelism in a ”Systemless System”: The
Europeanization of Maltese Political Culture, in “South European Society and Politics”
Vol. 7, No.1, pp. 43-62
3 Núria Almiron, Journalism in crisis: Corporate media and financialization, Hampton
Press, New York; Wayne Hope, Time, Communication and Financial Collapse, in
“International Journal of Communication”, No. 4, 2010, pp. 649–669; Dwayne Winseck,
Financialization and the “crisis of the media”: The rise and fall of (some) media
conglomerates in Canada, in “Canadian Journal of Communication”, No. 35, pp. 365–393;
Elsa Costa e Silva, Crisis, financialization and regulation: The case of media industries in
194
public space1. Moreover, the recovery of the media after the biggest recession
since 1929–1933 was hindered by another challenge – the coronavirus pandemic –
when advertising expenses were reduced to rescue advertisers’ budgets. During the
last decade, not only economic issues, and declining expenses on advertising in
media had an impact on news outlets. Another challenge was the development of
ICT technologies in social communication, headed by social media. Leading
newspapers around the globe launched web portals to maintain the attention of
their readers. These two challenges became a real danger to the functioning of
independent media based on traditional coverage. Even if some of them used
professionally designed websites, in the digital age, news and the number of
sources grows every day, including outlets based only on duplicating information.
In that situation, owners of leading media, which lost the competition with
Facebook and other giants, decided to sell outlets to domestic government-friendly
oligarchy (e.g., the Czech Republic) or state-owned companies (e.g., Poland),
which was a rescue for their functioning. However, selling these media led to their
politicization, which limited their independence. In the face of declining private
media incomes and reducing the number of workplaces, another issue was that
journalists practiced self-censorship to not publish anything against their
supervisors.
Therefore, this paper analyses the problem of limiting the freedom of the
press in Malta after published leaks about corruption in public administration. A
turning point was murdering Daphne Caruana Galizia in 2017, which drew the
international community's attention. The study verifies the following hypothesis:
after disclosing corruption scandals, the ruling elite decided to use the means
characteristic of quasi-militant democracy to limit the freedom of the press against
journalists who reported that issue and recognized them as enemies of the state.
This measure was used in practice, despite the legal framework that guarantees the
protection of this freedom. The level of using quasi-militant democracy means to
limit independent media did not decrease after Galizia’s murder, despite pressure
made by international opinion. On the one hand, this phenomenon is the effect of
solid foundations for legitimizing corruption in domestic policy. Therefore, public
opinion did not seek to disclose abusing power by journalists. On the other hand,
NGOs' failed efforts to increase the protection of the freedom of the press result
from a lack of efficient measures to improve media freedom. Therefore, ruling
elites only declared changes to calm down international opinion but, in practice,
adopted other, more personal, non-direct restrictions on independent media.
Portugal, in “The Political Economy of Communication”, No. 2; Antonis Skamnakis,
Accelerating a freefall? The impact of the post-2008 economic crisis on Greek media and
journalism, in “Journal of Greek Media & Culture”, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 9–25
1 Prasad Padmanabhan, Chi-Hui Wang, Chia-Hsing Huang, Did the 2008 global financial
crisis influence the host country corruption and inward foreign direct investments
relationship? An empirical examination, in “The Journal of International Trade &
Economic Development”, Vol. 29, No. 5, pp. 566-603
195
In the presented context, I decided to use quasi-militant democracy as a
theoretical category to explore the motivations and consequences of limiting the
freedom of the press. The paper’s conclusions may be useful in analysing the use
of limitations against independent media in the name of protecting democratic
regimes and explaining the reasons behind this phenomenon. Malta’s case delivers
useful evidence for analyzing putting pressure on media by politicians and the
limited freedom of the press in semi-consolidated democracy.
The paper’s structure is following. The Literature Review and Theoretical
Background section discusses the most significant studies on militant and quasi-
militant democracy and justifies choosing these theoretical categories to explore
limitations on the freedom of the press in Malta. Moreover, it presents crucial
studies on restrictions on media freedom to indicate dominant approaches to
exploring this phenomenon. Based on the literature review, we decided to apply
militant democracy and quasi-militant democracy to studies on media freedom in
Malta to answer the question about the real intentions of restrictions and their
consequences, which we classify as a non-exploring area. The Methods and
Sources section presents a research question, a justification for selecting sources,
and a research procedure. Then, the role of corruption in contemporary Maltese
domestic policy and the subject of Galizia’s journalistic investigation are
discussed. We analyze restrictions on the freedom of the press, considering the
Maltese legal framework. The next section explores the role of the Panama Papers
and Galizia’s assassination in disclosing corruption scandals in Malta. The section
Muzzle Press Freedom in Malta refers to NGOs’ remarks about media freedom.
Finally, we formulate conclusions about the character of restrictions on media
freedom and the dynamics of using selected quasi-militant democracy means in
Malta. I explain why despite putting pressure on international opinion, Maltese
authorities did not improve the protection of the freedom of the press and did not
stop using quasi-militant democracy means in the face of the murder of Daphne
Caruana Galizia.
Literature review and theoretical background
The presented literature review consists of three elements to indicate
relations between selected theoretical categories (militant democracy and quasi-
militant democracy) with the analyzed phenomenon (restrictions on the freedom of
the press in the face of disclosing corruption scandals). First, I discuss militant
democracy and quasi-militant democracy – theoretical categories that indicate real
intentions and consequences of restrictions on the freedom of the press. Moreover,
we refer to scholars who applied these categories to explore limitations on media
freedom in other states to justify choosing these theoretical frameworks and
present main conclusions about that. Second, thanks to studies on the role of the
freedom of the press in democratic societies, we explain its meaning for the
sovereignty of the political nation, which guarantees the survival of democratic
196
regimes1. We also refer to motivations and justifications for using restrictions on
the freedom of the press in democratic regimes to indicate which of them may
protect or destroy the political system. Finally, we bring up the definitions of
corruption and clientelism, used by scholars to address Malta’s case. Thanks to
that, we indicate the character of dominant relations in the Maltese public sphere,
disclosed by independent journalists.
Quasi-militant democracy is an antinomy of new-militant democracy2, a
modern type of militant democracy, a theoretical category conceived by Karl
Loewenstein in the mid-1930s. The latter focused on preserving a democratic
regime by eliminating its opponents through legal means3. Nowadays, political
science scholars continue their studies on militant democracy. Alexander S.
Kirshner pointed out that restrictions on certain rights and freedoms defend
democratic values while respecting the right to participate in public life4. Giovanni
Capoccia proposed understanding militant democracy as the "use of legal
restrictions on political expression and participation to curb extremist actors in
democratic regimes"5. Therefore, the body of literature was dominated by the
approach that militant democracy means may be used against extremists and anti-
democrats. However, in the literature, we can also find some critical approaches.
Carlo Invernizzi Accetti and Ian Zuckerman6, as critics of militant democracy,
alleged its use to cover authoritarian politics and expand executive power by
political elites. However, their approach is closer to a concept of quasi-militant
democracy, in which instruments may be used against enemies of ruling elites. For
this reason, to avoid confusing the aims and goals of restricting rights and
freedoms, Joanna Rak and Roman Bäcker proposed the differentiation between
neo-militant democracy and quasi-militant democracy. Essential features of neo-
militant democracy rest on democracy's self-defense ability without decreasing the
level of the political nation's sovereignty. In turn, quasi-militant democracy
attempts to expand the power competencies of the ruling elite while reducing the
level of the sovereignty of the political nation7. In neo-militant democracy,
restrictions on the freedom of speech and the press allow ruling elites to reduce the
1 Roman Bäcker, Kategoria narodu politycznego, in Jacek Wojnicki, Justyna
Miecznikowska, Łukasz Zamęcki, Polska i Europa w perspektywie politologicznej, Tom II,
(ed.) Warszawa, 2019, p. 38
2 Joanna Rak, Roman Bäcker, Neo-militant Democracies in Post-communist Member States
of the European Union, London, New York, 2022, p.5
3 Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I, in “The American
Political Science Review” Vol. 31, No, 3, pp. 417–432
4 Alexander Kirshner, A Theory of Militant Democracy, in A Theory of Militant
Democracy, Yale University Press, 2014
5 Giovanni Capoccia, Militant democracy: The institutional bases of democratic self-
preservation, in “Annual Review of Law and Social Science”, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 207-226
6 Carlo Invernizzi Accetti, Ian Zuckerman, What’s wrong with militant democracy?, in
“Political Studies”, Vol. 65, No. 1, p. 195
7 Joanna Rak, Roman Bäcker, Op. cit., pp. 8-9
197
possibility of spreading discrimination, hate speech, and fake news by anti-
democratic forces. In quasi-militant democracy, the same restrictions are used to
limit the independence of journalists and media workers.
In modern studies on militant democracy, some scholars conducted
research considering changes in scope and level of protecting the freedom of the
press1. Limiting the freedom of the press may be classified as a symptom of “hard”
militant democracy, which openly leads to the exclusion of certain entities
considered enemies of democracy2. In that approach, restrictions against media are
a type of countermeasure to the threat of democratic regimes by abusing the
freedom of the press. For analyzing Malta’s case, it is worth referring to
comparative studies on that phenomenon in Western European consolidated
democracy3. Maltese trajectory is like Austria’s case, where quasi-militant
democracy rules were a response to disclosing pieces of evidence of abusing power
by ruling elites and public officers4. In order to verify which restrictions can be
classified as neo-militant or quasi-militant democracy means, variants of
restrictions on the freedom of the press may be classified in the following catalog:
1) politicians or political-friendly businessmen’s actions to link the media sector
with the politicians’ sphere by putting pressure on independent outlets, 2)
interference in the process of media management (personnel policy, economic
decisions, etc.), 3) limiting free speech in the name of protecting personal believes,
public safety and constitutional order, 4) limitations to manifest own opinions
during public assemblies, 5) Internet censorship5. In this study, we intend to verify
which of these variants occurred in Malta, or another type, allowing us to expand
this catalog.
The freedom of the press and all other media, which is a derivative of the
freedom of speech, guarantees the media’s pluralism, commonly referred to as the
“fourth power”. In a democratic system, limitations lead to abuses by the ruling
elite, influencing the publishing process and published content. Nowadays, we
observe increasing acts of violence against journalists in Europe, especially by
1 Przemysław Osiewicz, Maciej Skrzypek, Is Spain becoming a militant democracy?
Empirical evidence from Freedom House Reports, in “Aportes. Revista de Historia
Contemporánea”, Vol. 35, Nr. 103, pp. 7–33; Maciej Skrzypek, Between neo-militant and
quasi-militant democracy: restrictions on freedoms of speech and the press in Austria,
Finland, and Sweden 2008–2019, in “European Politics and Society”; Kamila Rezmer-
Płotka, Restrictions of freedom of the press as an indicator of militant democracy in
Lithuania, in “Polish Political Science Yearbook”, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 204–210
2 Jan-Werner Müller, Protecting Popular Self-Government from the People? New
Normative Perspectives on Militant Democracy, in “Annual Review of Political Science”,
No. 19, p. 258
3 Maciej Skrzypek, Op. cit.
4 Idem, pp. 8-9
5 Idem, pp. 3-4
198
uniformed service representatives1. Decreasing media content quality, self-
censorship, and politicization endanger the formation of public opinion, which, as
Karl Popper said, is powerful enough to overthrow governments, even
undemocratic ones2.
Wojciech Adamczyk explained that informal control over institutions of
power by media serves to increase the transparency of the area of behind-the-
scenes activities of political elites. These activities significantly impact citizens'
quality of life and observance of the standards of a democratic state of law. He also
argued that journalistic unmasking abusing power by politicians is used to
stimulate public opinion to pressure the nation's representatives to take actions
such as legislative or personal changes. Informing about the activities of political
elites as effective means of informal control of the government confirms the
important role of mass communication in the political decision-making system.
Politicians seek to hide unlawful behavior from the public and, at the same time,
fear possible sanctions. Disclosing political scandals should lead first to social
disapproval and then to the imposition of sanctions3. In the case of neo-militant
democracy, restrictions on the freedom of speech and the press are used to combat
political groups classified as enemies of democracy. In quasi-militant democracy,
restrictions are used to expand the ruling elite's scope of power while reducing the
level of the sovereignty of the political nation.
At this point, it is worth conceptualizing two essential terms: corruption
and clientelism. Robert Klitgaard4 argued that ‘corruption is the misuse of office
for unofficial ends’, which is a too broad and capacious definition. Scholars who
analyze corruption in Malta used a more detailed conceptual framework. Natasha
Krsteski5 defined corruption as a violation of the moral values of society,
considered the most severe form of threat to the democratic rule of law. She
pointed out that any abuse of power for personal or collective gain, in both the
public and private sectors, constitutes corruption. Moreover, it occurs when the
impartiality principle is breached due to the intentional misappropriation of a
property. Corruption is a waste of power by the government against the general
interest6. Keith Mercieca1 stated that ”corruption is essentially a relationship, one
1 Reporters without Borders, 2019 World Press Freedom Index – A cycle of fear,
https://rsf.org/en/2019-world-press-freedom-index-cycle-fear, (7.06.2022).
2 Karl R. Popper, Opinia publiczna w świetle zasad liberalizmu (translated by A.
Malinowski), in ”Studia Polityczne”, No. 3, p. 12
3 Wojciech Adamczyk, Teflon power elite? Why do the political scandals disclosed by the
media (not) always mobilize Polish public opinion?, in “Annales Universitatis Mariae
Curie-Skłodowska – Sectio Balcaniensis et Carpathiensis”, No. 6, 2021, p. 12
4 Robert Klitgaard, International Cooperation Against Corruption, Finance &
Development, https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0035/001/article-A002-
en.xml, (7.06.2022)
5 Natasha Krsteski, Corruption in Malta, in “Knowledge International Journal”, Vol. 28,
No. 6, pp. 1925-1929
6 Ibidem, p. 1925
199
that trades in power and influence, and that comes to life in unison with the
opportunities afforded by its specific environment. In small states such as Malta,
an intricate web of power, networks, traditions, and obligations predetermine these
opportunities”. Finally, Mitchel defines corruption as ”self-interested activities of
politicians who appropriate state resources for personal benefit or use their public
position for private gain’; and clientelism as a ‘process whereby personal
relationship, called patronage, are established between politicians and members of
public. Recognize as essential features of Mediterranean political systems”2.
Therefore, corruption and clientelism, as specific relations between officers of
public administration and anyone who wants to achieve benefits from this relation,
have created a space where unfair and non-transparent practices are accepted in
realizing partisan aims, despite acting to the detriment of society.
In democratic regimes, a political nation accepts some limitations
necessary to guarantee survival for the political regime because some may improve
democratic decision-making by excluding anti-democrats. Quasi-militant
democracy is a strategy of using legal restrictions to accumulate ruling elites’
power by reducing the sovereignty of the political nation. In the context of the
freedom of the press and reducing advertising expenses due to economic
breakdown, media outlets and journalists are endangered by the risk of taking them
over by oligarchs related to political elites. That political pressure attempts to
transform media into a platform to distribute party agenda. It should be recognised
as an example of adopting a quasi-militant democracy strategy toward the freedom
of the press.
Methods and sources
The research starting point is the economic crisis of 2008, which had a
significant impact on European media markets3. In the aftermath of the economic
crisis, the popularity of populist rhetoric, which openly challenged the principles of
liberal democracy, also increased. On purpose, the final point is 2019, the moment
before the outbreak of the Coronavirus crisis, during which most restrictions on
civil rights and freedoms were dictated by the protection of public health and were
extorted by extraordinary situations. The coronavirus crisis opened a new and thus
far unfinished phase of militant democracy development. The fight against the
COVID-19 pandemic required new strategies and actions, so the analysis of
1 Keith Mercieca, The cat and the rat sleep together: an analysis of the factors that
influence corruption in Malta, in M. T. Vassallo (ed.) Public life in Malta: essays on
governance, politics and public affairs in the EU's smallest member state 1(2), p. 108
2 Jon P. Mitchel, Op. cit., p. 59
3 Murina Munteanu, Media in crisis: Should the state intervene? Reuters Institute
Fellowship Paper, Oxford, 2010, Open Society Foundations, Footprint of the financial
crisis in the media,
https://opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/footprint-financial-crisis-media,
(7.06.2022)
200
restrictions from 2020 should consider other factors. As for the turning point of
2008–2019, I identify the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia in 2018, which
focused international society on the problem of combating independent media in
Malta.
We ask the following questions to support the verification of the
hypothesis: 1) What restrictions on the freedom of the press did Malta include in
its national legislation? 2) What restrictions, as quasi-militant democracy means,
on the freedom of the press were adopted against journalists reporting corruption
scandals? 3) What were the scope and level of using quasi-militant democracy
after Galizia’s murder?
The research procedure includes three steps: operationalizing a research
tool, collecting, and selecting sources, analyzing data, and formulating
conclusions. First, we use the catalog of quasi-militant democracy means against
the freedom of the press1, but I do not exclude its modification after an empirical
analysis of Malta’s case. Second, I purposely selected the following sources: (a)
national collections of laws about the freedom of speech and the press, NGOs’
reports, media content, and experts’ analyses about the state of the freedom of
speech and the press. The first type of materials was obtained from official
websites of domestic parliaments and online databases of legislation. The second
type of source is online materials, accessed at credible portals, like websites on
gov., Edu. domains. Based on national legislation, I indicated the declaratory level.
NGOs’ reports, experts’ analyses, and media content allowed verifying the
practical level. A database of mentioned NGOs’ reports consists of online
documents from 2008 to 2019, published by European Center for Press and Media
Freedom, Freedom House, and Reporters Without Borders (RSF). These
organizations, which monitored the freedom of speech and the press worldwide,
warned about the problem of protecting the freedom of the press in Malta. Third, I
reviewed materials to present the application and efficiency of individual
measures. Finally, I presented conclusions about abusing regulations of hate
speech crimes and public incitement to hatred in a struggle with independent
media, violating relations between media markets and political systems, and
favoring public broadcasters by ruling elites. The methods employed for the
analysis are the qualitative analysis of sources and the quantitative analysis of data
from a comparative perspective.
Malta: corruption scandals as main challenge for democratic regime
EU institutions, during the accession, formulated recommendations to
Maltese governance about the necessity of adopting new measures to modernize
bureaucracy2. Mercieca3 noted that among institutions to combat corruption, the
main role was played by the Malta Police Force, the Security Service, the Attorney
1 Maciej Skrzypek, Op. cit., pp. 3-4
2 Jon P. Mitchel, Op. cit., p. 45
3 Keith Mercieca, Op. cit., p. 109
201
General’s Office, the Judiciary, the Permanent Commission Against Corruption,
and many other bodies of interest such as the National Audit Office, the
Ombudsman, and others. Despite several bodies and new legislation, anti-
corruption commissions were recognized as worthless and with no power to
combat that problem. The ineffectiveness of these institutions was confirmed by
the works of the Permanent Commission against Corruption, established to
investigate charges formulated about leaks of The Panama Papers.
A real obstacle and challenge were the legitimization of govern, the
concept of Maltese government based on a patronage relation in society1.
Moreover, corruption scandals expand beyond the political sphere. Spiteri’s
studies2 confirmed that corruption significantly negatively influenced the well-
being of Maltese people. Mercieca pointed out corruption's elusive and stealthy
nature and as an ethical problem, ‘driven on by the misconstrued understandings
and behaviors of individuals at the ultimate expense of others. She argued that a
significant role played: 1) appropriately targeted education for increasing
awareness about civic duties; 2) depolarisation of public discourse and political
landscape, dominated by two major parties, which is a crucial obstacle to building
consensus on how to tackle corruption; 3) recruitment and retention of a skilled
Public Service to build the functional institutional structure. She also argued that a
‘more informed, educated and independent civic society will no longer accept lame
excuses for inappropriate political intervention, inexistent regulation of party
funding, and convinced that ‘Malfeasance is no longer an acceptable practice and
becomes highly incongruent with the high standards of accountability and
transparency expected of local institutions3. In scholars’ opinion, effective
combating of corruption needs civic awareness, proper education, and access to
public information. These factors should be strengthened by the conviction that
abusing power is eradicated by professional and independent bodies. Free access to
public information about corruption needs independent media, free to report that
issue. Mitchel4 recognized the Maltese public sphere as semi-transformed with
well-developed mass media. However, media content is not an object of mass
consumption, so citizens' awareness of abusing power may be limited. Content
about corruption scandals is not the subject of society's interest. This statement is
important for the research problem.
Combating corruption became a priority in internal policy after the
democratic transition. However, that task was only EU institutions’
recommendations, considering that corruption, due to well-developed patronal
relations, had strong legitimization in post-colonial conditions. An essential feature
of consolidated democracy is the existence of well-developed and independent
1 Jon P. Mitchel, Op. cit., pp. 60-61
2 Kylie Spiteri, An econometric analysis of wellbeing in Malta: a focus on corruption,
https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/79815, (7.06.2022)
3 Keith Mercieca, Op. cit., pp. 127-131
4 Jon P. Mitchel, Op. cit., p. 5
202
media, which play a crucial role in disclosing scandals involving abuse of power.
Therefore, there were crucial factors in Maltese: the legitimization of corruption
and low consumption of media content, which limit the scale of independent
outlets.
Restrictions on the freedom of the press: Maltese legal framework
For the proper analyzing the practical level of freedom in Maltese media, it
is necessary to compare practice with the declaratory level as a legal framework,
which in Malta, is based on British law standards1. The Constitution of Malta
guarantees the freedom of expression, a foundation of the freedom of speech and
the press2. In Article 41, legislators hold that freedom to express opinions, receive
ideas and information, and communicate ideas and information cannot be hindered,
and anybody cannot interfere with it3.
Detailed regulation about freedom of the media was adopted by Press Act
(1974), which has a specific content layout because after conceptual-fundamental
definitions in Part I, legislators regulate press offenses. A specific provision was
adopted in Article 4, where legislators enter imprisonment and a fine in the case of
inciting others to take away the life or the liberty of the President of Malta or any
Minister. It adopted specific protection for the most important officers. Article 46
guarantees the right to the keeping secret of information’s sources unless it is
necessary for the interests of national security, territorial integrity, or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, or for the protection of the interests
of justice4. However, the court may deny the duty of leaking the source to protect
publishers' interests. The next Article prohibits blocking access to public
information by any media outlets by Government5. Another specific provision was
adopted in Criminal Code. Following Article 163: Insults of the Roman Catholic
religion by means of words, gestures, written or printed materials are punishable
by imprisonment for a period of one to six months6. However, the Article was
repealed by amendment to Act XXXVII.2016.3, which should be recognized as a
significant change to strengthen the freedom of the press. Amendments to the
criminal code and the Press Act in June 2012 includes gender identity and sexual
orientation as prohibited grounds for hate speech. In late 2013, Parliamentary
Secretary Jose Herrera announced a legislative proposal to remove all censorship
in the arts, but no changes had been enacted7. The Broadcasting Authority
1 Raymond Mangion, Constitutions and Legislation in Malta: 1914-1964, Russell Square
Publishing Limited
2 The Constitution of Malta, 1964, Art. 32
3 Idem, Art. 41
4 Press Act, 1974, Art. 46
5 Idem, Art. 47
6 Criminal Code, 1854, Art. 163
7 Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2015 – Malta,
https://www.refworld.org/docid/565313556.html, (7.06.2022)
203
regulates and monitors all radio and television broadcasts. The president appoints
its members on the advice of the prime minister, which should be recognized as a
possibility to pressure ruling elites.
A turning point was adopting the Media and Defamation Act for updating
the regulation of media and defamation matters and for matters consequential or
ancillary thereto in 2018. That regulation replaced The Press Act1. In the new law,
legislators do not define and regulate freedoms granted to journalists and media
outlets, which is a danger to the free functioning of media. Moreover, legislators
assign the central position to defamation. Defamatory words in written media give
rise to an action in libel before the competent court and the Code of Organization
and Civil Procedure. Civil proceedings for defamation may be instituted against
the author, the editor, and the publisher2. In the case of the court's decision about
defamation, a judge may order to remove content from that website, or stop
distributing, selling, or exhibiting material containing the statement3. Any person
who is a victim of defamation or who has had her private life intruded into through
a publication is entitled to demand to have published forthwith, free of charge, in
the same medium, a statement by way of contradiction or explanation4. Moreover,
the court may order the editor, the person responsible for the broadcasting medium,
or an operator of a website to pay a penalty to the complainant not exceeding
€2,000. That regulation guarantees the secrecy of the source of information in a
newspaper, broadcast, or website for which he is responsible. Except it is vital for
the interests of national security, territorial integrity, public safety, or for the
prevention of disorder or crime, or for the protection of the interests of justice5.
Authors of Freedom House’s reports recognized that the regulation would
decriminalize defamation and end the practice of freezing a journalist’s assets
while civil cases could proceed6. However, the 2020 report pointed out that
investigative journalists continued to face libel suits7, which shows that the new
regulation is ineffective for it remains a civil offense.
The legal framework of restrictions on the freedom of the press is signed
by colonial heritage, by taking an example of British law, despite adopting these
provisions during the transition period. Regulations about that issue are specific
because Maltese legislators did not describe provisions of guaranteed freedoms
like in western democracies. Therefore, the declaratory level of protecting the
freedom of the press is lower than in consolidated democracies. Insulting Roman
1 Media and Defamation Act, 2018, Art. 25
2 Idem, Art. 3
3 Idem, Art. 14
4 Idem, Art. 15
5 Idem, Art. 22
6 Freedom House, Malta: Freedom in the World 2018 Country Report,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/malta/freedom-world/2018 (7.06.2022).
7 Freedom House, Malta: Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/malta/freedom-world/2020, (7.06.2022)
204
Catholic Church and religious feelings were deleted from legislation in 2016,
which strengthened the position of media workers reporting church scandals – Fr
Muscat’s activities in social media1, Community of Jesus the Savior’s case2, and
child abuses cases3. Adopted in 2018 Defamation Act was not a milestone in
protecting journalists because it did not influence ending investigations against
journalists. Moreover, based on NGO reports, it should be recognized as low-
effective. Pressure on journalists may be put by other means. However, accusations
of defamation were the main instrument to limit the media’s independence, which
investigations in Daphne Caruana Galizia’s cases confirmed.
The Panama papers and Galizia’s assassination
International journalism investigation groups link traditional media with
new media technology to report corruption scandals and financial and tax crimes.
The first case of investigative journalism was reported in 1860–the 1870s in the
USA – the success of American muckrakers as a model for journalists all around
the world. On leaking the Panama Papers worked 400 teams of investigative
journalists, collected 11,5 mln files in 2,6 TB. Wojciech Adamczyk argued that
increasingly frequent international journalistic investigations exposing crimes
financial and tax are possible thanks to the skillful use of the remaining ones at the
disposal of resources: 1) professionally prepared, multi-person investigative teams;
2) proper selection of media and reporters, establishing the principles of
cooperation and assigning tasks (verifying obtained information, setting
publication dates); 3) modern tools for analyzing, processing, and sharing complex
and large-scale quantified datasets; 4) using the available resources and
information, often coming from confidential informants, which is forced thorough
analysis and verification of obtained data in independent sources. Moreover, he
pointed out that with developed advantages, international teams of journalistic
investigations markedly decreased risk for reporters4.
Daphne Caruana Galizia, an investigative journalist, accused the beneficial
owner of a third Panama company was the prime minister’s wife. After disclosing
1 Updated: Police launch investigation into priest’s ‘homophobic’ rant,
https://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2022-01-06/local-news/Minister-seeks-police-
investigation-into-priest-s-homophobic-rant-6736239555, (7.06.2022)
2 Church dissociates itself from Gesù Salvatur community,
https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/church-disassociates-itself-from-christian-
community.843600, (7.06.2022)
3 Catholic Church in Malta reports six priests for child abuse in two years,
https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/catholic-church-reports-six-priests-for-child-abuse-
in-two-years.831283, (7.06.2022); Scrap prescription in child abuse cases': foundation in
memory of a murdered girl, https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/scrap-prescription-in-
child-abuse-cases-foundation-in-memory-of.884446, (7.06.2022).
4 Wojciech Adamczyk, Follow the money. Międzynarodowe śledztwa dziennikarskie
dotyczące przestępstw finansowych i podatkowych, in ”Zarządzanie Mediami”, Vol. 9, No.
3, pp. 395-405
205
evidence of involving Maltese public officers in international corruption scandals,
she was murdered in October 2017. The blowing up of her car was as evident from
the previous one’s arrangements, the retribution of influential people for exposing
their participation in corruption. In November 2017, hundreds of people attended
her funeral, which was declared a National Day of Mourning by the government.
After Galizia’s murder, her close relatives were supported by RSF, who helped
them with legal assistance during defamation trials1. Galizia’s case became a
public issue, which engaged civil society and led to significant changes in Maltese
politics during the next years. At once, allegations about the possibilities of
political influence over corruption investigations were warned by members of the
opposition and civil society. Maltese activities demanded the resignation of the
attorney general and the police commissioner and accused them of being under the
prime minister's control. Moreover, as mentioned, the Permanent Commission
against Corruption was crippled by vacancies for much of the year. In 2017, RSF
and four other NGOs started joint missions to Malta to monitor trials and Galizia’s
murderers and political activities in that case.
In October 2018, a mission led by Reporters Without Borders (RSF)
criticized the Maltese authorities for “not living up to their obligations to guarantee
and safeguard freedom of expression and press freedom”. The mission pointed to
the slow pace of the trial against the suspects in Caruana Galizia’s murder and the
failure of investigators to arrest the masterminds behind the crime, which is
believed to be a contract killing2. In 2019, Yorgen Fenech, a wealthy businessman
friend of Schembri, was charged with complicity in the murder; he pleaded not
guilty. Five days before Fenech’s arraignment, the alleged middleman in the plot,
Melvin Theuma, received a presidential pardon and immunity to enable him to
testify in the case. He testified that Fenech had paid him to hire the three men who
carried out the murder. Theuma said he was also given a no-show government job.
In court testimony, Schembri denied any connection to Galizia’s murder and
refuted allegations that he had leaked information about the case to suspects3.
In July 2020, it was confirmed that Attorney General Peter Grech, as the
chief prosecutor, sent a note to police in 2016 advising them against investigating
the Panama Papers, stressing that such an investigation would be “highly
intrusive”. It violated the responsibility of his post and was an evident obstruction
to the course of justice, rendering his position as Attorney General untenable4. In
1 Malta: RSF files complaint in France in connection with Maltese journalist’s murder,
https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-rsf-files-complaint-france-connection-maltese-journalists-
murder, (7.06.2022)
2 Freedom House, Malta: Freedom in the World 201 Country Report,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/malta/freedom-world/2019, (accessed 7 June 2022)
3 Freedom House, Malta. Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/malta/freedom-world/2020, (7.06.2022)
4 Malta: RSF files complaint in France in connection with Maltese journalist’s murder,
https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-rsf-files-complaint-france-connection-maltese-journalists-
murder, (7.06.2022)
206
October 2020, PM Joseph Muscat resigned after mass civil society protests
connected to developments in Galizia’s case. In February 2021, Vincent Muscat,
one of three accused hitmen, was sentenced to 15 years in prison after entering a
guilty plea, and three men were arrested under suspicion of supplying the bomb
that took Caruana Galizia’s life1. In July 2021, the detailed report (437 pages) was
published. It was the result of 93 sittings, drafted by retired judge Michael Mallia,
former chief justice Joseph Said Pullicino, and judge Abigail Lofaro, who
comprise the board of inquiry. Public Inquiry was heard from 120 witnesses. The
main conclusion is that the Maltese state failed to prevent Galizia's assassination.
They argued that the 'State has to shoulder responsibility for the assassination
because it created an atmosphere of impunity, generated from the highest levels in
the heart of the administration of the Office of the Prime Minister'. It finds a
“culture of impunity not only for senior officials in the public administration,
including ‘persons of trust’ but also for a restricted circle of politicians,
businessmen, and criminals”2.
Galizia conducted a journal investigation about corruption scandals with
head politics and their relatives' participation. After her murder, NGOs and
international observers called to justify the process according to international
standards and significant changes in Maltese domestic policy to improve
transparency in public governance. The attention of international public opinion
was focused on Malta and lawsuits in Galizia's case, which put pressure on The
Public Inquiry. Thanks to civil society's efforts and NGOs, official investigations
of Galizia's murder move forward, despite attempts of interference by politicians
and other involved officers and oligarchs.
Muzzle press freedom in Malta: NGO’s reports
Malta, which is recognised as a country where a democratic regime has
dealt with many challenges in recent years, like other flawed democracies3, has a
real problem with reducing the freedom of the press, which has been confirmed by
NGO reports and special mission jointed after Galizia’s murder. One of the
significant institutions in monitoring the freedom of the press is Reporters Without
Borders (RSF). Malta is ranked 81st out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2020 World
Press Freedom Index, having fallen 34 places since Caruana Galizia’s
assassination in 2017. However, that progressive decline occurred since the
1 Malta: Developments in murder case mark nascent steps towards justice for Daphne
Caruana Galizia, https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-developments-murder-case-mark-nascent-
steps-towards-justice-daphne-caruana-galizia, (7.06.2022)
2 Landmark public inquiry report finds Maltese state must “shoulder responsibility” for the
assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, https://rsf.org/en/news/landmark-public-
inquiry-report-finds-maltese-state-must-shoulder-responsibility-assassination-daphne
(7.06.2022).
3 Democracy Index’s classification, EIU Democracy Index 2017, https://
www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2017, (7.06.2022)
207
beginning of the 21st century, confirmed by available RSF reports1. Their authors
explained the decline by implementing restrictions on expression to protect their
Roman Catholic faith. In their previous reports, the authors noted that blasphemy
cases in Malta had decreased slightly2. Madison Neidlinger called Maltese
regulations regarding the freedom of the press strict, referring to censorship laws
and regulations of blasphemy against Roman Catholicism, which is the state
religion. Based on these provisions since 1997, 185 libel cases have been pending
within the courts, with 36 cases filed in 2014 alone. Neidlinger added that the
freedom of the press in Malta is still discussed. In 2016, certain members of
Malta’s Labour Party were calling for surveillance of the press, which was
protested by journalists and media owners. They wanted to maintain their
independence but faced the danger of losing their jobs. Therefore, in Malta, media
are under political pressure, within which the blasphemy regulation may be used to
combat independent outlets.
In 2015, Freedom House published the report Freedom of the Press 2015 –
Malta that remarked the freedom of the press in Malta as 23 (0 = best, 100 =
worst). In 2015 Malta was classified as a state where the active independent media
sector is free to convey various opinions. Malta was recognized as a physically
safe environment for journalists, and there were no reported cases of threats or
harassment in 2014. However, they reported, among others, that news outlets are
occasionally ordered to pay exorbitant damages. Many libel cases result in fines or
jail terms. In June 2014, a former editor for It-Torca was ordered to pay €5,000 to
former Transport Malta chief executive Stanley Portelli for an image and article
published in 2012 about possible corruption at the agency. It follows the fact that
the major political parties, labor unions, businessmen, and the Catholic Church
have direct investments in media, and a number of these outlets are under pressure
to promote partisan agendas. It led to the problem argued by European Centre for
Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF): Malta does not have much independent
journalism. Even media outlets not tied to a political party have opaque ties with
the political and entrepreneurial establishment3. Maja Simunjak, the author of the
2015 Report about Media Pluralism in Malta, recognized the risk for media
pluralism as low/medium. Low risk was detected in Basic Protection and Market
1 Malta: Developments in murder case mark nascent steps towards justice for Daphne
Caruana Galizia, https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-developments-murder-case-mark-nascent-
steps-towards-justice-daphne-caruana-galizia (7.06.2022).
2 In 2011–2015, the number of people convicted of “public blasphemy” decreased from
119 to 99 convictions. Madison Neidlinger, Free Speech and Free Press Around the World.
Malta, https://freespeechfreepress.wordpress.com/malta, (7.06.2022)
3 Maltese journalist Caroline Muscat continues in the spirit of her murdered colleague
Daphne Caruana Galizia, https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2018/10/maltese-journalist-
caroline-muscat-continues-in-the-spirit-of-her-murdered-colleague-daphne-caruana-
galizia/, (7.06.2022)
208
Plurality, and a medium risk was found in Political Independence and Social
Inclusiveness1.
In 2017, RSF reported that many journalists living in Malta feel colonized
by politics, oligarchs, and other influential people. Another obstacle is Malta’s
politicians, who eagerly file lawsuits when investigative reporting sheds light on
their activities or threatens their interests. Journalists and media outlets are often
forced to pay exorbitant damages. Caruana Galizia alone was the target of 42 libel
suits at the time of her death. Moreover, they also argued the problem of a divided
media landscape in Malta. It shows the scale of the partisan problem in Malta
between supporters of the center-left Labour Party and the center-right
nationalists2.
In 2018, after the assassination of Galizia, the Committee to Protect
Journalists, the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, the European
Federation of Journalists, and RSF started a joint press freedom mission to Malta.
In 2021, their representatives returned to Malta, explaining the need for full
criminal justice for Galizia’s case and broader press freedom reforms. During a
meeting in 2021, Prime Minister Robert Abela reaffirmed his commitment to
ensuring the safety of journalists, both in terms of framework and implementation3.
In October 2019, RSF condemned the intensification of threats against independent
news outlets – a case of an attack from Josef Caruana, a member of the
communications staff at the Office of the Prime Minister in Malta, who published
posts on his social media smearing The Shift News' investigative reporting as
“fake news”. They noted attempts to discredit and marginalize Galizia's case4.
In November 2019, the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom,
European Federation of Journalists, Index on Censorship, International Federation
of Journalists, International Press Institute RSF, and Scottish PENWe, condemned
the actions taken by Maltese authorities to restrict press coverage and public
scrutiny of the ongoing investigation into the Galizia's case. They called on
Maltese authorities to ensure journalists' protection in carrying out their duties and
have access to political figures and information in the public interest. They noted
on attempted confiscation by security officers of a journalist’s mobile phone and
the detention of a group of journalists during the job5. Moreover, in the same
1 Maja Simunjak, Malta, https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2015/malta,
(7.06.2022)
2 Investigative journalism’s uncertain future in Malta, https://rsf.org/en/news/investigative-
journalisms-uncertain-future-malta, (7.06.2022)
3 Statement of the joint press freedom mission to Malta, https://rsf.org/en/news/statement-
joint-press-freedom-mission-malta, (7.06.2022)
4 Malta: Intensification of pressure against The Shift after the founder was awarded RSF
press freedom award, https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-intensification-pressure-against-shift-
after-founder-was-awarded-rsf-press-freedom-award, (7.06.2022)
5 Malta: International organizations condemn the further degradation of press freedom in
Malta and the continued intimidation of journalists, https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-
209
month, these NGOs repeated that investigation into Galizia's case must be
independent and impartial, without political interference in the investigation by
PM Muscat. Worries about his engagement raise the specter of undue executive
interference in the investigation: the financial interests of Muscat’s cabinet present
the serious possibility of a conflict of interest for the Prime Minister regarding the
investigation. Concerns of independence and impartiality emerge when the Prime
Minister himself continues to take libel suits against the estate of Galizia and her
son1.
In 2020, RSF was alarmed that no meaningful reforms were implemented
after three years. They pointed out that the Maltese media climate remains deeply
divided, and journalists who continue to pursue in-depth investigative reporting do
so at great risk. They informed that new Prime Minister Robert Abela was
attempting to interfere with the work of the Board of Inquiry and accused Abela
continuation the approach of his predecessor, Joseph Muscat. RSF referred to
journalists' reports about blocking more access to public information and access to
government officials2.
RSF remarked The Public Inquiry into Galizia’s case was a success
because, thanks to that work, the commissioners' political interference, police
cover-up, and collusion with criminals were revealed. Moreover, they pointed out
that Prime Minister tried to shut down the work of the Public Inquiry before it had
fulfilled its obligations. After the murder of Galizia, more than 20 defamation
lawsuits against her were continued, including by the former PM. Moreover, some
public officers tried to pressure her son and other journalists in Malta. Malta’s
media climate remained deeply divided, and media ownership was dominated by
the two major political parties, further stifling public debate in an environment
where propaganda dominates the news3. After publishing the Public Inquiry report
in 2021, ten NGOs formulated accusations against Joseph Muscat's administration.
Muscat's cabinet opposed the establishment of an independent The Public Inquiry,
which ultimately came about only through the threat of legal proceedings and a
landmark resolution from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
Moreover, they repeated a series of detailed legal and procedural recommendations
to strengthen the protection of journalists, journalism itself, and the freedom of
expression in the country. Recommendations related to police officers included the
international-organisations-condemn-further-degradation-press-freedom-malta-and-
continued, (7.06.2022)
1 Malta: International organizations concerned by the appearance of political interference
into the investigation of the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia,
https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-international-organisations-concerned-appearance-political-
interference-investigation, (7.06.2022)
2 Malta: Three years on, the pursuit of justice for Daphne Caruana Galizia stalled by
constant obstacles and lack of press freedom reform, https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-three-
years-pursuit-justice-daphne-caruana-galizia-stalled-constant-obstacles-and-lack-press,
(7.06.2022)
3 Malta, https://rsf.org/en/taxonomy/term/150, (7.06.2022)
210
protection of journalists and the need for specialized training for the officers “to
have a thorough understanding of the role of the journalist as a guardian of
democracy and the value of journalism as a valid collaborator with law
enforcement to ensure the rule of law”. Other recommendations for reforms at the
Constitutional level include creating an Ombudsman on journalistic ethics,
strengthening the Public Broadcaster's impartiality, and revising the Freedom of
Information Act to strengthen government transparency and compliance with
freedom of information requests1.
The last three Freedom House reports remark Maltese media as free and
diverse2. However, the report of 2021 indicated that in June 2020, the Maltese
media regulator named the Broadcasting Authority publicly instructed Television
Malta (TVM) not to ask questions of government officials during live press
conferences, claiming the order was meant to avoid partisan coverage. The order
sparked controversy after TVM interrupted the broadcast of an August press
conference on Malta’s COVID-19 response3. Undoubtedly, it should be recognized
as a form of censorship.
However, in 2022 Committee to Protect Journalists, the European Centre
for Press and Media Freedom, the European Federation of Journalists, and RSF
emphasized the need for the complete independence of the Commission of Experts
of the Public Inquiry into the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia. Moreover,
they noted the necessity to create an enabling environment for independent
journalism and measures to address impunity, corruption, and the abuse of power.
Their postulation was considered by Prime Minister Abela, who informed them
about the appointment of a Committee of Experts to implement these
recommendations. Authors of postulations sought assurances from Prime Minister
Abela to not amplify a media regulation policy and expand the scope of the
freedom of the press in practice. In January 2022, they informed us that their offer
of technical assistance to the Prime Minister had not been taken up4.
To sum up, changes in national legislation did not improve the protection
of the freedom of the press in practice and maintain using quasi-militant
democracy instruments against independent journalists. Many authors indicated
similar challenges and weaknesses of Maltese media pluralism. However, it is
worth noting that remarks from RSF and Freedom House are different. Documents
published by RSF should be recognized as more valuable, as they include detailed
1 Daphne Caruana, Galizia: Landmark Public Inquiry recommendations must be
implemented, https://rsf.org/en/news/daphne-caruana-galizia-landmark-public-inquiry-
recommendations-must-be-implemented, (7.06.2022).
2 Freedom House, Malta: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/malta/freedom-world/2021, (7.06.2022)
3 Idem
4 Malta: Implementation of Public Inquiry recommendations must meet international
standards, https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-implementation-public-inquiry-recommendations-
must-meet-international-standards, (7.06.2022)
211
and in-depth analyses. Intensive use of quasi-militant democracy means has
increased for years, despite paying attention to Maltese media since October 2017.
NGOs’ special mission monitored and analysed issues after Galizia’s murder, and
their members formulated recommendations for the government to strengthen the
freedom of the press and reduce the possibility of using quasi-militant restrictions.
Despite putting pressure on Maltese authority by international opinion did not
abandon quasi-militant democracy measures and did not decide to replace them
with strong protection of the freedom of the press.
Conclusions
Restrictions on the freedom of the press are the centre of militant
democracy’s reflections. Despite constitutional protection guarantees, media
pluralism may be limited by political elites and public officers to maintain public
order and national security. For proper verification of rulers’ intentions, purposes,
and results, it is worth using the mentioned distinction between neo-militant
democracy and quasi-militant democracy, especially in Malta’s case, when
declaratory level and practice differ significantly.
In the analyzed state, for disclosing the scope of abusing power, a
significant role was played by investigative journalists, recognized by ruling
politicians as enemies. Therefore, that approach legitimizes using a broad catalog
of restrictions against Maltese journalists, including supervision. Considering
generality and social attitudes to corruption and clientelism, the media’s work was
crucial for strengthening public life transparency.
Malta, as post-colonial semi-consolidated democracy, is an example of
how, by non-direct restrictions on freedom of the press, political elites may limit
journalists’ independence and by quasi-militant democracy instruments. Therefore,
it is necessary to indicate which measures of quasi-militant democracy limit the
freedom of the press in Malta. First, the most common is defamation lawsuits
against independent journalists who reported abusing power or acts against the
public interest. Second, the criminalization of insulting Catholicism in 2016 by
legal restrictions limited possibilities to informing about church scandals, which is
another type of limitation – the criminalization of contents recognized as insulting
religious beliefs. It will fulfill the mentioned catalog1. Finally, the development of
digital communication allows discrediting independent journalists on social media
(case of Caruana’s post). Moreover, after Galizia’s murder, we observe two
opposing approaches. On the one hand, ruling elites seek to continue expanding
using quasi-militant democracy instruments to reduce the number of non-partisan
outlets, which may undermine the legitimization of abusing power. State
authorities may seek to build an environment where the media do not disclose
corruption scandals. On the other hand, NGOs and journalists’ unions postulated
reforms to reduce these practices and strengthen the protection of the independence
of Maltese media, but ruling elites ignore these voices. Deep division in public life
1 M. Skrzypek, Op. cit.
212
led to a deadlock on that issue. Any effective regulations to protect journalists
cannot be adopted and used in practice. However, NGOs’ pressure to deal with
dangers to pluralism is growing.
Malta’s case showed that in states where corruption is accepted,
legitimization of abusing power to limit particular rights and freedoms, such as the
freedom of the press, is explained by approving these restrictions by members of
political nations and their representatives when journalists seek to disclose unfair
practices. Restrictions against media workers were used in many different areas
(political pressure, economic support, agreement to broadcasting). The dramatism
of Galizia’s case is confirmed by physical attacks and criminal acts, as revenge on
independent media and warning for the others. In Galizia’s inquiry, ruling elites
were motivated to continue abusing power to protect themselves, despite running
official investigations and monitoring NGOs. The restriction-friendly environment
in Malta should be explained by the polarisation of the public sphere, lack of the
strong protection of the freedom of the press, and the weak condition of domestic
media. Therefore, in the face of using quasi-militant democracy in practice, when
emotionalism dominates public life, the meaning of non-partisan observers, like
RSF, is increasing. Finally, it is worth paying attention to the role of NGOs and
international teams of journalists in monitoring and seeking to run public inquiry
for Galizia’s case under international standards.
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13. Skrzypek, Maciej, Between neo-militant and quasi-militant democracy:
restrictions on freedoms of speech and the press in Austria, Finland, and
Sweden 2008–2019, in “European Politics and Society”, 2022
14. Wayne, Hope, Time, Communication and Financial Collapse, in “International
Journal of Communication”, No. 4, 2010
15. Winseck, Dwayne, Financialization and the “crisis of the media”: The rise
and fall of (some) media conglomerates in Canada, in ”Canadian Journal of
Communication”, No. 35, 2010
16. Wojciech Adamczyk, Follow the money. Międzynarodowe śledztwa
dziennikarskie dotyczące przestępstw finansowych i podatkowych, in
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17. Wojciech Adamczyk, Teflon power elite? Why do the political scandals
disclosed by the media (not) always mobilize Polish public opinion?, in
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Press Articles and Documents
1. Caruana, Daphne, Galizia, Landmark Public Inquiry recommendations must be
implemented, https://rsf.org/en/news/daphne-caruana-galizia-landmark-
public-inquiry-recommendations-must-be-implemented
2. Catholic Church in Malta reports six priests for child abuse in two years,
https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/catholic-church-reports-six-
priests-for-child-abuse-in-two-years.831283
3. Church dissociates itself from Gesù Salvatur community,
https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/church-disassociates-itself-from-
christian-community.843600
4. Criminal Code,
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom
&itemid=8574
5. Freedom House, Malta: Freedom in the World 2018 Country Report,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/malta/freedom-world/2018
6. Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2015 – Malta,
https://www.refworld.org/docid/565313556.html
7. Freedom House, Malta: Freedom in the World 2019 Country Report,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/malta/freedom-world/2019
8. Freedom House, Malta: Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/malta/freedom-world/2020
9. Freedom House, Malta: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/malta/freedom-world/2021
10. Investigative journalism’s uncertain future in Malta,
https://rsf.org/en/news/investigative-journalisms-uncertain-future-malta
11. Klitgaard, Robert, International Cooperation Against Corruption, Finance &
Development,
https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0035/001/article-A002-
en.xml
12. Landmark public inquiry report finds Maltese state must “shoulder
responsibility” for the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia,
https://rsf.org/en/news/landmark-public-inquiry-report-finds-maltese-
state-must-shoulder-responsibility-assassination-daphne
13. Malta: Developments in murder case mark nascent steps towards justice for
Daphne Caruana Galizia, https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-developments-
murder-case-mark-nascent-steps-towards-justice-daphne-caruana-galizia
14. Malta: Implementation of Public Inquiry recommendations must meet
international standards, https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-implementation-
public-inquiry-recommendations-must-meet-international-standards
15. Malta: Intensification of pressure against The Shift after the founder was
awarded RSF press freedom award, https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-
215
intensification-pressure-against-shift-after-founder-was-awarded-rsf-
press-freedom-award
16. Malta: International organizations concerned by the appearance of political
interference into the investigation of the assassination of Daphne Caruana
Galizia, https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-international-organisations-
concerned-appearance-political-interference-investigation
17. Malta: International organizations condemn the further degradation of press
freedom in Malta and the continued intimidation of journalists,
https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-international-organisations-condemn-
further-degradation-press-freedom-malta-and-continued
18. Malta: RSF and 12 other international NGOs renew the call for justice 1000
days after the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia,
https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-rsf-and-12-other-international-ngos-renew-
call-justice-1000-days-after-murder-daphne-caruana
19. Malta: RSF files complaint in France in connection with Maltese journalist’s
murder, https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-rsf-files-complaint-france-
connection-maltese-journalists-murder
20. Malta: Three years on, pursuit of justice for Daphne Caruana Galizia stalled
by constant obstacles and lack of press freedom reform,
https://rsf.org/en/news/malta-three-years-pursuit-justice-daphne-
caruana-galizia-stalled-constant-obstacles-and-lack-press
21. Maltese journalist Caroline Muscat continues in the spirit of her murdered
colleague Daphne Caruana Galizia,
https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2018/10/maltese-journalist-
caroline-muscat-continues-in-the-spirit-of-her-murdered-colleague-
daphne-caruana-galizia/
22. Media and Defamation Act,
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom
&itemid=12823&l=1
23. Neidlinger, Madison, Free Speech and Free Press Around the World. Malta
24. Open Society Foundations, Footprint of financial crisis in the media,
https://opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/footprint-financial-
crisis-media
25. Press Act 1974,
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom
&itemid=8743&l=1
26. Reporters without borders, 2019 World Press Freedom Index – A cycle of fear,
https://rsf.org/en/2019-world-press-freedom-index-cycle-fear
27. Schrembi, Kevin, Orland, Malta remains a ‘flawed democracy’, gets lower
score in 2020 – Economist report
216
28. Scrap prescription in child abuse cases': foundation in memory of a murdered
girl, https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/scrap-prescription-in-child-
abuse-cases-foundation-in-memory-of.884446
29. Spiteri, Kylie, An econometric analysis of wellbeing in Malta: a focus on
corruption, https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/79815
30. Statement of the joint press freedom mission to Malta,
https://rsf.org/en/news/statement-joint-press-freedom-mission-malta
31. The Constitution of Malta 1964,
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom
&itemid=8566&l=1
32. Updated: Police launch investigation into priest’s ‘homophobic’ rant,
https://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2022-01-06/local-
news/Minister-seeks-police-investigation-into-priest-s-homophobic-
rant-6736239555
Websites
1. http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt
2. http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/
3. http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/
4. https://cmpf.eui.eu
5. https://freedomhouse.org/
6. https://freespeechfreepress.wordpress.com/
7. https://opensocietyfoundations.org
8. https://rsf.org/
9. https://timesofmalta.com/
10. https://timesofmalta.com/
11. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/
12. https://www.independent.com.mt/
13. https://www.indexoncensorship.org/
14. https://www.refworld.org/
15. https://www.um.edu.mt/
