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p-ISSN 2083-0157, e-ISSN 2391-6761 IAPGOŚ 4/2022 21
artykuł recenzowany/revised paper IAPGOS, 4/2022, 21–25
http://doi.org/10.35784/iapgos.3317
received: 22.11.2022 | revised: 7.12.2022 | accepted: 15.12.2022 | available online: 30.12.2022
GENERALIZED MODEL OF INFORMATION PROTECTION PROCESS
IN AUDIOVISUAL CONTENT DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
Heorhii Rozorinov1, Oleksandr Hres2, Volodymyr Rusyn2
1National Technical University of Ukraine “Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Politechnic Institute”, Department of Acoustic Multimedia Electronic Systems, Kyiv, Ukraine, 2Yuriy Fedkovych
Chernivtsi National University, Department of Radio Engineering and Information Security, Chernivtsi, Ukraine
Abstract. The most important indicators of the effectiveness of content protection systems are indicators of the achieved security level, i.e. functional
properties of security. These indicators are: confidentiality, integrity, availability. Each of the indicators of the functional properties of content security
is distributed according to the methods of ensuring and the degree of its achievement. A significant drawback of such indicators is that they are qualitative.
This significantly narrows the scope of their use and makes it impossible to use them in mathematical expressions for optimizing the parameters
of protection means, obtaining quantitative estimates of the performance quality of the protection system or its components, etc. The work offers a number
of quantitative indicators, which, depending on the purpose, can be probabilistic and temporal. Calculation of such indicators makes it possible to assess
the degree of ensuring the functional properties of information security or the possible degree of ensuring the functional properties of protected
information.
Keywords: security, content, communication network, model, indicator
UOGÓLNIONY MODEL PROCESU OCHRONY INFORMACJI
W SIECIACH DYSTRYBUCJI TREŚCI AUDIOWIZUALNYCH
Streszczenie. Najważniejszymi wskaźnikami skuteczności systemów ochrony treści są wskaźniki osiągniętego poziomu bezpieczeństwa – właściwości
funkcjonalne zabezpieczeń. Takimi wskaźnikami są: poufność, integralność, dostępność. Każdy ze wskaźników właściwości funkcjonalnych bezpieczeństwa
treści jest podzielony ze względu na metody zapewnienia i stopień ich osiągnięcia. Istotną wadą takich wskaźników jest to, że są one jakościowe. Zawęża to
znacznie zakres ich stosowania i uniemożliwia wykorzystanie ich w wyrażeniach matematycznych do optymalizacji parametrów środków ochrony,
uzyskania ilościowych ocen jakości działania systemu ochrony lub jego elementów itp. W pracy zaproponowano szereg wskaźników ilościowych, które w
zależności od celu mogą mieć charakter probabilistyczny i czasowy. Obliczenie takich wskaźników pozwala ocenić stopień zapewnienia właściwości
funkcjonalnych bezpieczeństwa informacji lub możliwy stopień zapewnienia właściwości użytkowych chronionych informacji.
Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo, treść, sieć komunikacyjna, model, wskaźnik
Introduction
Computer facilities and infocommunication technologies
are intensively implemented in all areas of human activity,
the protection of information in audiovisual content distribution
networks being of particular importance [4].
At the same time, significant contradictions arise: on the one
hand, process automation significantly increases the capabilities
of controls, and on the other hand, it leads to an increase
in the dependence of control stability on the reliability
of the operation of automation equipment and information
protection from unauthorized access and interference [20].
Therefore, along with the requirements for efficiency,
stability, continuity of operation, audiovisual content distribution
networks are also subject to the requirements of such basic system
security indicators as confidentiality, integrity, availability,
and observability of processes related to the use of content.
This raises the classical problem of ensuring the maximum
(or maximum possible) level of efficiency of the protection system
by optimizing the parameters of its elements [17].
One of the main vectors of cyber threats to multimedia
audiovisual content distributed in networks are cyber attacks.
Today, these attacks can be seen simply as secondary threats
creating "noise" in the network.
IoT are very common for protection of information in modern
telecommunication networks [10, 22]. One of the most important
functions of effective protection of the organization's information
system is threat tracking and analysis and calculation
of quantitative indicators of the functional properties of the
security of content distributed in networks [1, 3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 19].
In [11] methods for ensuring data security in mobile standards are
presented. Some methods can be used in programming level with
biometric technical realization [16].
Today, the number of multimedia devices that use audiovisual
content in networks continues to grow rapidly, therefore the issue
of ensuring confidentiality and data security in networks is urgent,
in particular, the development and improvement of information
protection methods and data transmission methods (for example,
based on pseudo-random sequences, chaos, etc.) [13, 14, 15].
The purpose of the work is to develop an effective system
for the protection of audiovisual content with the formalization
of the protection process in general, by developing its model.
1. Indicators of protection efficiency
Developing an effective content protection system
is impossible without knowing what this efficiency is and how
it is evaluated. The efficiency of the system means the degree
of achievement of the goal set before it, and its assessment
requires quantitative or qualitative characteristics,
or a combination of them – the so-called performance indicators
[2]. In so doing, the degree of achievement of the goal
is determined by comparing the value of the achieved performance
indicator with the desired or optimal value.
Quite often, it is difficult or even impossible to evaluate
a complex system with a single efficiency indicator. In such cases,
a system of indicators is introduced, and these indicators can
be contradictory, that is, the improvement of the system according
to some indicators leads to its deterioration according to others.
In such cases, it is necessary to somehow combine these indicators
into one, generalized, or define one of them as the main one,
dominant, and the rest should be considered as certain peculiar
restrictions. It is clear that such a problem is more or less well
solved if these performance indicators have a numerical value and
there are mathematical expressions for their calculation.
To build an effective audiovisual content protection system,
it is necessary to:
1. formulate the purpose of the system functioning,
2. develop an objective function – an expression (expressions)
for calculating an indicator or a set of system indicators,
3. find the optimal or acceptable value of the efficiency indicator
and determine the conditions (values of the system
parameters) under which this value is achieved,
4. determine the components of the system (subsystems
or elements) that provide the necessary parameters.
There are system-wide and partial performance indicators,
which can be qualitative or quantitative. Quantitative performance
indicators are preferable, as they allow easier obtaining numerical
values of the objective function and finding their optimal values.
22 IAPGOŚ 4/2022 p-ISSN 2083-0157, e-ISSN 2391-6761
The task of content protection can be formulated as:
1. achieving the necessary level of protection at the minimum
cost of the permissible level of restrictions on types
of information activities;
2. achieving the highest possible level of protection at acceptable
costs and a given level of restrictions on types of information
activities;
3. achieving the maximum level of protection at the necessary
costs and the minimum level of restrictions on types
of information activities.
Any of these options requires the presence of indicators that
would allow evaluating the effectiveness of solving the problem
of content protection.
The most important indicators of the effectiveness of content
protection systems are indicators of the achieved level of security,
which are called functional properties of security. These indicators
of functional properties of content security are:
1. confidentiality (a feature of information that information
cannot be obtained by an unauthorized user or process),
2. integrity (a feature of information that information cannot
be modified by an unauthorized user or process),
3. availability (a property of information that a user (or process)
with the appropriate authority can use the content
in accordance with the rules established by the security policy
without waiting longer than a specified (small) period
of time).
Each of these indicators of the functional properties of content
security is distributed according to the methods (mechanisms)
of ensuring and the degree of its achievement and has certain
levels [18].
A significant drawback of such indicators is that they
are qualitative. This significantly narrows the scope of their use
and makes it impossible to use them in mathematical expressions
for optimizing the parameters of protective equipment, obtaining
quantitative estimates of the quality of the functioning
of the protection system or its components, etc.
Therefore, this work offers a number of quantitative
indicators, which, depending on the goal, can be probabilistic
and temporal, namely:
1. Quantitative characteristic of violation of the confidentiality
of the content – the probability of meaningful (that is, with
an understanding of the content) reading of the information,
which, depending on the features of the construction
of the protection system, is determined by:
the probability of unauthorized access when
confidentiality is ensured only by means of access
restriction, as well as in the absence or when the violator
overcomes the means of cryptographic transformation
of information,
cryptographic stability of the encrypted content (when
confidentiality is ensured only by means of cryptographic
transformation of information, as well as when the violator
overcomes the means of restricting access to information).
2. Quantitative characteristics of violation of the integrity
of the content, which, depending on the features of the
construction of the protection system is determined by:
the probability of unauthorized access (when integrity
is ensured only by means of access restriction, deliberate
influence of authorized users, and also if the violator does
not have or overcome the means of integrity control),
the probability of information distortion (during random
user impacts, as well as direct impacts of natural factors
on information resources).
3. Quantitative characteristics of violation of content availability,
which, depending on the features of the construction
of the protection system is determined by:
the probability of unauthorized access (when integrity
is ensured only by means of restricting access and
intentional user influences),
delay time in content access (or content delivery).
Calculation of the indicated quantitative characteristics
of content security by means of technical protection makes
it possible to assess the degree of ensuring the functional
properties of information security or the possible degree
of ensuring the functional properties of protected information with
the aid of tools designed for implementation. In both cases,
for such a definition, it is necessary to have either the actual
structural diagrams of the tools used, or models of the tools being
developed for implementation.
An extremely important type of indicators is the economic
(cost) indicators of the effectiveness of the content protection
system. This follows from the fact that cost indicators, regardless
of their origin, can always be reduced to economic costs.
In addition, if the task of protection is not fulfilled or appropriate
tools of protecting the content are not applied, its owner suffers
some damage, which is also often easily reduced to additional
costs and, thus, to economic indicators. And, on the contrary,
the fulfillment of the protection task with the use of appropriate
tools reduces such possible costs and damage, that is, it allows
preventing possible costs.
The amount of damage, including the amount of harm that can
be prevented or the cost of spending a particular content, can be
estimated using:
1. quantitative indicators of security,
2. time indicators of processes related to the organization
and implementation of control,
3. the specific cost per time unit of the delay in the provision
of relevant services for the use of content and the duration
of such a delay,
4. the cost of spending this or that content – also due to the cost
of the time unit of its use and the duration of its use,
5. the intensity of content security threat flows.
6. At the same time, the dependence of cost indicators of security
on the listed variables can be considered as an objective
function, and time and other characteristics can be used
as parameters (in some cases, as restrictions) for optimizing
economic (cost) performance indicators.
For the technical protection of content, which effectively
provides the required level of functional services or functional
security properties in the conditions of the influence of threats
to these functional security properties, it is advisable to:
1. Formalize the process of technical protection of content
in general, by developing its adequate model.
2. Formalize the processes of ensuring the functional properties
of content security by developing models of such processes
and introduce their quantitative characteristics.
3. Determine the composition and sufficiency (functional
completeness) of the tools that should be used for the technical
protection of content.
2. Generalized model of technical content
protection
The general formulation of the task of formalizing the content
protection process is as follows [6].
Let there be a protected audiovisual content distribution
network, the information resources of which are the objects
of influence of unauthorized users-infringers, who, by
their unauthorized actions on the resources of this network, create
i (i = 1, 2, 3) types of threats to these resources, namely: threats
to privacy, threats to integrity and availability threats (Fig. 1).
Let a successful attempt to implement each of these threats cause
damage to the system (or its owner) (for example, in the form
of monetary damage), the amount of which depends on the type
of threat, the duration of its action and is equal to conventional
units per unit of time on average. Let also this damage be
of an additive nature, that is, it can accumulate depending on the
number and duration of threats that have not been countered.
Obviously, the amount, nature and even the time
of manifestation of damage depends on the type of the
corresponding threat. For example, the implementation
p-ISSN 2083-0157, e-ISSN 2391-6761 IAPGOŚ 4/2022 23
of an availability threat leads to the blocking of the network
and the termination of the service provision process. Realized
threats to the integrity of part of the basic and application software
are equivalent to threats to availability, and as threats to some
information resources.
Realized privacy threats most likely will not affect the
network performance in any way, but may manifest themselves
in the area of damage due to loss of image, trust in the owner
of the content (or relevant information), failure of contracts, loss
of positions in the service market, etc. Therefore, the mechanisms
of calculating or recalculating the possible damage into
conventional units Fi per unit of time have different complexity,
but these mechanisms are either known or can be developed quite
simply.
Fig. 1. Abstract model of technical content protection
Thus, there is a subsystem of technical protection
of information, which provides protection against each of the
types of specified threats with probability
i
p
, and includes tools
of protecting confidentiality, tools of protecting integrity,
and tools of protecting availability (Fig. 1) [6]. The subsystem
performs its functions by periodically (with a period
ki
T
)
monitoring the network's performance, which is formulated as its
ability to provide its own functional service – observation, through
the use of appropriate monitoring tools. We will assume that such
control requires
ki
T
time units. The frequency of control
is determined by the owners of the protected resources, by any
regulatory documents, or by the security administrator, and this
control can be carried out at the start of the protection procedure.
During the control, there is a check for violations of the network
performance, its update, an audit of events related to information
security, necessary reconfiguration of the parameters of the tools
of ensuring the corresponding functional properties (for example,
changing identifiers, passwords, key sets, with the help of which
access control is ensured, necessary crypto- and impersonation
resistance, etc.). The duration of control depends on the control
methods implemented in the protection subsystem and the
methods of their implementation [7, 20, 21]. Violations detected
during control are eliminated. For this, it is possible to use various
tools – the same backup copies, special fast-acting procedures
(algorithms) for restoring integrity, etc. It is clear that the duration
of the relevant procedures and the probability of correctly solving
these problems depend on the quality of the applied methods
and means of control and elimination of violations (resumption
of working capacity).
In so doing, the overall goal of the functioning
of the protection system is to minimize possible harm to the
system or its owner by counteracting a variety of possible threats
to the integrity, confidentiality and availability of network
information resources.
In the mathematical formulation, this problem is reduced
to the definition and optimization of the objective function, which
describes the dependence of certain harm on the parameters
of the protection system, the conditions for its application,
and the characteristics of threats.
When determining the objective function, it should
be assumed that the effects of these threats have certain frequency-
time characteristics (for example, in the form of the probability
of the occurrence of a threat during some average time interval).
But for protection with information resources that are tempting
for violators, it is appropriate to assume that such a probability
is close to unity throughout the entire time of protection.
Each of the mentioned threats has as a consequence some
damage to the content owner, if the corresponding protection
system did not detect and counteract this damage. Let the
probability of such an event be equal to
dіipq 1
, where
dі
p
is the probability of detection and subsequent countermeasures
against the i-th type threat. It is clear that
12di i i
p p p
is the
probability for a threat of the i-th type, where
2i
p
is the probability
of countering the same threat.
In this case, an undetected threat causes damage to the content
)1( diii pFQ
owner per unit of time.
If we assume that the duration of the impact of the i-th threat
is equal to
Di
T
, then the amount of damage can be determined as
diiDiipFTQ 1
. (1)
The duration of the impact of the threat
Di
T
, hence the
duration of damage accumulation, is a random value in the time
interval (0,
kiki TT
), where
ki
T
is the duration of time between
two adjacent checks of the performance of the protection system
against threats of the i-th type, and
ki
T
is the duration of the i-th
type of control and update of the functional properties
of information security, for example, integrity (we believe that
during control the system is inoperable and it is impossible
to harm it by implementing any threats). It can be assumed that
kikiDi TTT
, if the violator managed to implement the threat
immediately after the end of the corresponding control procedure,
and
0
Di
T
in the case of an attempt to implement the threat
immediately before its start. The worst conditions, in terms of the
amount of possible damage, are created at
kikiDi TTT
,
therefore, when developing a protection system, it is advisable to
focus on this duration of the threat. At the same time, the
maximum possible value of damage of the i-th type
)1()(
max diikikiDiipFTTTQ
(2)
Since the damage is additive in nature, the maximum amount
of possible total damage (PTD) can be defined as
ni
idiikiki
ni
iiPTD pFTTQQ
11 max1 )1()(
(3)
But (3) does not take into account the fact that during
the performance control of the protection system for the duration
ki
T
of time units, it is unable (especially in the case of detection
of an attempt to influence with the probability of this event
i
p
)
to perform its functions (at least in full), which is equivalent
to damage, which occurs when the system is idle, since
the implementation of the functional service “observability”
and "maintenance" of attempts at such influence also requires
spending a protection resource.
The amount of this damage can be defined as
21
in
PTD di ki i
i
Q p T C
(4)
where
i
C
is the damage due to downtime of the corresponding
network resources during control, in conventional units per unit
of time. Then
12
1
( )(1 )
in
PTD PTD PTD i ki ki di di i ki
i
Q Q Q F T T p p C T
(5)
24 IAPGOŚ 4/2022 p-ISSN 2083-0157, e-ISSN 2391-6761
It can be seen from expression (5) that it can be accepted
as the target function of the protection system, since it reflects
the dependence on the process and conditions of system operation.
Indeed, the value of possible total damage (PTD) is the smaller,
the smaller the number of threats n; the amount of damage
i
C
that can be caused by the successful implementation of each type
of threat; control period
ki
T
; duration of the i-th type of control
ki
T
; and the more is the probability of detecting
and counteracting the threat of the i-th type
di
p
; size difference
kiki TT
.
Expression (5) is easily reduced to the form
1 1 1
(1 )
i n i n i n
PTD i ki i ki di di i i di ki
i i i
Q FT FT p p C F p T
(6)
It is easy to make sure that the minuend, provided that
the value of the frequency of control
ki
T
is not a control
parameter, is equal to the maximum possible damage that can be
caused to the network in the absence of counteraction to the
impact of threats from the information security system.
Then it is clear that the value
11
(1 )
P
i n i n
PTD i ki di di i i di ki
ii
Q FT p p C F p T
(7)
is equal to the amount of damage that is eliminated (prevented)
due to the protection of resources by the system. Therefore,
this value can be applied as a separate objective function.
In expression (7), the value
ki
T
consists of the duration
of the control process (search for the fact of violation or non-
violation of the corresponding functional property of information
security)
ki
t
and the duration of the process of resuming
the possibility of its provision.
For the sake of certainty, we will assume that now we are
talking about ensuring the integrity of information. As already
mentioned, control of the network's ability to provide
the appropriate functional service, in this case – the integrity
of information, can be carried out by applying some standard
procedures (checking by tests, etc.). Let the characteristic
of the control process be its duration
ki
t
. If a violation
of integrity is detected during the control process, it is updated
using, for example, backup copies of the relevant information.
That is, the duration of the update is equal to zero, if a violation
of the network's ability to provide one or the other of its functional
properties, for example, integrity, is not detected during
monitoring, or, if such a violation is detected, it is equal
to the duration of the update process of the same functional
property –
ni
t
. Characteristics of the update process – the
duration of the update itself
ni
t
and the likelihood of its need
di
p
– the probability of detecting integrity violations. Then the
expectation of the update duration is
dinididini ptppt )1(0
(8)
That is, the duration of the entire control and update process
is a random variable and is determined by the duration of the
control process itself
ki
t
and the duration of the update
ni
t
with probability
di
p
. The average value of a quantity
ki
T
,
its mathematical expectation can be defined as
dinikiki pttT
. (9)
Extending this to processes associated with threats of any
type, the expression for calculating the value of harm to be
prevented can be written as:
ninikiiiiiikiiPTDPi pttpFCppTFQ )1(
(10)
It is clear that the protection system is more effective
the smaller the amount of damage (5) and the larger the amount
of damage prevented (10). To do this, you should increase
the value of the probability
i
p
and reduce the duration
of the control procedure
ki
T
. By the way, at
1
i
p
i.e. with
a protection system that is absolutely reliable in terms of detecting
and eliminating threats, the amount of damage that is prevented
acquires a maximum value, which is equal to:
ni
i
ni
ikiikiiPTDP TCTFQ
1 1
max
(11)
or
ni
i
ni
idinikiikiiPTDP pttCTFQ
1 1
max
(12)
that is, it is equal to the maximum possible damage due
to the successful implementation of threats, which is reduced
by the amount of the maximum possible damage due to an idle
network during control. It also follows from expressions (7), (10)
that it is advisable to apply network protection against threats
of any type only when the value of the damage to be prevented
is not negative (is greater than zero). For threats of the i-th type,
this means that
0)1( kiiiiiikiiTpFCppTF
. (13)
whence one can find the limit on the duration of control
ki
T
(at a certain value
i
p
)
)1(/ iiiidikiidinikiki pFCppTFpttT
(14)
or on the probability
di
p
(taking into account that
kiki TT
)
)/()/( iikikikikidi FCTTTTp
(15)
Since protection systems are used in practice, in which
the value of the probability of detecting and further countering
a threat of the i-th type approaches unity, expression (14)
can be simplified.
)/( iikidinikiki CFTpttT
(16)
It should be noted that the values
ki
T
and
di
p
obtained
from inequalities (10) – (16) are limited to those values when
the application of control gives a gain that exceeds the losses
of the network due to its downtime during control, that is,
the system becomes efficient and its application is cost effective.
In other words, expressions (15), (16) are conditions
for the expediency of using a system of protection against threats
of this type.
3. Conclusions
1. The values of the probabilities should be chosen the greater,
the more significant the losses in case of failure to detect the fact
of a successful implementation of the threat compared to the
losses due to network downtime during the control (the greater the
value of the ratio
ii CF /
).
On the contrary, the more operative the control is (with
a shorter duration of the control procedure
ki
t
, for example,
integrity and a shorter duration of the further update procedure
ni
t
) the smaller this probability may be. Moreover,
the more significant the losses due to failure to detect the fact
of a successful implementation of the threat compared to the
losses due to network downtime during monitoring (the greater the
value of the ratio
ii CF /
) and the greater the values of the
required or acceptable monitoring durations
ki
T
and the
probabilities of detecting and countering the threat of the i-th type
di
p
, the more perfect, and therefore, longer should be the control.
2. The considered generalized model makes it possible
to obtain a number of conditions, restrictions and optimal values
of the most general parameters of the protection system, which are
most important for solving the problem of protecting audiovisual
content, but do not allow formulating more specific requirements
for the composition and parameters of the protection system
or its components.
p-ISSN 2083-0157, e-ISSN 2391-6761 IAPGOŚ 4/2022 25
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D.Sc. Heorhii Rozorinov
e-mail: grozoryn@gmail.com
National Technical University of Ukraine “Igor
Sikorsky Kyiv Politechnic Institute” Department of
Acoustic Multimedia Electronic Systems.
D.Sc. (Engineering Sciences) Professor of Department
of Audiotechnic and Information Registration.
Research interests: pseudorandom sequence
generators; encryption information, acoustics.
Author of nearly 135 publications.
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6095-7539
Ph.D. Oleksandr Hres
e-mail: o.hres@chnu.edu.ua
Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University
Department of Radio Engineering and Information
Security. Ph.D. (Engineering Sciences) Assistant
Professor of Department of Radio Engineering and
Information Security.
Research interests: pseudorandom sequence
generators; encryption information. Author of nearly
42 publications.
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8465-193X
Ph.D. Volodymyr Rusyn
e-mail: rusyn_v@ukr.net
Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University
Department of Radio Engineering and Information
Security. Ph.D. (Engineering Sciences) Assistant
Professor of Department of Radio Engineering and
Information Security.
Research interests: modeling of nonlinear equations
and chaotic generators; control of chaotic oscillations.
Author of nearly 85 publications.
http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6219-1031
