Port Strategy to Minimise COVID-19 Risk in Cruise Ports: Application to the Port of Arrecife in Lanzarote

Abstract

The main objective of this article is to develop a methodology to detect, assess and prevent biosecurity-related risks. Currently, the main risk found in our daily life is COVID-19, which has triggered a serious global pandemic. As a result, economic and social activity has suffered a decline in its development and evolution compared to previous years. All activity has come to a standstill and we are in a process of improvement that needs time. With the help of this methodology, focused on cruise traffic, it will be possible to identify the greatest existing threat and the process by which this high level of risk occurs. Once identified, a series of measures can be proposed to mitigate and prevent the risk, in order to make the port a safer place. The main aim is to recover cruise traffic as soon as possible, as it makes an important contribution to the tourism sector and to the cities and countries where cruise ships call.

Full text

Citation: Camarero Orive, A.;
González-Cancelas, N.; Avilés López,
N. Port Strategy to Minimise
COVID-19 Risk in Cruise Ports:
Application to the Port of Arrecife in
Lanzarote. J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10,
1990. https://doi.org/10.3390/
jmse10121990
Academic Editor: Jin Wang
Received: 2 November 2022
Accepted: 2 December 2022
Published: 14 December 2022
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral
with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affil-
iations.
Copyright: © 2022 by the authors.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
Journal of
Marine Science
and Engineering
Article
Port Strategy to Minimise COVID-19 Risk in Cruise Ports:
Application to the Port of Arrecife in Lanzarote
Alberto Camarero Orive * , Nicoletta González-Cancelas and Noelia Avilés López
Department of Transport, Territorial and Urban Planning Engineering, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid,
28040 Madrid, Spain
*Correspondence: alberto.camarero@upm.es
Abstract:
The main objective of this article is to develop a methodology to detect, assess and prevent
biosecurity-related risks. Currently, the main risk found in our daily life is COVID-19, which has
triggered a serious global pandemic. As a result, economic and social activity has suffered a decline
in its development and evolution compared to previous years. All activity has come to a standstill
and we are in a process of improvement that needs time. With the help of this methodology, focused
on cruise traffic, it will be possible to identify the greatest existing threat and the process by which
this high level of risk occurs. Once identified, a series of measures can be proposed to mitigate and
prevent the risk, in order to make the port a safer place. The main aim is to recover cruise traffic as
soon as possible, as it makes an important contribution to the tourism sector and to the cities and
countries where cruise ships call.
Keywords: port; risk analysis; biosecurity; cruise ships; pandemic
1. Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic that broke out in 2020 was a turning point in our lives. In the
field of transport, the importance of the sector for economic and social development became
evident. As for ports, which are the main entry and exit point for goods in a country such
as Spain, their role has been essential for the sustainability of the economy, and although
traffic was affected during lock-down restrictions, it recovered after the return to normal
activity. However, passenger traffic, and more specifically cruise ship traffic, was strongly
affected; the latter was reduced to almost zero values due to the fear of contagion and the
lack of protocols in ports to minimise the risk of transmission of the virus.
The information related to existing risks, particularly those related to biosecurity, as
well as the methodologies that have been developed and are currently in use, do not focus
on cruise traffic in our ports, which need an effective and efficient solution to minimise risks
and return to pre-pandemic traffic. In view of this situation, there is a lack of research that
defines a methodology for assessing, detecting and preventing biosecurity-related risks, in
particular COVID-19, in the ports of the Spanish port system, focusing on the case of cruise
ship traffic due to the greater degree of exposure to biological risk. In order to detect and
evaluate the risk, it is necessary to distinguish the threats and the assets that are exposed
to these threats within the port processes involved in cruise ship traffic. It is necessary
to identify the threats through which cruise ship traffic is subject to biological risks by
establishing qualitative and quantitative criteria to draw up risk matrices for each of the
processes. It will be necessary to consider the probability of occurrence of the threat, the
consequences it produces and the vulnerability that is present at each moment according to
the process.
With these three variables differentiated, it will be possible to obtain the impact of
the risk as a product of these variables and, in this way, it will be possible to identify the
level of risk that exists in each of the port processes for cruise ship traffic. With the help
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990. https://doi.org/10.3390/jmse10121990 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/jmse

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 2 of 17
of individual risk matrices obtained for each process, a global matrix can be obtained that
allows the risk to be assessed as accurately as possible. Thus, it is possible to propose
preventive and mitigating measures for each type of hazard and in each zone of the port
typology studied.
Thus, the problem to be solved is to define a methodology for the activities and
processes that should be applied in Spanish ports for cruise ship traffic in order to minimise
possible contagions derived from COVID-19.
Thus, the aim of this article is to propose a methodology to be applied to the case
of cruise ship traffic in Spanish ports to detect, evaluate and prevent COVID-19 risks
associated with cruise ship traffic in ports. The proposed methodology can be applied to
cruise terminals in all ports in the Spanish port system, although this article has focused on
the port of Arrecife, in Lanzarote, which, due to its island nature and the importance of
cruise traffic, is a highly representative example.
The port of Arrecife currently has three kilometres of mooring line, 120 hectares of
flotation and 450,000 square metres of land area. Cruise traffic is one of its greatest assets,
with some 423,000 cruise passengers a year, making it the second port in the Canary Islands
in terms of cruise arrivals. It is fundamentally a port of call, where ships dock between the
beginning and the end of their voyage and can stay there for a day or even just a few hours.
There are several docks where cruise ships can dock (Figure 1): Muelle de Cruceros,
Naos, Mármoles, Prolongación de Mármoles, Transbordadores Poniente and, in the event
of an emergency or last-minute request for a stopover in an exceptional situation, Transbor-
dadores Naciente, provided that it is not occupied by container ships.
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 2 of 18
level of risk that exists in each of the port processes for cruise ship traffic. With the help of
individual risk matrices obtained for each process, a global matrix can be obtained that
allows the risk to be assessed as accurately as possible. Thus, it is possible to propose
preventive and mitigating measures for each type of hazard and in each zone of the port
typology studied.
Thus, the problem to be solved is to define a methodology for the activities and pro-
cesses that should be applied in Spanish ports for cruise ship traffic in order to minimise
possible contagions derived from COVID-19.
Thus, the aim of this article is to propose a methodology to be applied to the case of
cruise ship traffic in Spanish ports to detect, evaluate and prevent COVID-19 risks associ-
ated with cruise ship traffic in ports. The proposed methodology can be applied to cruise
terminals in all ports in the Spanish port system, although this article has focused on the
port of Arrecife, in Lanzarote, which, due to its island nature and the importance of cruise
traffic, is a highly representative example.
The port of Arrecife currently has three kilometres of mooring line, 120 hectares of
flotation and 450,000 square metres of land area. Cruise traffic is one of its greatest assets,
with some 423,000 cruise passengers a year, making it the second port in the Canary Is-
lands in terms of cruise arrivals. It is fundamentally a port of call, where ships dock be-
tween the beginning and the end of their voyage and can stay there for a day or even just
a few hours.
There are several docks where cruise ships can dock (Figure 1): Muelle de Cruceros,
Naos, Mármoles, Prolongación de Mármoles, Transbordadores Poniente and, in the event
of an emergency or last-minute request for a stopover in an exceptional situation, Trans-
bordadores Naciente, provided that it is not occupied by container ships.
Figure 1. Map of the port of Arrecife. Source: Port Authority of Las Palmas.
Figure 2 clearly shows the evolution of cruise ship traffic throughout the year in the
Port of Arrecife. Furthermore, it can also be seen that in 2020, with the start of the pan-
demic caused by COVID-19, traffic came to a standstill from March onwards and by the
end of the year it was growing slightly. In 2021 it was not able to recover 100% of its ca-
pacity, due to restrictions and measures that still had to be carried out.
Figure 1. Map of the port of Arrecife. Source: Port Authority of Las Palmas.
Figure 2clearly shows the evolution of cruise ship traffic throughout the year in the
Port of Arrecife. Furthermore, it can also be seen that in 2020, with the start of the pandemic
caused by COVID-19, traffic came to a standstill from March onwards and by the end of
the year it was growing slightly. In 2021 it was not able to recover 100% of its capacity, due
to restrictions and measures that still had to be carried out.

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 3 of 17
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 3 of 18
Figure 2. Evolution of cruise traffic in the Port of Arrecife. Source: Port Authority of Las Palmas.
In terms of the number of passengers in each month of the year, there is a clear up-
ward trend in the winter months, with the summer months being the months with the
fewest passengers.
All in all, this article contributes to the minimisation of contagions derived from
COVID-19 through the application of risk mitigation measures following the application
of the proposed methodology for cruise ship port traffic. It should be noted that the article
represents a significant advance in the application of the methodology to a type of port
traffic which is of great importance and vulnerability and which had not been studied
before.
2. State of the Art
The scientific world is developing techniques for the identification and preventive
analysis of risks so that appropriate risk elimination, mitigation, control or assurance
measures can be implemented. In particular, ports are sources of risk to their environment,
as well as being subject to risks (antisocial, natural, political, etc.).
A port project, as a whole, requires serious identification and analysis of the risks that
may occur and an appropriate strategy to deal with them.
The most commonly used techniques for the identification of risks in a port according
to [1] are:
• The specifications of the applicable technical regulations.
• Pathological experience in this type of facility.
• The experience of risk professionals.
• Staging of professionals at risk.
• The staging of situations, using Fuente-Diana techniques.
• The study of flows or activities within the port.
• Laboratory experimentation on uncertain situations.
• Surveys of operators or technicians or users of the facilities.
• Analysis of conflicts of interest between parties and contracts.
Biosafety is understood as a set of rules, measures and protocols that are applied in
multiple procedures related to scientific research and teaching work with the aim of con-
tributing to the prevention of risks or infections derived from exposure to potentially in-
fectious agents or with significant biological, chemical and/or physical risk loads, such as,
for example, the handling of special waste, the storage of reagents and the use of protec-
tive barriers [2].
Figure 2. Evolution of cruise traffic in the Port of Arrecife. Source: Port Authority of Las Palmas.
In terms of the number of passengers in each month of the year, there is a clear
upward trend in the winter months, with the summer months being the months with the
fewest passengers.
All in all, this article contributes to the minimisation of contagions derived from
COVID-19 through the application of risk mitigation measures following the application
of the proposed methodology for cruise ship port traffic. It should be noted that the
article represents a significant advance in the application of the methodology to a type
of port traffic which is of great importance and vulnerability and which had not been
studied before.
2. State of the Art
The scientific world is developing techniques for the identification and preventive
analysis of risks so that appropriate risk elimination, mitigation, control or assurance
measures can be implemented. In particular, ports are sources of risk to their environment,
as well as being subject to risks (antisocial, natural, political, etc.).
A port project, as a whole, requires serious identification and analysis of the risks that
may occur and an appropriate strategy to deal with them.
The most commonly used techniques for the identification of risks in a port according
to [1] are:
•The specifications of the applicable technical regulations.
•Pathological experience in this type of facility.
•The experience of risk professionals.
•Staging of professionals at risk.
•The staging of situations, using Fuente-Diana techniques.
•The study of flows or activities within the port.
•Laboratory experimentation on uncertain situations.
•Surveys of operators or technicians or users of the facilities.
•Analysis of conflicts of interest between parties and contracts.
Biosafety is understood as a set of rules, measures and protocols that are applied
in multiple procedures related to scientific research and teaching work with the aim of
contributing to the prevention of risks or infections derived from exposure to potentially
infectious agents or with significant biological, chemical and/or physical risk loads, such
as, for example, the handling of special waste, the storage of reagents and the use of
protective barriers [2].

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 4 of 17
In Spain, in the workplace, the reference regulation related to the exposure of workers
to biological agents is Royal Decree 664/1997 of 12 May [3].
In the work environment, infectious and parasitic processes can be transmitted in
different ways; often they are diseases carried by animals and spread to a worker who is
in contact or in proximity to the animal or its products. Other times it can be caused by
transmission from other human beings, where the spread occurs mainly through the air,
utensils or devices for personal or shared use. Another source of risk is the handling of
contaminated products, where living organisms reach the handler’s body through contact,
wounds, or by simple release into the environment [3].
The different types of biosecurity-related risks that can occur are as follows [4]:
•
Biological risk: refers to all micro-organisms and their toxins, including genetically
modified micro-organisms in cell cultures and human parasites, that are likely to cause
any type of infection, allergy or toxicity.
•
Physical risk: this enhances the biological risk and depends on the physical state of
each person, which may present a greater or lesser risk of contracting the disease.
•
Chemical risk: enhances biological risk and may cause laboratory hazards or the
unplanned release of viruses and laboratory-generated diseases.
•
Psychophysiological or human risk: this enhances the biological risk, depending on
the state of health of each person and the consequences that the disease may have on
his or her body.
•
Environmental risk: may increase the likelihood of disease transmission through
the environment.
Biological risk assessment is one of the key principles of biosecurity, the process used to
identify the hazard characteristics of an infectious organism, the activities that could lead to
exposure, the likelihood of contracting a disease following exposure and the consequences
of infection [
5
]. In 2020, with the onset of the global pandemic caused by COVID-19, the
identification and assessment of biosecurity-related risks became the key element of any
economic or social activity. This disease is transmitted from person to person through
contact with respiratory droplets from infected persons transmitted directly or through
secretions contaminating hands and objects. It is also necessary to consider that biological
agents are found everywhere, so any activity can have a risk of exposure, especially where
animals and plants and their products or wastes are present or handled and where people
are present [
6
]. All this has led to society’s need to regain confidence in security in its daily
activities. It should be borne in mind that there is no such thing as regaining confidence
under the principle of absolute security and there is a need for society to visualise risk
and make decisions based on that risk [
7
]. The International Labour Organisation (ILO)
produced a document on safety and health in the workplace and the most appropriate way
to proceed in the case of COVID-19, as it is also an occupational disease as soon as one is
infected at the workplace. Country-specific protocols on health, safety and occupational
risk prevention have been developed in relation to operations, the health system, etc. [7].
According to [
8
], a risk event is any event that is not known for sure in advance. Based
on this, it can be concluded that risk rules out certain events and that some events that are
not known today may be known tomorrow. This implies that attempting to rationalise risk
events may conflict with the scientific belief that any event can be explained in a cause-
effect framework. Despite this, the fact remains that risk events do exist; this argument is
supported by three main factors.
First, there is a risk due to our inability to accurately control and/or measure some
causal factors of events; second, there is a risk due to our limited ability to process informa-
tion; and third, the information needed to fully analyse a system should be obtained only if
its benefits outweigh its cost. Regarding biological agents affecting biosecurity, these can be
classified by species (bacteria, viruses, fungi and parasites), by their dangerousness, their
ease of propagation, degree of effectiveness and the existence or not of a vaccine [3].
According to these criteria, there are four groups of organisms that correspond to four
different levels of danger, as follows [3]:

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 5 of 17
•Group 1: Biological agent unlikely to cause disease in humans.
•
Group 2: A pathogenic agent that can cause disease in humans and may pose a
hazard to workers, is unlikely to spread to the community and effective treatments are
available to mitigate it.
•
Group 3: A pathogenic agent that can cause disease in humans and presents a serious
hazard to workers; there is a risk of spreading to the community and effective treatment
is generally available.
•
Group 4: Pathogen causing serious disease in humans and posing a serious hazard
to workers, with a high likelihood of spreading to the community and generally no
effective treatment.
Regarding biosecurity in ports, the International Association of Engineers and Ar-
chitects (IAEA) has created a “safe and resilient port” label for biosecure ports due to the
need for cruise ships and ports in general to have infection prevention and safety measures
and protective equipment for their crew members, providing continuity of activities and
adjusting liability in case of contagion [7].
In particular, the cruise industry faces the challenge of reducing the biosecurity risk to
desirable or even excellent levels. Therefore, the IAEA label develops a classification of the
level of biosecurity adopted by ports in terms of civil and occupational biosecurity [7].
This label establishes the gradation of protection to adjust the risk at each level with
the aim of ensuring biosecurity within cruise ships and classifies them into three different
levels: adequate, outstanding and excellent [7].
•
Adequate: complies with protocols and mandatory means of protection are incorporated.
•
Highlighted: risk prevention and risk-based means of protection and means of protec-
tion against biosecurity risks are incorporated. This is the desirable level.
•
Excellent: level where the risk is fully managed and the available means of protection
are used to the maximum level that corresponds to the lowest level of risk.
The objectives of the label are to manage biosafety by applying the principles of
risk prevention to minimise exposure and mitigate its consequences, in order to meet the
requirements and demands that apply from the legal, social, ethical, moral, economic and
scientific points of view.
The IAEA certifies ports that adopt and implement the measures that the label entails
and that demonstrate compliance with the biosecurity criteria, which implies that measures
have been taken for the prevention, minimisation and control of risks, that individual and
collective protection elements are in place, that work organisation is carried out and that
economic activities are coordinated [7].
To ensure compliance with the IAEA Mark, ISO 31000 is applied. A multidisciplinary
team of experts (chemists, virologists, engineers, architects) is required to draw up the
protection systems map, analyse its reliability and design the final risk assessment tool.
In addition, the team must verify the level of compliance of each of the dimensions using
a scoring procedure, calculate the total and use the result to define the cruise level and
continuously monitor compliance [7].
It is not only cruise ships that are a major source of disease transmission and biosecurity
risk, but also the handling of different cargoes arriving in ports on ships from countries
all over the world. One example is the loading and unloading of live animals and the
measures taken to prevent the occurrence of risks [9].
To be more specific, the possible impact of COVID-19 on the analysis of biosecurity
in ports can be analysed in more detail. Among the problems that this pandemic may
generate in ports, it can be stated that there is a wide range of implications and risks in the
shipping industry, regarding the health of the crew and passengers, the difficulty of crew
changes or the refusal of the crew to go to an affected area.
A risk assessment is a tool used to evaluate operational risks so that an organisation
can effectively mitigate and manage them to an acceptable level [
10
]. Risk analysis is a
systematic process that is based on the scientific collection and evaluation of information

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 6 of 17
relevant to a given risk, which is called a risk factor, in order to be able to estimate the
probability of occurrence and the impact that its occurrence may have. The risk to be
analysed is related to preventing the introduction of pathogens, preventing contagion and
preventing it from being too late to control the spread of a disease.
Once the risks have been identified and classified, an analysis of the risks must be
carried out by studying the possibility of occurrence and the consequences of each risk
factor in order to establish the level of risk of the project.
The task of risk management should include an estimation of the magnitude of a
particular risk and an assessment of the significance of the risk. The risk management
process has two parts [11]:
•
Risk evaluation: quantification of risk from data and understanding of the
processes involved.
•
Risk assessment: the social and political judgement of the importance of various risks
as faced by individuals and communities.
In order to understand risk and compare different risks, it is necessary to quantify
risk by collecting information on the effects of the various hazards that cause risk and on
the basis of statistical analyses that predict the likelihood of future events. Identifying the
causes and effects and understanding the processes of disastrous events is critical for future
risk assessment [11].
The accuracy of risk quantification depends largely on the amount of information
available. The number of events for which information is available must be sufficiently
high to be statistically significant and the quality and accuracy of the information must be
adequate. The three following components of risk assessment are essential [12]:
•
The probability of occurrence of the hazard: the likelihood of experiencing a natural
or technological hazard in a location or region;
•
Elements at risk: identification and preparation of an inventory of elements that could
be affected in the event of a hazard and where the estimation of their economic value
is necessary;
•
Vulnerability of risk elements: estimation of the damage people or buildings or any
element will suffer if they experience some level of risk.
The methods most commonly used to carry out risk analysis are grouped into three
classes [13]:
•
Qualitative methods: These are the most commonly used methods in risk analysis for
decision making in business projects. They can be used when the risk is low and does
not justify the time and resources needed to do a full analysis. These methods include
brainstorming, questionnaires and interviews, evaluation for multidisciplinary groups
and specialist and expert judgement, known as the Delphi technique.
•
Semi-quantitative methods: classifications such as high, medium or low, or more
detailed descriptions of likelihood and consequence are used. These ratings are
demonstrated in relation to an appropriate scale for calculating the level of risk.
Special attention should be paid to the scale in order to avoid misunderstandings or
misinterpretations of the calculation results.
•
Quantitative methods: these involve assigning occurrence values to the different
risks identified, i.e., calculating the level of risk. They include probability analysis,
consequence analysis and computer simulation. The most relevant is the Monte Carlo
method, which is detailed below.
The Monte Carlo method seeks to represent reality through a mathematical risk model
so that, by randomly assigning values to the variables of the model, different scenarios
and results are obtained. It is based on a sufficiently high number of iterations to be
representative of reality. Using the results obtained from the different iterations, a statistical
study is carried out from which relevant conclusions are drawn regarding the risk of a
project [13].

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 7 of 17
Other articles such as [
14
], tried to estimate the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on
shipping trade. Using panel data and by comparing behaviour in three different regions of
the world (Southeast Asia, North America and the European Union), trends were analysed.
It is clear that government prevention and control measures have a negative impact on
export trade, whereas import trade increases accordingly.
In [
15
], a framework was proposed to analyse the impact of COVID-19 on port traffic
using Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, whereas [
16
] analysed the impact of
the pandemic on individuals’ willingness to go on a cruise depending on the country
of residence.
Finally, [
17
] examined the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on cruise passengers’
behaviour and provided a guiding framework that helps cruise academics and operators to
maximise existing and potential passengers’ favourable decisions.
3. Methodology
All risk analysis is based on the identification of threats, which in our case refers to
those arising from the existence of the global pandemic caused by COVID-19 leaving aside
all those that may occur with regard to other aspects within the port [18].
The first step was identifying the new parameters that must be considered when
assessing the risks to different types of ports, which involved reviewing the existing
methodologies for assessing risks to infrastructures and selecting the methodologies that
are best suited to ports [
19
–
21
], taking into account the specific characteristics of the port
considered in this paper.
The proposed methodology aims to focus on the land side of the port, especially on
the processes that are related to cruise traffic. In order to carry out the methodology, it is
necessary to use data from actual events that currently occur in port terminals, in order
to know the probability of the occurrence of hazards, the consequences they could cause
and the vulnerability of the port to these hazards. The methodology used the following
steps (Figure 3).
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 8 of 18
Figure 3. Summary of steps to be followed in the proposed methodology. Source: own elaboration
Stage 1: Identify the processes that take place in the port. This stage seeks to identify
all the processes that take place within the port when the ship arrives at the port, distin-
guishing between port of call and home port.
Step 2: Identify the threats that may occur and the assets exposed. Once the processes
in the port have been identified on arrival of the vessel, the different threats to which each
of the assets that are exposed must be taken into account. The port authorities are involved
in these processes in order to carry out all the activities necessary to provide the different
port services.
Step 3: Establish qualitative and quantitative criteria for the risk matrix, which are
necessary to identify a scale for measuring the impact of the different threats on each of
the processes when assessing the risk.
Step 4: Define a risk matrix for each process. In order to draw up the risk matrices for
each of the processes being developed, the probability of occurrence of the threat, the con-
sequences that it would generate in the event of occurrence and the vulnerability of each
of the processes exposed to these threats must be considered.
Step 5: Obtain a global risk matrix. In order to summarise the risk matrices for each
of the processes, a global matrix must be obtained for each type of port studied, port and
port of call, which allows the risk in each of them to be assessed and the areas most ex-
posed to hazards to be identified.
Stage 6: Propose preventive and risk mitigation measures. Once the threats have been
identified and the risk assessed, it is necessary to propose a series of measures to prevent
and mitigate the risk in each of the processes identified for each type of port.
4. Discussion
4.1. Identification of Processes
The processes that are carried out from the moment the ship enters port waters must
be differentiated between the arrival and departure branches. In the same way, when con-
sidering the processes, the different areas of the port in which they are carried out are also
separated into the following: the external area of entry and exit of the port, the internal
area of the terminal and the external area of embarkation/disembarkation of passengers.
In the case of the port of call, the arrival of the ship at the port and disembarkation of
passengers takes place in the following process (Figure 4):
• Arrival of the cruise ship in port: embarkation of the pilot or pilot on board the cruise
ship in port waters.
Figure 3. Summary of steps to be followed in the proposed methodology. Source: own elaboration.
The proposed methodology is based on different phases that allow an approach to
the issue to be resolved by identifying the main threats to which cruise ship traffic is
exposed in ports and establishing criteria that allow risk matrices to be defined for the
different processes considered in port operations. Thus, a global risk matrix can be defined
to adequately assess the level of risk and define risk mitigation actions.

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 8 of 17
Stage 1: Identify the processes that take place in the port. This stage seeks to identify all
the processes that take place within the port when the ship arrives at the port, distinguishing
between port of call and home port.
Step 2: Identify the threats that may occur and the assets exposed. Once the processes
in the port have been identified on arrival of the vessel, the different threats to which each
of the assets that are exposed must be taken into account. The port authorities are involved
in these processes in order to carry out all the activities necessary to provide the different
port services.
Step 3: Establish qualitative and quantitative criteria for the risk matrix, which are
necessary to identify a scale for measuring the impact of the different threats on each of the
processes when assessing the risk.
Step 4: Define a risk matrix for each process. In order to draw up the risk matrices
for each of the processes being developed, the probability of occurrence of the threat, the
consequences that it would generate in the event of occurrence and the vulnerability of
each of the processes exposed to these threats must be considered.
Step 5: Obtain a global risk matrix. In order to summarise the risk matrices for each of
the processes, a global matrix must be obtained for each type of port studied, port and port
of call, which allows the risk in each of them to be assessed and the areas most exposed to
hazards to be identified.
Stage 6: Propose preventive and risk mitigation measures. Once the threats have been
identified and the risk assessed, it is necessary to propose a series of measures to prevent
and mitigate the risk in each of the processes identified for each type of port.
4. Discussion
4.1. Identification of Processes
The processes that are carried out from the moment the ship enters port waters must
be differentiated between the arrival and departure branches. In the same way, when
considering the processes, the different areas of the port in which they are carried out are
also separated into the following: the external area of entry and exit of the port, the internal
area of the terminal and the external area of embarkation/disembarkation of passengers.
In the case of the port of call, the arrival of the ship at the port and disembarkation of
passengers takes place in the following process (Figure 4):
•
Arrival of the cruise ship in port: embarkation of the pilot or pilot on board the cruise
ship in port waters.
•Mooring of the cruise ship: the moorers are involved.
•
Passenger disembarkation: Passengers disembark from the cruise ship via the gang-
ways provided.
•Temperature control: two options can be given.
a.
If the temperature is higher than legally permitted (>37.5
◦
C), carry out antigen
testing in the appropriate facilities. If positive, the trip is cancelled and cruise
passengers are checked and tested without being allowed to leave the cruise
ship, otherwise they will be contacted for tracing and follow up.
b.
If the temperature is below the legally permitted temperature (<37.5
◦
C), the
ship continues its journey as normal.
•Passenger scanning: security staff carry out passenger and baggage scanning.
•
Passengers go out onto the street, they can do this in different ways: go on an excursion
in a chartered bus, go out onto the street directly, take a taxi, hire a vehicle for the day
from one of the companies available, etc.

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 9 of 17
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 18
• Mooring of the cruise ship: the moorers are involved.
• Passenger disembarkation: Passengers disembark from the cruise ship via the gang-
ways provided.
• Temperature control: two options can be given.
a. If the temperature is higher than legally permitted (>37.5 °C), carry out antigen
testing in the appropriate facilities. If positive, the trip is cancelled and cruise
passengers are checked and tested without being allowed to leave the cruise
ship, otherwise they will be contacted for tracing and follow up.
b. If the temperature is below the legally permitted temperature (<37.5 °C), the ship
continues its journey as normal.
• Passenger scanning: security staff carry out passenger and baggage scanning.
• Passengers go out onto the street, they can do this in different ways: go on an excur-
sion in a chartered bus, go out onto the street directly, take a taxi, hire a vehicle for
the day from one of the companies available, etc.
Figure 4. Processes in the arrival of the cruise ship at the port of call. Source: own elaboration.
In the opposite case, the return of passengers to the cruise ship and its departure
follows the following process: (Figure 5).
• Return of passengers to the port: using the different alternatives considered.
• Temperature control: different possibilities are possible, analogous to those specified
for the arrival of the ship.
• Passenger scanning: to check entry to the port and to the cruise ship again.
• Boarding pass control: security staff must check that only authorised persons board
the aircraft.
• Use of terminal facilities: such as toilets, shops, restaurants and waiting rooms.
• Passengers board the cruise ship: by means of the gangways provided for this pur-
pose.
• Departure of the cruise ship from the port: embarkation of the pilot on board the
cruise ship to assist in leaving the port waters.
Figure 4. Processes in the arrival of the cruise ship at the port of call. Source: own elaboration.
In the opposite case, the return of passengers to the cruise ship and its departure
follows the following process: (Figure 5).
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 10 of 18
Figure 5. Processes for the departure of the cruise ship at the port of call. Source: own elaboration.
4.2. Threat Identification
The COVID-19-related threats to which the different assets carrying out the processes
in the port are exposed are mainly contagion by inhalation, by contact with contaminated
surfaces or by contact with people.
These threats can be broken down into different variants, which can be referred to as
sub-threats, allowing the impact of all of them to be analysed in order to create the risk
matrix. These allow the development of different situations in which the studied threats
occur. The people who may be exposed to the threats caused by COVID-19 infection,
within the operational processes of the cruise terminal with the arrival of the ship at the
port, are the following (Figures 6 and 7):
Figure 6. Risk assessment criteria. Source: own elaboration.
Figure 5. Processes for the departure of the cruise ship at the port of call. Source: own elaboration.
•Return of passengers to the port: using the different alternatives considered.
•
Temperature control: different possibilities are possible, analogous to those specified
for the arrival of the ship.
•Passenger scanning: to check entry to the port and to the cruise ship again.
•
Boarding pass control: security staff must check that only authorised persons board
the aircraft.
•Use of terminal facilities: such as toilets, shops, restaurants and waiting rooms.
•
Passengers board the cruise ship: by means of the gangways provided for this purpose.
•
Departure of the cruise ship from the port: embarkation of the pilot on board the cruise
ship to assist in leaving the port waters.
4.2. Threat Identification
The COVID-19-related threats to which the different assets carrying out the processes
in the port are exposed are mainly contagion by inhalation, by contact with contaminated
surfaces or by contact with people.
These threats can be broken down into different variants, which can be referred to as
sub-threats, allowing the impact of all of them to be analysed in order to create the risk
matrix. These allow the development of different situations in which the studied threats
occur. The people who may be exposed to the threats caused by COVID-19 infection, within

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 10 of 17
the operational processes of the cruise terminal with the arrival of the ship at the port, are
the following (Figures 6and 7):
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 10 of 18
Figure 5. Processes for the departure of the cruise ship at the port of call. Source: own elaboration.
4.2. Threat Identification
The COVID-19-related threats to which the different assets carrying out the processes
in the port are exposed are mainly contagion by inhalation, by contact with contaminated
surfaces or by contact with people.
These threats can be broken down into different variants, which can be referred to as
sub-threats, allowing the impact of all of them to be analysed in order to create the risk
matrix. These allow the development of different situations in which the studied threats
occur. The people who may be exposed to the threats caused by COVID-19 infection,
within the operational processes of the cruise terminal with the arrival of the ship at the
port, are the following (Figures 6 and 7):
Figure 6. Risk assessment criteria. Source: own elaboration.
Figure 6. Risk assessment criteria. Source: own elaboration.
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 11 of 18
Figure 7. Risk matrix 1. Source: own elaboration.
• Practical: as the person who goes on board the cruise ship to give the appropriate
instructions to the ship’s captain when the ship enters the port, there is a high risk of
contagion from being in contact with the captain and officers;
• Tugs: they do not have to experience any contact with the cruise ship’s crew as their
only function is to tow and assist in manoeuvring the ship from the outside;
• The moorers: they do not necessarily have to be in contact with the passengers or the
crew of the cruise ship in the course of their work, but they are in contact with the
moorers themselves, and having to work as a team poses a higher risk;
• Maritime Rescue personnel: in the event of having to intervene in an emergency,
Maritime Rescue personnel would be in contact with the passengers or crew mem-
bers of the cruise ship;
• Customs agents: they are in contact with the goods, they carry out checks on what is
being transported in order to prevent the entry of illegal goods. In the case of passen-
ger transport, they are not directly involved in the processes;
Figure 7. Risk matrix 1. Source: own elaboration.
•
Practical: as the person who goes on board the cruise ship to give the appropriate
instructions to the ship’s captain when the ship enters the port, there is a high risk of
contagion from being in contact with the captain and officers;
•
Tugs: they do not have to experience any contact with the cruise ship’s crew as their
only function is to tow and assist in manoeuvring the ship from the outside;

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 11 of 17
•
The moorers: they do not necessarily have to be in contact with the passengers or the
crew of the cruise ship in the course of their work, but they are in contact with the
moorers themselves, and having to work as a team poses a higher risk;
•
Maritime Rescue personnel: in the event of having to intervene in an emergency,
Maritime Rescue personnel would be in contact with the passengers or crew members
of the cruise ship;
•
Customs agents: they are in contact with the goods, they carry out checks on what
is being transported in order to prevent the entry of illegal goods. In the case of
passenger transport, they are not directly involved in the processes;
•
Tour-operator: person who is in charge of resolving any doubts or attending to any
needs that passengers may have, so he/she must be in contact with them and talk
to them;
•
Baggage handlers: personnel who are in direct contact with and handling the baggage
of cruise passengers;
•
Security staff: ensure that the security measures imposed at the terminal are respected.
They must be close to the passengers to ensure that all properly imposed measures
are respected;
•
Staff carrying out boarding pass control: they carry out the handling of documents
and come into contact with passengers to control boarding and port entry passes and
ensure the necessary legal procedures are followed.
•Shops and catering staff within the terminal: passengers will shop or consume in the
terminal establishments available to them.
•
Cleaning staff in terminal facilities: they are directly exposed to threats by having to
disinfect and clean surfaces that have been touched by all the people who have passed
through these areas.
•
Bus and taxi drivers transporting passengers: drivers are in contact with passengers
to transport them to desired destinations.
4.3. Establishment of Criteria for Risk Matrices
The following quantitative and qualitative criteria were used to assess the risk by
means of the corresponding risk matrices in each process. These were agreed by means
of a Delphi analysis in which personnel from the port of Arrecife, the academic world,
consultants and cruise company agents participated.
Probability of occurrence of the threat: Unlikely: contagion does not occur in the
process (0%). Unlikely: rarely occurs but can happen (0–30%). Possible: infection occurs in
isolated cases (30–60%). Very likely: contagion occurs frequently (60–90%). Safe: contagion
always occurs (90–100%).
Consequence of contagion occurring: Nil: no consequences because it does not occur
(0%). Mild: controllable, some isolated cases (0–30%) Medium: it becomes difficult to
control expansion (30–60%). Significant: contagion spreads to the majority of passengers
(60–90%). Catastrophic: all passengers and some staff (90–100%) are infected.
Vulnerability: degree of affectation as a consequence of the occurrence of an event
or impact. It is measured by the elements that are exposed to the hazard. Very low: no
exposure to the threat in any of the processes (0%). Low: there is some exposure in a
small part of the processes (0–30%). Medium: highest number of elements exposed to
the threat and in half of the processes (30–60%). High: almost all elements exposed to
the threat in most of the processes (60–90%). Very high: all elements are exposed in all
processes (90–100%).
Impact: Likelihood of Occurrence x Consequence x Vulnerability. Low: nothing
happens (0–10%). Moderate: some infection occurs, but is isolated (10–30%). Medium:
transmission occurs but is controlled (30–60%). High: infections occur and start to spread
(60–90%). Extreme: difficult to control the spread of infection (90–100%).
Thus, the combination of the different criteria affecting vulnerability and impact allows
us to obtain the following matrix of risk assessment criteria.

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 12 of 17
4.4. Definition of the Risk Matrices of the Different Processes
The risk matrices presented below were obtained for the different areas of the port,
which are: the outer passenger embarkation and disembarkation area, the inner terminal
area and the outer port entrance and exit area. It should be noted that the risk assessment
was carried out qualitatively in these matrices.
1. External embarkation and disembarkation area (Figure 7).
2.
Interior area of the terminal, where most of the passenger access control processes
take place and where a variety of services are provided (Figure 8).
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 13 of 18
Figure 8. Risk matrix 2. Source: own elaboration.
3. External exit or entrance area (Figure 9).
Figure 8. Risk matrix 2. Source: own elaboration.
3. External exit or entrance area (Figure 9).

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 13 of 17
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 14 of 18
Figure 9. Risk matrix 3. Source: own elaboration.
4.5. Definition of the Overall Risk Matrix
Once the risk has been assessed in the different processes that take place from the
time the cruise ship arrives at the port until it leaves the port, the study can be summarised
in an overall risk matrix (Figure 10).
This global matrix will allow the identification of the threat that can cause the greatest
consequences within the operations carried out in the port and the vulnerability of the
port to it, as well as the likelihood of its occurrence.
Figure 9. Risk matrix 3. Source: own elaboration.
4.5. Definition of the Overall Risk Matrix
Once the risk has been assessed in the different processes that take place from the time
the cruise ship arrives at the port until it leaves the port, the study can be summarised in
an overall risk matrix (Figure 10).
This global matrix will allow the identification of the threat that can cause the greatest
consequences within the operations carried out in the port and the vulnerability of the port
to it, as well as the likelihood of its occurrence.

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 14 of 17
J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 15 of 18
Figure 10. Global risk matrix. Source: own elaboration.
4.6. Proposed Preventive Measures
The safe management of port facilities where cruise passenger transport activities are
carried out has five basic objectives (Ministry of Transport, 2020):
1. Promote active measures to distance people;
2. Reduce, as far as possible, the physical contact of people with the environment by
implementing enhanced cleaning and disinfection measures in the environment;
3. To facilitate the carrying out of the checks planned by shipping companies which, for
whatever reason, require facilities inside or outside the terminal where cruise-type
vessels operate;
4. To promote the carrying out of the checks planned by shipping companies, the im-
plementation of which, for whatever reason, requires facilities inside or outside the
terminal where cruise-type vessels operate;
5. Facilitate the execution of actions derived from the management of health incidents
that have been detected on board a ship, or have been detected in passenger terminal
Figure 10. Global risk matrix. Source: own elaboration.
4.6. Proposed Preventive Measures
The safe management of port facilities where cruise passenger transport activities are
carried out has five basic objectives (Ministry of Transport, 2020):
1. Promote active measures to distance people;
2.
Reduce, as far as possible, the physical contact of people with the environment by
implementing enhanced cleaning and disinfection measures in the environment;
3.
To facilitate the carrying out of the checks planned by shipping companies which, for
whatever reason, require facilities inside or outside the terminal where cruise-type
vessels operate;
4.
To promote the carrying out of the checks planned by shipping companies, the
implementation of which, for whatever reason, requires facilities inside or outside the
terminal where cruise-type vessels operate;
5.
Facilitate the execution of actions derived from the management of health incidents
that have been detected on board a ship, or have been detected in passenger terminal
facilities, which may affect passengers, ships’ crews, terminal ground staff, or other
persons in transit through the terminal.

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 15 of 17
Once the different threats that can occur in the port upon the arrival of cruise ships
and the critical points have been identified, a series of mitigation and prevention measures
are established, which are listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Measures to be implemented according to the threats identified in the port of Arrecife.
Threats Measurements
Contagion by inhalation 1. Mandatory use of FFP2 masks for all Port of Arrecife personnel.
2. Maintain ventilation in any enclosed space.
Contact with surfaces 1. Sanitising hydrogels throughout the area available to anyone.
2.
Automatic devices to reduce contact with surfaces, such as litter bins or automatic doors.
Contact with people
1. Work and movement in the area in watertight groups while maintaining as much as
possible the distance between each person (1.5 m).
2. Establish unidirectional entry/exit flows to avoid overcrowding and to ensure the social
distance (1.5 m).
3. Limited seating in enclosed spaces.
In addition, other general measures can be implemented to reduce the impact of
threats and prevent them from occurring, such as:
1.
Signposting with informative posters reflecting and reminding individuals of the
obligatory measures against COVID-19 in port facilities. It is recommended that these
signs be written in different languages to make them easier to understand for all
the people who may pass through the facilities as cruise ship passengers come from
various parts of the world;
2.
The use of portable thermal cameras so that they can be placed where they are needed
at any given time, which would avoid exposing people to human contact by having to
take their temperature with a hand-held thermometer. In addition, this would avoid
crowding and queueing, as it would speed up the process significantly;
3.
The movement and parking of vehicles inside the port facilities must be restricted to
avoid crowds. Only authorised buses for the collection of cruise passengers or any
other vehicle with prior authorisation will be allowed access;
4.
With regard to the employees who work in all the processes that are carried out in the
port to provide different services for the cruise ship, training sessions should be given
so that they have knowledge of how to act at all times;
5.
Adequate coordination of the activities that take place in the port facilities should be
carried out in order to avoid crowds of people in each one of them.
Passengers should provide their personal details for tracking so that in the event of
the presence of a suspected case of contagion, it can be communicated to the persons who
may have been in contact with them and followed up to prevent further spread. New
methodologies can be included to carry out this measure, such as GPS tracking thanks to
the technology that is currently being developed
5. Conclusions
The methodology developed is reliable and allows the identification of the highest
levels of threat impact in an efficient manner. Thanks to this diagnosis, more preventive
and mitigating measures can be implemented in this process, the main objective of which
is to reduce the existing level of risk.
The methodology used establishes outlines that encompass most of the processes
followed to carry out the operations and activities in cruise terminals.
The methodology used makes it possible to assess the biosecurity-related risk caused
by COVID-19, making it possible to identify the threats present in the different processes
carried out in the port and the assets exposed to these threats.

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 16 of 17
The application of the methodology has made it possible to identify the threat that
most affects the assets that are exposed to it in the port, such as contagion through contact
with people. This is due to the fact that, despite being a large space, there is a high number
of passengers and personnel passing through the facilities and crowding can occur in certain
areas. The variant of the threat that presents an extreme impact occurs when not wearing a
mask and being in direct contact with other people for a prolonged period of time.
As a result, it can be concluded that the part of the terminal with the highest level of
risk is the interior area, as it is an enclosed space with a wide range of services and activities.
In terms of the threats considered for biosecurity risk assessment, the main one would
be COVID-19 infection. According to studies, this virus spreads more rapidly by inhalation
of aerosols in the environment. This is one reason that leads to the conclusion that enclosed
spaces will have a higher level of risk, and even more so if they are large spaces with a high
number of people circulating in them.
The level of risk from contagion can be reduced by minimising transit time through
the facilities and through the use of bubble groups for excursions and visits, allowing for
greater screening of passengers, both inside and outside the port area.
The results obtained are considered adequate for the approaches defined in the port
of Arrecife, although the limitations of the model are centred on the definition of the
processes in the different port operations carried out for cruise ship traffic and on the
effective application of the proposed measures. This is a very vulnerable type of traffic due
to the large number of people to whom the measures must be applied.
For future research, it is proposed to extend the study to base ports and other ports
where the level of cruise ship traffic is higher and the number of ships coinciding at the
same time is greater, which complicates the design of the processes and the application of
the proposed measures.
Author Contributions:
This article has been developed as a team work, in which all authors have
contributed in the different tasks to be done: Conceptualization, methodology, validation, formal
analysis, investigation, resources, data curation, writing, review and editing, visualization and
supervision. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: Not applicable.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1.
Rodríguez López, F.; Cardona, S.; De la Cruz, M. (December 2004). Organisation and Management of Security in Port Facilities
(Prevention + Protection).
2.
Universidad del Desarrollo, Website. Available online: https://medicina.udd.cl/sobre-la-facultad/comite- institucional-
debioseguridad/definicion-de-bioseguridad/ (accessed on 1 March 2021).
3.
Prado, J.D. IMF Business School. March 2021. Available online: https://blogs.imf-formacion.com/blog/prevencion-
riesgoslaborales/especial-master-prevencion/clasificacion-riesgos-biologicos/ (accessed on 12 February 2021).
4.
García Tarrau, D.S.; López Díaz, D. Manuel Fajardo Virtual Health University. 19 September 2013. Available online: https:
//uvsfajardo.sld.cu/tema-8-biosecurity (accessed on 1 March 2021).
5.
GEA, Guzmán Escobar and Associates GEA-Biosecurity Protocol for Ports. Retrieved January 2021. 2020. Available online:
https://gealegal.com/gea-protocolo-debioseguridad-para-puertos/ (accessed on 17 January 2021).
6.
INSST. National Institute for Safety and Health at Work. Retrieved January 2021. 2020. Available online: https://www.insst.es/-/
-en-que-actividades- hay-o-puedehaber-riesgo-biologico (accessed on 19 January 2021).
7. IAEA. Biosecurity in Ports; Technical University of Madrid: Madrid, Spain, 2020.
8.
Gómez González, R. A Methodology Proposal to Obtain Operational Parameter Forecasts and Operational Risk Assessment in
Container Terminals. Ph.D. Thesis, Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales y Puertos de la Universidad
Politécnica de Madrid Technical University of Madrid), Madrid, Spain, 2015.

J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2022,10, 1990 17 of 17
9.
Ministry of Agriculture (Spain). Available online: https://www.mapa.gob.es/es/ganaderia/temas/sanidad-animal-
higieneganadera/protocolo_bs_lyd_buques_tcm30-111980.pdf (accessed on 6 February 2021).
10. Lyon, B.; Hollcroft, B. Risk assessments Top 10 differences and tips for improvement. Prof. Saf. 2012,57, 28–34.
11.
Romero Faz, D. Methodology for Risk Assessment in Port Facilities. Ph.D. Thesis, School of Civil Engineering of the Technical
University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2017.
12.
Coburn, A.; Spence, R.; Pomonius, A. Vulnerability and Risk Assessment; Disaster Management Training Programme: Cambridge,
UK, 1991.
13. Community of Madrid. Risk Management/Analysis and Quantification; Community of Madrid: Madrid, Spain, 2019.
14.
Xu, L.; Shi, J.; Chen, J.; Li, L. Estimating the effect of COVID-19 epidemic on shipping trade: An empirical analysis using panel
data. Mar. Policy 2021,133, 104768. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
15.
Wang, X.; Liu, Z.; Yan, R.; Wang, H.; Zhang, M. Quantitative analysis of the impact of COVID-19 on ship visiting behaviors to
ports-A framework and a case study. Ocean. Coast. Manag. 2022,230, 106377. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
16.
Holland, J.; Mazzarol, T.; Soutar, G.N.; Tapsall, S.; Elliott, W.A. Cruising through a pandemic: The impact of COVID-19 on
intentions to cruise. Transp. Res. Interdiscip. Perspect. 2021,9, 100328. [CrossRef]
17.
Radic, A.; Lück, M.; Al-Ansi, A.; Chua, B.L.; Seeler, S.; Raposo, A.; Jenny Kim, J.; Han, H. To dine, or not to dine on a cruise ship
in the time of the COVID-19 pandemic: The tripartite approach towards an understanding of behavioral intentions among female
passengers. Sustainability 2021,13, 2516. [CrossRef]
18.
Ministry of Transport, Mobility and Urban Agenda (Spain). Measures for the Prevention, Containment and Mitigation of Health Risks
Arising from COVID-19 to be Established in Terminals Operating Cruise-Type Passenger Ships; Ministry of Transport, Mobility and
Urban Agenda: Madrid, Spain, 2020.
19. ILO; IMO. Main Methodologies for Risk Assessment in Ports; ILO: Geneva, Switzerland, 2003.
20.
Párraga, M.M.; González-Cancelas, N.; Soler-Flores, F. Port security applied to Transfer Port of Manta. In Advanced Research in
Scientific Areas; EDIS—Publishing Institution of the University of Zilina: Zilina, Slovakia, 2013; pp. 508–512.
21.
Baró, B.; Vallejo, E. Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Port of Barcelona; Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona: Bellaterra,
Spain, 2010.