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The Correlates of Prejudice: Groupthink and Individual Psychological Attributes
Abstract
This chapter examines the constructs that underlie prejudicial beliefs, including how individuals come to learn to hold such views, group-level predictors, and individual-level psychological attributes that have been shown to correlate with those predictors and ultimately, prejudice. First, indoctrination and groupthink are explored as ways that individuals come to adopt such views, most commonly through limiting their reasoning to binary thought processes. Then research on predictors such as religious extremism, right wing political orientation, and authoritarianism is reviewed which may explain ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation, most commonly towards those of other races, ethnicities, cultures, religions, or sexual orientation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of individual-level psychological attributes associated with the group-level predictors and ultimately with a tendency to hold discriminatory views. These include the dichotomy between analytic and intuitive cognitive styles, directional motives driven by confirmation bias, and cognitive ability as defined by intelligence level and cognitive flexibility. By examining the reasons that people may choose to adopt prejudicial views, we may be able to develop methods to address such occurrences and limit the spread of discrimination.
Keywords: prejudice, indoctrination, religious belief, right-wing political orientation, authoritarianism, cognition
Cultural interactions have been at the forefront of political strife in recent years as authoritarian regimes have come to power across the globe. This warrants investigation by social science researchers in the fields of social psychology, political psychology, and cognitive psychology. This study drew upon those three fields to explore the relationships between political orientation and (1) authoritarian traits, (2) attitudes towards intergroup relations and cross-cultural interactions (CCI), and (3) identity factors, largely through the lens of Social Identity Theory. Participants comprised 2,582 undergraduates at a public university in the U.S. The Diverse Learning Environments survey assessed views on social identity, intergroup relations, political and religious ideology, and social and political issues. Correlational analysis and ANOVA were conducted to determine relationships between variables and differences between groups. Results indicated that the more strongly respondents rated their political orientation as conservative, the more authoritarian traits they tended to report, the less likely they were to engage in CCI, and the more likely they were to hold negative views of those from different backgrounds than themselves. The more respondents rated their political orientation as liberal, the more open they were to diversity and more likely they were to engage in CCI. Identity factors appeared to be more important to conservatives than to liberals in that strength of political ideology was related to common identity characteristics for conservatives but not for liberals.
Prejudice and discrimination continue to persist within school environments, creating barriers to inclusive and equitable education. Addressing this issue requires a comprehensive and multifaceted approach that incorporates various strategies. This chapter presents an integrative framework for prejudice reduction in schools from a social-psychological perspective. Drawing upon key theories and research in social psychology, the framework proposes a holistic approach that combines individual-level interventions, intergroup contact, and institutional practices. The purpose of this study is to provide a review of the existing models on the subject and also to present a comparative analysis of the models that may contribute to ways of understanding the investigation of prejudice in schools.
Religious ideology and extremism have had an increasing influence on political agendas in the United States and much of the developed world in the past 60 years, with right-wing ideology becoming more prevalent this decade. This article serves as a review of studies investigating the correlations between political ideology, religiosity, right-wing authoritarianism, ingroups/outgroups, and prejudice in an attempt to describe and understand the well-established links between these dimensions. We discuss several group-level theories including Terror Management Theory, Social Identity Theory, Realistic Group Conflict Theory among others to frame the intercorrelations of these constructs in an effort to better understand the underlying mechanisms that drive individuals to embody religious and political beliefs. We then discuss individual-level cognitive and psychological differences such as intelligence, cognitive flexibility, and specific biological and neurological limitations of brain function that may influence people to adopt certain religious and political beliefs. Through a more comprehensive understanding of the underlying mechanisms of religious and political extremism, we may be better equipped to assuage the fear and denigration that is associated with many of these beliefs.
Objective
Fake news represents a particularly egregious and direct avenue by which inaccurate beliefs have been propagated via social media. We investigate the psychological profile of individuals who fall prey to fake news.
Method
We recruited 1,606 participants from Amazon's Mechanical Turk for three online surveys.
Results
The tendency to ascribe profundity to randomly generated sentences – pseudo‐profound bullshit receptivity – correlates positively with perceptions of fake news accuracy, and negatively with the ability to differentiate between fake and real news (media truth discernment). Relatedly, individuals who overclaim their level of knowledge also judge fake news to be more accurate. We also extend previous research indicating that analytic thinking correlates negatively with perceived accuracy by showing that this relationship is not moderated by the presence/absence of the headline's source (which has no effect on accuracy), or by familiarity with the headlines (which correlates positively with perceived accuracy of fake and real news).
Conclusion
Our results suggest that belief in fake news may be driven, to some extent, by a general tendency to be overly accepting of weak claims. This tendency, which we refer to as reflexive open‐mindedness, may be partly responsible for the prevalence of epistemically suspect beliefs writ large.
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Delusion-prone individuals may be more likely to accept even delusion-irrelevant implausible ideas because of their tendency to engage in less analytic and less actively open-minded thinking. Consistent with this suggestion, two online studies with over 900 participants demonstrated that although delusion-prone individuals were no more likely to believe true news headlines, they displayed an increased belief in “fake news” headlines, which often feature implausible content. Mediation analyses suggest that analytic cognitive style may partially explain these individuals’ increased willingness to believe fake news. Exploratory analyses showed that dogmatic individuals and religious fundamentalists were also more likely to believe false (but not true) news, and that these relationships may be fully explained by analytic cognitive style. Our findings suggest that existing interventions that increase analytic and actively open-minded thinking might be leveraged to help reduce belief in fake news.
Cognitive flexibility is operationalized in the neuropsychological literature as the ability to shift between modes of thinking and adapt to novel or changing environments. Religious belief systems consist of strict rules and rituals that offer adherents certainty, consistency, and stability. Consequently, we hypothesized that religious adherence and practice of repetitive religious rituals may be related to the persistence versus flexibility of one’s cognition. The present study investigated the extent to which tendencies towards cognitive flexibility versus persistence are related to three facets of religious life: religious affiliation, religious practice, and religious upbringing. In a large sample (N = 744), we found that religious disbelief was related to cognitive flexibility across three independent behavioural measures: the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Remote Associates Test, and Alternative Uses Test. Furthermore, lower frequency of religious service attendance was related to cognitive flexibility. When analysing participants’ religious upbringing in relation to their current religious affiliation, it was manifest that current affiliation was more influential than religious upbringing in all the measured facets of cognitive flexibility. The findings indicate that religious affiliation and engagement may shape and be shaped by cognitive control styles towards flexibility versus persistence, highlighting the tight links between flexibility of thought and religious ideologies.
Cognitive flexibility refers to the ability to quickly reconfigure our mind, like when we switch between different tasks. This review highlights recent evidence showing that cognitive flexibility can be conditioned by simple incentives typically known to drive lower-level learning, such as stimulus-response associations. Cognitive flexibility can also become associated with, and triggered by, bottom-up contextual cues in our environment, including subliminal cues. Therefore, we suggest that the control functions that mediate cognitive flexibility are grounded in, and guided by, basic associative learning mechanisms, and abide by the same learning principles as more low-level forms of behavior. Such a learning perspective on cognitive flexibility offers new directions and important implications for further research, theory, and applications.
The Dunning–Kruger effect refers to the observation that the incompetent are often ill-suited to recognize their
incompetence. Here we investigated potential Dunning–Kruger effects in high-level reasoning and, in particular, focused on the relative effectiveness of metacognitive monitoring among particularly biased reasoners. Participants who made the greatest numbers of errors on the cognitive reflection test (CRT) overestimated their performance on this test by a factor of more than 3. Overestimation decreased as CRT performance
increased, and those who scored particularly high underestimated their performance. Evidence for this type of
systematic miscalibration was also found on a self-report measure of analytic-thinking disposition. Namely, genuinely nonanalytic participants (on the basis of CRT performance) overreported their 'need for cognition' (NC), indicating that they were dispositionally analytic when their objective performance indicated otherwise. Furthermore, estimated CRT performance was just as strong a predictor of NC as was actual CRT performance. Our results provide evidence for Dunning–Kruger effects both in estimated performance on the CRT and in self-reported analytic-thinking disposition. These findings indicate that part of the reason why people are biased is that they are either unaware of or indifferent to their own bias.
Individual differences in the mere willingness to think analytically has been shown to predict religious disbelief. Recently, however, it has been argued that analytic thinkers are not actually less religious; rather, the putative association may be a result of religiosity typically being measured after analytic thinking (an order effect). In light of this possibility, we report four studies in which a negative correlation between religious belief and performance on analytic thinking measures is found when religious belief is measured in a separate session. We also performed a meta-analysis on all previously published studies on the topic along with our four new studies (N = 15,078, k = 31), focusing specifically on the association between performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test (the most widely used individual difference measure of analytic thinking) and religious belief. This meta-analysis revealed an overall negative correlation (r) of -.18, 95% CI [-.21, -.16]. Although this correlation is modest, self-identified atheists (N = 133) scored 18.7% higher than religiously affiliated individuals (N = 597) on a composite measure of analytic thinking administered across our four new studies (d = .72). Our results indicate that the association between analytic thinking and religious disbelief is not caused by a simple order effect. There is good evidence that atheists and agnostics are more reflective than religious believers.
Previous terror management theory research has shown that mortality salience (MS; a death reminder) leads to the derogation of those who are perceived to be threats to or violators of one’s cultural worldview. Immigrants may be viewed as such a threat, but not necessarily to all majority group members of the culture. The studies presented here tested the hypothesis that, depending upon the nature of the participants’ worldview, MS would either increase or decrease liking of an immigrant. After being reminded of their mortality or a control topic, French and American college students evaluated an immigrant. To assess differences in worldview, participants completed a measure of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Consistent across two studies, MS led to more negative evaluations of an immigrant among those high in RWA, but more positive evaluations for those low in RWA. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for understanding the interplay of mortality concerns and RWA in determining attitudes toward immigrants.
Well-being is a construct spanning multiple disciplines including psychology, economics, health, and public policy. In many ways, well-being is a nexus of inter-correlated variables, much like the g nexus. Here, we created an index of well-being for the geographical and political subdivisions of the United States (i.e., states). The measure resulted from hierarchical principal components analyses of state-level data on various hypothesized sub-domains of well-being, including general mental ability, education, economics, religiosity, health, and crime. A single, general component of well-being emerged, explaining between 52 and 85% of the variance in the sub-domains. General mental ability loaded substantially on global state well-being (.83). The relationship between global well-being and other important state-level outcomes was examined next. We conclude by offering parallels between the g nexus and the well-being nexus.
The present study examined whether IQ relates systematically to denomination and income within the framework of the g nexus, using representative data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY97). Atheists score 1.95 IQ points higher than Agnostics, 3.82 points higher than Liberal persuasions, and 5.89 IQ points higher than Dogmatic persuasions. Denominations differ significantly in IQ and income. Religiosity declines between ages 12 to 17. It is suggested that IQ makes an individual likely to gravitate toward a denomination and level of achievement that best fit his or hers particular level of cognitive complexity. Ontogenetically speaking this means that contemporary denominations are rank ordered by largely hereditary variations in brain efficiency (i.e. IQ). In terms of evolution, modern Atheists are reacting rationally to cognitive and emotional challenges, whereas Liberals and, in particular Dogmatics, still rely on ancient, pre-rational, supernatural and wishful thinking.
Some have argued that belief in God is intuitive, a natural (by-)product of the human mind given its cognitive structure and social context. If this is true, the extent to which one believes in God may be influenced by one's more general tendency to rely on intuition versus reflection. Three studies support this hypothesis, linking intuitive cognitive style to belief in God. Study 1 showed that individual differences in cognitive style predict belief in God. Participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), which employs math problems that, although easily solvable, have intuitively compelling incorrect answers. Participants who gave more intuitive answers on the CRT reported stronger belief in God. This effect was not mediated by education level, income, political orientation, or other demographic variables. Study 2 showed that the correlation between CRT scores and belief in God also holds when cognitive ability (IQ) and aspects of personality were controlled. Moreover, both studies demonstrated that intuitive CRT responses predicted the degree to which individuals reported having strengthened their belief in God since childhood, but not their familial religiosity during childhood, suggesting a causal relationship between cognitive style and change in belief over time. Study 3 revealed such a causal relationship over the short term: Experimentally inducing a mindset that favors intuition over reflection increases self-reported belief in God.
Substantial differences exist in the cognitive styles of liberals and conservatives on psychological measures. Variability in political attitudes reflects genetic influences and their interaction with environmental factors. Recent work has shown a correlation between liberalism and conflict-related activity measured by event-related potentials originating in the anterior cingulate cortex. Here we show that this functional correlate of political attitudes has a counterpart in brain structure. In a large sample of young adults, we related self-reported political attitudes to gray matter volume using structural MRI. We found that greater liberalism was associated with increased gray matter volume in the anterior cingulate cortex, whereas greater conservatism was associated with increased volume of the right amygdala. These results were replicated in an independent sample of additional participants. Our findings extend previous observations that political attitudes reflect differences in self-regulatory conflict monitoring and recognition of emotional faces by showing that such attitudes are reflected in human brain structure. Although our data do not determine whether these regions play a causal role in the formation of political attitudes, they converge with previous work to suggest a possible link between brain structure and psychological mechanisms that mediate political attitudes.
This article seeks to unify two subfields of psychology that have hitherto stood separately: evolutionary psychology and intelligence research/differential psychology. I suggest that general intelligence may simultaneously be an evolved adaptation and an individual-difference variable. Tooby and Cosmides's (1990a) notion of random quantitative variation on a monomorphic design allows us to incorporate heritable individual differences in evolved adaptations. The Savanna–IQ Interaction Hypothesis, which is one consequence of the integration of evolutionary psychology and intelligence research, can potentially explain why less intelligent individuals enjoy TV more, why liberals are more intelligent than conservatives, and why night owls are more intelligent than morning larks, among many other findings. The general approach proposed here will allow us to integrate evolutionary psychology with any other aspect of differential psychology.
Three studies link resistance to probative information and intransigence in negotiation to concerns of identity maintenance. Each shows that affirmations of personal integrity (vs. nonaffirmation or threat) can reduce resistance and intransigence but that this effect occurs only when individuals' partisan identity and/or identity-related convictions are made salient. Affirmation made participants' assessment of a report critical of U.S. foreign policy less dependent on their political views, but only when the identity relevance of the issue rather than the goal of rationality was salient (Study 1). Affirmation increased concession making in a negotiation over abortion policy, but again this effect was moderated by identity salience (Studies 2 and 3). Indeed, although affirmed negotiators proved relatively more open to compromise when either the salience of their true convictions or the importance of remaining faithful to those convictions was heightened, the reverse was true when the salient goal was compromise. The theoretical and applied significance of these findings are discussed.
The study explores whether people are more inclined to accept a conclusion that confirms their prior beliefs and reject one they personally object to even when both follow the same logic. Most of the prior research in this area has relied on the informal reasoning paradigm; in this study, however, we applied a formal reasoning paradigm to distinguish between cognitive and motivational mechanisms leading to myside bias in reasoning on value-laden topics (in this case abortions). Slovak and Polish (N = 387) participants indicated their attitudes toward abortion and then evaluated logical syllogisms with neutral, pro-choice, or pro-life content. We analysed whether participants’ prior attitudes influenced their ability to solve these logically identical reasoning tasks and found that prior attitudes were the strongest predictor of myside bias in evaluating both valid and invalid syllogisms, even after controlling for logical validity (the ability to solve neutral syllogisms) and previous experience of logic.
“Social sorting” is a concept used by Mason (2016) to explain the process by which individuals' social identities grow increasingly aligned with a partisan identity, reducing social cross-pressures on political behavior. Roccas and Brewer (2002) have found that individuals who feel fewer cross-pressures more strongly identify with their ingroups and are less tolerant of outgroups. Accordingly, we create “objective” and “subjective” measures of social sorting to help identify the mechanism by which individual partisans connect social sorting to partisanship in the CCES and a nonprobability Internet sample. As racial, religious, and ideological identities have cumulatively moved into greater alignment with Democratic and Republican identities in recent decades, American partisans have grown increasingly identified with their parties due to the psychological effects of identity alignment captured in objective and subjective sorting mechanisms. However, we find that this effect is more powerful among Republicans than among Democrats, due to the general social homogeneity of the Republican party. Contrary to the assessments of modern political punditry, Republicans are more susceptible to identity-based politics.
Beliefs profoundly affect people's lives, but their cognitive and neural pathways are poorly understood. Although previous research has identified the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) as critical to representing religious beliefs, the means by which vmPFC enables religious belief is uncertain. We hypothesized that the vmPFC represents diverse religious beliefs and that a vmPFC lesion would be associated with religious fundamentalism, or the narrowing of religious beliefs. To test this prediction, we assessed religious adherence with a widely-used religious fundamentalism scale in a large sample of 119 patients with penetrating traumatic brain injury (pTBI). If the vmPFC is crucial to modulating diverse personal religious beliefs, we predicted that pTBI patients with lesions to the vmPFC would exhibit greater fundamentalism, and that this would be modulated by cognitive flexibility and trait openness. Instead, we found that participants with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) lesions have fundamentalist beliefs similar to patients with vmPFC lesions and that the effect of a dlPFC lesion on fundamentalism was significantly mediated by decreased cognitive flexibility and openness. These findings indicate that cognitive flexibility and openness are necessary for flexible and adaptive religious commitment, and that such diversity of religious thought is dependent on dlPFC functionality.
Religion is the most segregated arena of American life, but its effect on collegiate diversity outcomes has been overlooked, despite the significance of both race and religion in many students’ lives. This study examines whether religious observance, religious worldview identification, and participation in a religious student organization are significantly related to cross-racial interaction (CRI), a form of bridging social capital, during college. The current study yielded largely positive relationships between general religiosity and CRI. General religiosity was also positively linked to CRI for Asian American, white, and black students. CRI was higher for students from minority religious backgrounds. Participation in campus religious groups was nonsignificant, regardless of the racial composition of the group. Findings are surprising given previous work that has mainly found negative relationships between religion and diversity-related outcomes in college. We discuss implications for the study of the campus climate and the effect of religion on campus race relations.
The Psychotemporal Survey of Ideologies (PSI) was completed by 1,000 adults in a nationwide U.S. poll. On the PSI subscale measuring “visionary liberalism focused on the future,” atheists scored higher than everyone else, and racial minorities scored collectively higher than other racial groups. On the subscale measuring “dread-ridden conservatism focused on the future,” Tea Party affiliates scored higher than everyone else, and “born again” Protestants scored significantly higher than other religiously defined groups. On the PSI subscale measuring “pragmatic liberalism focused on the present,” people with a graduate school education scored significantly higher than those with less education, and on the subscale measuring “pragmatic conservatism focused on the present,” Whites scored significantly higher than other racial groups. On the PSI subscale measuring “guilt-ridden liberalism focused on the past,” agnostics scored significantly higher than other religiously defined groups, and on the subscale measuring “nostalgic conservatism focused on the past,” high school dropouts scored significantly higher than better educated groups.
Despite overwhelming scientific consensus, popular opinions regarding evolution are starkly divided. In the USA, for example, nearly one in three adults espouse a literal and recent divine creation account of human origins. Plausibly, resistance to scientific conclusions regarding the origins of species-like much resistance to other scientific conclusions (Bloom & Weisberg, 2007)-gains support from reliably developing intuitions. Intuitions about essentialism, teleology, agency, and order may combine to make creationism potentially more cognitively attractive than evolutionary concepts. However, dual process approaches to cognition recognize that people can often analytically override their intuitions. Two large studies (total N=1324) found consistent evidence that a tendency to engage analytic thinking predicted endorsement of evolution, even controlling for relevant demographic, attitudinal, and religious variables. Meanwhile, exposure to religion predicted reduced endorsement of evolution. Cognitive style is one factor among many affecting opinions on the origin of species.
Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Based on the reasoning that religious groups evidence intergroup processes that can create prejudice, two studies examined the relation between religiosity and attitudes toward religious and non-religious others. In both studies, among more religious individuals, attitudes toward religious others were very positive and attitudes toward non-religious others were quite negative. These relations emerged on all measures of traditional religiosity used. Some prejudice against religious others existed among less religious individuals, but it was less pronounced and less pervasive than the prejudice of more religious people. It is suggested that intergroup processes such as competition between religious groups for resources or value promotion likely foster prejudice against religious outgroup members, perhaps irrespective of personal religious orientation.
High levels of religiosity have been linked to lower levels of intelligence in a number of recent studies. These results have generated both controversy and theoretical interest. Here in a large sample of US adults we address several issues that restricted the generalizability of these previous results. We measured six dimensions of religiosity (rather than just one or two), along with a multi-scale instrument to assess general intelligence. We also controlled for the influence of the personality trait openness on facets of religious belief and practice. The results indicated that lower intelligence is most strongly associated with higher levels of fundamentalism, but also modestly predicts central components of religiosity such as a sense of religious identification and private religious practice. Secondly, we found that a higher level of openness – often assumed to lead to lower religiosity – is weakly associated with reduced fundamentalism but with increased religious mindfulness, private religious practice, religious support, and spirituality. These new results provide a framework for understanding the links between reasoning and faith.
Religion has a powerful influence on learning and development, and this provides an important cultural foundation for stratification processes. Findings from prior studies of the connection between religion and educational attainment are mixed, but most studies point to negative effects of sectarian Protestant affiliation and fundamentalist beliefs in the inerrancy of sacred texts on educational attainment, aspirations, occupational attainment, and wealth. Verbal ability provides an important potential mechanism through with conservative religion anchors stratification outcomes. I examine the impact of religious affiliation, religious participation, and beliefs in the inerrancy of the Bible on verbal ability. Using data from the 1984–2006 General Social Surveys, I find that both inerrantist beliefs and sectarian affiliations have substantial negative effects on verbal ability. Religious participation has a modest positive effect on verbal ability, but its influence is mostly confined to sectarian Protestants and biblical inerrantists. Importantly, the positive effect of age on verbal ability is substantially weaker among sectarians and biblical inerrantists, suggesting that their closed social networks hinder learning throughout the lifecourse.
We trace the rise, fall, and resurgence of political ideology as a topic of research in social, personality, and political psychology. For over 200 years, political belief systems have been classified usefully according to a single left-right (or liberal-conservative) dimension that, we believe, possesses two core aspects: (a) advocating versus resisting social change and (b) rejecting versus accepting inequality. There have been many skeptics of the notion that most people are ideologically inclined, but recent psychological evidence suggests that left-right differences are pronounced in many life domains. Implicit as well as explicit preferences for tradition, conformity, order, stability, traditional values, and hierarchy-versus those for progress, rebelliousness, chaos, flexibility, feminism, and equality-are associated with conservatism and liberalism, respectively. Conservatives score consistently higher than liberals on measures of system justification. Furthermore, there are personality and lifestyle differences between liberals and conservatives as well as situational variables that induce either liberal or conservative shifts in political opinions. Our thesis is that ideological belief systems may be structured according to a left-right dimension for largely psychological reasons linked to variability in the needs to reduce uncertainty and threat.
© 2008 Association for Psychological Science.
Although most people are religious, there are hundreds of millions of religious disbelievers in the world. What is religious disbelief and how does it arise? Recent developments in the scientific study of religious beliefs and behaviors point to the conclusion that religious disbelief arises from multiple interacting pathways, traceable to cognitive, motivational, and cultural learning mechanisms. We identify four such pathways, leading to four distinct forms of atheism, which we term mindblind atheism, apatheism, inCREDulous atheism, and analytic atheism. Religious belief and disbelief share the same underlying pathways and can be explained within a single evolutionary framework that is grounded in both genetic and cultural evolution.
Links between religion and prejudice have been interpreted to suggest that religion can both reduce and exacerbate prejudice. Here, the analysis of religion as a meaning system illuminates how religion can affect intergroup attitudes. Traditional psychological perspectives on religion and prejudice are summarized, followed by a discussion of religion and prejudice in cross-cultural and cross-religious contexts, involving varying target groups. Next, we explore possible explanatory mechanisms by proposing how four levels of meaning associated with religion—cognitive, motivational, societal, and intergroup—may both promote and attenuate prejudice. Finally, additional factors that might facilitate the paradoxical coexistence of religious egalitarian intentions with prejudiced attitudes are considered, and we speculate about the potential for religious groups to reduce prejudice within their adherents.
Uncovering the complex relationships between religiosity and values may provide a better understanding of what it means to be religious or nonreligious. This article reviews research on values and religiosity across cultural and religious groups. Although religious groups differ in the importance they attribute to different values, the pattern of correlations between religiosity and values is strikingly consistent across monotheistic religions: Persons more committed to religion attribute relatively high importance to values expressing motivation to avoid uncertainty and change and relatively low importance to values expressing motivations to follow one's hedonistic desires, or to be independent in thought and action.
There is, on the face of it, a logical difficulty as well as a practical one about ascribing to parents both a right to give their children a religious upbringing and a duty to avoid indoctrinating them. Curiously, this logical difficulty was largely overlooked in the debate on religious upbringing and parental rights between Terence McLaughlin, Eamonn Callan and Peter Gardner in the 1980s. In this paper I set out the terms of the logical problem and propose a solution to it.
Scientific interest in the cognitive underpinnings of religious belief has grown in recent years. However, to date, little
experimental research has focused on the cognitive processes that may promote religious disbelief. The present studies apply
a dual-process model of cognitive processing to this problem, testing the hypothesis that analytic processing promotes religious
disbelief. Individual differences in the tendency to analytically override initially flawed intuitions in reasoning were associated
with increased religious disbelief. Four additional experiments provided evidence of causation, as subtle manipulations known
to trigger analytic processing also encouraged religious disbelief. Combined, these studies indicate that analytic processing
is one factor (presumably among several) that promotes religious disbelief. Although these findings do not speak directly
to conversations about the inherent rationality, value, or truth of religious beliefs, they illuminate one cognitive factor
that may influence such discussions.
The current study seeks to better understand how religiosity and health are positioned within the g-nexus. Specifically, the degree to which differences in average IQ across nations is associated with differences in national religiosity (i.e., belief rate) and national health statistics independent of differences in national wealth is examined. Consistent with expectations, results show that, independent of national wealth and belief rate, IQ has a positive influence on national health as indicated by fertility rate, infant mortality rate, maternal mortality rate, and deaths due to HIV/AIDS, and life expectancy. Additionally, as hypothesized, IQ and belief rate interacted to influence reproductive health (i.e., fertility rate, infant- and maternal mortality). Specifically, high IQ acts as a buffer against the negative effects of belief rate; when IQ is high belief rate has no effect, but when IQ is low belief rate has a strong negative effect. The pattern of findings from this study, combined with previous research, serve to confirm that general cognitive ability (i.e., the g-factor) is an important and central node within a larger nexus of psychological and social variables. Theoretical and epidemiological implications are discussed.
Although cognitive neuroscience has made remarkable progress in understanding the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in executive control, the broader functional networks that support high-level cognition and give rise to general intelligence remain to be well characterized. Here, we investigated the neural substrates of the general factor of intelligence (g) and executive function in 182 patients with focal brain damage using voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping. The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System were used to derive measures of g and executive function, respectively. Impaired performance on these measures was associated with damage to a distributed network of left lateralized brain areas, including regions of frontal and parietal cortex and white matter association tracts, which bind these areas into a coordinated system. The observed findings support an integrative framework for understanding the architecture of general intelligence and executive function, supporting their reliance upon a shared fronto-parietal network for the integration and control of cognitive representations and making specific recommendations for the application of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System to the study of high-level cognition in health and disease.
That religion is an impactful social category has often been assumed but seldom tested. Based on social identity and self-categorization theories, it is argued that devout religious commitment reflects, at least in part, an individual's motivation to engage in religious self-stereotyping (i.e. to perceive oneself as an exemplary religious group member). In order to test this analysis, individuals scoring high or low on a measure of intrinsic religious orientation received false feedback that either threatened or bolstered their self-perceptions on a dimension of behaviour that was either important or not important to religious group membership. As expected, intrinsic orientation predicted increased religious self-stereotyping only when feedback was threatening and important to religious group membership; affective and behavioural indices revealed a similar pattern. Implications for the social identity/self-categorization literature, and for theory development in the psychology of religion, are subsequently discussed.
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