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Modern China
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DOI: 10.1177/00977004221133533
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Article
Indenturing Celebrity:
Governing China’s
Entertainment Industries
Elaine Jeffreys1 and Jian Xu2
Abstract
This article examines the governance of China’s entertainment industries
using the concept of “indentured celebrities”—famous people who are
obliged to serve as ambassadors for Chinese government advertising and
public diplomacy. The article introduces the idea of indentured celebrities
in relation to Western sociological understandings of major celebrities as
“national power elites,” “powerless elites,” and cosmopolitan “Big Citizens”
who use their mediatized star power to exert unelected, “stateless” political
influence. It then examines the expansion since the mid-2000s of regulatory
controls over China’s entertainment industries. Finally, it explores the
“Fan Bingbing tax evasion case,” revealing how online public censure, and
the associated potential for government action, can coalesce to discipline
celebrity behaviors. We conclude that regulatory frameworks and, to a
lesser degree, “supervision by public opinion,” indenture major celebrities
to aid the ruling Chinese Communist Party, while undermining any scope to
exert nongovernmental political influence as per Western celebrities.
Keywords
China, celebrities, elites, entertainment, government, media
1School of International Studies & Education, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of
Technology Sydney, Australia
2School of Communication and Creative Arts, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin
University, Australia
Corresponding Author:
Elaine Jeffreys, School of International Studies & Education, Faculty of Arts and Social
Sciences, University of Technology Sydney, PO Box 123, Broadway, NSW 2007, Australia.
Email: Elaine.Jeffreys@uts.edu.au
1133533MCXXXX10.1177/00977004221133533Modern ChinaJereys and Xu
research-article2022
2 Modern China 00(0)
Entertainment celebrities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) occupy a
contested ethico-political space as new cultural-economic elites in a rising
world power and self-proclaimed socialist country. After the PRC’s founding
under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership in 1949, the nationaliza-
tion of industry and centralized economic planning prevented private enter-
prise and the accumulation of significant private wealth. There was no
celebrity-oriented entertainment industry in mainland China in the contem-
porary sense of the word until after the adoption of market-based economic
reforms in December 1978 (Edwards and Jeffreys, 2010). From 1949 until
the late 1980s, state-funded literary and arts workers (authors, actors, singers,
and dancers) were trained at state academies, and either wrote for or per-
formed in (politically didactic) state-produced events and broadcast media
productions. Strict controls over the state-owned media also ensured that
PRC media chiefly communicated Communist Party ideology and policies
and promoted military and labor heroes as social role models. Hence, CCP
members in institutional positions of authority comprised the only identifi-
able national power elite.
New elites (private entrepreneurs and entertainment stars) have emerged
in China along with the increased incomes and commercialization of indus-
try, media, and services that have accompanied and driven the PRC’s eco-
nomic reforms and shift to a more consumption-oriented economy (Edwards
and Jeffreys, 2010; Sullivan and Kehoe, 2019). Starting in the late 1980s,
government authorities gradually stopped financing the state-controlled
broadcast media, requiring film, television, and radio producers to experi-
ment with a party-controlled but market-oriented media system. Market
competition forced commercialized media to expand their role as “informa-
tion-entertainment” providers to attract audiences and advertising revenue.
This resulted in a proliferation of television stations and entertainment pro-
gramming on broadcast and eventually digital media. It also created multi-
ple types of celebrities (film, sport, television, reality, and internet stars),
some of whom comprise an elite cultural-economic group by virtue of their
extraordinary fame, wealth, and media visibility.
But what kind of elites are major entertainment celebrities, especially in
the PRC context? Writing in 1956, sociologist C. Wright Mills (2000 [1956])
included film and sports stars in what he described as “the power elite.” Mills
argued that North America’s post-Second World War economic recovery,
technological innovation, and Cold War supremacy had created a new elite
group—“the power elite,” which, unlike America’s local-society, small-town
elites of the 1920s, involved a national, interconnected group of political,
military, and corporate leaders and celebrities. Mills included celebrities
within this new national elite, even while noting that they lacked the
Jeffreys and Xu 3
institutional decision-making powers of political-military-corporate elites,
because American film and sports stars are regularly in the public eye and
political power elites want to be seen with them.
In 1972, sociologist Francesco Alberoni (2007) dubbed Euroamerican
celebrities “the powerless elite” to differentiate them from the political-mili-
tary-corporate-religious leaders of the national power elite, defined as people
who influence the fortunes of the societies that they direct through their insti-
tutional decision-making powers. Alberoni argued that power elites and stars
both attract national attention and thus have social influence, but the cha-
risma of stardom does not translate into a political power relationship. This is
because power elites are observed and evaluated primarily according to the
social impact of their institutional activities and decisions, whereas public
interest in celebrity centers on celebrity products and lifestyles. Additionally,
although celebrities attract intense public scrutiny, their wealth, behaviors,
and morals are typically viewed in a more indulgent fashion than are those of
other members of society because celebrities personify ability-based, upward
social mobility, and live at a distance from fans and “anti-fans.” Alberoni
(2007: 65) concluded that celebrities combine maximum social visibility
with the inability to control the opportunities of the public and are therefore
“institutionally considered as unimportant from a political point of view”
(emphasis in original).
Today, sociologists and development scholars variously praise or decry a
“politicized enclave” of A-list Western entertainment celebrities (“Big
Citizens”) for wielding their mediatized “star power” to exert unelected,
“stateless,” political influence by fronting international humanitarian causes
(Rojek, 2014: 128). Unlike celebrity career politicians, Big Citizens are not
associated with national political parties and related obligations (Rojek, 2014:
133). Supporters claim that celebrity ambassadorial advocacy for the United
Nations (UN) and international nonprofit organizations on issues such as
human rights, poverty alleviation, and the environment raises the profile of an
organization and campaign by attracting media publicity and new audiences/
donors.1 Critics maintain that celebrity advocacy is a self-serving branding
exercise by privileged elites that buttresses neoliberal capitalism and discour-
ages active citizen participation in efforts to redress global inequality and
injustice (Kapoor, 2013; Rojek, 2014). Instead, they aver that it encourages
“cause-sumerism” (the practice of purchasing goods with part of the purchase
price being donated to a “distant” cause), and thereby disguises the ongoing
exploitation of people and resources in developed and developing countries by
Western governments and multinational corporations.
Entertainment celebrities in China are not members of the PRC power
elite, but, contrary to the powerless elite thesis, they are important from a
4 Modern China 00(0)
political perspective and consequently have been “indentured” to serve the
nation (and not act as independent Big Citizens). The political importance of
PRC celebrities stems from their public visibility and access to means of
mass communication, and therefore an omnipresent, although not always
exercised, potential to influence public opinion in unpredictable ways.
However, the PRC’s system of one-party rule limits the space for national
celebrities to become career politicians and/or engage in non-government-
supported ambassadorial advocacy. This system precludes the existence of
effective opposition political parties and removes the need for mediatized
political competition—a perceived driver of the celebritization of Western
politics, for example, the rise in North America of politician celebrities, poli-
ticians who use others’ celebrity, and celebrity politicians and advocates
(Jeffreys, 2016). It also limits the space for nongovernmental humanitarian
activism led by charismatic individuals and civil society organizations.
At the same time, the PRC government is adeptly adopting modern com-
munication strategies to promote policy goals, including using celebrities in
government advertising (domestic political messaging) and public diplomacy
(communication with international audiences). Celebrities have been inden-
tured to serve the nation in this context because the success of their careers is
not only beholden to the appreciation of their audiences as in Western con-
texts but also contingent on their willingness to endorse government-defined
national values and aspirations. PRC celebrities are indentured, to use the old
meaning of the word, in the sense that they enter into an agreement with other
parties to do or refrain from doing certain acts, in return for a benefit or
reward. In this case, the benefit is to remain in the public eye and retain the
lucrative side benefits that accompany a public profile. But in return they
must justify their fame and wealth by conforming to government (and some-
times public) expectations that they are law-abiding, civic-minded citizens
who will help deliver the “Chinese Dream” of the PRC being a prosperous,
world-leading country by the time of its centenary in 2049 (Xi, 2014).
This article reveals how China’s celebrities are indentured to act as ambas-
sadors for domestic political messaging and public diplomacy as follows.
First, it explores the expansion since the mid-2000s of formal regulatory con-
trols over the PRC’s entertainment industries. Second, it examines the 2018
“Fan Bingbing 范范范 tax evasion case” to demonstrate how supervision by
public opinion in the form of online public censure, and the associated poten-
tial for government action, can coalesce to discipline celebrity personas and
behaviors. We conclude that these regulatory frameworks and populist prac-
tices indenture major entertainment celebrities to serve the nation, while
undermining any scope to exert nongovernmental political influence as per
the Big Citizens of Western societies.
Jeffreys and Xu 5
Regulating China’s Contemporary Entertainment
Industries
In a recent article on the politics of celebrity in China, Jonathan Sullivan and
Séagh Kehoe (2019: 242) argue that China’s celebrities can reach and poten-
tially influence large audiences, concluding that this makes celebrities and
star-making industries a focus of PRC government efforts to regulate and
use “celebrity power.” They add that the governance of China’s entertain-
ment industries is achieved through formal legal and regulatory frameworks,
which are “supplemented by informal, soft controls in the form of govern-
ment pronouncements and state media editorials setting out norms and
expectations” that are supported by “Chinese publics” (Sullivan and Kehoe,
2019: 245–46).
While Sullivan and Kehoe point usefully to the political relevance of PRC
celebrities, their account of the governance of China’s entertainment indus-
tries contains significant gaps. First, their description of the formal regulatory
system is outdated; the system has been overhauled since 2017. Second, they
fail to distinguish between different types of media and neglect to show how
formal and informal controls are conjoined in practice. Our keyword search
for the term “celebrity” 明星 on the database of People’s Daily 人民日报,2
the print media news outlet of the CCP, revealed that there were no editorials
社论 on the topic of celebrity during the five-year period between 2016 and
2020. The “government pronouncements” to which Sullivan and Kehoe refer
appear instead to be notices about new or desired industry-specific regula-
tions, while other entertainment-related communications are constrained to
social media posts on the newspaper’s official account on Sina Weibo,3 a
Twitter-like microblogging site. While the print version of People’s Daily and
its Weibo account demonstrate what the PRC government thinks about vari-
ous issues, the print newspaper deals exclusively with the traditional, conse-
quential “hard news topics” of politics, business, and international affairs,
whereas the Weibo account is used purposively to engage with and poten-
tially shape public sentiment by providing (micro-)comments on selected
trending social issues (Xu and Sun, 2021: 181), including “soft news topics”
such as entertainment and celebrity scandals. Finally, Sullivan and Kehoe
offer little to no empirical evidence to support the claim that Chinese publics
make celebrities conform to social norms: how precisely do publics do this?
As we discuss later with reference to the Fan Bingbing case, the main mecha-
nism is the assemblage of populist, contingent practices known as “supervi-
sion by (online) public opinion.”
Regulatory controls over China’s cultural industries (news, publishing,
copyright, radio, television, film, arts, internet, entertainment) have expanded
6 Modern China 00(0)
dramatically since 2017 in line with government plans for the PRC to have
the world’s biggest media and entertainment market. The Thirteenth Five-
Year Plan for Economic and Social Development for 2016–2020 stated that
the cultural industries would be a pillar of the national economy by 2020,
requiring all levels of government to work toward that goal (Xinhua, 2017).
Government incentives have ensured that the value of China’s media and
entertainment market, already the second largest in the world after the United
States, is burgeoning (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2020). Economic planning
for 2021–2025 recommends further developing the cultural industries to pro-
mote China’s “soft power” in domestic and international arenas (Xinhua,
2020).
Unlike in Western contexts, there is a political expectation that China’s
commercial and increasingly international cultural industries will boost the
domestic economy while advancing socialist culture, a task unified under the
rubric of “building spiritual civilization” (Xi, 2014). The Central Guidance
Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization 中央精神文明建设指导委
员会, established in 1997 under the supervision of the Propaganda Department
(now rebranded in English as the Publicity Department) of the CCP Central
Committee, is tasked with the mission of tying economic growth and socialist
culture. Rebranded in English in 2012 as the Central Commission for Guiding
Cultural and Ethical Progress 中共中央精神文明建设指导委员会, the
commission’s mission has been framed since the 2000s in terms of promoting
national values and a civic culture, and therefore “appropriate” art, literature,
and media practices (Gov.cn, 2001). These goals are reiterated in a 2019 doc-
ument titled “Outline for Building Civic Ethics in the New Era” 新时代公民
道德建设实施纲要—that is, the post-2012 era of Xi Jinping’s presidency
(Xinhua, 2019).
Appropriate cultural-media practices in the PRC context generally refer to
the creation of products that directly or indirectly support government adver-
tising and public diplomacy. Such products promote government-endorsed
national values and policy goals, support the PRC’s revolutionary history,
counter negative (Western) cultural influences, and communicate a positive
international image of China (Xi, 2014). For example, Article 23 of the
National Security Law of the PRC states that China’s strength and cultural
competitiveness will be enhanced by advancing traditional Chinese culture
and socialist core values, while guarding against negative cultural influences
(National People’s Congress of the PRC, 2015). Traditional cultural virtues
are a feature of government advertising designed to build a civic-minded citi-
zenry and refer to revamped Confucian guidelines for ethical behavior such
as displaying harmony, benevolence, righteousness, courtesy, wisdom, hon-
esty, loyalty, and filial piety. The socialist core values, defined at the CCP’s
Jeffreys and Xu 7
Eighteenth National Congress in 2012, are prosperity, democracy, civility,
harmony, freedom, equality, justice, rule of law, patriotism, dedication, integ-
rity, and friendship. These virtues and values emphasize civility and civic
mindedness rather than what is often presented as a return to old-school
“socialist morality” (Ni, 2021).
The PRC’s media-communications system was restructured in early 2018
with the aim of developing the cultural industries and improving China’s
international reputation. The State Administration of Press, Publication,
Radio, Film and Television was dismantled. Three government-run broad-
casters, China Central Television (CCTV), China Radio International, and
China National Radio, were merged into a state-media conglomerate called
the “Voice of China,” managed by a new government organization, the
National Radio and Television Administration, and supervised by the
Publicity Department (Zhang, 2018). Other new organizations—the National
Film Bureau, the State Press and Publication Administration, and the National
Copyright Administration—were also placed under the Publicity Department’s
supervision.
Hence, the CCP’s Publicity Department now exercises direct regulatory
control over all film, television, radio, book publishing, and news media.
This includes supervising domestic film production, content, distribution,
and screening, and major film events, as well as international joint produc-
tions, film importing and exporting, and global exchange initiatives. Similar
controls are exercised over internet businesses and content by the Cyberspace
Administration of China, established in 2014 under the supervision of the
Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, directed by PRC President and
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping.
Supporting this restructuring, the first Film Industry Promotion Law of the
PRC, effective March 2017, and the first Radio and Television Law of the
PRC, issued as a draft for public comment in March 2021, outline the govern-
ment-identified rules of conduct for entertainment industry professionals
(Central People’s Government of the PRC, 2016; National Radio and
Television Administration, 2021). Article 1 of the Film Industry Promotion
Law states that the law aims to facilitate the healthy development of the film
industry, advance socialist core values, and enrich people’s cultural lives
(Central People’s Government of the PRC, 2016). Article 3 adds that film
creation, distribution, and screening should prioritize social rather than eco-
nomic benefit. Article 9 urges film industry organizations to create self-disci-
pline regulations to strengthen knowledge of the law and professional ethics.
It also encourages actors, directors, and other personnel to comply with
Chinese laws and regulations, respect social norms, abide by professional
ethics, adopt self-discipline measures, and establish a positive social image.
8 Modern China 00(0)
Article 16 prohibits films from showing content banned by laws or adminis-
trative regulations, including content that endangers the constitution, national
security, ethnic unity, and religious policy, or promotes pornography, gam-
bling, drug use, violence, or crime. As films in China cannot be screened on
broadcast or digital media without a government release permit, the law
requires entertainment industry professionals to manage their public personas
and products, in accordance with government-endorsed national values and
policy goals.
The draft Radio and Television Law outlines similar but more explicit
rules of conduct for entertainment professionals (National Radio and
Television Administration, 2021). The law supports the broadcasting of
content that supports socialism, China, national policies, and scientific/cul-
tural innovation (Article 45). Conversely, it bans content that denigrates the
CCP, socialism, revolutionary heroes, and Chinese culture and history, as
well as content that promotes misinformation, obscenity, violence, illegal-
ity, and crime (Article 19). The law stipulates that radio and television prac-
titioners shall abide by Chinese law and professional ethics and establish a
positive social image (Article 62). It further bans the broadcasting of prod-
ucts created by media producers/performers who have broken relevant laws
and regulations (Article 32). These stipulations are enforced through a sys-
tem of fines, product boycotts, and suspensions of business licenses, which
includes penalties for exceeding national caps on remuneration for stars/
creators 主创人员 (Article 65).
These organizational and legislative changes are formalizing a system of
regulatory controls over the entertainment industries that has been gaining
momentum since the mid-2000s. Following the PRC’s post-1978 adoption
of economic reforms, the Propaganda Department started using internal cen-
sorship measures in the form of “blacklisting” to constrain the development
of artistic and commercial media forms (and the careers of certain celebri-
ties) that were viewed as politically sensitive, even though being “banned”
sometimes added to the countercultural capital of some stars/products in
domestic niche and overseas markets. In such instances, state-funded media
organizations and cultural departments would receive an internal notice sug-
gesting that the works should be blacklisted for being “spiritually harmful.”
Thus, the music of Cui Jian 崔健, the “godfather of Chinese rock,” was
neither played nor shown on state-run radio and television for almost twenty
years because one of his songs, “Nothing to My Name” 一无所有, was used
as an unofficial anthem by students during the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-
tests (Amar, 2020).
In the mid-2000s, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television
(SARFT, 1998–2013), subsequently the State Administration of Press,
Jeffreys and Xu 9
Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT, 2013–2018), started
issuing regulations to control new commercial entertainment media, espe-
cially reality shows. In 2006, SARFT limited the number of national and
interprovincial talent competitions, ostensibly to stop industry exploitation of
people under the age of eighteen and the promotion of outlandish judging
regimes and participant behaviors (Central People’s Government of the PRC,
2006). In 2011, it instructed satellite channels to increase programming about
news, economics, documentaries, culture, science, education, and children
and to restrict talent, dating, talk, and game shows to a maximum of two
shows per channel per week (Sina, 2011). Presaging current film and televi-
sion laws, it instructed satellite channels to produce “ethics-building pro-
grams” depicting traditional Chinese virtues and socialist values.
Also foretelling current legislation, SAPPRFT targeted illegal behavior on
the part of entertainment professionals in a 2014 public notice on strengthen-
ing the management of broadcast and online media products. Dubbed “the
block on wrongdoing artists” 封杀劣迹艺人, the notice instructed all media
platforms to cease showing products involving actors, directors, and screen-
writers convicted of engaging in drugs, prostitution, and other illicit activities
(Sohu, 2015). It stated that film, television, and radio professionals should
disseminate “positive energy” by providing excellent products and present-
ing a good public image. Disseminating positive energy is a political slogan
associated with Xi Jinping; it refers to the practice of projecting an optimistic,
uplifting attitude to realize the Chinese Dream. As per current legislation, the
ban on broadcasting products involving producers and performers associated
with illegality provides a clear economic incentive for relevant industries to
vet personnel in line with government directives to protect their businesses,
and for performers to self-govern their public personas to protect their careers.
It signals a shift to proactive industry-professional self-regulation rather than
reactive government censorship.
Shortly after, in 2015, Xi Jinping gave a speech to senior members of the
Publicity Department calling for the cultural industries to strengthen party
leadership; fifty media organizations subsequently signed the “Pact on Self-
Disciplining the Professional Ethics of Press, Publishing, Radio, Film, and
Television Broadcasting Personnel” 新闻出版广播影视从业人员职业道
德自律公约, agreeing to protect the CCP’s reputation, abide by the law, and
promote the socialist core values, positive energy, and a good professional
image (People.cn, 2015). At a related symposium, A-lister Fan Bingbing
endorsed the pact, stating that celebrities should be professional, abide by
the law, and deliver positive energy by providing a good personal example
(Sina, 2015).
10 Modern China 00(0)
The pact started a process of indenturing celebrities to the service of gov-
ernment, which is now encapsulated in law and in the Publicity Department’s
oversight of the entertainment industries. In 2016, SAPPRFT responded to an
inspection of its work by the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection by issuing a Rectification Notice (People.cn, 2016). Foretelling
current legislation, the Rectification Notice advocated party leadership of all
media, restricting the scope of television entertainment programs, and cap-
ping celebrity pay. It further recommended banning entertainment profes-
sionals convicted of criminal or illegal acts from attending and winning
national film, television, radio, and celebrity awards, and banning associated
products. The Cyberspace Administration of China similarly issued a raft of
regulations from 2016 onward to manage internet and livestreaming content,
including celebrity/social-influencer product endorsements, by outlining
rules of industry-professional conduct and encouraging self-censorship (Xu
and Zhang, 2021).
Multiple examples demonstrate the use of indentured celebrities in gov-
ernment advertising and potentially regional-diasporic public diplomacy. In
the run-up to the CCP’s Nineteenth National Congress in 2017, CCTV issued
a four-part series of celebrity-endorsed public service advertisements (PSAs)
titled the “Glory and the Dream—Our Chinese Dream” 光荣与梦想 我们的
中国梦 (CCTV, 2017). More than thirty celebrities, including A-list film
stars Li Bingbing 李冰冰 and Jackie Chan, appeared in the PSAs, which
were featured on entertainment platforms across China. The PSAs endorsed
major political slogans associated with Xi Jinping, including the Chinese
Dream and socialist core values. In 2019, the Publicity Department released
PSAs endorsed by young pop stars and actors promoting the socialist core
values and China’s emerging social credit system (see YouTube, 2019).
Regulations issued in 2020 by the National Radio and Television
Administration urged broadcasters to restrict high performer salaries and
encourage performer participation in public welfare programs. Hence, PRC
celebrities look set to become a regular feature of mediatized events promot-
ing government-endorsed, rather than Big Citizen, philanthropy (see Deng
and Jeffreys, 2019; Hood, 2015).
The tightening of laws and regulatory frameworks and the restructuring of
the PRC’s media-communications system under Publicity Department super-
vision represent important channels through which entertainment creators
and celebrities have been indentured to aid the CCP in its objectives. The next
section examines the 2018 Fan Bingbing case to reveal how online public
sentiment and the associated potential for government action can also
coalesce to indenture China’s celebrities. Sociologists argue that celebrities
are members of an “open” rather than self-perpetuating elite because their
Jeffreys and Xu 11
fame depends on positive audience sentiment, which is revokable (Alberoni,
2007: 9). This observation raises the question of how and in what circum-
stances can Chinese publics revoke stardom.
Online Public Sentiment and the Fan Bingbing Case
Some scholars of celebrity in China contend that a longstanding tradition of
public figures acting as moral exemplars has ensured that government and
public expectations are basically aligned. In this view, PRC celebrities are
expected to be good social role models with high moral standards, who
model individual success and consumerism rather than class struggle.
Sullivan and Kehoe (2019: 246) argue that normative values like “filiality,
faithfulness in marriage and the collective good are dominant social norms
that [PRC] celebrities are expected to conform to by the state, business and
publics.” Min Xu, Stijn Reijnders, and Sangkyun Kim (2021: 97) conclude
from fifteen interviews about Chinese audiences’ engagement with celeb-
rity culture that the “intersections between the desirable qualities of famous
people and the value system promoted by the Chinese government are
clear.”
While superficially true, this argument ignores the fact that government
values and social norms are not always aligned, and fans, anti-fans, and other
interested audiences may interact with celebrity differently. In China, as else-
where, celebrities are insulated to some degree from the social consensus.
Audiences usually or eventually forgive celebrities for their lavish consump-
tion practices and sexual affairs. Actor Huang Xiaoming 黄晓明 is still a star
despite public criticisms of his US$31 million wedding to actor-singer
Angelababy, as are actors Chen He 陈赫 and Dong Jie 董洁 after reported
extramarital affairs. Film star Zhang Ziyi 章子怡 and other A-listers survived
intense media and public scrutiny for allegedly failing to donate to the
national 2008 Sichuan earthquake disaster-relief efforts (Jeffreys, 2011).
The argument that government and public expectations are aligned also
does little, in the cases where it does occur, to shed light on the chief mecha-
nism—“supervision by public opinion” 舆论监督—that brings about that
alignment in practice. Supervision by public opinion refers to an assemblage
of populist, contingent practices, which can translate into government action
in specific circumstances. The expression entered the Chinese lexicon in the
late 1980s, when CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang stated in his 1987
report to the Thirteenth Party Congress that the CCP “should use all kinds of
modernized news and propaganda tools to increase reporting on government
and party affairs” and “allow supervision by public opinion to play a role”
12 Modern China 00(0)
(Chen, 2017: 624). Originally exercised chiefly by broadcast media through
investigative reporting, supervision by public opinion is now a routine com-
ponent of party and government work.
While tighter government controls over China’s media have inhibited
investigative journalism, online whistleblowing and public outcry has
coalesced to form a new model of supervision by public opinion known as
“internet or online supervision” 网络监督 (Xi, 2016; Xu, 2016). The general
aim of such networked supervision is to expose the wrongdoings of party and
government officials and public figures, especially corruption, malfeasance,
and crime. The PRC government has incorporated these practices into its
revitalization of “mass line” 群众路线 (i.e., from the people to the people)
forms of governance, to encourage public participation in and support for
policy objectives. In a 2016 speech at a national conference on cybersecurity
and informatization work, Xi Jinping instructed party and government offi-
cials to accept the new supervision channel of the people and proactively
respond to public concerns online. Local governments are now monitoring,
soliciting, and analyzing online public sentiment, outsourcing the work to
research institutions, media organizations, and businesses that do data min-
ing, sentiment analysis, and cloud computing (Hou, 2017).
We examine the case of Fan Bingbing below, a film star who Sullivan and
Kehoe (2019: 249) (presumably writing pre-scandal) assert has been
“rewarded handsomely” for adhering to “state ideals,” because it provides a
striking example of supervision by public opinion of a major celebrity result-
ing in direct rather than indirect regulatory action. Our examination shows
that celebrities in China, as elsewhere, are not insulated from the social con-
sensus when they are seen to act above the law or fail to comport themselves
in ways commensurate with the economic privilege and moral leeway
allowed them. It further suggests that government action against celebrities
occurs in contingent, strategic circumstances to achieve pragmatic policy
goals rather than strictly morality-impelled social control.
Fan Bingbing, born in 1981, is an internationally renowned celebrity with
around 64 million followers on Sina Weibo.4 Fan stars in Hollywood block-
busters such as Iron Man 3 and X-Men: Days of Future Past and won “Best
Female Actor” at China’s 2017 Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film
Festival. She topped the annual Forbes China Celebrity lists during 2013–
2017, which measure celebrity income and “marketability.”
Fan “disappeared” from public view in early June 2018 and reemerged on
October 3, ending global media speculation about her whereabouts, to pub-
licly confess on social media that she owed the PRC government 884 million
yuan (US$129 million) in evaded taxes (https://weibo.com/fbb0916, October
3, 2018, 12.03). A search for the name “Fan Bingbing” on the Dow Jones
Jeffreys and Xu 13
Factiva global news database from June 1 to October 3, 2018,5 reveals that
Fan was the subject of nearly 370 international news items during this period.
Many Western journalists focused on the unusual nature of a celebrity disap-
pearance, suggesting that it showed that “no one is safe in the PRC” because
“everyday life is dominated by politics” and “the law is whatever the CCP
says it is” (Kuo, 2018: n.p.). Others more fabulously claimed that Fan’s gen-
der, beauty, wealth, and fanbase made her an “existential terror” for a patriar-
chal regime headed by Xi Jinping, who is reportedly “dwarfed in stature by
Fan’s stardom” (Liao, 2018).
Cui Yongyuan 崔永元, a Chinese household name as a former CCTV
anchor and online activist against genetically modified food, kickstarted
rumors that Fan was guilty of tax evasion in May 2018. Cui posted a copy of
a “yin-yang contract” on his Weibo account,6 which had 17 million followers
at the time (now over 19 million). A yin-yang contract refers to the practice
of having two contracts for one employment (or property), one of which cites
a lower fee than the actual salary, with the lower amount used for accounting
purposes. His initial and subsequent posts said that “someone” (Fan) had
been paid 10 million yuan and 50 million yuan for four days of work on a
sequel to the award-winning movie Cell Phone 手机, starring Fan Bingbing
(Zhihu, 2018). Although Cui later apologized to Fan and claimed that the
contracts were not hers, his first post on May 29 attracted over 80,500 com-
ments, was reposted 46,000 times that same day, and was also widely circu-
lated on WeChat.
Cui’s apparent exposé of celebrity tax evasion became a hot-button issue
overnight and a medium for public debate about the law and income inequal-
ity. Netizens criticized Fan for allegedly breaking the law and evading taxes
while receiving an astronomical fee for quick work. One response to Cui’s
posts, which received thousands of likes, highlighted the discrepancy between
Fan’s purported income and that of everyday Chinese by exclaiming: “60
million!!! How many lifetimes would it take another Chinese to earn that
much money?” (梧桐相执手, May 29, 2018, 13:09). Another response con-
trasted Fan’s alleged salary to that of revolutionary-era soldiers, implicitly
asking whether massive income inequality is acceptable in the PRC: “My
God! It makes me so sad when I know that veterans had to make a living by
collecting [and selling] garbage for recycling!” (李楊说QuQ, May 29, 2018,
13:05).
The online outcry was evidently too “loud” for government regulators to
ignore; on June 3, 2018, the State Taxation Administration (2018a) issued a
statement saying that it valued the public exposure of yin-yang contracts in
the film and television industries, which tax departments in Jiangsu province
and elsewhere were now investigating. Although the statement did not
14 Modern China 00(0)
explicitly mention Fan Bingbing, subsequent rumors suggested that she had
businesses registered in Jiangsu province and in Khorgos City in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region, an international free trade zone (Frater, 2018).
People’s Daily endorsed the taxation authority’s action on its Weibo account,
stating that tax evasion in the film and television industries should be inves-
tigated because “All are equal before the law. No one is beyond the law, no
matter how famous and well networked they are and how many fans they
have” (Sina, 2018a). On June 27, the Publicity Department, Ministry of
Culture and Tourism, State Taxation Administration, State Administration of
Radio and Television, and National Film Bureau took further action by order-
ing a cap on astronomical remuneration, establishing initiatives against tax
evasion, and banning government-funded investment in tax-exempt charita-
ble foundations run by certain entertainment businesses for inflating celebrity
wages (Xinhua, 2018a).
Supervision by public opinion in the form of Cui Yongyuan’s posts and
responses to them thus catalyzed government action on tax evasion in the
entertainment industries; but the nature, amplification, and resolution of the
Fan Bingbing case is intimately related to policy agendas, not just govern-
ment attention to online whistleblowing and public sentiment. Supervision
by public opinion typically only results in central government action when
straightforward action can be taken that presents the government in a positive
light as responsive and capable (Jeffreys and Xu, 2018). Cui’s revelations
about celebrity tax evasion took place in the context of a government-led
anticorruption campaign that involved targeting rich, corrupt officials and
overseeing government austerity measures. As part of this campaign, state-
owned enterprises were banned from using public money to pay exorbitant
celebrity salaries. Celebrity income is consequently a legitimate object of
public scrutiny in the PRC, as are the actual or imagined connections between
potentially corrupt politicians, entrepreneurs, and celebrities.
The “corrupt” financing activities of entertainment companies and celeb-
rities (including Fan Bingbing) were already a salient feature of news report-
ing at least as early as 2016. A search for the keyword “celebrity” 明星 on the
China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) Core Newspaper Database
between 2016 and 2018 revealed that around 240 of 1,620 articles, or 15
percent of the total, focused on celebrity-related problems.7 In 2016, the key
issue (accounting for half of around fifty articles on celebrity-related prob-
lems) was “sky-high pay” 天价片酬 and related policy solutions. High per-
formance fees were criticized for inflating media and entertainment industry
share prices and cinema ticket prices and limiting film and television quality
by reducing producer and screenwriter budgets. Proposed solutions included
capping celebrity pay and introducing higher taxation rates for celebrities
Jeffreys and Xu 15
with some charity-related tax benefits (e.g., Xinhua, 2016). In 2017, the key
issue (half of around 80 articles on celebrity-related problems) was financial
impropriety: notably, listed media corporations’ failure to disclose to regula-
tors income streams that were themselves related to high salaries paid to
celebrities. These corporations were able to offset the cost of hiring celebri-
ties, and thereby inflate their own net profits (and potentially share prices as
well) by purchasing unlisted “shell” companies whose profits were generated
by the same celebrity-fee income (e.g., Xinhua Finance, 2017). In 2018, the
key issues (around 50 of 110 articles on celebrity-related problems) were
high celebrity salaries and financial impropriety, including tax evasion. By
way of comparison, in 2019, news coverage of these issues had virtually
disappeared: of around 715 articles on celebrity, 90 articles focused on celeb-
rity-related problems, but only 10 were about high salaries and financial
impropriety.
The furor surrounding the Fan Bingbing case also relates to the PRC gov-
ernment’s pledge to improve overall living standards, reduce income inequal-
ity, and innovate social governance. As outlined at the 2017 National Party
Congress, this means curbing excessive incomes, prohibiting illicit incomes,
raising low-level incomes, and ensuring equitable access to public services
(Xi, 2017). The main redistributive mechanism to realize these goals is tax
reform, as detailed in an amendment to the Individual Income Tax Law sub-
mitted to the PRC’s legislature in June 2018, passed on August 31, and effec-
tive January 1, 2019 (State Taxation Administration, 2018b). The reforms
aim to raise government revenue and stimulate the economy by introducing a
unique taxpayer identification number, consolidating tax residency rules,
raising the tax-free threshold, amending progressive tax rates, clarifying tax-
deductible items, and introducing an anti-tax-avoidance rule.
Tax reforms and entertainment industry regulation are central to the
denouement of the Fan Bingbing case, as demonstrated by a press release by
Xinhua News Agency at 10 a.m. on October 3, 2018, which ended the mys-
tery of her disappearance. The release stated that Fan had been investigated
by tax authorities since early June, based on information received from mem-
bers of the public (Xinhua, 2018c). As a result of that investigation, which
ended on September 30, Fan had been ordered to pay US$129 million in late
and evaded taxes and fines, according to Article 201 of the 2011 Criminal
Law of the PRC.8 It added that Fan was treated leniently, as stipulated in
Article 201: she had received an administrative punishment for first-time tax
evasion and would not face criminal charges providing that she pay the mon-
ies owed by a fixed time. It ended by saying that personnel in the film and
television industries that underwent self-examination and made remedial
payments to tax authorities on or before December 31, 2018, would not face
16 Modern China 00(0)
administrative penalties. In other words, the central government used the Fan
Bingbing case to offer (wealthy) film and television professionals a tempo-
rary amnesty while warning them of a forthcoming crackdown on tax evasion
supported by the amended tax law.
A few hours later, just after noon on October 3, Fan posted an “apology
letter” on her Weibo account confessing to tax evasion and begging forgive-
ness for putting money before the law, because “without the good policies of
the party and the state, without the love and protection of the people, there
would be no Fan Bingbing” (https://weibo.com/fbb0916, October 3, 2018,
12.03). The apology ended with Fan promising to be a law-abiding citizen-
entrepreneur who would be a good social role model and spread positive
energy henceforth; it was reposted nearly 330,000 times and had received
more than 2.4 million likes by the end of 2018. The wording of the apology,
which repeats government discourses on appropriate celebrity conduct, sug-
gests it was crafted with the aid of the Publicity Department, and presumably
was the agreed-upon cost of avoiding potential criminal investigation for tax
fraud. Certainly, media responses on the legality of her punishment indicate
that some commentators believed that Fan had been treated far too leniently
by government authorities, even as her reputation and career lay in tatters
(Renmin ribao, 2018).
While Fan’s apology echoes government discourses on good celebrity
conduct, the responses of fans were more indulgent and highlight the hetero-
geneous nature of public opinion. Most fans said that they forgave Fan and
expressed ongoing love for her (https://weibo.com/fbb0916, October 3, 2018,
12.03). Only a few respondents said that she should be ashamed of herself.
This support explains why Fan still endorses international luxury products
(Zhang, 2020), even as it remains unclear when or if she will make a film and
television comeback.
Official media commentary issued online shortly after Fan’s apology indi-
cates that the case had “advertising value” for the central government as a
means of providing legal education. Xinhua, CCTV, and People’s Daily
released opinions and social media posts suggesting that the case warned art-
ists in the film and television industries to abide by the law and showed that
everyone is equal before the law, regardless of individual wealth, fame, and
beauty (CCTV News, 2018; Sina, 2018b; Xinhua, 2018b).
The commentaries praised the combination of supervision by public opin-
ion and government action for generating visible law enforcement, while
informing readers that individual income taxation is the cornerstone of mod-
ern governance and a citizen obligation. As they added, public consensus also
confirmed that high-income earners have a greater obligation to contribute to
a modern governance system by paying higher taxes and financially
Jeffreys and Xu 17
supporting charities. The commentaries concluded by appealing for citizen
compliance with the tax reforms, telling film and television professionals,
public figures, and ordinary citizens alike to view Fan’s case as a warning to
abide by the law.
Advertising the tax reforms via a celebritized cautionary tale was there-
fore an effective way for the government to communicate that underreporting
of income and tax evasion would henceforth not be tolerated, without scaring
everyone into silence and pushing the problem further underground. A news
article published in early 2019, which interviewed senior officials at the State
Taxation Administration, the State Administration of Radio and Television,
and the National Film Bureau, stated that the self-correction of tax records by
film and television professionals between October and December 2018 had
generated government revenue of nearly 12 billion yuan (Sina, 2019). The
article added that self-discipline on the part of film and television profession-
als, combined with Taxation Administration oversight, would ensure the law-
ful payment of income tax.
In summary, supervision by networked public opinion has ensured that
China’s celebrities are a legitimate focus of government attention because
many people want government action on financial impropriety by the super-
rich, just as they desire action against corrupt officials. The Fan Bingbing
case suggests that the government could take further action without public
backlash, even though celebrities have large fanbases. The fact that the gov-
ernment received nearly 12 billion yuan in self-corrected taxes from film-
television professionals by late 2018 suggests that additional action might be
forthcoming and could be conducted without harming China’s developing
cultural industries. Although media-entertainment company share prices fell
around the time of Fan Bingbing’s case, they soon rose and the share price
trend has remained stable over a five-year period.9
But a large-scale, government-led celebrity witch hunt is not a likely sce-
nario, despite Western media claims to the contrary after the introduction of
new measures to strengthen the governance of individual taxation and tax-
related incentives in the entertainment industries (State Taxation
Administration, 2021; Turland, 2021). This is because the cautionary tale
telegraphed to major and lesser celebrities by the Fan Bingbing case is clear.
Celebrities as newly rich elites can anticipate regulatory leniency and contin-
ued public visibility only when they accept the legal and citizen obligations
associated with economic privilege. Notably, while the new tax guidelines
recommend publicizing typical tax evasion cases to promote legal education
and industry compliance, they promise leniency for businesses and individu-
als that promptly correct their accounting practices (State Taxation
Administration, 2021).
18 Modern China 00(0)
Since the Fan Bingbing case, the governance of celebrity conduct in the
PRC, and its interaction with the disciplinary force of public opinion, has
continued to evolve in new ways. In particular, the shift to industry profes-
sionalization and self-governance allows public sentiment to be harnessed
through semi-official organizations that occupy the space between govern-
ment and industry. This shift is illustrated by the “Management Measures for
the Self-Discipline of Performers in the Performance Industries” 演出行业
演艺人员从业自律管理办法, issued by the China Association of Performing
Arts 中国演出行业协会 (CAPA), a national nonprofit organization, in 2021.
CAPA runs a performing arts expo in Beijing and produces an annual report
on the value of China’s performance industry, which is cited regularly in
People’s Daily. The “Management Measures” reiterate the legal-professional
behaviors outlined in national laws, adding that noncompliant members and
their products will be boycotted and urging performers to participate in pub-
lic welfare activities.
Although these measures only cover voluntary members, CAPA has been
vocal on social media about the need to boycott (nonmember) celebrities for
alleged criminal and “poor” behaviors, and People’s Daily has reposted the
CAPA regulations and claims in efforts to shape netizen opinion. Commenting
via its Weibo account on the arrest on suspicion of rape of Chinese Canadian
pop star Kris Wu 吴亦凡, People’s Daily averred that no celebrity is above
the law and celebrities should be good (not bad) role models (QQ.com, 2021).
Also commenting via its Weibo account about an online apology posted by
actor Zhang Zhehan 张哲瀚, People’s Daily criticized Zhang’s ignorance of
PRC history, while implicitly celebrating the anniversary of the CCP’s vic-
tory over Japan in the Second World War (Sunnews, 2021). Zhang had
attracted public criticism for posting photographs of himself at a Japanese
shrine to war heroes (a Chinese symbol of war crimes). This controversy cost
Zhang multiple brand endorsements as businesses became concerned about
reduced product sales following the CCP’s centenary; media companies also
removed his products from music-video sharing platforms in acts of industry
self-censorship designed to preempt potential government action. Both
examples illustrate government efforts to highlight regulatory frameworks
and steer public opinion through the opportunistic medium of celebrity
gossip.
Conclusion
Celebrities in contemporary China are members of an indentured elite group
rather than “the power elite,” a “powerless elite,” or “Big Citizens,” as
defined in the sociological literature (Alberoni, 2007; Mills, 2000; Rojek,
Jeffreys and Xu 19
2014). Government incentives, as framed in PRC laws and regulations, pro-
mote cooperative public behaviors on the part of professionals in the enter-
tainment industries who wish to maintain their careers. The need for
celebrities to maintain maximum public visibility, combined with supervi-
sion by public opinion of celebrity activities, further encourages cooperative
celebrity behaviors. These kinds of regulatory and populist practices reduce
the potential for PRC celebrities as new cultural-economic elites to embody
an alternative social voice and vision as per Western Big Citizens.
The indentured-elite status of PRC celebrities is underscored by the use of
prominent celebrities as mouthpieces for government advertising, and more
starkly by the Fan Bingbing tax evasion case. The case, which drew interna-
tional media attention following Fan’s dramatic disappearance and subse-
quent contrite reappearance charged with tax evasion/arrears in the realm of
US$129 million, threw a harsh spotlight on the illegal financial activities of
entertainment companies and A-list celebrities. New laws and regulations
that have arisen as a response to this problem, and other similar infringe-
ments, encourage celebrities to act as cost-effective endorsers of PSAs and
media events promoting public policy and welfare goals. This trend is being
reinforced by the ongoing shift to industry professionalization and self-gov-
ernance, which allows professional associations to play a new role in har-
nessing public opinion to discipline the conduct of entertainment celebrities.
Indentured to the state, celebrities justify their existence as elites by perform-
ing a politically useful purpose.
The examples we have presented illustrate the expanding network of regu-
latory constraints that enmesh PRC entertainment celebrities and curtail their
potential to use their wealth, visibility, and ability to exploit the mass media
to independently influence public opinion. These constraints dissolve any
notion that entertainment celebrities’ elite status and the indulgence afforded
toward their more extravagant individual behaviors somehow makes them
“above the law.” But they also create behavioral incentives that follow
directly from broader governmental strategies to address inequality, prevent
economic crime, and regulate public conduct in line with the CCP’s core
values. In short, bringing entertainment celebrities under an expanding regu-
latory umbrella ensures they can remain in the public eye, but are unable to
use their mediatized star power to exert nongovernmental political influence
as per the Big Citizen celebrities of Western societies.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
20 Modern China 00(0)
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article.
Notes
1. See, e.g., the UNICEF Goodwill Ambassadors program: https://www.unicef.org/
goodwill-ambassadors.
2. Available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/43063/43079/43084/index.html.
3. Available at https://weibo.com/rmrb.
4. Available at https://weibo.com/fbb0916.
5. Available at https://www.dowjones.com/professional/factiva/.
6. Available at https://weibo.com/cuiyongyuan.
7. Available at http://cnki.net.
8. A translation is available here: www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/
criminal-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china.
9. See, e.g., the share price history of the Chinese multinational entertainment
company Huayi Brothers: https://cn.investing.com/equities/huayi-brothers-
media-corp-historical-data.
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Jeffreys and Xu 25
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Author Biographies
Elaine Jeffreys is Professor in International Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social
Sciences, University of Technology Sydney. Recent books include Governing HIV in
China (Routledge, 2018); New Mentalities of Government in China (Routledge,
2016); Sex in China (Polity, 2015); and Celebrity Philanthropy (Intellect, 2015).
Jian Xu is Senior Lecturer in Communication at Deakin University, Australia. He
researches Chinese digital media cultures, internet governance, cultural governance,
and celebrity studies. He is series editor of Asian Celebrity and Fandom Studies
(Bloomsbury) and editor of Asian Celebrity and Digital Media (Hong Kong University
Press, 2023).
