Putin Is Creating the Multipolar World He (Thought He) Wanted

Abstract

Up until the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s and China’s worsening relations with the European Union and the United States meant that the world order was at risk of falling apart into two rival blocs, as during the Cold War: Europeans and Americans against Russians and Chinese. Since 24 February 2022, that is not so clear anymore. The more Russia escalates the violence in Ukraine, but also the strategic anxiety (by putting its nuclear forces on alert), the more difficult it becomes for other powers to stay completely aloof, let alone to simply align with Russia. The more EU and US sanctions reverberate throughout the global economy, the more it becomes impossible for other powers to avoid going at least partially along. China in particular has in fact already made a defining choice.

Full text

Egmont Institute
Putin Is Creating the Multipolar World He (Thought He) Wanted
Author(s): Sven Biscop, Bart Dessein and Jasper Roctus
Egmont Institute (2022)
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EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations
No. [ ]
[Date]
No. 156
March 2022
Putin Is Creating the Multipolar World He (Thought He)
Wanted
European Union and the United States meant that
the world order was at risk of falling apart into two
rival blocs, as during the Cold War: Europeans and
Americans against Russians and Chinese. 1 Since
24 February 2022, that is not so clear anymore. The
more Russia escalates the violence in Ukraine, but
also the strategic anxiety (by putting its nuclear
forces on alert), the more difficult it becomes for
other powers to stay completely aloof, let alone to
simply align with Russia. The more EU and US
sanctions reverberate throughout the global
economy, the more it becomes impossible for
other powers to avoid going at least partially along.
China in particular has in fact already made a
defining choice.
THE KINGDOM IN THE MIDDLE
avoid taking any explicit stance.2 When Russia is
involved, China will not always openly support it, but it
will hardly ever openly go against it (and vice versa).3
Judging from a quotation from the China National
Defense Newspaper in the on 11 February
2022, China at first, indeed, distinctly leant towards
Russia, blaming the US and NATO for the tensions,
and ridiculing the American warning that large-scale
invasion was imminent.4 Many even suspected
collusion, assuming that Vladimir Putin must have
informed Xi Jinping of his plans while in Beijing for the
Winter Olympics.
Putin likely did warn Xi of impending action, but,
judging from reports in Chinese official media, China
appears to have been taken by surprise by the scale of
the actual invasion. Initial media reports spoke of
assault on Kyiv. 5 This is also evidenced by how China
bumbled the evacuation of its citizens from Ukraine,
leading to derision on Chinese social media. Initially
Chinese citizens were urged to proudly display the
Chinese flag when they went out, so as to prevent
Russian fire. After a few days, however, Beijing
implicitly admitted that this might provoke violence,
due to increasing anti-Chinese sentiment in Ukraine,
and by the third day of the invasion, it advised citizens
to remain indoors and hide their identities instead,6
before finally recommending evacuation via Moldova.7
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evolve. On 25 February already, China (along with
India and the United Arab Emirates) abstained from
the vote in the UN Security Council on the draft
resolution condemning Russia; only Russia itself voted
against. The Chinese ambassador explained the
abstention by the need for caution, adding that
8 The
Liberation Daily, the newspaper of the Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party of Shanghai, reported that
on the same day, in a telephone conversation between
Xi and Putin, the former again expressed
side to solve their problems with the Ukrainian side
also referring to respect
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
countries.9 On 1 March, foreign minister Wang Yi
spoke with his Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Kuleba,
between Ukraine and Russia, calls on Ukraine and
Russia to find a solution to the problem through
negotiations, supports all constructive international
efforts conducive to a political solution, and is
extremely concerned about the harm suffered by
10
As to the sanctions, the Chinese foreign ministry stated
11 Beijing is unlikely to follow the EU and
the US in freezing Russian reserves or to halt trade with
the country. But it cannot totally avoid the impact of
branch, for example, is but one of several banks that
has stopped financing trade in Russian commodities,
and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has
frozen all its activities in Russia and Belarus.
A MULTIPOLAR WORLD
the EU and the US. But, set against the backdrop of
Western fears that China might abuse the moment to
revert to force of arms itself to change the status quo
restrained. Those fears did not take into account, in any
case, that the last time China went to war was against
Vietnam in 1979. Going to war now would completely
a, therefore,
and the potential impact on all of its international
relations would be immense. While by no means
impossible, it would certainly be an enormous
gamble.12
Silent pragmatism puts China on the side of its own
interests. What that does mean, is that we are in a truly
multipolar world. Each of the current four global
players pursues its own interests; these interests overlap
more often with those of some than of others, but they
do not overlap completely. In the end, therefore, each
of the four cooperates, or not, with each of the other
four, as its interests dictate. China and Russia regard
each other as close partners against perceived
very assertive yet mainly politico-economic strategy
requires a degree of stability. Now especially the CCP
needs to project stability, as it is preparing for the
expected re-election of Xi Jinping as General-Secretary
later this year. Russia, in contrast, is pursuing an
aggressive politico-military strategy that allows it to
make the most of its resources in conditions of
instability.
Beijing welcomes Russian military interventions that
preserve stability, like recently in Kazakhstan. But a war
(and, after some initial reluctance, as of early March
Chinese media seem willing to call it just that) 13 that
destroys a country seen as a major hub for the Belt and
Road Initiative, and that provokes a global economic
explains the following opinion in the Liberation Daily of
member of the EU at this time is not unexpected. The
EU is an economic integration organization, not a
military one, and Ukraine will legitimately receive more
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economic support after joining the EU, without
14
Putin regularly clamoured for multipolarity, but what
he really meant was an end to perceived American
unipolarity. What he did not want, but has now
provoked, is an international arena ruled by actual
multipolarity, in which he has to compete for the
support of other states. Only to find out that he can
coerce only a very few into aligning, and that he has little
to attract the others, while his brutal aggression has
shaken the equipoise even of those inclined to favour
his version of events.
In a multipolar world, the EU strategy of dealing with
other powers as partner, competitor, and rival all at
once, is the right one. Great powers traditionally
compartmentalise their relations: they cooperate where
they can, but push back when they must. Even towards
Russia, after the initial 2014 invasion of Ukraine, the
EU kept signalling that it was willing to cooperate in
areas where interests coincided. Russia declined. By
launching a war of aggression, it has now finally made
compartmentalisation impossible, and forced the EU
to reduce all relations to a minimum.
Chinese support for (eventual) EU membership of
Ukraine, while resolutely backing Russian opposition to
NATO membership,15 shows that China is still looking
to compartmentalize its relations with the West. This is
no surprise. After all, by also applying
compartmentalisation to China, in spite of all the recent
frictions, the EU, and even to a large degree the US,
have enabled it to assume the position that it has today.
Had they not done so, and treated China exclusively as
a rival, Beijing may have seen no other option than to
fully align with Russia. Instead, China currently has too
much at stake to opt for such a choice. Now is not the
colleague.
CONCLUSION: ONE WORLD
Will China eventually play a more active role in solving
this crisis? That it could provide Russia an economic
lifeline may actually be in the interest of the EU and US.
Western sanctions are intended to hurt, to signal to
Russia and to the world at large that violating the core
rules of the international order comes at a price. But
they are not meant to make Russia collapse, which
might provoke escalatory behaviour remember
economy in 1941: the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Continued trade with China could prevent such an
apocalyptic outcome.
At the same time, Beijing could make use of that
relationship to signal its discomfort to Moscow behind
hold
prospect of great diplomatic prestige, but comes
without any guarantee for success, and thus runs
-avert instincts on the
international stage. A private message from Xi to Putin
that expresses his hopes that this war ends soon,
however, might be just as effective.
The fact is that by its stance to this date, China has
already made a defining choice. Had China fully
supported Russia in its war of aggression it may well
have tipped the world into a new bipolar rivalry.
Instead, there is still a chance to keep the world
together, to maintain one set of rules that all states
subscribe to, because to pursue its interests, China
needs the stability that these rules create. Russia has put
itself outside that order for now, but the aim must be
to bring it too back into the fold eventually. Only a
world order that includes all great powers of the day can
-interest may just overlap
enough with our self-interest to make it happen.
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ENDNOTES
1
Interpreting China as a Regional and Global Power. Nationalism and Historical Consciousness in World Politics.
Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 271-292. .
2 Sulmaan Wasif Khan, and Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping. Cambridge MA and
3 Dmitri Trenin, How Russia Can Maintain Equilibrium in the Post- Pandemic Bipolar World. Moscow, Carnegie, 1 May
2020.
4 China National Defense Newspaper (Zhongguo guofang bao) cited in the (Renmin ribao) of February 11:
Renmin ribao, February
).
5 See: Jiefang ribao
exchanging views on the current situation in Ukraine. Supports Russia and Ukraine to solve their problems through
--- ). The
eastern
.
6 anged their dispatch: from brightly showing
).
7 both anonymous and
identified of Chinese exchange students stuck in bomb shelters, and even, casualties. See for instance Voice of America,
).
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8 Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Ending Ukraine Crisis, as Russian Federation Wields Veto .
New York, 25 February 2022.
9 Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao) Jinping talks with Putin on the phone,
focusing on exchanging views on the current situation in Ukraine. Supports Russia and Ukraine to solve their problems
---
). Note that, according to David Shambaugh, China Goes Global. The Partial Power. Oxford, Oxford University Press,
nonaggression, non- ernal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence) are
.
10
11 Press
2 28
.
12 -active (some would say assertive) than it was in
the Deng Xiaoping era. No
calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide the capabilities and bide the time; never claim leadership; make
lengjing guancha; wen zhu zhenjiao; chenzhe yingfu; taoguang yanghui; shan yu shou zhuo; jue bu
dangtou; you suo zuowei ; ; ;; ; ; ).
13 Renmin ribao, 25 February, small column on page 3:
U.S. is non-stop increasing tensions ). This had
changed by March, see for instance: Jiefang ribao
negotiations held today at the Belarusian-Polish border Ukraine formally applies to join the EU, more rapid situational
).
14 Jiefang ribao
Belarusian-Polish border Ukraine formally applies to join the EU, more rapid situational evolutions, Russian troops to
). Said comments are attributed to Li Xin, director of the Eurasian Institute of
the Shanghai University of Political Science and Law. Or
.
15
eastward expansion of NATO is the crux of the problem, and Ukraine's quest for NATO membership is the nucleus of this
crux. The international community should seize the opportunity to promote peace talks. If [the West] would continue to
provide additional weapons and equipment to one side of the conflict and continue to build momentum to pull one side into
(
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)
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www.egmontinstitute.be
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