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CzOTO2020, volume 2, issue 1, pp.100-111
SIMULATION-BASED TRAINING IN FIRE
PREVENTION AND FIRE-FIGHTING
OF SCAVENGE AIR RECEIVERS FIRES
doi: 10.2478/czoto-2020-0013
Date of submission of the article to the Editor: 19/08/2019
Date of acceptance of the article by the Editor: 20/02/2020
Prof. Leszek Chybowski1 – orcid id: 0000-0003-0245-3946
Seweryn Strojecki2 – orcid id: 0000-0003-1516-3374
Włodzimierz Markiewicz 3 – orcid id:0000-0002-2283-3375
1 Maritime University of Szczecin, Poland, l.chybowski@am.szczecin.pl
2 Carnival Corporation & plc, USA, seweryn1186@gmail.com
3 BP plc, United Kingdom, tolek74@gmail.com
Abstract: This article presents topics concerning fire hazards during the use of low-
speed diesel engines in marine vehicles. The causes and effects of fires in the spaces
of scavenge air receivers in marine diesel engines are presented. Methods to prevent
and fight these fires are shown, including the operating procedures required from ship
engine room operators. The possibility of training personnel to apply the abovemen-
tioned procedures during operation using simulations of a Kongsberg MC-90 IVship
engine room is presented. Simulations were conducted which included a fire in
a scavenge air receiver occurring during the operation of a MAN B&W 5L90MC main
engine,with loads corresponding to 50% and 100% of the machine’s recommended
setting.
Keywords: fire safety, marine diesel engine, scavenge air receiver, engine room sim-
ulator, safety training
1. INTRODUCTION
Ship engine rooms have high explosion and fire risks because they contain all three of
the factors necessary to initiate combustion: combustible materials (fuels, lubricating
oils, oil waste), oxygen sources (ventilation systems, starting air systems, engine
charging systems), and heat sources (exhaust gas discharge manifolds, potential ex-
haust gas purges to underpiston spaces, friction processes) (Bistrović et al., 2017;
Cieślak et al., 2000; Gawdzińska et al., 2015; Krystosik-Gromadzińska, 2016, 2019;
Ubowska and Szczepanek, 2016). A fire is an uncontrolled, spontaneous combustion
of materials (Gawdzińska et al., 2017), whereas an explosion is a rapid release of
large amounts of energy, which is usually accompanied by a rapid increase in tem-
perature and pressure, radiation emission (e.g., lightning, sparks), and acoustic
waves (e.g., sound, bang). Explosions are caused by violent physical phenomena
(e.g., explosions of gas tanks or tyres (Chybowski et al., 2015,Karliński et al., 2019;
101 Safety management – technical facilities and technology
Karliński et al., 2014b, 2014a)),and rapid exothermic chemical reactions (e.g., com-
bustion). The release of energy usually results in repeated environmental damage
due to mechanical impacts and repeated fires and explosions (Chybowski et al., 2018;
Kaczyński et al., 2019; Ulewicz and Mazur, 2013; Ulewicz et al., 2019). Both fires and
explosions pose huge threats to the machinery crew, in particular those in marine en-
gine rooms (Chybowski et al., 2019; Chybowski and Kazienko, 2019; Laskowski et al.,
2015).
Fires can occur in scavenge air receivers of marine engines (Strojecki, 2011). Scav-
enge air receivers in slow-running engines are high-capacity tanks that are bolted to a
cylindrical block, which is open towards air flushing through the engine (Fig. 1). The
flushing air is collected in the receiver after passing through a radiator or coolers, de-
pending on the construction.
In the receiver of the flushing air, there are check valves that open under pressure
acting from inside the valve body. The position and number of check valves depend
on the particular construction, which varies by manufacturer. In the air receiver behind
the air cooler, there may also be an air dehumidifier.
There are auxiliary blowers at the flushing air receiver scavenge, whose task is to
support the turbocharger and maintain a minimum air pressure in the receiver when-
ever the engine rotates at a low speed, dynamically accelerates, or during engine
start-up. In such situations, the turbocharger cannot generate the appropriate pres-
sure inside the scavenge air receiver due to an insufficient amount of exhaust gases
powering it. The scavenge air receiver also has a safety valve (Fig. 2) which is de-
signed to open if the pressure in the receiver exceeds the permissible standard 3.4-
3.8 bar or the pressure specified by the manufacturer.
Fig. 1. Scavenge air system
Source: (MAN B&W Diesel A/S, 2013)
SYSTEM SAFETY: HUMAN - TECHNICAL FACILITY - ENVIRONMENT - CzOTO vol. 2, iss. 1, 2020 102
Fig. 2. Safety valve scavenge air receiver
Source: (MAN B&W Diesel A/S, 2013)
Fires and explosions in the scavenge air receiver are among the most serious failures
of marine engines due to the potential consequences and extent of damage. Very
often, such situations end tragically,and maritime statistics indicate that many sailors
have lost their lives in these situations. Significant material damage can also occur.
2. CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF FIRES IN SCAVENGE AIR RECEIVERS
Fires may be caused by the ignition of products scraped off by pistons from cylinder
liners and the scavenge air receiver (Fig. 3), such as those from burnt cylinder oil,
carbon deposits, oil, etc.
Excess amounts of these products may be deposited due to:
poor quality fuels, which affect the combustion efficiency,
poor technical condition of the engine,
poor condition of the injection equipment, e.g., "pouring" injector, improperly
spraying injector,
excessive overload of the engine or individual cylinders,
insufficient amount of rinsing air due to a malfunctioning turbocharger,
obstructed exhaust system due to combustion of residues deposited in the ex-
haust manifold and on the turbine grate,
poor condition of the piston rings,
poor condition of the cylinder liners,
incorrect delivery timing of the cylinder oil,
incorrect static setting of injection pumps.
Combined, these factors lead to excessive contaminant deposition in the scavenge air
receiverand also pose a fire hazard in the receiver. Oil deposited in the scavenge air
receiver gradually carbonizes due to temperature until it reaches the point of combus-
tion due to the compressed air. The ignition of carbon deposits in the scavenge air
receiver may be caused by:
prolonged gas blowing,
slow combustion in the cylinder due to incorrect fuel spray, incorrect injector
tip type (nozzle), or misaligned fuel injection,
reverse flow of gases through the flushing air vents due to incorrect positioning
of the exhaust cam disk or high resistance in the exhaust gas system due to
counter-pressure.
103 Safety management – technical facilities and technology
Fig. 3. Initiation of a fire in the underpiston space as a result of exhaust gas blow-by
Source: (Marine Diesels, 2011)
Another danger in the scavenge air receiver is the explosion of oil mist, which can
occur not only in the crankcase, but also in the scavenge air receiver due to the con-
stant presence of oil in the charging air. Ignition of this mixture may occur, e.g., as
a result of the backflow of exhaust gas from the cylinder to the scavenge air receiver,
or exhaust gas purging. The gas-air and exhaust gas flow directions depend on the
pressure difference. The following condition should be met at all times during the load
exchange:
pair ˃ pcyl ˃ pexh
(1)
where pairis the charging air pressure, pcyl is the gas pressure in the cylinder, and pexh
is the exhaust gas pressure behind the cylinder.
A fire in the scavenge air receiver in its initial stage is nearly impossible to see be-
cause it takes place inside the engine. The signs of a fire in the scavenge air receiver
include a drop in engine speed and smoke, as well as an increase in the temperature
of exhaust gases, possible turbine stall, and a temperature increase in the scavenge
air receiver. A sudden blow will cause smoke, sparks, and flames to be blown out
when each of the drainage taps of the receiver is open. Therefore, it is necessary to
maintain an efficient drainage system. Due to the risk of an explosion in the crank-
case, it is not recommended to stand near its safety valves since flames can rapidly
escape the engine housing.
A fire in a scavenge air receiver can lead to very serious consequences, among the
most dangerous of which are explosions of the engine crankcase. In addition, a fire in
the receiver can cause the piston-cylinder system components to overheat, and also
stuffing boxes in crosshead engines. In addition, the hull may be deformed, cracked,
or damaged. In the case of significant overheating of the scavenge air receiver walls,
it is recommended to check the tension of the tightening screws, as they may loosen
due to the high temperature.
After over 100 years of marine engine development, many design solutions have
been created and implemented to ensure the safe operation of an engine. This also
applies to the protection of charge air reservoirs.
SYSTEM SAFETY: HUMAN - TECHNICAL FACILITY - ENVIRONMENT - CzOTO vol. 2, iss. 1, 2020 104
3. PREVENTING AND FIGHTING FIRES IN SCAVENGE AIR RECEIVERS
Passive fire protection is understood to be regular inspections of the scavenge air
receiver, its blowing, and cleaning. These activities are performed by the machine
crew in accordance with strictly defined procedures and manufacturer recommenda-
tions. The main duty of the crew during the scavenge air receiver operation is to main-
tain the cleanliness of the internal space of the container. In this space, all products
collected by the piston from cylinder linings, such as cylinder oil, fuel sludge, oil
sludge, etc., accumulate. Replaced contaminants must be removed on an ongoing
basis to prevent a fire in the air receiver. For this purpose, at least once per shift, the
drain valve on the line connecting the drainage tank with the sewage tank should be
opened for a period of several dozen engine revolutions.
Despite the systematic implementation of the above-mentioned procedures, after
several months of engine operation, the scavenge air receiver accumulates a layer of
sediments that cannot be removed by "blowing." Thus, every 3-6 months, it is neces-
sary to carefully clean the scavenge air receiver to remove sludge and hard carbon
deposits.
To ensure that oil sludge from the scavenge air receiver is drained off, thereby reduc-
ing the fire risk, it is recommended to (MAN B&W Diesel A/S, 2013):
perform daily checks of the drainage pipes while the engine is in motion;
regularly clean the drainage pipes.
Drainage pipe cleaning should be carried out at regular intervals to prevent blockages
in the drainage system. The main drainage pipe and the supply pipe to the drainage
tank can be cleaned with air, hot water, or steam while the engine is idle. If valve
leakages are suspected, they must be removed and cleaned by hand with the main
drainage pipe. When using water or steam, the risk of corrosion of the piston rods
must be considered if the valves are leaking.
To prevent the formation of favourable conditions for the self-ignition of coal deposits
and the explosion of oil mist in the scavenge air receiver, the following basic operating
rules should be closely followed (Strojecki, 2011):
the technical condition of the engine must be maintained at an appropriate
level in accordance with the manufacturer's requirements and normal opera-
tion. Specifically, the correct operation of the piston-crankshaft system and the
load exchange installation should be checked (Nozdrzykowski & Chybowski,
2019). The engine should not be operated if the liner and piston rings cylinder
are significantly worn out,
the technical condition of injection equipment, lubrication, and cooling system
must be maintained at an appropriate level, and should also be checked to
ensure proper regulation,
under no circumstances should the motor or individual cylinders be overload-
ed,
the correct operation of the main engine protection devices must be checked
periodically.
If a fire is detected (increase in temperature of the block and tank plates, smoke, in-
crease in the exhaust gas temperature) in the scavenge air receiver,the following ac-
tions should be performed immediately (MAN B&W Diesel A/S, 2013):
105 Safety management – technical facilities and technology
reduce the speed or stroke of the screw to the "slow” e.g.,“forward" position,
and stop the motor automatically or manually after obtaining permission from
the navigation bridge,
if there is a risk of fire spreading into the crankcase, the cooling should not be
switched off when the engine stops, and it is recommended that the turntable
be switched on to avoid thermal stress on the heated elements,
switch off the auxiliary blowers,
stop the fuel supply (stop the pumps),
stop the oil supply (stop the pumps),
prepare fire extinguishing equipment forthe scavenge air receiver (do not open
the container or crankcase from the side of the fire until the temperature drops
below 100˚C),
remove wet sediment and sludge from all parts of the scavenge air receiver,
clean the individual rods and bushings, and check their surface condition,
alignment, and distortion, then apply an oil film,
repeat the above steps, but focus on the piston crown and jacket while the en-
gine is running (oil and cooling rein attached). Also check the stuffing box and
the bottom of the scavenge air receiver for potential cracks caused by fire.
If, for some reason, the machine crew does not detect any signs of fire in the scav-
enge air receiver system alarm,an alarm is generated when the temperature in the
flushing air reaches 80˚C, and at 120˚C activates the "Slow down" procedure and re-
duces the speed or stroke of the screw.
Figure 4 shows the fire-fighting system in the engine scavenge air receiver spaces
MAN B&W. During the fire-fighting process, the system is connected to a valve
marked "AT", and its correct position is set. The following extinguishing agents may
be used: steam, water mist, or CO2for fighting with fire in scavenge air receivers.
Fig. 4. Fire-fighting systems in scavenge air receiver spaces
Source: (MAN B&W Diesel A/S, 2013)
Depending on the model, the extinguishing agent delivery systems differ slightly in
their design. This relationship is easily understandable, since the supply of oil mist or
steam must be included in the construction of the extinguishing system of the scav-
enge air receiver drainage pipe, so that the water collected in the receiver can be
drained after the fire is extinguished.
The main difference between these three extinguishing factors is their form of admin-
istration. Steam is administered at pressures from 3-10 bar from the main steam sys-
tem, whereas water mist is applied at minimal pressures 2.5 bar from the fresh water
SYSTEM SAFETY: HUMAN - TECHNICAL FACILITY - ENVIRONMENT - CzOTO vol. 2, iss. 1, 2020 106
system. In this case, the inert gas CO2should be fed at 150 bar from cylinders de-
signed specifically for fire-fighting in the main engine.
4. USE OF A SIMULATOR FOR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES TRAINING
Simulators are an excellent tool to train operators in emergency diagnostics and cor-
rect operation in accordance with emergency procedures (Bejger et al., 2018). An
example of such actions are the previously-mentioned actions used to diagnose a fire
in a scavenge air receiver and the steps taken by the operator of the engine room in
the event that such a fire is detected. The following fire simulations in a scavenge air
receiver were prepared using Kongsberg MC-90 IV (Kongsberg Maritime, 2005) ship
engine room simulator installed in the Maritime University of Szczecin. Basic infor-
mation about the ship and its propulsion used in the simulator is summarised in Table
1.
Table 1
Ship and engine data used in the experiment
Parameter
Description
Ship type:
Total length:
Width:
Draught:
Load capacity:
tanker
305 m
47 m
19.7 m
187 997 DWT
Main engine:
Cylinder bore:
Stroke:
Number of cylinders
Nominal power
Nominal speed
Nominal mean indicating pressure
MAN B&W, model 5L90MC
900 mm
2900 mm
5
18.4 MW
74 rpm
13 bar
Source: (Kongsberg Maritime, 2005)
The data of the main engine operation was read for the engine in its full-service condi-
tion (reference conditions), and then measurements were made using a simulated fire
in the scavenge air receiver. The measurements were made for subsequent machine
telegraph settings from 50% to 100%. Additionally, measurements in the case of a fire
in the scavenge air receiver were made for two telegraph settings: 50% and 100%.
During the simulation, the following values were recorded:
main engine speed [rpm];
shaft power [MW];
torque [kNm];
load indicator [%];
exhaust gas temperatures after cylinders [˚C];
average exhaust gas temperature [˚C];
scavenge air temperature [˚C];
scavenge air pressure [bar];
turbochargers speed [rpm];
During the fire simulation, the scavenge air receiver recorded alarms to better illus-
trate the difference between the reference state and the failure states and the prevail-
ing operating conditions.
107 Safety management – technical facilities and technology
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1. Engine operation under full service condition
The full service condition served as a reference condition for comparison purposes,
and the parameter values are listed in Table 2. Under this condition, the engine was in
full working order, and no alarms were reported.
Table 2
Selected engine parameters in the full-service condition
Machine telegraph set-
ting
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Main engine speed [rpm]
49.22
57.72
64.00
70.30
72.15
74.00
Main engine shaft power
[MW]
4.44
7.42
10.37
14
15.16
16.51
Torque [kNm]
888.82
1255.40
1576.50
1930.50
2035.60
2160.50
Load indicator [%]
27.84
35.01
41.35
49.49
52.78
56.62
Exhaust gas temperature
after cylinder no. 1 [oC]
295.53
271.35
289.69
306.62
316.49
326.59
Exhaust gas temperature
after cylinder no. 2 [oC]
261.97
273.44
291.82
309.51
319.50
328.22
Exhaust gas temperature
after cylinder no. 3 [oC]
261.69
273.39
292.39
309.86
319.25
328.00
Exhaust gas temperature
after cylinder no. 4 [oC]
260.92
273.40
291.10
308.55
318.27
327.63
Exhaust gas temperature
after cylinder no. 5 [oC]
259.01
271.49
288.82
306.15
316.42
325.44
Average exhaust gas tem-
perature after cylinders [oC]
260.62
272.61
290.76
308.13
317.98
327.17
Scavenge air temperature
[oC]
34.79
36.97
39.55
43.63
45.26
46.72
Scavenge air pressure [bar]
0.52
0.84
1.23
1.68
1.86
2.04
Turbocharger no. 1 speed
[rpm]
3771.2
4843.0
5740.5
6650.2
6981.6
7243.9
Turbocharger no. 2 speed
[rpm]
3770.9
4849.3
5737.9
6650.5
6988.2
7250.4
Source: (Strojecki, 2011)
The table shows a clear increase in temperature associated with an increase in the
telegraph setting, and thus in the motor speed.
5.2. Engine operation during fire in scavenge air receiver
Simulating a fire in the scavenge air receiver in cylinder section No. 2 with the tele-
graph set to 100% caused the operator to almost immediately observe an increase in
the charge air temperature in the receiver from 46.72˚C (Table 2) to 116.72˚C (Fig. 5).
SYSTEM SAFETY: HUMAN - TECHNICAL FACILITY - ENVIRONMENT - CzOTO vol. 2, iss. 1, 2020 108
Fig. 5. Operating parameters of subsystems associated with cylinder system No. 2
Source: (Strojecki, 2011)
The operator also observed a high temperature alarm in the receiver and the "slow
down" warning alarm (Fig. 6).The heated charge air entering the combustion chamber
raised the temperature of the exhaust gases and triggered another alarm for the high
exhaust gas temperature. Activation of this alarm caused automatic activation of the
"slow down" procedure which caused the motor speed to drop from 74 rpm to 45.3
rpm. High-temperature alarms in the high-temperature exhaust receiver turned off
because the temperature equalized and dropped below the alarm threshold. However,
the "slow down" alarm was still active because the fire in the receiver was extin-
guished. The complete list of alarms is shown in Table 3.
Fire in the scavenge air receiver simulated at a 50% telegraph setting for cylinder
No.2 was the same as at the 100% setting. The only difference was that the "slow
down" procedure, which was initiated by the automation system, could not lower the
engine speed below its minimum speed, which decreased the revolutions from 49.2
rpm to 44.8 rpm (Table 3).Such a small drop in speed did not significantly change the
alarm parameters. Therefore, despite the "slow down", the alarms did not "decrease",
but rather gradually increased.
109 Safety management – technical facilities and technology
Table 3
Engine alarm log MAN B&W-5L90MC during fire in scavenge air receiver
Speed set-
ting
Alarm
Time
Value
Sate
Description
100%
01:32:29
116.23 oC
High
Main engine Cylinder no. 2 charge air tem-
perature
01:33:21
392.00oC
High
Main engine Cylinder no. 2 exhaust gas tem-
perature
01:33:35
91.75 oC
High
Main engine Cylinder no. 2 cooling water
temperature at outlet
01:33:36
47.33oC
High
Main engine Cylinder no. 2 temperature dif-
ference in the collector and in the combustion
chamber
01:34:04
1˂0-1˃
High
Slow Down
Source: (Strojecki, 2011)
Fig. 6. Bridge drive control station with high-temperature charge air alarm and slow down pre-
warning
Source: (Strojecki, 2011)
The next measurement was made with the telegraph set to 100%, and fire was simu-
lated in the entire scavenge air receiver, i.e. in all cylinders. A fire of this magnitude
engulfed all engine systems, and there was an immediate increase in the charge air
and exhaust temperatures on all cylinders. This caused the automation system to ac-
tivate the "shut down" procedure due to danger to the motor.
6. CONCLUSION
The presented fire scenarios in scavenge air receivers can be successfully used dur-
ing the training of marine mechanics. Scenarios illustrate to operators of engine room
SYSTEM SAFETY: HUMAN - TECHNICAL FACILITY - ENVIRONMENT - CzOTO vol. 2, iss. 1, 2020 110
causes and effects chain between the occurring situation and the symptoms of the
situation. It is possible to analyse processes and their influence for diagnostics, alarm
and protection systems.
Complex technical system simulators equipped with appropriate software to simulate
emergencies are the cheapest and only safe method to train operators to rapidly re-
spond to life-threatening conditions. In addition, studies regarding the speed of reac-
tions under simulated conditions can be used to obtain valuable data for future anal-
yses of human reliability and can illuminate the origin of disasters.
ACNKOWLEDGMENTS
The research presented in this article was carried out under the Grant of the Ministry
of Science and Higher Education of Poland no 1/S/IESO/17: “Increasing operational
effectiveness of complex technical systems by systematic development and imple-
mentation of innovations using novel materials and modifying the object’s structure”
performed at the Maritime University of Szczecin, Poland.
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