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Etude de biais du système de valuation tels que la distorsion de la pondération des probabilités, l'effet de cadre et l'aversion à la perte chez une population saine et une population souffrant d'addiction aux jeux de hasard et d’argent
Abstract
Les mécanismes cérébraux engagés dans la prise de décision sont loin d’être compris. Nos choix sont le plus souvent loin d’être rationnels et cela est lié à la valeur subjective attribuée aux options présentées par notre cerveau. Le travail réalisé dans cette thèse vise à comprendre plus en profondeur le système de valuation cérébral grâce à la technique d’IRMf. Nous avons étudié notamment les biais de prise de décision autour de trois études portant sur la distorsion des probabilités pour une récompense immédiate ou retardée, l’effet de cadre dans un contexte de gains ou de pertes pour une décision prise pour soi ou pour un proche et enfin le phénomène d’aversion à la perte pour des récompenses primaires ou secondaires. Ces études ont été menée à la fois chez une population saine et une population souffrant d’addiction comportementale, une addiction aux jeux d’argent pour les deux premières études et l’anorexie mentale pour la dernière étude.
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Background: Gambling disorder (GD) is the most common behavioral addiction and shares pathophysiological and clinical features with substance use disorders (SUDs). Effective therapeutic interventions for GD are lacking. Non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) may represent a promising treatment option for GD. Objective: This systematic review aimed to provide a comprehensive and structured overview of studies applying NIBS techniques to GD and problem gambling. Methods: A literature search using Pubmed, Web of Science, and Science Direct was conducted from databases inception to December 19, 2019, for studies assessing the effects of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) and transcranial direct current stimulation (t-DCS) on subjects with GD or problem gambling. Studies using NIBS techniques on healthy subjects and those without therapeutic goals but only aiming to assess basic neurophysiology measures were excluded. Results: A total of 269 articles were title and abstract screened, 13 full texts were assessed, and 11 were included, of which six were controlled and five were uncontrolled. Most studies showed a reduction of gambling behavior, craving for gambling, and gambling-related symptoms. NIBS effects on psychiatric symptoms were less consistent. A decrease of the behavioral activation related to gambling was also reported. Some studies reported modulation of behavioral measures (i.e., impulsivity, cognitive and attentional control, decision making, cognitive flexibility). Studies were not consistent in terms of NIBS protocol, site of stimulation, clinical and surrogate outcome measures, and duration of treatment and follow-up. Sample size was small in most studies. Conclusions: The clinical and methodological heterogeneity of the included studies prevented us from drawing any firm conclusion on the efficacy of NIBS interventions for GD. Further methodologically sound, robust, and well-powered studies are needed.
Objectives
Gambling characteristics are factors that could influence problem gambling development. The aim of this study was to identify a typology of gamblers to frame risky behaviour based on gambling characteristics (age of initiation/of problem gambling, type of gambling: pure chance/chance with pseudoskills/chance with elements of skill, gambling online/offline, amount wagered monthly) and to investigate clinical factors associated with these different profiles in a large representative sample of gamblers.
Design and setting
The study is a cross-sectional analysis to the baseline data of the french JEU cohort study (study protocol : Challet-Bouju et al , 2014). Recruitment (April 2009 to September 2011) involved clinicians and researchers from seven institutions that offer care for or conduct research on problem gamblers (PG). Participants were recruited in gambling places, and in care centres. Only participants who reported gambling in the previous year between 18 and 65 years old were included.
Participants gave their written informed consent, it was approved by the French Research Ethics Committee.
Participants
The participants were 628 gamblers : 256 non-problem gamblers (NPG), 169 problem gamblers without treatment (PGWT) and 203 problem gamblers seeking treatment (PGST).
Results
Six clustering models were tested, the one with three clusters displayed a lower classification error rate (7.92%) and was better suited to clinical interpretation : ‘Early Onset and Short Course’ (47.5%), ‘Early Onset and Long Course’ (35%) and ‘Late Onset and Short Course’ (17.5%). Gambling characteristics differed significantly between the three clusters.
Conclusions
We defined clusters through the analysis of gambling variables, easy to identify, by psychiatrists or by physicians in primary care. Simple screening concerning these gambling characteristics could be constructed to prevent and to help PG identification. It is important to consider gambling characteristics : policy measures targeting gambling characteristics may reduce the risk of PG or minimise harm from gambling.
Trial registration number
NCT01207674 (ClinicalTrials.gov); Results.
In an inter-temporal choice (IteCh) task, subjects are offered a smaller amount of money immediately or a larger amount at a later time point. Here, we are using trial-by-trial fMRI data from 363 recording sessions and machine learning in an attempt to build a classifier that would ideally outperform established behavioral model given that it has access to brain activity specific to a single trial. Such methods could allow for future investigations of state-like factors that influence IteCh choices.
To investigate this, coefficients of a GLM with one regressor per trial were used as features for a support vector machine (SVM) in combination with a searchlight approach for feature selection and cross-validation. We then compare the results to the performance of four different behavioral models.
We found that the behavioral models reached mean accuracies of 90% and above, while the fMRI model only reached 54.84% at the best location in the brain with a spatial distribution similar to the well-known value-tracking network. This low, though significant, accuracy is in line with simulations showing that classifying based on signals with realistic correlations with subjective value produces comparable, low accuracies. These results emphasize the limitations of fMRI recordings from single events to predict human choices, especially when compared to conventional behavioral models. Better performance may be obtained with paradigms that allow the construction of miniblocks to improve the available signal-to-noise ratio.
Impulsivity is a multidimensional construct. Although gambling disorder (GD) has been associated with high impulsivity, impulsivity across multiple domains has not been thoroughly investigated in this population. We first aimed to examine whether associations between three facets of impulsivity (response impulsivity, choice impulsivity and impulsive tendency) varied between GD patients and healthy controls (HC). We next aimed to evaluate relationships between these three types of impulsivity, as proposed by theoretical models of impulsivity, and their associations with GD severity. The sample included 97 treatment-seeking adult men with GD, diagnosed according to DSM-5 criteria, and 32 male HCs recruited from the general population. Greater impulsivity in all three domains was found in men with GD in comparison to men without GD. Associations between impulsivity facets were found in both groups, with response impulsivity being the only domain associated with GD severity. Our findings confirm that multiple domains of impulsivity are relevant in GD. Future studies should examine the extent to which treatments aimed at targeting specific aspects of impulsivity improve outcomes.
Background and aims:
Although numerous correlational studies have shown an association between cognitive distortions and problem gambling, only a few behavioral studies have investigated this topic by comparing problem (PGs) and non-problem gamblers (N-PGs). This quasi-experiment investigated the occurrence in both groups of a widespread cognitive distortion, the gambler's fallacy (GF), using a fictitious roulette game. Moreover, it investigated whether the GF increased the bet amount and whether impulsivity and sensation seeking were associated with the GF.
Methods:
Two indices of the GF were used: a cognitive index, the probability estimate of each outcome (black/red) after manipulating the final run length (the same outcome occurring four times/once), and a behavioral index, the choice of the outcome on which to bet. A total of 320 (160 PGs and 160 N-PGs) unpaid male volunteers, aged between 18 and 68, participated in this study.
Hypotheses:
Erroneous probability estimates should mediate the effect of longer runs on the alternation choice (i.e., the choice of an outcome different from the previous one) to support the occurrence of GF. The GF should increase betting. PGs should be more prone than N-PGs to GF.
Results:
The choice of the outcome depended on both cognitive (erroneous probability estimates) and affective (preference for red) factors. PGs bet more than N-PGs but they were not more prone than N-PGs to incurring GF. Although impulsivity and sensation seeking were more intense in PGs than in N-PGs, they scarcely affected GF.
Discussion and conclusions:
Overall, our results corroborate the tested model of the GF that links mistaken probability estimates, choice of the outcome on which to bet, and bet amount. However, they are similar to PGs and N-PGs and fail to corroborate the hypothesis that the GF is more evident in PGs.
Introduction: Impairments in emotion regulation are understood to be a transdiagnostic risk factor of suffering from compulsive and addictive behaviors. The aim of this study was to investigate the role of emotion regulation deficits in gambling disorder and to analyze these differences taking gender, age, and gambling activity preferences into account.
Methods:
The sample included n = 484 patients seeking treatment for gambling disorder at a specialized outpatient service. Main outcomes were sociodemographic variables, emotion regulation, and gambling severity.
Results:
Differences between sexes were found in non-acceptance of emotions. Older patients obtained higher levels in non-acceptance of emotions, lack of emotion regulation strategies, emotional clarity, and global emotion regulation scores. No differences were found in emotion scores considering gambling preferences (non-strategic versus strategic). Path analysis showed that emotion regulation scores and age had a direct effect on gambling disorder severity, while emotion regulation and gambling preference were not mediational variables in the relationships of gender and age with gambling severity.
Conclusions:
Emotion regulation impairments differ in patients seeking treatment for gambling problems. Early prevention and intervention programs should incorporate the different dimensions of this process, taking into account clinical phenotypes.
Aberrant patterns of brain functional connectivity in the default mode network (DMN) have been observed across different classes of substance use disorder (SUD) and are associated with craving and relapse. In addicted individuals resting functional connectivity (RSFC) of the anterior DMN, which participates in attribution of personal value and emotional regulation, tends to be decreased, whereas RSFC of the posterior DMN, which directs attention to the internal world, tends to be increased. Aberrant RSFC within the DMN is believed to contribute to impaired self-awareness, negative emotions and to ruminations in addiction. Additionally, the disrupted connectivity between DMN and cortical regions involved with executive function, memory and emotion could be critical to drug-taking regardless of negative consequences and to stress-triggered relapse. At the system level, the dynamics of DMN interactions with the executive control and the salience networks are also disturbed in addiction. The DMN is prominently engaged during the withdrawal and preoccupation phases of the addiction cycle at the expense of the executive control network and with an enhanced participation of the salience network. In contrast, DMN prominence appears to be transitorily decreased during the intoxication phases. There is also growing evidence that disruption of the DMN in addiction reflects in part changes in dopaminergic, glutamatergic, and GABAergic signaling associated with acute and chronic drug use. Findings are starting to reveal DMN RSFC as a potential biomarker for predicting clinical outcomes in SUD and identify the DMN as a promising target for the treatment of addiction.
Discounting refers to decreases in the subjective value of an outcome with increases in some attribute of that outcome. The attributes most commonly studied are delay and probability, with far less research on effort and social discounting. Although these attributes all represent costs that reduce subjective value, it is as yet unclear how the extent to which they do so is related at the individual level. Accordingly, the present study examined the degree to which individual participants discounted hypothetical monetary rewards on each of four discounting tasks in which the delay, probability, effort, and number of people with whom the money was to be shared were manipulated. At the group level, larger amounts were discounted less steeply than smaller amounts when delay and effort were varied, whereas larger amounts were discounted more steeply when probability and number of people were varied. At the individual level, the correlational pattern was examined using exploratory factor analysis. A six-factor structure (with separate factors for delay and effort, and two factors each for social and probability discounting) described the relations among indifference points. At a more molar level, a two-factor structure, which corresponded to the direction of the observed magnitude effects, described the relations among area-under-the-curve measures of discounting in the eight conditions resulting from crossing two monetary amounts with the four cost factors. We conclude that despite sharing some similarities, individual and group differences in discounting involving the different types of costs reflect mostly separate processes and traits.
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) provides a framework to evaluate an individual decision-making process through a simulated card game where the risks and rewards vary by the decks chosen. Participants are expected to understand the logic behind the allocation of gains and losses over the course of the test and adapt their pattern of choices accordingly. This review explores the scientific work on studying problem gambling via the IGT while employing neuroimaging techniques. We first concentrate on the historical evolution of the IGT as a mechanism for studying gamblers’ behavioral patterns. Our research will also discuss the prefrontal cortex as this region of the brain is most affected by changes in behavioral patterns. In this review, we describe a number of features that may be useful in investigating decision-making patterns that lead to gambling addiction. We discuss the evidence base to date including experiments involving gambling behavior in different groups of participants (e.g., males and females, adults and minors, patients and controls) and alterations to experiment conditions that provide more thorough understanding of thought patterns in potential gamblers. We conclude that psychological testing combined with functional imaging provide powerful tools to further examine the relationships between functional impairment of the brain and a person’s ability to objectively anticipate the end results of their decisions.
The structural MRI evidence for gray matter deficits in GD is currently inconclusive, although a conservative statement would be that any reductions are modest in comparison to the reliable deterioration seen in SUDs [57,58,59]. This conclusion is supported by GD studies employing direct 3-group designs with an SUD comparison group [28, 44]. Nevertheless, individual differences in brain anatomy correlate with vulnerability factors, including impulsivity, which may be transdiagnostic across addictive disorders [44, 46]. DTI studies indicate more consistent reductions in white matter integrity that are of a distributed nature and similar to changes described in SUDs. It is currently unclear whether gray matter or white matter alterations in GD relate directly to reward-based symptom clusters.
We replicated and extended Shoda, Mischel, and Peake’s (1990) famous “marshmallow” study, which showed strong bivariate correlations between a child’s ability to delay gratification just before entering school and both adolescent achievement and socioemotional behaviors. Concentrating on children whose mothers had not completed college, we found that an additional minute waited at age 4 predicted a gain of approximately 1/10th of a SD in age-15 achievement. But this bivariate correlation was only half the size of those reported in the original studies, and was reduced by two-thirds in the presence of controls for family background, early cognitive ability, and the home environment. Most of the variation in adolescent achievement came from being able to wait at least 20 seconds. Associations between delay time and age-15 measures of behavioral outcomes were much smaller and rarely statistically significant.
It is often claimed that negative events carry a larger weight than positive events. Loss aversion is the manifestation of this argument in monetary outcomes. In this review, we examine early studies of the utility function of gains and losses, and in particular the original evidence for loss aversion reported by Kahneman and Tversky (Econometrica 47:263–291, 1979). We suggest that loss aversion proponents have over-interpreted these findings. Specifically, the early studies of utility functions have shown that while very large losses are overweighted, smaller losses are often not. In addition, the findings of some of these studies have been systematically misrepresented to reflect loss aversion, though they did not find it. These findings shed light both on the inability of modern studies to reproduce loss aversion as well as a second literature arguing strongly for it.
Gambling disorder (GD) is characterized by an inability to stop or control gambling behaviour and is often accompanied by gambling-related cognitive distortions. Task-based functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies have revealed abnormal responses within the prefrontal and insular cortex, and mesolimbic reward regions. Studies examining resting-state functional connectivity in GD, although limited in number, have so far applied seed-based analysis approaches which revealed altered brain functioning. Here, we applied data-driven Independent Components Analysis to resting-state multi-echo fMRI data. Networks of interest were selected by spatially correlating them to independently derived network templates. Using dual regression, we compared connectivity strength between 20 GD patients and 20 healthy controls within 4 well-known networks (the ventral attention, limbic, frontoparietal control, and default mode network) and an additional basal ganglia component. Compared to controls, GD patients showed increased integration of the right middle insula within the ventral attention network, an area suggested to play an important role in addiction-related drive. Moreover, our findings indicate that gambling-related cognitive distortions-a hallmark of GD-were positively related to stronger integration of the amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex and insula within various resting-state networks.
Dopamine has been associated with risky decision-making, as well as with pathological gambling, a behavioral addiction characterized by excessive risk-taking behavior. However, the specific mechanisms through which dopamine might act to foster risk-taking and pathological gambling remain elusive. Here we test the hypothesis that this might be achieved, in part, via modulation of subjective probability weighting during decision making. Human healthy controls (n = 21) and pathological gamblers (n = 16) played a decision-making task involving choices between sure monetary options and risky gambles both in the gain and loss domains. Each participant played the task twice, either under placebo or the dopamine D2/D3 receptor antagonist sulpiride, in a double-blind counterbalanced design. A prospect theory modelling approach was used to estimate subjective probability weighting and sensitivity to monetary outcomes. Consistent with prospect theory, we found that participants presented a distortion in the subjective weighting of probabilities, i.e., they overweighted low probabilities and underweighted moderate to high probabilities, both in the gain and loss domains. Compared with placebo, sulpiride attenuated this distortion in the gain domain. Across drugs, the groups did not differ in their probability weighting, although gamblers consistently underweighted losing probabilities in the placebo condition. Overall, our results reveal that dopamine D2/D3 receptor antagonism modulates the subjective weighting of probabilities in the gain domain, in the direction of more objective, economically rational decision making.
Increased cognitive distortions (i.e. biased processing of chance, probability and skill) are a key psychopathological process in disordered gambling. The present study investigated state and trait aspects of cognitive distortions in 22 individuals with Internet Gaming Disorder (IGD) and 22 healthy controls. Participants completed the Gambling Related Cognitions Scale as a trait measure of cognitive distortions, and played a slot machine task delivering wins, near-misses and full-misses. Ratings of pleasure (“liking”) and motivation to play (“wanting”) were taken following the different outcomes, and gambling persistence was measured after a mandatory phase. IGD was associated with elevated trait cognitive distortions, in particular skill-oriented cognitions. On the slot machine task, the IGD group showed increased “wanting” ratings compared with control participants, while the two groups did not differ regarding their “liking” of the game. The IGD group displayed increased persistence
Compulsivity is a core feature of addictive disorders, including gambling disorder. However, it is unclear to what extent this compulsive behavior in gambling disorder is associated with abnormal compulsivity-related neurocognitive functioning. Here, we summarize and synthesize the evidence for compulsive behavior, as assessed by compulsivity-related neurocognitive tasks, in individuals with gambling disorder compared to healthy controls (HCs). A total of 29 studies, comprising 41 task-results, were included in the systematic review; 32 datasets (n=1,072 individuals with gambling disorder; n=1,312 HCs) were also included in the meta-analyses, conducted for each cognitive task separately. Our meta-analyses indicate significant deficits in individuals with gambling disorder in cognitive flexibility, attentional set-shifting, and attentional bias. Overall, these findings support the idea that compulsivity-related performance deficits characterize gambling disorder. This association may provide a possible link between impairments in executive functions related to compulsive action. We discuss the practical relevance of these results, their implications for our understanding of gambling disorder and how they relate to neurobiological factors and other 'disorders of compulsivity'.
The valuation of food is a fundamental component of our decision-making. Yet little is known about how value signals for food and other rewards are constructed by the brain. Using a food-based decision task in human participants, we found that subjective values can be predicted from beliefs about constituent nutritive attributes of food: protein, fat, carbohydrates and vitamin content. Multivariate analyses of functional MRI data demonstrated that, while food value is represented in patterns of neural activity in both medial and lateral parts of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), only the lateral OFC represents the elemental nutritive attributes. Effective connectivity analyses further indicate that information about the nutritive attributes represented in the lateral OFC is integrated within the medial OFC to compute an overall value. These findings provide a mechanistic account for the construction of food value from its constituent nutrients.
In this paper, we present an incentivized experiment to investigate the degree of loss aversion when people make decisions for their current selves and future selves under risk. We find that when participants make decisions for their future selves, they are less loss averse compared to when they make decisions for their current selves. This finding is consistent with the interpretation of loss aversion as a bias in decision-making driven by emotions, which are reduced when making decisions for future selves. Our findings endorsed the external validity of previous studies on the impact of emotion on loss aversion in a real world decision-making environment.
Aims
The study aims to describe the construct of cognitive distortions based on the narratives of older adult gamblers (aged 60 years and above) in Singapore.
Methods
Singapore residents (citizens or permanent residents) aged 60 years and above, who were current or past regular gamblers were included in the study. Participants were recruited using a combination of venue based approach, referrals from service providers as well as by snowball sampling. In all, 25 in-depth interviews were conducted with older adult gamblers. The six-step thematic network analysis methodology was adopted for data analysis.
Results
The mean age of the participants was 66.2 years. The majority were male (n = 18), of Chinese ethnicity (n = 16), with a mean age of gambling initiation at 24.5 years. Among older adult gamblers, cognitive distortions emerged as a significant global theme comprising three organizing themes–illusion of control, probability control and interpretive control. The organizing themes comprised nine basic themes: perception of gambling as a skill, near miss, concept of luck, superstitious beliefs, entrapment, gambler’s fallacy, chasing wins, chasing losses, and beliefs that wins are more than losses.
Conclusions
Cognitive distortions were endorsed by all gamblers in the current study and were shown to play a role in both maintaining and escalating the gambling behaviour. While the surface characteristics of the distortions had a culture-specific appearance, the deeper characteristics of the distortions may in fact be more universal than previously thought. Future research must include longitudinal studies to understand causal relationships between cognitive distortions and gambling as well as the role of culture-specific distortions both in the maintenance and treatment of the disorder.
Cue reactivity is an established procedure in addictions research for examining the subjective experience and neural basis of craving. This experiment sought to quantify cue-related brain responses in gambling disorder using personally tailored cues in conjunction with subjective craving, as well as a comparison with appetitive non-gambling stimuli. Participants with gambling disorder (n=19) attending treatment and 19 controls viewed personally tailored blocks of gambling-related cues, as well as neutral cues and highly appetitive (food) images during a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scan performed ~2–3 h after a usual meal. fMRI analysis examined cue-related brain activity, cue-related changes in connectivity and associations with block-by-block craving ratings. Craving ratings in the participants with gambling disorder increased following gambling cues compared with non-gambling cues. fMRI analysis revealed group differences in left insula and anterior cingulate cortex, with the gambling disorder group showing greater reactivity to the gambling cues, but no differences to the food cues. In participants with gambling disorder, craving to gamble correlated positively with gambling cue-related activity in the bilateral insula and ventral striatum, and negatively with functional connectivity between the ventral striatum and the medial prefrontal cortex. Gambling cues, but not food cues, elicit increased brain responses in reward-related circuitry in individuals with gambling disorder (compared with controls), providing support for the incentive sensitization theory of addiction. Activity in the insula co-varied with craving intensity, and may be a target for interventions.
Individuals are consistently observed to be risk averse over gains and risk seeking over losses. This study examined whether increased social distance would change these behavioral patterns. To test our hypothesis, social distance was manipulated by asking the participants to make decisions either for themselves or for another person (Experiment 1), either for a known person or for an unknown person (Experiment 2), and either for a close friend or for a distant friend (Experiment 3). The results of Experiments 1 and 3 showed that increased social distance made people more risk neutral, and such an effect was stronger in the gain domain than in the loss domain. However, the effect of social distance was not observed in Experiment 2. These findings suggest that risk preferences are influenced by the social distance between decision makers and beneficiaries.
The incidence of pathological gambling in Parkinson's patients is significantly greater than in the general population. A correlation has been observed between dopamine agonist medication and the development of pathological gambling. However, scientists conjecture that the affected patients have underlying risk factors. Studies analysing Parkinson's patients have detected that patients who developed pathological gambling are younger, score higher on novelty-seeking tests, are more impulsive and are more likely to have a personal or family history of alcohol addiction. In addition, some genetic variations have been associated with the susceptibility of developing pathological gambling, which include mutations of DRD3, 5-HTTLPR and GRIN2B. Studies focusing on neurofunctional discrepancies between Parkinson's patients with and without pathological gambling have found increased functional activation and dopamine release in regions associated with the mesolimbic reward system. Further, there is also evidence showing increased processing of reward and decreased activation elicited by punishment, suggesting altered learning processes. Further, the role of deep brain stimulation of the nucleus subthalamicus (STN DBS) is controversial. In most Parkinson's patients, pathological gambling resolved after the initiation of the STN DBS, which might be explained by discontinuation or decrease of dopamine agonist medication. However, it has been also shown that some patients are more impulsive while the STN DBS is activated. These differences may depend on the DBS localisation in the more limbic or motor part of the STN and their regulative effects on impulsivity. Further research is needed to clarify susceptibility factors for the development of pathological gambling in Parkinson's patients. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Background and aims
Pathological gambling is associated with comorbid disorders, such as anxiety, depression, and drug and alcohol abuse. Difficulties of emotion regulation may be one of the factors related to the presence of addictive disorders, along with comorbid symptomatology in pathological gamblers. Therefore, the aim of this study was to evaluate the difficulties of emotion regulation, drug and alcohol abuse, and anxious and depressive symptomatology in pathological gamblers, and the mediating role of difficulties of emotion regulation between anxiety and pathological gambling.
Methods
The study sample included 167 male pathological gamblers (mean age = 39.29 years) and 107 non-gamblers (mean age = 33.43 years). Pathological gambling (SOGS), difficulties of emotion regulation (DERS), drug and alcohol abuse (MUTICAGE CAD-4), and anxious and depressive symptomatology (SA-45) were measured. Student’s t, Pearson’s r, stepwise multiple linear regression and multiple mediation analyses were conducted. The study was approved by an Investigational Review Board.
Results
Relative to non-gamblers, pathological gamblers exhibited greater difficulties of emotion regulation, as well as more anxiety, depression, and drug abuse. Moreover, pathological gambling correlated with emotion regulation difficulties, anxiety, depression, and drug abuse. Besides, emotion regulation difficulties correlated with and predicted pathological gambling, drug and alcohol abuse, and anxious and depressive symptomatology. Finally, emotion regulation difficulties mediated the relationship between anxiety and pathological gambling controlling the effect of age, both when controlling and not controlling for the effect of other abuses.
Discussion and conclusions
These results suggest that difficulties of emotion regulation may provide new keys to understanding and treating pathological gambling and comorbid disorders.
Reward prediction errors consist of the differences between received and predicted rewards. They are crucial for basic forms of learning about rewards and make us strive for more rewards-an evolutionary beneficial trait. Most dopamine neurons in the midbrain of humans, monkeys, and rodents signal a reward prediction error; they are activated by more reward than predicted (positive prediction error), remain at baseline activity for fully predicted rewards, and show depressed activity with less reward than predicted (negative prediction error). The dopamine signal increases nonlinearly with reward value and codes formal economic utility. Drugs of addiction generate, hijack, and amplify the dopamine reward signal and induce exaggerated, uncontrolled dopamine effects on neuronal plasticity. The striatum, amygdala, and frontal cortex also show reward prediction error coding, but only in subpopulations of neurons. Thus, the important concept of reward prediction errors is implemented in neuronal hardware.
Finding ways to adapt natural tendencies and nudge collective action is central to the well-being of future generations, say Helga Fehr-Duda and Ernst Fehr.
Besides their fundamental movement function evidenced by Parkinsonian deficits, the basal ganglia are involved in processing closely linked non-motor, cognitive and reward information. This review describes the reward functions of three brain structures that are major components of the basal ganglia or are closely associated with the basal ganglia, namely midbrain dopamine neurons, pedunculopontine nucleus, and striatum (caudate nucleus, putamen, nucleus accumbens). Rewards are involved in learning (positive reinforcement), approach behavior, economic choices and positive emotions. The response of dopamine neurons to rewards consists of an early detection component and a subsequent reward component that reflects a prediction error in economic utility, but is unrelated to movement. Dopamine activations to non-rewarded or aversive stimuli reflect physical impact, but not punishment. Neurons in pedunculopontine nucleus project their axons to dopamine neurons and process sensory stimuli, movements and rewards and reward-predicting stimuli without coding outright reward prediction errors. Neurons in striatum, besides their pronounced movement relationships, process rewards irrespective of sensory and motor aspects, integrate reward information into movement activity, code the reward value of individual actions, change their reward-related activity during learning, and code own reward in social situations depending on whose action produces the reward. These data demonstrate a variety of well-characterized reward processes in specific basal ganglia nuclei consistent with an important function in non-motor aspects of motivated behavior.
The Publisher regrets that this article is an accidental duplication of an article that has already been published in COBEHA, 31 (2020) 102–108, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.03.004. The duplicate article has therefore been withdrawn.
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Gambling disorder (GD) patients show excessively risky decision-making in the financial domain. We aimed to clarify whether GD patients show risky decision-making in domain-general or in domain-specific. Furthermore, we also investigated the effect of the well-known cognitive bias, the framing effect on GD’s decision-making under risk. Sixty-two male GD patients and 74 age-matched healthy male controls (HC) conducted a risky choice task in which they should choose solutions for difficult situations between a sure and a risky option that had the same expectations. Six situations were prepared for each financial and health domain. For each domain, three situations were presented with options using positive frames, and the other three situations were presented with options using negative frames. The results showed that GD chose more risky options in the financial domain with positive frames than HC, but chose comparably in the financial domain with negative frames, whereas GD and HC chose comparably in the health domain regardless of the frames. Thus, GD showed risky decision-making in domain-specific. In addition, the results indicate the importance of considering the influence of the framing effect for assessment of risky decision-making by GD. Domains and the influence of the framing effect should be considered when decision-making patterns of neuropsychiatric disorders are studied.
Behavior addictions, such as Gambling Disorder and Internet Gaming Disorder, have been demonstrated to have severe negative impact. Heightened impulsivity, deficits in decision making, and cognitive biases in the preference of immediate rewards have been shown to be crucial aspects in addictive disorders. While for Gambling Disorder (GD), dysfunctional decision making has been documented before, data for Internet Gaming Disorder (IGD) are still underrepresented. In order to allow for a direct comparison of both disorders, we assessed different measures of impulsivity (trait, impulsive choice, and decision making) in a clinical sample.
N = 31 patients meeting criteria for GD and n = 30 patients with IGD were recruited from an outpatient clinic and compared regarding their performance in a Delay Discounting Task (DDT), the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), and self-report data on impulsivity (Barratt Impulsiveness Scale). Healthy controls (n = 27) were included as a reference group.
In the DDT, the area under the curve was associated with the severity of GD only. No correlations were found for the impulsivity subscales and the area under the curve which, however, was similar between the two patient groups in contrast to controls. The GD-group performed poorer then the other groups in the IGT while IGD-patients performed poorer only at the beginning of the experiment.
Although only few significant differences occurred, similarities between GD and IGD regarding the DDT point towards a tendency on discounting rewards faster. Likewise, both patient groups were performing worse in the IGT than healthy controls which indicates deficiencies in decision making. Interestingly, the IGD-group was able to shift towards more advantageous decision making, which might have important implications for therapeutic interventions.
Here we review emotional regulation and its relationship with gambling disorder. Specifically, we review difficulties individuals with gambling disorder may have in identifying emotional states and selecting and implementing emotional regulation strategies. Difficulties in emotional regulation in individuals with gambling disorder may relate importantly to specific factors, such as gambling-related cognitions, attachment styles, comorbidities and impulsivity. Following a review of these factors, relationships between emotional regulation and treatment approaches for gambling disorder are discussed.
Discoveries over the past two decades demonstrate that regions distributed throughout the association cortex, often called the default network, are suppressed during tasks that demand external attention and are active during remembering, envisioning the future and making social inferences. This Review describes progress in understanding the organization and function of networks embedded within these association regions. Detailed high-resolution analyses of single individuals suggest that the default network is not a single network, as historically described, but instead comprises multiple interwoven networks. The multiple networks share a common organizational motif (also evident in marmoset and macaque anatomical circuits) that might support a general class of processing function dependent on internally constructed rather than externally constrained representations, with each separate interwoven network specialized for a distinct processing domain. Direct neuronal recordings in humans and monkeys reveal evidence for competitive relationships between the internally and externally oriented networks. Findings from rodent studies suggest that the thalamus might be essential to controlling which networks are engaged through specialized thalamic reticular neurons, including antagonistic subpopulations. These association networks (and presumably thalamocortical circuits) are expanded in humans and might be particularly vulnerable to dysregulation implicated in mental illness.
We investigate time discounting under risk. To this end, we modify a popular multiple price list (MPL) design to elicit time discounting. Structural estimations of model parameters yield several new insights. For one, we find present bias to persist under risk, contrary to some previous evidence from the psychology literature. We further confirm the robustness of inverse-S shaped probability weighting. This is important inasmuch as random choice predicts the opposite shape in our setup. We also show that correcting for probability weighting under risk impacts the assessment of discount rates. Those are systematically underestimated under the commonly used, more restrictive, expected utility.
How is effort integrated in value-based decision-making? Animal models and human neuroimaging studies primarily linked the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and ventral striatum (VS) to the integration of effort in valuation. Other studies demonstrated the role of these regions in invigoration to effort demands, thus it is hard to separate the neural activity linked to anticipation and subjective valuation from actual performance. Here, we studied the neural basis of effort valuation separated from performance. We scanned forty participants with fMRI, while they were asked to accept or reject monetary gambles that could be resolved with future performance of a familiar grip force effort challenge or a fixed risk prospect. Participants’ willingness to accept prospective gambles reflected discounting of values by physical effort and risk. Choice-locked neural activation in contralateral primary sensory cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) tracked the magnitude of prospective effort the participants faced, independent of choice time and monetary stakes. Estimates of subjective value discounted by effort were found to be tracked by the activation of a network of regions common to valuation under risk and delay, including vmPFC, VS and sensorimotor cortex. Together, our findings show separate neural mechanisms underlying prospective effort and actual effort performance.
Decisions made for others reflect not only decision-makers' cognitive and emotional states but also decision-makers' interpersonal concerns. People who make choices for others will potentially be blamed for unappealing outcomes by others. Therefore, we hypothesize that individuals will seek sure gains (which increase individuals' responsibility for desirable outcomes) and avoid sure losses (which decrease individuals' responsibility for undesirable outcomes) when making risky decisions for others more than when making such decisions for themselves. The results of two studies show that making decisions for others (vs. oneself) promotes risk-averse choices over gains. This effect may be driven by the perceived responsibility associated with different options. When both options exhibit variance in outcomes, such self-other difference disappears. However, no self-other difference over losses was observed. Taken together, our research highlights interpersonal concerns in making decisions for others, as well as the behavioral consequences of these concerns in decisions under risk.
Background and aims
A number of studies have investigated connections between probability discounting and gambling. The aim of this research was to obtain a meta‐analytic weighted effect size for the relationship between shallow probability discounting, (the tendency to overvalue reinforcement with lower odds) and gambling intensity and to examine whether a gambling diagnosis moderated this effect size such that the relationship is stronger for diagnosed problem gamblers.
Methods
A database search identified studies that (a) measured both probability discounting and gambling and (b) reported statistical results allowing calculation of an effect size for meta‐analysis. The search resulted in 12 studies reporting statistical results for probability discounting and gambling. The studies comprised 1685 individuals from different cohorts and nations, and included gamblers and non‐gamblers. The studies reported 18 effect sizes. Across studies, gambling severity was assessed through diagnosis, and gambling intensity was assessed through self‐report, and performance. Comprehensive Meta Analysis software calculated the weighted effect size and moderating role of gambling diagnosis.
Results
Shallower probability discounting was associated with greater gambling severity or intensity in all 12 studies. Across the studies, the weighted meta‐analytic effect size for the connection between probability discounting and gambling was significant, with Hedges’ g =.36 (SE = 0.07, 95% CI [0.21, 0.50], p < .001). Addressing the second aim of the study, individuals diagnosed with a gambling disorder or problem gambling compared with not diagnosed individuals showed an effect size of Hedges’ g =.79 (SE=.18, 95% CI[.45,.1.14] and a moderation analysis indicated that this type of comparison showed significantly stronger effects than effect sizes based on associations between probability discounting and gambling (Q(1) = 7.80, p = .005).
Conclusions
There appears to be a positive association between problem gambling and shallow probability discounting (a cognitive bias that overvalues low probability gains and/or undervalues high probability losses).
Gambling disorder (GD) is characterized by continual gambling despite negative consequences. Risky decision‐making is a hallmark of the disorder. We applied a tool from behavioral economics for assessing probability cognition in both gain and loss domains to GD. We aimed to examine the alteration of probability cognition and its relationship with brain structure in GD. Forty‐six GD patients and 52 age‐matched healthy controls (HCs) conducted a risky choice task in which subjects should choose between a sure and a risky option in both loss and gain domains. The distortion and elevation parameters of the probability weighting function were estimated. We compared the parameters between GD and HC and examined their relationships with the striatum and amygdala volumes in GD. GD showed greater elevation parameter in the gain domain and smaller regional gray matter volume in the left amygdala than HC. The elevation parameter in the gain domain showed a negative correlation with the left amygdala volume in GD. Altered probability cognition in the gain domain but not in the loss domain might be more relevant to risky decision‐making in GD. Our findings indicate that alteration in the amygdala might play a significant role in risky decision‐making of GD. Longitudinal studies are recommended to examine the causal relationship between brain abnormalities and risky decision‐making in GD. The present study examined the alteration of probability cognition in both gain and loss domain and its relationship with brain structure in gambling disorder. Gambling disorder showed the alteration of subjective probability cognition in gain domain with general increment but not in loss domain, and the degree of general increment of it was related to the amygdala volume. These results suggested that alteration in the amygdala might play a key role in risky decision‐making of gambling disorder.
Certain behavioral addictions pose difficult and unresolved problems for the criminal justice system. These disorders are characterized by strong desire states and may be associated with illegal behaviors that are committed to support the addiction. In this article, we begin with a general account of criminal responsibility and provide the legally relevant phenomenology and cognitive features of behavioral addictions. We then discuss how the legal system has approached two behavioral addictions, gambling disorder and kleptomania, during criminal trials and at sentencing. The conclusion summarizes an approach to the adjudication of behavioral addiction-related criminal behavior.
Neuroimaging studies of decision-making have generally related neural activity to objective measures (such as reward magnitude, probability or delay), despite choice preferences being subjective. However, economic theories posit that decision-makers behave as though different options have different subjective values. Here we use functional magnetic resonance imaging to show that neural activity in several brain regions—particularly the ventral striatum, medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex—tracks the revealed subjective value of delayed monetary rewards. This similarity provides unambiguous evidence that the subjective value of potential rewards is explicitly represented in the human brain.
Decision Neuroscience addresses fundamental questions about how the brain makes perceptual, value-based, and more complex decisions in non-social and social contexts. This book presents compelling neuroimaging, electrophysiological, lesional, and neurocomputational models in combination with hormonal and genetic approaches, which have led to a clearer understanding of the neural mechanisms behind how the brain makes decisions. The five parts of the book address distinct but inter-related topics and are designed to serve both as classroom introductions to major subareas in decision neuroscience and as advanced syntheses of all that has been accomplished in the last decade. Part I is devoted to anatomical, neurophysiological, pharmacological, and optogenetics animal studies on reinforcement-guided decision making, such as the representation of instructions, expectations, and outcomes; the updating of action values; and the evaluation process guiding choices between prospective rewards. Part II covers the topic of the neural representations of motivation, perceptual decision making, and value-based decision making in humans, combining neurcomputational models and brain imaging studies. Part III focuses on the rapidly developing field of social decision neuroscience, integrating recent mechanistic understanding of social decisions in both non-human primates and humans. Part IV covers clinical aspects involving disorders of decision making that link together basic research areas including systems, cognitive, and clinical neuroscience; this part examines dysfunctions of decision making in neurological and psychiatric disorders, such as Parkinson's disease, schizophrenia, behavioral addictions, and focal brain lesions. Part V focuses on the roles of various hormones (cortisol, oxytocin, ghrelin/leptine) and genes that underlie inter-individual differences observed with stress, food choices, and social decision-making processes. The volume is essential reading for anyone interested in decision making neuroscience. With contributions that are forward-looking assessments of the current and future issues faced by researchers, Decision Neuroscience is essential reading for anyone interested in decision-making neuroscience. Provides comprehensive coverage of approaches to studying individual and social decision neuroscience, including primate neurophysiology, brain imaging in healthy humans and in various disorders, and genetic and hormonal influences on decision making Covers multiple levels of analysis, from molecular mechanisms to neural-systems dynamics and computational models of how we make choices Discusses clinical implications of process dysfunctions, including schizophrenia, Parkinson's disease, eating disorders, drug addiction, and pathological gambling Features chapters from top international researchers in the field and full-color presentation throughout with numerous illustrations to highlight key concepts
Gambling problems impact 0.2%-4.0% of the population, and research related to treating gambling has burgeoned in the last decades. This article reviews trials for psychosocial treatments of gambling problems. Using Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses Standards, we identified 21 randomized trials. Eleven studies evaluated interventions delivered via multisession, in-person therapy: cognitive therapies, cognitive-behavioral (CB) therapies, and motivational interventions (MI) alone or with CB therapies. An additional 10 studies used approaches that involved 1 or fewer in-person sessions; these included workbooks with CB exercises alone or in combination with MI and brief feedback or advice interventions. Although most studies found some benefits of CB therapy (alone or combined with MI) and brief feedback or advice relative to the control condition in the short term, only a handful of studies demonstrated any long-term benefits. Nearly half the studies used waitlist controls, precluding an understanding of long-term efficacy, and standardized outcomes measures are also lacking. Populations also differ markedly across studies, from nontreatment-seeking persons who screened positive for gambling problems to those with severe gambling disorder, and these discrepant populations may require different interventions. Although problem gamblers with less pronounced symptoms may benefit from very minimal interventions, therapist contact generally improved outcomes relative to entirely self-directed interventions, and at least some therapist contact may be necessary for patients with more severe gambling pathology to benefit from CB interventions. As treatment services for gambling continue to grow, this review provides timely information on best practices for gambling treatment. (PsycINFO Database Record
The phenomenology of delay discounting, (e.g. shape of the discount function; relation to mental health) has been reviewed in detail previously, but not its neural substrates. Its neuropsychology is crucial for both theory and clinical practice. So, here, we review the neural underpinnings of delay discounting. We introduce its objective summary measures; provide an atheoretical summary of current findings – linking brain regions to each objectively measurable variable; and then provide a preliminary five-stage summary model of cognitive processing; followed by a mapping of parameters to the flow of information through neural systems. The whole is designed to stimulate future research on the roles of each brain region in delay discounting. Delay and payoff produce activity in many brain areas: thalamus; sensory, parietal, temporal, cingulate, prefrontal, motor, and insular cortex; and basal ganglia. Delay discounting, then, appears to emerge from the interaction of neural systems as they process streams of events in recurrent loops and not to be a simple calculation carried out in a single centre in the brain.
Decreased cognitive control over the urge to be involved in gambling activities is a core feature of Gambling Disorder (GD). Cognitive control can be differentiated into several cognitive sub-processes pivotal in GD clinical phenomenology, such as response inhibition, conflict monitoring, decision-making, and cognitive flexibility. This article aims to systematically review fMRI studies, which investigated the neural mechanisms underlying diminished cognitive control in GD. We conducted a comprehensive literature search and collected neuropsychological and neuroimaging data investigating cognitive control in GD. We included a total of 14 studies comprising 499 individuals. Our results indicate that impaired activity in prefrontal cortex may account for decreased cognitive control in GD, contributing to the progressive loss of control over gambling urges. Among prefrontal regions, orbital and ventromedial areas seem to be a possible nexus for sensory integration, value-based decision-making and emotional processing, thus contributing to both motivational and affective aspects of cognitive control. Finally, we discussed possible therapeutic approaches aimed at the restoration of cognitive control in GD, including pharmacological and brain stimulation treatments.
Studying brain abnormalities in behavioral addiction including GD enables us to exclude possible confounding effects of exposure to neurotoxic substances, which should provide important insight that can lead to a better understanding of addiction per se. There have been a few brain structural magnetic resonance imaging studies for GD, although the results have been inconsistent. On the other hand, GD was suggested to be a heterogeneous disorder in terms of risk attitude. We aimed to examine the heterogeneity of GD by combining a behavioral economics task and voxel-based morphometry. Thirty-six male GD patients and 36 healthy male control subjects underwent a task for estimation of loss aversion, which can assess risk attitude in real-life decision-making. The GD patients were divided into two groups based on their level of loss aversion, low and high. While both groups showed common gray matter volume reduction in the left supramarginal gyrus and bilateral posterior cerebellum, high loss-aversion GD showed pronounced reduction in the left posterior cerebellum and additional reduction in the bilateral medial orbitofrontal cortex. Our study suggests that the heterogeneity of GD is underpinned at the brain structural level. This result might be useful for understanding neurobiological mechanisms and for the establishment of precise treatment strategies for GD.
Numerous experiments have recently sought to identify neural signals associated with the subjective value (SV) of choice alternatives. Theoretically, SV assessment is an intermediate computational step during decision making, in which alternatives are placed on a common scale to facilitate value-maximizing choice. Here we present a quantitative, coordinate-based meta-analysis of 206 published fMRI studies investigating neural correlates of SV. Our results identify two general patterns of SV-correlated brain responses. In one set of regions, both positive and negative effects of SV on BOLD are reported at above-chance rates across the literature. Areas exhibiting this pattern include anterior insula, dorsomedialprefrontal cortex, dorsal and posterior striatum, and thalamus. The mixture of positive and negative effects potentially reflects an underlying U-shaped function, indicative of signal related to arousal or salience. In a second set of areas, including ventromedial prefrontal cortex and anterior ventral striatum, positive effects predominate. Positive effects in the latter regions are seen both when a decision is confronted and when an outcome is delivered, as well as for both monetary and primary rewards. These regions appear to constitute a “valuation system,” carrying a domain-general SV signal and potentially contributing to value-based decision making.
Delay discounting refers to the decrease in subjective value of an outcome as the time to its receipt increases. Across species and situations, animals discount delayed rewards, and their discounting is well-described by a hyperboloid function. The current review begins with a comparison of discounting models and the procedures used to assess delay discounting in nonhuman animals. We next discuss the generality of discounting, reviewing the effects of different variables on the degree of discounting delayed reinforcers by nonhuman animals. Despite the many similarities in discounting observed between human and nonhuman animals, several differences have been proposed (e.g., the magnitude effect; nonhuman animals discount over a matter of seconds whereas humans report willing to wait months, if not years before receiving a reward), raising the possibility of fundamental species differences in intertemporal choice. After evaluating these differences, we discuss delay discounting from an adaptationist perspective. The pervasiveness of discounting across species and situations suggests it is a fundamental process underlying decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record
To make sound economic decisions, the brain needs to compute several different value-related signals. These include goal values that measure the predicted reward that results from the outcome generated by each of the actions under consideration, decision values that measure the net value of taking the different actions, and prediction errors that measure deviations from individuals' previous reward expectations. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging and a novel decision-making paradigm to dissociate the neural basis of these three computations. Our results show that they are supported by different neural substrates: goal values are correlated with activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex, decision values are correlated with activity in the central orbitofrontal cortex, and prediction errors are correlated with activity in the ventral striatum.
Neuroeconomics is the study of the neurobiological and computational basis of value-based decision making. Its goal is to provide a biologically based account of human behaviour that can be applied in both the natural and the social sciences. This Review proposes a framework to investigate different aspects of the neurobiology of decision making. The framework allows us to bring together recent findings in the field, highlight some of the most important outstanding problems, define a common lexicon that bridges the different disciplines that inform neuroeconomics, and point the way to future applications.