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emotion and political
psychology
.
. I
I is timely, given the explosion of interest in emotion over the past 20-plus years, to
brie y re ect on the history of research on political emotion. In the 1980s an earlier
handbook, Margaret Hermann’s Political Psychology ( 1986 ), did not have a chapter on
emotion, nor did Greenstein and Lerner’s still earlier A Source Book for the Study of
Personality and Politics ( 1971 ). at emotion was largely ignored in the 1970s and 1980s
should be, on re ection, a bit of surprise. For from the very outset of Western thought,
reason and emotion were understood as the two fundamental qualities of human
nature( Aristotle, 1954 ; Aristotle, 1983 ; Plato, 1974 ). Indeed it was the purpose of that
inquiry to learn how to reconcile the presumed agonistic relationship between these two
core faculties ( Nussbaum, 1986 ). 1
e period of inattention to emotion re ected, we believe, two presumptions. First,
that emotion was mysterious or elusive and, hence, not amenable to scienti c inquiry.
And, second, that emotion would prove to be a declining force as the growth of and
reliance on scienti c knowledge, joined with expansive public education, would enable
reason to take up the central role in politics ( Marcus, 2002 ).
2 Beginning in the 1980s
emotion began its move to center stage in both psychology and political science. Since
then, the number of published articles with the words “a ect” or “emotion” in the title
has grown exponentially ( Brader, Marcus, & Miller, 2011 ). Re ecting the growth of
research, two recent textbooks on political psychology have chapters devoted to emo-
tion and politics ( Cottam, 2004 ; Houghton, 2009 ).
We rst o er an overview and critical re ections on the dominant theoretical
approaches to emotion and politics. Second, we consider the antecedents and functions
that have been posited to distinguish a number of common emotional states. ird, we
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examine the rapidly accumulating evidence that emotions shape attention, decision-
making, attitudes, and action in the realm of politics. Finally, we conclude with some
re ections on important and promising paths forward in the study of emotion and
political psychology.
. M T P
Two broad approaches are evident in the long history of interest in emotion. We can
term them the “outside in” and “inside out” approach. e “outside in” approach began
with the earliest e orts of humans to understand ourselves. It has been with us ever
since. e “inside out” approach is far more recent, enabled by advances in technology.
Scholars adopting an “outside in” approach infer the constitution and causes of emo-
tions from verbal reports of experiences and observations of behavior ( Darwin, 1998 ;
Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005 ; Frijda, 1986 ; Izard, 1991 ; Lazarus, 1991 ; Plutchik, 1980 ;
Schwarz & Clore, 2003 ; Tomkins, 2008 ; Zajonc, 1980 ). Much as has been the case with
many other longstanding psychological concepts—intelligence, motive, memory, and
attitudes, “outside in” scholars infer from a reasoned examination of human behavior
that the brain is engaged with emotion.
3 From what scholars see “outside,” they infer
what’s going on “inside.” ey observe manifestations of emotion in facial expression,
in gesture, tone, or as reported verbally by subjects. ey must deduce its latent quali-
ties from what they, and we, can observe, though that does not preclude speculation, as
for example Descartes “locating” the source of emotion in the pineal gland ( Descartes,
1989 ). Practitioners of the “outside in” approach do not directly study the brain’s role in
generating emotions and therefore, setting aside occasional speculations, tend not to
o er precise accounts of how emotion is produced by thebrain.
e “inside out” approach—facilitated by technological advances that permit better
observation and measurement of brain activities—involves direct investigation of neu-
ral processes that engage a ect ( Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1995 ; Damasio,
1994 ; Gray, 1987 ; LeDoux, 1995 ; Panksepp, 1998 ; Rolls, 2005 ). is focus on neural pro-
cesses generated new insights. First, for most neuroscientists, the subjective experience
of a ect is of only peripheral interest. As Cacioppo and colleagues ( Cacioppo, Berntson,
Norris, & Gollan, 2011 , p.34)note:
ere is an understandable appeal to settling for feelings as the appropriate data to
model in the area of a ect. It is these feelings that some theorists seek to describe,
understand, and explain. e structure and processes underlying mental contents
are not readily apparent, however, and most cognitive processes occur unconsciously
with only selected outcomes reaching awareness.
Neuroscientists instead shi ed attention to the role of neural processes that subserve
emotion. is in turn led to nding that these same processes also subserve various adap-
tive processes, such as attention and decision-making. Second, neuroscientists argue
that a ect is inherently appraisal and that a separate and subsequent stage of “cognitive”
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interpretation is not an essential ingredient to making a ect meaningful ( Cacioppo &
Decety, 2009 ; Marcus, 2012 ). We return to this point below, as the concepts a ect , cogni-
tion , and appraisal , as scienti c terms, have become increasingly problematic.
.. Primary eoretical Approaches
ere are three primary theoretical approaches to emotion in broad use today, though
there are many speci c variants within each. Evolving initially from the “outside in” tra-
dition, there are approach-avoidance theories and appraisal theories. eories of a ect
as neural process exemplify the “inside out” perspective. We review each inturn.
2.1.1. Approach-Avoidance eories
Here a ect functions to solve the problem of approach and avoidance. A ect is o en
understood as a simple valence assessment of circumstances (or stimuli) as either pun-
ishing or rewarding. A ect is thus critical to identifying stimuli as either rewarding,
hence justifying approach, or punishing, thus warranting avoidance. is notion under-
girds modern attitude theories, where liking-disliking constitutes the critical a ec-
tive dimension of attitudes ( Eagley & Chaiken, 1993 ; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975 ). It also
underlies Damasio’s ( Damasio, 1994 ) conception of “somatic markers” as automatic
preconscious signals that facilitate decision-making by sorting good from bad in our
environment on the basis of past associations. Similarly, political psychologists adopt-
ing a “hot cognition” approach in the study of motivated reasoning see a ect as the deci-
sive initial assessment of reward and punishment ( Lodge & Taber, 2013 ).
On one hand, scholars have long found this a convenient and useful way to simplify
a ective experience:Does she like or dislike that policy? Are voters in a good or bad
mood? Is his partisan identity based more on attraction to one party or repulsion from
the other? Much research on both explicit and implicit attitudes (toward racial groups,
political parties, political candidates, etc.) continues to focus on a simple positive-nega-
tive dimension of a ect (see Taber & Young, chapter17, this volume). On the other hand,
a er some 30years of analysis in innumerable studies, it is clear that a ective subjective
experience is not well described by only a single valence dimension ( Larsen & McGraw,
2011 ; Marcus, 2003 ). Scholars from diverse approaches have found it increasingly use-
ful to make ner di erentiations among emotions. Once reliance on a single approach-
avoidance conception of emotion, and measures that reproduce that conception (e.g.,
feeling thermometers), is relaxed so as to accommodate what is now known about the
complex and multifaceted character of (preconscious and postawareness) appraisals—
s e e gure6.2 and attendant discussion below—a richer array of insights is likely to follow.
2.1.2. Appraisal eories
Appraisal theories are among the leading contemporary approaches to make ner dis-
tinctions among emotions. As the name implies, their focus is the appraisals, conceived
as cognitive interpretations of the signi cance of a situation for one’s goals, that trigger
emotions ( Smith & Ellsworth, 1985 ). Both conscious and preconscious appraisals are
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possible ( Lazarus, 1991 ; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001 ). Speci c theories seek to
o er a unique one-to-one mapping between appraisal pattern and emotion, in order to
explain why we observe variation in emotional experiences across individuals and situ-
ations. To empirically test these relationships, some studies ask subjects to describe situ-
ations in which they felt particular emotions ( Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996 ; Smith
& Ellsworth, 1985 ), while others experimentally manipulate the attributes of scenarios
(along posited appraisal dimensions) to test whether those situations generate the pre-
dicted emotions ( Roseman, 1991 ).
Each theory conceives of a slightly di erent inventory of appraisals and emotions.
Smith and Ellsworth ( Smith & Ellsworth, 1985 ), for example, map six appraisal dimen-
sions (of eight initially considered) on een emotions. e dimensions include pleas-
antness, certainty, attention, anticipated e ort, responsibility, and situational control.
e nature of their contributions di ered. Pleasantness explained a great deal of vari-
ance in emotional experiences, while situational control explained only a small portion;
but the latter was particularly essential to discriminating among negative emotions like
sadness, anger, fear, and disgust. Other theories conceptualize and label the appraisals
di erently, though there is clearly overlap. Having focused on ve appraisals in earlier
work ( Roseman, 1991 ), Roseman etal. ( 1996 ) found that seven appraisals work best to
predict 17 emotions:unexpectedness, situational state (present/absent), motivational
state (reward/punish), probability (certain/uncertain), control potential, problem
source, and causal agency (circumstances, others, orself).
In a nal example, Lazarus ( 1991 ) identi es a “core relational theme” for each emo-
tion, or what that emotion signals about the ongoing relationship between a person and
her environment. Six appraisals—three primary, three secondary—evaluate the mean-
ing of a situation and trigger the appropriate emotion. Primary appraisals, which con-
cern “the stakes,” include goal relevance, goal congruency, and type of ego-involvement.
Secondary appraisals, which concern how the situation will be resolved, include blame/
credit, coping potential, and future expectations. Asituation must be perceived as “goal
relevant” for any emotion to be triggered.
Several studies draw on appraisal theories to isolate the causes and explain the
emergence of distinct emotions with political consequences ( Brader, Groenendyk,
& Valentino, 2010 ; Huddy, Feldman, & Cassess, 2007 ; Just, Crigler, & Belt, 2007 ;
Steenbergen & Ellis, 2006 ; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, & Hutchings,
2011 ). However, to date, most of this research tends not to advance an entire appraisal
account, but rather adopts isolated propositions related to a subset of speci c emo-
tions and appraisals as needed for the study in question (but cf. Roseman, Abelson, &
Ewing, 1986 ).
2.1.3. Neural Process eories
Beginning in the 1980s neuroscientists advanced accounts of the neural processes
that generated a ective response ( Adolphs & Spezio, 2006 ; Adolphs, Tranel, &
Damasio, 1998 ; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997 ; Gray, 1987 ; Gray,
1990 ; LeDoux, 1993 ; LeDoux, 2000 ; Rolls, 1999 ). Although researchers have identi-
ed multiple neural systems that generate distinct emotions ( Panksepp, 1998 ), early
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work placed a heavy emphasis on two dimensions of a ective appraisal, one most
o en labeled “positive” (a dimension that arrayed a ect from moribund to enthu-
siastic), the second labeled “negative” (a dimension that ranged from calm to anx-
ious and fearful). Each of these invoked neural processes that in turn in uenced
downstream cognitive and behavioral processes. By the late 1990s and early 2000s,
researchers from multiple perspectives found it increasingly useful to take notice
of a third dimension, anger ( Huddy etal., 2007 ; Lerner & Keltner, 2001 ; Marcus,
Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000 ; Panksepp, 1998 ). 4 is dimension is held to produce
a ects that range from calm to heightened aversion (e.g., rage, bitterness, anger, con-
tempt, disgust, and soon).
e most prevalent theoretical formulation in political psychology, the theory of
a ective intelligence, evolved similarly from an initial focus on two dimensions, an
anxiety dimension and an enthusiasm dimension ( Marcus & MacKuen, 1993 ; Marcus,
1988 ) to adopting the current three-dimensional view ( MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, &
Marcus, 2010 ; Marcus etal., 2000 ; Marcus, 2002 ). e virtue of this formulation is that
it makes an explicit case for the adequacy of the now widely adopted three-dimensional
structural account of a ective appraisals. Enthusiasm generates hypotheses about when
people become engaged in politics in various ways and their reliance on extant identi -
cations and convictions ( Brader, 2006 ; Marcus etal., 2000 ). Anxiety generates hypoth-
eses about attention, learning, and reliance on contemporary considerations ( Brader,
2006 ; MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman, & Keele, 2007 ; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993 ). Aversion/
anger generates hypotheses about the role of normative violations, and defensive and
aggressive actions to protect extant identi cations and convictions ( Huddy etal., 2007 ;
MacKuen etal., 2010 ).
.. Critical Considerations
Before turning to research on causes and consequences of emotion, we need to review
a few of the concepts that scholars have used to describe emotion. eoretical perspec-
tives have appeared at di erent times, applying somewhat di erent presumptions, o en
unstated, about terms that, while appearing to be scienti c, are just as o en vernacular
in meaning. is raises the risk of overly plastic meanings inasmuch as lay ideas are
o en plural in their meanings. ree frequently used terms recur in various accounts of
emotion. Moreover, these conceptual terms are central to describing the phenomenon
and imputing the mechanisms that control and give rise to the appearance of this or that
emotion. e core terms requiring some excavation are discrete , appraisal , and cogni-
tion , with the latter two terms o en paired, as in “cognitive appraisal.” ese terms have
come to be used in various ways that o en lead to confusion.
2.2.1. What Does It Mean to Say an Emotion Is Discrete or Dimensional?
ere are two meanings of the term “discrete” apparent in the literature, one more
casual and one more conceptually dense. e rst is an assertion that di erent emo-
tions need to be kept clearly discriminated. As a vernacular term, used in that fashion,
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the claim that an emotion is discrete is an appropriate way to make an introductory
claim. But even in that usage the term is merely preliminary unless then linked to
a recognized taxonomy of emotion states so that the a ective state in question is
explicitly related to the other speci ed a ect states. is has been done in the case
of “basic emotions.” Various scholars have enumerated what they take to be the core
fundamental a ects. ough not all agree on the nal array, they typically identify
something like 8 to 12“basic emotions” ( Frijda, Kuipers, & Schure, 1989 ; Ortony,
Clore, & Collins, 1989 ; Roseman, 1984 ). is second use of the term advances a richer
imputation, one that holds that each discrete emotion is a bounded domain that has
some homogenous quality both as to its antecedents and its consequences. is sec-
ond meaning and usage is best grasped by comparison to another frequently used
approach to depicting emotion, that of treating a ective states as aligned along one or
more dimensions.
Consider anxiety from a dimensional point of view. Anxiety, conceived as an a ective
dimension, is typically regarded as an appraisal of uncertainty. In this dimensional view,
a ective states of anxiety depict di erent degrees of uncertainty, hence uniting semantic
terms such as tranquil , calm , uneasy , jittery , nervous , and fearful as “marking” di erent
degrees of anxiety, arrayed from less to more. From a discrete perspective, while jittery
and fearful might be seen as describing di erent intensities of anxiety, the emotions of
tranquility and calmness would more likely be regarded as a di erent, discrete a ective
state, one to be contrasted to anxiety .
Figure6.1 provides a further example of the sorts of di erences that can distinguish
discrete and dimensional approaches. e gure displays four common feeling words—
lethargic , withdrawn , congenial , and, enthusiastic . Part Ashows how these four a ective
states could be construed when applying a discrete approach. In this case, for illustra-
tive purposes, we “organize” the four emotional states, in the way a cognitive appraisal
theorist might, that is, according to the evaluations presumed to give rise to these four
Valence
Regarding
Positive (approach)
Negative (avoidance)
Lethargic Withdrawn Congenial
Enthusiasm Dimension (less to more)
Enthusiastic
Self-regarding
A. Hypothetical Example of Discrete Organization of Selected Emotions
B. Hypothetical Example of Dimensional Organization of Selected Emotions
Enthusiastic
Lethargic
Other-regarding
Congenial
Withdrawn
. Sample Taxonomies:Discrete and Dimensional Typologies of Emotion
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discrete states. Part B shows how applying a dimensional approach might array them
along a single dimension.
If we asked subjects to rate how well each of these a ect words describe diverse sce-
narios, we would likely nd that each of these terms is thought to be most applicable
to quite di erent circumstances. Having found that people systematically di erentiated
these four terms, a scholar could conclude that these are distinct emotions produced
by applying a self-regarding versus other-regarding consideration, thereby di erentiat-
ing enthusiastic and lethargic from withdrawn and congenial . And that scholar might
also conclude that subjects di erentiated appetitive (i.e., positive) outcomes from aver-
sive (i.e., negative) outcomes, thus di erentiating enthusiastic and congenial from with-
drawal and lethargic . ese two general abstract considerations when jointly applied
generate the four distinct a ect states as depicted in Part Aof gure6.1 . us, data and
conception converge.
However, if we asked how enthusiastic , lethargic , withdrawn , or congenial they felt in
di erent settings, we might well nd that the reported levels each rise and fall in a cor-
related fashion. Indeed, they might be so highly correlated that they converge to a single
dimension. Here again, conception and measurement converge.
In Part A, each of the four a ect terms is located in its own cell, emphasizing its
unique features, presumably produced by the joint application of two abstract consid-
erations. In Part B of gure6.1 , we see these same a ect terms “marking” di erent levels
of a positive a ective state, ranging from very low to very high, generated by a single
appraisal, that of the likelihood of securing a positive outcome (either in the past, pres-
ent, or future).
Testing the validity of these two perspectives turns on resolving three issues. First,
they clearly di er as to number of antecedent factors that generate the a ects (i.e.,
two or one). Second, they presumably di er in “downstream” consequences (though
not all theories produce explicit theoretical claims thereon). ird, is there neurologi-
cal evidence on the mechanisms by which these (and other) a ects are generated? As
we shall suggest below, however, these two accounts need not be treated as mutually
exclusive.
2.2.2. What Does It Mean to Say at Appraisals Are Central to
Emotion?
A ective reactions are expressed in facial display, posture, gesture, vocal timbre, and
so forth. Emotions, it is now generally agreed, are generated by neural processes in
the brain. e neural processes engaged with emotion are very fast, cycling on the
order of ve times faster than conscious awareness and producing their appraisals
prior to conscious awareness ( Rolls, 1999 ; Rolls, 2005 ). is requires fundamental
rethinking about the relationship between a ect and cognition. A ective precon-
scious appraisals execute faster than and arise before consciousness. But the tra-
ditional de nition of cognition, a word derived from Latin, to cogitate, to think,
has long been perceived as taking place only “inside” the mind where cogitating
takesplace.
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Consciousness—the subjective arena wherein feeling and thinking seem to play out—
o ers the false sensation of instantaneous and comprehensive access to external a airs.
In fact, consciousness is not instantaneous. During the time that it takes the brain to
construct consciousness, our brains are active in understanding our circumstances
through very fast appraisals of the somatosensory and sensory streams along with inte-
grating those appraisals with our goals so as to enact habituated actions ( Marcus, 2012 ).
We subjectively experience events around us as if the events and their mental repre-
sentation in conscious awareness are concurrent. But this apparent concurrence is itself
a fabrication by preconscious neural processes ( Libet, 2004 ; Libet, Gleason, Wright, &
Pearl, 1983 ; Libet, Wright, Feinstein, & Pearl, 1979). Given that subjective experience
seems to give instant and veridical access to the world, it is not surprising that initial
research suggesting that humans react to external events before they are conscious
of those events ( Zajonc, 1980 ) was met with considerable skepticism and resistance
( Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980 ; Lazarus, 1982 ; Lazarus, 1984 ; Tsal, 1985 ). 5 H e n c e , t h e
more potent di erentiation between consciousness and a ect is not spatial but tempo-
ral. And it is well established that people act on these preconscious appraisals ( Bechara
etal., 1997 ; Todorov & Ballew, 2007 ).
Early cognitive theories of a ect arose before this new understanding and thus o en
presumed that thinking of some sort was necessary to interpret a ective reactions
so as to make them coherent and subjectively meaningful. As a result, researchers
risked con ating self-reported interpretations of when and why subjects felt a par-
ticular emotion with the temporally prior and “hidden” processes by which a ective
responses are generated. Put di erently, some cognitive appraisal accounts seemed to
confuse structural accounts, which posit implicit “rules” by which situational ante-
cedents elicit distinct emotions, with the actual process giving rise to emotions ( Clore
& Ortony, 2008 ).
In contrast, like other neural process accounts, the most prevalent approach in politi-
cal science—the theory of a ective intelligence ( Marcus etal., 2000 ; Marcus, 2002 )—
holds, in its current form, that there are three preconscious appraisals that generate the
array of emotions that people experience at the outset of exposure to some stimulus
(whether new or old, contemporaneously present, recalled from prior exposure, or part
of some imagined future). Of the three, two are ubiquitous, levels of enthusiasm ranging
from lethargic to enthusiastic, and levels of anxiety ranging from calm to anxious. e
third, which they label aversion , is a situational appraisal manifest only when confront-
ing familiar punishing circumstances.
6
Preconscious appraisals and postawareness appraisals can both in uence subjec-
tive a ective states. However, disentangling the contributions of pre- and postaware-
ness processes requires some rethinking about the terms cognition and appraisal. Most
researchers, regardless of approach, now use appraisal to refer to the brain’s assess-
ment of some internal or external situation. ere remains considerable disagreement
over whether to call all appraisals cognitive or even what doing so implies ( Scherer
et al., 2001 ). e everyday meaning of the word cognition has long been equated
with conscious thought or, at least, higher cortical mental functions. In the wake of
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long-running and attention-getting debate over the “primacy” of a ect and cognition
( Lazarus, 1982 ; Lazarus, 1984 ; Zajonc, 1980 ), many psychologists and neuroscientists
have adopted an expanded de nition of cognition as applying to any sort of informa-
tion processing in the brain. From this perspective, cognitive appraisals can be under-
stood to encompass anything from preconscious perceptions that arise directly from
somatosensory and sensory inputs to extended conscious rumination about the mean-
ing of events.
We argue that this “resolution” does more to obscure than to clarify. Amultitude of
brain processes, including many long associated with “cognition,” occur at a precon-
scious level. Calling nearly everything the brain does “cognition” seems less than helpful
to understanding how a host of distinct and interdependent processes function to regu-
late behavior.
e eld, therefore, would bene t from shi ing away from this terminology (and
the seemingly intractable debate it invites) to specify more concretely the process
by which the brain translates sensory and somatosensory inputs into di erentiated
emotional reactions, as well as how those emotions translate in turn into behavioral
responses. In our view, scholars should focus directly on the temporal dimension,
endeavoring to understand how preconscious and postawareness processes each con-
tribute to emotional episodes. Subjective feeling states result from a sequential series
of appraisals that have both “upstream” (preconscious) and “downstream” (conscious)
aspects.
Such a temporal focus may productively turn attention to understanding better
which appraisals, and thus which emotional states (or levels of emotional di erentia-
tion), can and do arise at a preconscious stage and which arise only, or mainly, with
conscious re ection. For example, it is now widely accepted among both cognitive
appraisal theorists and neuroscientists that basic preconscious appraisals of situa-
tions as something like desirable/undesirable (i.e., good/bad) set in motion positive/
negative a ective responses automatically—that is, outside subjective control and
o en outside of awareness ( Clore & Ortony, 2008 ; Keltner & Lerner, 2010 ; LeDoux,
1996 ). In contrast, some evaluations suggested by cognitive appraisal theories may
not be apt for preconscious a ective appraisals, which are very fast, concerned with
de execution of action plans (including speech), and rely on the tight integra-
tion of current expectations with somatosensory input and fast sensory appraisals.
us, an important and open question for future research is which appraisal dimen-
sions require conscious awareness and which can occur at a pre-conscious stage.
Appraisals of novelty/familiarity? Degree of situational control? Self/other causal
responsibility? Certain/uncertain outcomes? Scholars have even dubbed certain
a ects as “self-conscious emotions” (see below), implying a more elaborate process
of comparing the performance of the self with social expectations and norms. But
does the social comparison underlying such emotions imply conscious awareness?
e answer remains unclear.
From this broader understanding, both neural process theories, such as the theory
of a ective intelligence, and cognitive appraisal theories posit appraisal as an essential
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function of conscious and a ective processes. is would suggest that earlier e orts
to integrate discrete and dimensional accounts in a “hierarchical” structure ( Tellegen,
Watson, & Clark, 1999a ; 1999b ) might be more usefully reconceived not in spatial terms,
higher or lower, but rather in temporally arrayed “layers,” with earlier states swi ly being
elaborated by downstream appraisals. is suggestion, as shown in gure6.2 , allows for
multiple appraisals, some very early with others falling along later in the time course of
a ective experience.
For example, as illustrated in the gure, initial preconscious appraisals may trigger
emotions along a couple of fundamental dimensions, such as anxiety-calm and enthu-
siasm-lethargy. Subsequent appraisals may shape a ective responses into a broader
array of speci c emotional states, such as anger, fear, sadness, disgust, shame, and joy.
Finally, as conscious awareness and interpretation of emotions unfolds further, and emo-
tions become infused with greater cognitive input, individuals may experience still more
subtle variations in a ect—for example, as angry-like reactions di erentiate into anger,
frustration, contempt, and resentment ( Clore, Ortony, Dienes, & Fujita, 1993 )—or the
blending of a ects into a unique emotional state—such as sadness and joy melding into
a feeling of nostalgia as one re ects on happier past times ( Holak & Havlena, 1998 ). In
this way, the elaboration shown in gure6.2 suggests one way to account for the richness
of a ective experience while also relying on the more parsimonious account of the early
stages of preconscious appraisal. ough it should be added that for at least some circum-
stances, notably those when people confront very familiar stimuli (e.g., people, slogans,
groups, circumstances, etc.) rather than an unfolding richness we might nd, in some
circumstances, the a ective space collapsing even to a single valence dimension ( Marcus
etal., 2000 ).
t
0
t
0
arrival of sensory and somatosensory signals in the brain
t
1
conscious awareness
t
2
elaboration or consolidation of aective experience
t
3
further downstream changes
t
1
t
2
t
3
Preconscious
Appraisals
Conscious
Appraisals
. A ective Experience Over Time
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. A F
E
is section is divided into brief discussions of emotions or “families of emotions.” Our
goal is to provide readers with a sense of the most relevant distinctions among emo-
tions, as suggested by the research literature to date, including their antecedents and
functions. ese categories do not re ect any particular theory, but instead identify for
readers distinctions that have proven useful for social and political psychologists across
a variety of studies and perspectives. Indeed, as noted earlier, one theory might argue
for tying multiple categories to a single a ective dimension, while another theory might
insist on splitting a single category apart into even ner distinctions. is is also not an
exhaustive list. Some emotions—surprise, jealousy, regret, sympathy, to name a few—
have received little or no attention from political psychologists todate.
7
.. Enthusiasm, Hope, Pride, andJoy
is set of emotions illustrates well the tension between vernacular labels that attempt
to assign meaning to our experiences and scienti c categories that mark distinct psy-
chological processes. ey are central examples of what are o en called positive or
“feel-good” emotions, and they are indeed associated with pleasurable feelings and an
approach orientation. ere are some ready di erences in the way people use these
terms in everyday life. Joy and happiness o en refer most directly to feelings of pleasure
and may describe even more broadly a positive mood or general satisfaction with life
( Fredrickson, 2003 ). Enthusiasm suggests a more speci c state of excitement and expec-
tation for what’s happening and what’s ahead. Hope implies a prospective orientation,
yearning for better things. Pride, in contrast, is a more retrospective feeling of pleasure
and con dence due to one’s success.
us, one might be tempted to treat these as distinct categories and yet, for all the
di erentiation in meaning attached to the labels, it has been di cult to di erentiate
these emotions observationally (based on self-reports and the like) and especially by
their consequences. 8 ey appear very similar in terms of neural, physiological, expres-
sive, cognitive, and behavioral responses. Several scholars have argued that these feel-
ings emerge from one emotional system—variously given labels such as the behavioral
approach system ( Gray, 1987 ), the seeking system ( Panksepp, 1998 ), or the disposition
system ( Marcus etal., 2000 )—that functions to regulate and adapt behavior toward the
pursuit of rewards. People experience the emotional state associated with feelings of
enthusiasm, joy, and so on, when the system receives positive feedback about that pur-
suit, namely when rewards appear within reach, are getting closer, or have been attained.
is emotion generates the physical and mental resources for maintaining and focusing
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interest and engagement with the pursuit of those rewards in question, motivating the
expenditure of further e ort to reach the goal. In the service of such goal-seeking, this
system also facilitates the learning of routines (habits of mind and body) and regulates
their execution.
Political psychologists have shown that enthusiasm—typically measured as a scale
that combines self-reported feelings from this set of emotions (e.g., “hopeful,” “proud,”
“enthusiastic,” “happy”)—increases interest in political processes, motivates politi-
cal action, and strengthens reliance on prior convictions in making political choices
( Brader, 2006 ; Marcus etal., 2000 ; Valentino etal., 2011 ). What triggers enthusiasm
in the political domain? In general, political psychologists have devoted less e ort to
uncovering the antecedents of politically consequential emotions than the e ects. But
experimental research has highlighted a few sources of political enthusiasm. ese can
be substantive in origin, such as reassuring news stories about the enactment of desired
policies ( MacKuen etal., 2010 ), the positive economic impact of social trends ( Brader,
Valentino, & Suhay, 2008 ), or the lead one’s party has in the polls ( Valentino, Hutchings,
Banks, & Davis, 2008 ). Enthusiasm can also be triggered in somewhat more super -
cial (yet equally consequential) ways, such as by the smile of a charismatic politician
( Sullivan & Masters, 1988b ) or the use of upli ing music and feel-good imagery in cam-
paign advertising ( Brader, 2006 ). 9
ere is much more to learn about this set of emotions. Despite the di culties
mentioned earlier, there has been some e ort to di erentiate further among so-called
“positive” emotions. For example, some associate pride with an expressive impulse
( Lazarus, 1991 ) and argue, therefore, it may particularly motivate people to put their
views and accomplishments on display through public discussion or the wearing
and posting of political messages ( Corrigan & Brader, 2011 ). Research on “self-con-
scious emotions” also di erentiates pride by highlighting its relationship to feelings
of shame and guilt (see below). Scholars also have suggested other potential conse-
quences of enthusiasm, joy, or other “positive” emotions that remain relatively little
explored in the political realm. Evidence in social psychology suggests these emo-
tions can stimulate creative, playful thinking that leads to new solutions ( Fredrickson,
2003 ) and assist recovery from stressful states, from “laughing o ” a scare to coping
with aversive events such as disaster or terrorist attacks. Similarly, the past decade has
seen increased interest in investigating the impact of political humor, but we are not
aware of any such studies to date that treat audience reactions to successful attempts
at political humor explicitly as an emotion (i.e., amusement ) and pursue its e ects
accordingly.
.. Sadness and Disappointment
If the preceding set of emotions is associated with the successful pursuit and acquisition
of rewards, sadness and disappointment are clearly related to the reverse:failure and
loss. Not surprisingly, therefore, dimensional accounts such as the theory of a ective
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intelligence posit these emotions as products of negative feedback from the same emo-
tional system that generates enthusiasm. Vernacular usage can imply subtle distinctions
in meaning for how feelings are labeled in this category:one is sad, not disappointed,
at the loss of a loved one. But this may simply re ect di erences in intensity; a person
who failed to achieve a goal she had been pursuing might describe herself as disap-
pointed, sad, or depressed, as the importance of the goal and the magnitude of the fail-
ure increase. Is there an emotional di erence between the loss of something valued and
the failure to obtain rewards? Evidence on the behavioral consequences does yet not
fully support such a distinction. Sadness and disappointment motivate withdrawal and
more e ortful processing of information, encouraging individuals to accept the loss,
re ect on their situation, and change goals and plans accordingly ( Bonanno, Goorin, &
Coifman, 2008 ).
Although these emotions are ubiquitous and explicitly part of prominent theories,
their political antecedents and implications are little studied. So much of politics seems
to be about stirring up passions, the heavy emphasis on high-arousal emotions such as
enthusiasm, fear, and anger, is perhaps understandable. However, sadness and disap-
pointment are hardly irrelevant to the political domain. How does sadness a ect the
behavior of citizens experiencing a sense of collective and, at times, personal loss fol-
lowing events such as deadly terrorist attacks, a devastating natural disaster, or the death
of a beloved leader? Or what about the consequences of disappointment felt at the fail-
ure of one’s “side” in an election, a war, or international competition? By and large, the
answers await furtherstudy.
.. Fear and Anxiety
Fear is the most studied emotion, not only within political psychology (e.g., see Stein,
chapter12, this volume), but also in the social sciences writ large. e terms fear and
anxiety (along with numerous other cognates:alarm, worry, terror, etc.) typically refer
to the same emotion in everyday discourse, conveying at most di ering intensities
of feeling. Although scholars broadly agree that these are at least very closely related
“defensive” emotions, some draw distinctions between the terms. For example, clini-
cal psychologists distinguish between generalized anxiety disorders and speci c fears
(phobias) that a ict individuals ( Öhman & Mineka, 2001 ; Öhman & Soares, 1993 ;
Öhman, Dimberg, & Esteves, 1989 ). Other researchers have pointed to neurologi-
cal and behavioral di erences between an emotional state (fear) associated with clear
threats and more purely avoidance reactions, on one hand, and one (anxiety) associated
with ambiguous threats and a mix of approach reactions and risk aversion, on the other
( Gray & McNaughton, 2000 ; Perkins, Inchley-Mort, Pickering, Corr, & Burgess, 2012 ).
Nonetheless, to date, most political psychologists use these labels interchangeably. On
a practical level, research subjects in surveys and experiments seem to use the terms to
report the same latent emotional experience, and such self-reports remain the principal
method of measuring emotions. It remains to be seen whether political psychologists
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can isolate more subtle di erences in these emotional responses and trace them in turn
to meaningfully distinct political consequences.
e disproportionate scholarly attention focused on fear clearly re ects the central-
ity and importance of its function in human life. Fear is a product of an emotional sys-
tem—sometimes named the behavioral inhibition system ( Gray, 1987 ), the surveillance
system ( Marcus etal., 2000 ), or simply the fear system ( Panksepp, 1998 )—that moni-
tors the environment for potential threats and adapts behavior accordingly. It may be
activated as an innate response to certain classes of events that portend danger (e.g.,
unexpected loud noises, large objects quickly approaching) or as a learned response to
just about anything that has become associated with danger ( LeDoux, 1996 ). Novelty,
or uncertainty, can trigger anxiety, since what is unknown may also be dangerous. Fear
interrupts ongoing behavior, while redirecting attention and other cognitive activity
toward dealing with the threat. Speci cally, it prompts individuals to seek out informa-
tion related to the threat and to reconsider courses of action to deal with the danger in
light of present circumstances. It motivates people to remove the danger, if that is readily
doable, or, if not, to remove themselves from the danger. us, fear motivates (and pre-
pares the body for) risk-aversive behavior, including actions aimed at prevention and
protection, conciliatory acts, hiding, and ight. e impact of fear on memory is more
complex, with evidence that it can both enhance the encoding and recall of memories
and yetalso interfere with encoding and recall.
What arouses fear among citizens? As with enthusiasm, political psychologists
have demonstrated that it can be triggered by both substantive and super cial stim-
uli. Subliminal images of snakes and skulls ( Way & Masters, 1996a ; Way & Masters,
1996b ) and the discordant music and violent images that serve as a backdrop to cam-
paign advertising ( Brader, 2006 ) generate anxiety that spills over to a ect the way vot-
ers process political information and make decisions. Of course, fear is o en activated
directly by threats conveyed by the very events, people, and policies at the heart of
political life, including, for example, the worried or uncertain expressions of political
leaders ( Sullivan & Masters, 1988b ), campaign news suggesting a preferred candidate
is losing ( Valentino etal., 2008 ) or does not have the policy positions or character one
hoped ( Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010 ), stereotypic portrayals of threatening
out-groups ( Brader etal., 2008 ), news of deadly viral outbreaks ( Brader etal., 2010 ), or
images of terrorist attacks ( Gadarian, 2010 ; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischho , 2003 ;
Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009 ).
.. Calmness and Serenity
If feelings of fear arise from threatening conditions, then serenity or calmness is the state
that prevails only when threats are absent. Perhaps for this reason, dimensional accounts
of emotion, which place fear and calmness as poles on a single axis, give greater recog-
nition to this emotional state. e theory of a ective intelligence, for example, posits
that calmness is generated when the surveillance system indicates everything is safe and
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expected ( Marcus etal., 2000 ). In contrast, discrete emotion accounts rarely include
this emotion in their lists. We are aware of no research on the political antecedents and
implications of serenity. is is understandable, given that the emotional state implies
that “not much is happening,” but it nonetheless seems to hold potential signi cance
for politics that has gone unexplored. For example, leaders may wish to restore calm
to a public upset about the threat of war, disease, terrorism, or other crisis. Whereas
numerous studies in political psychology have investigated how to make citizens more
anxious, none yet have investigated how to make them morecalm.
.. Anger
e status of anger has posed particular di culties for dimensional models of emo-
tion. Although people clearly experience anger as distinct from fear, self-reported
feelings of anger o en accompany those of fear. and the structural analyses have typ-
ically placed anger and fear in very close proximity ( Tellegen etal., 1999a ; 1999b ).
is makes considerable sense in light of the fact that many of the same situations
that produce fear also produce anger ( Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004 ; Berkowitz,
1988 ). Nevertheless, anger appears to be an “approach” emotion ( Carver, 2004 ) and,
as such, its consequences o en seem to have more in common with enthusiasm than
fear. In light of this, Carver recasts the dimension underlying the behavioral approach
system such that sadness anchors the low end when rewards vanish or are recognized
as unobtainable, but anger and frustration emerge along the middle of the dimension
when rewards are seen as slipping away but still within reach. Another dimensional
account, a ective intelligence theory, has also evolved to argue that aversion—de ned
as a cluster of feelings that includes anger, disgust, contempt, and hatred—is activated
by the same system that produces enthusiasm (i.e., the disposition system), speci -
cally when familiar disliked or threatening stimuli present themselves ( MacKuen
etal., 2010 ).
Whatever the challenges to de ning its “place” in the structure of emotions, anger
clearly has distinct e ects. Indeed, one of the most important contributions of politi-
cal psychology’s growing attention to emotions in recent years has been to explain why
threatening or aversive circumstances in politics o en produce such divergent reac-
tions. Social scientists have long recognized that “threat” has a strong in uence on indi-
viduals but previously did not di erentiate or reconcile its myriad e ects. In contrast to
those who are anxious, angry citizens cling tightly to their prior convictions and are less
receptive to new considerations or opposing points of view. Anger is a particularly pow-
erful mobilizing force that motivates people to take and support risky, confrontational,
and punitive actions.
What triggers anger? Anger emerges in situations when people are threatened or nd
obstacles blocking their path to reward (see also Huddy, chapter23, this volume). e
primary function of the set of e ects just described is to marshal the cognitive and physi-
cal resources necessary to overcome such obstacles or threats. But we have already noted
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that anger and fear frequently co-occur. Moreover, fear is also a response to threats, and
sadness is also a response when rewards are not obtained. So what distinctively triggers
anger? Beyond the presence of threats and obstacles, four antecedents receive consider-
able discussion in the literature:(1)an external cause, especially the intentional actions
of some “freely acting” agent who can be blamed ( Lazarus, 1991 ; Smith & Ellsworth,
1985 ); (2)coping potential, or the perception that one has some control over the situ-
ation ( Carver, 2004 ; Frijda, 1986 ; Lazarus, 1991 ); (3)perception that the situation is
unfair, illegitimate, or undeserved ( Averill, 1983 ; Roseman, 1991 ); and (4)the familiar-
ity of a threat ( Marcus, 2002 ). Some have argued that many or all of these factors may
constitute su cient rather than necessary conditions for the arousal of anger; no one
is essential, but each strengthens the likelihood and experience of an anger response
( Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004 ).
By conducting further research to isolate the causes of anger as distinct from other
“negative” emotions, political psychologists can shed light on the origins of public out-
rage and contribute to a greater understanding of anger among psychologists generally
( Krosnick & McGraw, 2002 ). Steenbergen and Ellis ( 2006 ), for example, draw on survey
data to suggest that anger toward presidential candidates may be rooted in assessments
of unfair or morally wrong actions. Other studies have found that intentionality of the
wrongdoer increases anger in criminal justice opinions ( Petersen, 2010 ) and, in experi-
mental research, that situational blame and control trigger anger distinctly from fear in
response to threatening news ( Brader etal., 2010 ).
.. Disgust
Much as it requires some e ort to disentangle anger from fear, even more e ort is
required to pull apart disgust and anger ( Hutcherson & Gross, 2011 ). e co-occurrence
of self-reported disgust and anger to any speci c elicitor is high; numerous studies use
“disgusted” as an indicator term in constructing scales for anger ( Conover & Feldman,
1986 ; MacKuen etal., 2010 ; Valentino etal., 2011 ). e theory of a ective intelligence
explicitly conceptualizes disgust as a marker for an emotional state called “aversion,”
which is also indicated by feelings of anger, contempt, and hatred ( MacKuen etal., 2010 ).
Despite this close entanglement with anger, however, disgust reactions also clearly arise
from a distinctive and very old neural and physiological process that has evolved to
avoid and expel contamination ( Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008 ). When people smell
decomposing bodies or urine-saturated alleyways, when they see cockroaches crawl-
ing across food or maggot-infested wounds, they automatically wrinkle their nose, curl
their upper lip, and even feel nauseous. Disgust motivates individuals to stay away from
noxious or impure stimuli and, if necessary, to purge and cleanse themselves of the pos-
sible contaminants. Scholars have recently begun to examine more fully the social and
political implications of disgust, building on the recognition that disgust reactions in
human societies seem to have been extended beyond the realm of physical impurity to
the realm of moral impurity ( Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008 ).
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.. Shame, Embarrassment, Guilt, andPride
e last set of emotions more fully represents a family or class of emotions. Although
there has been di culty and disagreement in distinguishing among some of these feel-
ing terms, no scholars propose that they all constitute a single emotional state or dimen-
sion. Many scholars instead consider it useful to categorize these a ective states together
under the label “self-conscious emotions” ( Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2007 ). ey are
triggered by preconscious or conscious appraisals evaluating the self, speci cally com-
paring how well or poorly oneself has performed with respect to a socially prescribed
standard or norm ( Lewis, Haviland-Jones, & Barrett, 2008 ). Both the experience and the
anticipation of experiencing these emotions can in uence behavior, typically motivat-
ing people toward greater adherence with social standards.
Ordinary people (and some researchers) use shame and guilt interchangeably,
but mounting research suggests two clearly distinct emotional processes are at work
( Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007 ):the rst, labeled shame, is triggered when negative
self-evaluation is leveled at the whole self (“I am a bad person”), while the second, guilt,
is triggered when negative self-evaluation is focused on a speci c behavior (“I did a bad
thing”). e divergent consequences are stark. Shame, by far the more painful experi-
ence, causes feelings of powerlessness and worthlessness; motivates a desire to hide,
deny, or escape the situation; inhibits empathy; provokes externalization of blame and
destructive anger; and is associated with a host of psychological disorders (depression,
post-traumatic stress disorder, suicidal thoughts, etc.). In contrast, guilt elicits feelings
of remorse and regret over actions; causes heavier focus on the consequences of behav-
ior for others; and motivates reparative actions such as confession, apologies, e orts
to make amends, and desire to improve future behavior. Embarrassment manifests as
a relatively mild feeling ( Lewis etal., 2008 ), triggered by norm violations, social awk-
wardness, and feeling exposed (i.e., conspicuous); it motivates conciliatory behavior,
attempts to win the approval of others in the group, and conformity with social norms
( Tangney etal., 2007 ). Finally, pride is triggered by a positive self-evaluation for meeting
standards or other socially valued outcomes and encourages further conformity with
standards.
Although these emotions may seem more the province of interpersonal relations
than politics, they bear ample relevance for politics. Self-conscious emotions likely
facilitate the informal policing and maintenance of group norms (e.g., reciprocity,
civility, acquiescence) that enable cooperation and reinforce power structures in com-
munities, formal organizations, social movements, or any peer network. For example,
the experience of embarrassment or pride at nding oneself out of or in line, respec-
tively, with the political values of one’s group elicits greater adherence and application
of those values ( Suhay, 2008 ). Politicians and activists try at times to explicitly “shame”
(usually meaning guilt or embarrassment, by the de nitions above, and so illustrative
of the confusion over terms) citizens or leaders into “doing what is right.” During the
civil rights movement, Martin Luther King Jr. used these emotional tactics when he
pointed to the hypocritical gap between American principles and the realities of racial
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inequality, and again when he told white audiences that the “tragedy” of their times
lay not in the violent actions of bad people, but rather in the “appalling silence and
indi erence of the good people.” Without directly measuring emotions, recent studies
highlight the way get-out-the-vote e orts can motivate greater adherence to civic duty
and thereby boost turnout—ostensibly by evoking self-conscious emotions through
the actual or threatened publication of names and voting records to neighbors or mem-
bers of the community ( Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 2010 ; Panagopoulos, 2010 ). As a
nal example, citizens may experience collective guilt for the harmful actions of group
members (past or present), which in turn may motivate support for reparative policies
and political action on behalf of such goals ( Leach, Iyer, & Pederson, 2006 ; Pagano &
Huo, 2007 ).
. P C E
Research on the political consequences of emotions to date has spanned several impor-
tant substantive domains of politics, including voter decision-making in election cam-
paigns; reactions to war, terrorism, disaster; the e ects of mass-mediated messages; the
formation of policy preferences; and the evolution of political activism and social move-
ments. We o er a brief and necessarily selective overview of a fast-growing body of evi-
dence demonstrating that emotions shape political outcomes in a multitude of ways. We
organize this discussion according to types of e ects, ranging from how emotions a ect
preferences over individual and collective political actions, thus shaping both public
opinion and political participation, to how they in uence the very processes of atten-
tion, information processing, and decision-making. In the concluding section of the
chapter, we also highlight some new or neglected areas ripe for further consideration by
political psychologists.
.. Motivation for Personal and PoliticalAction
In adapting behavior to meet situational needs, emotions prepare the body for and pro-
vide an impulse toward certain courses of action, sometimes called action tendencies
( Frijda, 1986 ). As a result, they can shape both the private and public actions of citizens.
High-arousal emotions, such as fear, enthusiasm, and anger, provide the motivation
for citizens to become engaged with and participate in politics generally ( Marcus etal.,
2000 ). Of these, the impact of fear seems most variable and the impact of anger seems
most reliably potent, but both appear to depend on the resources or e cacy of the indi-
vidual ( Brader, 2006 ; Rudolph, Gangl, & Stevens, 2000 ; Valentino etal., 2011 ; Valentino,
Banks, Hutchings, & Davis, 2009 ; see also Valentino & Nardis, chapter18, this volume).
Political psychologists should also take note of recent work in political sociology that
documents the critical role of emotions in motivating and sustaining collective action
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in protests, social movements, and other forms of political activism ( Goodwin, Jasper,
& Polletta, 2001 ; Gould, 2009 ; Jasper, 1998 ; 2011 ; see also Klandermans & Stekelenburg,
chapter24, this volume).
e action tendencies ascribed to fear, anger, enthusiasm, sadness, and other emo-
tions are quite distinct, of course, though such implications remain relatively under-
explored in the eld. Fear and anger, for example, have divergent e ects not only on
the assessment of risks, but also actual risk-taking behavior. In the shadow of terrorist
attacks, fearful citizens perceive greater risks and are more like to engage in precau-
tionary actions like screening mail and restricting travel, while angry citizens perceive
less risk and engage in more risk-acceptant behaviors ( Lerner etal., 2003 ). Similarly,
facing a potentially deadly viral outbreak, angry citizens were more likely to write
o cials demanding investigation and prosecution of those who caused the outbreak,
while fearful citizens were more likely to engage in preventative or protective behav-
iors, such as wearing a mask, increased hand washing, and reading up on the disease
( Brader etal., 2010 ). We should expect similar emotion-speci c patterns for explic-
itly political actions where this is a t between action tendency and type of behavior;
for example, pride ought to promote expressive displays of group loyalty, while anger
ought to motivate participation in confrontational protests or other forms of political
aggression.
.. From Action Tendencies to Political Attitudes
Much of politics involves collective and representational action, with governments,
political parties, or other groups acting ostensibly on behalf of others. In many or even
most cases, citizens do not act directly to pursue their goals for society, but instead
express support for particular policies or outcomes and choose leaders who will pursue
them. us, action tendencies should manifest as much in preferences for public action
(i.e., public opinion) as in individual participatoryacts.
Indeed, scholars have found that emotions inform preferences and policy-related
attitudes across several policy domains. For example, anger and anxiety have been
the focal emotions for studies of public reactions to terrorism, with anxiety leading to
more risk-averse or isolationist policy preferences and anger leading to more support
for more confrontational policies ( Fischho , Gonzalez, Lerner, & Small, 2005 ; Huddy,
Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005 ; Lambert etal., 2010 ; Lerner etal., 2003 ; Skitka, Bauman,
Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006 ; Small, Lerner, & Fischho , 2006 ). Across a range of
behaviors, anger seems to promote a more con dent, aggressive response during crises,
while fear causes individuals to pull back or proceed with caution (see also Druckman &
McDermott, 2008 ). Similarly, anxiety and anger seem to make individuals more and less
receptive, respectively, to compromise ( MacKuen etal., 2010 ).
We also see emotions a ecting opinions and decisions in the domain of morality.
While many have held that such decisions ought to rely on explicit principles, the sen-
timental approach has long held that normative actions are embedded in early habits
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of right action sustained by emotional foundations ( Frazer, 2010 ; Hume, 1975 ; 1984 ;
Smith, 1959 ). Amodern-day sentimentalist is Jonathan Haidt ( 2001 ). In his moral
foundations theory ( Haidt & Joseph, 2007 ; Haidt, 2008 ), Haidt grounds moral judg-
ment in emotions. He argues that ve foundations—harm/care, fairness/reciproc-
ity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, purity/sanctity—elicit the key emotions
of disgust and empathy that motivate action intended to sustain the moral codes in
question.
is formulation has stimulated and exempli ed work on so-called moral emotions
( Tangney etal., 2007 ). at body of work includes studies examining the role of shame,
embarrassment, and pride in promoting adherence to group values in democratic life
( Suhay, 2008 ), the role of empathy and guilt in promoting support for humanitarian and
reparative actions during war ( Pagano & Huo, 2007 ), and the role of anger and guilt in
punishing norm violations ( Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009 ). Acluster of recent studies
considers the role of disgust in moral judgments and behavior. Studies focusing on both
traits (i.e., general sensitivity to disgust reactions) and situational reactions nd that dis-
gust causes individuals to make harsher moral judgments ( Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz,
2011 ; Helzer & Pizarro, 2011 ; Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011 ; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005 ).
Research in the United States also suggests that disgust reactions push people toward
identifying as politically conservative ( Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012 ; Inbar, Pizarro,
Knobe, & Bloom, 2009 ). Finally, disgust is associated with morally conservative policy
positions, especially on issues linked to perceived impurity, such as abortion and homo-
sexuality ( Inbar & Gilovich, 2011 ; Inbar etal., 2009 ).
.. Information Processing and Decision-Making
It has now become conventional wisdom that humans have two modes of decision-
making, the so-called dual-process model. For a review see Evans ( 2008 ). e essential
claim is that there is a fast system that relies primarily on processes not present in con-
sciousness, and there is a slow system that makes use of deliberative, introspective, and
thoughtful processes resident in consciousness. Emotion is increasingly understood to
play a principal role in shaping which route, or path, is active and in serving to sustain
each. is is important in part because if citizens, and leaders, have two modes of judg-
ment, each activated in di erent circumstances, then understanding the strengths and
liabilities of each shapes what we can expect of citizens and their leaders under circum-
stances when judgment processes di er. is has normative as well as empirical implica-
tions ( Marcus, 2013 ). Such process-focused research examines how a ective appraisals
shape attention and judgment, by shi ing from swi reliance on extant convictions and
habits to deliberative processes.
Several studies explore the impact of emotions on attention and learning. Many nd
that fear causes citizens to desire and seek out more political information ( Brader etal.,
2008 ; Huddy etal., 2007 ; Marcus et al., 2000 ; Valentino etal., 2008 ). is search for
information tends to be selectively focused on what may be useful for the situation at
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hand ( Brader, 2006 ; Valentino etal., 2009 ), but also broader and more balanced, as it is
less shaped by partisan or other con rmatory biases ( MacKuen etal., 2010 ; Valentino
etal., 2009 ). In many cases, though perhaps not all ( Feldman & Huddy, n.d. ), this seek-
ing increases relevant factual knowledge ( Marcus etal., 2000 ; Valentino et al., 2008 ;
Valentino etal., 2009 ). e e ects of anger diverge sharply from this pattern. For exam-
ple, anger appears to reduce the amount of time actually spent visiting political websites,
shrink the number of web pages visited, and narrow searches to opinion-con rming
sources, produce less thoughtful opinions, and inhibit accurate recall of informa-
tion ( Geva & Skorick, 2006 ; MacKuen etal., 2007 ; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Lau, 2007 ;
Valentino etal., 2008 ; Valentino etal., 2009 ). In sum, these ndings con rm that there
exist two di erent decisions-making modes, one triggered by anger, focusing on defense
of extant convictions and hence disinterested in discon rming evidence or new infor-
mation triggered, and a second, more deliberative and open mode that is triggered by
anxiety.
Much of the research on decision-making and a ect has been shaped by the theory
of a ective intelligence ( Marcus etal., 2000 ). at account holds that anxiety increases
attention to contemporary information relevant to the decision choice, while both anger
and enthusiasm lead to automatic reliance on relevant convictions. Numerous studies
indeed nd that political judgments of anxious citizens are more responsive to available
information (e.g., media messages, campaign content) and less closely tied to predispo-
sitions (e.g., party identi cation or ideology) or prior attitudes, while anger and enthu-
siasm push decision-making in the opposite direction ( Brader etal., 2008 ; Brader, 2006 ;
Druckman & McDermott, 2008 ; MacKuen etal., 2007 ; Marcus, Sullivan, eiss-Morse,
& Stevens, 2005 ; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009 ; Parker & Isbell, 2010 ; Redlawsk etal.,
2010 ). 10 Banks and Valentino ( 2012 ) have applied the same interest in anger and anxi-
ety to racial attitudes and nd that anxiety undermines reliance on convictions, while
anger strengthens it. Finally, Small and Lerner (2008) look at how a di erent emotion,
incidental sadness, a ected welfare policy judgments. Similar to what others have found
for anxiety, sadness stimulated deeper processing of information and more attention to
situational attributions, leading individuals to support more generous assistance.
. G F
Emotions have become a vibrant research topic within political psychology. As a result,
we have a learned a great deal about the impact of emotions on opinion formation and
political behavior, especially in electoral settings and under the threat of war or terror-
ism. Most attention has fallen on enthusiasm, fear, and anger, with only incipient con-
sideration of other emotions to date. We are con dent that research in the years ahead
will deepen and broaden our understanding of these emotions and their implications
for politics. It will also be important for political psychologists to devote greater study to
the antecedents of political emotions, about which we know far less, and to illuminate
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the full range of relevant emotions or emotional dimensions. For all its recent vigor, this
eld of inquiry remains relatively young. ere are many productive paths forward as
the eld expands. We conclude this chapter by highlighting a number of theoretical,
methodological, and substantive issues that merit attention from political psychologists
over the next decade.
.. eoretical Testing and Integration
Research in this eld has been predominantly theory-driven, in the sense of proceed-
ing from theoretical propositions about the function and operation of emotions in the
human brain. Most studies, however, have been content to take up isolated propositions
without situating their tests in a fuller theory of political emotions. Work on the theory
of a ective intelligence ( Marcus etal., 2000 ) is the major exception. Nonetheless, studies
have drawn—some loosely, some directly—on a number of related theoretical perspec-
tives from social psychology and neuroscience, including cognitive appraisal theories
( Scherer etal., 2001 ), appraisal tendency theory ( Lerner & Keltner, 2000 ), the a ect-as-
information model ( Schwarz & Clore, 2003 ), terror management theory ( Landau etal.,
2004 ), the hot cognition hypothesis ( Lodge & Taber, 2005 ; Lodge & Taber, 2013 ), and
intergroup emotions theory ( Mackie & Smith, 2004 ). To the extent such perspectives
are useful for understanding emotions in the domain of politics, political psychologists
should extend or adapt them as necessary to articulate full theoretical accounts of politi-
cal emotions. Moreover, with few exceptions, researchers have focused largely on test-
ing propositions in accordance with a single perspective rather than testing competing
theoretical explanations. e theoretical developments of this eld require explicit con-
sideration of how well empirical tests accord with not just one, but multiple theories.
At the same time, there is considerable potential for theoretical integration as well as
di erentiation. For example, one need not see approaches like a ective intelligence and
cognitive appraisal theories as inherently or completely incompatible, given that they
tend to emphasize di erent aspects of emotional response (e.g., preconscious versus
postconscious appraisals). Indeed, by taking greater note of the temporal resolution,
it is not hard to envision a ective responses in the brain as multilayered. On one level,
the brain may automatically encode and respond to sensory data with positive and
negative a ects as a useful mechanism for sorting objects and experiences according
to their implications for the self, consistent with the hot cognition and somatic marker
hypotheses ( Damasio, 1994 ; Lodge & Taber, 2005 ). On another level, preconscious
appraisals may further di erentiate emotional responses through the activation of a
limited set of modular or dimensional systems that adapt behavior to meet the needs of
the situation, consistent with a ective intelligence theory ( Marcus etal., 2000 ), a ec-
tive neuroscience approaches ( Panksepp, 1998 ), and functional evolutionary accounts
( Tooby & Cosmides, 2008 ). On yet a third level, postconscious appraisals may enable
highly di erentiated self-understandings of emotional responses that shape subse-
quent e orts to manage both the experience and expression of those emotions, consis-
tent with cognitive appraisal theories ( Lazarus, 1991 ; Scherer etal., 2001 ; Tracy etal.,
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2007 ). Tellegen, Watson, and Clark ( Tellegen etal., 1999a ; 1999b ), for example, nd
support for a three-level hierarchical structure of a ective experience, moving from
global bipolar a ect to discrete emotions, based on self-report data. E orts at theo-
retical integration and consideration of the multilayered nature of a ective experience
can improve our understanding of each constituent emotional process as well as focus
our attention on which processes are most relevant for illuminating particular political
experiences.
.. Measurement
Issues of measurement pose some familiar and some unique challenges to the study of
emotions that have received relatively light consideration and treatment within politi-
cal psychology. Psychologists have used a variety of tools to try to measure emotional
reactions, including most notably verbal self-reports, psychophysiological measures,
and human coding of facial or other body movements ( Larsen & Fredrickson, 1999 ).
Self-reports are by far the most common form of measurement in social and political
psychology owing to ease of use and low cost. But reliance on verbal reports is tricky
for at least three reasons. First, people have tenuous access to their emotional states—
indeed, emotions frequently occur outside of conscious awareness. Second, as with
any self-reported behavior, subjects can censor or edit their answers to meet perceived
social expectations. ird, as discussed earlier, the vagaries of everyday language do not
align perfectly with scienti c conceptions. Aperson might equally well use the terms
“disgusted” or “angry” to describe his reaction at another individual’s transgression,
and yetalso use “disgusted” to describe his feelings at seeing insects in his food, when
“angry” would not be a suitable descriptor. Similarly, in the English vernacular, people
might say they are “anxious” either when they are worried (i.e., fearful) or when they are
eagerly anticipating (i.e., enthusiastic about) what is tocome.
In light of these problems, it is tempting to turn to biological aspects of emotional
response that do not require conscious awareness, cannot be easily controlled, and are
not ltered through linguistic conventions. Paul Ekman and his students, for example,
have developed and re ned a detailed system for coding facial expressions that has been
subject to extensive cross-cultural validation and application in numerous domains
( Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005 ). Others have deployed a variety of tools to monitor directly
such bodily reactions as heart rate, skin conductance, muscle tension, electrical activ-
ity, and blood ow. ese techniques come with their own serious handicaps, however.
Both facial coding and psychophysiological monitoring are laborious and require direct
observation of subjects, o en under highly controlled conditions. Some of the meth-
ods—electroencephalogram (EEG), facial electromyography (EMG), and functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)—are particularly apt to feel invasive and arti -
cial. Moreover, while emotions are clearly tied to patterns of visceral and brain activity,
decades of research have failed to yield evidence of a clear one-to-one correspondence
between speci c emotional states and autonomic, visceral, and brain indicators ( Larsen,
Bernston, Poehlmann, Ito, & Cacioppo, 2008 ).
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In view of the particular strengths and weaknesses of each measurement approach, spe-
ci c studies and especially extended research programs tend to bene t from triangulating
through the use of multiple methods ( Larsen & Fredrickson, 1999 ). Nonetheless, given
the predominance of self-reports and their necessity for survey studies, greater attention
is warranted to best practices in obtaining reliable and valid emotional self-reports. Two
useful guidelines that emerge relatively clearly from earlier work ( Marcus, MacKuen,
Wolak, & Keele, 2006 ) include (1)asking about the intensity (how much?) of emotions
toward some target yields results comparable to asking about the frequency (how o en?)
of such emotions (both are superior to o ering binary response options or a checklist);
and (2)as with any latent construct, multiple-item scales yield stronger measures; speci -
cally it is typically critical to include two cognate terms and preferably three or more for
each emotion (dimension) the researchers seeks to tap, especially if the goal is to di eren-
tiate among highly correlated positive or negative a ects (e.g., fear vs. anger vs. sadness).
Recent research in progress parallels other work in survey methodology by assess-
ing the costs and bene ts of question-and-response formats in self-administered ques-
tionnaires, relevant both for laboratory studies and for the increasingly prevalent use
of Internet surveys. For example, the use of a sliding scale generates more reliable and
valid measures in many situations ( Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2009 ). Consistent
with other work on survey methods, the use of a grid format to administer a battery of
emotion items notably reduces completion time over asking items separately on sequen-
tial computer screens. However, subjects seem to report stronger positive emotions and
weaker negative emotions when presented with a grid relative to answering the items
sequentially ( Brader, Valentino, & Karl, 2012 ). 11
One question that arises o en concerns the level of speci city required vis-à-vis the
target of emotion. For example, if one wishes to examine the impact of anxiety on voting
decisions, what is the appropriate target for the emotional self-report question? Should
we expect only anxiety about the candidates or the choice between them to be relevant?
How about more di use but obviously politically relevant anxiety about the current
conditions or future direction of the country? How about anxiety over frequently rel-
evant issues, such as anxiety about economic conditions, security in an age of terror-
ism, or cultural change at the hands of large-scale immigration? Finally, is it possible
that anxiety over seemingly unrelated matters—stresses about an impending deadline
at work, nervousness over an upcoming romantic date, the presence of a snake in the
room—could a ect voting decisions as well? Research to date suggests that integral and
incidental a ects produce similar behavioral consequences ( Adolphs, 2009 ; Brader,
2005 ; Isbell & Ottati, 2002 ; Small etal., 2006 ; Way & Masters, 1996b ). at said, studies
in political psychology largely have failed to compare directly whether target speci city
moderates the impact of emotional responses.
.. Promising Avenues for Future Research
In addition to the preceding theoretical and methodological issues, many substan-
tive topics are ripe for further consideration. One is the link between emotions and
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personality . In recent years, political psychology has seen renewed interest in person-
ality, especially from a trait theory perspective (see Caprara and Vecchione, chapter2,
this volume). Psychologists have long posited the existence of trait analogs to speci c
emotional states, for example, “trait anxiety,” “trait anger,” and “disgust sensitivity”
( Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994 ; Spielberger & Sydeman, 1994 ; Watson & Clark, 1991 ).
ese traits may be conceptualized as an individual’s propensity to experience certain
emotions more (or less) o en and more (or less) intensely, perhaps due to a greater (or
lower) sensitivity to the associated environmental triggers or the tendency to generate
relevant appraisals. us, a person who quickly becomes enraged at the slightest provo-
cation is likely to score high in trait anger. Researchers o en treat emotional traits and
states as interchangeable predictors when pursuing the implications of particular emo-
tions ( Inbar & Gilovich, 2011 ; Inbar etal., 2009 ; Lerner & Keltner, 2000 ).
Emotions have also been tied to more general personality constructs. For example,
two scales promulgated as part of a more comprehensive ve-factor model of personal-
ity (the “Big Five”) are closely associated with emotions. Speci cally, the trait of extra-
version is linked to the experience of positive emotions, and the trait of neuroticism is
linked to the experience of negative emotions ( McCrae & Costa, 2003 ). Another gen-
eral construct is empathy, which is regarded as a disposition that has both cognitive
and a ective elements ( Davis, 1994 ; Morrell, 2010 ). Empathy concerns an individual’s
ability or tendency to understand and react emotionally to other people’s experiences.
It inhibits aggression and antisocial behaviors that are harmful to others ( Tangney
etal., 2007 ).
e antecedents of political emotions are a neglected topic in research generally, but
what research has been done is predominantly focused on situational rather than pre-
dispositional triggers. Only a handful of studies have considered how personality traits
in uence the experience and expression of political emotions ( Bizer etal., 2004 ; Marcus,
Sullivan, eiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995 ; Wolak & Marcus, 2007 ). Further research in this
vein can shed light, for example, on who is apt to be most responsive to speci c types of
emotional appeals—persuaded to reconsider one’s views when faced with a fear-induc-
ing threat, mobilized to political violence when angered by injustice, motivated to vote
by a guilt-in ected reminder of civic duty, or moved to volunteer out of sympathy when
o cials plea for help in the wake of disaster. Some researchers also have suggested links
between emotional traits and the development of liberal-conservative political orienta-
tions ( Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2008 ; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway,2003 ).
A second broad domain for future research is the role of emotions in group processes,
both intragroup and intergroup relations . What role do emotions play in tying citizens
together and directing the activities within small advocacy groups, election campaign
teams, large political organizations, or social movements? How do emotions shape the
relationship between leaders and followers? Such questions about intragroup dynam-
ics are hardly new ( Fini er, 1974 ; Verba, 1961 ), but they have slipped out of focus in
contemporary political psychology ( Mendelberg, 2005 ). In the 1980s and early 1990s,
researchers at Dartmouth College laid down a sizable foundation of work on how emo-
tional expressions and nonverbal behavior shape the relationships between leaders
and followers in mass societies ( Masters & Sullivan, 1989a ; 1989b ; McHugoLanzetta,
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Sullivan, Masters, & Englis, 1985 ; Sullivan & Masters, 1988a ; 1988b ; Warnecke, Masters,
& Kempter, 1992 ; Way & Masters, 1996a ; 1996b ). However, studies of the topic have
become less frequent ( Bucy & Bradley, 2004 ; Bucy & Grabe, 2008 ; Bucy & Newhagen,
1999 ; Glaser & Salovey, 1998 ; Stewart, Waller, & Schubert, 2009 ; Stroud, Glaser, &
Salovey, 2005 ) and have focused almost exclusively on political candidates, especially
US presidential candidates. Political psychologists have yet to delve far into studying
how emotions shape the bonds among group members or between leaders and followers
in small-scale political organizations, protest movements, or in authoritarian societies.
One place to start, for example, is for political psychologists to engage with recent
work in political sociology, which has begun to explore the ways in which emotions
shape the development, maintenance, and activities of advocacy groups and social
movements ( Barbalet, 2001 ; Goodwin etal., 2001 ; Gould, 2009 ; Jasper, 2011 ; see also
Klandermans & Stekelenburg, chapter24, this volume). Given strong interest in politi-
cal discussion and deliberation (see Myers & Mendelberg, chapter22, this volume),
another fruitful avenue for future research is to examine the implications of emotions
for communication and decision-making in deliberative settings ( Hickerson & Gastil,
2008 ; MacKuen etal., 2010 ). Yet a third possibility is for political psychologists to take
seriously the a ective nature of social and political group identities. Emotions may be
useful indicators of the strength of in-group identi cation (Greene & Elder, 2001 ), but
speci c emotions experienced as a group member have more nuanced implications for
whether and what sorts of actions she is willing to undertake (see Huddy, chapter23,
this volume).
In contrast, research on intergroup processes—prejudice, con ict, cooperation—
has ourished in contemporary political psychology (e.g., see chapters in this volume
by Kinder, chapter 25; Green and Staerklé, chapter 26; Hewstone and Al-Ramiah,
chapter27; and Bar-Tal and Halperin, chapter28). Negative a ect, ranging from mild
dislike to intense hatred, has long been a de ning element of prejudice toward out-
groups. But, when probed, people express a much more complex array of negative emo-
tions toward out-groups—anger, fear, pity, disgust, guilt—and, in some cases, even
positive emotions—sympathy, gratitude, and admiration. Although simple, summary
measures of prejudice or “group a ect” are useful as ubiquitous, powerful predictors of
behavior, political psychologists should move away from heavy reliance on prejudice
to take greater account of speci c out-group emotions, which will lead to much ner-
grained insights about the causes and consequences of both intergroup con ict and
cooperation.
Two very similar, relatively new theories in social psychology—Intergroup Emotions
eory ( Mackie & Smith, 2004 ; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000 ) and a Sociofunctional
reat-Based Approach to Intergroup A ect ( Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005 )—provide
promising foundations for pursuing this work. Each posits that distinct appraisals or
threat perceptions of out-groups evoke speci c emotions toward those groups, leading
to distinctive “pro les” or patterns of emotions—anger, fear, disgust, pity, envy—that
members of one group feel toward each out-group in their environment ( Dasgupta,
DeSteno, Williams, & Hunsinger, 2009 ; Iyer & Leach, 2008 ). Given what has been
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learned about the function and consequences of speci c emotions, these theories point
the way to distinct predictions for political attitudes and behavior depending on the out-
group implicated. Very little work to date has tested such political implications ( Cottrell,
Richards, & Nichols, 2010 ; Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003 ), and thus
political psychologists could contribute greatly to the development of these perspec-
tives and enrich their own understanding of intergroup relations in doing so (see both
Huddy, chapter23, and Stein, chapter12, this volume).
A third direction for future research is the study of individual and institutional e orts
to control emotions . While there is considerable psychological research on individuals’
e orts to regulate their own emotions, research on e orts to in uence the emotions
of others for political purposes is relatively rare. Studies of the antecedents of political
emotions lag behind studies of e ects and have focused predominantly on the individ-
ual appraisals, situational outcomes, and events depicted in news stories. In contrast,
few studies examine explicit e orts to in uence emotions, especially those with a recur-
ring or institutionalizedbasis.
One limited exception is research on the use of emotional appeals in electoral or issue
advocacy messages to sway audiences ( Brader, 2006 ; Huddy & Gunnthorsdottir, 2000 ;
Roseman etal., 1986 ; Weber, Searles, & Ridout, 2011 ). Even this small body of work
focuses more on the e ectiveness of speci c emotional triggers than on the strategy
and tactics adopted by candidates, political parties, and interest groups. ere are many
questions we could ask about such emotional strategies in political communication
( Brader & Corrigan, 2005 ; Ridout & Searles, 2011 ; Weber etal., 2011 ):Which emotion
or mix of emotions do these political actors try to evoke in their audiences? Does the
desire to elicit speci c emotions a ect decisions about who is targeted and when? To
what extent do political actors condition their emotional strategies on the emotional
strategies of their rivals?
Political e orts at manipulating emotions, of course, extend well beyond campaign
and issue ads. Numerous other recurring events in and out of election campaigns are
occasions for eliciting public emotions:party conventions, campaign rallies, national
parades, state funerals, and high-pro le political speeches (e.g., the State of the Union
speech, with its perennial presidential invocation of national achievements and future
goals delivered to a regular refrain of congressional applause and cheers). From time to
time, political leaders launch “campaigns” to persuade the public toward some course of
action (e.g., extending rights to protect previously marginalized groups, passing legisla-
tion to reform healthcare access, preparing the country for war). In studying how and
why politicians try to elicit emotions in these persuasive campaigns, it is equally impor-
tant to consider the limits on their capacity to generate the desired emotions (cf. Lupia &
Menning, 2009 ).
Not all e orts at emotional control aim at arousing emotions; some seek to inhibit
or quell emotions. Take, for example, certain courtroom rituals in the United States.
O cers of the court convey and expect a serious, civil demeanor. Abaili or other o -
cer instructs those present to rise and to be silent. Ajudge may insist on keeping “order
in the court” in the face of emotional outbursts and limit the introduction of evidence
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when she deems its emotional impact to outweigh its probative value. Such rituals can
serve other important purposes as well, but they are designed in part to inhibit the role
of emotions in judicial proceedings.
12 Political psychologists need to study e orts to
inhibit or lessen emotional arousal, a topic they have to date largely ignored, for such
e orts play a role in both ritual and extraordinary aspects of political life. Leaders, for
example, o en try to calm their citizens during crises or when they worry that fear will
turn into panic or anger into violence—speaking to the country in the wake of military
attacks, civil unrest, terrorism, natural or civil disaster, political shootings, or economic
collapse (“ e only thing we have to fear is fear itself ”). One challenge faced by govern-
ments in the United States and elsewhere following terrorist attacks has been how to bal-
ance the need to encourage the public to stay alert for threats while also reassuring them
that they are safe. Autocratic leaders try to manage emotions at least as much as their
democratic counterparts. Just as leaders in China, Iran, or elsewhere may foment public
anger at foreign powers, for example, they may also try to restrain such emotions in ser-
vice of their domestic and foreign policy goals (e.g., Stockman, 2013 ). How e ective are
such attempts to keep public emotions “under control” or to assuage fear, anger, or other
already-aroused emotions? Does the level of di culty and the e ectiveness of particular
approaches vary across emotions?
Finally, a fourth frontier ripe for further study is the resonance of emotional appeals
with past experience and present context . Most research on the impact of emotionally
evocative messages focuses tightly on di erences across appeals and individuals, with
little consideration of how the emotional appeal resonates with the audience. In some
cases, success in eliciting emotions may depend on how appropriately the appeal ts
with “tenor of the times” or the current “public mood.” Is it possible to stoke economic
anxieties in a time of prosperity, or generate partisan enthusiasm a er a string of politi-
cal losses? In other cases, a topic—crime, perhaps—may be perpetually more suscepti-
ble to fear appeals. e impact may also depend on resonance with an individual’s prior
experiences. Is it easier to arouse anger (moral outrage) among those who have experi-
enced injustice themselves or witnessed it rsthand? Researchers should also be mind-
ful of the temporal dimension:how long does emotional resonance last, how quickly
does itdecay?
ese suggestions—personality, group dynamics, external control, resonance—are
hardly exhaustive of promising directions for future work. Replication and extension
of existing lines of research on antecedents and e ects of emotions will also be impor-
tant; so too are the issues of theoretical development and methodological re nement
mentioned earlier. In a relatively short time, research on emotions has gone from a
topic that received little explicit consideration in studies of politics to a central theme
in political psychology. We have tried to highlight in this chapter how much we have
learned from this explosion of interest already, as well as to suggest several next steps
for the advancement of the eld. We suspect that the relevant chapter in the third edi-
tion of the Political Psychology handbook, 10 or more years from now, will provide even
greater cause for celebration at the progress in our understanding of the political psy-
chology of emotions.
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N
. e longevity of that conception is remarkable. As we write this chapter, the investment
company Raymond James has as its principal advertising theme: “When investing,
we remove the vagaries of emotion. Because they are vagaries.” eir advertising text
continues:“Just to make one thing perfectly clear, we are not some unfeeling nancial
automatons. Emotions are a wonderful thing. It’s just that emotions can trump logic
and play havoc with investing.” e remainder of the ad text continues in that same
vein:turbulent, irrational emotions that, while making us human, compete with cold
implacable but e cacious reason.
. For more on conceptions of emotion and its relationship to reason, see ( Frazer, ;
Krause, ).
. As with “intelligence” and “attitudes,” as research has continued, these homogenous
concepts soon confronted discon rming results. Rather than splitting these concepts
into separate scienti c categories, in the main, accommodation was achieved by adding
subcategories to account for otherwise discrepant results. Hence we have now multiple
forms of intelligence rather than one, and we now have “implicit” and “explicit” attitudes.
In each instance the option of concluding that these concepts are awed was rejected.
us implicit and explicit attitudes continue to be categorized as attitudes even though
they have quite di erent properties (e.g., the former most likely are located in procedural
memory and are nonverbal; while the latter are located in semantic memory and are verbal
in character).
. ough here, as elsewhere, Roger Masters and his colleagues were examining this a ect
well before others turned to it (Masters & Sullivan, a ; b ; ; McHugo, Lanzetta,
Sullivan, Masters, & Englis, ; Sullivan & Masters, a ; b ), as were Conover and
Feldman ( ).
. at it takes, using Libet’s estimate, milliseconds for conscious representations to arise
and that a ective appraisals arise in less than milliseconds both before and “outside” of
consciousness is now widely accepted and o en demonstrated, as for example in Todorov’s
work ( Todorov & Ballew, ; Willis & Todorov, ).
. We will not be surprised to nd that these three dimensions are insu cient. Work, largely
done with animals, argues for a distinction between fear and anxiety largely having to
do with the role of memory in enabling conditioning for one, fear, but not for the other,
anxiety ( Davis & Shi, ; Davis, a ; b ; Davis, Walker, Miles, & Grillon, ).
. For example, empathy has long been of interest, and it has been proposed as a vital and
distinct facet of a ect shaping particular “we” versus “they” interactions ( Brothers, ;
Chlopan, McCain, Carbonell, & Hagen, ; Morrell, ).
. In his cognitive appraisal account, Lazarus () in fact di erentiates them into at least
three categories:joy/enthusiasm, pride, and hope. But this is consistent with our argument
in that Lazarus’s distinctions are based on the relational (self-environment) meaning of the
emotions, not on evidence of their empirical consequences.
. Although, in many cases, it may seem obvious what makes people feel happy or
enthusiastic, it is not always so. For example, Hutchings, Valentino, Philpot, and White
( ) experimentally manipulated news stories to emphasize either similarity or
di erence in the racial policy st ances of George W.Bush and Al Gore in the election.
Blacks responded with signi cantly higher enthusiasm for Gore in the “di erence
condition,” even though what di ered was not a more positive take on Gore’s position,
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but instead the implication that Bush was more hostile to black interests (than in the
similarity article).
. ere are those who dissent on the persuasiveness of these studies ( Ladd & Lenz, ;
), though see ( Brader, ; Marcus, MacKuen, & Neuman, ).
. It remains unclear from the extant studies which set of responses—grid or sequential—
yields more valid measures.
. At the same time, of course, some aspects of court proceedings are clearly intended to
arouse emotions. For example, in criminal trials, prosecutors may use horri c photos of
the crime scene to elicit disgust and harsher judgments, or some jurisdictions may allow
emotional testimony from family and friends at sentencing hearings.
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