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Nordic Psychology
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rnpy20
Psychological assumptions underlying credibility
assessments in Finnish asylum determinations
Jenny Skrifvars, Veronica Sui, Jan Antfolk, Tanja van Veldhuizen & Julia
Korkman
To cite this article: Jenny Skrifvars, Veronica Sui, Jan Antfolk, Tanja van Veldhuizen & Julia
Korkman (2022): Psychological assumptions underlying credibility assessments in Finnish asylum
determinations, Nordic Psychology, DOI: 10.1080/19012276.2022.2145986
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/19012276.2022.2145986
© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 26 Nov 2022.
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Psychological assumptions underlying
credibility assessments in Finnish asylum
determinations
JENNY SKRIFVARS
1
, VERONICA SUI
1
, JAN ANTFOLK
1
, TANJA VAN VELDHUIZEN
2
&
JULIA KORKMAN
1
Correspondence address: Jenny Skrifvars, Åbo Akademi University, Tehtaankatu 2, Turku, 20500, Finland.
Email: jenny.skrifvars@abo.fi
Abstract
Credibility assessments are an important but complex part of asylum procedures. The
current study investigated psychological assumptions underlying credibility assessments in
Finnish first-instance asylum procedures and how these assumptions fit with widely
accepted psychological science. Following previous research, we categorized assumptions in
56 real-life asylum cases from the Finnish Immigration Service. We found that asylum
officials held assumptions about how truthful applicants present their claims, the plausibility
of individuals’behavior in their home countries, and applicants’knowledge about asylum
procedures. The assumptions were only partially in line with psychological science on
memory, trauma, intercultural communication, and decision-making. To improve decision-
making, training programs for asylum officials should include relevant findings from
psychological science. To increase the transparency and combat bias, the written
determination letters should also include explicit information about the decision-makers’
reasoning processes.
Keywords: Asylum seeker, asylum procedure, credibility assessment, credibility indicator, decision-making
Introduction
Deciding whether a person is in need of international protection or not has been described
as one of the most complex and difficult forms of decision-making in the modern state
(Thomas, 2006). Despite the clear theoretical definition and legal criteria for granting asylum
status outlined in the 1951 United Nations convention and the EU Qualification Directive, the
process of determining eligibility is in practice complex (Qualification Directive, The European
Parliament, 2011; United Nations, 1951). Contrary to claimants in other legal cases, asylum
seekers rarely possess documents that would substantiate their claims (Kagan, 2003). Because
of this, asylum seekers are only required to verify their asylum claims to a reasonable degree
of likelihood, instead of beyond a reasonable doubt (Thomas, 2006). The principle of the
benefit of the doubt also states that, if certain conditions are met, decision-makers should
1
The Faculty of Humanities, Psychology and Theology, Åbo Akademi University, Turku, Finland;
2
Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, Free University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered,
transformed, or built upon in any way.
Nordic Psychology, 2022
https://doi.org/10.1080/19012276.2022.2145986 RESEARCH ARTICLE
accept an applicant’s statements even without corroborating evidence (for more information,
see, e.g. Qualification Directive, The European Parliament, 2011). According to the EU
Qualification Directive, The European Parliament (2011), the asylum seeker has to provide the
authorities with all relevant information, whereas the official must assess and ascertain the
information in cooperation with the applicant. In the credibility assessment, the believability
of each element should be assessed impartially and objectively. Because only the elements
that are perceived as believable are forwarded to the substantiality assessment (i.e. the pro-
cess of deciding whether the conditions for granting asylum are met), the credibility assess-
ment is of key importance in the asylum decision-making process (Kagan, 2003;Qualification
Directive, The European Parliament, 2011). Several jurisdictions, including the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Association of Refugee Law
Judges (IARLJ), have developed detailed guidelines for conducting fair and reliable asylum
procedures (IARLJ, 2015;UNHCR,2013). Despite the detailed guidance on how to conduct
credibility assessments, decision-makers continue to base their decisions on unreliable markers
of credibility such as demeanor and delay (Baillot et al., 2014;Dowdetal.,2018;Granhag
et al., 2005; Herlihy et al., 2010; Kagan, 2003). The current study replicated and extended pre-
vious studies by identifying assumptions that underlie credibility assessments and by compar-
ing these assumptions against widely accepted psychological science.
Current best-practice guidelines for evaluating asylum claims
The latest guideline from the UNHCR includes a thorough analysis about how credibility
assessments are conducted within the European Union (EU). It also provides detailed informa-
tion about credibility indicators and how they should be implemented in practice (UNHCR,
2013). Officials are encouraged to use five credibility indicators when judging the believability
of statements: sufficiency of detail and specificity,internal consistency,consistency with other wit-
nesses,consistency with information from external sources,andplausibility. Although helpful,
these indicators are based on the assumption that applicants are able to recall and present
an account of their past experiences in a detailed, consistent and plausible manner. This is
not fully supported by empirical research (Dowd et al., 2018; Granhag et al., 2017;Herlihy&
Turner, 2009). Several authors have criticized the criteria of “plausibility”for being based on
fundamentally subjective and culture-specific commonsense judgements (Herlihy & Turner,
2009; Maegherman et al., 2018; Sweeney, 2007). Moreover, the criteria of sufficiency of detail
and consistency have been criticized for being subjective when applied, despite conceptually
seeming objective, as well as being too extensively relied upon (Maegherman et al., 2018;
Sweeney, 2007). The analysis in the UNHCR handbook (2013) agrees that asylum officials
sometimes make decisions on premises that are in conflict with current psychological know-
ledge about for example, memory, cultural differences, and decision-making. Decision-makers
should, therefore, be informed about empirical psychological evidence regarding individual
and contextual circumstances that might affect the asylum procedure, and carefully take these
into consideration in their decision-making (UNHCR, 2013).
Psychological literature relevant to asylum procedures
Empirical research in psychology provides knowledge about several aspects relevant to asy-
lum procedures, such as memory functions, the impact of trauma and culture on memory,
2 J. Skrifvars et al.
intercultural communication, and decision-making. As in-depth literature reviews on most of
these topics exist (e.g. Cameron, 2010; Granhag et al., 2017; Herlihy et al., 2012; Herlihy &
Turner, 2009), we provide only a brief overview. In this overview, we focus primarily on psy-
chological research.
The variation and limits of memory
Autobiographical memory (i.e. the memories of personally experienced events in an individ-
ual’s own life), as memory in general, is not an objective, exact recollection of events, but
rather a constructive process prone to distortion and errors (Conway & Loveday, 2015;
Hyman & Loftus, 1998). The details attended to and encoded into memory depend on an
individual’s previous knowledge and experiences (Cohen, 2001). Memory for repeated
events are blended together, making it difficult to remember specific instances (Herlihy
et al., 2012). Moreover, the central gist of an event is often remembered, whereas peripheral
information (e.g. temporal information such as dates, frequencies, durations and sequences,
the appearance of common objects, names and verbatim wording of verbal exchanges)
may be lost (Cameron, 2010). Furthermore, each retelling of a memory differs from another.
People tend to recall more information with repeated recalls (i.e. hypermnesia; Cameron,
2010; Cohen, 2001). Social demands and suggestive questioning, on the other hand, might
lead a person to develop and report distorted or entirely false memories (Hyman & Loftus,
1998). In sum, inconsistencies, vagueness, and gaps in recall occur naturally in both true
and false recollections.
Trauma and memory
Research on how trauma and trauma-related disorders such as Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) affect memory is extensive but not without controversies (Engelhard et al.,
2019). While evidence show that traumatic memories have specific characteristics, such as a
tendency to be dominated by sensorial/perceptual and emotional details, the belief that
traumatic memories are processed by special mechanisms or fragmented and incoherent by
nature is not supported by evidence (Crespo & Fernandez-Lansac, 2016; Engelhard et al.,
2019). While some studies have found that traumatic memories are more vulnerable to dis-
tortions compared to neutral memories (Southwick et al., 1997), others have found that
traumatic memories are recalled more accurately than neutral memories (e.g. Porter &
Peace, 2007). Most researchers currently agree that traumatic memories are prone to similar
distortions and errors as neutral memories (Strange & Takarangi, 2015). A recent meta-ana-
lysis indicates that high stress may impair memory when it occurs before and during encod-
ing, or at retrieval (Shields et al., 2017). Similarly to neutral memories, the central gist of
traumatic experiences is usually remembered, but peripheral details may be forgotten
(Moore & Zoellner, 2007). Additionally, persons exposed to trauma have a tendency to
report less specific autobiographical memories, leading to overly general memories (Barry
et al., 2018). Individuals might also, consciously or unconsciously, avoid traumatic memories
to avoid unwanted emotional states (Herlihy et al., 2012). Whereas much of the research
has focused on PTSD, depression and anxiety may also disrupt memory functions, for
example, by impairing the efficacy of attentional control or leading to an overly negative
Psychological assumptions underlying credibility assessments in Finnish asylum determinations 3
recall of memories (Chaudhary, 2010; Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). Because asylum seekers
have a higher prevalence of mental health issues than the normal population (Fazel et al.,
2005), these aspects are important to consider.
Memory and culture
Depending on their cultural background, people store and recall autobiographical memories
differently (Gutchess & Indeck, 2009; Wang, 2016). Differences have been found in whether
memories are self-focused or focused on social interactions, how detailed and specific mem-
ories are, the valence (positive vs. negative emotional characteristics) of memories, the
emergence of early autobiographical memories, as well as the accessibility and functional
use of memories (Wang, 2016). As could be expected, persons from more individualistic cul-
tures tend to provide specific, self-focused, lengthy memories focused on individual experi-
ences, whereas persons from collectivistic cultures tend to provide more general
descriptions, focusing on collective activities, social interaction, and the role of others
(Herlihy et al., 2012; Nelson, 2003). Asylum officials should be aware of these variations
when assessing the narratives of applicants from different cultures.
Intercultural communication
Successful intercultural communication is characterized by participants actively trying to
understand each other, as well as mutual trust (Gyulai, 2013). Challenges to successful inter-
cultural communication are often due to differences in communication style and in the use
of words, notions, and concepts (Granhag et al., 2017). Research on communication styles
has distinguished high-context (e.g. Asian) cultures and low-context (e.g. Western) cultures,
depending on how explicitly messages are exchanged and how much the context is
expected to contribute (Hall, 1976). Recent studies have shown that persons from high-con-
text (vs. low-context) cultures tend to report less details in response to open, free recall
questions in interviews (see, e.g. Vrij et al., 2021). Furthermore, asylum seekers may under-
stand instructions to “tell the truth”or “tell everything”differently from the official, and
applicants might have difficulties knowing which details are relevant to their cases
(Granhag et al., 2017). The way in which individuals present their narratives differ in both
verbal directness (direct or indirect) and emotional expressiveness (restrained or articulate;
Granhag et al., 2017). Finally, applicants from cultures with large power distances (i.e. hier-
archical standards defining how authorities are perceived and approached) might find it
inappropriate, or even shameful, to present objections or additions to asylum officials
(Granhag et al., 2017; Herlihy & Turner, 2009).
Factors affecting decision-making
Much of the psychological research on human decision-making is relevant to the asylum
context, although only few studies have specifically focused on asylum decisions (Herlihy &
Turner, 2009). Human decision-making is prone to subjectivity on different levels. The cogni-
tive system relies on shortcuts, or heuristics, and this makes human reasoning vulnerable to
error and bias (e.g. Dror & Charlton, 2006). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) described two
important heuristics: the availability and representativeness heuristics. With these heuristics,
4 J. Skrifvars et al.
humans reduce complex tasks to simpler judgements based on what comes easily to mind
and on similarity, rather than on probability. Another important heuristic, the confirmation
bias, describes our tendency to seek information that confirms our belief and disregard evi-
dence against it. The primacy effect and belief perseverance again represent our tendency
to give undue weight to our first impressions and adhere to initial beliefs even in light of
new evidence against them (Burke, 2006; Kassin et al., 2013). This tendency has also
recently been found in asylum decision-making (Maegherman et al., 2018). Importantly, bias
affects everyone and is not only due to incompetence (Dror, 2020). Experts may even be
more susceptible to bias, especially in fields where the ground truth is impossible to know
(Dror, 2020; Dror & Charlton, 2006). In such fields, the accuracy of decisions cannot be eval-
uated, and therefore, decision-makers can seldom learn from mistakes or outcome feedback
(Dror, 2020; Pompedda et al., 2017). Considering the uncertain evidentiary context of refu-
gee status determination, asylum adjudicators may be especially prone to using heuristics
in their decisions.
Likewise, individual and contextual circumstances may affect decision-making (Dror, 2020).
Studies have found that the mood, mindset, and ideology of decision-makers can affect
judgements (Danziger et al., 2011; Giner-Sorolla et al., 2002; Herlihy & Turner, 2009).
Furthermore, generalizations and stereotypes are helpful when navigating the complex
social world, however, they are based on our limited personal or second-hand experiences
and might distort our decision-making (Herlihy & Turner, 2009). In the asylum context, a
large-scale study of asylum cases in the United States revealed large discrepancies in grant
rates between asylum adjudicators, depending on individual characteristics of the immigra-
tion judge, such as gender and work experience (Schoenholtz et al., 2007).
Therefore, to combat bias, decision-makers must acknowledge the fundamental tendency
of the human mind to be biased and to systematically check for potential biases in their
own decision-making.
In conclusion, to properly employ the recommended credibility indicators and assess the
credibility of asylum applicants and their narratives, it is vital that asylum officials are
informed about the aforementioned topics in psychological science.
Previous research on assumptions underlying credibility assessments
Previous research has addressed various problematic aspects of credibility assessments in
asylum cases (see, e.g. Cameron, 2010; Cohen, 2001; Granhag et al., 2005; Kagan, 2003;
Maegherman et al., 2018). Nonetheless, only two studies have explicitly analyzed the under-
lying assumptions held by decision-makers in written determination letters (Dowd et al.,
2018; Herlihy et al., 2010). Herlihy et al. (2010) qualitatively analyzed British immigration
judges’assumptions in decision-making in a sample of 30 written asylum determinations.
Through an inductive thematic analysis, the authors identified three themes: There: how
others behave,Here: the asylum system, and A truthful account, each with sub-themes. The
first theme consisted of assumptions about how individuals, families and authorities behave
in their country of origin. The second theme described assumptions about the appellants’
knowledge of and ability to navigate through the asylum system, and other professional
actors’clinical judgements. The third theme consisted of assumptions about the characteris-
tics of truthful testimonies, such as the appellant’s demeanor. The authors also briefly
Psychological assumptions underlying credibility assessments in Finnish asylum determinations 5
evaluated these assumptions against empirical evidence and highlighted the need for more
cross-disciplinary research.
In 2018, Dowd and colleagues analyzed decision-makers’assumptions in 50 asylum cases
processed by the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal (Dowd et al., 2018). The aim was to
outline the extent to which Tribunal members acknowledge credibility guidelines and psy-
chological science when applicants’claims cannot be substantiated by corroborating evi-
dence. The authors used the same themes as Herlihy et al. (2010), but partially adapted
them to better fit their sample (Table 1). The first theme, Now: The applicant as a truthful
witness, included three sub-themes of assumptions about the manner in which the appli-
cant’presented their claims, the consistency of the claims throughout the process, and the
specificity of the claim. The second theme, There: Plausibility of account, included four sub-
themes of assumptions regarding the plausibility of the behavior of both applicants, family
members and State or non-State actors, and the characteristics of durable threats. The third
theme, Here: The asylum system, included two sub-themes of assumptions about the appli-
cants’knowledge of and behavior in the asylum system in the receiving country, and the
use of the benefit of the doubt-principle.
Dowd et al. (2018) found that Tribunal members approach the credibility assessments
inconsistently, and that many assumptions contradict widely accepted psychological know-
ledge about memory and behavior—especially the assumptions about demeanor, consist-
ency, and detail. The authors concluded that such contradictions substantially impact the
validity of asylum determinations, and recommended Tribunal members to strive for pre-
dictability and consistency in their decision-making.
The current study
More research that systematically examines decision-making in real-life asylum decisions is
needed to improve credibility assessment guidelines and address current challenges in
using credibility indicators. Our main aim with the current study was to identify underlying
assumptions and expectations in credibility assessments held by Finnish asylum officials. We
also investigated whether the identified assumptions correspond with widely accepted psy-
chological science on memory and behavior. Importantly, in contrast to previous studies on
appealed asylum cases, the current study extended the field of study by using a random-
ized sample of cases processed in 2017-2018 from the Finnish first-instance asylum
Table 1. Themes and sub-themes of assumptions made by asylum officials (Dowd et al., 2018).
Now: The applicant as a
truthful witness There: Plausibility of account Here: The asylum system
Demeanor Assumptions about the conduct of
State and non-State actors
Assumptions about delay
and disclosure
Inconsistency Assumptions about threats being
only temporary
The benefit of the doubt
Detail Assumptions about fear, fight,
or flight
Assumptions about family
6 J. Skrifvars et al.
authority. Following the previous research by Herlihy et al. (2010) and Dowd et al. (2018),
we first established coding principles for identifying assumptions and then assigned
assumptions to the themes. As most assumptions fit the themes described in previous
research, we decided to use the same themes and sub-themes as Dowd and colleagues in
our coding. The small number of assumptions that did not fit those themes were examined
thoroughly and given new labels.
Methods
Ethical permission
The study received permission by the Research Ethics Board for Psychology and Speech and
Language Pathology of Åbo Akademi University.
Case selection
We included 56 cases from a randomly selected sample of 200 official asylum cases
obtained from the Finnish Immigration Service in 2019. The case files were classified as pub-
licly available and provided to the researchers after anonymization. The cases were proc-
essed between 2017 and 2018 in the four active units of the Immigration Service in Finland
at the time. Each asylum casefile included transcripts of all available asylum hearings and
the written decision. The applicants were both adults and minors, adults applying individu-
ally, or with their families.
To be included, a case had to contain: 1) a concluding determination (46 expired or “not
investigated”cases were excluded) and 2) explicit statements about the applicant’s credibil-
ity (98 cases were excluded). The final sample consisted mostly of rejected cases (n¼47).
The percentage of rejections did not reflect the general ratio of rejected to granted cases in
Finland but was due to the fact that Finnish asylum officials are not obligated to explain
their reasoning in the written determination letters of granted cases and were thus insuffi-
ciently informative for the current study. Of the nine granted cases included in the sample,
one received asylum status and eight subsidiary protection status or a residence permit on
other grounds.
Procedure
First, we familiarized ourselves with how Finnish asylum officials formulate their conclusions
and structure their decisions. We focused on the section in the determination letters called
“facts”, as there was no separate section explicitly called “credibility assessment”. In the
“facts”section, officials mainly described credibility issues but also included conclusions
about the substantiality assessment (i.e. whether the presented facts are sufficient grounds
to be granted asylum). Second, we established the coding principles for identifying assump-
tions in the determination letters. Third, we read through all determination letters and
entered all assumptions to a data file. Fourth, we assigned preliminary labels to all assump-
tions in the data file. At this point we noticed that almost all assumptions fit the themes
and sub-themes described in the previous research by Dowd and colleagues. Therefore, we
decided to use the same themes and sub-themes as Dowd and colleagues in our coding of
Psychological assumptions underlying credibility assessments in Finnish asylum determinations 7
theme. The few assumptions that did not fit any of the previously defined sub-themes were
later categorized into new sub-themes.
Definitions and coding principles
An assumption was defined as a statement, or statements, about a credibility indicator or
any other fact affecting the credibility assessment of the applicant’s claim, in which the asy-
lum officials explained their conclusions (e.g. “Your story about the kidnapping lacks details
and specificity. Therefore, the Finnish Immigration Service does not believe that it reflects a
true event.”). To minimize coding bias, an assumption had to include both a statement
about a credibility aspect or fact and a statement about the interpretation or conclusion of
how this affected the decision. Consequently, we did not code vague statements not expli-
citly connected to facts or conclusions as assumptions (e.g. “You have reported things
inconsistently.”). Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the subjective nature of cod-
ing assumptions when interpreting the findings.
We used the same set of themes and sub-themes described by Dowd et al. (2018): 1.
Now: 1.1 Demeanor, 1.2 Inconsistency, 1.3 Detail; 2. There: 2.1 Assumptions about the conduct
of State and non-State actors, 2.2 Assumptions about threats being only temporary, 2.3
Assumptions about fear, fight, or flight, 2.4 Assumptions about family; and 3. Here: 3.1
Assumptions about delay and disclosure, and 3.2 The benefit of the doubt (see Table 1). We
later revised the names of the sub-themes to better fit the current sample. We coded
assumptions that fit several sub-themes into all relevant sub-themes, for example, the state-
ment “Your story lacks details and specificity and is inconsistent with your wife’s story,
therefore the Finnish Immigration Service does not believe that it reflects a true event.”was
coded as both detail and inconsistency.
Interrater reliability analysis
The first and second author coded four cases cooperatively as a learning phase, after which
they coded 20% of the sample (n¼11) independently for an interrater reliability analysis.
The focus was on identifying assumptions. When evaluating the results, the coders noted a
need for stricter and more extensive coding principles for identifying assumptions. The cod-
ing principles were therefore revised, and a new set of cases was chosen. In the second
interrater reliability analysis, we found that a total of 109 assumptions were identified, of
which both coders had identified 88 (80.7%). Of the 21 assumptions that had been identi-
fied by only one coder, 8 were excluded after discussion since they did not fit the defin-
ition. In approximately half of the inconsistently coded assumptions, we had identified the
same assumption, but disagreed on whether it contained one or two assumptions.
Following Herlihy et al. (2010), we considered the interrater reliability sufficient.
Revising the sub-themes
After identifying and coding all assumptions, we adapted the sub-themes to better fit our
sample. We deleted the sub-theme demeanor since no examples were identified in our sam-
ple. Furthermore, we divided the sub-theme assumptions about threats being only temporary
into two sub-themes; threat assumed not to be personal and threat assumed not to be
8 J. Skrifvars et al.
durable, as we found that most of the examples related to a threat not being personal,
rather than not being persistent. At this point, we observed that assumptions belonging to
these two sub-themes were used both in regards to the credibility assessment and the sub-
stantiality assessment. The extent to which these statements were psychological assump-
tions rather than references legal criteria was often unclear in the decisions, and therefore,
we decided to include them in the analysis at this stage. Finally, we slightly renamed the
remaining themes (for a list of the final themes, see Table 2).
Next, we thoroughly examined the small number of assumptions (n¼19) which had not
been coded into any of the previously described sub-themes. We read the assumptions,
their descriptions, and preliminary labels several times and adapted the labels during the
process. We identified two new sub-themes to the theme Now: The applicant as a truthful
witness that had not been included in the previous studies; the ability to disclose sensitive
information and the impact of one assumption on the whole claim. The first sub-theme rep-
resented assumptions about what applicants are able and willing to talk about. The
second sub-theme reflected instances where the asylum official explicitly stated that the
credibility of one element affected the credibility of another element of the claim.
Results
Descriptive results
We identified a total of 449 assumptions, with cases containing 1–22 assumptions. Most
assumptions led to negative evaluations or disbelief in the applicants’accounts (72.4%).
Assumptions leading to positive evaluations were found only in the following three sub-
themes: consistency (77.4%), detail (14.5%), and the benefit of the doubt (7.5%).
Themes
The frequencies of the themes and sub-themes of the assumptions found in the sample are
presented in Table 2. For examples of each sub-theme, see Table 3.
Now: The applicant as a truthful witness
More than half of all identified assumptions related to the applicants’ways of presenting
their claims during the asylum hearings. The four sub-themes represented both the way the
applicant presented their claims, as well as what the officials expected the applicants to dis-
close. The first sub-theme, sufficiency of detail and specificity, consisted of almost a quarter
of all assumptions in the total sample. Truthful applicants were expected to provide
detailed and specific information about their experiences, including peripheral information
about durations, times, frequencies, names, verbatim wordings of conversations and texts,
as well as visual or auditive details. A lack of specificity in the accounts was perceived as an
indicator of untruthfulness.
The second sub-theme, consistency, was the most frequently occurring type of assump-
tion, making up almost one third of all assumptions. Asylum officials expected truthful
statements to be consistent both within and between interviews with the applicant and
between family members. Furthermore, applicants’statements were expected to correspond
to external corroborating information, either presented by the applicants themselves or
externally retrieved (e.g. Country of Origin-reports collected by the UNHCR).
Psychological assumptions underlying credibility assessments in Finnish asylum determinations 9
A small number of assumptions belonged to the third sub-theme, the ability to disclose
sensitive information. Asylum seekers were expected to be able and willing to disclose sensi-
tive personal information about, for example, traumatic experiences, personal relationships,
sexual orientation, or religious beliefs. An applicant’s inability or unwillingness to describe
subjective thoughts and feelings regarding a personal experience was considered as indica-
tive of untruthfulness.
The sub-theme the impact of one assumption on the whole claim, also consisted of a small
number of assumptions. In these assumptions, the decision-maker explicitly stated that the
perceived credibility of one element affected the credibility of another element of the claim.
These assumptions were often related to verbal claims. For example, according to an offi-
cial, an untruthful claim about the home country also indicated that a claim about a military
group was untruthful. Only few assumptions related to other aspects, such as the docu-
ments submitted by the applicant: In one case, a document was deemed fabricated, and as
a result another unrelated document was also deemed fabricated.
There: Plausibility of account
More than a third of the assumptions belonged to the second theme, relating to plausibil-
ity. Three of the sub-themes reflected the plausibility of the behavior of individuals and
organizations and two sub-themes reflected what officials assumed personal and durable
threats to entail. The first sub-theme, plausibility of the alleged conduct of State or non-State
actors consisted of a small number of all assumptions and reflected officials’beliefs about
how State or non-State actors (e.g. paramilitary, or extremist groups) normally function.
Decision-makers held various assumptions about the grounds on which military groups
base their recruitment. For example, it was not seen as plausible that military groups would
Table 2. Frequencies of the themes and sub-themes of assumptions made by finnish asylum officials.
Themes and sub-themes n%CI %95
Now: The applicant as a truthful witness 259 57.6 [53.03,62.17]
Sufficiency of detail and specificity 102 22.7 [18.83, 26.57]
Consistency 138 30.7 [26.43, 34.96]
The ability to disclose sensitive information 9 2.0 [0.71, 3.29]
The impact of one assumption on the whole claim 10 2.2 [0.84, 3.56]
There: Plausibility of account 169 37.6 [33.12, 42.08]
Plausibility of the alleged conduct of State and non-State actors 24 5.3 [3.23, 7.37]
Plausibility of the alleged conduct of the applicant 17 3.8 [2.03, 5.57]
Plausibility of the alleged conduct of other actors 7 1.6 [0.44, 2.76]
Threat assumed not to be personal 104 23.1 [19.21, 26.99]
Threat assumed not to be durable 17 3.8 [2.03, 5.57]
Here: The asylum system 21 4.5 [2.58, 6.42]
Delay and disclosure 12 2.7 [1.20, 4.19]
The benefit of the doubt 9 2.0 [0.71, 3.29]
Note. CI ¼confidence interval. 95%CI were calculated as point estimate þ/- 1.96SE, and SE were calculated as 冑((p(1
p)/n).
10 J. Skrifvars et al.
have attempted to recruit young applicants or applicants lacking military skills. Officials also
held assumptions about when, how actively, and how successfully military groups and
States search for and find wanted persons.
A similarly small number of assumptions belonged to the second sub-theme, plausibility
of the alleged conduct of the applicant. These assumptions related to the plausibility of the
behavior of the applicant, often entailing expectations about how rational individuals
behave in so called fear, fight, or flight situations. A variety of different behaviors were
deemed implausible by the officials. In one case, it was deemed implausible that an appli-
cant had heard the name of her rapist, since she allegedly had been partially unconscious
during the rape. In another case, regarding an applicant with a history of substance abuse,
the decision-makers stated that a person can reasonably be assumed to be able to stay
away from alcohol if it causes serious problems.
A somewhat smaller number of assumptions belonged to the sub-theme plausibility of the
alleged conduct of other actors. These assumptions reflected decision-makers’expectations
about the behavior of other actors, such as family members or relatives. For example, one
decision-maker did not believe that a document could have been written by a law firm
because of several typing errors. In another case, the official assumed that it was implaus-
ible for a renowned lawyer to only have one inexperienced employee.
Approximately one fourth of all assumptions belonged to the sub-theme threat assumed
not to be personal. Decision-makers assumed that an applicant was not personally threat-
ened based on a variety of reasons, for example that the threat was related to the general
safety situation in the applicant’s home country. In other cases, the applicant was not seen
as sufficiently profiled, or the threat was assumed to be directed at a family member or
relative and not personally at the applicant. A few assumptions belonged to the related
sub-theme threat assumed not to be durable. Decision-makers assumed in some cases that
threats would subside over time. However, the time frame of what was considered sufficient
time for a threat to pass differed between decision-makers from a few months to several
years. Judgements about both of these sub-themes were frequently included in the sub-
stantiality assessment, that is, when the claims were compared to the legal criteria.
Furthermore, in both these sub-themes, decision-makers frequently used external informa-
tion (e.g. Country of Origin-reports) to support their decisions.
Here: The asylum system
Less than 5% of all assumptions belonged to the third theme. These assumptions related to
the use of the benefit of the doubt-principle, and to the applicants’knowledge about the
asylum procedure and ability to navigate through the asylum system. For the assumptions
about delay and disclosure, decision-makers expected applicants to be aware of how and
when to apply for international protection, as well as what information and evidence to
provide during the processes. Not applying for asylum directly after arriving at the receiving
country, or not disclosing all information or evidence promptly at the beginning of the asy-
lum hearing was seen as an indicator of untruthfulness.
In the second sub-theme, the benefit of the doubt, the use of the principle was explicitly
stated. Decision-makers gave the benefit of the doubt to applicants both based on personal
circumstances (such as young age, or physical and mental health concerns) and contextual
Psychological assumptions underlying credibility assessments in Finnish asylum determinations 11
Table 3. Examples of the themes and sub-themes.
Theme Sub-theme Example Assumption
Now: The
applicant as a
truthful
witness
Sufficiency of
detail
and specificity
“Altogether, your narrative is marked by a lack of
subjective specificity. Your claims about the
threat from Asaib Ahl Al-Haq is undetailed, and
you have given limited answers to the clarifying
questions about the threat.”
“When you have been asked to disclose more about
the attack, your statements have remained
narrow and only contained few details that are
typical for self-experienced accounts.”
A lack of detail
and specificity
in applicant’s
narratives can
be used as
indicators of
untruthfulness.
Now: The
applicant as a
truthful
witness
Consistency “You have presented detailed information about the
attack on your store, but [name X] and [name Y]
statements contain inconsistencies between
themselves. [X], you said that you were inside the
cafeteria when the men attacked and assaulted
you. [Y], you said that [X] had closed the store
and was outside when the attack happened. This
weakens the credibility of your claims.”
“Your identity cannot be confirmed as you have not
presented any documentary evidence to support
it. However, you have spoken consistently about
your background during the process. The Finnish
Immigration Service therefore deems your claims
about your citizenship, religion, and
ethnicity credible.”
Inconsistency
within the
applicant’s
narrative,
between two
individuals’
narratives, or
between
external
information
and the
applicant’s
narrative can
be used as
indicators of
untruthfulness.
Now: The
applicant as a
truthful
witness
The ability to
disclose
sensitive
information
“When prompted, you have not described your
thoughts and feelings regarding the conversion
to Christianity [questions X-Y]. You have said that
you have chosen the church [name] because the
Holy Spirit has touched you, but this experience
has been presented very superficially [questions X-
Y]. When asked how your life has changed after
coming to faith, you have given a very short
answer about your life becoming better after
having read the Bible [questions X-Y]. The Finnish
Immigration Service considers it reasonable to
assume that you would be able to describe this
important change in your life and the thoughts
related to it in more detail, and from a more
personally experienced perspective.”
“Sexuality is part of an individual’s identity. When
one’s identity is in a process of change, there are
often several different feelings associated with
homosexuality and the recognition of it. You
state that your sexual thoughts about men
emerged after puberty. However, you have not
described the formation of your sexual identity,
or thoughts and feelings related to it. [ …] Your
answers regarding your sexual orientation have
also been closely tied to having sexual
intercourse, not thoughts and feelings you have
If individuals are
unable or
unwilling to
disclose
sensitive
personal
information,
this can be
seen as an
indicator of
untruthfulness.
(Continued)
12 J. Skrifvars et al.
Table 3. (Continued).
Theme Sub-theme Example Assumption
experienced due to your homosexuality. The
Finnish Immigration Service states that there is
more to one’s sexual identity than having sex.”
Now: The
applicant as a
truthful
witness
The impact of
one
assumption on
the
whole claim
“[…] you have given wrongful information about
your home area, which in itself weakens the
credibility of your narrative. Therefore, the Finnish
Immigration Service does not accept your claims
about the threats from ISIS to be real.”
“You have presented photographs and copies of
documents which you claim are related to your
father’s political activity. Considering the
ambiguities and inconsistencies in the other
documents you have presented, [these]
documents cannot be given much
evidential value.”
The perceived
credibility of
one element
can affect the
credibility of a
later element
of the claim.
There: Plausibility
of account
Plausibility of the
alleged
conduct of
State or Non-
state actors
“Considering the presented Country of Origin
Information (COI), your age, story, and lack of
special skills and knowledge about weapons, the
Finnish Immigration Service does not accept as a
fact that you would be subject to a threat of
being recruited into armed groups.”
“The Finnish Immigration Service finds it implausible
that you at the age of 13, after your father’s
death, have begun receiving threatening text
messages from Mahdi’s army due to your father’s
party membership.”
The behavior of a
State or non-
State actor is
deemed
implausible
and as a
consequence,
the claim is
deemed
not credible.
There: Plausibility
of account
Plausibility of the
alleged
conduct of
the applicant
“Your narrative contains implausible features. You
said that you were unconscious during the rape,
but still at times conscious when the rapist told
you his name. [ …] the Finnish Immigration
Service does not accept that your rapist was an
infamous prisoner wanting to kill you because
you recognize him.”
“A nurse at the Reception Center has stated that
you have started a healthier lifestyle and that you
do not consume alcohol at all anymore. [ …] the
Finnish Immigration Service considers it
reasonable to assume that a person can stay
away from the consumption of alcohol if it
causes serious problems. [ …] Considering all the
above, the Finnish Immigration Service does not
accept that you would be in danger of serious
infringement due to the consumption of alcohol
if you were to return to your country of origin.”
The behavior of
an applicant is
deemed
implausible
and as a
consequence,
the claim is
deemed
not credible.
There: Plausibility
of account
Plausibility of the
alleged
conduct of
other actors
“There are several grammatical and typing errors in
the documents, which does not support your
claim that the documents are from a law firm.
[…] Considering the previously mentioned facts,
the Finnish Immigration Service does not accept
your narrative about the events of 2012 to be
The behavior of
another actor
is deemed
implausible
and as a
consequence,
(Continued)
Psychological assumptions underlying credibility assessments in Finnish asylum determinations 13
Table 3. (Continued).
Theme Sub-theme Example Assumption
true.”
“Considering your entire narrative, the Finnish
Immigration Service finds it implausible that even
though [person X], according to your statements
was a famous and valued lawyer, he only had
one inexperienced supporting lawyer in
his office.”
the claim is
deemed
not credible.
There: Plausibility
of account
Threat assumed
not to
be personal
“The Finnish Immigration Service concludes that you
have been randomly targeted by a shooting due
to the country’s general safety situation.”
“The previously presented COI supports the fact that
marriages between Sunnis and Shias can cause
problems on a case-by-case basis. [Person X], you
have not presented credible grounds as to why
you would be of specific interest for the Shia
militia because of your intermarriage or
other reasons.
Assumptions
about what
constitutes a
real threat,
and which
aspects assure
that the threat
is directed
toward
the applicant.
There: Plausibility
of account
Threat assumed
not to
be durable
“You have left the area and been away for over one
and a half years. Considering the time that has
passed since the event and the nature of [it], the
Finnish Immigration Service does not accept as a
fact that you would be in danger of serious
violations from the same persons if you were to
return to your home area.”
“However, considering that you have not brought
forward any other personal reasons than your
clan background, and that those violations took
place 20 years ago, and that according to current
COI, the [X]-minority are not subject to direct
violence, the Finnish Immigration Service does
not accept that the reason why you originally
fled Somalia would put you in danger of
violations in the future.”
Assumptions
about which
threats might
subside over
time, and how
long it takes
for them
to subside.
Here: The
asylum system
Assumptions
about delay
and disclosure
“You have stated that you have understood the
meaning of the hearing, including the obligation
to disclose all reasons why you cannot return to
your home country, and therefore, The Finnish
Immigration Service deems it generally
implausible that you have brought these [new]
aspects forward only at the appeal stage of the
process, when you have not mentioned them at
all at the hearings arranged at [place X] and
[place Y].”
“When you, [person X] and [person Y], arrived in
Finland, you told the authorities that you came
on a tourist trip to Finland and that you would
stay for 42 days. You have only presented your
asylum claims when the authorities prevented
you from entering to the country. When asked
why you did not immediately disclose that you
were going to apply for international protection,
Disclosing new
relevant
information at
a later stage in
the process
can be seen as
an indicator of
untruthfulness.
(Continued)
14 J. Skrifvars et al.
circumstances (such as the best interest of a child). Furthermore, sufficient consistency
could compensate a lack of detail and vice versa.
Discussion
The current study analyzed assumptions held by first-level decision-makers at the Finnish
Immigration Service, expanding on previous research regarding how subjective assumptions
held by decision makers affect credibility assessments at all levels of decision-making.
Finnish asylum officials seemed to hold similar assumptions to those held by decision-mak-
ers at the appeal level, which were the focus of previous studies (Dowd et al., 2018; Herlihy
et al., 2010). A notable difference was, however, found regarding assumptions related to
demeanor, as no such assumptions were identified in the current sample. It cannot be
excluded that demeanor may have had some effect on the officials and their decision mak-
ing but was simply not written down. Nonetheless, this suggests that credibility assess-
ments in our sample were not based on the behavior or manners of the applicants in the
interview situations to any substantial degree, which is in line with the current best-practice
guidelines. Demeanor should not be used as an indicator of untruthfulness, as individuals
with different background show a variety of behaviors and no reliable behavioral cues to lie
detection exist (Bond & Depaulo, 2006; Dowd et al., 2018; Kagan, 2003; UNHCR, 2013).
Table 3. (Continued).
Theme Sub-theme Example Assumption
you said that you were afraid, that you did not
have any experience of seeking asylum, and that
you had to get to the Reception Center.”
Here: The
asylum system
The benefitof
the doubt
“Your statements about [ex-husband’s] background
was left unspecified. However, considering that
you were only 13 years old when you married
him and that you only spent roughly one year
together with him, the Finnish Immigration
Service assumes that you cannot be expected to
be able to speak about [your ex-husband’s]
background in more detail. The documents that
you have delivered from the court corroborates
your statements about [ex-husband’s] criminal
past.”
“When assessing your [daughter’s] danger of being
subject to genital mutilation if you and your
family were to be returned to your home area,
the Finnish Immigration Service applies the
benefit of the doubt-principle. [ …] the Finnish
Immigration Service has not been convinced of
[parents’] general credibility earlier. However,
considering all previously mentioned facts and
the best interests of the child, the Finnish
Immigration Service does not believe that your
[parent X] and [parent Y] lowered credibility is a
reason not to apply the benefit of the doubt-
principle [ …]”
Assumptions
about when to
implement the
principle of
the benefitof
the doubt.
Psychological assumptions underlying credibility assessments in Finnish asylum determinations 15
Now: The applicant as a truthful witness
In many cases, asylum officials expected truthful applicants to present their claims in suffi-
cient detail, with sufficient consistency within and between interviews and between family
members. Sufficiency of detail and consistency are described in the current best practice
guidelines by the UNHCR as credibility indicators that can be used to distinguish between
truthful and untruthful claims. These indicators are, however, partially inconsistent with psy-
chological knowledge. Several researchers and the UNHCR have acknowledged that these
indicators should not be used without careful consideration of the naturally occurring
inconsistencies and limits of memory, as well as the potential impact of trauma and cultural
differences on memory (Cameron, 2010; Cohen, 2001; Herlihy et al., 2012; UNHCR, 2013).
Whereas a truthful applicant can be expected to remember the central gist of an event,
psychological science does not provide reasons to expect an applicant to remember all per-
ipheral information (Cameron, 2010). Moreover, psychological science does not provide rea-
sons to expect perfect consistency within or between truthful narratives (Herlihy et al.,
2012). Trauma, mental health issues, and cultural differences may have an impact on mem-
ory, affecting the applicant’s ability to tell a consistent and detailed narrative (Herlihy et al.,
2012). In the current sample, Finnish decision-makers often seemed to lack knowledge
about how naturally occurring variation in memory might affect the narratives of asylum
seekers. In a few exceptions, officials stated that they accepted a statement as truthful even
if it was, for example, undetailed or inconsistent, and this was explained by factors such as
the age or mental health of the applicant. Nevertheless, alternative explanations for incon-
sistent or undetailed statements were rarely considered.
Moreover, we found assumptions reflecting the expectation that truthful applicants can
and are willing to provide detailed information about sensitive personal experiences such
as the development of one’s sexual identity and religious conviction. Studies have found
that disclosure of sensitive personal information in asylum hearings is considered difficult
by many asylum applicants, and that disclosure is related to various individual and context-
ual factors such as trauma, stigma, gender, educational background, and interviewer charac-
teristics (Baillot et al., 2014;B
€
ogner et al., 2010; UNHCR, 2013). Furthermore, cultural
differences may impact the content and focus of memories. The collectivistic, general mem-
ories focusing on social interaction that asylum seekers may present, might not fit the
Western asylum official’s expectation of self-focused and detailed memories (Wang, 2016). A
person from a non-western culture might, thus, not have encoded detailed, self-focused
memories about thoughts and feelings regarding, for example, one’s sexual development.
Various factors related to intercultural communication may also affect disclosure, such as
the perceived power distance, or different understandings of what details are considered
relevant (Granhag et al., 2017; Hope et al., 2022). To automatically dismiss unwillingness to
disclose sensitive information as an indicator of untruthfulness is not in line with psycho-
logical science. Finnish asylum officials rarely seemed to—at least in writing—consider pos-
sible alternative explanations to why an asylum seeker failed to disclose personal
experiences.
Finally, in the written determination letters, a perceived lack of credibility in one state-
ment could undermine the credibility in later statements. This theme is not related directly
to empirical psychological knowledge, and thus not a focus of this review. Nevertheless, it
can be noted that not processing each element of an applicant’s claim objectively and
16 J. Skrifvars et al.
impartially is not in line with the recommendations of conducting credibility assessments
(Qualification Directive, The European Parliament, 2011).
There: Plausibility of account
Asylum officials were found to judge a variety of behaviors, actions, or lack of actions, as
implausible or unlikely both generally and in specific situations. Many assumptions seemed
to be based on a subjective view of how a reasonable person (asylum seeker or persecutor)
would act. Notably, officials seldom explained their reasoning behind decisions, nor did
they explore possible alternative explanations for unlikely behaviors. Assumptions about
plausibility are problematic since human behavior is highly variable and unpredictable, and
it is not possible to predict with certainty how individuals will react and behave in specific
situations (Granhag et al., 2017; Reifels et al., 2013). Moreover, according to Sweeney (2007)
comparing the behavior of a persecutor to a standard of how a reasonable person would
have acted effectively means judging if and how the persecution could have been executed
more effectively. In other legal contexts, a standard of what can be expected of a reason-
able person in terms of liability may be valid, however, the benefit and appropriateness of
applying a similar standard to persecutors in foreign countries is questionable
(Sweeney, 2007).
Furthermore, the definition of plausibility lacks clarity and consensus. The UNHCR high-
lights that plausibility, although described as a credibility indicator, should be used with
considerable caution and never be the sole ground for rejecting asylum (UNHCR, 2013). The
UNCHR recommends defining plausibility as the “realistic likelihood of events”, commonly
interpreted as implying that a statement is implausible if a decision-maker deems it to be
“beyond human experience of possible occurrence”(Maegherman et al., 2018). Although
the definition is precise, according to whom something is implausible remains a subjective
element. In other words, despite the asylum process being required by law to be objective
and impartial, decision makers must evaluate what is realistic based on their subjective
views (Herlihy & Turner, 2009; Maegherman et al., 2018). Our findings highlight this prob-
lematic aspect of judging plausibility.
Our findings support the notion made by previous authors that judgements about plausi-
bility in asylum decisions is based on personal first- or second-hand commonsense judge-
ments, speculations, stereotypes, and subjective perceptions of risk (Herlihy & Turner, 2009;
UNHCR, 2013). These judgements fail to consider possible differences in norms, customs
and behaviors between cultures and societies or the individuals’personal circumstances.
Moreover, shortcuts in our thinking processes and a range of biases at different levels affect
all decision-making (Dror, 2020). In contexts where it is impossible to provide feedback on
accuracy, decision-makers can become more and more biased. This risk can be reduced
only with continuous training on how to counteract bias (Dror, 2020; Pompedda et al.,
2017). The UNHCR (2013) concludes that if plausibility is used as a credibility indicator, the
assessment should be based on independent, objective, reliable, and time-appropriate evi-
dence, and be thoroughly described with clear references to the evidence. Finnish asylum
officials do not seem to follow this recommendation, as the explanations behind the rea-
soning found in our sample were limited and unstructured.
Psychological assumptions underlying credibility assessments in Finnish asylum determinations 17
Determining whether threats are genuine and durable is an important part of evaluating
the legal grounds for granting asylum. However, in the current sample, these statements
were often difficult to separate from statements about the credibility of an applicant’s
claims. Additionally, the assumptions regarding whether threats are genuine, and durable
were often intertwined with external information. These factors made it difficult to interpret
to what extent they were related to a lack of consideration of psychological knowledge.
We, nevertheless, observed a large variety in these assumptions, especially in relation to
what durable threats entail. These types of assumptions might result in inconsistent deci-
sion-making by asylum officials, and consequently, to legally uncertain determinations.
Here: The asylum system
Although rare, we found asylum officials to hold assumptions about the use of the benefit
of the doubt-principle, and about applicants’abilities to understand and navigate through
the asylum system. Both aspects are based on legal directives and, therefore, relate more to
judicial issues than to psychological science. According to the Qualification Directive, The
European Parliament (2011), an applicant must apply for asylum, present all relevant infor-
mation, and submit all available evidence as early as possible. Nevertheless, there could be
several alternative explanations for why applicants might not act according to these princi-
ples. First, particularly in the beginning of or during the first hearing, the applicant may be
stressed by the situation. It is well established that stress during the interview hampers
memory (Shields et al., 2017). Second, due to the constructive nature of memory the appli-
cant may remember additional information at a later recall and add relevant details to the
claim at a later stage of the procedure. Third, applicants suffering from mental health issues
may not be able to keep track of their obligations as asylum seekers, or which aspects of
the claim they have not disclosed yet. Fourth, difficulties due to intercultural communica-
tion might create situations in which the applicant does not understand what constitutes
relevant information or what “tell everything”entails. Fifth, differences in power distance
might make the applicant hesitant to present objections against or additions to the official.
Sixth, applicants may find it difficult to disclose sensitive information to officials and inter-
preters if they doubt the confidentiality of the interview, or distrust officials all together
(Herlihy & Turner, 2009;K
€
alin, 1986). Finally, trauma, guilt, shame, stigma, distress, or ner-
vousness might affect the disclosure of information negatively. In sum, as Coffey argues:
delayed disclosure may be “entirely consistent with the reality of the event”(Coffey, 2003,
p. 415). Officials should carefully consider such alternative explanations when assessing
these issues.
In our sample, the benefit of the doubt was used sparsely. Asylum officials might not,
however, always explicitly state when they use the principle in the written determination.
Additionally, the UNHCR (2013) has found that officials are often uncertain of how to apply
the benefit of the doubt. Nevertheless, in the examples we identified in our sample the
benefit of the doubt seemed to be applied appropriately, according to international stand-
ards. Such examples of good practice could be collected by researchers and used in training
and guidebooks for the officials carrying out the indeed very complex and difficult task of
conducting asylum interviews and/or making decisions based on these interviews.
18 J. Skrifvars et al.
Limitations
Although our coding principles were based on previous findings and we worked to estab-
lish reliable coding principles and definitions, the coding of assumptions was complex and
may have been affected by our subjective expectations and own assumptions.
Differences in the written determinations between individual officials were ample. The
style of describing and explaining aspects regarding the credibility of an applicant varied to
a large extent. Consequently, it was sometimes challenging to understand which statements
were related to which conclusions. It is possible that the officials did consider alternative
explanations for negative credibility findings in their decisions but did not write them
down. The coding was further complicated by the fact that the determination letters did
not include an explicit section for the credibility assessment, which made it difficult to sep-
arate credibility findings from the substantiality assessment.
Moreover, the sample of determinations was relatively small and consisted mostly of
rejected cases with negative assumptions. This is because Finnish officials are not obligated
to document their reasoning for accepted cases, which makes written explanations of posi-
tive credibility findings rare. Only documenting and analyzing the decision-making underly-
ing negative cases may create serious distortions in both research and asylum decision-
making. Additionally, we included even infrequent sub-themes since they have been
included in previous studies and give a more detailed insight into this rather understudied
field of research.
Recommendations
Officials at the Finnish Immigration Service were found to hold a number of assumptions
that are not in line, or only partially in line, with empirical research on human behaviour
and memory. Our findings give cause for recommendations for future practice and research
necessary to improve the quality of the decision-making processes of asylum officials and
protect the integrity of the asylum procedures.
Firstly, asylum officials should be provided with more training on how memory functions
and on factors affecting communication and decision-making. Persecution is a traumatic
experience, and, therefore, stress and the possible impact of trauma and trauma-related
mental health disorders must be well understood by asylum officials. Improved knowledge
about cultural differences and challenges related to intercultural communication is also vital
for asylum officials whose entire work is carried out in an intercultural context.
Understanding and acknowledging different cognitive biases that affect decision-making,
especially in situations where ground truth is difficult to establish, is equally important.
Guidelines and handbooks already incorporate these aspects to some extent, but these
aspects should also be incorporated in the practical training that officials receive. Research
from other legal contexts (e.g. child interviewing) has found that extensive training, continu-
ous feedback, and follow-up sessions are needed to successfully implement new practices
(Powell, 2008). Similarly, authors have listed a number of steps of how to overcome bias in
and improve legal decision-making (Burke, 2006). Developing and extending the training
that asylum officials receive has been recommended (see, e.g. Schoenholtz et al., 2007), and
would likely improve the quality of the asylum procedures.
Psychological assumptions underlying credibility assessments in Finnish asylum determinations 19
Second, requiring asylum officials to structure and explain their reasoning behind all cred-
ibility findings in a more explicit manner would increase the transparency of the decision-
making process. Including a separate section for describing only credibility aspects would
improve the overall structure of the determination letters. Decision-makers should explicitly
write down all arguments with clear references to the evidence and systematically seek
alternative explanations to all findings by actively considering the opposite (e.g. Hirt &
Markman, 1995;O’Brien, 2009). Other debiasing methods worth exploring include alterna-
tive stories or systematic tools such as checklists (Schmittat et al., 2022; Sibbald et al., 2013).
These measures could minimize the effect of bias and subjective assumptions on the deci-
sion-making. Additionally, this would also make it possible for the official, the applicant, as
well as lawyers, judges, and policy makers to understand and evaluate the reasoning on
which the decision has been made. Officials in Finland, as well as in many other countries,
are currently not obligated to address the credibility assessment in granted asylum cases.
Addressing the credibility assessment and explaining the reasoning behind credibility find-
ings in all cases, regardless of outcome, would further increase the transparency.
Conclusions
Our findings show that Finnish asylum officials to a substantial extent base their decisions
on assumptions that are not grounded in psychological science. Using UNHCR’s credibility
indicators correctly requires careful consideration and caution by asylum officials. Our study
further confirms the need for policy makers, case workers, and interdisciplinary experts to
improve the validity of the current methods to protect the integrity of the asylum process.
Importantly, this should entail better training in psychology, in particular, investigative inter-
viewing, memory and decision making for asylum officials, requiring officials to increase the
transparency in their reasoning, and systematically combating bias in decision-making.
Availability of data
Thedatathatsupportthefindings of this study are available on request from the
corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restrictions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This work was supported by a grant from Waldemar von Frenckell’s Foundation to the first
author (J.S), a grant (decision number: 151173) from The Swedish Cultural Foundation in
Finland to the third author (J.A), and a grant from Sundell’s Foundation to the last
author (J.K).
ORCID
Jenny Skrifvars http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4159-7256
Jan Antfolk http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0334-4987
Tanja van Veldhuizen http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1057-365X
20 J. Skrifvars et al.
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