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The Most Demanding Moral Capacity: Could Evolution Provide Any Base? La capacidad moral más exigente: ¿Podría la evolución proporcionar alguna base?
Abstract
The attempts to make moral and evolution compatible have assimilated moral capacity either with complex self-control in favour of one's own goals or with spontaneous altruism. Those attempts face an easy problem, since those two senses of moral are adaptively advantageous resources. But let us focus on the decisions made in favour of another person which the subject, when making them, feels are contrary to his own goals: Could a base for this capacity arise in evolution, however poor and weak? I propose that such base, while it is not an adaptive advantage but quite the opposite, arises from the convergence between two abilities which in their respective origins were adaptively very advantageous: the advanced mode of 'theo-ry-of-mind' (ToM) and inner speech. Keywords: others' mental contents; speech directed to oneself; spontaneous altruism; Advanced Theory of Mind; vicarious expectations. Resumen: Los intentos de hacer compatibles la moral y la evolución han asimilado la capacidad moral con el autocontrol complejo en favor de las metas propias o con el altruis-mo espontáneo. Esos intentos se en-frentan a un problema fácil, puesto que esos dos sentidos de la moral son adaptativamente ventajosos. En cambio, las decisiones que van contra las propias metas de uno son desven-tajosas. A pesar de ello, ¿pudo surgir en la evolución una base, por pobre y débil que fuera, para esta capacidad? Propongo que tal base, si bien no es una ventaja adaptativa en principio, sino más bien lo contrario, surge de la convergencia entre dos habilidades que en sus respectivos orígenes sí eran muy ventajosas adaptativamen-te: el modo avanzado de la teoría de la mente (ToM) y el habla interior. Palabras clave: contenidos mentales de los otros; discurso dirigido a uno mismo; altruismo espontáneo; Teoría de la Mente; expectativas vicarias. 1 I am very grateful to the reviewers for their helpful comments.
... 'Self-control' (Shilton et al. 2020), or 'self-domestication'? I can only say that the connotations of the term 'self-domestication' are less suitable for a capacity that, "even when it takes us to meekness, means the strength and power to use one's energy for one's purposes": Roszak 2022. (This author, instead of "self-control", uses "fortitude" or "resilience", but these are terms that I can't use: They include morality, while, in my view (Bejarano 2022), self-control is not necessarily moral.) ...
Can we nowadays keep a qualitative difference between the primitive and advanced Theory-of-Mind? The old criteria have become blurry. In addition, it is clear that in ‘apes’ lifestyle’ it is not necessary to use the communicative-cognitive basic abilities which became indispensable in ‘the new lifestyle’. Thus, it is usual to conclude that apes would have to some degree such abilities. However, this article tries to reformulate and defend that qualitative difference. Thus, after underlining the contrast between two kinds of mental states (‘contents’ and ‘expectations’), I apply it to the detection of foreign mental states as well. Then, three points are proposed: First, ‘vicarious expectations’ sustain the primitive ToM; second, a subject can have no expectation of inner states which are intrinsically impossible for him; third, the state of interacting with ourselves as with a different person –e.g., the thinking what others think of us– cannot be a vicarious expectation of ours, but it requires the estimation of foreign contents. From this hypothesis, I deduce that vicarious expectations are unable to sustain self-conscious emotions or the really effective reception of pointing gestures. These abilities could appear only when ‘the estimation of foreign contents’ –i.e., the origin of the advanced ToM– arose.
Auditory language comprehension recruits cortical regions that are both close to sensory-motor landmarks (supporting auditory and motor features) and far from these landmarks (supporting word meaning). We investigated whether the responsiveness of these regions in task-based functional MRI is related to individual differences in their physical distance to primary sensorimotor landmarks. Parcels in the auditory network, that were equally responsive across story and math tasks, showed stronger activation in individuals who had less distance between these parcels and transverse temporal sulcus, in line with the predictions of the ‘tethering hypothesis’ which suggests that greater proximity to input regions might increase the fidelity of sensory processing. Conversely, language and default mode parcels, which were more active for the story task, showed positive correlations between individual differences in activation and sensory-motor distance from primary sensory-motor landmarks, consistent with the view that physical separation from sensory-motor inputs supports aspects of cognition that draw on semantic memory. These results demonstrate that distance from sensorimotor regions provides an organising principle of functional differentiation within the cortex. The relationship between activation and geodesic distance to sensory-motor landmarks is in opposite directions for cortical regions that are proximal to the heteromodal (DMN and language network) and unimodal ends of the principal gradient of intrinsic connectivity.
As proposed for the emergence of modern languages, we argue that modern uses of languages (pragmatics) also evolved gradually in our species under the effects of human self‐domestication, with three key aspects involved in a complex feedback loop: (a) a reduction in reactive aggression, (b) the sophistication of language structure (with emerging grammars initially facilitating the transition from physical aggression to verbal aggression); and (c) the potentiation of pragmatic principles governing conversation, including, but not limited to, turn‐taking and inferential abilities. Our core hypothesis is that the reduction in reactive aggression, one of the key factors in self‐domestication processes, enabled us to fully exploit our cognitive and interactional potential as applied to linguistic exchanges, and ultimately to evolve a specific form of communication governed by persuasive reciprocity—a trait of human conversation characterized by both competition and cooperation. In turn, both early crude forms of language, well suited for verbal aggression/insult, and later more sophisticated forms of language, well suited for persuasive reciprocity, significantly contributed to the resolution and reduction of (physical) aggression, thus having a return effect on the self‐domestication processes. Supporting evidence for our proposal, as well as grounds for further testing, comes mainly from the consideration of cognitive disorders, which typically simultaneously present abnormal features of self‐domestication (including aggressive behavior) and problems with pragmatics and social functioning. While various approaches to language evolution typically reduce it to a single factor, our approach considers language evolution as a multifactorial process, with each player acting upon the other, engaging in an intense mutually reinforcing feedback loop. Moreover, we see language evolution as a gradual process, continuous with the pre‐linguistic cognitive abilities, which were engaged in a positive feedback loop with linguistic innovations, and where gene‐culture co‐evolution and cultural niche construction were the main driving forces.
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Research Article
A story to tell: the role of narratives in reducing delay discounting for people who strongly discount the future
Leonard H. Epstein,Tatiana Jimenez-Knight,Anna M. Honan,Mathew J. BiondolilloORCID Icon,Rocco A. Paluch &Warren K. Bickel
Received 08 Oct 2020, Accepted 25 May 2021, Published online: 03 Jun 2021
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ABSTRACT
Delay Discounting (DD) or devaluing a future, larger reward in favour of a smaller, more immediate reward, has been linked to negative health behaviours. One intervention that reduces DD is Episodic Future Thinking (EFT). EFT has participants generate cues representing positive future events that correspond to temporal windows during the DD task. The current study examined if incorporating EFT cues into narratives would strengthen effects on DD. One hundred and sixty adults were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and were randomised to traditional or narrative EFT. Results showed that participants in narrative EFT discounted the future less (p = 0.034) than participants who engaged in traditional EFT. This novel approach to EFT is well grounded in research and theory on the power of narratives to influence behaviour and can open a new window into ways to reduce DD to strengthen engagement in positive choices.
How can we be moved by a narrative which we know to be fictitious? (Paradox of Redford). Taking into consideration the symbolic game of children, I reject the solutions connected with metabelief and turn to the evolutionary path of imitation. The ability to latently imitate (to learn) motor sequences that are new for the subject requires two registrations to be kept apart, each one for a different proprioception and environment. In this way, as well as finding a solution to the paradox, we propose that imagining oneself but in different circumstances would form the basis of another, much more fundamental capacity, the ability to imitate, not only different circumstances, but also another person, another way of seeing the same world.
By age 2, children are developing foundational language processing skills, such as quickly recognizing words and predicting words before they occur. How do these skills relate to children’s structural knowledge of vocabulary? Multiple aspects of language processing were simultaneously measured in a sample of 2‐to‐5‐year‐olds (N = 215): While older children were more fluent at recognizing words, at predicting words in a graded fashion, and at revising incorrect predictions, only revision was associated with concurrent vocabulary knowledge once age was accounted for. However, an exploratory longitudinal follow‐up (N = 55) then found that word recognition and prediction skills were associated with rate of subsequent vocabulary development, but revision skills were not. We argue that prediction skills may facilitate language learning through enhancing processing speed.
This paper argues that rituals are mechanisms of resource management. The argument is based on four observations: (i) over the course of hominin evolution, fitness became contingent on psychological states; (ii) these psychological states can be understood as ‘resources’, not unlike material resources such as energy, food or fuel; (iii) ritual ‘manages’ these psychological resources—meaning that it cultivates, builds and directs them; and (iv) ritual management can be analytically decomposed, providing a new descriptive tool for understanding rituals and predictions about ritual survival.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Ritual renaissance: new insights into the most human of behaviours’.
A fundamental question in psychology and neuroscience is the extent to which cognitive and neural processes are specialised for social behaviour, or are shared with other ‘non-social’ cognitive, perceptual, and motor faculties. Here we apply the influential framework of Marr (1982) across research in humans, monkeys, and rodents to propose that information processing can be understood as ‘social’ or ‘non-social’ at different levels. We argue that processes can be socially specialised at the implementational and/or the algorithmic level, and that changing the goal of social behaviour can also change social specificity. This framework could provide important new insights into the nature of social behaviour across species, facilitate greater integration, and inspire novel theoretical and empirical approaches.
Significance
The ability to reason about other people’s thoughts and beliefs characterizes the complex social interaction among humans. This ability, called Theory of Mind (ToM), has long been argued to develop around 4 y when children start explicitly reasoning about others' beliefs. However, when tested nonverbally, infants already show action expectations congruent with others’ beliefs before the age of 2 y. Do these behaviors reflect different systems for understanding others’ minds—an early and a later developing one—or when does ToM develop? We show that these abilities are supported by the maturation of independent brain networks, suggesting different systems for explicit verbal ToM and early nonverbal action expectations.
From early in life, human infants appear capable of taking others’ perspectives, and can do so even when the other’s perspective conflicts with the infant’s perspective. Infants’ success in perspective-taking contexts implies that they are managing conflicting perspectives despite a wealth of data suggesting that doing so relies on sufficiently mature Executive Functions, and is a challenge even for adults. In a new theory, I propose that infants can take other’s perspectives because they have an altercentric bias. This bias results from a combination of the value that human cognition places on others’ attention, and an absence of a competing self-perspective, which would, in older children, create a conflict requiring resolution by Executive Functions. A self-perspective emerges with the development of cognitive self-awareness, sometime in the second year of life, at which point it leads to competition between perspectives. This theory provides a way of explaining infants’ ability to take others’ perspectives, but raises the possibility that they could do so without representing or understanding the implications of perspective for others’ mental states.
Heyes argues that human metacognitive strategies (cognitive gadgets) evolved through cultural rather than genetic evolution. Although we agree that increased plasticity is the hallmark of human metacognition, we suggest cognitive malleability required the genetic accommodation of gadget-specific processes that enhanced the overall cognitive flexibility of humans.
The main tenet of this paper is that human communication is first and foremost a matter of negotiating commitments, rather than one of conveying intentions, beliefs, and other mental states. Every speech act causes the speaker to become committed to the hearer to act on a propositional content. Hence, commitments are relations between speakers, hearers, and propositions. Their purpose is to enable speakers and hearers to coordinate their actions: communication is coordinated action for action coordination. To illustrate the potential of the approach, commitment-based analyses are offered for a representative sample of speech act types, conversational implicatures, as well as for common ground.
Converging evidence suggests that high rank is communicated through various nonverbal behaviors (e.g., expansiveness), but prior studies have not examined whether 2 distinct forms of high rank-known as prestige and dominance-are communicated through distinct nonverbal displays. Given the divergent messages that prestigious and dominant leaders need to send in order to attain and retain their place in the social hierarchy, theoretical accounts would suggest that individuals use distinct sets of nonverbal behaviors to communicate these 2 forms of high rank. In the present research, we tested this hypothesis in 7 studies, using carefully controlled experimental designs (Studies 1, 2, 3, 4a, and 4b) and the assessment of spontaneously displayed nonverbal behaviors that occurred during a lab-based group interaction (Study 5) and a real-world political contest (Study 6). Results converged across studies to show that prestige and dominance strategies are associated with distinct sets of nonverbal behaviors, which are largely consistent with theoretical predictions. Specifically, prestige, or the attainment of rank through earned respect, and dominance, or the use of intimidation and force to obtain power, are communicated from different head positions (i.e., tilted upward vs. downward), smiling behaviors (i.e., presence vs. absence of a symmetrical smile), and different forms of bodily expansion (i.e., subtle chest expansion vs. more grandiose space-taking). These findings provide the first evidence for 2 distinct signals of high rank, which spontaneously emerge in social interactions and guide social perceptions and the conferral of power.
Why do humans create images and what are their features that make them special? How are image-making and the use of images related? What is the purpose of images? The " problem of images " is addressed through the lens of contemporary neuroscience, arguing why and how neuroscience can investigate our relationship with art and aesthetics, framing this empirical approach as " experimental aesthetics. " Recent discoveries are presented that changed our ideas about perception, action, and cognition and the relationship among them, allowing a new look—complementary to the humanistic approach—at the problem of images. A new model of perception and cognition is proposed, called embodied simulation, which reveals the constitutive relationship between brain-body and the reception of human creative expressions.
A key feature of human prosociality is direct transfers, the most active form of sharing in which donors voluntarily hand over resources in their possession. Direct transfers buffer hunter-gatherers against foraging shortfalls. The emergence and elaboration of this behaviour thus likely played a key role in human evolution by promoting cooperative interdependence and ensuring that humans' growing energetic needs (e.g. for increasing brain size) were more reliably met. According to the strong prosociality hypothesis, among great apes only humans exhibit sufficiently strong prosocial motivations to directly transfer food. The versatile prosociality hypothesis suggests instead that while other apes may make transfers in constrained settings, only humans share flexibly across food and non-food contexts. In controlled experiments, chimpanzees typically transfer objects but not food, supporting both hypotheses. In this paper, we show in two experiments that bonobos directly transfer food but not non-food items. These findings show that, in some contexts, bonobos exhibit a human-like motivation for direct food transfer. However, humans share across a far wider range of contexts, lending support to the versatile prosociality hypothesis. Our species' unusual prosocial flexibility is likely built on a prosocial foundation we share through common descent with the other apes.
Evidence of care for the ill and injured amongst Neanderthals, inferred through skeletal evidence for survival from severe illness and injury, is widely accepted. However, healthcare practices have been viewed primarily as an example of complex cultural behaviour, often discussed alongside symbolism or mortuary practices. Here we argue that care for the ill and injured is likely to have a long evolutionary history and to have been highly effective in improving health and reducing mortality risks. Healthcare provisioning can thus be understood alongside other collaborative ‘risk pooling’ strategies such as collaborative hunting, food sharing and collaborative parenting. For Neanderthals in particular the selective advantages of healthcare provisioning would have been elevated by a variety of ecological conditions which increased the risk of injury as well their particular behavioural adaptations which affected the benefits of promoting survival from injury and illness. We argue that healthcare provisioning was not only a more significant evolutionary adaptation than has previously been acknowledged, but moreover may also have been essential to Neanderthal occupation at the limits of the North Temperate Zone.
Significance
In coming to understand minds, the greatest challenge for young children is understanding when others have a false belief. Why is that person searching for the toy over there when it is really over here? There is currently much controversy about when children come to this understanding because experiments of different types yield different results. This paper attempts to resolve the controversy by integrating theory and data in a different way. Specifically, the paper argues that young children do not just come to imagine what is in other minds on their own; rather, they come to this understanding through certain types of social and communicative interactions with others that require them to compare their respective perspectives.
Humans have a remarkable ability to simulate the minds of others. How the brain distinguishes between mental states attributed to self and mental states attributed to someone else is unknown. Here, we investigated how fundamental neural learning signals are selectively attributed to different agents. Specifically, we asked whether learning signals are encoded in agent-specific neural patterns or whether a self–other distinction depends on encoding agent identity separately from this learning signal. To examine this, we tasked subjects to learn continuously 2 models of the same environment, such that one was selectively attributed to self and the other was selectively attributed to another agent. Combining computational modelling with magnetoencephalography (MEG) enabled us to track neural representations of prediction errors (PEs) and beliefs attributed to self, and of simulated PEs and beliefs attributed to another agent. We found that the representational pattern of a PE reliably predicts the identity of the agent to whom the signal is attributed, consistent with a neural self–other distinction implemented via agent-specific learning signals. Strikingly, subjects exhibiting a weaker neural self–other distinction also had a reduced behavioural capacity for self–other distinction and displayed more marked subclinical psychopathological traits. The neural self–other distinction was also modulated by social context, evidenced in a significantly reduced decoding of agent identity in a nonsocial control task. Thus, we show that self–other distinction is realised through an encoding of agent identity intrinsic to fundamental learning signals. The observation that the fidelity of this encoding predicts psychopathological traits is of interest as a potential neurocomputational psychiatric biomarker.
Modern humans have large and globular brains that distinguish them from their extinct Homo relatives. The characteristic globularity develops during a prenatal and early postnatal period of rapid brain growth critical for neural wiring and cognitive development. However, it remains unknown when and how brain globularity evolved and how it relates to evolutionary brain size increase. On the basis of computed tomographic scans and geometric morphometric analyses, we analyzed endocranial casts of Homo sapiens fossils (N = 20) from different time periods. Our data show that, 300,000 years ago, brain size in early H. sapiens already fell within the range of present-day humans. Brain shape, however, evolved gradually within the H. sapiens lineage, reaching present-day human variation between about 100,000 and 35,000 years ago. This process started only after other key features of craniofacial morphology appeared modern and paralleled the emergence of behavioral modernity as seen from the archeological record. Our findings are consistent with important genetic changes affecting early brain development within the H. sapiens lineage since the origin of the species and before the transition to the Later Stone Age and the Upper Paleolithic that mark full behavioral modernity.
https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aao5961
People talk not only to others but also to themselves. The self talk we engage in may be overt or covert, and is associated with a variety of higher mental functions, including reasoning, problem solving, planning and plan execution, attention, and motivation. When talking to herself, a speaker takes devices from her mother tongue, originally designed for interpersonal communication, and employs them to communicate with herself. But what could it even mean to communicate with oneself? To answer that question, we need a theory of communication that explains how the same linguistic devices may be used to communicate with others and oneself. On the received view, which defines communication as information exchange, self talk appears to be an anomaly, for it is hard to see the point of exchanging information with oneself. However, if communication is analysed as a way of negotiating commitments between speaker and hearer, then communication may be useful even when speaker and hearer coincide. Thus a commitment-based approach allows us to make sense of self talk as well as social talk.
When humans and other animals make cultural innovations, they also change their environment, thereby imposing new selective pressures that can modify their biological traits. For example, there is evidence that dairy farming by humans favored alleles for adult lactose tolerance. Similarly, the invention of cooking possibly affected the evolution of jaw and tooth morphology. However, when it comes to cognitive traits and learning mechanisms, it is much more difficult to determine whether and how their evolution was affected by culture or by their use in cultural transmission. Here we argue that, excluding very recent cultural innovations, the assumption that culture shaped the evolution of cognition is both more parsimonious and more productive than assuming the opposite. In considering how culture shapes cognition, we suggest that a process-level model of cognitive evolution is necessary and offer such a model. The model employs relatively simple coevolving mechanisms of learning and data acquisition that jointly construct a complex network of a type previously shown to be capable of supporting a range of cognitive abilities. The evolution of cognition, and thus the effect of culture on cognitive evolution, is captured through small modifications of these coevolving learning and data-acquisition mechanisms, whose coordinated action is critical for building an effective network. We use the model to show how these mechanisms are likely to evolve in response to cultural phenomena, such as language and tool-making, which are associated with major changes in data patterns and with new computational and statistical challenges.
In recent years, developmental psychologists have increasingly been interested in various forms of prosocial behavior observed in infants and young children—in particular comforting, sharing, pointing to provide information, and spontaneous instrumental helping. We briefly review several models that have been proposed to explain the psychological mechanisms underpinning these behaviors. Focusing on spontaneous instrumental helping, we home in on models based upon what Paulus (Child Development Perspectives 8(2):77–81, 2014) has dubbed ‘goal-alignment’, i.e. the idea that the identification of an agent’s goal leads infants to take up that goal as their own. We identify a problem with the most well-known model based upon this idea, namely the ‘goal contagion’ model. The problem arises from the way in which the model specifies the content of the goal which is identified and taken up. We then propose an alternative way of specifying the content of the goal, and use this as a starting point for articulating an alternative model based upon the idea of alignment, namely the ‘goal slippage’ model. By elucidating the difference between goal contagion and goal slippage, we contribute to the articulation of experimental criteria for assessing whether and when the mechanisms specified by these two models are at work.
The challenge of studying human cognitive evolution is identifying unique features of our intelligence while explaining the processes by which they arose. Comparisons with nonhuman apes point to our early-emerging cooperative-communicative abilities as crucial to the evolution of all forms of human cultural cognition, including language. The human selfdomestication hypothesis proposes that these early-emerging social skills evolved when natural selection favored increased in-group prosociality over aggression in late human evolution. As a by-product of this selection, humans are predicted to show traits of the domestication syndrome observed in other domestic animals. In reviewing comparative, developmental, neurobiological, and paleoanthropological research, compelling evidence emerges for the predicted relationship between unique human mentalizing abilities, tolerance, and the domestication syndrome in humans. This synthesis includes a review of the first a priori test of the self-domestication hypothesis as well as predictions for future tests. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Psychology Volume 68 is January 03, 2017. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
Why do people cooperate? We address this classic question by analyzing and discussing the role of reputation: people cooperate to maintain a positive reputation in their social environment. Reputation is a key element fueling a system of indirect reciprocity, where cooperators establish a good reputation and are thus more likely to receive future benefits from third parties. The tendencies to monitor, spread, and manage each other's reputation help explain the abundance of human cooperation with unrelated strangers. We review research on the phenomenon of reputation-based cooperation in the domains of how people manage their reputation in response to varying cues of reputation, when reputation can promote cooperation, and individual differences in reputation management. We also propose three directions for future research: group stability and reputation-based cooperation, solutions to cope with noise and biased reputation, and the relative efficiency of positive versus negative reputation systems.
Over the last few decades, motor imagery has attracted the attention of researchers as a prototypical example of ‘embodied cognition’ and also as a basis for neuro-rehabilitation and brain–machine interfaces. The current definition of motor imagery is widely accepted, but it is important to note that various abilities rather than a single cognitive entity are dealt with under a single term. Here, motor imagery has been characterized based on four factors: 1) motor control, 2) explicitness, 3) sensory modalities, and 4) agency. Sorting out these factors characterizing motor imagery may explain some discrepancies and variability in the findings from previous studies and will help to optimize a study design in accordance with the purpose of each study in the future.
Other than talent and opportunity, what makes some people more successful than others? One important determinant of success is self-control—the capacity to regulate attention, emotion, and behavior in the presence of temptation. A second important determinant of success is grit—the tenacious pursuit of a dominant superordinate goal despite setbacks. Self-control and grit are strongly correlated, but not perfectly so. This means that some people with high levels of self-control capably handle temptations but do not consistently pursue a dominant goal. Likewise, some exceptional achievers are prodigiously gritty but succumb to temptations in domains other than their chosen life passion. Understanding how goals are hierarchically organized clarifies how self-control and grit are related but distinct: Self-control entails aligning actions with any valued goal despite momentarily more-alluring alternatives; grit, in contrast, entails having and working assiduously toward a single challenging superordinate goal through thick and thin, on a timescale of years or even decades. Although both self-control and grit entail aligning actions with intentions, they operate in different ways and over different timescales. This hierarchical goal framework suggests novel directions for basic and applied research on success.
In the origin of syntax, primitive, holophrastic signs had to be weakened (original, drastic ‘bleaching’) and to lose their previous status of whole message. The original syntax was probably thema/rhema syntax. The earliest themas repeat the hearer’s message: the speaker embeds the hearer’s message in his own message. In this way a holophrase could be weakened, and turn into a part of a syntactic combination. This pregrammatical, interpersonal ‘recursive embedding’ is embodied in sensorimotor processes. The upper level is embodied in the intonation; the lower level, in the articulatory-phonetic word. This decoupling of intonation and articulatory pattern–i.e. the emergence of intonation capable of comprising more than one word–facilitated the weakening of previous holophrases and the genesis of syntax. In time, that facilitation determined the preeminence of voice over gesture, regardless of whether or not that preeminence existed before syntax.
Keywords: bleaching (semantic weakening); embodied cognition; holophrastic sign; intonation; recursive mind.
Weakness of the will may lead to ineffective goal striving in the sense that people lacking willpower fail to get started, to stay on track, to select instrumental means, and to act efficiently. However, using a simple self-regulation strategy (i.e., forming implementation intentions or making if–then plans) can get around this problem by drastically improving goal striving on the spot. After an overview of research investigating how implementation intentions work, I will discuss how people can use implementation intentions to overcome potential hindrances to successful goal attainment. Extensive empirical research shows that implementation intentions help people to meet their goals no matter whether these hindrances originate from within (e.g., lack of cognitive capabilities) or outside the person (i.e., difficult social situations). Moreover, I will report recent research demonstrating that implementation intentions can even be used to control impulsive cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses that interfere with one’s focal goal striving. In ending, I will present various new lines of implementation intention research, and raise a host of open questions that still deserve further empirical and theoretical analysis.
What makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either as a proximate “how” question or as an ultimate “why” question. The “how” question is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judgments and interactions, and has been investigated by psychologists and social scientists. The “why” question is about the fitness consequences that explain why humans have morality, and has been discussed by evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation. Our goal here is to contribute to a fruitful articulation of such proximate and ultimate explanations of human morality. We develop an approach to morality as an adaptation to an environment in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and recruited in mutually advantageous cooperative interactions. In this environment, the best strategy is to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation equally. Those who offer less than others will be left out of cooperation; conversely, those who offer more will be exploited by their partners. In line with this mutualistic approach, the study of a range of economic games involving property rights, collective actions, mutual help and punishment shows that participants' distributions aim at sharing the costs and benefits of interactions in an impartial way. In particular, the distribution of resources is influenced by effort and talent, and the perception of each participant's rights on the resources to be distributed.
We rely constantly on self-control in every aspect of our lives. Although it is not an ability unique to humans, our elevated levels of self-control may have played a key role in our evolution. Self-control is likely to have been key to many of the traits such as prosociality, that define modern humans. Despite this, attempts to study the evolution of self control through characteristics of the archaeological record have been few. Studies of related concepts such as inhibitory control have often been vague and do not reflect the whole scope of self-control. Defining self-control as arising from a combination of cognitive abilities including inhibition and the conscious regulation of emotions, this paper sets out a novel approach. We identify links between material culture, behaviours and the cognitive–emotional processes underlying them and produce testable predictions of what increases in these abilities might look like in the archaeological record. Using an example, we consider how late Acheulean handaxes (bifaces) demonstrate five characteristics that can be related to forms of self-control: deliberate practice, forward planning, time and energy investment, hierarchical processing, and distress tolerance. This provides some initial insights and lays the groundwork for future research in this area.
Cooperative behavior is central to human societies. Human adults who reach their cooperative decisions more rapidly and independently of cognitive control display greater levels of prosocial behavior. This is taken to show that cooperation is guided by intuitive processes rather than by active control of selfish impulses. The current study investigated the emergence of intuitive cooperation in early human ontogeny. We measured helping behavior (latency and frequency) in a longitudinal sample of infants at ages 14 and 18 months. Between 14 and 18 months, the frequency of helping significantly increased and latency to help significantly decreased, suggesting advances in helping behavior during this period of development. Moreover, at 18 months and to some extent, even at 14 months, infants who helped more rapidly (as indexed by a shorter latency) acted more prosocially (as indexed by a greater frequency of helping) than infants who were slower to help. This link between latency and frequency of prosocial behavior was independent of infants' ability for inhibitory control and general sociability levels. Prosocial behavior thus begins to be governed by intuitive processes that operate independently of cognitive control early in human ontogeny. This informs our understanding of the nature and emergence of cooperative behavior by supporting accounts that assign a central role to intuition in the evolution of human cooperation.
According to the dual inheritance theory, cultural learning in our species is a biased and highly efficient process of transmitting cultural traits. Here we define a model of cultural learning where social learning is integrated as a complementary element that facilitates the discovery of a specific behavior by an apprentice, and not as a mechanism that works in opposition to individual learning. In that context, we propose that the emergence of the ability to approve or disapprove of offspring behavior, orienting their learning (a process we call assessor teaching), transformed primate social learning into a cultural transmission system, like that which characterizes our species. Assessor teaching facilitates the replication and/or reconstruction of behaviors that are difficult to imitate and helps to determine which behaviors should be imitated. We also explore the form in which assessor teaching has conditioned the evolution of our abilities to develop cultures in the hominin line, converting us into individuals equipped with what we call a suadens psychology. Our main point is to defend the hypothesis that suadens psychology determines the stability and dynamics that affect the trajectories of many cultural characters. We compare our proposal with other theories about cultural evolution, specifically with dual inheritance theory and cultural attraction theory. You can read the paper in
https://rdcu.be/bgnlx
Pride, shame, and guilt color our highest and lowest personal moments. Recent
evidence suggests that these self-conscious emotions are neurocognitive
adaptations crafted by natural selection. Specifically, self-conscious emotions
solve adaptive problems of social valuation by promoting the achievement of
valued actions and characteristics to increase others’ valuations of the individual
(pride); limiting information-triggered devaluation (shame); and remedying
events where one put insufficient weight on the welfare of a valuable other
(guilt). This adaptationist perspective predicts a form–function
fit: a correspondence between the adaptive function of a self-conscious emotion and its
information-processing structure. This framework can parsimoniously explain
known facts about self-conscious emotions, make sense of puzzling
findings, generate novel hypotheses, and explain why self-conscious emotions have
their characteristic self-reflexive phenomenology.
Moral thinking pervades our practical lives, but where did this way of thinking come from, and what purpose does it serve? Is it to be explained by environmental pressures on our ancestors a million years ago, or is it a cultural invention of more recent origin? In The Evolution of Morality, Richard Joyce takes up these controversial questions, finding that the evidence supports an innate basis to human morality. As a moral philosopher, Joyce is interested in whether any implications follow from this hypothesis. Might the fact that the human brain has been biologically prepared by natural selection to engage in moral judgment serve in some sense to vindicate this way of thinking—staving off the threat of moral skepticism, or even undergirding some version of moral realism? Or if morality has an adaptive explanation in genetic terms—if it is, as Joyce writes, "just something that helped our ancestors make more babies"—might such an explanation actually undermine morality's central role in our lives? He carefully examines both the evolutionary "vindication of morality" and the evolutionary "debunking of morality," considering the skeptical view more seriously than have others who have treated the subject.
Interdisciplinary and combining the latest results from the empirical sciences with philosophical discussion, The Evolution of Morality is one of the few books in this area written from the perspective of moral philosophy. Concise and without technical jargon, the arguments are rigorous but accessible to readers from different academic backgrounds. Joyce discusses complex issues in plain language while advocating subtle and sometimes radical views. The Evolution of Morality lays the philosophical foundations for further research into the biological understanding of human morality.
Bradford Books imprint
In this thesis I discuss the Sexual Selection for Morality (SSM) hypothesis, which seeks to explain the evolution of morality in terms of sexual selection and costly signalling. The first part of the thesis puts SSM on the table for critical dissection. My starting point is the work on sexual selection, costly signalling, and morality by evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller. I clarify and elaborate upon Miller's views by drawing on recent work in signalling theory. The result is a clearer and more nuanced version of SSM. In the second part of the thesis, I evaluate the empirical evidence for this revised version of SSM. I first clarify the predictions of the hypothesis, then survey relevant literature from biology, psychology, anthropology, and economics. Findings from these fields combine to support the claim that moral behaviour plays a signalling role. However, it appears likely that such signals are aimed at many receivers in addition to potential mates, including potential social allies as well as sexual and social rivals. SSM should thus be seen as part of a more general signalling-based account of morality. The third and final part of the thesis considers the metaethical implications of the truth of SSM. A relatively recent arrival on the metaethical scene is the Darwinian debunker, who claims that an evolutionary explanation of morality is, broadly speaking, undermining of morality. A prominent line of reply has been to claim that the fact (if it be one) that human morality is an adaptation shaped by selection over many millennia provides reason to think that our faculty for making moral judgements is likely to mostly produce true judgements. I call this the reliabilist reply. If SSM is true, I argue, then not all the conditions required for the success of the reliabilist reply are met. In particular, what I call the tracking condition fails to be met. The truth of SSM thus counts against the plausibility of the reliabilist reply and lends support to Darwinian debunkings of morality.
It is often, though sometimes only implicitly, assumed that biological/genetic evolution sets neural substrates, that neural substrates fix cognitive abilities, and that cognitive abilities determine the spectrum of cultural practices exhibited by a biological species. We label this view as the “bottom‐up‐only” view. In this paper we will show that such a “chain of dependence” is much looser than usually assumed, especially as far as recent periods (the last 800,000 years vs. the last 7 million years or more) are considered. We will provide evidence and arguments supporting the idea that cultural innovation may have direct and ascertainable effects both on the cognitive capabilities of populations of hominins (via what we call “cultural exaptation”) and on the neural substrates of the individuals in those populations (via what we call “cultural neural reuse”). Together, cultural exaptation and cultural neural reuse may give raise to a plausible general mechanism for cognitive evolution in which culture is the driving force, thus offering a “top‐down‐also” view of human evolution.
In this paper, I present a new general hypothesis concerning the origin and evolutionary development of human language and its speakers. The hypothesis is based on the theory of language I develop in Dor (2015): language should be properly understood as a social communication technology of a very particular type, collectively constructed for the specific function of the instruction of imagination. The hypothesis, then, runs as follows: pre-linguistic humans (most probably Homo erectus) developed their culture and their pre-linguistic communication to the point where the collective invention of language became both necessary and possible. The moment of the origin consisted of no more than exploratory attempts to use what had already been achieved to go into the realm of the instruction of imagination. When the new function began to show its potential, a developmental process was launched that was directly driven throughout by the constant pressure to raise the levels of collective success in instructive communication. Throughout the process, individuals were selected for their ability to meet the challenges of the emerging technology, and the required capacities were (partially and variably) genetically accommodated. Homo sapiens, an imaginative species adapted for fast speech, and maybe our sisters species too, eventually emerged from the collectively-driven process with unique adaptations to language.
Foot (2001), Hursthouse (1999), and Thompson (2008), along with other philosophers, have argued for a metaethical position, the natural goodness approach, that claims moral judgments are, or are on a par with, teleological claims made in the biological sciences. Specifically, an organism’s flourishing is characterized by how well they function as specified by the species to which they belong. In this essay, I first sketch the Neo-Aristotelian natural goodness approach. Second, I argue that critics who claim that this sort of approach is inconsistent with evolutionary biology due to its species essentialism are incorrect. Third, I contend that combining the natural goodness account of natural-historical judgments with our best account of natural normativity, the selected effects theory of function, leads to implausible moral judgments. This is so if selected effects function are understood in terms of evolution by natural selection, but also if they are characterized in terms of cultural evolution. Thus, I conclude that proponents of the natural goodness approach must either embrace non-naturalistic vitalism or troubling moral revisionism.
What do the pointing gesture, the imitation of new complex motor patterns, the evocation of absent objects and the grasping of others’ false beliefs all have in common? Apart from being (one way or other) involved in the language, they all would share a demanding requirement – a second mental centre within the subject. This redefinition of the simulationism is extended in the present book in two directions. Firstly, mirror-neurons and, likewise, animal abilities connected with the visual field of their fellows, although they certainly constitute important landmarks, would not require this second mental centre. Secondly, others’ beliefs would have given rise not only to predicative communicative function but also to pre-grammatical syntax. The inquiry about the evolutionary-historic origin of language focuses on the cognitive requirements on it as a faculty (but not to the indirect causes such as environmental changes or greater co-operation), pays attention to children, and covers other human peculiarities as well, e.g., symbolic play, protodeclaratives, self-conscious emotions, and interactional or four-hand tasks.
Human prosociality is marked by the versatility with which we help across various contexts. New research highlights that this capacity emerges early in human ontogeny. In this article, I review evidence showing that young children's helping is both flexible and robust, based upon inferential social-cognitive capacities and prosocial motivations. Then I discuss the possible evolutionary function of helping skills as an early-emerging trait. I use evolutionary theory and anthropological evidence to support the hypothesis that children's helping affects adult subsistence in traditional societies and argue that evolution thus might have favored an early developmental onset of these behaviors.
Executive function (EF) improves between the ages of 3 and 5 and has been assessed reliably using the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS), a task in which children first sort bivalent cards by one dimension (e.g., shape) and then are instructed to sort by a different dimension (e.g., color). Three-year-olds typically perseverate on the pre-switch dimension, whereas 5-year-olds switch flexibly. Labeling task stimuli can facilitate EF performance (0110 and 0060), but the nature of this effect is unclear. In 3 experiments we examined 2 hypotheses deriving from different theoretical perspectives: first, that labels facilitate performance in a more bottom-up fashion, by biasing attention to relevant task rules (Kirkham et al., 2003); and second, that labels aid performance in a more top-down fashion by prompting reflection and an understanding of the hierarchical nature of the task (Zelazo, 2004). Children performed better on the DCCS when labels referred to the relevant sorting dimension (Experiment 1). This was a function of the content of the labels rather than the change in auditory signal across phases (Experiment 2). Furthermore, labeling the opposite dimension only did not have a symmetrically negative effect on performance (Experiment 3). Together, these results suggest external, verbal labels bias children to attend to task-relevant information, likely through interaction with emerging top-down, endogenous control.