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74 Kosjenka Dumančić, Nika Šimurina, Anita Čeh Časni, Mirjana Hladika
Markušić, S., Stanko, D., Korbar, T. Belić, N., Penava, D., Kordić, B. (2020). e Zagreb
(Croatia) M5.5. Earthquake on 22 March 2020. Geosciences, Vol. 10(7), 252. Availa-
ble at: https://www.mdpi.com/2076–3263/10/7/252/htm
Ocial Gazette (2013). Zakon o gradnji [Construction Act]. Ocial Gazette, No. 153/13,
20/17, 39/19, 125/19.
Ocial Gazette (2013). Zakon o porezu na dodanu vrijednost [Value Added Tax Act].
Ocial Gazette, No. 73/13, 99/13, 148/13, 153/13, 143/14, 115/16, 106/18, 121/19,
138/20.
Ocial Gazette (2013). Zakon o prostornom uređenju [Spatial Planning Act]. Ocial
Gazette, No. 153/13, 65/17, 114/18, 39/19, 98/19.
Ocial Gazette (2018). Zakon o porezu na promet nekretnina [Real Estate Transfer Tax
Act]. Ocial Gazette, No. 115/16, 106/18.
Scharmann, L.; Cibilic, A. (2020). Introduction to the Croatian Spatial Planning System.
Project ‘Rainman’ funded by Interreg Central Europe, European Commission. Avail-
able at: https://rainman-toolbox.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/RAINMAN_Spa-
tial-Planning_Croatia.pdf
Vadali, S. R. (2014). Using the Economic Value Created by Transportation to Fund Trans-
portation. National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Transportation Research
Board of the National Academics. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publica-
tion/262500680_Using_the_Economic_Value_Created_by_Transportation_to_Fund_
Transportation
Ziha, N. (2016). Croatian Property Law Between Tradition and Transition: A Revival
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(VADEA).
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8 Czechia
Eliška Vejchodská, Vojtěch Bosák, Ondřej Slach, Petr Rumpel
8.1 Local Authories and Planning System
Czech land-use planning is dened by Building Act No. 183/2006 Coll. until 2023. After-
wards, a new law (Building Act No. 283/2021 Coll.) comes into force. e new law leaves
the fundamental principles of planning untouched, but the opportunities for land value cap-
ture were changed as described below. As the new coalition established after 2021 elections
claims that signicant changes to the new law have to be undertaken, the future of Czech
planning rules is rather unclear.
e planning process usually proceeds in the following steps: land-use plan approval, plan-
ning permission approval, and building permit approval. Land-use plans are initiated and
approved by municipal authorities. ey are created in accordance with many rather strin-
gent laws and central state agencies directives. us, this central state guidance supports as
well as constrains local planning. Land-use plans are prepared at a scale of 1:10,000, not
enabling going into detail. ey only dene the type of future development without delin-
eating the spatial structure of development, gross oor area of new development, public space
or infrastructural needs. It is therefore not well suited for public value capture like dening
obligations for developers, as the future use of the plots as well as infrastructural needs are
still unclear. Municipal authorities might also initiate the creation of a more detailed plan
called a regulatory plan, which is voluntary. Nevertheless, as they nd the preparation of
regulatory plans rather unfeasible within the Czech institutional context, regulatory plans
are rarely implemented. erefore, only land-use plans that are less detailed than regulatory
plans guide most development and are rst and usually at the same time the last planning
stage in Czechia with political decision-making power. e rest of the development approval
process is in the hands of public administration ocers who, based on the limits dened by
land-use plans, approve planning and building permits1 of individual investors (MRDCR,
2019). Land-use plans are binding for their decision-making and enable obtaining planning
permissions by landowners unconditionally after fullling law requirements. e opportu-
nities for public value capture within these planning stages are thoroughly described below.
8.2 Recurring Forms of public value capture
Recurrent forms generally concern taxes on real property, which in Czechia include real
estate tax and capital gains tax. e real estate tax accrues to, and its amount is inuenced
by, the municipality. However, income from this tax is relatively negligible compared to the
centrally collected and redistributed revenue from shared taxes. About 1.3% of the total
1 Planning permission stage veries the possibility to place a parcular building on a plot based on technical infra-
structural needs (e.g. the connecon of planned development to the road network), land-use plan requirements
and other general regulaons; within the building permission stage, technical details of planned development
are checked with the support of a detailed technical documentaon.
8
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76 Eliška Vejchodská, Vojtěch Bosák, Ondřej Slach, Petr Rumpel
tax revenues of public budgets came from property taxes, including real estate tax, in 2019
(OECD, 2020). Capital gains tax accrues to the national budget and is related to income
taxation.
8.2.1 Recurring Forms (Annual Payments)
8.2.1.1 Real Estate Tax
e real estate tax is based on Act No. 338/1992 Coll. It is necessary to stress that the Czech
real estate tax is meagre and among the lowest within the OECD countries (OECD, 2020).
Its low yield reects the broader pattern of the lower signicance of real estate taxes in tran-
sition countries (Janoušková and Sobotovičová, 2021). is tax made up 4% of municipal
budgets in 2012 (Sedmihradská, 2013) and 0.6% of total national tax revenue in 2017
(Janoušková and Sobotovičová, 2021). Calculating the real estate tax amount for each prop-
erty is a complex process. In the rst step, it relies on xed rates (e.g. amount of CZK per
1m2 of built-up area) or prices set by law (e.g. land prices set by law taxed by an annual rate
of 0.75%) without any relation to market value. In the second step, the calculated amount
is multiplied by a coecient dependent on the number of inhabitants of the municipality
in which real estate is located. ese default coecients can be largely decreased or slightly
increased by the municipality.
Land and buildings are taxed as separate units, while the land is taxed at a lower xed rate per
square metre than the gross oor area of buildings. Commercial and industrial property is
taxed at a higher xed rate than residential property (probably due to the political feasibility
of real estate taxation), and agricultural land and undeveloped land are taxed at a lower rate
than residential property (Sedmihradská, 2013).
Although experts recommend calculation based on market value, its implementation is hin-
dered by the nancial and administrative demands of the valuation system (Janoušková and
Sobotovičová, 2021).
e real estate tax does not play any role in the decision-making concerning the use of the
property, as it is too low. Similarly, the possibilities of coecients’ adjustment given to mu-
nicipalities do not signicantly aect the total amount of real estate tax collected as they are
rarely used (Janoušková and Sobotovičová, 2021).
8.2.2 Recurring Forms (in Case of Sale/Purchase)
8.2.2.1 Real Estate Transfer Tax
Real estate transfer tax applied on the property purchaser was abolished in 2020, whereas in-
heritance tax was abolished in 2014. e reason for abolishing transfer tax was, as explained
by politicians, to support the real estate market aected by the Covid-19 pandemic. How-
ever, the abolition was not a temporary measure tied to the Covid-19-induced economic
crisis.
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76 Eliška Vejchodská, Vojtěch Bosák, Ondřej Slach, Petr Rumpel
tax revenues of public budgets came from property taxes, including real estate tax, in 2019
(OECD, 2020). Capital gains tax accrues to the national budget and is related to income
taxation.
8.2.1 Recurring Forms (Annual Payments)
8.2.1.1 Real Estate Tax
e real estate tax is based on Act No. 338/1992 Coll. It is necessary to stress that the Czech
real estate tax is meagre and among the lowest within the OECD countries (OECD, 2020).
Its low yield reects the broader pattern of the lower signicance of real estate taxes in tran-
sition countries (Janoušková and Sobotovičová, 2021). is tax made up 4% of municipal
budgets in 2012 (Sedmihradská, 2013) and 0.6% of total national tax revenue in 2017
(Janoušková and Sobotovičová, 2021). Calculating the real estate tax amount for each prop-
erty is a complex process. In the rst step, it relies on xed rates (e.g. amount of CZK per
1m2 of built-up area) or prices set by law (e.g. land prices set by law taxed by an annual rate
of 0.75%) without any relation to market value. In the second step, the calculated amount
is multiplied by a coecient dependent on the number of inhabitants of the municipality
in which real estate is located. ese default coecients can be largely decreased or slightly
increased by the municipality.
Land and buildings are taxed as separate units, while the land is taxed at a lower xed rate per
square metre than the gross oor area of buildings. Commercial and industrial property is
taxed at a higher xed rate than residential property (probably due to the political feasibility
of real estate taxation), and agricultural land and undeveloped land are taxed at a lower rate
than residential property (Sedmihradská, 2013).
Although experts recommend calculation based on market value, its implementation is hin-
dered by the nancial and administrative demands of the valuation system (Janoušková and
Sobotovičová, 2021).
e real estate tax does not play any role in the decision-making concerning the use of the
property, as it is too low. Similarly, the possibilities of coecients’ adjustment given to mu-
nicipalities do not signicantly aect the total amount of real estate tax collected as they are
rarely used (Janoušková and Sobotovičová, 2021).
8.2.2 Recurring Forms (in Case of Sale/Purchase)
8.2.2.1 Real Estate Transfer Tax
Real estate transfer tax applied on the property purchaser was abolished in 2020, whereas in-
heritance tax was abolished in 2014. e reason for abolishing transfer tax was, as explained
by politicians, to support the real estate market aected by the Covid-19 pandemic. How-
ever, the abolition was not a temporary measure tied to the Covid-19-induced economic
crisis.
Public_Value.indd 76Public_Value.indd 76 13.10.2022 07:45:4313.10.2022 07:45:43
8 Czechia 77
8.2.2.2 Capital Gains Tax
e capital gains tax from sold real property is based on Act No. 586/1992 Coll. on income
tax. e general income tax, covering also the income from capital gain, is determined at a
15% level (person’s income in excess of 48 times the average wage is taxed at a 23% tax rate).
e capital gains from the sale of real properties are tax exempted for individuals if the seller
uses the revenue for buying another property for their own housing needs. Sales are also tax
exempted after 10 years of ownership, or if the seller lived in real estate for more than 2 years
before the sale.
8.3 Non-recurring Forms of public value capture
In this section, several non-recurrent forms of public value capture are discussed. Compared
to recurrent forms, these rest on the discretion of local actors, which pose higher demands
on the capacities and resources of local actors for their implementation.
8.3.1 Non-recurring Forms (Focusing on One Factor of Value Increase)
8.3.1.1 Fee for Construcon of Infrastructure
Act No. 565/1990 Coll. on local fees establishes the opportunity for the municipality to
collect a fee from the owners of developable plots for the improvement of their property
stemming from its connection to the water supply or sewerage system. e fee does not re-
late to any other type of infrastructure and is collected by the infrastructure provider, often
the municipality. e fee must not exceed the dierence between the price of land with and
without the possibility of the connection to the waterworks or sewerage system. Its calcu-
lation is based on the developable land area, not on any other measure, such as gross oor
area. e fee needs to be set by the municipality in a generally binding decree issued in the
year of the nal inspection of the construction at the latest.
8.3.1.2 Infrastructure Investments by Developers
Other relevant duties of investors follow Act No. 274/2001 Coll. on water lines and sew-
erage systems. is act states that if an investor requests connection to water lines or sew-
erage system, but this action would exceed this infrastructure’s (clearly dened) capacity,
the municipality is not obliged to accept the request. Many big investors invest in capacity
enlargement themselves if they want to get planning permission (on the other hand, other
investors in the same area can take advantage of these undertaken investments for free). e
same principle stays within the area of transport infrastructure provision. In large cities,
where private development necessitates the accommodation of the adjacent infrastructure
(for instance, an increase of its capacity), the developer company is usually responsible for
it; otherwise, it would not obtain the planning permit. In other circumstances, such as in
the case of small investors, the connection to transport infrastructure is provided by the road
owner without any conditions, which is on the local level the municipality usually. In fact,
the public sector often pays for the connection of plots to transport infrastructure.
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78 Eliška Vejchodská, Vojtěch Bosák, Ondřej Slach, Petr Rumpel
8.3.2 Non-recurring Forms (Focusing on More than One Factor of Value Increase)
8.3.2.1 Replong
e Building Act (183/2006 Coll.) denes replotting (land readjustment or land reallo-
cation, in other words), which focuses on adjusting land for new needs within a develop-
ment area. e instrument was introduced by the amendment of the Building Act by Act
No.350/2012 Coll., which species that:
‘e land-use plan may dene the area or corridor in which any changes in the area [its devel-
opment] is conditioned by a contract with the owners of land and buildings that will be aected
by the proposed plan, which must include approval of the plan and consent to the distribution of
costs and benets associated with its implementation.’
e ‘replotting agreement’ species, for instance:
• the share of individual owners in the total value of land and buildings or the area of the
territory concerned,
• the obligation of the owners to reduce their share by transferring a proportional part of
the land necessary for the implementation of technical infrastructure,
• the obligation of the owners to tolerate a part of the technical infrastructure on their
land,
• consent of the owners with the replotting intention,
• an agreement on property settlement if some owners lose their landownership by replot-
ting or if the parcelling proposed in connection with the new land use does not allow
them to maintain their share in the total value or acreage of the site.
As it is obvious from the list of demands that, for reaching the replotting agreement, resolv-
ing several potentially conicting issues that aect property rights is necessary. In combina-
tion with the requirement of 100% consent of all owners in the area, this proved unrealistic
in most cases. e ownership is often so fragmented that transaction costs of undertaking
such a negotiating process with a high probability of not being approved in the end prevent
from even trying it. After municipalities realised this was a dead-end, they relinquished con-
ditioning the new development by ‘replotting agreements’.
e new Building Act No. 283/2021 Coll. does not dene the instrument replotting or land
adjustment at all.
In addition to this instrument, there is a particular instrument to be used for farmland pur-
poses only, based on Act No. 139/2002 Coll. on land consolidations. Land consolidation
seems to be an absolute necessity as a legacy of socialism. During socialism, some farmland
was developed or reorganised, some previous roads disappeared, and new ones were created.
As properties were given back to previous owners before their nationalisation, the resultant
property structure did not allow smooth farming. Compared to replotting, land consolida-
tion functions well in terms of the number of projects nalised. However, this instrument
cannot be considered a value capture instrument. e idea is to spatially and functionally
organise farmland in the public interest and in the interest of the rational management of
landowners’ properties. e nal objective is to ensure the accessibility and use of farmland.
e law states that “if it is necessary to set aside the necessary acreage of land for common facili-
Public_Value.indd 78Public_Value.indd 78 13.10.2022 07:45:4313.10.2022 07:45:43
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78 Eliška Vejchodská, Vojtěch Bosák, Ondřej Slach, Petr Rumpel
8.3.2 Non-recurring Forms (Focusing on More than One Factor of Value Increase)
8.3.2.1 Replong
e Building Act (183/2006 Coll.) denes replotting (land readjustment or land reallo-
cation, in other words), which focuses on adjusting land for new needs within a develop-
ment area. e instrument was introduced by the amendment of the Building Act by Act
No.350/2012 Coll., which species that:
‘e land-use plan may dene the area or corridor in which any changes in the area [its devel-
opment] is conditioned by a contract with the owners of land and buildings that will be aected
by the proposed plan, which must include approval of the plan and consent to the distribution of
costs and benets associated with its implementation.’
e ‘replotting agreement’ species, for instance:
• the share of individual owners in the total value of land and buildings or the area of the
territory concerned,
• the obligation of the owners to reduce their share by transferring a proportional part of
the land necessary for the implementation of technical infrastructure,
• the obligation of the owners to tolerate a part of the technical infrastructure on their
land,
• consent of the owners with the replotting intention,
• an agreement on property settlement if some owners lose their landownership by replot-
ting or if the parcelling proposed in connection with the new land use does not allow
them to maintain their share in the total value or acreage of the site.
As it is obvious from the list of demands that, for reaching the replotting agreement, resolv-
ing several potentially conicting issues that aect property rights is necessary. In combina-
tion with the requirement of 100% consent of all owners in the area, this proved unrealistic
in most cases. e ownership is often so fragmented that transaction costs of undertaking
such a negotiating process with a high probability of not being approved in the end prevent
from even trying it. After municipalities realised this was a dead-end, they relinquished con-
ditioning the new development by ‘replotting agreements’.
e new Building Act No. 283/2021 Coll. does not dene the instrument replotting or land
adjustment at all.
In addition to this instrument, there is a particular instrument to be used for farmland pur-
poses only, based on Act No. 139/2002 Coll. on land consolidations. Land consolidation
seems to be an absolute necessity as a legacy of socialism. During socialism, some farmland
was developed or reorganised, some previous roads disappeared, and new ones were created.
As properties were given back to previous owners before their nationalisation, the resultant
property structure did not allow smooth farming. Compared to replotting, land consolida-
tion functions well in terms of the number of projects nalised. However, this instrument
cannot be considered a value capture instrument. e idea is to spatially and functionally
organise farmland in the public interest and in the interest of the rational management of
landowners’ properties. e nal objective is to ensure the accessibility and use of farmland.
e law states that “if it is necessary to set aside the necessary acreage of land for common facili-
Public_Value.indd 78Public_Value.indd 78 13.10.2022 07:45:4313.10.2022 07:45:43
8 Czechia 79
ties [e.g. technical infrastructure, or anti-erosion measures], land owned by the state and then
owned by the municipality shall be used rst”. e landowners have to receive a property in
the same value (valued according to the criterion of land fertility, not the provision of infra-
structure) as before, plus or minus 4%.
8.3.2.2 State Acquision of Land
e instrument which enables the state to acquire property beyond private law contracts is
based on Act No. 256/2013 Coll. on cadastre, which species that properties with unclear
ownership rights whose owners do not use them and do not pay property tax will become
state ownership. is issue is not rare due to discontinuity in property rights caused by
socialism and later transition to the market economy (see above). e owners have a legally
determined (see Act No. 89/2012, Civil code) period for claiming their ownership for such
properties, which ends by the end of 2023. After that, a state agency (Oce for Government
Representation in Property Aairs) will acquire the property until it is sold to the highest
bidder in a public auction. is instrument aims to unblock the development of neglected
properties, be it for private or public investment. Since it is sold regardless of the intended
use, the goal is not the active land-use planning and value capture.
8.3.2.3 Temporarily Restricted Property Rights
e possibility to restrict property rights temporarily is based on Act No. 283/2021 Coll.
on building law (included also in the law No. 183/2006 Coll.). It concerns the temporary
restriction (up to 6 years) of building activity in the delimited area until the new land-use
plan is approved. It enables the municipality to restrict development when it exceeds public
infrastructure capacity, and the solution requires new land-use regulation. It can be consid-
ered a supportive instrument for public infrastructure cost recovery in a later planning phase
if the municipality utilises this phase for negotiating with local landowners.
8.3.2.4 Cooperave Development by Urban Contracts
e legal framework of the Building Act No. 183/2006 Coll. currently oers limited op-
portunities to utilise urban developer obligations for land value capture. erefore, some
municipalities try improvising in implementing some voluntary obligation models based on
private law, which would allow them to grasp at least a small part of the land value increase
caused by planning.
e Building Act 183/2006 Coll. mentions ‘planning contracts’ (§66) applied when the
investor requests a regulatory plan. e investor requests a regulatory plan when the regu-
latory plan approval conditions the development of a particular area. e municipality has
1 year only for its approval; otherwise, this condition expires (§43), which is probably why
municipalities rarely use this instrument. As a part of the preparation of the regulatory plan,
the municipality can request signing a planning contract specifying a contribution of the
investor for the construction of infrastructure. However, since this type of regulatory plan is
rarely used, as are also planning contracts.
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80 Eliška Vejchodská, Vojtěch Bosák, Ondřej Slach, Petr Rumpel
Furthermore, building law species (§88) which requirements can be imposed on the inves-
tor for planning approval by public authorities. Suppose the planned project necessitates the
construction of additional technical and transport infrastructure outside the area proposed
for development due to the lack of infrastructure capacities (such as a new capacity intersec-
tion, new capacity of water pipes network). In that case, the investor has to sign contracts
with the owners of the infrastructure specifying the solution and usually covers the invest-
ment costs or provides the infrastructure on their own. is approach is much more often
used than the planning contracts based on §66.
e binding land-use plan enables the obtainment of planning permission by landowners
unconditionally, as specied in Section 3.1. e rest of the approval process concerns check-
ing formal requirements for new construction by administration ocers and ends with plan-
ning permits of individual investors. Municipal politicians have only the right to declare
their statement towards the intended development, which is not binding for public ocials.
Although the decision of public administration should be politically independent, munici-
pal politicians dominate over public ocials as they can inuence their employment status
or nancial bonuses (Feřtrová et al., 2013), which forms the basis for political inuence over
granting planning approval. e threat of hindering the process by local authorities leads to
the willingness of developers to negotiate with them and to give a voluntary nancial con-
tribution to municipalities in return for the decrease of the risk of blocking development by
them. Mostly, these voluntary contributions amount to € 20–80 per square meter gross oor
area (Vejchodská and Hendricks, 2022).
e new law No. 283/2021 Coll. formalises planning contracts to be used more often for
public infrastructure costs recovery, and removes the informal linkage between municipal
politicians and employers of the building oce by removing the delegated powers in the
building approval process from the municipal oce to the state. is step largely disables
the functioning of the voluntary developer contribution schemes and seeks to enable the
penetration of more formal obligations in the future. It even includes the possibility for
the municipality to require in-kind or cash contributions from landowners for changes of
land-use plan without which the development intention cannot be realised (the law limits
neither the character nor the scope of these contributions). However, in situations without
the need to change the land-use plan, the utilisation of planning contracts is limited. First,
the land-use plan needs to specify places where development is conditioned by concluding a
planning contract with the investor. Second, this condition is valid for 4 years only starting
from the land-use plan approval. After this period, development can proceed without any
obligations from the side of the investor. We can expect that the real eect of such planning
contracts will primarily be the postponement of development rather than covering the costs
of public infrastructural needs.
8.4 Interim Conclusion for Czechia
e paper reviewed the number of public value capture instruments recognised in Czech law
or informally used in practice. e existing institutional context of planning in Czechia of-
fers limited opportunities for land value capture, although some rather eective approaches
Public_Value.indd 80Public_Value.indd 80 13.10.2022 07:45:4313.10.2022 07:45:43
© CC BY NC, https://vdf.ch/public-value-capture-of-increasing-property-values-across-europe-e-book.html
80 Eliška Vejchodská, Vojtěch Bosák, Ondřej Slach, Petr Rumpel
Furthermore, building law species (§88) which requirements can be imposed on the inves-
tor for planning approval by public authorities. Suppose the planned project necessitates the
construction of additional technical and transport infrastructure outside the area proposed
for development due to the lack of infrastructure capacities (such as a new capacity intersec-
tion, new capacity of water pipes network). In that case, the investor has to sign contracts
with the owners of the infrastructure specifying the solution and usually covers the invest-
ment costs or provides the infrastructure on their own. is approach is much more often
used than the planning contracts based on §66.
e binding land-use plan enables the obtainment of planning permission by landowners
unconditionally, as specied in Section 3.1. e rest of the approval process concerns check-
ing formal requirements for new construction by administration ocers and ends with plan-
ning permits of individual investors. Municipal politicians have only the right to declare
their statement towards the intended development, which is not binding for public ocials.
Although the decision of public administration should be politically independent, munici-
pal politicians dominate over public ocials as they can inuence their employment status
or nancial bonuses (Feřtrová et al., 2013), which forms the basis for political inuence over
granting planning approval. e threat of hindering the process by local authorities leads to
the willingness of developers to negotiate with them and to give a voluntary nancial con-
tribution to municipalities in return for the decrease of the risk of blocking development by
them. Mostly, these voluntary contributions amount to € 20–80 per square meter gross oor
area (Vejchodská and Hendricks, 2022).
e new law No. 283/2021 Coll. formalises planning contracts to be used more often for
public infrastructure costs recovery, and removes the informal linkage between municipal
politicians and employers of the building oce by removing the delegated powers in the
building approval process from the municipal oce to the state. is step largely disables
the functioning of the voluntary developer contribution schemes and seeks to enable the
penetration of more formal obligations in the future. It even includes the possibility for
the municipality to require in-kind or cash contributions from landowners for changes of
land-use plan without which the development intention cannot be realised (the law limits
neither the character nor the scope of these contributions). However, in situations without
the need to change the land-use plan, the utilisation of planning contracts is limited. First,
the land-use plan needs to specify places where development is conditioned by concluding a
planning contract with the investor. Second, this condition is valid for 4 years only starting
from the land-use plan approval. After this period, development can proceed without any
obligations from the side of the investor. We can expect that the real eect of such planning
contracts will primarily be the postponement of development rather than covering the costs
of public infrastructural needs.
8.4 Interim Conclusion for Czechia
e paper reviewed the number of public value capture instruments recognised in Czech law
or informally used in practice. e existing institutional context of planning in Czechia of-
fers limited opportunities for land value capture, although some rather eective approaches
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8 Czechia 81
can be identied (for an overview of land value capture practice during the development
process, please see Figure 8.1).
Mainly larger municipalities found ways how to force developers to pay for the technical
infrastructure within their development areas and ways how to force them to increase the
capacities of technical infrastructure, which is necessary for the realisation of their projects
outside the development area. Beyond these requirements, some municipalities try to force
investors to give ‘voluntary’ contributions to the municipal budget or pay for additional
infrastructure on their own to create a good relationship between the developer and the
municipality. However, these contributions are minor, matching municipalities’ minimal
negotiating power after the approval of the binding land-use plan.
e debate on possibilities for land value capture has recently intensied among experts
and politicians (see, Vejchodská et al., 2019). Recent research indicates that various actors
in land development, including municipal authorities and private developers, perceive the
current situation in the public infrastructure provision as unsatisfactory. Municipal author-
ities miss better opportunities for public infrastructure provision, developers feel a lack of
a predictable entrepreneurial environment and would welcome some new models of land
value capture if they would provide them with a level playing eld and a better relationship
with the municipalities as well as the public (Vejchodská and Hendricks, 2022). e new
law No. 283/2021 Coll. also tried to react to this demand, partly unsuccessfully, however
(Felcman and Vejchodská, 2022). e continuing debate in Czechia on the eectiveness of
value capture models provides condent hope for the improvement of Czech public value
capture models in the years to come.
Figure 8.1: Value capture in CzechiaNote: e instrument of reallocation (land readjustment) does not
apply in Czechia.
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82 Eliška Vejchodská, Vojtěch Bosák, Ondřej Slach, Petr Rumpel
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