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The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale – 5: A short-form measure of conspiracist ideation
Abstract
The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCB-15) is a reliable and valid measure of conspiracist ideation, but it is also inefficient. At 15 items, the GCB-15 can take upwards of four minutes to complete. Here we introduce the GCB-5—a 5-item, short form of the GCB-15. Across five studies, we use self- and informant-report methods to demonstrate that the GCB-5 is a reliable, criterion-valid, and construct-valid measure of conspiracist ideation. In the final study, we further provide evidence that the GCB-5 has promise for addressing novel research questions. Specifically, we show that people high in conspiracist ideation—as assessed by the GCB-5—are more accepting of the use of nuclear weapons and other forms of so-called “virtuous violence” (e.g., anti-abortion legislation).
... Over the past decade, there has been increasing recognition of the negative consequences of conspiracist ideation (i.e., the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories; see Brotherton et al., 2013;Goreis & Voracek, 2019;Imhoff et al., 2022;Uscinski, 2020; see also Nera, 2024;Sutton et al., 2024). Research has suggested that those who believe in conspiracy theories are less likely to vote (Butler et al., 1995), vaccinate (Jolley & Douglas, 2014), and engage in behaviors intended to combat climate change (Van der Linden, 2015), as well as being more likely to harbor prejudicial beliefs (Kay, 2024a;Sapountzis & Condor, 2013) and hold favorable attitudes toward the use of nuclear weapons (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014;Kay & Slovic, 2023). To further investigate the consequences of conspiracist beliefs (and, ultimately, develop interventions to combat these beliefs), it is crucial for researchers to have measures that are psychometrically sound. ...
... Unfortunately, little work has been done to compare the psychometric properties of existing conspiracist ideation measures, making it exceptionally difficult for researchers to make informed decisions about which measures to use in their studies. The present project is intended to address this limitation by providing a psychometric comparison of five short-form conspiracist ideation measures: the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale-5 (GCB-5; Kay & Slovic, 2023), the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ; Bruder et al., 2013), the General Measure of Conspiracism (GMC; Drinkwater et al., 2012), the American Conspiracy Thinking Scale (ACTS; Uscinski & Parent, 2014), and the One-Item Conspiracy Measure (1CM; Lantian et al., 2016). 1 Background Before turning to our investigation, it is important to describe what we mean by a measure's ''psychometric properties.'' Here, we use the term to refer to three qualities of a scale: its reliability, validity, and efficiency. ...
... The efficiency of a scale refers to its length or, more specifically, its brevity. As has been discussed elsewhere (Kay & Slovic, 2023), efficient measures have several advantages over inefficient measures. For one, efficient measures can save researchers time. ...
Choosing a short-form measure of conspiracist ideation (i.e., the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories) is fraught. Despite there being numerous scales to choose from, little work has been done to compare their psychometric properties. To address this shortcoming, we compared the internal consistency, 2-week test–retest reliability, criterion validity, and construct validity of five short-form conspiracist ideation measures: the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale–5 (GCB-5), the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), the General Measure of Conspiracism (GMC), the American Conspiracy Thinking Scale (ACTS), and the One-Item Conspiracy Measure (1CM). The results of our investigation indicated that all five scales are reliable and valid measures of conspiracist ideation. That said, the GCB-5 tended to perform the best, while the 1CM tended to perform the worst. We conclude our investigation by discussing trade-offs among the five scales, as well as providing recommendations for future research.
... In the present study, we test the measurement invariance of four generic measures of conspiracist belief: the General Measure of Conspiracism (GMC; Drinkwater et al., 2012), the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale -5 (GCB-5; Kay & Slovic, 2023), the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ; Bruder et al., 2013), and the American Conspiracy Thinking Scale (ACTS; Uscinski & Parent, 2014). Despite all of these measures being generic, they differ in ways that could influence whether they are likely to be invariant or not. ...
... The GCB-5 (Kay & Slovic, 2023) was developed by extracting one item from each of the five themes of conspiracist belief captured by the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale -15 (GCB-15; Brotherton et al., 2013), including the belief that (1) the government engages in nefarious acts, (2) aliens exist and are being hidden from the public, (3) small, clandestine organizations manipulate world events, (4) the wellbeing of the public is under threat from plots hatched in secret places, and (5) the sharing and spread of information is controlled by people and organizations with sinister motives. Given that it was only recently introduced, there is not much existing evidence for the GCB-5's invariance, although some research has indicated that the GCB-5 has strong-factorial invariance across different gender identities and age groups (Dagnall et al., 2023). ...
... Unfortunately, despite a proliferation of measures for assessing conspiracist ideation, little work has been done to investigate and compare their psychometric properties (but see Kay & Slovic, 2023, 2024Swami et al., 2017), including, critically, their measurement invariance. In the present study, we tested the configural, metric, strong factorial, and strict factorial measurement invariance of four short-form conspiracist ideation measures-the GMC (Drinkwater et al., 2012), GCB-5 (Kay & Slovic, 2023), CMQ (Bruder et al., 2013), and ACTS (Uscinski & Parent, 2014)-between Democrats (n1 = 351) and Republicans (n2 = 339). ...
Are Republicans more likely to believe in conspiracy theories than Democrats? This question has received considerable attention among researchers, but answering it requires measures of conspiracist belief that function the same among Democrats and Republicans. Unfortunately, evidence of such measurement invariance is scarce. To address this limitation, the current preregistered study tested the invariance of four short-form conspiracist ideation measures across the two major US political parties. We hypothesized that all four scales would achieve strict factorial invariance. The General Measure of Conspiracism was the only measure to reach this level. The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale–5 and Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire, by contrast, only achieved metric invariance, despite the former demonstrating the greatest overall fit of the measures tested. The American Conspiracy Thinking Scale only achieved configural invariance. Researchers who are interested in comparing conspiracist ideation between Democrats and Republicans may, therefore, be best served by using the General Measure of Conspiracism.
... The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale-Short (GCB-5, Kay and Slovic, 2023) is a 5-item, abridged version of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (Brotherton et al., 2013), which assesses the tendency to endorse general (i.e., non-event-based) conspiracyrelated ideas and concepts (Kay and Slovic, 2023). Investigators have widely adopted the GCBS, and the instrument has attested psychometric properties (Brotherton et al., 2013;Drinkwater et al., 2020;Dinić et al., 2023). ...
... The instrument comprises the highest loading items from the five GCBS dimensions: government malfeasance, extraterrestrial cover-up, malevolent global conspiracy, personal well-being, and control of information. Researchers have recently validated the GCB-5 Kay and Slovic, 2023). Items appear as statements (e.g., ' A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major world decisions, such as going to war') and participants respond by completing a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = definitely not true to 5 = definitely true). ...
... The measurement instruments selected were theoretically and psychometrically satisfactory (RPBS, Drinkwater et al., 2017;SPQ-B, Raine and Benishay, 1995;PEFs, Drinkwater et al., 2022;GCBS-5, Dagnall et al., 2023;Kay and Slovic, 2023;MLS, Steger et al., 2006;TSWLS, Guitard et al., 2022;RSE, Monteiro et al., 2022). ...
This study examined variations in positive well-being as a function of paranormal belief and schizotypy. A sample of 2,362 United Kingdom-based respondents completed self-report measures assessing paranormal belief, schizotypy, positive well-being (meaning in life, satisfaction with life, and self-esteem), paranormal experience, and belief in conspiracies. The paranormal belief was most strongly related to the cognitive–perceptual factor of schizotypy. Both paranormal belief and the cognitive–perceptual factor were associated with reporting paranormal experiences and endorsement of conspiracist beliefs. Despite commonality, paranormal belief and schizotypy were differentially related to well-being. Paranormal belief correlated positively with meaning in life (presence and search) and satisfaction with life. Schizotypy correlated negatively with presence, satisfaction with life, and self-esteem and positively with search. Latent profile analysis identified four subgroups: Profile 1, low belief and schizotypy (49% of the sample); Profile 2, low belief and cognitive–perceptual, moderate interpersonal and disorganised (13.6%); Profile 3, high belief, moderate cognitive–perceptual and interpersonal, low disorganised (24.3%); and Profile 4, high belief and schizotypy (13.1%). Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) found that low belief with mixed schizotypy was associated with lower presence, and low belief and schizotypy (vs. high) were related to higher presence. Paranormal belief and schizotypy were associated with greater search, higher scores on paranormal experiential factors, and endorsement of generic conspiracist beliefs. Finally, lower belief and schizotypy were concomitant with higher satisfaction with life and self-esteem. Overall, paranormal belief was related to positive well-being, whereas schizotypy was associated with lower positive wellbeing.
... The efficiency of a scale refers to its length or, more specifically, its brevity. As has been discussed elsewhere (Kay & Slovic, 2023), efficient measures have several advantages over inefficient measures. For one, efficient measures can save researchers time. ...
... The five short-form conspiracist ideation measures of interest in the present study are remarkably efficient. The GCB-5 (Kay & Slovic, 2023), CMQ (Bruder et al., 2013), and GMC (Drinkwater et al., 2012) are each 5 items long, taking participants about 35 seconds to complete. ...
... Although it was only introduced recently, a fair amount of evidence has amassed in favour of the GCB-15's reliability and validity. Across five studies, Kay and Slovic (2023) found strong support for the GCB-5's internal consistency (αs = .71 to .80); ...
Choosing a short-form measure of conspiracist ideation is fraught. Despite there being numerous scales to choose from, little work has been done to compare their psychometric properties. To address this shortcoming, we compared the internal consistency, two-week test-retest reliability, criterion validity, and construct validity of five short-form conspiracist ideation measures: the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale – 5 (GCB-5), Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), General Measure of Conspiracism (GMC), American Conspiracy Thinking Scale (ACTS), and One-Item Conspiracy Measure (1CM). The results of our investigation indicated that all five of the scales are reliable and valid measures of conspiracist ideation. That said, the GCB-5 tended to perform the best while the 1CM tended to perform the worst. We conclude our investigation by discussing trade-offs among the five scales, as well as providing recommendations for future research.
... As scholarly interest in the domain evolved, investigators developed self-report instruments to assess belief in conspiracies. Prior to the emergence of scales assessing general ideation (see Brotherton and French, 2014), these were typically centered on real-life situations/events theories (Swami et al., 2017;Drinkwater et al., 2020;Kay and Slovic, 2023). This "theory-based" approach is derived from the supposition that belief in conspiracies is monological (Goertzel, 1994), whereby endorsement of one theory predicts advocacy of others (Sutton and Douglas, 2014). ...
... The poor fit of the one-factor solution is problematic because studies typically use the GCBS as a global measure (e.g., Marchlewska et al., 2022;Cosgrove and Murphy, 2023;Harmon-Jones and Szymaniak, 2023). Moreover, Kay and Slovic (2023) have proposed a concise (i.e., 5-item) unidimensional version of the GCBS, the GCB-5. ...
... The GCB-5 was developed and psychometrically evaluated through five studies (Kay and Slovic, 2023). In study 1, participants completed the GCBS, and the highest loading items from each of the factors were identified; these corresponded with Brotherton and French (2014). ...
The 5-item Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCB-5) is an abridged version of the 15-item GCBS. It was developed as a global measure of the tendency to engage in non-event-based, conspiracy-related ideation. The GCB-5 is appealing to researchers because of its brevity, which facilitates the measurement of belief in conspiracies alongside multiple constructs and/or in situations where resources are limited (time, etc.). Noting that several studies failed to find an adequate unidimensional fit in the parent GCBS measures across different contexts, the present study further assessed the psychometric properties of the GCB-5. This was necessary since the GCB-5 was validated using North American samples. Thus, to ensure that the GCB-5 was satisfactory for use with samples in the United Kingdom (UK), GCBS/GCB-5 items were administered to a large, representative UK-based sample (N = 1,331), alongside a range of validated conspiracy scales. Confirmatory factor analysis found that a one-factor GCB-5 model produced a good model fit. This specified that the GCB-5 was underpinned by a single dimension. Furthermore, the performance of the GCB-5 was equivalent to the longer GCBS. Both instruments produced similar mean item scores and standard deviations and were comparably positively correlated with concurrent measures. Although the GCB-5 internal reliability was lower than the GCBS, it was good. The GCB-5 also demonstrated configural, metric, and scalar invariance (among gender and age subgroups). This indicated that the GCB-5 was interpreted similarly by men and women and different age groups. Overall, results supported the assertion that the GCB-5 is a psychometrically satisfactory global measure of non-event-based, conspiratorial ideation.
... Brotherton et al. (2013) found a strong positive correlation between the GCBS and the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (BCTI) (r = .86). Kay and Slovic's (2023) study also found strong positive associations among the GCBS, CMQ, BCTI. These results highlight the robust criterion validity of the Turkish version of the GCBS. ...
... Majima and Nakamura (2020) reported that generic conspiracy beliefs were negatively associated with interpersonal trust. Kay and Slovic (2023) found a negative relationship between interpersonal trust and GCBS, emphasizing how Table 2 Correlation matrix for criterion-related and discriminant validity GCBS Belief in a Just World, indicating that individuals with stronger conspiracy beliefs are more likely to view the world as less just. A moderate positive relationship between the GCBS and Expectational Malevolence was also found, suggesting that those who hold stronger conspiracy beliefs tend to have a more negative view of others' intentions. ...
Conspiracy theories have gained increasing attention in recent years, particularly in education, as they influence individuals’ decision-making and attitudes. To address this issue, we aim to adapt the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS) into Turkish and explore its relationship with critical thinking, information literacy, and media literacy among prospective teachers in Türkiye. In the first phase, we validated the Turkish version of the GCBS by administering it to a sample of 637 adults. After the validation, we employed a mixed-methods explanatory sequential design to gain a deeper understanding of the relationships between these constructs. In the quantitative phase, we administered the GCBS, along with scales measuring critical thinking, information literacy, and media literacy, to 406 prospective teachers. The findings revealed a low-level positive but significant relationship between conspiracy beliefs and self-reported critical thinking scores. However, we found no significant relationship between conspiracy beliefs and the objective critical thinking test. Additionally, we identified a low-level positive correlation between conspiracy beliefs and literacy skills (both information and media literacy), suggesting that individuals with stronger conspiracy beliefs may also have slightly higher literacy skills, though the relationship remains weak. In the qualitative phase, we conducted focus group discussions with 12 volunteer participants selected from the top 25% of the sample based on their critical thinking and conspiracy belief scores. Focus group discussions revealed that prospective teachers with tendencies toward believing conspiracy theories had distorted perceptions of critical thinking and literacy skills, despite identifying as critical thinkers. Their interest in conspiracy theories generally stemmed from epistemic curiosity. Also, they indicated that they may struggle to maintain neutrality in educational settings, often reinforcing conspiratorial thinking outside class. This mindset may blur the line between fact and belief, undermining the credibility of the educational environment.
... Finally, to assess an individual's general inclination toward believing in conspiracy theories, we used the 5-item Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale (GCB-5) developed by Kay and Slovic (2023). This scale is a reliable shortened version of GCB-15 (Brotherton et al., 2013), which has demonstrated its ability to predict belief in a wide range of specific conspiracy theories. ...
... Hence, we now turn to microlevel data from Tanzania for further exploration. In our micro analyses, we used two measures of conspiracy theorizing: belief in COVID-19 conspiracy and GCB-5 (Kay & Slovic, 2023). Among these two measures, belief in coronavirus conspiracy is epistemically riskier because it inquires about a specific conspiracy, unlike GCB-5, which, similar to CMQ, aims to gauge people's general tendency to believe in conspiracies F I G U R E 4 Plot of the relationship between the predicted level of belief in COVID-19 conspiracy (from Model 4) and belief in witchcraft. ...
This article suggests that since people who believe in magic and those who believe in conspiracy theories produce meaning and make sense of the world by engaging in the same process of signification, they should be more likely to have one such belief if they hold the other. To test this proposition, we perform both macro‐ and micro‐level analyses using, respectively, cross‐national datasets and an original set of Tanzanian data. Our findings from both sets of analyses reveal a strong association between witchcraft beliefs and the belief in conspiracy theories.
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... Instruments employed within this study have demonstrated robust psychometric integrity (i.e., reliability and validity): RPBS (Drinkwater et al., 2017), GCB-5 (Dagnall et al., 2023;Kay and Slovic, 2023); SPQ-B (Raine and Benishay, 1995); SCCS (Karwowski, 2012(Karwowski, , 2014; RES (Rosenberg, 1965); and MLQ (Steger et al., 2006). ...
Via a shared link with schizotypy, paranormal belief (PB) and conspiracy theory endorsement (CT) influence meaning in life (presence and search). This association is important because meaning in life (particularly presence) is a significant prognosticator of positive wellbeing. Despite this, previous research in this domain remains limited. Major restrictions being the assumption that belief is homogeneous and the failure to consider how factors related to positive wellbeing (i.e., creativity and self-esteem) explain links between belief, schizotypy and psychological health. Accordingly, based on PB, CT, and schizotypy, this study used latent profile analysis (LPA) to identify belief subgroups. Analysis then employed sequential mediation to assess whether creativity and self-esteem mediated the relationship between belief and meaning in life. A sample of 647 completed measures at four time points 2 months apart. At baseline, LPA identified two subgroups: Lower (Profile 1) vs. Higher (Profile 2) belief Ideation. Path analysis revealed that Profile 2 (vs. Profile 1) predicted greater search over time. Moreover, Profile 2 predicted creativity (self-efficacy and personal identity), which in combination with self-esteem, sequentially mediated the belief-meaning in life relationship. Explicitly, creative self-efficacy prognosticated greater self-esteem, which aligned with greater presence and lower search. Creative personal identity demonstrated a negative link with self-esteem but predicted presence and search. Overall, higher scorers in PB, CT, and schizotypy were less driven to search and more likely to possess presence as a function of possessing confidence in their ability to find solutions to problems and self-esteem.
... The scales used in the present study possessed attested psychometric properties (i.e., validity and reliability): RPBS Tobacyk, 2004), GCB-5 (Dagnall et al., 2023;Kay and Slovic, 2023), SPQ-B (Raine and Benishay, 1995), Brief-COPE (Carver, 1997), MLQ (Steger et al., 2006), RES (Rosenberg, 1965), and SWLS (Diener et al., 1985). ...
Using network analysis (NA), this study examined interrelationships between advocacy of scientifically unsubstantiated beliefs (i.e., Paranormal and Conspiracy Endorsement) and positive wellbeing outcomes (i.e., Coping, Meaning in Life, Self-Esteem, and Satisfaction with Life). A total of 1,667 participants completed study measures. Analysis revealed that Paranormal Belief (PB) and Self-Esteem were central variables. Although not directly connected, common relationships existed with Search for Meaning in Life and Avoidant Coping. PB was most strongly linked (positively) with Conspiracy Endorsement, the Cognitive-Perceptual dimension of schizotypy, Search, and Avoidant Coping. Connections indicated that PB potentially mediated relationships between Schizotypy, Search, and Avoidant Coping. Self-Esteem was most strongly linked positively with the Presence of Meaning in Life, Active Coping, and Satisfaction with Life, and negatively with Avoidant Coping and Search. Network examination also revealed that Self-Esteem bridged relationships between Coping (Active and Avoidant), Meaning in Life (Search and Presence), and Satisfaction with Life. While the correlation between PB and Self-Esteem was small, the significance of these nodes suggested that their indirect interaction (through Search and Avoidant Coping) influenced factors related to positive wellbeing. This implied that the connection between PB and enhanced Self-Esteem positively impacted wellbeing. Conversely, PB associated with low Self-Esteem reflected poorer psychological health. Therefore, subsequent research should test this notion using specific belief facets.
... Measures possessed established psychometric properties: RPBS Dagnall et al., 2023a); GCBS-5 (Dagnall et al., 2023b;Kay and Slovic, 2023); SOP2 (Nießen et al., 2022); Brief-COPE (Carver, 1997); MLQ (Steger et al., 2006); and SISI (Postmes et al., 2013). ...
Recent studies report that paranormal belief and conspiracy theory endorsement are differentially related to factors allied to positive wellbeing (e.g., meaning in life and coping behaviours). Since these findings derive from correlational studies using cross sectional designs, researchers need to undertake further investigation to establish outcome robustness. Accordingly, the present study used a multiple time point design. Respondents (N = 1,158) completed measures on three occasions, three months apart. While a strong positive association was found between paranormal belief and conspiracist theory endorsement, path analysis revealed divergent relationships with positive wellbeing outcomes. Specifically, paranormal belief predicted greater levels of positive wellbeing over time (meaning in life and social identity), whereas conspiracy theory endorsement predicted only social identity. Consideration of mediation effects revealed that paranormal belief prognosticated greater presence of meaning in life via links with active coping and positive outlook. Additionally, avoidant coping positively mediated the paranormal belief-search for meaning in life relationship. Conspiracy theory endorsement predicted greater social identity via avoidant coping. Findings indicated that paranormal belief and conspiracy theory endorsement were differentially related to positive wellbeing outcomes. Regarding paranormal belief, the construct was concomitantly attendant with passive and active psychological functions. The association with avoidant coping suggested that in some circumstances supernatural credence enables believers to avert attention from problems.
... In addition, we will measure some variables related to the research questions not addressed in this manuscript and, therefore, they are not described in detail here. Specifically, we will measure endorsement of beliefs in evolution 94 , religiosity 95 , and conspiracy beliefs 96 . ...
Intuition often guides our thinking effectively, but it can also lead to consequential reasoning errors, underpinning poor decisions and biased judgments. Little is known about how people globally self-correct such intuitive reasoning errors and what enhances their correction. Defying prevailing models of reasoning, recent research suggests that people spontaneously correct only a few errors during deliberation; however, enhancing error monitoring and motivating further effort should increase error correction. Here, we study whether these mechanisms apply to reasoning across individualistic and collectivistic cultures (expected N = 33,000 participants from 67 regions). Participants will solve problems that elicit incorrect intuitions twice: first intuitively and then reflectively, allowing them to correct initial errors, in a 2 (feedback: absent vs present) × 2 (answer justification: absent vs present) between-participants design. The study will shed more light on the nature, generalisability, and promotion of corrective behaviour, crucial for understanding and improving reasoning worldwide.
... In addition, we will measure some variables related to the research questions not addressed in this manuscript and, therefore, they are not described in detail here. Specifically, we will measure endorsement of beliefs in evolution 94 , religiosity 95 , and conspiracy beliefs 96 . ...
Intuition often guides our thinking effectively, but it can also lead to consequential reasoning errors, underpinning poor decisions and biased judgments. Little is known about how people globally self-correct such intuitive reasoning errors and what enhances their correction. Defying prevailing models of reasoning, recent research suggests that people spontaneously correct only a few errors during deliberation; however, enhancing error monitoring and motivating further effort should increase error correction. Here, we study whether these mechanisms apply to reasoning across individualistic and collectivistic cultures (expected N = 33,000 participants from 67 regions). Participants will solve problems that elicit incorrect intuitions twice: first intuitively and then reflectively, allowing them to correct initial errors, in a 2 (feedback: absent vs present) × 2 (answer justification: absent vs present) between-participants design. The study will shed more light on the nature, generalisability, and promotion of corrective behaviour, crucial for understanding and improving reasoning worldwide.
... Ces indices sont proches de ceux de l'échelle originale (Brotherton et al., 2013), ainsi que ses reprises dans d'autres études (Atari et al., 2019 ;Lantian et al., 2016 ;Majima & Nakamura, 2019). Ils sont légèrement élevés par rapport à la version courte de la Generic Conspiracy Beliefs Scale de Kay et Slovic (2023). ...
L’échelle de mesure générique des croyances conspirationnistes permet d’appréhender les croyances conspirationnistes en général, mais ne permet pas de mesurer les croyances conspirationnistes spécifiques aux épidémies. Le présent article a pour objectif d’adapter et de valider une version française de la mesure des croyances conspirationnistes spécifiques aux épidémies, issue de la Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS, Brotherton et al., 2013). Les données sont recueillies par questionnaire auprès de la population générale francophone (N = 1630), pendant la pandémie de la Covid-19, en utilisant 6 items issus de la GCBS en lien avec les épidémies. Une analyse factorielle exploratoire et confirmatoire réalisée sur deux sous-échantillons indépendants fait ressortir une structure unidimensionnelle de l’échelle, avec des indices de validité convergente et discriminante satisfaisants. En outre, les croyances conspirationnistes prédisent négativement l’efficacité perçue des mesures de prévention; ce qui confirme la validité prédictive de l’échelle. On discute de son intérêt et de son utilité pour le diagnostic des croyances conspirationnistes en temps de pandémie, comme celle de la Covid-19.
... is the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale (GCBS) developed by Brotherton et al. (2013). In addition to being one of the most commonly used scales to measure conspiracy beliefs (see Pilch et al., 2023), the GCBS is known for its cross-national validity and high internal psychometric validity, making it perfect for our multinational large-N sample (Drinkwater et al., 2020;Kay & Slovic, 2023). Support for Activism (α = .93) ...
Research on conspiracy theories has long turned a blind eye on the role of age in explaining conspiracy beliefs. Few studies include age and those that do have yet to consider how and why age matters when it comes to the spread of conspiracy theories. In this article, we investigate the relationship between age and conspiracy beliefs with two complementary studies. In Study 1, we conduct a meta-analysis of a large sample of studies on conspiracy beliefs published between 2014 and 2024 (k = 191; N = 374,224). The results reveal a small but robust negative association between age and conspiracy endorsement. In Study 2, we use an original multinational survey to investigate three potential mechanisms that may explain the relationship between age and conspiracy beliefs (N = 6098). We explain youth's higher beliefs in conspiracy theories by their predisposition to unconventional styles of political participation, lower levels of self-esteem, and general political disaffection.
... Likewise, people who believe in these theories appear to feel greater disgust and contempt towards Jewish people (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012), believe Jewish people are a threat to the values and welfare of the nation (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014), believe violence against Jewish people is acceptable (Dyrendal, 2020;Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012), oppose having Jewish people as friends and neighbours (Dyrendal, 2020), believe Jewish people shouldn't be allowed to buy property (Bilewicz et al., 2013), and express less willingness to vote for Jewish political candidates (Bilewicz et al., 2013;Jolley et al., 2020). Finally, believers in these theories are more likely to harbour negative feelings about immigrants (Jolley et al., 2020) and citizens of foreign nations (Šrol et al., 2022), believe the country is under threat from foreign nations (Van Prooijen & Song, 2021), and believe the border should be permanently closed (Kay & Slovic, 2023). ...
Researchers have long argued that conspiracist ideation and prejudice are intimately linked, but the empirical research supporting this notion is relatively limited. Past studies have shown that conspiracist ideation is associated with Islamophobia, antisemitism, and xenophobia but few other forms of prejudice. The present project expands the scope of this research by examining the associations of three measures of conspiracist ideation with twenty measures of prejudice. Across two studies-one using a sample of undergraduate students (N = 299) and one using a sample of CloudResearch Connect participants demographically matched to the US population (N = 538)-we found that conspiracist ideation is associated with a diverse array of prejudicial beliefs, including hostile sexism, modern homonegativity, transnegativity, modern racism towards Black people, antisemitism, and classism, among many other forms of prejudice. We also found that conspiracist ideation is highly associated with generalized prejudice, represented by a latent factor capturing the shared variance among the twenty prejudice measures. Taken together, these findings indicate that there is a close relationship between conspiracist ideation and prejudice.
... This data was previously reported byKay (2021) andKay and Slovic (2023). ...
To detect careless and insufficient effort (C/IE) survey responders, researchers can use infrequency items – items that almost no one agrees with (e.g., “When a friend greets me, I generally try to say nothing back”) – and frequency items – items that almost everyone agrees with (e.g., “I try to listen when someone I care about is telling me something”). Here, we provide initial validation for two sets of these items: the 14-item Invalid Responding Inventory for Statements (IDRIS) and the 6-item Invalid Responding Inventory for Adjectives (IDRIA). Across six studies (N1 = 536; N2 = 701; N3 = 500; N4 = 499; N5 = 629, N6 = 562), we found consistent evidence that the IDRIS is capable of detecting C/IE responding among statement-based scales (e.g., the HEXACO-PI-R) and the IDRIA is capable of detecting C/IE responding among both adjective-based scales (e.g., the Lex-20) and adjective-derived scales (e.g., the BFI-2). These findings were robust across different analytic approaches (e.g., Pearson correlations; Spearman rank-order correlations), different indices of C/IE responding (e.g., person- total correlations; semantic synonyms; horizontal cursor variability), and different sample types (e.g., US undergraduate students; Nigerian survey panel participants). Taken together, these results provide promising evidence for the utility of the IDRIS and IDRIA in detecting C/IE responding.
... Exploratory Measures. Some measures were included for exploratory purposes, namely participants' trait tendency to brood and reflect (self-developed items), the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (Bruder et al., 2013), the Generic Conspiracist Belief Scale-5 (Kay & Slovic, 2023), and some demographic items (age, gender, level of education, subjective social class, political orientation). ...
This Stage 2 Registered Report concerns the relationship between rumination, a repetitive style of negative thinking, and conspiracy beliefs (Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/y82bs, date of in-principle-acceptance: 23/05/2023). Based on four pilot studies, we tested in a fifth, registered study whether brooding, a particularly dysfunctional form of rumination, contributes to conspiracy beliefs using a repeated-measures within-person experiment (N = 1,638). Mean difference scores (conspiracy beliefs at T2 minus conspiracy beliefs at T1) were significantly greater in the brooding condition than in the control condition. However, we could neither confirm that this effect was larger than the specified smallest effect size of interest of d = 0.20, nor conclude that it was too small to be of interest (i.e., smaller than d = 0.20). We explored how reflection, an analytic form of rumination, impacted conspiracy beliefs. We further discuss implications for theories about the formation of conspiracy beliefs, and efforts aimed at preventing or reducing unfounded conspiracy beliefs. Hopefully, this article sparks a discussion among conspiracy belief researchers about how smallest effect sizes of interest could be determined in a principled way based on real-world outcomes.
Recent research has demonstrated that actively open-minded thinking (AOT)—a cognitive thinking style characterized by the active avoidance of myside bias and overconfidence in one’s conclusions—is related to lower misinformation susceptibility. Furthermore, logic-based inoculation has proven effective at conferring resistance against misinformation, conspiracy beliefs, and certain unwanted psychological states. Building on these findings, the current article outlines two pre-registered experiments, conducted on Reddit.com (Study 1, N = 462) and Prolific Academic (Study 2, N = 464), wherein participants were either allocated to a control condition or presented with an inoculation message prebunking failure to engage in AOT. We hypothesised that improvements in AOT relative to the control group should indirectly reduce misinformation susceptibility and conspiracy beliefs. Results showed that in both studies, the AOT inoculation significantly improved AOT relative to the control group, and in turn, reduced conspiracy beliefs and improved truth discernment of real news headlines from fake ones. Furthermore, the intervention also improved sharing discernment (Study 1), and its efficacy was exclusive to improving AOT rather than its individual epistemic components (Study 2). We provide recommendations for future efforts to reduce misinformation susceptibility using logic-based inoculation and discuss the theoretical implications of our findings.
Previous research linked counternormative tendencies (e.g., conspiracy beliefs, cyberbullying, and catfishing) to narcissism—a personality trait characterized by difficulties in experiencing psychological threats. We argue that avoidance coping with stress favours attitudes and behaviours that allow for deflecting from stressful events and releasing one's stress at the expense of others. Thus, we hypothesized that avoidance coping might explain why narcissism favours counternormative tendencies. We conducted four studies (total N = 2643) in the United States and Poland to examine avoidance coping as a mediator of the relationship between narcissism and counternormative tendencies: conspiracy beliefs (Studies 1–4), willingness to conspire (Studies 2–4), cyberbullying (Studies 3–4) and catfishing (Study 4). All studies found a consistent positive indirect relationship between various forms of narcissism and counternormative tendencies via avoidance coping. These findings suggest that counternormative tendencies might reflect using maladaptive coping strategies.
This paper presents the results of a study on the Polish version of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS), which was designed to measure individual differences in conspiracist thinking (Brotherton, French, & Pickering; 2013). The Polish version of the scale had excellent internal consistency as measured by Cronbach alpha: .93. The Polish version also had excellent test-retest stability. To check the validity of the questionnaire, various tools were used to measure the characteristics that can be correlated with conspiracist thinking. As a result, it was found that conspiracist thinking is positively correlated with the external locus of control, the results obtained in the Scale of Belief in Zero-Sum Game and the results of the MMPI-2 Paranoia scale. It was also found that patients with paranoid personality disorder and paranoid schizophrenia had higher results on the adapted scale than healthy subjects. In sum, the Polish version of GCBS had satisfactory psychometric properties, which makes it useful for measuring conspiracist thinking.
The empirical short-form literature has been characterized by overly optimistic views of the transfer of validity from parent form to short form and by the weak application of psychometric principles in validating short forms. Reviewers have thus opposed constructing short forms altogether, implying researchers are succumbing to an inappropriate temptation by trying to abbreviate measures. The authors disagree. The authors do not oppose the development of short forms, but they do assert that the validity standards for short forms should be quite high. The authors identify 2 general and 9 specific methodological sins characterizing short-form construction and offer methodological suggestions for the sound development of short forms. They recommend a set of 6 a priori steps researchers should consider and 9 methodological procedures researchers can use to develop valid abbreviated forms of clinical-assessment procedures.
Although sometimes used interchangeably, the present review highlights the important differences between generalized worldviews suspecting conspiracy at play (conspiracy mentality) and specific beliefs about the existence of a certain conspiracy (conspiracy theory). In contrast to measures of beliefs in specific conspiracy theories, those of conspiracy mentality are more stable, less malleable, less skewed in their distribution and less contaminated by other ideological content. These differences have important implications for empirical research and the theorizing of conspiracy beliefs. Building on an analogy of personality traits, we argue that conspiracy mentality is a relatively stable readiness to interpret world events as being caused by plots hatched in secret, whereas specific conspiracy beliefs are then manifest indicators (partially contaminated by other dispositions).
Conspiratorial belief is a type of argument that accepts implausible explanations in situations of great uncertainty or mystery. Claiming that the coronavirus is an artificial fabrication of laboratories is an example of conspiracist belief. The aim of this research was to analyze the impact of conspiracist ideation and psychotic-like experiences in patients with schizophrenia, patients with other mental disorders, and participants with no psychiatric history with a 132-day follow-up during the COVID-19 crisis. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was applied and Bayesian inferences were carried out. The results conclude that conspiracist ideation and psychotic-like experiences increased significantly after 132 days of social-health restrictions in the general population. However, psychotic-like experiences did not increase in patients with schizophrenia. Conspiracist ideation has a quantitative degradation similar to the continuum model of psychosis; it is present both in patients with schizophrenia and in those participants with no clinical history. The psychopathological value of conspiracist ideation within the spectrum of psychosis is discussed.
Model fit assessment is a central component of evaluating confirmatory factor analysis models and the validity of psychological assessments. Fit indices remain popular and researchers often judge fit with fixed cutoffs derived by Hu and Bentler (1999). Despite their overwhelming popularity, methodological studies have cautioned against fixed cutoffs, noting that the meaning of fit indices varies based on a complex interaction of model characteristics like factor reliability, number of items, and number of factors. Criticism of fixed cutoffs stems primarily from the fact that they were derived from one specific confirmatory factor analysis model and lack generalizability. To address this, we propose a simulation-based method called dynamic fit index cutoffs such that derivation of cutoffs is adaptively tailored to the specific model and data characteristics being evaluated. Unlike previously proposed simulation-based techniques, our method removes existing barriers to implementation by providing an open-source, Web based Shiny software application that automates the entire process so that users neither need to manually write any software code nor be knowledgeable about foundations of Monte Carlo simulation. Additionally, we extend fit index cutoff derivations to include sets of cutoffs for multiple levels of misspecification. In doing so, fit indices can more closely resemble their originally intended purpose as effect sizes quantifying misfit rather than improperly functioning as ad hoc hypothesis tests. We also provide an approach specifically designed for the nuances of 1-factor models, which have received surprisingly little attention in the literature despite frequent substantive interests in unidimensionality. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
The present research empirically examines how different types of coping strategies are associated with belief in conspiracy theories. Conspiracy beliefs have been linked to the frustration of basic needs and seem to increase during major world events that evoke stress. Thus, we hypothesized that they may serve as a psychological response to maladaptive coping strategies. This hypothesis was tested among British participants and conceptually replicated across three studies. Cross-sectionally, we examined coping strategies (i.e., self-sufficient, social-support, avoidance, and religious) and belief in a specific conspiracy theory (Study 1, n = 199) and belief in general notions of conspiracy (Study 2, n = 411). In Study 3 (n = 398), we experimentally primed different coping styles via a mnemonic recollection procedure and measured belief in notions of conspiracy. Avoidance coping (recognized as being maladaptive and leading to at least temporary disengagement and abandonment of goal-related behaviours) positively predicted belief in conspiracy theories (Studies 1 and 2). In Study 3, priming avoidance coping (vs. self-sufficient coping or no coping strategy) significantly increased belief in conspiracy theories. These findings suggest that using maladaptive coping strategies (either dispositional or situationally induced) may foster conspiracy beliefs.
This study explored the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and the personality disorders. A sample of 475 British adults, aged around 30 years, completed measures of Belief in Conspiracy Theories (CTs) and the Personality Disorders (PDs), as well as the SAPAS, a short intelligence test and two self-evaluations. Belief in CTs was correlated with nearly all PDs, as well as the three established higher order clusters (A: odd and eccentric; B: dramatic and emotional; C: anxious). A series of stepwise multiple regressions were computed. A final regression showed five of the variables (education, intelligence, Cluster A, B, and C) were significant, which indicated that less well-educated and less intelligent participants, scoring higher on two PD clusters (Cluster A and B) but lower on Cluster C, believed more in the CTs. Implications of the study for understanding the origin of CTs is discussed. Limitations of the study, particularly the sample and measures used, are acknowledged.
We tested the link between COVID‐19 conspiracy theories and health protective behaviours in three studies: one at the onset of the pandemic in the United Kingdom (UK), a second just before the first national lockdown, and a third during that lockdown (N = 302, 404 and 399). We focused on conspiracy theories that did not deny the existence of COVID‐19 and evaluated the extent to which they predicted a range of health protective behaviours, before and after controlling for psychological and sociodemographic characteristics associated with conspiracy theory belief. COVID‐19 conspiracy beliefs were positively correlated with beliefs in other unrelated conspiracies and a general conspiracy mind‐set, and negatively correlated with trust in government and a tendency towards analytical thinking (vs. intuitive thinking). Unexpectedly, COVID‐19 conspiracy believers adhered to basic health guidelines and advanced health protective measures as strictly as non‐believers. Conspiracy believers were, however, less willing to install the contact‐tracing app, get tested for and vaccinated against COVID‐19, and were more likely to share COVID‐19 misinformation—all of which might undermine public health initiatives. Study 3 showed conspiracy theory believers were less willing to undertake health protective behaviours that were outside of their personal control, perceiving these as having a negative balance of risks and benefits. We discuss models explaining conspiracy beliefs and health protective behaviours, and suggest practical recommendations for public health initiatives.
Past research has demonstrated that conspiracy belief is linked to a low level of self-reported general trust. In four experimental online studies (total N = 1105) we examined whether this relationship translated into actual behavior. Specifically, since the decision to trust relies on the ability to detect potential social threat, we tested whether conspiracy believers are better at detecting actual threat, worse at detecting the absence of threat, or simply trust less, irrespective of any social cue. To this end, participants played multiple, independent rounds of the trust game, a behavioral measure for interpersonal trust. We manipulated social threat by presenting photographs of their alleged trustees with varying intensity of facial anger. In three of the four studies, trustors' conspiracy beliefs predicted a more cautious investment behavior in the trust game. This association, however, was not contingent on the social threat posed by the trustee. The present research thus joins a number of studies demonstrating that conspiracy beliefs can – under certain circumstances - influence everyday behavior.
Is there a point within a self-report questionnaire where participants will start responding carelessly? If so, then after how many items do participants reach that point? And what can researchers do to encourage participants to remain careful throughout the entirety of a questionnaire? We conducted two studies (Study 1 N = 358; Study 2 N = 129) to address these questions. Our results found (a) consistent evidence that participants responded more carelessly as they progressed further into a questionnaire, (b) mixed evidence that participants who were warned that carelessness would be punished displayed smaller increases in carelessness, and (c) mixed evidence that increases in carelessness were greater within an unproctored online study (Study 1) than within a proctored laboratory study (Study 2). These findings help address when and why careless responding is likely to occur, and they suggest effective preventive strategies.
Significance
Two surveys of United States public opinion found that support for killing enemy civilians and combatants disproportionately with nuclear or conventional weapons was deeply divided along partisan political lines. Those approving such excessively lethal attacks tended to be Republican and conservative. They felt socially distant from the enemy, dehumanized them, and believed that the victims were to blame for their fate. These same individuals also tended to support domestic policies that protect gun owners, restrict abortion, and punish immigrants and criminals (excessively). Understanding the origins and motives underlying the widespread support for such punitive behaviors is essential to mitigating violence that threatens millions of people and our democracy.
Previous research has suggested that the Dark Triad traits and, specifically, Machiavellianism and psychopathy, are associated with a tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. The current study (N = 203) aimed to replicate and extend the existing research by examining the relationship between the Dark Tetrad traits—Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, and everyday sadism—and a novel measure of COVID-19 conspiracist ideation. Machiavellian views and psychopathic antisociality were significant positive predictors of the tendency to believe in COVID-19 conspiracy theories, even when accounting for the participants’ knowledge about COVID-19. Overall, the results suggest that some (but not all) aspects of the Dark Tetrad are associated with COVID-19 conspiracist ideation.
This study examined whether thinking style mediated relationships between belief in conspiracy and schizotypy facets. A UK‐based sample of 421 respondents completed the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS), Oxford‐Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences Short (O‐Life), and measures indexing preferential thinking style (proneness to reality testing deficits and Need for Cognition). Path analysis revealed direct and indirect relationships between Conspiracy Beliefs and schizotypy facets. Unusual Experiences had a direct effect on Conspiracy Beliefs and predicted Reality Testing and Need for Cognition. Preferential thinking style mediated the schizotypy‐belief in conspiracy relationship. This pattern of results (higher experiential‐based processing and lower Need for Cognition) was consistent with intuitive thinking. Introverted Anhedonia and Impulsive Nonconformity predicted Reality Testing and had indirect effects on Conspiracy Beliefs. Finally, Reality Testing predicted Conspiracy Beliefs, whereas Need for Cognition did not. These results confirm that cognitive processes related to thinking style mediate the schizotypy‐conspiracist beliefs relationship.
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COVID-19 pandemic has led to popular conspiracy theories regarding its origins and widespread concern over the level of compliance with preventive measures. In the current preregistered research, we recruited 1088 Turkish participants and investigated (a) individual differences associated with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs; (b) whether such conspiracy beliefs are related to the level of preventive measures; and (c) other individual differences that might be related to the preventive measures. Higher faith in intuition, uncertainty avoidance, impulsivity, generic conspiracy beliefs, religiosity, and right-wing ideology, and a lower level of cognitive reflection were associated with a higher level of belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories. There was no association between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and preventive measures while perceived risk was positively and impulsivity negatively correlated with preventive measures. We discuss the implications and directions for future research.
Perceived lack of control is widely believed to motivate, at least partly, belief in conspiracy theories. We question the theoretical foundations of this belief and meta‐analyze existing published and unpublished studies to assess the overall effect of lack of control on conspiracy beliefs. The overall effect was small and not statistically significant (d = −0.05), and was not moderated by comparison group (baseline vs. control affirmation), type of manipulation used to threaten control, inclusion of a manipulation check, or sample type. However, the predicted effect of control was more likely to be observed when beliefs were measured in terms of specific conspiracy theories, rather than as general or abstract claims. Overall, the present studies to date offer limited support for the hypothesis that conspiracy beliefs arise as a compensatory control.
COVID-19 pandemic has led to popular conspiracy theories regarding its origins and widespread concern over the level of compliance with preventive measures. In the current preregistered research, we recruited 1,088 Turkish participants and investigated (a) individual differences associated with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs; (2) whether such conspiracy beliefs are related to the level of preventive measures; and (3) other individual differences that might be related to the preventive measures. Higher faith in intuition, uncertainty avoidance, impulsivity, generic conspiracy beliefs, religiosity, and right-wing ideology, and a lower level of cognitive reflection were associated with a higher level of belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories. There was no association between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and preventive measures while perceived risk was positively and impulsivity negatively correlated with preventive measures. We discuss the implications and directions for future research.
The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS) is the most widely used measure of general belief in conspiracy theories. The scale comprises five related but distinct factors (Government Malfeasance, Extraterrestrial Cover-up, Malevolent Global Conspiracies, Personal Wellbeing, and Control of Information). Despite this, investigators have typically treated the GCBS as unidimensional by referencing only overall total. Although, the GCBS possesses established psychometric properties, critics question its factorial structure, suggest alternative models, and recommend routine examination of GCBS dimensions as part of analysis. Through two studies, the present paper assessed GCBS factorial structure, internal reliability, convergent validity, and invariance. This involved comparing the original five-factor solution with alternative one, two, and three-factor models. To ensure that the best fitting model was robust, the authors conducted analysis in two independent samples (Study one, N = 794, UK university-based sample; and Study two, N = 418, UK respondents collected via a market research company). Results in both studies indicated superior fit for the correlated five-factor solution. This solution demonstrated invariance across gender, and samples (Study one and two). Furthermore, the total scale and five subfactors evinced good alpha and omega total reliability. Convergent validity testing exhibited associations of an expected strength between conspiracist beliefs, reality testing, and cognitive insight. Large intercorrelations existed among GCBS subfactors, suggesting that the measure reflects a narrow set of interrelated conspiracist assumptions. These findings support the use of overall scale scores as an index of belief in conspiracy theories.
Generic conspiracist belief refers to the general tendency toward conspiracist ideation independent of specific event‐based conspiracy theories. The present research aimed to develop a Japanese version of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS‐J). In two studies, we examined the factor structure, reliability, and convergent and discriminant validity of the GCBS‐J. In Study 1 (N = 600), exploratory factor analysis with a split‐half subsample proposed a two‐factor solution dissociating extraterrestrial conspiracy from other conspiracist ideations. Subsequent confirmatory factor analysis with the other split‐half subsample confirmed the two‐factor structure. Study 1 also established convergent validity by indicating strong positive correlations with other measures of conspiracist belief. Study 2 (N = 178) added further evidence to indicate a positive correlation with related psychological constructs, such as paranormal beliefs. Study 2 also confirmed temporal test–retest reliability and the discriminant validity of the GCBS‐J by indicating no association with an unrelated construct, namely Big‐Five personality traits. These findings suggest that the GCBS‐J is a useful tool for assessing generic conspiracist beliefs within Japanese samples.
A conspiracy theory refers to an alternative explanation of an event involving a conspirator plot organised by powerful people or organisations. Belief in conspiracy theories is related to negative societal outcomes such as poor medical decisions and a decrease in prosocial behaviour. Given these negative outcomes, researchers have explored predictors of belief in conspiracy theories in an attempt to understand and possibly manage these beliefs. In the current study, we explored the utility of personality in predicting belief in conspiracy theories. The aim of the current study was to explore the utility of the odd beliefs/magical thinking subtype of schizotypy, Machiavellianism, grandiose narcissism, vulnerable narcissism, primary psychopathy, and secondary psychopathy in predicting belief in conspiracy theories. Participants (N = 230; 44.7% male, 55.3% female) completed an anonymous, confidential online questionnaire which comprised demographics and measures of personality traits and belief in conspiracy theories. The total regression model indicated odd beliefs/magical thinking, trait Machiavellianism, and primary psychopathy were significant, positive predictors of belief in conspiracy theories. No other predictors reached significance. Results of the current study highlight individuals who might be more susceptible to believing conspiracy theories. Specifically, these results indicate that the individual more likely to believe in conspiracy theories may have unusual patterns of thinking and cognitions, be strategic and manipulative, and display interpersonal and affective deficits.
Several self-report measures of conspiracist beliefs have been developed in Western populations, but examination of their psychometric properties outside Europe and North America is limited. This study aimed to examine the psychometric properties of three widely-used measures of conspiracist beliefs in Iran. We translated the Belief in Conspiracy Theory Inventory (BCTI), Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), and Generic Conspiracist Belief Scale (GCBS) into Persian. Factorial validity was examined using principal-axis factor analysis in a community sample from Tehran, Iran (N = 544). Further, the relationships between scores on these measures and hypothesized antecedents (i.e., education, schizotypal personality, information processing style, superstitious beliefs, religiosity, and political orientation) were examined. Overall, we failed to find support for the parent factor structures of two of the three scales (BCTI and GCBS) and evidence of construct validity for all three scales was limited. These results highlight the necessity of further psychometric work on existing measures of conspiracy theories in diverse culturo-linguistic groups and the development of context-specific measures of conspiracist beliefs.
In the last decade, the number of investigations of the beliefs in conspiracy theories has begun to increase in the fields of social, differential, and experimental psychology. A considerable number of variables have been suggested as predictors of conspiracy beliefs, amongst them personality factors such as low agreeableness (as disagreeableness is associated with suspicion and antagonism) and high openness to experience (due to its positive association to seek out unusual and novel ideas). The association between agreeableness, openness to experience and conspiracy beliefs remains unclear in the literature. The present study reviews the literature of psychological studies investigating conspiracy beliefs. Additionally, the association between Big Five personality factors and conspiracy beliefs is analyzed meta-analytically using random-effects models. Ninety-six studies were identified for the systematic review. A comprehensive account of predictors, consequences, operationalization, questionnaires, and most prominent conspiracy theories is presented. For meta-analysis, 74 effect sizes from 13 studies were extracted. The psychological literature on predictors of conspiracy beliefs can be divided in approaches either with a pathological (e.g., paranoia) or socio-political focus (e.g., perceived powerlessness). Generally, there is a lack of theoretical frameworks in this young area of research. Meta-analysis revealed that agreeableness, openness to experience, and the remaining Big Five personality factors were not significantly associated with conspiracy beliefs if effect sizes are aggregated. Considerable heterogeneity in designs and operationalization characterizes the field. This article provides an overview of instrumentation, study designs, and current state of knowledge in an effort toward advancement and consensus in the study of conspiracy beliefs.
Beck’s insight—that beliefs about one’s self, future, and environment shape behavior—transformed depression treatment. Yet environment beliefs remain relatively understudied. We introduce a set of environment beliefs— primal world beliefs or primals —that concern the world’s overall character (e.g., the world is interesting, the world is dangerous ). To create a measure, we systematically identified candidate primals (e.g., analyzing tweets, historical texts, etc.); conducted exploratory factor analysis ( N = 930) and two confirmatory factor analyses ( N = 524; N = 529); examined sequence effects ( N = 219) and concurrent validity ( N = 122); and conducted test-retests over 2 weeks ( n = 122), 9 months ( n = 134), and 19 months (n = 398). The resulting 99-item Primals Inventory (PI-99) measures 26 primals with three overarching beliefs— Safe, Enticing , and Alive (mean α = .93)—that typically explain ∼55% of the common variance. These beliefs were normally distributed; stable (2 weeks, 9 months, and 19 month test-retest results averaged .88, .75, and .77, respectively); strongly correlated with many personality and wellbeing variables (e.g., Safe and optimism, r = .61; Enticing and depression, r = −.52; Alive and meaning, r = .54); and explained more variance in life satisfaction, transcendent experience, trust, and gratitude than the BIG 5 (3%, 3%, 6%, and 12% more variance, respectively). In sum, the PI-99 showed strong psychometric characteristics, primals plausibly shape many personality and wellbeing variables, and a broad research effort examining these relationships is warranted.
The present study investigates the validity and utility of the German adaptations of the two short forms of the Big Five Inventory-2 (BFI-2), the 30-item BFI-2-S, and the 15-item BFI-2-XS, developed by Soto and John (2017b). Both scales assess the Big Five domains. The BFI-2-S allows, in addition, the brief assessment of three facets per domain. Based on a large and heterogeneous sample, we show that the psychometric properties of these adapted short scales are consistent with those of the Anglo-American source versions, and we demonstrate substantial convergence between the adaptations and the source versions. Extending the original scale development study, we demonstrate high retest stability of the scales and their facets. Our results clearly indicate the construct and criterion validity of the two scales: Both show substantial convergence with the NEO-PI-R domain scales. Moreover, the distinctive correlation pattern found between the facets of the BFI-2 and the NEO-PI-R could be replicated for the facets of the BFI-2-S. Furthermore, we show that the domain scales of both instruments are associated in the hypothesized directions with important life outcomes, such as life satisfaction and intelligence, and that the facets of the BFI-2-S have incremental validity for predicting these outcomes.
Research on individual-difference factors predicting belief in conspiracy theories has proceeded along several independent lines that converge on a profile of conspiracy believers as individuals who are relatively untrusting, ideologically eccentric, concerned about personal safety, and prone to perceiving agency in actions and profundity in bullshit. The present research represents the first attempt at an integrative approach to testing the independent contributions of these diverse factors to conspiratorial thinking. Two studies (N = 1,253) found that schizotypy, dangerous-world beliefs, and bullshit receptivity independently and additively predict endorsement of generic (i.e., nonpartisan) conspiracy beliefs. Results suggest that “hyperactive” agency detection and political orientation (and related variables) might also play a role. The studies found no effects of situational threats (mortality salience or a sense of powerlessness) – though it remains to be seen whether real-world instantiations of situational threats might move some people to seek refuge in conspiratorial ideation.
Public discourse and scholarly literature often make a strong connection between paranoid thought and belief in conspiracy theories. We report one meta‐analysis and two correlational studies across two distinct cultural contexts (total N = 578) to provide an estimate for their association but also evidence for their distinctiveness via a multi‐trait‐multi‐method approach. Whereas the meta‐analysis (k = 11 studies) provided support for a reliable association between paranoia and conspiracy beliefs, the two additional studies provide direct evidence for their distinctiveness and divergent associations with other constructs. Although both assume sinister intentions of others, beliefs in conspiracy theories are more specific in who these others are (powerful groups) than paranoia (everyone). In contrast, paranoia was more restricted in terms of who the target of the negative intentions is (the self) than conspiracy theorizing (society as a whole). In light of this and distinct associations of conspiracy beliefs with political control and trust but not (inter‐)personal control and trust (like paranoia), we propose to treat the two as distinct (albeit correlated) constructs with conspiracy beliefs reflecting a political attitude compared to paranoia as a self‐relevant belief.
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This research examined the link between attachment styles and belief in conspiracy theories. It was hypothesized, due to the tendency to exaggerate the intensity of threats, that higher anxiously attached individuals would be more likely to hold conspiracy beliefs, even when accounting for other variables such as right-wing authoritarianism, interpersonal trust, and demographic factors that have been found to predict conspiracy belief in previous research. In Study 1 (N = 246 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers), participants higher in anxious attachment style showed a greater tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. Further, this relationship remained significant when accounting for other known predictors of conspiracy belief. Study 2 (N = 230 Prolific Academic workers) revealed that anxious attachment again predicted the general tendency to believe conspiracy theories, but also belief in specific conspiracy theories and conspiracy theories about groups. These relationships held when controlling for demographic factors. The current studies add to the body of research investigating the individual differences predictors of conspiracy belief, demonstrating that conspiracy belief may, to some degree, have roots in early childhood experiences.
Widespread misperceptions undermine citizens’ decision-making ability. Conclusions based on falsehoods and conspiracy theories are by definition flawed. This article demonstrates that individuals’ epistemic beliefs–beliefs about the nature of knowledge and how one comes to know–have important implications for perception accuracy. The present study uses a series of large, nationally representative surveys of the U.S. population to produce valid and reliable measures of three aspects of epistemic beliefs: reliance on intuition for factual beliefs (Faith in Intuition for facts), importance of consistency between empirical evidence and beliefs (Need for evidence), and conviction that “facts” are politically constructed (Truth is political). Analyses confirm that these factors complement established predictors of misperception, substantively increasing our ability to explain both individuals’ propensity to engage in conspiracist ideation, and their willingness to embrace falsehoods about high-profile scientific and political issues. Individuals who view reality as a political construct are significantly more likely to embrace falsehoods, whereas those who believe that their conclusions must hew to available evidence tend to hold more accurate beliefs. Confidence in the ability to intuitively recognize truth is a uniquely important predictor of conspiracist ideation. Results suggest that efforts to counter misperceptions may be helped by promoting epistemic beliefs emphasizing the importance of evidence, cautious use of feelings, and trust that rigorous assessment by knowledgeable specialists is an effective guard against political manipulation.
What psychological factors drive the popularity of conspiracy theories that explain important events as secret plots by powerful and malevolent groups? What are the psychological consequences of adopting these theories? We review the current research, and find that it answers the first of these questions more thoroughly than the second. Belief in conspiracy theories appears to be driven by motives that can be characterized as epistemic (understanding one’s environment), existential (being safe and in control of one’s environment) and social (maintaining a positive image of the self and the social group). However, little research has investigated the consequences of conspiracy belief, and to date, this research does not indicate that conspiracy belief fulfills people’s motivations. Instead, for many people conspiracy belief may be more appealing than satisfying. Further research is needed to determine for whom, and under what conditions, conspiracy theories may satisfy key psychological motives.
We used an identities approach to examine voting intentions in the June 2016 United Kingdom (UK) referendum on membership of the European Union (EU). In April 2016, 303 British adults (58.7% women, age M = 34.73) indicated their voting intentions for the referendum and completed measures of identification with the national in-group, perceived threat from Muslim immigrants, belief in Islamophobic conspiracy narratives, Islamophobia, general conspiracist beliefs, ambiguity tolerance, and belief in a clash of civilisations. Path and mediation analyses indicated that greater belief in Islamophobic conspiracy theories mediated the link between Islamophobia and intention to vote to leave. Islamophobia and Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs also mediated the effects of perceived threat from Muslims on voting intentions. Other variables acted as antecedents of perceived threat or Islamophobic conspiracy narratives. These findings highlight the role that identity-based cognitions may have played in shaping voting intentions for the UK EU referendum.
In the current research, we investigated whether belief in conspiracy theories satisfies people’s need for uniqueness. We found that the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories was associated with the feeling of possessing scarce information about the situations explained by the conspiracy theories (Study 1) and higher need for uniqueness (Study 2). Further two studies using two different manipulations of need for uniqueness (Studies 3 and 4) showed that people in a high need for uniqueness condition displayed higher conspiracy belief than people in a low need for uniqueness condition. This conclusion is strengthened by a small-scale meta-analysis. These studies suggest that conspiracy theories may serve people’s desire to be unique, highlighting a motivational underpinning of conspiracy belief.
Adding to the growing literature on the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs, the present paper argues that a small part in motivating the endorsement of such seemingly irrational beliefs is the desire to stick out from the crowd, the need for uniqueness. Across three studies, we establish a modest but robust association between the self-attributed need for uniqueness and a general conspirational mindset (conspiracy mentality) as well as the endorsement of specific conspiracy beliefs. Following up on previous findings that people high in need for uniqueness resist majority and yield to minority influence, Study 3 experimentally shows that a fictitious conspiracy theory received more support by people high in conspiracy mentality when this theory was said to be supported by only a minority (vs. majority) of survey respondents. Together these findings support the notion that conspiracy beliefs can be adopted as a means to attain a sense of uniqueness.
Keywords: conspiracy
The Big Five Inventory–2 (BFI-2) uses 60 items to hierarchically assess the Big Five personality domains and 15 more-specific facet traits. The present research develops two abbreviated forms of the BFI-2—the 30-item BFI-2-S and the 15-item BFI-2-XS—and then examines their measurement properties. At the level of the Big Five domains, we find that the BFI-2-S and BFI-2-XS retain much of the full measure’s reliability and validity. At the facet level, we find that the BFI-2-S may be useful for examining facet traits in reasonably large samples, whereas the BFI-2-XS should not be used to assess facets. Finally, we discuss some key tradeoffs to consider when deciding whether to administer an abbreviated form instead of the full BFI-2.
A number scales have been developed to measure conspiracist ideation, but little attention has been paid to the factorial validity of these scales. We reassessed the psychometric properties of four widely-used scales, namely the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (BCTI), the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS), and the One-Item Conspiracy Measure (OICM). Eight-hundred-and-three U.S. adults completed all measures, along with measures of endorsement of 9/11 and anti-vaccination conspiracy theories. Through both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, we found that only the BCTI had acceptable factorial validity. We failed to confirm the factor structures of the CMQ and the GBCS, suggesting these measures had poor factorial validity. Indices of convergent validity were acceptable for the BCTI, but weaker for the other measures. Based on these findings, we provide suggestions for the future refinement in the measurement of conspiracist ideation.
Background:
Parents' vaccine attitudes influence their decision regarding child vaccination. To date, no study has evaluated the impact of vaccine conspiracy beliefs on human papillomavirus vaccine acceptance. The authors assessed the validity of a Vaccine Conspiracy Beliefs Scale (VCBS) and determined whether this scale was associated with parents' willingness to vaccinate their son with the HPV vaccine.
Methods:
Canadian parents completed a 24-min online survey in 2014. Measures included socio-demographic variables, HPV knowledge, health care provider recommendation, Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), the seven-item VCBS, and parents' willingness to vaccinate their son at two price points.
Results:
A total of 1427 Canadian parents completed the survey in English (61.2%) or French (38.8%). A Factor Analysis revealed the VCBS is one-dimensional and has high internal consistency (α=0.937). The construct validity of the VCBS was supported by a moderate relationship with the CMQ (r=0.44, p<0.001). Hierarchical regression analyses found the VCBS is negatively related to parents' willingness to vaccinate their son with the HPV vaccine at both price points ('free' or '$300') after controlling for gender, age, household income, education level, HPV knowledge, and health care provider recommendation.
Conclusions:
The VCBS is a brief, valid scale that will be useful in further elucidating the correlates of vaccine hesitancy. Future research could use the VCBS to evaluate the impact of vaccine conspiracies beliefs on vaccine uptake and how concerns about vaccination may be challenged and reversed.
Sociologists coined the term "anomie" to describe societies that are characterized by disintegration and deregulation. Extending beyond conceptualizations of anomie that conflate the measurements of anomie as 'a state of society' and as a 'state of mind', we disentangle these conceptualizations and develop an analysis and measure of this phenomenon focusing on anomie as a perception of the 'state of society'. We propose that anomie encompasses two dimensions: a perceived breakdown in social fabric (i.e., disintegration as lack of trust and erosion of moral standards) and a perceived breakdown in leadership (i.e., deregulation as lack of legitimacy and effectiveness of leadership). Across six studies we present evidence for the validity of the new measure, the Perception of Anomie Scale (PAS). Studies 1a and 1b provide evidence for the proposed factor structure and internal consistency of PAS. Studies 2a-c provide evidence of convergent and discriminant validity. Finally, assessing PAS in 28 countries, we show that PAS correlates with national indicators of societal functioning and that PAS predicts national identification and well-being (Studies 3a & 3b). The broader implications of the anomie construct for the study of group processes are discussed.
Conspiracy Theory (CT) endorsers believe in an omnipresent, malevolent, and highly coordinated group that wields secret influence for personal gain, and credit this group with the responsibility for many noteworthy events. Two explanations for the emergence of CTs are that they result from social marginalisation and a lack of agency, or that they are due to a need-to-explain-the-unexplained. Furthermore, representativeness heuristics may form reasoning biases that make such beliefs more likely. Two related studies (N = 107; N = 120) examined the relationships between these social marginalisation, intolerance of uncertainty, heuristics and CT belief using a correlational design. Overall, intolerance of uncertainty did not link strongly to CT belief, but worldview variables did — particularly a sense of the world as (socially) threatening, non-random, and with no fixed morality. The use of both representative heuristics that were examined was heightened in those participants more likely to endorse CTs. These factors seem to contribute to the likelihood of whether the individual will endorse CTs generally, relating similarly to common CTs, CTs generally historically accepted as “true”, and to the endorsement of fictional CTs that the individual would find novel. Implications are discussed.
The present cross-sectional study (NParticipants = 397; NInformants = 460) examined the association of both grandiose narcissism and vulnerable narcissism with conspiracy beliefs in the context of four theoretically-relevant mediators. Participants who were higher in grandiose narcissism and vulnerable narcissism were more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, seemingly because they were more likely to hold unusual beliefs. There was, likewise, some evidence to suggest that vulnerable narcissists believe in conspiracy theories because they suffer from paranoia, whereas grandiose narcissists believe in conspiracy theories because of a desire to be unique. Together, these results suggest that the conspiracist ideation seen among grandiose and vulnerable narcissists is a consequence of features that are shared between and unique to each of the traits.
Previous research has established the principle that situations can affect the expression of personality, though it is not well-understood what specific patterns characterize this change across situations. We explore the possibility of contrasting situation themes that influence personality expression, implying that there is a change in personality expression initiated by a transition between two distinct types of situations. 474 undergraduate students completed a questionnaire in which 15 personality tendencies were juxtaposed with each of 41 differing situations. Our findings replicated previous research indicating that Honesty/Propriety yields the least variance between situations while Emotional Stability and Extraversion yield the most variance. Principal components analysis was used to examine cross-situational variability with four models already present in psychological literature, each with contrasting poles. We found that our models of threat vs. reward, positive affect vs. negative affect, and agency vs. no agency were clear sources of cross-situational variability. Taken together, these results indicate ways of improving our understanding of patterns of change in personality expression across a variety of commonly occurring situations.
It remains unclear why those scoring high on certain aspects of the Dark Tetrad (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, and sadism) are more inclined to believe in conspiracy theories. The present study (N = 474) aimed to clarify this issue by investigating the associations between the facets of the Dark Tetrad traits and conspiracist ideation in the context of five potential mediators. At least one facet of every Dark Tetrad trait was associated with conspiracist ideation, and nearly every association could be attributed, in part, to the tendency for those with aversive personalities to entertain odd beliefs, be fatalistic, and distrust others. Contrary to what the prior research might suggest, these results indicate that the conspiracist ideation found among those scoring high in the Dark Tetrad traits is the result of some shared feature of the traits rather than a feature that is unique to each trait.
We provide a brief overview of the Turnaway Study, the first study to collect longitudinal data on individual women who received versus were denied a wanted abortion in the United States. The study team collected data on nearly 1,000 women seeking an abortion from 30 facilities around the country and followed them for 5 years. We discuss some of the main findings from the study related to the health, labor, and human capital outcomes of the women who were denied abortions and gave birth. We conclude by describing future opportunities to learn from the study with new linkages to administrative data.
We tested the hypothesis that people show generality in their endorsement of unsubstantiated claims, employing more types of measures than used in previous studies. We found that measures of generic conspiracist ideation, specific fictitious conspiracy theory and false conspiracy theory beliefs were all strongly and positively intercorrelated. A multiple regression analysis revealed that the measures of specific false and fictitious conspiracy theories both significantly predicted generic conspiracist ideation. A second broader test of the generality hypothesis showed that these measures of false and fictitious conspiracy belief were positively intercorrelated with measures of psychological misconceptions, pseudoscience, poorly‐supported psychological practices, and paranormal beliefs. However, the measures of misconceptions and pseudoscience displayed substantially lower correlations. The results provide support for the generality of acceptance of a wider variety of unsubstantiated claims than used in previous studies, but also suggest differences in the types endorsed based on the kind of knowledge and content measured.
Effect sizes are underappreciated and often misinterpreted—the most common mistakes being to describe them in ways that are uninformative (e.g., using arbitrary standards) or misleading (e.g., squaring effect-size rs). We propose that effect sizes can be usefully evaluated by comparing them with well-understood benchmarks or by considering them in terms of concrete consequences. In that light, we conclude that when reliably estimated (a critical consideration), an effect-size r of .05 indicates an effect that is very small for the explanation of single events but potentially consequential in the not-very-long run, an effect-size r of .10 indicates an effect that is still small at the level of single events but potentially more ultimately consequential, an effect-size r of .20 indicates a medium effect that is of some explanatory and practical use even in the short run and therefore even more important, and an effect-size r of .30 indicates a large effect that is potentially powerful in both the short and the long run. A very large effect size (r = .40 or greater) in the context of psychological research is likely to be a gross overestimate that will rarely be found in a large sample or in a replication. Our goal is to help advance the treatment of effect sizes so that rather than being numbers that are ignored, reported without interpretation, or interpreted superficially or incorrectly, they become aspects of research reports that can better inform the application and theoretical development of psychological research.
This study sought to replicate previous work showing relationships between components of schizotypy and conspiracist beliefs, and extend it by examining the mediating role of cognitive processes. An international online sample of 411 women and men (mean age = 35.41 years) completed measures of the schizotypal facets of Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and Ideas of Reference, conspiracist beliefs, and cognitive processes related to need for cognition, analytic thinking, and cognitive insight. Path analysis confirmed the associations between both schizotypal facets and conspiracist beliefs in the present sample. Confirmatory evidence was found for the association between analytic thinking and conspiracist beliefs, and results also suggested an association between cognitive insight and conspiracist beliefs. Cognitive insight also mediated the link between Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and Ideas of Reference with conspiracist beliefs. However, analytic thinking provided a mediating link to conspiracy ideation for Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and not Ideas of Reference. Finally, there was an association between Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and need for cognition, but this path did not extend to conspiracist beliefs. These results suggest possible mediating roles for analytic thinking and self-certainty between schizotypy and conspiracist beliefs.
Research on the psychology of conspiracy theories has shown recent steps towards a standardization of measures. The present article seeks to continue that trend by presenting the Flexible Inventory of Conspiracy Suspicions (FICS), a questionnaire template that can be adapted to measure suspicions of a conspiracy around nearly any topic of public interest. Compared to conspiracy belief measures that ask about specific theories on a given topic, the FICS is worded in such a way as to provide relatively stable validity across time and cultural context. Using a hybrid approach incorporating classical test theory and Rasch scaling, three questionnaire studies on Mechanical Turk demonstrate the validity of the FICS in measuring conspiracy suspicions regarding 9/11, vaccine safety, and US elections, with good psychometric properties in most situations. However, the utility of the FICS is limited in the case of climate change due to the existence of two opposing conspiracy theories that share essentially no common assumptions (‘climate change is a hoax’ vs. ‘there is a conspiracy to make people believe that climate change is a hoax’). The results indicate that the FICS is a reliable and valid measure of conspiracy suspicions within certain parameters, and suggest a three-level model that differentiates general conspiracist ideation, relatively vague conspiracy suspicions, and relatively specific conspiracy beliefs.
Individual differences researchers very commonly report Pearson correlations between their variables of interest. Cohen (1988) provided guidelines for the purposes of interpreting the magnitude of a correlation, as well as estimating power. Specifically, r = 0.10, r = 0.30, and r = 0.50 were recommended to be considered small, medium , and large in magnitude, respectively. However, Cohen's effect size guidelines were based principally upon an essentially qualitative impression, rather than a systematic, quantitative analysis of data. Consequently, the purpose of this investigation was to develop a large sample of previously published meta-analytically derived correlations which would allow for an evaluation of Cohen's guidelines from an empirical perspective. Based on 708 meta-analytically derived correlations, the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles corresponded to correlations of 0.11, 0.19, and 0.29, respectively. Based on the results, it is suggested that Cohen's correlation guidelines are too exigent, as b3% of correlations in the literature were found to be as large as r = 0.50. Consequently, in the absence of any other information, individual differences researchers are recommended to consider correlations of 0.10, 0.20, and 0.30 as relatively small, typical, and relatively large, in the context of a power analysis, as well as the interpretation of statistical results from a normative perspective.