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The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale – 5: A short-form measure of conspiracist ideation
Abstract
The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCB-15) is a reliable and valid measure of conspiracist ideation, but it is also inefficient. At 15 items, the GCB-15 can take upwards of four minutes to complete. Here we introduce the GCB-5—a 5-item, short form of the GCB-15. Across five studies, we use self- and informant-report methods to demonstrate that the GCB-5 is a reliable, criterion-valid, and construct-valid measure of conspiracist ideation. In the final study, we further provide evidence that the GCB-5 has promise for addressing novel research questions. Specifically, we show that people high in conspiracist ideation—as assessed by the GCB-5—are more accepting of the use of nuclear weapons and other forms of so-called “virtuous violence” (e.g., anti-abortion legislation).
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Although sometimes used interchangeably, the present review highlights the important differences between generalized worldviews suspecting conspiracy at play (conspiracy mentality) and specific beliefs about the existence of a certain conspiracy (conspiracy theory). In contrast to measures of beliefs in specific conspiracy theories, those of conspiracy mentality are more stable, less malleable, less skewed in their distribution and less contaminated by other ideological content. These differences have important implications for empirical research and the theorizing of conspiracy beliefs. Building on an analogy of personality traits, we argue that conspiracy mentality is a relatively stable readiness to interpret world events as being caused by plots hatched in secret, whereas specific conspiracy beliefs are then manifest indicators (partially contaminated by other dispositions).
Conspiratorial belief is a type of argument that accepts implausible explanations in situations of great uncertainty or mystery. Claiming that the coronavirus is an artificial fabrication of laboratories is an example of conspiracist belief. The aim of this research was to analyze the impact of conspiracist ideation and psychotic-like experiences in patients with schizophrenia, patients with other mental disorders, and participants with no psychiatric history with a 132-day follow-up during the COVID-19 crisis. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was applied and Bayesian inferences were carried out. The results conclude that conspiracist ideation and psychotic-like experiences increased significantly after 132 days of social-health restrictions in the general population. However, psychotic-like experiences did not increase in patients with schizophrenia. Conspiracist ideation has a quantitative degradation similar to the continuum model of psychosis; it is present both in patients with schizophrenia and in those participants with no clinical history. The psychopathological value of conspiracist ideation within the spectrum of psychosis is discussed.
Model fit assessment is a central component of evaluating confirmatory factor analysis models and the validity of psychological assessments. Fit indices remain popular and researchers often judge fit with fixed cutoffs derived by Hu and Bentler (1999). Despite their overwhelming popularity, methodological studies have cautioned against fixed cutoffs, noting that the meaning of fit indices varies based on a complex interaction of model characteristics like factor reliability, number of items, and number of factors. Criticism of fixed cutoffs stems primarily from the fact that they were derived from one specific confirmatory factor analysis model and lack generalizability. To address this, we propose a simulation-based method called dynamic fit index cutoffs such that derivation of cutoffs is adaptively tailored to the specific model and data characteristics being evaluated. Unlike previously proposed simulation-based techniques, our method removes existing barriers to implementation by providing an open-source, Web based Shiny software application that automates the entire process so that users neither need to manually write any software code nor be knowledgeable about foundations of Monte Carlo simulation. Additionally, we extend fit index cutoff derivations to include sets of cutoffs for multiple levels of misspecification. In doing so, fit indices can more closely resemble their originally intended purpose as effect sizes quantifying misfit rather than improperly functioning as ad hoc hypothesis tests. We also provide an approach specifically designed for the nuances of 1-factor models, which have received surprisingly little attention in the literature despite frequent substantive interests in unidimensionality. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
The present research empirically examines how different types of coping strategies are associated with belief in conspiracy theories. Conspiracy beliefs have been linked to the frustration of basic needs and seem to increase during major world events that evoke stress. Thus, we hypothesized that they may serve as a psychological response to maladaptive coping strategies. This hypothesis was tested among British participants and conceptually replicated across three studies. Cross-sectionally, we examined coping strategies (i.e., self-sufficient, social-support, avoidance, and religious) and belief in a specific conspiracy theory (Study 1, n = 199) and belief in general notions of conspiracy (Study 2, n = 411). In Study 3 (n = 398), we experimentally primed different coping styles via a mnemonic recollection procedure and measured belief in notions of conspiracy. Avoidance coping (recognized as being maladaptive and leading to at least temporary disengagement and abandonment of goal-related behaviours) positively predicted belief in conspiracy theories (Studies 1 and 2). In Study 3, priming avoidance coping (vs. self-sufficient coping or no coping strategy) significantly increased belief in conspiracy theories. These findings suggest that using maladaptive coping strategies (either dispositional or situationally induced) may foster conspiracy beliefs.
We tested the link between COVID-19 conspiracy theories and health protective behaviours in three studies: one at the onset of the pandemic in the United Kingdom (UK), a second just before the first national lockdown, and a third during that lockdown (N = 302, 404 and 399). We focused on conspiracy theories that did not deny the existence of COVID-19 and evaluated the extent to which they predicted a range of health protective behaviours, before and after controlling for psychological and sociodemographic characteristics associated with conspiracy theory belief. COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs were positively correlated with beliefs in other unrelated conspiracies and a general conspiracy mind-set, and negatively correlated with trust in government and a tendency towards analytical thinking (vs. intuitive thinking). Unexpectedly, COVID-19 conspiracy believers adhered to basic health guidelines and advanced health protective measures as strictly as non-believers. Conspiracy believers were, however, less willing to install the contact-tracing app, get tested for and vaccinated against COVID-19, and were more likely to share COVID-19 misinformation – all of which might undermine public health initiatives. Study 3 showed conspiracy theory believers were less willing to undertake health protective behaviours that were outside of their personal control, perceiving these as having a negative balance of risks and benefits. We discuss models explaining conspiracy beliefs and health protective behaviours, and suggest practical recommendations for public health initiatives.
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Past research has demonstrated that conspiracy belief is linked to a low level of self-reported general trust. In four experimental online studies (total N = 1105) we examined whether this relationship translated into actual behavior. Specifically, since the decision to trust relies on the ability to detect potential social threat, we tested whether conspiracy believers are better at detecting actual threat, worse at detecting the absence of threat, or simply trust less, irrespective of any social cue. To this end, participants played multiple, independent rounds of the trust game, a behavioral measure for interpersonal trust. We manipulated social threat by presenting photographs of their alleged trustees with varying intensity of facial anger. In three of the four studies, trustors' conspiracy beliefs predicted a more cautious investment behavior in the trust game. This association, however, was not contingent on the social threat posed by the trustee. The present research thus joins a number of studies demonstrating that conspiracy beliefs can – under certain circumstances - influence everyday behavior.
Significance
Two surveys of United States public opinion found that support for killing enemy civilians and combatants disproportionately with nuclear or conventional weapons was deeply divided along partisan political lines. Those approving such excessively lethal attacks tended to be Republican and conservative. They felt socially distant from the enemy, dehumanized them, and believed that the victims were to blame for their fate. These same individuals also tended to support domestic policies that protect gun owners, restrict abortion, and punish immigrants and criminals (excessively). Understanding the origins and motives underlying the widespread support for such punitive behaviors is essential to mitigating violence that threatens millions of people and our democracy.
Previous research has suggested that the Dark Triad traits and, specifically, Machiavellianism and psychopathy, are associated with a tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. The current study (N = 203) aimed to replicate and extend the existing research by examining the relationship between the Dark Tetrad traits—Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, and everyday sadism—and a novel measure of COVID-19 conspiracist ideation. Machiavellian views and psychopathic antisociality were significant positive predictors of the tendency to believe in COVID-19 conspiracy theories, even when accounting for the participants’ knowledge about COVID-19. Overall, the results suggest that some (but not all) aspects of the Dark Tetrad are associated with COVID-19 conspiracist ideation.
This study examined whether thinking style mediated relationships between belief in conspiracy and schizotypy facets. A UK‐based sample of 421 respondents completed the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS), Oxford‐Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences Short (O‐Life), and measures indexing preferential thinking style (proneness to reality testing deficits and Need for Cognition). Path analysis revealed direct and indirect relationships between Conspiracy Beliefs and schizotypy facets. Unusual Experiences had a direct effect on Conspiracy Beliefs and predicted Reality Testing and Need for Cognition. Preferential thinking style mediated the schizotypy‐belief in conspiracy relationship. This pattern of results (higher experiential‐based processing and lower Need for Cognition) was consistent with intuitive thinking. Introverted Anhedonia and Impulsive Nonconformity predicted Reality Testing and had indirect effects on Conspiracy Beliefs. Finally, Reality Testing predicted Conspiracy Beliefs, whereas Need for Cognition did not. These results confirm that cognitive processes related to thinking style mediate the schizotypy‐conspiracist beliefs relationship.
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COVID-19 pandemic has led to popular conspiracy theories regarding its origins and widespread concern over the level of compliance with preventive measures. In the current preregistered research, we recruited 1088 Turkish participants and investigated (a) individual differences associated with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs; (b) whether such conspiracy beliefs are related to the level of preventive measures; and (c) other individual differences that might be related to the preventive measures. Higher faith in intuition, uncertainty avoidance, impulsivity, generic conspiracy beliefs, religiosity, and right-wing ideology, and a lower level of cognitive reflection were associated with a higher level of belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories. There was no association between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and preventive measures while perceived risk was positively and impulsivity negatively correlated with preventive measures. We discuss the implications and directions for future research.
COVID-19 pandemic has led to popular conspiracy theories regarding its origins and widespread concern over the level of compliance with preventive measures. In the current preregistered research, we recruited 1,088 Turkish participants and investigated (a) individual differences associated with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs; (2) whether such conspiracy beliefs are related to the level of preventive measures; and (3) other individual differences that might be related to the preventive measures. Higher faith in intuition, uncertainty avoidance, impulsivity, generic conspiracy beliefs, religiosity, and right-wing ideology, and a lower level of cognitive reflection were associated with a higher level of belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories. There was no association between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and preventive measures while perceived risk was positively and impulsivity negatively correlated with preventive measures. We discuss the implications and directions for future research.
The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS) is the most widely used measure of general belief in conspiracy theories. The scale comprises five related but distinct factors (Government Malfeasance, Extraterrestrial Cover-up, Malevolent Global Conspiracies, Personal Wellbeing, and Control of Information). Despite this, investigators have typically treated the GCBS as unidimensional by referencing only overall total. Although, the GCBS possesses established psychometric properties, critics question its factorial structure, suggest alternative models, and recommend routine examination of GCBS dimensions as part of analysis. Through two studies, the present paper assessed GCBS factorial structure, internal reliability, convergent validity, and invariance. This involved comparing the original five-factor solution with alternative one, two, and three-factor models. To ensure that the best fitting model was robust, the authors conducted analysis in two independent samples (Study one, N = 794, UK university-based sample; and Study two, N = 418, UK respondents collected via a market research company). Results in both studies indicated superior fit for the correlated five-factor solution. This solution demonstrated invariance across gender, and samples (Study one and two). Furthermore, the total scale and five subfactors evinced good alpha and omega total reliability. Convergent validity testing exhibited associations of an expected strength between conspiracist beliefs, reality testing, and cognitive insight. Large intercorrelations existed among GCBS subfactors, suggesting that the measure reflects a narrow set of interrelated conspiracist assumptions. These findings support the use of overall scale scores as an index of belief in conspiracy theories.
Generic conspiracist belief refers to the general tendency toward conspiracist ideation independent of specific event‐based conspiracy theories. The present research aimed to develop a Japanese version of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS‐J). In two studies, we examined the factor structure, reliability, and convergent and discriminant validity of the GCBS‐J. In Study 1 (N = 600), exploratory factor analysis with a split‐half subsample proposed a two‐factor solution dissociating extraterrestrial conspiracy from other conspiracist ideations. Subsequent confirmatory factor analysis with the other split‐half subsample confirmed the two‐factor structure. Study 1 also established convergent validity by indicating strong positive correlations with other measures of conspiracist belief. Study 2 (N = 178) added further evidence to indicate a positive correlation with related psychological constructs, such as paranormal beliefs. Study 2 also confirmed temporal test–retest reliability and the discriminant validity of the GCBS‐J by indicating no association with an unrelated construct, namely Big‐Five personality traits. These findings suggest that the GCBS‐J is a useful tool for assessing generic conspiracist beliefs within Japanese samples.
A conspiracy theory refers to an alternative explanation of an event involving a conspirator plot organised by powerful people or organisations. Belief in conspiracy theories is related to negative societal outcomes such as poor medical decisions and a decrease in prosocial behaviour. Given these negative outcomes, researchers have explored predictors of belief in conspiracy theories in an attempt to understand and possibly manage these beliefs. In the current study, we explored the utility of personality in predicting belief in conspiracy theories. The aim of the current study was to explore the utility of the odd beliefs/magical thinking subtype of schizotypy, Machiavellianism, grandiose narcissism, vulnerable narcissism, primary psychopathy, and secondary psychopathy in predicting belief in conspiracy theories. Participants (N = 230; 44.7% male, 55.3% female) completed an anonymous, confidential online questionnaire which comprised demographics and measures of personality traits and belief in conspiracy theories. The total regression model indicated odd beliefs/magical thinking, trait Machiavellianism, and primary psychopathy were significant, positive predictors of belief in conspiracy theories. No other predictors reached significance. Results of the current study highlight individuals who might be more susceptible to believing conspiracy theories. Specifically, these results indicate that the individual more likely to believe in conspiracy theories may have unusual patterns of thinking and cognitions, be strategic and manipulative, and display interpersonal and affective deficits.
Several self-report measures of conspiracist beliefs have been developed in Western populations, but examination of their psychometric properties outside Europe and North America is limited. This study aimed to examine the psychometric properties of three widely-used measures of conspiracist beliefs in Iran. We translated the Belief in Conspiracy Theory Inventory (BCTI), Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), and Generic Conspiracist Belief Scale (GCBS) into Persian. Factorial validity was examined using principal-axis factor analysis in a community sample from Tehran, Iran (N = 544). Further, the relationships between scores on these measures and hypothesized antecedents (i.e., education, schizotypal personality, information processing style, superstitious beliefs, religiosity, and political orientation) were examined. Overall, we failed to find support for the parent factor structures of two of the three scales (BCTI and GCBS) and evidence of construct validity for all three scales was limited. These results highlight the necessity of further psychometric work on existing measures of conspiracy theories in diverse culturo-linguistic groups and the development of context-specific measures of conspiracist beliefs.
In the last decade, the number of investigations of the beliefs in conspiracy theories has begun to increase in the fields of social, differential, and experimental psychology. A considerable number of variables have been suggested as predictors of conspiracy beliefs, amongst them personality factors such as low agreeableness (as disagreeableness is associated with suspicion and antagonism) and high openness to experience (due to its positive association to seek out unusual and novel ideas). The association between agreeableness, openness to experience and conspiracy beliefs remains unclear in the literature. The present study reviews the literature of psychological studies investigating conspiracy beliefs. Additionally, the association between Big Five personality factors and conspiracy beliefs is analyzed meta-analytically using random-effects models. Ninety-six studies were identified for the systematic review. A comprehensive account of predictors, consequences, operationalization, questionnaires, and most prominent conspiracy theories is presented. For meta-analysis, 74 effect sizes from 13 studies were extracted. The psychological literature on predictors of conspiracy beliefs can be divided in approaches either with a pathological (e.g., paranoia) or socio-political focus (e.g., perceived powerlessness). Generally, there is a lack of theoretical frameworks in this young area of research. Meta-analysis revealed that agreeableness, openness to experience, and the remaining Big Five personality factors were not significantly associated with conspiracy beliefs if effect sizes are aggregated. Considerable heterogeneity in designs and operationalization characterizes the field. This article provides an overview of instrumentation, study designs, and current state of knowledge in an effort toward advancement and consensus in the study of conspiracy beliefs.
Beck’s insight—that beliefs about one’s self, future, and environment shape behavior—transformed depression treatment. Yet environment beliefs remain relatively understudied. We introduce a set of environment beliefs— primal world beliefs or primals —that concern the world’s overall character (e.g., the world is interesting, the world is dangerous ). To create a measure, we systematically identified candidate primals (e.g., analyzing tweets, historical texts, etc.); conducted exploratory factor analysis ( N = 930) and two confirmatory factor analyses ( N = 524; N = 529); examined sequence effects ( N = 219) and concurrent validity ( N = 122); and conducted test-retests over 2 weeks ( n = 122), 9 months ( n = 134), and 19 months (n = 398). The resulting 99-item Primals Inventory (PI-99) measures 26 primals with three overarching beliefs— Safe, Enticing , and Alive (mean α = .93)—that typically explain ∼55% of the common variance. These beliefs were normally distributed; stable (2 weeks, 9 months, and 19 month test-retest results averaged .88, .75, and .77, respectively); strongly correlated with many personality and wellbeing variables (e.g., Safe and optimism, r = .61; Enticing and depression, r = −.52; Alive and meaning, r = .54); and explained more variance in life satisfaction, transcendent experience, trust, and gratitude than the BIG 5 (3%, 3%, 6%, and 12% more variance, respectively). In sum, the PI-99 showed strong psychometric characteristics, primals plausibly shape many personality and wellbeing variables, and a broad research effort examining these relationships is warranted.
Public discourse and scholarly literature often make a strong connection between paranoid thought and belief in conspiracy theories. We report one meta‐analysis and two correlational studies across two distinct cultural contexts (total N = 578) to provide an estimate for their association but also evidence for their distinctiveness via a multi‐trait‐multi‐method approach. Whereas the meta‐analysis (k = 11 studies) provided support for a reliable association between paranoia and conspiracy beliefs, the two additional studies provide direct evidence for their distinctiveness and divergent associations with other constructs. Although both assume sinister intentions of others, beliefs in conspiracy theories are more specific in who these others are (powerful groups) than paranoia (everyone). In contrast, paranoia was more restricted in terms of who the target of the negative intentions is (the self) than conspiracy theorizing (society as a whole). In light of this and distinct associations of conspiracy beliefs with political control and trust but not (inter‐)personal control and trust (like paranoia), we propose to treat the two as distinct (albeit correlated) constructs with conspiracy beliefs reflecting a political attitude compared to paranoia as a self‐relevant belief.
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This research examined the link between attachment styles and belief in conspiracy theories. It was hypothesized, due to the tendency to exaggerate the intensity of threats, that higher anxiously attached individuals would be more likely to hold conspiracy beliefs, even when accounting for other variables such as right-wing authoritarianism, interpersonal trust, and demographic factors that have been found to predict conspiracy belief in previous research. In Study 1 (N = 246 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers), participants higher in anxious attachment style showed a greater tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. Further, this relationship remained significant when accounting for other known predictors of conspiracy belief. Study 2 (N = 230 Prolific Academic workers) revealed that anxious attachment again predicted the general tendency to believe conspiracy theories, but also belief in specific conspiracy theories and conspiracy theories about groups. These relationships held when controlling for demographic factors. The current studies add to the body of research investigating the individual differences predictors of conspiracy belief, demonstrating that conspiracy belief may, to some degree, have roots in early childhood experiences.
Widespread misperceptions undermine citizens’ decision-making ability. Conclusions based on falsehoods and conspiracy theories are by definition flawed. This article demonstrates that individuals’ epistemic beliefs–beliefs about the nature of knowledge and how one comes to know–have important implications for perception accuracy. The present study uses a series of large, nationally representative surveys of the U.S. population to produce valid and reliable measures of three aspects of epistemic beliefs: reliance on intuition for factual beliefs (Faith in Intuition for facts), importance of consistency between empirical evidence and beliefs (Need for evidence), and conviction that “facts” are politically constructed (Truth is political). Analyses confirm that these factors complement established predictors of misperception, substantively increasing our ability to explain both individuals’ propensity to engage in conspiracist ideation, and their willingness to embrace falsehoods about high-profile scientific and political issues. Individuals who view reality as a political construct are significantly more likely to embrace falsehoods, whereas those who believe that their conclusions must hew to available evidence tend to hold more accurate beliefs. Confidence in the ability to intuitively recognize truth is a uniquely important predictor of conspiracist ideation. Results suggest that efforts to counter misperceptions may be helped by promoting epistemic beliefs emphasizing the importance of evidence, cautious use of feelings, and trust that rigorous assessment by knowledgeable specialists is an effective guard against political manipulation.
What psychological factors drive the popularity of conspiracy theories that explain important events as secret plots by powerful and malevolent groups? What are the psychological consequences of adopting these theories? We review the current research, and find that it answers the first of these questions more thoroughly than the second. Belief in conspiracy theories appears to be driven by motives that can be characterized as epistemic (understanding one’s environment), existential (being safe and in control of one’s environment) and social (maintaining a positive image of the self and the social group). However, little research has investigated the consequences of conspiracy belief, and to date, this research does not indicate that conspiracy belief fulfills people’s motivations. Instead, for many people conspiracy belief may be more appealing than satisfying. Further research is needed to determine for whom, and under what conditions, conspiracy theories may satisfy key psychological motives.
We used an identities approach to examine voting intentions in the June 2016 United Kingdom (UK) referendum on membership of the European Union (EU). In April 2016, 303 British adults (58.7% women, age M = 34.73) indicated their voting intentions for the referendum and completed measures of identification with the national in-group, perceived threat from Muslim immigrants, belief in Islamophobic conspiracy narratives, Islamophobia, general conspiracist beliefs, ambiguity tolerance, and belief in a clash of civilisations. Path and mediation analyses indicated that greater belief in Islamophobic conspiracy theories mediated the link between Islamophobia and intention to vote to leave. Islamophobia and Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs also mediated the effects of perceived threat from Muslims on voting intentions. Other variables acted as antecedents of perceived threat or Islamophobic conspiracy narratives. These findings highlight the role that identity-based cognitions may have played in shaping voting intentions for the UK EU referendum.
Adding to the growing literature on the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs, the present paper argues that a small part in motivating the endorsement of such seemingly irrational beliefs is the desire to stick out from the crowd, the need for uniqueness. Across three studies, we establish a modest but robust association between the self-attributed need for uniqueness and a general conspirational mindset (conspiracy mentality) as well as the endorsement of specific conspiracy beliefs. Following up on previous findings that people high in need for uniqueness resist majority and yield to minority influence, Study 3 experimentally shows that a fictitious conspiracy theory received more support by people high in conspiracy mentality when this theory was said to be supported by only a minority (vs. majority) of survey respondents. Together these findings support the notion that conspiracy beliefs can be adopted as a means to attain a sense of uniqueness.
Keywords: conspiracy
The Big Five Inventory–2 (BFI-2) uses 60 items to hierarchically assess the Big Five personality domains and 15 more-specific facet traits. The present research develops two abbreviated forms of the BFI-2—the 30-item BFI-2-S and the 15-item BFI-2-XS—and then examines their measurement properties. At the level of the Big Five domains, we find that the BFI-2-S and BFI-2-XS retain much of the full measure’s reliability and validity. At the facet level, we find that the BFI-2-S may be useful for examining facet traits in reasonably large samples, whereas the BFI-2-XS should not be used to assess facets. Finally, we discuss some key tradeoffs to consider when deciding whether to administer an abbreviated form instead of the full BFI-2.
A number scales have been developed to measure conspiracist ideation, but little attention has been paid to the factorial validity of these scales. We reassessed the psychometric properties of four widely-used scales, namely the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (BCTI), the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS), and the One-Item Conspiracy Measure (OICM). Eight-hundred-and-three U. S. adults completed all measures, along with measures of endorsement of 9/11 and anti-vaccination conspiracy theories. Through both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, we found that only the BCTI had acceptable factorial validity. We failed to confirm the factor structures of the CMQ and the GBCS, suggesting these measures had poor factorial validity. Indices of convergent validity were acceptable for the BCTI, but weaker for the other measures. Based on these findings, we provide suggestions for the future refinement in the measurement of conspiracist ideation.
Background:
Parents' vaccine attitudes influence their decision regarding child vaccination. To date, no study has evaluated the impact of vaccine conspiracy beliefs on human papillomavirus vaccine acceptance. The authors assessed the validity of a Vaccine Conspiracy Beliefs Scale (VCBS) and determined whether this scale was associated with parents' willingness to vaccinate their son with the HPV vaccine.
Methods:
Canadian parents completed a 24-min online survey in 2014. Measures included socio-demographic variables, HPV knowledge, health care provider recommendation, Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), the seven-item VCBS, and parents' willingness to vaccinate their son at two price points.
Results:
A total of 1427 Canadian parents completed the survey in English (61.2%) or French (38.8%). A Factor Analysis revealed the VCBS is one-dimensional and has high internal consistency (α=0.937). The construct validity of the VCBS was supported by a moderate relationship with the CMQ (r=0.44, p<0.001). Hierarchical regression analyses found the VCBS is negatively related to parents' willingness to vaccinate their son with the HPV vaccine at both price points ('free' or '$300') after controlling for gender, age, household income, education level, HPV knowledge, and health care provider recommendation.
Conclusions:
The VCBS is a brief, valid scale that will be useful in further elucidating the correlates of vaccine hesitancy. Future research could use the VCBS to evaluate the impact of vaccine conspiracies beliefs on vaccine uptake and how concerns about vaccination may be challenged and reversed.
Sociologists coined the term "anomie" to describe societies that are characterized by disintegration and deregulation. Extending beyond conceptualizations of anomie that conflate the measurements of anomie as 'a state of society' and as a 'state of mind', we disentangle these conceptualizations and develop an analysis and measure of this phenomenon focusing on anomie as a perception of the 'state of society'. We propose that anomie encompasses two dimensions: a perceived breakdown in social fabric (i.e., disintegration as lack of trust and erosion of moral standards) and a perceived breakdown in leadership (i.e., deregulation as lack of legitimacy and effectiveness of leadership). Across six studies we present evidence for the validity of the new measure, the Perception of Anomie Scale (PAS). Studies 1a and 1b provide evidence for the proposed factor structure and internal consistency of PAS. Studies 2a-c provide evidence of convergent and discriminant validity. Finally, assessing PAS in 28 countries, we show that PAS correlates with national indicators of societal functioning and that PAS predicts national identification and well-being (Studies 3a & 3b). The broader implications of the anomie construct for the study of group processes are discussed.
Conspiracy Theory (CT) endorsers believe in an omnipresent, malevolent, and highly coordinated group that wields secret influence for personal gain, and credit this group with the responsibility for many noteworthy events. Two explanations for the emergence of CTs are that they result from social marginalisation and a lack of agency, or that they are due to a need-to-explain-the-unexplained. Furthermore, representativeness heuristics may form reasoning biases that make such beliefs more likely. Two related studies (N = 107; N = 120) examined the relationships between these social marginalisation, intolerance of uncertainty, heuristics and CT belief using a correlational design. Overall, intolerance of uncertainty did not link strongly to CT belief, but worldview variables did — particularly a sense of the world as (socially) threatening, non-random, and with no fixed morality. The use of both representative heuristics that were examined was heightened in those participants more likely to endorse CTs. These factors seem to contribute to the likelihood of whether the individual will endorse CTs generally, relating similarly to common CTs, CTs generally historically accepted as “true”, and to the endorsement of fictional CTs that the individual would find novel. Implications are discussed.
Despite any factual evidence, the idea of a secret „Islamization of Europe“ is finding increasing support among different groups in Germany. Anders Behring Breivik, who killed seventy-seven people in the July 22, 2011, massacre in Norway, was partly motivated by such beliefs. A test of revised integrated threat theory as a framework for analyzing Islamophobic conspiracy stereotypes in Germany. Symbolic and realistic threats are analyzed as mediators between different antecedents (in-group identification, ambiguity intolerance, clash of civilizations) and the dependent variable, conspiracy stereotypes. An online survey was con- ducted with 355 respondents from Berlin. The findings indicate that respondents with higher education and left-leaning political orientation were less likely to be- lieve in conspiracy stereotypes and threats. The structural equation model indicates partial mediation via symbolic threats for clash of civilizations and education on conspiracy stereotypes. Symbolic threats fully mediate the relationship between in-group identification and ambiguity intolerance on conspiracy stereotypes.
This study explored the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and the personality disorders. A sample of 475 British adults, aged around 30 years, completed measures of Belief in Conspiracy Theories (CTs) and the Personality Disorders (PDs), as well as the SAPAS, a short intelligence test and two self-evaluations. Belief in CTs was correlated with nearly all PDs, as well as the three established higher order clusters (A: odd and eccentric; B: dramatic and emotional; C: anxious). A series of stepwise multiple regressions were computed. A final regression showed five of the variables (education, intelligence, Cluster A, B, and C) were significant, which indicated that less well-educated and less intelligent participants, scoring higher on two PD clusters (Cluster A and B) but lower on Cluster C, believed more in the CTs. Implications of the study for understanding the origin of CTs is discussed. Limitations of the study, particularly the sample and measures used, are acknowledged.
The present cross-sectional study (NParticipants = 397; NInformants = 460) examined the association of both grandiose narcissism and vulnerable narcissism with conspiracy beliefs in the context of four theoretically-relevant mediators. Participants who were higher in grandiose narcissism and vulnerable narcissism were more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, seemingly because they were more likely to hold unusual beliefs. There was, likewise, some evidence to suggest that vulnerable narcissists believe in conspiracy theories because they suffer from paranoia, whereas grandiose narcissists believe in conspiracy theories because of a desire to be unique. Together, these results suggest that the conspiracist ideation seen among grandiose and vulnerable narcissists is a consequence of features that are shared between and unique to each of the traits.
Previous research has established the principle that situations can affect the expression of personality, though it is not well-understood what specific patterns characterize this change across situations. We explore the possibility of contrasting situation themes that influence personality expression, implying that there is a change in personality expression initiated by a transition between two distinct types of situations. 474 undergraduate students completed a questionnaire in which 15 personality tendencies were juxtaposed with each of 41 differing situations. Our findings replicated previous research indicating that Honesty/Propriety yields the least variance between situations while Emotional Stability and Extraversion yield the most variance. Principal components analysis was used to examine cross-situational variability with four models already present in psychological literature, each with contrasting poles. We found that our models of threat vs. reward, positive affect vs. negative affect, and agency vs. no agency were clear sources of cross-situational variability. Taken together, these results indicate ways of improving our understanding of patterns of change in personality expression across a variety of commonly occurring situations.
It remains unclear why those scoring high on certain aspects of the Dark Tetrad (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, and sadism) are more inclined to believe in conspiracy theories. The present study (N = 474) aimed to clarify this issue by investigating the associations between the facets of the Dark Tetrad traits and conspiracist ideation in the context of five potential mediators. At least one facet of every Dark Tetrad trait was associated with conspiracist ideation, and nearly every association could be attributed, in part, to the tendency for those with aversive personalities to entertain odd beliefs, be fatalistic, and distrust others. Contrary to what the prior research might suggest, these results indicate that the conspiracist ideation found among those scoring high in the Dark Tetrad traits is the result of some shared feature of the traits rather than a feature that is unique to each trait.
Is there a point within a self-report questionnaire where participants will start responding carelessly? If so, then after how many items do participants reach that point? And what can researchers do to encourage participants to remain careful throughout the entirety of a questionnaire? We conducted two studies (Study 1 N = 358; Study 2 N = 129) to address these questions. Our results found (a) consistent evidence that participants responded more carelessly as they progressed further into a questionnaire, (b) mixed evidence that participants who were warned that carelessness would be punished displayed smaller increases in carelessness, and (c) mixed evidence that increases in carelessness were greater within an unproctored online study (Study 1) than within a proctored laboratory study (Study 2). These findings help address when and why careless responding is likely to occur, and they suggest effective preventive strategies.
Perceived lack of control is widely believed to motivate, at least partly, belief in conspiracy theories. We question the theoretical foundations of this belief and meta‐analyze existing published and unpublished studies to assess the overall effect of lack of control on conspiracy beliefs. The overall effect was small and not statistically significant (d = ‐ 0.05), and was not moderated by comparison group (baseline vs control affirmation), type of manipulation used to threaten control, inclusion of a manipulation check, or sample type. However, the predicted effect of control was more likely to be observed when beliefs were measured in terms of specific conspiracy theories, rather than as general or abstract claims. Overall, the present studies to date offer limited support for the hypothesis that conspiracy beliefs arise as a compensatory control.
We provide a brief overview of the Turnaway Study, the first study to collect longitudinal data on individual women who received versus were denied a wanted abortion in the United States. The study team collected data on nearly 1,000 women seeking an abortion from 30 facilities around the country and followed them for 5 years. We discuss some of the main findings from the study related to the health, labor, and human capital outcomes of the women who were denied abortions and gave birth. We conclude by describing future opportunities to learn from the study with new linkages to administrative data.
We tested the hypothesis that people show generality in their endorsement of unsubstantiated claims, employing more types of measures than used in previous studies. We found that measures of generic conspiracist ideation, specific fictitious conspiracy theory and false conspiracy theory beliefs were all strongly and positively intercorrelated. A multiple regression analysis revealed that the measures of specific false and fictitious conspiracy theories both significantly predicted generic conspiracist ideation. A second broader test of the generality hypothesis showed that these measures of false and fictitious conspiracy belief were positively intercorrelated with measures of psychological misconceptions, pseudoscience, poorly‐supported psychological practices, and paranormal beliefs. However, the measures of misconceptions and pseudoscience displayed substantially lower correlations. The results provide support for the generality of acceptance of a wider variety of unsubstantiated claims than used in previous studies, but also suggest differences in the types endorsed based on the kind of knowledge and content measured.
Effect sizes are underappreciated and often misinterpreted—the most common mistakes being to describe them in ways that are uninformative (e.g., using arbitrary standards) or misleading (e.g., squaring effect-size rs). We propose that effect sizes can be usefully evaluated by comparing them with well-understood benchmarks or by considering them in terms of concrete consequences. In that light, we conclude that when reliably estimated (a critical consideration), an effect-size r of .05 indicates an effect that is very small for the explanation of single events but potentially consequential in the not-very-long run, an effect-size r of .10 indicates an effect that is still small at the level of single events but potentially more ultimately consequential, an effect-size r of .20 indicates a medium effect that is of some explanatory and practical use even in the short run and therefore even more important, and an effect-size r of .30 indicates a large effect that is potentially powerful in both the short and the long run. A very large effect size (r = .40 or greater) in the context of psychological research is likely to be a gross overestimate that will rarely be found in a large sample or in a replication. Our goal is to help advance the treatment of effect sizes so that rather than being numbers that are ignored, reported without interpretation, or interpreted superficially or incorrectly, they become aspects of research reports that can better inform the application and theoretical development of psychological research.
The present study investigates the validity and utility of the German adaptations of the two short forms of the Big Five Inventory-2 (BFI-2), the 30-item BFI-2-S, and the 15-item BFI-2-XS, developed by Soto and John (2017b). Both scales assess the Big Five domains. The BFI-2-S allows, in addition, the brief assessment of three facets per domain. Based on a large and heterogeneous sample, we show that the psychometric properties of these adapted short scales are consistent with those of the Anglo-American source versions, and we demonstrate substantial convergence between the adaptations and the source versions. Extending the original scale development study, we demonstrate high retest stability of the scales and their facets. Our results clearly indicate the construct and criterion validity of the two scales: Both show substantial convergence with the NEO-PI-R domain scales. Moreover, the distinctive correlation pattern found between the facets of the BFI-2 and the NEO-PI-R could be replicated for the facets of the BFI-2-S. Furthermore, we show that the domain scales of both instruments are associated in the hypothesized directions with important life outcomes, such as life satisfaction and intelligence, and that the facets of the BFI-2-S have incremental validity for predicting these outcomes.
Research on individual-difference factors predicting belief in conspiracy theories has proceeded along several independent lines that converge on a profile of conspiracy believers as individuals who are relatively untrusting, ideologically eccentric, concerned about personal safety, and prone to perceiving agency in actions and profundity in bullshit. The present research represents the first attempt at an integrative approach to testing the independent contributions of these diverse factors to conspiratorial thinking. Two studies (N = 1,253) found that schizotypy, dangerous-world beliefs, and bullshit receptivity independently and additively predict endorsement of generic (i.e., nonpartisan) conspiracy beliefs. Results suggest that "hyperactive" agency detection and political orientation (and related variables) might also play a role. The studies found no effects of situational threats (mortality salience or a sense of powerlessness) - though it remains to be seen whether real-world instantiations of situational threats might move some people to seek refuge in conspiratorial ideation.
This study sought to replicate previous work showing relationships between components of schizotypy and conspiracist beliefs, and extend it by examining the mediating role of cognitive processes. An international online sample of 411 women and men (mean age = 35.41 years) completed measures of the schizotypal facets of Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and Ideas of Reference, conspiracist beliefs, and cognitive processes related to need for cognition, analytic thinking, and cognitive insight. Path analysis confirmed the associations between both schizotypal facets and conspiracist beliefs in the present sample. Confirmatory evidence was found for the association between analytic thinking and conspiracist beliefs, and results also suggested an association between cognitive insight and conspiracist beliefs. Cognitive insight also mediated the link between Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and Ideas of Reference with conspiracist beliefs. However, analytic thinking provided a mediating link to conspiracy ideation for Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and not Ideas of Reference. Finally, there was an association between Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and need for cognition, but this path did not extend to conspiracist beliefs. These results suggest possible mediating roles for analytic thinking and self-certainty between schizotypy and conspiracist beliefs.
In the current research, we investigated whether belief in conspiracy theories satisfies people’s need for uniqueness. We found that the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories was associated with the feeling of possessing scarce information about the situations explained by the conspiracy theories (Study 1) and higher need for uniqueness (Study 2). A further two studies using two different manipulations of need for uniqueness (Studies 3 and 4), showed that people in a high need for uniqueness condition displayed higher conspiracy belief than people in a low need for uniqueness condition. This conclusion is strengthened by a small-scale meta-analysis. These studies suggest that conspiracy theories may serve people’s desire to be unique, highlighting a motivational underpinning of conspiracy belief.
Research on the psychology of conspiracy theories has shown recent steps towards a standardization of measures. The present article seeks to continue that trend by presenting the Flexible Inventory of Conspiracy Suspicions (FICS), a questionnaire template that can be adapted to measure suspicions of a conspiracy around nearly any topic of public interest. Compared to conspiracy belief measures that ask about specific theories on a given topic, the FICS is worded in such a way as to provide relatively stable validity across time and cultural context. Using a hybrid approach incorporating classical test theory and Rasch scaling, three questionnaire studies on Mechanical Turk demonstrate the validity of the FICS in measuring conspiracy suspicions regarding 9/11, vaccine safety, and US elections, with good psychometric properties in most situations. However, the utility of the FICS is limited in the case of climate change due to the existence of two opposing conspiracy theories that share essentially no common assumptions (‘climate change is a hoax’ vs. ‘there is a conspiracy to make people believe that climate change is a hoax’). The results indicate that the FICS is a reliable and valid measure of conspiracy suspicions within certain parameters, and suggest a three-level model that differentiates general conspiracist ideation, relatively vague conspiracy suspicions, and relatively specific conspiracy beliefs.
Individual differences researchers very commonly report Pearson correlations between their variables of interest. Cohen (1988) provided guidelines for the purposes of interpreting the magnitude of a correlation, as well as estimating power. Specifically, r = 0.10, r = 0.30, and r = 0.50 were recommended to be considered small, medium , and large in magnitude, respectively. However, Cohen's effect size guidelines were based principally upon an essentially qualitative impression, rather than a systematic, quantitative analysis of data. Consequently, the purpose of this investigation was to develop a large sample of previously published meta-analytically derived correlations which would allow for an evaluation of Cohen's guidelines from an empirical perspective. Based on 708 meta-analytically derived correlations, the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles corresponded to correlations of 0.11, 0.19, and 0.29, respectively. Based on the results, it is suggested that Cohen's correlation guidelines are too exigent, as b3% of correlations in the literature were found to be as large as r = 0.50. Consequently, in the absence of any other information, individual differences researchers are recommended to consider correlations of 0.10, 0.20, and 0.30 as relatively small, typical, and relatively large, in the context of a power analysis, as well as the interpretation of statistical results from a normative perspective.
