Who Wants to Be the Next James Bond or Anna Chapman? Exploring the Correlates of a Willingness to Enter the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI) Among Spanish University Students

Abstract

The intelligence services compete with other public and private bodies to recruit the best candidates. Therefore, they must design specific recruitment policies to attract the young talent they need. However, the variables associated with the desire to work for these agencies among young people is still unknown. In this study, we explore these variables based on a survey administered to 2,888 young university students in Spain. The results reveal that social science students and those with greater satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions are more willing to work for the Spanish National Intelligence Centre.

Full text

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fint20
Intelligence and National Security
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fint20
Who Wants to Be the Next James Bond or
Anna Chapman? Exploring the Correlates of
a Willingness to Enter the Centro Nacional de
Inteligencia (CNI) Among Spanish University
Students
Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández & Cristina Del-Real
To cite this article: Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández & Cristina Del-Real (2022): Who Wants to Be the
Next James Bond or Anna Chapman? Exploring the Correlates of a Willingness to Enter the Centro
Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI) Among Spanish University Students, Intelligence and National
Security, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2022.2141289
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2022.2141289
© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 15 Nov 2022.
Submit your article to this journal
View related articles
View Crossmark data

Who Wants to Be the Next James Bond or Anna Chapman?
Exploring the Correlates of a Willingness to Enter the Centro
Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI) Among Spanish University
Students
Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández and Cristina Del-Real
ABSTRACT
The intelligence services compete with other public and private bodies to
recruit the best candidates. Therefore, they must design specic recruit-
ment policies to attract the young talent they need. However, the vari-
ables associated with the desire to work for these agencies among young
people is still unknown. In this study, we explore these variables based on
a survey administered to 2,888 young university students in Spain. The
results reveal that social science students and those with greater satisfac-
tion with democracy and trust in political institutions are more willing to
work for the Spanish National Intelligence Centre.
1. Introduction
There is a pithy sort of saying in the intelligence services that no one decides to work for the
intelligence services, as the intelligence services have already decided that they want you to work for
them. It summarises a non-transparent recruitment process that invariably leads to the same
question: what exactly is the prole of a potential spy? Moreover, who wants to be a spy?
Unfortunately, the information we possess on the recruitment processes of the Spanish intelligence
agencies is minimal – particularly if we compare it with the detailed one available about the rest of
the Spanish public sector. Only some basic information is available, i.e., men-women ratio, age, and
military/police/civilian background, which can only succinctly be obtained thanks to public state-
ments and the information on the intelligence service’s website.
Spain’s rst democratic intelligence service was the Centro Superior de Información de la Defensa
(henceforth, CESID) [Higher Centre for Defence Intelligence]. In contrast to the former intelligence
service – the Servicio Central de Documentación or Central Documentation Service – which was totally
composed of military and police personnel,
1
the CESID’s recruitment policy aimed to increase the
number of civilians and women in the service as a way of contributing to the democratisation
process of the intelligence apparatus. These new spies had a dierent prole from the previous ones.
They had university degrees and were uent in foreign languages. However, in practice, this phase
was characterised by the recruitment of family members or civilians from military family’s environ-
ments in an attempt by the CESID to work only with trusted persons.
2
The eorts to ensure a certain
‘pedigree’ ultimately functioned as a Spanish version of the ‘old-boys network’ in the United
Kingdom and as a sort of security clearance to avoid inltration from foreign agencies. But this
(unwritten) policy degenerated into recruitment processes with highly inbred dynamics. Since then,
accusations of nepotism and inbred behaviour, favouring relatives of CESID personnel, judges,
diplomats, and other high-ranking state ocials, have been frequent in the Spanish media.
CONTACT Cristina Del-Real c.del.real@fgga.leidenuniv.nl
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2022.2141289
© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

Between 2001 and 2005, the Spanish intelligence service – renamed in 2002 as Centro Nacional de
Inteligencia (henceforth, CNI) [National Intelligence Centre]– undertook a massive recruitment cam-
paign to meet the growing threats posed by international terrorism as well as cyber threats. As
a result, the number of CNI sta increased from around 2000 to 3500 members.
3
Part of this increase
was due to the creation of the Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) [National Cryptology Centre] within
the CNI, responsible for the cybersecurity of the State Administration technology systems. CCN
recruitment policies have always been more transparent. They specically target technology experts
(e.g., computer scientists, mathematicians, and engineers). However, CNI recruitment, sta composi-
tion, and characteristics remain behind a curtain of fog.
The ‘baby boomer’ generation – representing the majority of those recruited at the beginning of
the 1980s when democracy began to be consolidated in Spain – will retire within the next ten years.
Therefore, the CNI will soon have to start a new and extensive recruitment process targeting those
who are currently in university classrooms or who have only recently left them. These potential
future Spanish spies belong to Generation Z, born – roughly – between 1996 and 2012. This cohort’s
composition and characteristics are relevant to our research because Generation Z has dierent
values, interests and political opinions from the previous two generations: Generation X and
Generation Y, also known as millennials.
4
The literature on the recruitment of human resources for the Public Sector has for a long time now
demanded recruitment strategies designed for specic target groups rather than selection based on
general qualications as the principal eligibility criterion.
5
In 2019, the CNI participated, for the rst time,
in a job fair – Foroempleo – organised by the Universidad Carlos III (Madrid). CNI sought to raise
knowledge about the service among university students, which is generally low across the entire
Spanish population.
6
The need for these strategies is even more signicant for the CNI because this little-
known agency needs technological skills and personnel procient in various languages, which are also
extensively demanded by private companies – which usually oer better working conditions and salaries
than the CNI. Therefore, the CNI must deploy recruitment strategies that target the most motivated
individuals within its areas of interest. For such strategies to be ecient – and considering that the CNI
competes with more attractive employers such as technology companies – they should be based on
a deep knowledge of the proles of those most likely to be willing to join the intelligence service.
The willingness of university students to work in an intelligence service has rarely been explored
in the academic literature.
7
The same is true of closely related topics such as the factors that explain
a personal willingness to act as an informant or double agent.
8
This gap in the literature is perhaps
due to the inherent diculties in obtaining information on such a core element of the intelligence
agencies as its personnel, and to the particular characteristics of intelligence services in a democratic
state, which make it impossible to compare with other public bodies. For example, they have no
direct end-users outside the circles of policy- and decision-makers, and some of their work has no
counterpart within the rest of the public sector (i.e., operational agents).
9
Moreover, moving to the
societal dimension, their secretive nature makes it almost impossible to visualise a realistic external
image, as family members very rarely declare that they work there, their premises and facilities are
hardly identiable, and their media image is highly distorted in lms. Thus, the most basic concrete
aspects of a job that usually attract potential candidates to work for any organisation –salary, job
function, working conditions, benets, etc.–
10
are unknown to the broader public in the case of the
intelligence services.
This study contributes to lling this gap by providing an empirical examination of university
students’ willingness to work for the intelligence services. Specically, this paper aims to determine
which variables are most associated with the willingness of Spanish undergraduates to work for the
Spanish intelligence service, CNI. The article is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the variables
that are most associated with a willingness to work for the public sector, along with the presentation
of the hypotheses. In Section 3, the data and their treatment are explained. In Section 4, the results
are detailed, and, in Section 5, the conclusions are presented, as well as the limitations of this study
and other lines of research that might stem from it.
2A. M. DÍAZ-FERNÁNDEZ AND C. DEL-REAL

2. Related literature and hypotheses
Although we identied no studies on the willingness of young people in any country to work for the
intelligence service, there are various studies in which the willingness of younger members of the
public, especially graduates, to work for the public sector, in general, and for military and police
agencies, in particular, have been explored. These studies have helped us to draw up our hypotheses
on the willingness of Spanish university students to apply to work for the CNI.
Firstly, previous research has found that students with educational backgrounds related to public
administration expressed greater willingness to work in the public sector.
11
Within this line of
research, it has been found that students of ‘politics’ (i.e., public administration, public policy, and
politics) expressed greater willingness to join government organisations (state, federal, and local).
12
Pure science students would typically be more inclined to prefer government employers who
focused on environmental issues. In contrast, law, humanities, and behavioural science students
would be more inclined to prefer a government employer who focuses on ‘other public goods’, and
business students might likewise be the stereotypical prospective employees for the private sector.
13
Therefore, our rst hypothesis can be expressed as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Social Science students will express greater willingness to work for the CNI than students
from non-Social Science disciplines.
Second, personal positioning towards politics may also be associated with a willingness to work
for the CNI. Within the political positioning of the undergraduate, we explore two dimensions:
opinion towards the government as an institution and political ideology. Some studies have
shown that younger students generally tend to hold more negative perceptions towards the
government and politics, which may inuence their decision-making when applying for a public
sector job. Within the extremely limited knowledge that we have so far on this Generation, we
have identied investigations that show that, for example, Spanish centennials who show
a lower perception of the Government – dened as the political institution – and its bureau-
cratic apparatus
14
are more attracted by entrepreneurism than by accessing public jobs.
15
Therefore, we expect that positive opinions towards the government will be associated with
willingness to work for the CNI.
16
Similarly, political ideology is associated with a willingness to
work for the government. For example, studies have reported strong associations between
conservative ideology and willingness to work for the public sector.
17
Other studies, however,
have found that left-of-centre political ideology is positively associated with public service
motivation, although these ndings are obtained from a sample of postgraduates who already
accessed the public sector.
18
While we cannot determine if this association also inuences the
individual’s decision-making processes, having contradictory results justies our caution with
our hypothesis on the inuence of political ideology. Therefore, our second hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 2a: Students holding negative points of view towards the institution of the Government are
less likely to express a willingness to work for the CNI.
Hypothesis 2b: Political ideology is associated with the students’ willingness to work for the CNI.
When incomplete information exists on the employer and when the individuals are still looking for
their rst job – as in our case – the Theory of Symbolic Attraction shows that organisations attract
job seekers with symbolic images (i.e., organisational personality) that helps them to portray
a certain type of social identity.
19
Intelligence services are these sorts of organisations.
Therefore, public knowledge about an organisation, its reputation, and image, can inuence
people’s willingness to work for it, as stated in the study by Cable and Turban.
20
While we do
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 3

not attempt to replicate their investigation in our work, we explore the explanatory capacity of
those three dimensions analysed in Cable and Turban’s work. The more knowledge a job applicant
has of an organisation, the higher that person’s willingness to apply for a job there.
21
Linked to
that knowledge are the reputation and the image of that organisation. Although there may be
limited research on knowledge as a necessary precursor of employer reputation and image, there
is greater knowledge on the positive relationship between organisational reputation and its
attractiveness for potential job applicants.
22
The third dimension is image. Some studies have
explored the impact of spy lms and movies on the public perceptions of the intelligence services’
image
23
when their ordinary and real work is far from the image portrayed. Therefore, our third
hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3: Knowledge of the missions and powers of the CNI, higher perceptions of its reputation,
and perceptions of intelligence work closer to movie images will be associated with a willingness to work
for the CNI.
Finally, condence may also aect people’s decisions. Condence is dened by the level of trust that
members of the public place in an institution.
24
However, the topic of public condence in
intelligence agencies is scarcely explored. Therefore, and partially inspired by studies on police
forces,
25
we identied the following dimensions for our study: perceived lawfulness, i.e., the institu-
tions act within the law
26
and the rights and liberties of individual members of the public are not
violated
27
; trust in the eectiveness of CNI, i.e., it performs its duties well and in an eective
manner
28
; and, perceived neutrality, which is based on the belief that the values and prejudices of
the CNI should not interfere with its decision-making process. It is therefore a way of assessing the
extent to which an institution is perceived to take objective decisions.
29
Our fourth and last
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Higher condence in the CNI will be associated with a willingness to work for the CNI.
3. Data and methods
3.1. Data
Data from an opinion survey on civil liberties and security was used to test our four hypotheses. The
study participants were selected following a probabilistic sampling method stratied by
Autonomous Community and academic discipline, using the proportionate allocation strategy. The
University Degrees were divided into ve academic disciplines –i.e., Applied Sciences, Formal
Sciences, Humanities, Natural Sciences, and Social Sciences – following the classication of the
Secretaría General de Universidades, the Spanish government department responsible for
universities.
30
All sampling errors were below 10 per cent in each Autonomous Community, except
for the Balearic Islands (10.7 per cent), La Rioja (11.5 per cent), Murcia (11 per cent), and Navarra
(11.2 per cent). Equally, sampling errors by academic discipline were below 10 per cent except for
Formal Sciences (10.4 per cent).Once the groups had been selected, the questionnaires were sent by
courier to our collaborators at the dierent universities. The average completion time was 24
minutes (Min. = 14; Max. = 28). The surveys were administered to 101 groups of students following
51 dierent bachelor’s degree courses at 30 Spanish public universities between October 2018 and
May 2019.
The survey was completed by 2888 Spanish university students, however, only 2616 answered the
specic question of their willingness to work for the CNI.The participants were born between 1990
and 2000 (M = 20.9, SD = 1.9). Males and females comprised 43 per cent (n = 1126) and 56.2 per cent
4A. M. DÍAZ-FERNÁNDEZ AND C. DEL-REAL

(n = 1470) of the sample. This ratio between men and women corresponded to the proportion of the
total university population (i.e., 45.1 per cent males and 54.9 per cent females).
31
The demographic
characteristics of the sample can be found in Table 1.
3.2. Measures
The dependent variable of this study was willingness to work for the CNI, measured using the
responses to the question: ‘Assuming you had the necessary qualications, would you like to work in
the CNI?’ Response options ranged from 1 (‘not at all’) to 4 (‘most certainly’). We created a binary
variable for the analysis, coded as 0 when participants selected ‘not at all’ and ‘probably not’ and
coded as 1 when they selected the options’ probably yes’ and ‘most certainly’.
Our independent variables were educational background, political opinions, knowledge, and
condence in the CNI. First, we included ve academic disciplines (1 = ‘Applied Sciences’, 2
= ‘Formal Sciences’, 3 = ‘Humanities’, 4 = ‘Natural Sciences’, and 5 = ‘Social Sciences’) to measure
educational background.
Second, our study included three variables for describing political opinions. We measured political
ideology with the question: ‘When talking about politics, the expressions left-wing and right-wing are
commonly used. Please position yourself, on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is on the ‘left’ and 10 is on
the ‘right’. To measure satisfaction with democracy in Spain, participants were asked to express their
degree of agreement or disagreement on a 4-point Likert scale with the statement: ‘I am very
satised with the functioning of democracy in Spain’, where 1 = ‘strongly disagree’, 2 = ‘disagree’,
3 = ‘agree’, and 4 = ‘strongly agree’. Finally, respondents were asked to estimate the extent of their
trust in the following political institutions: the judiciary, political parties, the Government, the
Parliament, the Monarchy, and the Ombudsman. Their answers ranged from ‘no condence’ (1) to
‘total condence’ (4). We then performed an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to obtain an indexed
score for general trust in political institutions. Principal component factor analysis with varimax
rotation yielded three factors that explained 46.87 per cent, (factor 1), 15.50 per cent (factor 2), and
12.93 per cent (factor 3), respectively, which we used to calculate the index score for trust in political
institutions (see Appendix).
Third, three dimensions of public knowledge in the CNI were measured
32
: knowledge of its
missions and powers, reputation, and image. In Spain, the legal framework that regulates the CNI
comprises two laws: Ley 11/2002, de 6 de mayo, reguladora del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
(henceforth, the CNI Act), and Ley Orgánica 2/2002, de 6 de mayo, reguladora del control judicial
previo del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, (henceforth, the CNI Preliminary Judicial Review Act). The
CNI Act states the mission and the activities of the CNI, while the Preliminary Judicial Review Act
regulates the authorisation mechanism for the CNI to conduct operations that might contravene
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for sociodemographic variables based on willingness to work for the CNI (n = 2,616).
No (n = 1361) Yes (n = 1255) Total
n % n % n %
Sex
Male 557 49.5 569 50.5 1126 100
Female 769 54.1 674 45.9 1470 100
Academic discipline
Applied Sciences 313 55.5 251 44.5 564 100
Formal Sciences 8 44.4 10 55.6 18 100
Humanities 167 72 65 28 232 100
Natural Sciences 59 59 41 41 100 100
Social Sciences 814 47.8 888 52.2 1702 100
Relatives in security professions
Yes 144 45.4 173 54.6 317 100
No 1155 53.3 1012 46.7 2167 100
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 5

fundamental rights. We followed the same measures and coding as previous research on public
knowledge of the intelligence agencies when measuring both knowledge of the CNI mission
statement and their legally attributed powers (i.e., Del-Real & Díaz-Fernández, 2021).The reputation
of the CNI was measured through the responses of the participants to the following questions:
Would you say that the CNI is considered to be . . . (1) outside the world’s top 20; (2) in the world’s top
20; (3) the world’s top 15 (4) the world’s top 10; or (5) the world’s top ve?. Finally, the image of the
CNI was used in the following question: ‘In general terms, how similar do you think the work of an
intelligence service is to the way it is depicted in the movies?’, where 1 = ‘Not at all similar’, 2
= ‘Somewhat similar’, 3 = ‘Quite similar’, and 4 = ‘Totally similar’.
The fourth independent variable was condence in the CNI. This variable was measured using an
18-item scale. The list of 18-items was examined through EFA, to obtain the factors behind public
condence in the CNI and to check the validity of the items. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of
sampling adequacy was 0.823, conrming the adequacy of the sampling. Bartlett’s test of sphericity
was signicant (χ2 (153) = 17837.37, p < .001), indicating that our data is likely to be suitable for
factor analysis. The communalities were all above 0.4 (see Table 2), conrming that each item shared
some common variance with other items. The factor loading matrix for the nal solution is presented
in Table 2. Factor scores for each of the four components were obtained using the regression
method. Finally, internal consistency for each of the factors was examined using Cronbach’s alpha.
We obtained four factors of public condence. Factor 1, conceptualised as ‘procedural unlawfulness’
explained 22.66 per cent of the variance, and grouped together all the items that described CNI
behaviour as unlawful in relation to the rights of citizens and their privacy (α = 0.79). This factor was
measured negatively. Factor 2, called ‘perception of eectiveness in policing missions’ −
20.36 per cent of the variance – described the extent to which the CNI was perceived as eective
at combating threats (α = 0.82). Factor 3–11.27 per cent of the variance – described the extent to
which the CNI was perceived as eective at providing assessments for policymakers. It was therefore
conceptualised as ‘perception of eectiveness in CNI intelligence missions’ (α = 0.85). Finally, Factor
4–6.17 per cent of the variance – described the extent to which the activities of the CNI were
perceived to be inuenced by interests outside the public interest. This factor was conceptualised as
Table 2. Factor loadings and communalities based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with direct oblimin Kaiser normal-
isation rotation for 18 items (N = 2616), ‘The CNI . . .’ .
Components
1 2 3 4 Communalities
Compiles private and public confidential data .776 .641
Monitors activity of social media .769 .625
Conducts telephone tapping without court orders .691 .626
Violates individual rights and liberties .559 .575
Enters private homes without court orders .535 .445
Is effective at fighting against organised crime .719 .625
Is effective at fighting against terrorism .769 .663
Is effective at protecting communication networks from cyber-attacks (hacking) .606 .503
Knows the risks and threats which the States confronts .724 .618
Works for the interests of the community .672 .560
Works to combat threats against the State .764 .678
Is effective at advising the government on national policy .918 .837
Is effective at advising the government on international policy .897 .820
Is effective at defending the economic and industrial interests of Spain .793 .624
Has its own objectives not set by the Government .691 .461
Hides behind secrecy so as not to provide explanations of its work .608 .570
Jumps procedures when security is at risk .600 .545
Completes missions attentive to the interests of the political party in government
and not the State
.546 .465
Rotation converged in 20 iterations. Factor loadings <0.4 are suppressed. Percentage of variance explained by each factor: Factor
1 = 22.66 per cent, Factor 2 = 20.36 per cent, Factor 3 = 11.27 per cent, Factor 4 = 6.17 per cent. Total percentage of variance
explained = 60.45 per cent, KMO =.823.
6A. M. DÍAZ-FERNÁNDEZ AND C. DEL-REAL

‘perceived non-neutrality’ (α = 0.69) and was measured negatively. We therefore expected to nd
a positive relationship between the willingness to work for the CNI and factors 2 and 3, and
a negative relationship with factors 1 and 4.
Additionally, we collected socio-demographic characteristics – gender, college year, and relatives
in security professions – which we used as the control variables.
3.3. Analytical strategy
Binary logistic regression models were used to test our hypotheses. The results of the binary
regression models are presented using the standardised coecient and each respective Odds
Ratio (OR). The OR represented the multiplicative eect of a unit increase of the study variable on
the odds of students willing to work for the CNI. We estimated ve binary logistic regression models,
one for each group of variables and a nal one with all variables: education (model 1), political
(model 2), public knowledge (model 3), public condence (model 4), and combined (model 5).
Examination of the variance ination factors indicated no multicollinearity problems in the models
(VIF <2), suggesting that none of the other variables inuenced our inputs. We then checked for
statistically signicant dierences between the proportions of students who either would or would
not work for the CNI according to the undergraduate degree, so as to further explore the academic
background of the students who expressed greater willingness to work for the CNI. To do so, we
performed the chi-square test of independence and then the z-test for proportions using the
Bonferroni correction to adjust the p-values. All analyses were performed with SPSS 27.
4. Results
In this section, the hypotheses are tested using four dierent models (models 1–4) and a nal model
on willingness to work for the CNI (model 5). Model 5 reproduces some of the results already
mentioned in models 1 to 4.
4.1. Willingness to work for the CNI by academic background (Hypothesis 1)
We estimated a binary logistic regression using Social Sciences as the reference category to test our
rst hypothesis. If we are to validate our rst hypothesis, we should obtain OR <1 for all academic
disciplines. Model 1 in Table 3 shows that if students are studying a bachelor’s degree in Social
Sciences, they will have a greater likelihood of being willing to work for the CNI than students from
Humanities (OR = 0.35, p > 0.001) or Natural Sciences (OR = 0.53, p > 0.001). However, no statistically
signicant results were obtained regarding Applied Sciences (p = 0.643) and Formal Sciences (p =
0.065).
We examined the percentage of students willing to work for the CNI according to the bachelor’s
programme, in order to explore the university degrees whose students had expressed greater
willingness to work for the CNI. The initial 51 programmes available in our dataset were then
recoded into 19 broader categories to simplify the interpretation of the results. For instance, dierent
Engineering programmes were all labelled under the general term ‘Engineering’. The chi-square test
of independence showed that our dependent variable was signicantly associated with the uni-
versity programme, X
2
(18, N = 2616) = 197.66, p < 0.001. The results with the percentage of students
who would work for the CNI by bachelor’s programme is shown in Figure 1. The line across the graph
represents the average percentage of students who would like to work for the CNI (i.e., 48 per cent).
As can be observed, students from International Relations (81.4 per cent) and Criminology
(76.2 per cent) were the most willing to work for the CNI from all the social science students.
Business, Philosophy and Law students were also above the mean percentage.
We performed the z-test for proportions using the Bonferroni correction, in order to examine
whether these dierences in the proportions were statistically signicant. Table 4 shows the results
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 7

of the pairwise comparison of proportions for each bachelor’s degree course. Percentages from the
same column that did not have the same subscript were signicantly dierent at p < 0.05 in the
bilateral test of equality of proportions. It means that, for example, the proportion of International
Relations students willing to work for the CNI was signicantly higher than the proportion of Law
students. The table shows us that the proportion of International Relations and Criminology students
who wanted to work for the CNI was signicantly higher than for all other degrees, excluding
Computer Science, Psychology, and Business students, for whom the proportions appeared not to
dier (p < 0.05). We also found that Computer Science students formed the third group of students
who expressed greater willingness to work for the CNI, provided they met the necessary conditions
(62.9 per cent). This proportion was signicantly higher than the students of Political Science (p =
0.018), Engineering (p = 0.015), Medicine (p < 0.001), Education (p < 0.001), Translation (p = 0.007),
History (p = 0.004), and Philology (p < 0.001). The results of the binary logistic regression and the
pairwise comparison of proportions partially validated Hypothesis 1, as while Social Science students
appeared to be among the students more willing to work for the CNI, Computer Science students
were also signicantly likely to be interested in working for the intelligence agency.
4.2. Willingness to work for the CNI by political variables (Hypotheses 2a and 2b)
In model 2 of Table 3, the three political variables are all positive and statistically signicant. In line
with Hypothesis 2a, the results indicated that students showing greater satisfaction with democracy
in Spain (OR = 1.16, p = 0.004) and trust in political institutions (OR = 1.36, p = 0.002) were more likely
to be willing to work for the CNI than students who were neither satised with democracy nor
trusted political institutions. The results also oered evidence to support Hypothesis 2b, as the
Table 3. Binary logistic regression models predicting willingness to work for the CNI.
Variables
Model 1
(Education)
Model 2
(Political)
Model 3
(Knowledge)
Model 4
(Confidence)
Model 5
(Combined)
Education (ref. = Social Sciences)
Applied Sciences −0.06 (0.95) 0.05 (1.05)
Formal Sciences −0.47 (0.63) −0.18 (0.84)
Humanities −1.06*** (0.35) −0.85*** (0.43)
Natural Sciences −0.63*** (0.53) −0.69*** (0.49)
Political opinions
Ideology 0.15*** (1.16) 0.09*** (1.09)
Democracy satisfaction 0.18** (1.19) 0.03 (1.03)
Trust in institutions 0.31** (1.36) 0.07 (1.07)
Knowledge
Missions 0.09*** (1.10) 0.08*** (1.08)
Powers 0.01 (1.01) −0.02 (0.98)
Reputation 0.37*** (1.44) 0.21*** (1.23)
Image 0.38*** (1.47) 0.28*** (1.32)
Confidence in CNI
Procedural unlawfulness −0.12** (0.89) −0.07 (0.94)
Police effectiveness 0.59*** (1.81) 0.44*** (1.55)
Intelligence effectiveness 0.15** (1.16) 0.04 (1.04)
Non-neutrality 0.00 (1.00) −0.00 (0.99)
Control variables
Gender (ref. = male) −0.17 (0.85) −0.13 (0.87) −0.22* (0.80) −0.29** (0.75) −0.20* (0.82)
College year −0.15** (0.86) −0.10* (0.90) −0.12** (0.89) −0.13** (0.88) −0.17** (0.84)
Relatives (ref. = no) 0.35** (1.41) 0.23 (1.26) 0.27* (1.31) 0.21 (1.24) 0.19 (1.21)
Constant 0.44*** (1.55) −1.44*** (0.24) −1.85 (0.16) 0.31** (1.36) −1.34*** (0.26)
Hosmer and Lemeshow test
a
13.535 17.742* 6.008 10.539 10.429
Nagelkerke R
2
0.043 0.077 0.101 0.125 0.193
n2464 2376 2420 2319 2234
N = 2616 students from Spanish Universities. The table displays the standardised coefficient and odds ratio in brackets. *p < .05;
**p < .005; ***p < .001.
a
Hosmer – Lemeshow statistics indicate a good fit of the model if the significance value is higher than
.05.
8A. M. DÍAZ-FERNÁNDEZ AND C. DEL-REAL

further the student is to the right of the political spectrum, the more likely they are to express
interest in working for the CNI (OR = 1.16, p < 0.001). Therefore, our results yielded support for both
Hypotheses 2a and 2b.
Figure 1. Percentage of students per university undergraduate degree who would be willing to work for the CNI.
Table 4. Results of the pairwise comparisons of proportions (N = 2616).
Willing to work for the CNI
No Yes
Architecture 53.3 per cent
a,b,e,j
46.7 per cent
a,b,e,j
Business 43.2 per cent
e,g,h,i
56.8 per cent
e,g,h,i
Chemistry 59.0 per cent
a,e,i,j
41.0 per cent
a,e,i,j
Communication 57.1 per cent
a,d,e,i
42.9 per cent
a,d,e,i
Computer Science 37.1 per cent
b,i
62.9 per cent
b,i
Criminology 23.8 per cent
b
76.2 per cent
b
Education 66.9 per cent
a,j,k
33.1 per cent
a,j,k
Engineering 57.3 per cent
a,c,e
42.7 per cent
a,c,e
History 72.9 per cent
a,e,j
27.1 per cent
a,e,j
International Relations 18.6 per cent
b,g
81.4 per cent
b,g
Law 47.3 per cent
e,f,i
52.7 per cent
e,f,i
Mathematics 44.4 per cent
a,b,e,j
55.6 per cent
a,b,e,j
Medicine 70.6 per cent
a,j,k
29.4 per cent
a,j,k
Philology 78.8 per cent
j
21.2 per cent
j
Philosophy 47.1 per cent
a,b,e,j
52.9 per cent
a,b,e,j
Political Science 62.5 per cent
a,e,j
37.5 per cent
a,e,j
Psychology 46.7 per cent
b,c,d,e,k
53.3 per cent
b,c,d,e,k
Translation 67.6 per cent
a,e,j
32.4 per cent
a,e,j
Tourism 57.4 per cent
a,f,h,i,j,k
42.6 per cent
a,f,h,i,j,k
Values in the same column that do not share the same subscript are significantly
different at p < 0.05 in the bilateral test of equality for proportions.
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 9

4.3. Willingness to work for the CNI and public knowledge of the CNI (Hypothesis 3)
Model 3 in Table 3 shows the results for the eect of the variables relating to public knowledge
of the intelligence service on willingness to work for the CNI. Three of the four variables were
statistically signicant. According to these results, students with better knowledge of the CNI’s
missions were more willing to work for the CNI than students who were unaware of its existence
(OR = 1.10, p < 0.001). Reputation of the CNI operated in the same way as knowledge of the CNI,
so those students who perceived that the CNI had a good reputation were more likely to work
for the intelligence service (OR = 1.44, p < 0.001). Finally, the odds of being willing to work for the
CNI were 1.47 times higher when the student conjectured that the CNI’s work was similar to what
they had seen in the movies (p < 0.001). This result suggests to us that both knowledge of the
real missions and the idealised image of spying presented in lms are both factors associated
with the willingness of young people to work for the CNI. One of the reasons for this result can
be found in the distribution of knowledge in CNI missions, which ranged from −6 to + 6 and was
skewed to the left, meaning that 68.4 per cent of students knew nothing of CNI missions and
only 10.3 per cent of the sample showed a reasonable knowledge of the CNI’s missions.
Therefore, a low awareness of CNI missions may be aecting the result connected to the
image. However, this result provides insucient evidence, so Hypothesis 3 can neither be
validated nor rejected.
4.4. Willingness to work for the CNI by public condence in the CNI (Hypothesis 4)
Model 4 in Table 3 shows that the variables measuring condence in the CNI are also positively
related to students’ willingness to work in the Spanish intelligence service. Students who perceived
that the CNI interferes with rights and freedoms were less likely to be willing to work for the CNI (OR
= 0.89, p = 0.005). On the contrary, both trust in the eectiveness of the CNI (OR = 1.81, p < 0.001) and
trust in the eectiveness of CNI assessments (OR = 1.16, p = 0.001) increased the likelihood of
a willingness to work for the CNI among those students. However, perceived non-neutrality was
not found to be statistically signicant in students’ willingness to work for the CNI (p = 0.954). These
results partially supported Hypothesis 4.
4.5. Combined model
Model 5 in Table 3 presents our nal model on willingness to work for the CNI. Model 5 reproduces
some of the results already mentioned in models 1–4. However, this model 5 combines in one
logistic regression analysis all study variables, thus allowing us to interpret the results of each group
in interaction with the other variables’ groups. In this model, we can see that the highest OR
corresponds to trust in CNI eectiveness (OR = 1.55, p < 0.001), followed by image (OR = 1.32, p <
0.001), and reputation (OR = 1.23, p < 0.001). Overall, this result revealed that a willingness to work for
the CNI was strongly associated with student opinions of the intelligence service. In the combined
model, satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions were no longer statistically signicant
variables, while ideology remained signicant, but with a lower OR when compared to Model 2.
Model 5 also revealed that some socio-demographic variables were aecting students’ willingness to
work for the CNI. The most signicant variable was college year, which remained signicant in all ve
models. According to this result, students from the early college years were more willing to work for
the CNI than those who were closer to graduation (OR = 0.84, p = 0.001). Besides, female students
were less willing to work for the CNI than male students (OR = 0.82, p = 0.04). A Nagelkerke R
2
of 0.19
in the nal model indicated a substantial increase in the explanatory power of model 5 compared to
the Nagelkerke R
2
of 0.04 obtained in model 1. Nagelkerke R
2
not only increased in the nal model,
but also across all four models, each of which had a higher explanatory power than the previous one
(Table 3). This result strengthens the observations outlined above on the greater explanatory power
10 A. M. DÍAZ-FERNÁNDEZ AND C. DEL-REAL

of CNI perception-related variables when compared with academic background and political
opinions.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The need to recruit Generation Z university students in the medium term to join the CNI underlines
the importance of knowing what the explanatory variables are, in order to design better recruitment
and retention strategies. Our research has conrmed, for an agency as specic as the intelligence
services within the public sector, that university students from the legal, international relations, and
criminological disciplines have a greater willingness to work for the CNI. Moreover, our research
contributes to the literature on the willingness of Computer Science students to work for the CNI,
probably motivated by the relevance of cyber threats, as well as the increasing role and publicity of
the work of the National Cryptological Centre (CCN),
33
which is part of the CNI. These results partially
conrmed H1.
As with other parts of the public sector, students who showed greater satisfaction with democ-
racy and trust in political institutions were, according to the results of our research, more willing to
work in the intelligence service, thus obtaining empirical evidence to support H2a. However, the
weight of these variables declined when the combined model in favour of the CNI perception-
related variables was analysed. In the same way, we found that political ideology is associated with
students’ willingness to work for the CNI, thus conrming H2b. Particularly, ideologically more
conservative students showed a higher level of willingness to work for the CNI, as previous research
has also found.
34
From the three dimensions proposed by Cable and Turban,
35
that is, knowledge – in our case of
the CNI’s missions and powers – reputation, and image, it was the combined model that showed
how these variables to a greater degree explained the willingness to join the CNI. It is consistent that
those university students for whom the CNI has a greater reputation – they consider it among the
best ve in the world – showed a greater propensity to work for it. In turn, the positive relationship
between those willing to work for the CNI and those who considered that working for the intelli-
gence agencies would be similar to the dynamic and adventurous escapades from the movies was
striking. These results partially supported H3 and they perhaps explain why students from junior
college years were more willing to work for the CNI than more mature students closer to graduation.
Our research has contributed to expanding the work of Cable and Turban and the Theory of
Symbolic Attraction, in that it has provided data on the explanatory capacity of this set of variables
to explain the willingness of an individual to work in an organisation as peculiar as an intelligence
service. The weights of these variables in our regression models fully justify focusing recruitment
campaigns on public awareness and improving the image of the CNI through information cam-
paigns, television series, and social media.
Finally, the results have also conrmed H4, as trust in the CNI was found to increase the
willingness of university students to work for this agency. Our results are consistent with studies
on other security organisations
36
which have shown that individuals are willing to work for agencies
that they consider to be both respectful of the law – in this case, without violating the rights and
freedoms of the members of public – and professional when completing their job – in our case,
eective at ghting certain threats and advising the government. The only variable that is not
statistically signicant is ‘perceived non-neutrality’, that is, how CNI performs its work, perhaps again,
motivated by the – obvious – lack of direct contact with an intelligence agency, as well as knowledge
on how they operate.
While the number of foreigners in our sample was proportional with their numbers among the
Spanish university community,
37
it was still small; nonetheless, this could be a scientic limitation
although not a practical one as the CNI – as well as other intelligence services around the world – is
legally bound not to hire foreigners. The reasons why female students nd it less attractive to join the
Spanish intelligence service when most studies have shown that women prefer to work for the
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 11

government could also be examined in future studies; breaking down the job into its dierent tasks
could potentially explain that rejection by women is justied on some specic – operational – tasks.
38
CNI has very recently started to participate at university job fairs with its own stand; in case this
strategy continues – or new ones emerge – investigations to measure the impact of this participation
should be conducted. Further research is still needed on this target population and should also
involve young professionals who left university some years ago and who would be willing to join the
CNI at a later stage of their professional career. Finally, following the limited existing research
studying the interactions between the three dimensions proposed by Cable and Turban,
39
the
image that lms and TV series project and its impact on willingness to join the intelligence services
could contribute greater understanding – specically, through the Theory of Symbolic Attraction.
In the same way that the attractiveness of the public sector can in some way be predicted,
40
the
variables of our study and the use of other variables have contributed to knowledge that can underpin
long-term strategies for recruiting new members to the intelligence services. There appear to be fewer
candidates for some vacancies such as cyber-security, cyber-espionage, and for countering disinforma-
tion that the CNI will in the future have to ll and where erce competition for talented graduates is
spiralling between various sectors, so it is important to listen to the Generation Z workforce about their
preferences for dierent sectors and organisations. As there is a positive relationship between the
attractiveness of the employer and the willingness to apply for a job,
41
if CNI wants to attract these
graduates to the service it must begin to design and to implement recruitment actions from the very
earliest days at some university campuses – as well as to adapt the information provided on its websites
and social media
42
– instead of passively awaiting the right applicants, perhaps in vain.
Notes
1. San Martín, Servicio Especial.
2. Díaz-Fernández, Los Servicios de Inteligencia Españoles.
3. Information provided by the director of the CNI, Félix Sanz, during the conference given within the framework of
the XXVIII International Seminar on Security and Defense Europe, organized by the Association of European
Journalists, in Toledo on June 6, 2016.
4. Acheampong, “Reward Preferences of the Youngest Generation”; and Foa et al., “Youth and Satisfaction with
Democracy”.
5. Carrier et al., “Online Canadian Police Recruitment Videos”; Rigaux and Cunningham, “Enhancing Recruitment
and Retentio”; and Cho and Lewis, “Turnover Intention and Turnover Behavior.”
6. Del-Real and Díaz-Fernández, “Public Knowledge of Intelligence Agencies among University Students in Spain”;
and Díaz-Fernández and Del-Real, “The Animated Video as a Tool for Political Socialization on the Intelligence
Services.”
7. Smith, “Finding a Match”; and Lomas, “#ForgetJamesBond.”
8. Podbregar, Hribar, and Ivanuša, “Intelligence and the Signicance of a Secret Agent’s Personality Traits”; Burkett,
“An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment”; and Fowler and Birdsall, “Are the Best and Brightest Joining
the Public Service?”
9. Antonsen and Jørgensen, “The ‘Publicness’ of Public Organizations.”
10. Cable and Turban, “Establishing the Dimensions, Sources and Value of Job Seekers’ Employer Knowledge during
Recruitment”; and Ng, Gosset, and Winter, “Millennials and Public Service Renewal.”
11. Ko and Jun, “A Comparative Analysis of Job Motivation and Career Preference of Asian Undergraduate Students”;
Lievens, Hoye, and Schreurs, “Examining the Relationship between Employer Knowledge Dimensions and
Organizational Attractiveness”; and Perry and Vandenabeele, “Behavioral Dynamics of Public Service
Motivation.”
12. Taylor, “Recruiting University Graduates for the Public Sector.”
13. Ibid.
14. Ferrer, “Jóvenes, Participación y Actitudes Políticas En España”; Cerezo, “La Generación Z y La Información”;
Espiritusanto, “Los Auténticos Nativos Digitales”; and Rubio and Álvaro, eds., “Jóvenes y Generación 2020.”
15. Vilanova and Ortega, Generación Z.
16. Jäkel and Borshchevskiy, “Who Wants to Work in Bureaucracy?”
17. Rose, “Student Preferences for Federal, State, and Local Government Careers.”
18. Ritz, Brewer, and Neumann, “Public Service Motivation.”
19. Swider, Zimmerman, and Barrick, “Searching for the Right Fit.”
12 A. M. DÍAZ-FERNÁNDEZ AND C. DEL-REAL

20. Cable and Turban, “Establishing the Dimensions, Sources and Value of Job Seekers’ Employer Knowledge during
Recruitment.”
21. Collins and Stevens, “The Relationship between Early Recruitment-Related Activities.”
22. Highhouse, Thornbury, and Little, “Social-Identity Functions of Attraction to Organizations.”
23. Blistène, “Ordinary Lives behind Extraordinary Occupations”; and Zegart, “‘Spytainment’.”
24. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law.
25. Davies and Johns, “British Public Condence in MI6 and Government Use of Intelligence”; Gill and Phythian,
Intelligence in an Insecure World; and Hribar, Podbregar, and Rosi, “A Model of Citizens’ Trust in Intelligence
Services.”
26. Hough et al., “Procedural Justice, Trust, and Institutional Legitimacy”; and Jang, Joo, and Zhao, “Determinants of
Public Condence in Police.”
27. Tyler, “Social Justice.”
28. Tankebe, “Viewing Things Dierently.”
29. Tyler, “Social Justice.”
30. Secretaría General de Universidades, “Datos y Cifras Del Sistema Universitario Español 2018–2019.”
31. Secretaría General de Universidades, “Datos y Cifras Del Sistema Universitario Español 2019–2020.”
32. See note 20 above.
33. Del-Real and Díaz Fernández, “Understanding the Plural Landscape of Cybersecurity Governance in Spain.”
34. See note 17 above.
35. See note 20 above.
36. Cross and Fine, “Police-Related Social Media Exposure and Adolescents’ Interest in Becoming a Police Ocer”;
Morrow, Vickovic, and Shjarback, “Motivation to Enter the Police Profession in the Post-Ferguson Era”; Sunshine
and Tyler, “The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing”; and Wortley,
Williams, and Walker, “Perceptions of Policing by Australian Senior Secondary Students.”
37. Proportions are: in Spain (Spanish 87.1 per cent, foreigners 12.9 per cent); in the Spanish university community
(Spanish 93.9 per cent, foreigners 3.5 per cent), and in our sample (Spanish 96 per cent, foreigners 4 per cent).
38. Winnæss, Damen, and Thomassen, “Understanding Learning Preferences and Career Aspirations of Norwegian
Police Students.”
39. See note 20 above
40. Ritz and Waldner, “Competing for Future Leaders.”
41. Lemmink, Schuijf, and Streukens, “The Role of Corporate Image and Company Employment Image.”
42. Carpentier, Van Hoye, and Weijters, “Attracting Applicants through the Organization’s Social Media Page”; and
Carrier et al., “Online Canadian Police Recruitment Videos.”
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
This work was supported by the National Intelligence Centre (CNI) under collaboration agreement 47/12. The funders
had no role in the study design, data collection and analyses, decision to publish or preparation of the manuscript.
Notes on contributors
Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández is Associate Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Cadiz. His research interests
include intelligence services, and the role of technology in cooperation among security and intelligence agencies. He
belongs to the research group SEJ-378 “Criminal System, Security and Criminology” of the University of Cádiz.
Cristina Del-Real is Assistant Professor of Cyber Crisis at the Institute of Security and Global Aairs at Leiden University.
Her research explores the intersection between society, technology and security policy, with specic areas of interest in
cyber security governance in public and private organizations. Cristina’s other areas of interest include public percep-
tion of intelligence agencies and security governance in smart cities.
ORCID
Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2376-0374
Cristina Del-Real http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3069-4974
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 13

References
Acheampong, N. A. A. ”Reward Preferences of the Youngest Generation: Attracting, Recruiting, and Retaining
Generation Z into Public Sector Organizations.” Compensation & Benets Review 53, no. 2 (April 2021): 75–97.
doi:10.1177/0886368720954803.
Antonsen, M., and T. Beck Jørgensen. ”The ‘Publicness’ of Public Organizations.” Public Administration 75, no. 2 (January
1997): 337–357. doi:10.1111/1467-9299.00064.
Blistène, P. “Ordinary Lives Behind Extraordinary Occupations: On the Uses of Rubicon for a Social History of American
Intelligence.” Cambridge Review of International Aairs 34, no. 5 (2021): 739–760. doi:10.1080/09557571.2021.
1892592.
Burkett, R. “An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment: From MICE to RASCLS.” Studies in Intelligence 57, no. 1
(2013): 7–17.
Cable, D. M., and D. B. Turban. ”Establishing the Dimensions, Sources and Value of Job Seekers’ Employer Knowledge
During Recruitment.” In Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management. 20 vols., 115–163. Bingley: Emerald
(MCB UP), 2001. doi:10.1016/S0742-7301(01)20002-4.
Carpentier, M., G. Van Hoye, and B. Weijters. ”Attracting Applicants Through the Organization’s Social Media Page:
Signaling Employer Brand Personality.” Journal of Vocational Behavior 115 (2019): 103326. doi:10.1016/j.jvb.2019.
103326. December.
Carrier, J., C. Bennell, T. Semple, and B. Jenkins. “Online Canadian Police Recruitment Videos: Do They Focus on Factors
That Potential Employees Consider When Making Career Decisions?” Police Practice and Research 22, no. 6 (November
1, 2021): 1585–1602. doi:10.1080/15614263.2020.1869549.
Cerezo, P. “La Generación Z Y La Información.” Revista de Estudios de Juventud 114 (2016): 95–109.
Cho, Y. J., and G. B. Lewis. ”Turnover Intention and Turnover Behavior: Implications for Retaining Federal Employees.”
Review of Public Personnel Administration 32, no. 1 (March 2012): 4–23. doi:10.1177/0734371X11408701.
Collins, C. J., and C. Kay Stevens. “The Relationship Between Early Recruitment-Related Activities and the Application
Decisions of New Labor-Market Entrants: A Brand Equity Approach to Recruitment.” The Journal of Applied Psychology
87, no. 6 (2002): 1121–1133. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.87.6.1121.
Cross, A. R., and A. D. Fine. ”Police-Related Social Media Exposure and Adolescents’ Interest in Becoming a Police
Ocer.” Police Practice and Research (December 19, 2021): 1–16. doi:10.1080/15614263.2021.2017932.
Davies, G. A. M., and R. Johns. “British Public Condence in MI6 and Government Use of Intelligence: The Eect on
Support for Preventive Military Action.” Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 5 (October 2012): 669–688. doi:10.
1080/02684527.2012.708520.
Del-Real, C., and A. M. Díaz-Fernández. “Public Knowledge of Intelligence Agencies Among University Students in
Spain.” Intelligence and National Security 37, no. 1 (October 11, 2021): 19–37. doi:10.1080/02684527.2021.1983984.
Del-Real, C., and A. M. Díaz Fernández. “Understanding the Plural Landscape of Cybersecurity Governance in Spain:
A Matter of Capital Exchange.” International Cybersecurity Law Review (2022). doi:10.1365/s43439-022-00069-4.
Díaz-Fernández, A. M. Los Servicios de Inteligencia Españoles: Desde La Guerra Civil Hasta El 11-M: Historia de Una
Transición. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2005.
Díaz-Fernández, A. M., and C. Del-Real. “The Animated Video as a Tool for Political Socialisation on the Intelligence
Services.” Communication & Society 31, no. 1 (2018): 281–297. doi:10.15581/003.31.3.281-295.
Espiritusanto, Ó. “Los Auténticos Nativos Digitales: ¿estamos Preparados Para La Generación Z?” Revista de Estudios de
Juventud 114 (2016): 7-10.
Ferrer, M. “Jóvenes, Participación y Actitudes Políticas En España, ¿son Realmente Tan Diferentes?” Revista de Estudios de
Juventud 75 (2006): 195–206.
Foa, R. S., A. Klassen, D. Wenger, A. Rand, and M. Slade. Youth and Satisfaction with Democracy: Reversing the Democratic
Disconnect? Cambridge, UK: Centre for the Future of Democracy, 2020. https://www.cam.ac.uk/system/les/youth_
and_satisfaction_with_democracy.pdf
Fowler, L., and C. Birdsall. ”Are the Best and Brightest Joining the Public Service?” Review of Public Personnel
Administration 40, no. 3 (September 2020): 532–554. doi:10.1177/0734371X19836152.
Gill, P., and M. Phythian. Intelligence in an Insecure World. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006.
Highhouse, S., E. E. Thornbury, and I. S. Little. ”Social-Identity Functions of Attraction to Organisations.” Organisational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 103, no. 1 (May 2007): 134–146. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.01.001.
Hough, M., J. Jackson, B. Bradford, A. Myhill, and P. Quinton. “Procedural Justice, Trust, and Institutional Legitimacy.”
Policing 4, no. 3 (August 1, 2010): 203–210. doi:10.1093/police/paq027.
Hribar, G., I. Podbregar, and B. Rosi. ”A Model of Citizens’ Trust in Intelligence Services.” Security Journal (January 7, 2021).
doi:10.1057/s41284-020-00275-x.
Jäkel, T., and G. Alexander Borshchevskiy. ”Who Wants to Work in Bureaucracy? Career Intentions of Post-Millennial
Students.” Teaching Public Administration 37, no. 1 (March 2019): 67–91. doi:10.1177/0144739418806553.
Jang, H., H. -J. Joo, and J. (. Zhao. ”Determinants of Public Condence in Police: An International Perspective.” Journal of
Criminal Justice 38, no. 1 (January 2010): 57–68. doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2009.11.008.
14 A. M. DÍAZ-FERNÁNDEZ AND C. DEL-REAL

Ko, K., and K.-N. Jun. ”A Comparative Analysis of Job Motivation and Career Preference of Asian Undergraduate
Students.” Public Personnel Management 44, no. 2 (June 2015): 192–213. doi:10.1177/0091026014559430.
Lemmink, J., A. Schuijf, and S. Streukens. “The Role of Corporate Image and Company Employment Image in Explaining
Application Intentions.” Journal of Economic Psychology 24, no. 1 (February 2003): 1–15. doi:10.1016/S0167-4870(02)
00151-4.
Lievens, F., G. Hoye, and B. Schreurs. ”Examining the Relationship Between Employer Knowledge Dimensions and
Organizational Attractiveness: An Application in a Military Context.” Journal of Occupational and Organizational
Psychology 78, no. 4 (December 2005): 553–572. doi:10.1348/09631790X26688.
Morrow, W. J., S. G. Vickovic, and J. A. Shjarback. “Motivation to Enter the Police Profession in the Post-Ferguson Era: An
Exploratory Analysis of Procedural Justice.” Criminal Justice Studies 34, no. 2 April 3 (2021): 135–155. doi:10.1080/
1478601X.2020.1802591.
Ng, E. S. W., C. W. Gosset, and R. Winter. ”Millennialls and Public Service Renewal: Introduction to Millennialls and Public
Service Motivation (PSM).” Public Administration Quarterly 40, no. 3 (2016): 412–428.
Perry, J. L., and W. Vandenabeele. ”Behavioral Dynamics: Institutions, Identities and Self-Regulation.” In J. L. Perry, and A.
Hondeghen, Motivation in Public Management: The Call of Public Service, 56–79. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Podbregar, I., G. Hribar, and T. Ivanuša. ”Intelligence and the Signicance of a Secret Agent’s Personality Traits.”
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 28, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 520–539. doi:10.1080/08850607.
2015.1022465.
Rigaux, C., and J. B. Cunningham. “Enhancing Recruitment and Retention of Visible Minority Police Ocers in Canadian
Policing Agencies.” Policing and Society 31, no. 4 (April 21, 2021): 454–482. doi:10.1080/10439463.2020.1750611.
Ritz, A., G. A. Brewer, and O. Neumann. ”Public Service Motivation: A Systematic Literature Review and Outlook.” Public
Administration Review 76, no. 3 (May 2016): 414–426. doi:10.1111/puar.12505.
Ritz, A., and C. Waldner. “Competing for Future Leaders: A Study of Attractiveness of Public Sector Organizations to
Potential Job Applicants.” Review of Public Personnel Administration 31, no. 3 (September 2011): 291–316. doi:10.
1177/0734371X11408703.
Rose, R. “Student Preferences for Federal, State, and Local Government Careers: National Opportunities and Local
Service.” Journal of Public Aairs Education 21, no. 1 (March 2015): 83–100. doi:10.1080/15236803.2015.12001818.
Rubio, R., and M. A. Álvaro, eds. ”Jóvenes Y Generación 2020.” Revista Estudios de Juventud 108 (2015): 5-9.
San Martín, J. I. Servicio Especial: A Las Órdenes de Carrero Blanco, de Castellana a El Aaiún. 1a ed. Espejo de España, 91.
Serie Biografías y memorias. Barcelona: Planeta, 1983.
Secretaría General de Universidades. “Datos y Cifras Del Sistema Universitario Español 2018-2019.” Madrid: Ministerio de
Universidades. Gobierno de España, 2019. https://www.educacionyfp.gob.es/dam/jcr:b9e82c7a-1174-45ab-8191-
c8b7e626f5aa/informe-datos-y-cifras-del-sistema-universitario-espa-ol-2019-2020-corregido.pdf
Secretaría General de Universidades. “Datos y Cifras Del Sistema Universitario Español 2019-2020.” Madrid: Ministerio de
Universidades. Gobierno de España, 2020. https://www.educacionyfp.gob.es/dam/jcr:b9e82c7a-1174-45ab-8191-
c8b7e626f5aa/informe-datos-y-cifras-del-sistema-universitario-espa-ol-2019-2020-corregido.pdf
Smith, A. L. ”Finding a Match: The Revolution in Recruitment and Its Application to Selecting Intelligence Analysts.”
Intelligence and National Security 37, no. 5 (July 29, 2022): 667–688. doi:10.1080/02684527.2021.2015854.
Sunshine, J., and T. R. Tyler. ”The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing.” Law
& Society Review 37, no. 3 (September 2003): 513–548. doi:10.1111/1540-5893.3703002.
Swider, B. W., R. D. Zimmerman, and M. R. Barrick. “Searching for the Right Fit: Development of Applicant
Person-Organization Fit Perceptions During the Recruitment Process.” The Journal of Applied Psychology 100, no. 3
(2015): 880–893. doi:10.1037/a0038357.
Tankebe, J. “Viewing Things Dierently: The Dimensions of Public Perceptions of Police Legitimacy: Public Perceptions
of Police Legitimacy.” Criminology 51, no. 1 (February 2013): 103–135. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.2012.00291.x.
Taylor, J. “Recruiting University Graduates for the Public Sector: An Australian Case Study.” International Journal of Public
Sector Management 18, no. 6 (October 2005): 514–533. doi:10.1108/09513550510616742.
Tyler, T. R. ”Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure.” International Journal of Psychology 35, no. 2 (April 2000): 117–125.
doi:10.1080/002075900399411.
Tyler, T. R. Why People Obey the Law. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.
Vilanova, N., and I. Ortega. Generación Z: Todo Lo Que Necesitas Saber Sobre Los jóvenes Que Han Dejado Viejos a Los
“Millennials”. 1
a
ed., en esta colección. Barcelona: Plataforma Editorial, 2017.
Winnæss, P., M. -L. Damen, and G. Thomassen. ”Understanding Learning Preferences and Career Aspirations of
Norwegian Police Students from a Comparative Perspective.” In The Making of a Police Ocer: Comparative
Perspectives on Police Education and Recruitment. 1st ed., 111–140. Routledge, 2020. doi:10.4324/9780429277221.
Wortley, R., R. Williams, and M. Walker. “Perceptions of Policing by Australian Senior Secondary Students: Implications
for Diversifying the Recruit Mix.” Policing and Society 6, no. 2 (June 1996): 131–144. doi:10.1080/10439463.1996.
9964746.
Zegart, A. B. “‘Spytainment’: The Real Inuence of Fake Spies.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence
23, no. 4 (August 31, 2010): 599–622. doi:10.1080/08850607.2010.501635.
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 15

Appendix
Factor loadings and communalities based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
with varimax rotation
Components
1 2 3 Communalities
To what extent do you trust in each of the following political institutions?
The political parties .850 .729
The Government .829 .748
The Parliament .685 .680
The Monarchy .873 .780
The Judicial power .719 .635
Ombudsman .948 .946
Rotation converged in 4 iterations. Factor loadings <0.4 are suppressed. Percentage of variance explained by each factor: Factor 1
= 46.87 per cent, Factor 2 = 15.50 per cent, Factor 3 = 12.93 per cent, Total percentage of variance explained = 75.29 per cent,
KMO =.803.
16 A. M. DÍAZ-FERNÁNDEZ AND C. DEL-REAL