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Of precarity and conspiracy: Introducing a socio-functional model of conspiracy beliefs

November 2022
British Journal of Social Psychology 62(1)

DOI:10.1111/bjso.12597

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CC BY-NC 4.0

Authors:

Jaïs Adam-Troïan

Heriot-Watt University

Maria Chayinska

University of Messina

Maria paola Paladino

University of Trento

Özden Melis Uluğ

University of Sussex

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Conspiracy Beliefs (CB) are a key vector of violent extremism, radicalism and unconventional political events. So far, social-psychological research has extensively documented how cognitive, emotional and intergroup factors can promote CB. Evidence also suggests that adherence to CB moves along social class lines: low-income and low-education are among the most robust predictors of CB. Yet, the potential role of precarity-the subjective experience of permanent insecurity stemming from objective material strain-in shaping CB remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose for the first time a socio-functional model of CB. We test the hypothesis that precarity could foster increased CB because it undermines trust in government and the broader political 'elites'. Data from the World Value Survey (n = 21,650; Study 1, electoral CB) and from representative samples from polls conducted in France (n = 1760, Study 2a, conspiracy mentality) and Italy (n = 2196, Study 2b, COVID-19 CB), corroborate a mediation model whereby precarity is directly and indirectly associated with lower trust in authorities and higher CB. In addition, these links are robust to adjustment on income, self-reported SES and education. Considering precarity allows for a truly social-psychological understanding of CB as the by-product of structural issues (e.g. growing inequalities). Results from our socio-functional model suggest that implementing solutions at the socioeconomic level could prove efficient in fighting CB.

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1School of Psychology, Keele University, Keele, UK

2Department of Cognitive, Psychological, and

Pedagogical Sciences, University of Messina,

Messina, Italy

3Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science,

University of Trento, Trento, Italy

4School of Psychology, University of Sussex,

Sussex, UK

5Department of Psychology, University of Fribourg,

Fribourg, Switzerland

Correspondence

Jais Adam-Troian, School of Psychology, Keele

University, 1.11 Dorothy Hodgkin Building, Keele,

Newcastle ST5 5BG, UK.

Email: j.adam-troian@keele.ac.uk and Troian.jais@

gmail.com

Abstract

Conspiracy Beliefs (CB) are a key vector of violent extrem-

ism, radicalism and unconventional political events. So far,

social-psychological research has extensively documented

how cognitive, emotional and intergroup factors can promote

CB. Evidence also suggests that adherence to CB moves

along social class lines: low-income and low-education are

among the most robust predictors of CB. Yet, the poten-

tial role of precarity—the subjective experience of permanent

insecurity stemming from objective material strain—in shaping

CB remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose for

the first time a socio-functional model of CB. We test the

hypothesis that precarity could foster increased CB because

it undermines trust in government and the broader politi-

cal ‘elites’. Data from the World Value Survey (n = 21,650;

Study 1, electoral CB) and from representative samples from

polls conducted in France (n = 1760, Study 2a, conspiracy

mentality) and Italy (n = 2196, Study 2b, COVID-19 CB),

corroborate a mediation model whereby precarity is directly

and indirectly associated with lower trust in authorities and

higher CB. In addition, these links are robust to adjustment

on income, self-reported SES and education. Considering

precarity allows for a truly social-psychological understand-

ing of CB as the by-product of structural issues (e.g. grow-

ing inequalities). Results from our socio-functional model

suggest that implementing solutions at the socio-economic

level could prove efficient in fighting CB.

KEYWORDS

conspiracy beliefs, ontological insecurity, precarity, socio-functional, trust

ARTICLE

Of precarity and conspiracy: Introducing a

socio-functional model of conspiracy beliefs

Jais Adam-Troian1 | Maria Chayinska2 | Maria Paola Paladino3 |

Özden Melis Uluğ4 | Jeroen Vaes3 | Pascal Wagner-Egger5

DOI: 10.1111/bjso.12597

Received: 7 October 2021 Accepted: 26 October 2022

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and

reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.

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INTRODUCTION

The 2010–2020 decade has affected Western societies with political events propelled in part by conspiracy

beliefs. Conspiracy beliefscan be defined as explanations of events involving a plot organized by powerful

individuals pursuing a malevolent agenda (Keeley, 1999). Research on the renewal of domestic far-right

and Islamist terrorism (START, 2021), the election of hardline right-populist leaders in several countries

(e.g. Hungary, Poland, United States), the United Kingdom's 2016 referendum leading to its breakaway

from the EU (i.e. ‘Brexit’) and the unprecedented wave of ‘Yellow Vests’ riots that shook France in 2018

(Mahfud et al., 2021; Wagner-Egger et al., 2022) systematically highlighted the key role of conspiracy

beliefs. These conspiracies typically involve beliefs regarding the involvement of ‘corrupt’ Jewish bankers,

the ‘Satanistic’ global elite or an alleged planned ‘Great Replacement’ of European natives by Muslim

immigrants orchestrated by pro-immigration politicians (Barbier et al., 2021; Jolley et al., 2021; Kofta

et al., 2020; Obaidi et al., 2021; Rousis et al., 2020). The 2021 Capitol attack in the United States was also

motivated by the belief that the 2020 elections were rigged in favour of the Democratic party (Barry &

Frenkel, 2021).

Social-psychological research has demonstrated that conspiracy beliefs can be seen as the by-product

of intuitive reasoning (Swami et al., 2014), conflictual intergroup relations (Biddlestone et al., 2020),

maladaptive coping strategies (Marchlewska et al., 2021), uncertainty, distrust (van Mulukom et al.,

2022; Wagner-Egger et al., 2022) and cultural environments that promote these factors (Adam-Troian,

Wagner-Egger, et al., 2020). Moreover, a substantial part of the literature has highlighted that conspiracy

beliefs and mentality is favoured by pathological factors such as anxiety, paranoia and schizotypy as well

as political factors such as perceived powerlessness and anomie (see Goreis & Voracek, 2019). Political

science research conducted in the United States even points at specific elements of local cultures that

favour the emergence of conspiracy beliefs, such as a paranoid style among mass opinion (Oliver &

Wood, 2014) or ethnic prejudice (Morgan & Lee, 2019).

More than simple beliefs reflecting individual attitudes towards a given group (suspected of conspir-

ing against the ingroup), conspiracy beliefs fulfil different functions and can be thought of as expressions

of various motives crystallized in a single narrative. Conspiracy beliefs can help protect the individual

self by deflecting blame from personal failure; they can buffer threats to the relational self by increasing

social support through the expression of concerns shared by group members, and simultaneously serve

to defend the collective self by blaming outgroups (Biddlestone et al., 2021), which explains the common

antisemitic trope of many conspiracy narratives (but see Kofta et al., 2020). In fact, recent evidence

suggests that events, which prompt control threats (e.g. reminders of historical trauma) may lead individ-

uals from victimized groups to mobilize antisemitic conspiracy beliefs as a way to cope by increasing the

illusion that at least some other group in society (i.e. Jewish people) is in control (Skrodzka et al., 2022).

In addition to control motives, the need for a positive social identity may also foster conspiracy beliefs

against outgroups (Grzesiak-Feldman & Kaminska-Feldman, 2005; Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2014).

Moreover, conspiracy beliefs provide an insight into how the individual self relates to an ingroup

embedded in a history of relations with other outgroups. As an illustration, case studies on the conspiracy

narratives surrounding the war in Kosovo highlighted how Serbs' construction of NATO's intervention

in this country as a ‘Western’ conspiracy took root in their imagined historical intergroup relations. For

instance, these often drew upon the Fourth Crusade, during which a European army supposed to retake

Jerusalem from Muslims ended up sacking Constantinople (Brown & Theodossopoulos, 2003).

Echoing these relational features, endorsement of these various conspiracy theories seems to be polar-

ized along social class lines (Douglas et al., 2019). This is reflected in the finding that low-income and

low-education are robust predictors of conspiracy beliefs (Uscinski, 2020; van Prooijen, 2017). Although

they are crucial to understanding support for populist leaders and measures (e.g. anti-immigration poli-

cies; Muis & Immerzeel, 2017), unconventional political movements (e.g. the Yellow Vests; Adam-Troian

et al., 2021) and even COVID-19 vaccine scepticism (Callaghan et al., 2020), these social class features of

conspiracy beliefs remain less explored by social-psychological research (in comparison with cognitive,

political or motivational factors). In this paper, we explore for the first time how the experience of precarity,

ADAM-TROIAN eT Al.

an important yet overlooked factor, might contribute to promoting conspiracy beliefs rooted in class antag-

onism and perceptions of relative deprivation between precarious individuals and non-precarious ones.

The social psychology of precarity

One of the first conceptualizations of precarity comes from early sociological studies of Algerian laborers'

conditions in French Algeria (Bourdieu & Abdelmalek, 1964). Bourdieu and Abdelmalek's (1964) analysis

relied on interview data from Algerian workers during the colonial period and led to the identification

of two prototypical categories of labor as perceived and experienced by workers. A first ‘traditional’ type

of labor summarized the condition of Algerian peasants, characterized by objective self-sufficiency, but

more importantly maybe, by a subjective sense of stability and predictability due to the activity's reli-

ance on seasonal rhythms. Opposed to this conception of work judged as ideal by participants was the

so-called ‘precarious’ employment experienced by uprooted Algerian rural employees. This precarious

employment was defined as characterized by isolation from one's relatives, dependency on the employer

and a permanent sense of uncertainty (see Millar, 2017).

From early on, precarity was, therefore, conceptualized from a social-psychological standpoint, marked

by a heightened sense of personal uncertainty and unpredictability in life circumstances, hence theoret-

ically distinct from poverty exclusively (although the two are empirically correlated, see Lemke, 2016).

Accordingly, we chose to define precarity as the subjective experience of permanent social and psycholog-

ical insecurity, stemming from objective conditions of affiliative and economic deprivation (e.g. exploita-

tion, colonial legacies, see ANONYMIZED_B, 2022). These objective conditions emerge from labor

characteristics (i.e. precarious work) such as job insecurity (e.g. part-time, short term), lack of benefits,

low prestige and income (Castel, 2003; Kalleberg, 2011).

Recent developments on the concept have extended the notion of precarity. Beyond the sole domain

of work and labour relations, precarity is a construct which, “conjures life worlds that are inflected with uncer-

tainty and instability” (Waite, 2009, p. 416) and is now understood as an experience at the intersection of

different spheres within individuals' lives. This broader conception of precarity considers that it “inhabits

everything from the global political economy to the vicissitudes of employment, health, social relations, self-perception”

(Ettlinger, 2007, p. 324). Precarity taps into the very feelings and perceptions associated with not being

safe and secure, which can translate into subjective judgements of being on the verge of collapse (Philo

et al., 2019) or in a permanent state of self-uncertainty (Söderström, 2019).

Precarity is thus associated with a sense of ontological insecurity and existential threat (Jonas &

Fritsche, 2013; Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020; Laing, 1960), which ultimately affects the way individuals project

themselves in the future. In fact, recent research suggests that a lack of ability to project oneself into the

future (i.e. to exert Time–Space Distanciation) is a distinct psychological signature of precarity, because

precarity renders future time projection too costly (induces stress, see ANONYMIZED, 2022). Besides

this ability to project oneself into the future, ontological security refers to a “person's fundamental sense

of safety in the world and includes a basic trust of other people”(Giddens, 1991, p. 38). In turn, this sense of

trust is necessary to sustain individual psychological wellbeing but also to buffer existential anxiety and

identity-uncertainty (see Kinnvall, 2004 for a similar argument).

The increase in socio-economic inequalities brought about by intense global macro-economic reforms

(beginning in the 80 s; Piketty & Saez, 2014) has led to a generalization of precarity across so-called

‘WEIRD’ societies (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic; Agius et al., 2021; Henrich

et al., 2010). Because of this increase in prevalence, sociologists and demographers have considered the

theoretical relevance of using novel social classifications based on the experience of precarity. Instead

of using the traditional socio-economic classifications (i.e. low, middle, high SES), some researchers

conceptualized the existence of a whole new class—defined by a lack of work-related security (e.g. no

stable income, social safety net, upward social mobility), strong feelings of alienation and anger towards

upper-classes (the ‘precariat’; Standing, 2011).

PReCARITY AND CONSPIRACY BelIeFS 3

Thus, precarity—as an objective life condition and a subjective life experience—can be thought of as

an encompassing psychosocial construct. In fact, precarity allows for theoretically disentangling empiri-

cally distinct constructs, namely economic deprivation (i.e. poverty) from the experience of permanent

insecurity. This is important because several analyses have highlighted how right-wing populist parties

and measures do not really appeal to individuals in the poorest income brackets, but to those situated just

above them (see Archibugi & Sorace, 2019 regarding the Brexit vote). In the U.S., for instance, Trump

votes in 2016 were driven by increased support from the ‘squeezed middle’: the average American worker

who earned a similar income in 2009 than in 1975 (Gifford, 2021). In France, the Yellow Vests movement

grew out of the larger population of those just above the poverty line, under constant threat of falling

below at any point (Mahfud et al., 2021).

To the extent that precarity increases people's feelings of anxiety, powerlessness, hopelessness and

perceptions of anomie (Adam-Troian, Bonetto, et al., 2020; Sprong et al., 2019), it may be a potent driver

of political extremism. As such, we argue that precarity is a crucial variable to understand the formation of

populist and radical socio-political attitudes and may, therefore, be especially important to understand how

individuals endorse radical beliefs about politics and society in the form of conspiracy theories.

From precarity to conspiracy?

Decades of research have identified three main classes of factors that are linked with conspiracy beliefs

(Wagner-Egger, 2021): societal-political, cognitive-psychological and communicational. The communica-

tional dimension encompasses the effects of internet access and social media on unfounded beliefs (e.g.

Bronner, 2015). Dozens of studies have shown that cognitive biases, emotions (e.g. anxiety) and intuitive

thinking are associated with conspiracy beliefs (Douglas et al., 2019; Goreis & Voracek, 2019), highlighting

the importance of cognitive-psychological factors. Regarding the societal-political dimension, research indi-

cates that people who are disadvantaged in society (e.g. lower SES, ethnic minorities; see for instance van

Prooijen et al., 2018) endorse more conspiracy beliefs. As conspiracy beliefs can be defined as serious accu-

sations of conspiracy without ‘sufficient proofs’, and very often target the elites (Wagner-Egger, 2021), there

are thus reasons to consider conspiracy beliefs as irrational discourses of revenge for being in disadvantaged

social positions. These disadvantaged social positions may be characterized objectively and subjectively.

Studies have repeatedly indicated that lower education levels are related to greater endorsement of

conspiracy beliefs (Garrett & Weeks, 2017; Goertzel, 1994; Green & Douglas, 2018; Mancosu et al., 2017;

Oliver & Wood, 2014; Radnitz & Underwood, 2015; Stempel et al., 2007; Swami et al., 2016; Uscinski

& Parent, 2014; van Prooijen, 2017; van Prooijen et al., 2015). Since precarity fosters lower educational

achievement by decreasing access to the economic and social resources required to succeed academically

(Croizet et al., 2019; Goudeau & Croizet, 2017), it could hence exert a remote influence on conspiracy

beliefs.

Low economic resources are also related to a higher level of conspiracy beliefs (Freeman &

Bentall, 2017; Radnitz & Underwood, 2015; Uscinski & Olivella, 2017; Uscinski & Parent, 2014). In fact,

the economic aspects of precarity may impact individual endorsement of conspiracy beliefs directly and

indirectly through the effects of various dimensions of personality, cognition and health. This is not

only true at the individual level but also at the country level, as several studies showed that the higher

the economic inequalities in a country, the higher the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs (Cordonier

et al., 2021; Drochon, 2018; Imhoff et al., 2022). Likewise, the perception of objective and subjective

economic inequality on conspiracy beliefs has been proved to be related to greater conspiracy beliefs

(Salvador Casara et al., 2022), both at the correlational and the experimental level (conspiracy beliefs

increased when participants were presented with an imaginary country that suffered from more economic

inequality compared to a less unequal imaginary country).

Although there is no direct evidence for this relationship, studies have highlighted that precarity

facilitates known predictors of conspiracy beliefs. For instance, Obschonka et al. (2018) have demon-

ADAM-TROIAN eT Al.

strated how historical deindustrialization processes generate increased population anxiety and depression

in former coal-mining areas, through intergenerational exposure to precarity and unemployment. Like-

wise, precarity can increase mental health issues, including psychotic symptoms (for a demonstration

in the United States; see Wickham et al., 2014). Hence, there are reasons to believe that precarity could

foster conspiracism through increasing risk factors for conspiracy beliefs, such as anxiety, schizotypy and

paranoid ideation (Bruder et al., 2013; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992).

In addition, the subjective experience of precarity may affect conspiracy beliefs. It is a well-established

finding that perceptions of anomie fuel conspiracy beliefs through distrust towards politicians and authori-

ties, feelings of loss of control and powerlessness, dissatisfaction in life, political alienation (Abalakina-Paap

et al., 1999; Brotherton et al., 2013; Bruder et al., 2013; Goertzel, 1994; Green & Douglas, 2018; Imhoff

& Bruder, 2014; Swami, 2012; Wagner-Egger & Bangerter, 2007; Wood et al., 2012).

Precarity, as it entails insecurity in several life domains, taps into the motivational processes at work

behind conspiracy beliefs. Conspiracy beliefs help individuals cope with uncertain situations and stressful

life experiences by giving them a sense of meaning and control (Marchlewska et al., 2018; see Douglas

et al., 2017 for a review), while paradoxically degrading their mental health (i.e. manifested in a maladap-

tive form of coping; Marchlewska et al., 2021). Some studies showed that experiencing loss of control

and threats to one's identity is related to conspiracy beliefs (e.g. Graeupner & Coman, 2017; van Prooijen

& Acker, 2015; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).

Moreover, individual need for physical safety and death-related anxiety are positive predictors of

conspiracy mentality and endorsement of various conspiracy theories (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999;

Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami, 2012). It is thus possible that the sense of physical threat associated with

precarity and low perceived SES (e.g. poorer health; Cundiff & Matthews, 2017) leads to increased conspir-

acy beliefs. In fact, the constant threats faced by poorer and lower-social status individuals explain why

these groups develop more collectivistic values and group-based conceptions of their identity (Iacoviello

& Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2019), which have been shown to directly predict conspiracy beliefs (Adam-Troian,

Wagner-Egger, et al., 2020; van Prooijen & Song, 2021).

The present research: A socio-functional model of conspiracy beliefs

This brief overview of the literature suggests that both objective and subjectivefeatures of precarity could

foster conspiracy beliefs endorsement. By considering for the first time the potential role of precarity, we

aim to lay the basis for a socio-functional theory of conspiracy beliefs to explain why, despite the poten-

tial negative consequences on one's reputation (Lantian et al., 2018), believing in conspiracy beliefs is still

attractive to individuals. The socio-functional model states that conspiracy beliefs may provide people

with (1) an explanation of why they are disadvantaged in society, (2) liable individuals or groups for that

disadvantage (scapegoating) and (3) a feeling of revenge, with the belief that in the future, conspirators

will be caught and punished.

In this perspective, we argue that the exact actors, intentionality or details of a plot in a conspiracy

narrative do not matter much to the believers. Instead, we propose that the common underlying theme

behind conspiracy narratives, which is that some groups ‘at the top’ of society are trying to deceive or

harm those precariously situated ‘at the very bottom’ (Nera et al., 2020), matters more to believers. This

view fits recent evidence showing that the actual information value of a conspiracy narrative does not

influence individuals' endorsement of it (Meuer et al., 2021). Instead, we argue that feelings of (dis)trust

–rather than perceptions of meaning—may play an important role in understanding how precarity might

relate to conspiracy beliefs (van Mulukom et al., 2020).

According to our model, the experience of precarity would generate strong feelings of distrust (Smith

& Bohm, 2008). Indeed, perceptions of economic inequalities (which are higher among lower-income indi-

viduals, Knell & Stix, 2020) and real economic inequalities tend to foster a general lack of trust towards

various social groups, especially those at ‘the top’ of society (see Sprong et al., 2019; Teymoori et al., 2017).

In turn, this distrust would increase prejudicial intergroup attitudes based on class distinctions in the form

PReCARITY AND CONSPIRACY BelIeFS 5

of conspiracy beliefs. Research does show that conspiracy beliefs can be considered as a form of inter-

group prejudice (Chayinska & Minescu, 2018; Jolley et al., 2020; Sapountzis & Condor, 2013; Sternisko

et al., 2020), and several studies have demonstrated that perceptions of relative deprivation, rather than

actual socio-economic status (see Ogorzalek et al., 2020) can be a potent driver of intergroup prejudice

(e.g. Guimond & Dambrun, 2002). Hence, conspiracy beliefs could reflect individual perceptions that their

precarious situation is intentionally caused by other outgroups who hold more socio-economic and politi-

cal power. These beliefs could occur if precarity fosters a greater sense of distrust towards the ‘elites’ (e.g.

non-precariat outgroup members or individuals perceived as such) and related institutions.

This proposition is indirectly corroborated by the fact that, although anti-minority (downwards)

conspiracy beliefs may vary along with conservative ideology, anti-elite (upwards) conspiracy beliefs are a

common feature of both left- and right-wing extremists (which tend to be more prevalent among lower

SES; Nera et al., 2021). More directly, well-established evidence positively linking poverty and distrust,

whether interpersonal or political, suggests that precarity and distrust may display similar associations

(De Courson & Nettle, 2021). Likewise, recent evidence demonstrates the existence of a positive link

between economic inequality and conspiracy beliefs, mediated by perceptions of anomie (i.e. societal

breakdown, which entails generalized distrust see Salvador Casara et al., 2022).

Additionally, in a socio-functional view, most conspiracy beliefs should be understood as extended

intuitions and abusive generalizations stemming from a ‘gut feeling’ that may actually have a kernel of

truth (e.g. experiencing feelings of existential threat, stemming from precarity; see Douglas et al., 2017).

For instance, despite the fact that increase in economic inequality is due to an interplay between complex

factors, it is still true that inequality and precarity are caused—in part—by the collective intentional behav-

iour of corporate institutions and high-income individuals in society (e.g. tax-evasion; see Stiglitz, 2021).

Thus, although conspiracy beliefs may seem irrational and exaggerated (e.g. far from tax-evasion), the

group-level prevalence of such beliefs may objectively reflect one's group's decreasing socio-economic

status and political power. Our approach is in line with the notion that given the “apparently irrational language

of conspiracy it is important to ask how such marginalised forms of thinking might be as a consequence of social precarity”

(Johnson-Schlee, 2019, p. 176). Far from innocuous, however, (Douglas et al., 2021) precarity-induced

conspiracy beliefs can foster radical forms of political and collective action in attempts to actively chal-

lenge the status quo (Imhoff et al., 2022; Rottweiler et al., 2022).

Considering these associations, we aimed to empirically test our model to provide the first evidence of

a potential role of precarity-induced distrust in shaping conspiracy beliefs. We hypothesized that precarity

should be positively linked to conspiracy beliefs (H1), negatively to trust in actors related to the conspir-

acy (H2), which itself would be negatively linked to conspiracy beliefs (H3). Our analyses should yield a

positive indirect effect so that increases in precarity levels would lead to increases in conspiracy beliefs

through decreased trust in actors related to the conspiracy (H4).

A crucial question we also sought to address when testing our model was to find out whether the

subjective experience of precarity could be related to conspiracy beliefs, independently of objective life

circumstances (e.g. income, education, etc.). This could explain why, for instance, votes for populist move-

ments or candidates (e.g. Trump in the United States) tend to be more prevalent among the lower-middle

class whose earnings and available income may be higher than that of the lower-classes, but who struggle

to deal with the financial requirements of their relatively ‘more wealthy’ lifestyle (e.g. paying mortgages

vs. social housing rent).

OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIES

To test our theoretical model of conspiracy beliefs based on precarity, we conducted three cross-sectional

studies using various representative samples across six continents. The first study made use of the latest

(2017–2021) World Values Survey wave (WVS wave 7; Haerpfer et al., 2020). Although conspiracy beliefs

are not measured in the WVS, we constructed an index of conspiracy beliefs by analysing respondents'

ADAM-TROIAN eT Al.

agreement on items regarding perceptions of electoral fraud but exclusively restricting our analysis on

countries with objectively high indices of electoral, liberal and direct democratic freedoms where such

fraud is less likely to occur.

Studies 2a (France) and 2b (Italy) employed the analyses of poll data, this time including validated

scales for measuring both conspiracy beliefs and mentality regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and other

alleged plots (e.g. 9/11). Study 2a was a secondary analysis of a dataset collected by third parties related to

the investigators (but not designed by investigators themselves) and Study 2b was an analysis of a survey

directly conducted by some of the investigators in the context of another project related to COVID-19's

psychological consequences in Italy. This strategy allowed us to establish robust correlational findings

across a range of ecologically valid stimuli (Wells & Windschitl, 1999).

The studies were all conducted in accordance with the APA Code of Conduct (APA,

2017). Supplementary materials, analyses and all data underlying our findings can be openly

accessed and downloaded through the Open Science Framework platform at https://osf.

io/93f5d/?view_only=1b927686808346e385d5e2dedbede4be.

STUDY 1

METHOD

In this first study, we decided to analyse data collected in the context of the 2017–2021 WVS, which

included a substantial number of measures relevant to our theoretical model. Data collection procedure

as well as content of the questionnaire in each country is extensively detailed on the WVS website.1

Participants

Given the specific methodological choices we made to calculate our conspiracy beliefs score (see section

Measures below), our analysis focused on a fraction only of the WVS data. It included 21,649 participants

from 16 countries (46.9% male; Mage = 47.3, SDage = 17.5), guaranteeing sufficient power to detect small

direct and indirect effects as well as to provide for stable correlation estimates (Schönbrodt & Perugini,

2013).

Measures

Our study used indicators and measures computed as detailed below. Country-specific descriptive statis-

tics are available on the OSF project page (under Study 1 WVS).

Precarity

Five items were averaged to create a composite measure of precarity. These items asked how often partici-

pants or their family had “gone without enough food to eat,”“felt unsafe from crime in [their] home,”“gone without medi-

cine or medical treatment that [they] needed,”“gone without a cash income”and “gone without a safe shelter over [their]head”

over the last 12 months. This indicator hence tapped into feelings of insecurity (one item) and subjective

estimates of uncertainty in several areas of life such as health, food, finance and constituted an adequate

proxy for measuring overall experience of precarity (questions 51 to 55; 4-point Likert, from 1 ‘never’ to 4

‘often’; M = 1.44, SD = .57, α = .77).

https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV7.jsp.

PReCARITY AND CONSPIRACY BelIeFS 7

Conspiracy beliefs

As mentioned earlier, the WVS does not contain measures of conspiracy beliefs per se. To assess partic-

ipants' level of conspiracy beliefs, we thus took advantage of the presence of items assessing partici-

pants' perceptions of electoral fairness (questions 224 to 233). Electoral fairness is the cornerstone of

democratic practices. We thus decided to focus only on those countries displaying a level of democratic

and political freedom high enough to make sure that any perceptions of electoral unfairness would be at

odds with the country's political reality. To do so, we selected countries ranked as ‘Free’ by the Freedom

House Project Index (https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores, this index was also

coded as a country characteristic in the WVS itself). This left us with the following 16 countries: Andorra,

Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Japan, New Zealand, Peru, South Korea,

Romania, Taiwan, Tunisia and the United States.

Still, some of the electoral fairness items were ambiguous. For instance, question 233 asked if “women

have equal opportunities to run the office.” Given the existing gender differences in political involvement, partic-

ipation and representation in favour of men, one could completely agree with the item and be in line with

results from social science research (at least among OECD countries e.g. Kittilson, 2016). Question 229

asks if “election officials are fair,” which is a broad subjective statement. Likewise, it may be objected that

question 230 “rich people buy elections” reflects evidence showing how political donations from high-income

individuals and corporations affect electoral outcomes and policy making (Bekkouche et al., 2020;

Cagé, 2020; Muttakin et al., 2021).

For these reasons, we only retained items related to unambiguous political practices that are very

unlikely to occur in democratic contexts. These items were questions 225–227 “opposition candidates are

prevented from running,”“TV news favors the governing party,”“voters are bribed” as well as question 231 “voters are

threatened with violence at the polls”(4-point Likert, from 1 ‘never’ to 4 ‘often’, M = 2.15, SD = .66, α = .68). Item

reliability (α = .68) was the highest among all possible combinations within this set of four items.

Electoral trust

To avoid noise and remain domain-specific in our assessment, we decided to measure electoral distrust

using the single-item question 76 “could you tell me how much confidence you have in elections?” (4-point Likert,

from 1‘a great deal’ to 4‘none at all’;M = 2.66, SD = .98, reverse-coded to obtain a measure of trust).

Covariates

In addition to our constructs of interest, we computed indices to be used as covariates to rule out alter-

native explanations for our model and potential confounds. For these robustness checks, we first sought

to capture religious affiliation (question 173; atheist vs. all other denominations, 11.6%), political ideology

(question 240; 10-point Likert, from 1 ‘left’ to 10 ‘right’; M = 5.30, SD = 2.27) and political extremism

(derived from ideology, distance from the scale center, 5-points, M = 1.96, SD = 1.17), which are all

important predictors of conspiracy beliefs (Douglas et al., 2019; Nera et al., 2021).

Second, we aimed to demonstrate the specificity of precarity as a predictor of trust and conspiracy

beliefs. To do so, our robustness checks would need to rule out confounds such as physical health (subjec-

tive, question 47, “how would you describe your state of health these days?”; 5-point Likert, from 1 ‘very poor’ to 5

‘very good,’M = 3.85, SD = .85), life satisfaction (question 49, 10-point Likert, from 1 ‘completely dissatisfied’

to 10 ‘completely satisfied,’M = 7.14, SD = 2.03), economic satisfaction (question 50, 10-point Likert, from 1

‘completely dissatisfied’ to 10 ‘completely satisfied,’M = 5.00, SD = 2.32), education (also a predictor of conspir-

acy beliefs; see van Prooijen, 2017; question 275, 8-points from 1 ‘no education’ to 8 ‘doctorate,’M = 3.93,

SD = 1.82), subjective socio-economic status (question 287, “would you describe yourself as belonging to the…”,

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5-points from 1 ‘upper class’ to 5 ‘lower class,’ M = 2.78, SD = .93) and income (question 288, 10-points

income scale from 1‘lowest income group’ to 10‘highest income group,’M = 4.89, SD = 2.01). Age and sex of

participants were also included in the robustness checks.

RESULTS

Correlations

Due to the structure of WVS data (individuals nested in countries; see Schielzeth et al., 2013), it is not

possible to compute Pearson correlation coefficients. These would yield biased estimates due to cluster-

ing. Rather, it is recommended to use repeated measure correlations, which can be computed one by one

(pairwise) manually using the openly accessible R package ‘rmcorr’ (see Bakdash & Marusich, 2017 for

more details). Given a large number of potential correlations between the constructs involved (n = 84),

we decided to report such correlations exclusively between our constructs of interest for the sake of

parsimony.

In line with H1, precarity was positively linked to conspiracy beliefs, r(16945) = .13, p < .001,

95%CI [0.11, 0.14]. Supporting H2 and H3, respectively, precarity was negatively related to electoral

trust, r(20887)=−.07,p <.001,95%CI[−0.08,−0.06],andelectoraltrustwasnegativelyassociatedwith

conspiracy beliefs, r(16774)=−.19,p <.001,95%CI[−0.21,−0.18].

Robustness checks

Because rmcorr cannot compute partial correlations, we then turned to multilevel modelling using the

GAMLj module for JAMOVI (based on R language and commands from the ‘lme4’ package; Bates

et al., 2007; The Jamovi Project, 2021) to assess whether the links between our constructs of interests

were robust to adjustment on covariates. Full models can be seen in the relevant section on the OSF

project page (Study 1 WVS).

These analyses confirmed that our results were robust. Again, in line with H1, precarity still positively

predicted conspiracy beliefs, t(14149) = 12.36, β = .07, p < .001, 95%CI [0.06, 0.08]. Supporting H2 and

H3 once more, precarity negatively predicted electoral trust, t(16698) = 2.52, β=−.02,p = .012, 95%CI

[−0.04,−0.01],andelectoraltrustnegativelypredictedconspiracybeliefs,t(14147) = 22.45, β=−.12,

p <.001,95%CI[−0.13,−0.11].

Multilevel mediation analysis

Due to the clustering of individuals within countries, it was not possible to implement traditional medi-

ation tests relying on OLS regressions (e.g. Hayes, 2017). We, therefore, used the R ‘mediation’ (Tingley

et al., 2014) package to conduct analyses based on non-parametric estimates (see Imai et al., 2010 for more

details). These analyses (Nbootstrap = 1000) corroborated a model (see Figure 1) including the presence of

both direct, β = .13, p < .001, 95%CI [0.11, 0.14] and indirect effects of precarity on conspiracy beliefs

through electoral trust, β = .02, p < .001, 95%CI [0.01, 0.02]. This indirect effect amounted to approxi-

mately 10% of the model's total effect, β = .14, p < .001, 95%CI [0.12, 0.16].

DISCUSSION

This first series of results provided support for our hypothesized model. We successfully established the

presence of a robust link between precarity and conspiracy beliefs, across several model specifications,

PReCARITY AND CONSPIRACY BelIeFS 9

including a host of relevant covariates. The link between precarity and conspiracy beliefs (unadjusted,

β = .13, p < .001) was still substantial after adjustment (β = .07, p < .001). This link is furthermore gener-

alizable to a substantial sample of democratic countries spanning several continents. On the other hand,

the link between precarity and trust was much weaker when adjusted, which may explain why the conse-

quent indirect effects of precarity through trust were also relatively small (β=−.02).Thismaybedue

to the single-item trust measure (i.e. noisy), but could also reflect low adequacy between the mediation

model and the data. Moreover, we could not provide strong construct validity for our indicators (but see

Houston, 2004), which were not properly validated scales. For all these reasons, we decided to replicate

our results using two further representative survey datasets collected in France and Italy.

STUDY 2

METHOD

This second set of studies aimed to replicate the results from Study 1 by using more valid and precise

measures of both trust and conspiracy beliefs. To do so, we used cross-sectional survey data collected in

France (2a, pre-pandemic) and Italy (2b, during the pandemic) using representative samples. The countries

were chosen partly for convenience reasons and because they were not included in the WVS study, there-

fore, allowing for a proper confirmatory test with non-overlapping samples and cultural contexts. Study

2a waspart of a multi-study data collection effort. Study 2b is an original analysis of a subset of indicators

from data collected in Italy during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Participants

Study 2a (France)

A survey on a representative sample of the French population was conducted between December 21st

and December 23rd, 2018 by the Institut Français d'Opinion Publique (IFOP) on behalf of the Fondation

Jean-Jaurès2and Conspiracy Watch.3

The representativeness of the overall sample was ensured by the quota method, for three criteria:

gender, age and profession, after stratification by region and socio-professional categories (n = 1506). A

group of 254 French people aged between 18 and 35 were added to this sample and were surveyed in

parallel between December 21st and December 23rd. The final sample thus resulted in a total of 1760

https://www.jean-jaures.org/.

https://www.conspiracywatch.info/.

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FIGURE 1 Partial mediation model of Precarity's effect on electoral conspiracy beliefs through electoral trust. Note.

***p < .001, numbers represent beta coefficients for each path. Numbers between brackets indicate lower and upper bounds for

coefficients' 95%CI. DE = direct effect, IDE = indirect effect.

participants (44.80% male; Mage = 46.10, SDage = 18.40). According to the IFOP, this was done to obtain

a larger subsample of young people who are believed to be especially sensitive to conspiracy theories in

France, as it was observed in a previous representative survey (Wagner-Egger et al., 2018). We performed

the statistical analyses on the full sample for reasons of commodity, but we verified whether the results

were identical when weighing participants for representativeness.

Study 2b (Italy)

A nationally representative survey study was conducted in Italy between December 27, 2020 and January

7, 2021. The current study was part of a larger questionnaire that aimed at studying public opinion about

the pandemic-related issues (e.g. respondents' physical status, psychological status, subjective probability

of contracting COVID-19, opinions about COVID-19's dangerousness).

Participants were recruited by the participant-sourcing platform Cloud Research using a quota

sampled cohort of Italian adults. Quotas were based on the Italian National Institute of Statistics popu-

lation estimate data for gender and income. The final sample comprised 2204 participants (52.5% male;

Mage = 28.33, SDage = 11.34).

Again, both these sample sizes guaranteed sufficient power to detect small direct and indirect effects

as well as to provide for stable correlation estimates (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013).

Measures

Precarity

To overcome the limitation posed by a somewhat broad measure of precarity in Study 1, in Studies 2a and

2b, our precarity measures were made of more straightforward, strict indicators focusing on economic

matters. As the experience of precarity in the literature is tied to economic and labor issues (Millar, 2017),

we opted for a more severe test of our theoretical proposition in Studies 2a and 2b.

Study 2a (France)

Highlighting a subjective sense of financial insecurity and struggle, precarity was measured in France

using an item asking if participants “manage to make ends meet at the end of the month” (5-point Likert, from 1

‘easily’ to 5 ‘very hardly’; M = 2.92, SD = 1.10).

Study 2b (Italy)

Three items adapted and modified from prior research (see Adam-Troian et al., 2021) were used to assess

the extent to which participants experienced precarity related to the COVID-19 outbreak: I am “worried

about losing my job,”“worried that I will not have enough money for my family needs,” and “concerned that my financial

situation may be adversely affected” (5-point Likert, from 1 ‘completely disagree’ to 5 ‘completely agree’; M = 3.05,

SD = 1.06, α = .86).

Conspiracy beliefs

Conspiracy beliefs in both studies pertained to different contexts. While the survey in France was

conducted pre-COVID-19 and included ‘classic’4 conspiracy beliefs (e.g. beliefs about 9/11) as well as a

Classic conspiracy beliefs comprise beliefs that transcend cultural contexts within modern history (e.g. antisemitic conspiracies, American militarism

requiring “false flag” operations, world domination by secret societies, depraved elites engaging in immoral behaviours).

PReCARITY AND CONSPIRACY BelIeFS 11

general measure of conspiracy mentality, the Italian survey contained mostly conspiracy beliefs related to

the pandemic.

Study 2a (France)

The survey comprised two sets of conspiracy-related outcomes. First, we analysed respondents' endorse-

ment of ten particular conspiracy theories, four of which directly relate to the US context: “the CIA controls

global drug trafficking,”“9/11 was an ‘inside job,’”“‘Big Pharma’” and governments promote dangerous vaccines,” “the

Illuminati manipulate the masses,”“there are hidden signs for the New World Order on banknotes and video clips,”“Zion-

ists conspire for world domination,”“there is an organized “Great Replacement” of EU natives by immigrants,” “Lady

Diana's car crash was not accidental,”“the Apollo landing on the moon was fake” and “planes spread so-called “Chemtrails”

for secret reasons” (4-point Likert, from 1‘not agree at all’ to 4 ‘completely agree,’ M = 1.96, SD = .81, α = .94).

Second, we also made use of the survey's standardized generic conspiracy beliefs scale (Conspiracy

Mentality Questionnaire, 5 items; see Bruder et al., 2013 for the full item list, which includes generic

statements such as “There are secret organizations that greatly influence political decisions”). Contrary to the original

paper, the scale was downsized by IFOP to 4 points (instead of 10) for practical reasons (from 1‘absolutely

not true’ to 4 ‘completely true’; M = 3.03, SD = .69, α = .86).

Study 2b (Italy)

Five items adapted from Oleksy et al. (2021) were used to assess the extent to which participants endorsed

diverse conspiracy theories related to the COVID-19 outbreak: “The media pay disproportionate attention to

negative news to sow panic in our society,”“The pharmaceutical industry is taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic

to make money,”“The government is deceiving us and hiding information about the Coronavirus,”“The problems facing the

pandemic in Italy are the product of the corruption of government officials who squandered the money” and “The phar-

maceutical industry is making a fortune from the pandemic by selling more medicines than ever” (5-point Likert, from 1

‘completely disagree’ to 5 ‘completely agree,’ M = 3.24, SD = .87, α = .82).

Trust

Study 2a (France)

In France, a broad inclusive trust measure was created by reverse-coding and averaging questions assess-

ing distrust towards five institutions (the police, justice system, military, education and the media; 5-point

Likert, from 1 ‘very confident’ to 5‘not confident at all,’M = 2.61, SD = .54, α = .75; reverse-coded).

Study 2b (Italy)

In Italy, six items were adapted and modified from Teymoori et al. (2016) to measure the extent to which

respondents trusted political authorities: “The government represents the majority of the population,”“The govern-

ment works for the welfare of the people,”“Authorities protect vulnerable and weak people,”“Government laws and policies

are effective,”“People approve of the government's agenda,” and “People can trust the authorities” (5-point Likert, from

1 ‘completely disagree’ to 5 ‘completely agree,’ M = 2.69, SD = .87, α = .92).

Covariates

As in Study 1, we included a number of covariates (in addition to age and sex) to assess the robustness

of our results.

Study 2a (France)

Again, we measured religious affiliation (no religion vs. all other denominations, 40.3%), political ideology

(5-point, from 1 ‘far-left’ to 5 ‘far-right,’M = 3.13, SD = 1.36; coded from the candidate they voted for in

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2017) and political extremism (derived from ideology, distance from the scale center, 3-points, M = 1.11,

SD = .79). Education was measured using a 11-point ranking (highest diploma earned, from 1 = ‘none’ to

11 = ‘Doctorate,’ M = 8.59, SD = 2.24) and monthly income with a 6-point scale (from 1 = ‘less than 1000€’

to 6 = ‘4000€and more,’M = 8.59, SD = 2.24). Likewise, we made use of a measure of life satisfaction

(“would you say that you succeeded in life?”; 5-point Likert, from 1 = ‘not at all’ to 5 = ‘completely,’ M = 2.75,

SD = .67).

Study 2b (Italy)

Due to survey length constraints, fewer covariates were available in the Italian study, although still enough

to conduct proper robustness checks. Political ideology was included (9-point Likert, from 1 ‘far-left’ to

9 ‘far-right,’M = 5.01, SD = 1.95) and political extremism was, again, derived from it (4-points, M = 1.45,

SD = 1.31). Education was also measured through highest diploma earned (7 ranks from 1 = ‘none’ to

7 = ‘Doctorate,’ M = 4.38, SD = 1.31), and subjective income level on a 5-point scale (relative to the average

Italian, from 1 = ‘much lower than average’ to 5 = ‘much more than average,’M = 3.29, SD = .82). As a proxy

for life and economic satisfaction, we also included a single-item measure of past-relative deprivation

(“would you say your life has improved or worsened compared to before?”5-point Likert, from 1 = ‘improved a lot’ to

5 = ‘worsened a lot,’M = 2.45, SD = .82).

RESULTS

Correlations

Bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients between our variables of interest were computed (see Table 1).

In France, and in line with H1, precarity was positively linked to both conspiracy beliefs, r(770) = .30,

p < .001, 95%CI [0.23, 0.36] and conspiracy mentality, r(1372) = .25, p < .001, 95%CI [0.20, 0.30].

Supporting H2 and H3, respectively, precarity was negatively related to institutional trust, r(1616)=−.25,

p <.001,95%CI[−0.30,−0.20], which in turnwasnegativelyassociatedwithbothconspiracy beliefs,

r(761)=−.33,p <.001,95%CI[−0.39,−0.26]andconspiracymentality,r(1326)=−.36,p < .001, 95%CI

[−0.40,−0.31].

Likewise in Italy, in line with H1, precarity was positively linked with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs,

r(1848) = .22, p < .001, 95%CI [0.17, 0.26]. Supporting H2 and H3, respectively, precarity was negatively

related to political trust, r(1849)=−.15,p < .001,95%CI[−0.19,−0.10],whichwasinturnnegatively

associated with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, r(1848)=−.46,p <.001,95%CI[−0.50,−0.42].

Robustness checks

Partial correlation coefficients adjusting for the covariates available in each country were then computed

(see Table 1). In France, precarity was still positively linked with conspiracy mentality scores, r(684) = .15,

p < .001, 95%CI [0.07, 0.22] but the relationship with conspiracy beliefs disappeared, r(410) = .08, p = .11,

95%CI[−0.02,0.18],providingmixedevidenceforH1.Still,supportingH2andH3,respectively,precar-

ity was negatively related to trust in institutions, r(776)=−.11,p =.004,95%CI[−0.18,−0.04],inturn

negatively associated with both conspiracy beliefs, r(407)=−.24, p < .001, 95%CI[−0.33, −0.15] and

conspiracy mentality, r(671)=−.24,p <.001,95%CI[−0.31,−0.17].

In Italy, all links held to adjustment. As per H1, precarity was still positively linked with COVID-

19 conspiracy beliefs, r(1819) = .12, p < .001, 95%CI [0.08, 0.17]. Supporting H2 and H3, respectively,

precarity was also negatively related to political trust, r(1820)=−.07,p =.005,95%CI [−0.11, −0.02],

and political trust was negatively associated with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, r(1819)=−.40,p < .001,

95%CI[−0.43,−0.36].

PReCARITY AND CONSPIRACY BelIeFS 13

Mediation analysis

To test H4 this time, we could implement mediation tests relying on OLS regressions (see Hayes, 2017

for more details). We used the GLM Mediation package from JAMOVI (The Jamovi Project, 2021;

Nbootstrap = 1000) to compute two mediation models (see Figure 2) with COVID-19 beliefs as the outcome

in Italy and focusing on conspiracy mentality in France (since conspiracy beliefs were not robust to adjust-

ment). Full model tables can be accessed in the corresponding OSF web page folder. Again, the analyses

corroborated a model including the presence of a direct, β = .12, p < .001, 95%CI [0.09, 0.16] and an

indirect effect of precarity on conspiracy beliefs through institutional trust, β = .05, p < .001, 95%CI [0.04,

0.07] in France. This indirect effect amounted to approximately 28% of the model's total effect, β = .18,

p < .001, 95%CI [0.21, 0.26].

In Italy, analyses also detected the presence of both direct, β = .14, p < .001, 95%CI [0.10, 0.17] and

indirect effects of precarity on conspiracy beliefs through political trust, β = .05, p < .001, 95%CI [0.04, 0.08],

the latter amounting to approximately 26% of the model's total effect, β = .19, p < .001, 95%CI [0.15, 0.23].

DISCUSSION

Studies 2a and 2b further corroborated the plausibility of a socio-functional model of conspiracy beliefs

based on precarity. Across a range of different operationalizations of all constructs involved, we success-

fully replicated the results from Study 1. Moreover, the size of coefficients and proportions of indi-

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1 2 3 4

Study 2a (France)

Bivariate

Precarity -

Trust −.25*** -

CBs −.30*** −.33*** -

CMQ −.25*** −.36*** .60*** -

Partial

Precarity -

Trust −.11** -

CBs .08 −.24*** -

CMQ .15*** −.24*** .47*** -

Study 2b (Italy)

Bivariate

Precarity -

Trust −.15*** -

COVID-19 CBs .22*** −.46*** - -

Partial

Precarity -

Trust −.07** -

COVID-19 CBs .12*** −.40*** - -

Note

: Control variables for partial correlations arethe covariates available in each country survey, see methods, measures section.

Abbreviation: CB, Conspiracy Beliefs.

**p < .01, ***p < .001.

TABLE 1 Summary of bivariate and partial correlation analyses between precarity, trust and conspiracy beliefs measures

from studies 2a (France, N = 1760) and 2b (Italy, N = 1860).

rect relative to total effects in Italy was strikingly similar to those obtained in France. However, we also

observed that some of the conspiracy beliefs measures (e.g. ‘classic’ conspiracy beliefs in France), were

not robustly associated with precarity.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

In this set of studies, we sought to examine the structural determinants of conspiracy beliefs by laying

the foundations for a socio-functional approach to conspiracy beliefs. Drawing on existing theories of

precarity, we predicted that the experience of a permanent sense of ontological insecurity—especially

in the financial domain—would explain individuals' increased tendency to endorse conspiracy beliefs.

Our hypothesis was that perceived precarity, through its effect on trust towards institutions and ‘elites’,

could be a factor to understand the observable class divide surrounding conspiracy beliefs. Across three

population-based survey studies conducted in both Global North and Global South countries, we found

consistent evidence for a predictive power of precarity upon conspiracy beliefs directly and indirectly

through different types of trust.

An important feature of our results is that—for the first time—we demonstrated that precarity is

robustly associated with conspiracy beliefs, regardless of how precarity is operationalized (Study 1: phys-

ical and economic safety; Study 2a: subjective feelings of “making ends meet”; Study 2b: worry of financial

insecurity due to the pandemic) or how conspiracy beliefs are measured (beliefs related to electoral,

conspiracy mentality, COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs). In fact, the indicators we used to operationalize

precarity, although imperfect, could be the basis for future psychometric precarity scales to be tested and

validated properly (see Boateng et al., 2018), maybe in conjunction with indicators tapping into other

subjective experiences of precarity (e.g. Time–Space Distanciation, see ANONYMIZED). Moreover, the

links we observed were systematically robust to adjustment on known predictors of conspiracy beliefs

and on actual financial variables (e.g. income, SES). This reveals how precarity can still predict conspiracy

beliefs because of its psychosocial component, in line with conceptions of precarity as an experience that

transcends traditional class boundaries (see Standing, 2011).

PReCARITY AND CONSPIRACY BelIeFS 15

FIGURE 2 (a) Partial mediation model of Precarity's effect on conspiracy beliefs through Trust in France. (b) Partial

mediation model of Precarity's effect on conspiracy beliefs through Trust in Italy. Note. ***p < .001, numbers represent beta

coefficients for each path. Numbers between brackets indicate lower and upper bounds for coefficients' 95%CI. DE = direct

effect, IDE = indirect effect.

(a)

(b)

Hence, our socio-functional model provides a novel complementary perspective to current explana-

tions of the link between conspiracy beliefs and distrust. Current research highlights how stable individual

differences in psychopathological traits (e.g. paranoid ideation; see van der Linden et al., 2021) and local

historical factors (US social history; Hofstader, 1964) can underly distrust and conspiracy beliefs. Here,

we propose and demonstrate that other experiences such as precarity can also shape individuals' percep-

tion of institutions and higher-SES groups as hostile outgroups, generating a form of distrust that is a

fertile psychological ground for conspiracism. This is important to understand the amorphous nature of

conspiracy beliefs. Here, we show that power—through the relative presence or absence of experienc-

ing precarity—plays a role in shaping those beliefs and can explain how these may be instrumentalized

for political ends (especially by authoritarian leaders; Ren et al., 2022), generating hatred and intergroup

violence.

Still, one may argue that these results cannot be generalized to all types of conspiracy beliefs (see

Franks et al., 2017 for an overview of the different motivations at play behind conspiracy beliefs). Indeed,

Study 2a showed that adjustment made the link between precarity and ‘classic’ conspiracy beliefs disap-

pear, suggesting that precarious individuals do not believe in these more than non-precarious ones.

Although this could be due to statistical issues (e.g. power, N dropped to 407 on this outcome in France),

we believe this result to corroborate our hypothesis further. When taking a closer look at the items, these

‘classic’ conspiracies (e.g. the fake moon landing, the chemtrails or the Illuminati; see Robertson, 2016) are

the ones that could be considered the most out of touch with concrete political or ideological concerns

(and may be driven by more spiritual or community-oriented motives, Franks et al., 2017).

Interestingly, there is also evidence that the apparently high prevalence of these conspiracy beliefs

(e.g. QAnon, micro-chips in the COVID-19 vaccine) may be due to methodological biases, which tend to

inflate self-reported endorsement (Clifford et al., 2019; Sutton & Douglas, 2020). Therefore, it is possi-

ble that precarity relates more strongly to less far-fetched beliefs pertaining to power struggles between

socio-economic and political groups, while more ‘fringe’ conspiracy beliefs—such as micro-chips in

vaccines—may be more strongly predicted by cognitive or pathological traits and the presence of meas-

urement issues.

Our overall results may, therefore, suggest that precarity may shape one's adherence to conspiracy

beliefs about ‘relevant’ political and social groups involved in the management of economy and society

(e.g. government, decision-makers, multinational corporations) that are likely to (or have the potential to)

influence the condition of precarious individuals. Findings from the current research may, therefore, also

explain related phenomena such as people's engagement in or support for unconventional political move-

ments like the Brexit in the UNITED KINGDOM or the Yellow Vests movement in France. As previous

research has documented, these social movements were driven by precarious middle-class individuals

more than by those at the very bottom of the socio-economic ladder (Blavier, 2021; Hobolt, 2016).

Theoretically grounded conspiracy beliefs within the broader framework of precarity allows to

approach an overtly empirically driven field (Goreis & Voracek, 2019) with a solid background. Doing

so shows that, although conspiracy narratives are irrational, the endorsement of these narratives obeys

a rational social and intergroup logic (albeit not a normative ratinality), in line with a socio-functional

perspective. The current investigation can be considered the first social-psychological attempt to directly

examine the association between precarity and conspiracy beliefs through (dis)trust towards political and

social institutions. Accordingly, we were able to pinpoint that between 10 and 30% of precarity's effect on

conspiracy beliefs could operate through trust, meaning that between 70 to 90% remain open to parallel

or alternative pathways to consider.

For instance, the constant anxiety and uncertainty generated by precarity could negatively impact

people's cognitive ability by increasing their cognitive load, leading to increased conspiracy beliefs (Farah

et al., 2017; Haushofer & Fehr, 2014). Lower educational achievement due to precarity (Croizet et al., 2019)

could also explain a substantial portion of the link between precarity and conspiracy beliefs (see also van

Prooijen, 2017). Likewise, it is possible that precarity leads to higher perceptions of anomie, the collapse

of societal fabric, which are themselves linked with higher levels of conspiracy beliefs (Jolley et al., 2019;

Salvador Casara et al., 2022). Similarly, the mediating role of precarity-induced clinical and subclinical

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psychopathological factors (Wickham et al., 2014), which is known to foster conspiracy ideation (Bowes

et al., 2021; Georgiou et al., 2019), should be tested.

This mediation process, however, remains to be tested further. For instance, indirect effect sizes from

all three studies were small. While this type of effect may matter in the long run (e.g. when exposure is

chronic; see Funder & Ozer, 2019), this small size indicates that a substantial part of the mechanism

linking precarity with conspiracy beliefs remains to be explained further. Nonetheless, given the scope

and representativeness of the samples investigated, our results favour plausible key effects of precarity on

socio-political attitudes (trust and conspiracy beliefs), which may have important practical implications.

The introduction of precarity in social psychology allows for designing novel targeted intervention

avenues aimed at countering conspiracy beliefs by targeting their chronic determinants, beyond individual

aspects. For now, interventions aimed at dismantling conspiracy beliefs disproportionately focus on elim-

inating fake-news sharing (e.g. changing individual behaviour on social media), prompting more analytical

mindsets and inoculating individuals with counterarguments before exposure to conspiracy beliefs-related

content (Bago et al., 2020; Bonetto et al., 2018). In other words, interventions targeting conspiracy beliefs

aim to correct flawed logic and reasoning among so-called ‘irrational’ individuals, whereas their imme-

diate environment—and related chronic exposure factors—remain untouched. This may explain why

effect sizes remain small and inconsistent from one study to another (e.g. Roozenbeek et al., 2021), a

consequence maybe of a strong cognitive take on conspiracy beliefs (see van Mulukom et al., 2020 for a

similar argument).

The consequences of failing to implement a sociological social psychology research program (Boutilier

et al., 1980) to investigate conspiracy beliefs may go beyond theoretical losses. A form of cognitive ‘busi-

ness as usual’ prevents us from taking a critical perspective on the underlying causes of conspiracist think-

ing in our societies (Dafermos, 2015), which may have deleterious applied consequences. More specif-

ically, the distraction caused by a focus on individual factors in behavioural science tends to delay and

impede the implementation of effective solutions at the systemic level (Chater & Loewenstein, 2022). As

an illustration let us take research, which shows that conspiracy beliefs about the origins of AIDS/HIV

is higher among Latinos, women and African American groups in the United States (Ross et al., 2006).

While a mainstream cognitive approach would focus on education and analytical reasoning, an analysis

based on our model would lead practitioners to consider the role of structural factors such as discrimina-

tion in fostering precarity among disadvantaged group members. One approach would recommend that

practitioners craft interventions to ‘educate’ individuals, while the other would encourage them to test

public policies addressing the structural causes of conspiracy thinking (discrimination, inclusion, political

rights, economic equality…).

Besides the usefulness of our approach considering precarity in economic terms, much more should

be done to investigate other facets of the phenomenon. As the example above indicates, class is merely

one aspect of the experience of precarity. In fact, it has been argued that identity, ethnicity and gender

all shape experiences of precarity (see, Misra, 2021). This is because precarity is linked with a sense of

ontological insecurity, which pertains to concerns regarding oneself in relationship to the social world, the

stability of one's status, of one's sense of being valued, respected, safe, included—in addition to material

concerns (but see Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020).

Although we did not directly integrate minority status in our analyses, we believe our models are still

informative in these regards. Minority status is associated with conspiracy beliefs mainly due to experi-

ences of discrimination (Graeupner & Coman, 2017; van Prooijen et al., 2018): it is not causal in and of

itself but because it is a proxy for structural phenomena that lead to inequality of treatment. To the extent

that we accounted for an exhaustive number of variables likely to be affected by structural discrimination

(e.g. subjective health, satisfaction with life, income, social status, education…), the robust link between

precarity and conspiracy beliefs provides evidence for the role of ontological insecurity as a driver of

such beliefs across groups. As a side note, in such a statistical context, assuming an effect of minority

status (devoid of its structural component) would implicitly offer support to questionable assumptions

regarding the existence of biological differences between groups (reproducing a colonial research agenda,

see ANONYMIZED_C, 2022).

PReCARITY AND CONSPIRACY BelIeFS 17

To explore thoroughly the multiple aspects of precarity, however, would require the construction of

proper indicators, which may not be captured only through quantitative means. A more socially relevant

social psychology of conspiracy beliefs (Giner-Sorolla, 2019) entails investigating precarity as a broader

construct, which ultimately calls for a mixed-methods approach in future research (e.g.Levy Paluck, 2010).

CONCLUSION

Our study of economic precarity suggests that implementing solutions at the socio-economic level could

prove efficient in fighting conspiracy beliefs. Within the boundaries of our studies' limitations, we, there-

fore, propose that using tools derived from applied economics (e.g. systematic targeted randomized field

studies with income allocations, see Duflo & Banerjee, 2011) may, for instance, help to radically fight

the current spread of vaccine scepticism and xenophobic populism. Beyond conspiracy beliefs and their

consequences, the current lack of research on precarity in social psychology may impede the progress

of crucial work in the areas of inequalities, social justice and intergroup relations. By highlighting the

contextual aspects and volatile nature of experiences of insecurity in several life domains (Ettlinger, 2007;

Philo et al., 2019; Söderström, 2019), which may affect societal and intergroup attitudes, precarity as a

construct holds the potential to help craft ever more powerful interventions. A true social psychology

of precarity holds the promise of achieving a paradigmatic change by displacing the research focus from

individual-level determinants to structural-level factors, too often overlooked by social psychologists (see

Oishi et al., 2009). As Bourdieu (1998) wrote: “to change one's life, one has to change political life.”

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Maria Chayinska: Conceptualization; data curation; investigation; methodology; project administra-

tion; validation; writing – original draft; writing – review and editing. Maria Paola Paladino: Concep-

tualization; investigation; methodology; project administration; writing – review and editing. Özden

Melis Uluğ: Conceptualization; investigation; methodology; writing – review and editing. Jeroen Vaes:

Conceptualization; investigation; methodology; writing – review and editing. Pascal Wagner-Egger:

Methodology; project administration; writing – review and editing.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

All authors declare no conflict of interest.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Supplementary materials, analyses and all data underlying our findings can be openly

accessed and downloaded through the Open Science Framework platform at https://osf.

io/93f5d/?view_only=1b927686808346e385d5e2dedbede4be.

ORCID

Jais Adam-Troian https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2285-4114

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[English abstract below] - Introduction - En oncologie, le suivi des recommandations médicales est un prédicteur important de la survie et de la qualité de vie des patients. Il a été observé chez des patients à bon pronostic que le recours aux médecines complémentaires et alternatives était associé à un refus des traitements conventionnels et à une survie moindre (Johnson et al., 2018a, 2018b). Identifier les facteurs psychosociaux qui prédisent l’attrait pour les médecines complémentaires et alternatives et le rejet de la médecine conventionnelle est primordial afin d’en limiter l’impact. Une étude corrélationnelle que nous avions réalisées en amont de ce projet (Fournier & Varet, 2024) pointait le rôle potentiellement important des croyances conspirationnistes (CC). - Objectifs et méthodologie - Toutes les études de ce projet ont été administrées en ligne, auprès d’une population générale (non atteinte de cancer), invitée à se mettre à la place d’un patient recevant un diagnostic de cancer. L’étude 1 (N = 313) reposait sur un design corrélationnel et visait à répliquer et approfondir les résultats de l’étude réalisée en amont. Les études 2a (N = 283) et 2b (N = 242) reposaient sur un design quasi-expérimental et visaient notamment à vérifier la causalité des relations entre variables observées précédemment. L’étude 3 (N prévisionnel = 348), qui sera réalisée au printemps 2023, reposera sur un design expérimental et visera à tester l’efficacité d’une intervention brève pour réduire les effets des CC observés dans les études précédentes. - Résultats, implications, perspectives - Les étude 1, 2a et 2b montrent que l’adhésion à des CC non-spécifiques à la santé prédit l’adhésion à des CC spécifiques à la chimiothérapie. Ces deux variables prédisent une moindre intention de recours à la chimiothérapie et une plus grande intention de recours aux médecines complémentaires et alternatives. L’étude 2b indique que l’exposition à un article propageant des CC sur la chimiothérapie, prédit, lorsqu’il est jugé crédible, une moindre intention de recours à la chimiothérapie et une plus grande intention de recours aux médecines complémentaires et alternatives. Un article niant ces CC prédit également, lorsqu’il est jugé peu crédible, une moindre intention de recours à la chimiothérapie et une plus grande intention de recours aux médecines complémentaires et alternatives. Les implications pratiques de ces résultats sont discutées. Ils montrent notamment que l’exposition à des fausses informations liées à la chimiothérapie sur le cancer peuvent impacter négativement les croyances et les intentions des individus face aux traitements oncologique, face à la médecine conventionnelle plus généralement, et face aux autorités et sources officielles au-delà du seul domaine de la santé. Par ailleurs, ils montrent que les actions visant à réduire les CC liées à la chimiothérapie peuvent avoir des effets contre-productifs lorsque la source n’est pas jugée crédible et invite à une prudence dans l’élaboration des communications de santé auprès du public. Sont également discutées les principales limites et perspectives, en particulier le développement, à moyen terme, d’un projet visant à tester la réplicabilité des effets observés auprès d’une population clinique. Cependant, l’intérêt de développement d’un projet intermédiaire de consolidation de ces observations est également envisagé à court terme. _____________________________________________________________________________________ [English abstract] - Introduction - In oncology, following medical recommendations is an important predictor of patient survival and quality of life. It has been observed in patients with a good prognosis that the use of complementary and alternative medicine was associated with refusal of conventional treatments and poorer survival (Johnson et al., 2018a, 2018b). Identifying the psychosocial factors that predict attraction to complementary and alternative medicine and rejection of conventional medicine is crucial in order to limit their impact. A correlational study we carried out prior to this project (Fournier & Varet, 2024) pointed to the potentially important role of conspiracy beliefs (CCs). - Aims and methodology - All the studies in this project were administered online to a general population (without cancer), who were asked to put themselves in the shoes of a patient diagnosed with cancer. Study 1 (N = 313) was based on a correlational design and aimed to replicate and extend the results of the previous study. Studies 2a (N = 283) and 2b (N = 242) were based on a quasi-experimental design and aimed in particular to verify the causality of the relationships between variables observed previously. Study 3 (N = 348), which will be carried out in spring 2023, will be based on an experimental design and will aim to test the effectiveness of a brief intervention in reducing the effects of CCs observed in the previous studies. - Results, implications and prospects - Studies 1, 2a and 2b show that adherence to non-health-specific CCs predicts adherence to chemotherapy-specific CCs. These two variables predict a lower intention to use chemotherapy and a higher intention to use complementary and alternative medicine. Study 2b indicates that exposure to an article propagating CCs on chemotherapy, when judged credible, predicts a lower intention to use chemotherapy and a higher intention to use complementary and alternative medicine. An article denying these CCs also predicts, when judged not very credible, a lower intention to use chemotherapy and a higher intention to use complementary and alternative medicine. The practical implications of these results are discussed. In particular, they show that exposure to false information relating to chemotherapy and cancer can have a negative impact on people's beliefs and intentions with regard to cancer treatments, conventional medicine more generally, and official authorities and sources beyond the health sector. In addition, they show that actions aimed at reducing chemotherapy-related CC can have counter-productive effects when the source is not deemed credible, and call for caution when developing health communications for the public. The main limitations and prospects are also discussed, in particular the development, in the medium term, of a project aimed at testing the replicability of the effects observed in a clinical population. However, the interest in developing an intermediate project to consolidate these observations is also envisaged in the short term.

Precarious engagements and the politics of knowledge production: Listening to calls for reorienting hegemonic social psychology

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2022
BRIT J SOC PSYCHOL

In this paper, we invite psychologists to reflect on and recognize how knowledge is produced in the field of social psychology. Engaging with the work of decolonial, liberation and critical psychology scholars, we provide a six-point lens on precarity that facilitates a deeper understanding of knowledge production in hegemonic social psychology and academia at large. We conceptualize knowledge (re)production in psychology as five interdependent 'cogs' within the neoliberal machinery of academia, which cannot be viewed in isolation; (1) its epistemological foundations rooted in coloniality, (2) the methods and standards it uses to understand human thoughts, feelings and behaviours, (3) the documentation of its knowledge, (4) the dissemination of its knowledge and (5) the universalization of psychological theories. With this paper we also claim our space in academia as early career researchers of colour who inhabit the margins of hegemonic social psychology. We join scholars around the world in calling for a much-needed disciplinary shift that centres solutions to the many forms of violence that are inflicted upon marginalized members of the global majority. To conclude, we offer four political-personal intentions for the reorientation for the discipline of hegemonic social psychology with the aim to disrupt the politics of knowledge production and eradicate precarity.

A Kaupapa Māori conceptualization and efforts to address the needs of the growing precariat in Aotearoa New Zealand: A situated focus on Māori

Article

Full-text available

Nov 2022

In Aotearoa New Zealand, the precariat is populated by at least one in six New Zealanders, with Māori (Indigenous peoples) being over‐represented within this emerging social class. For Māori, this socio‐economic positioning reflects a colonial legacy spanning 150 years of economic and cultural subjugation, and intergenerational experiences of material, cultural and psychological insecurities. Relating our Kaupapa Māori approach (Māori cultural values and principles underlining research initiatives) to the precariat, this article also draws insights from existing scholarship on social class in psychology and Assemblage Theory in the social sciences to extend present conceptualizations of the Māori precariat. In keeping with the praxis orientation central to our approach, we consider three exemplars of how our research into Māori precarity is mobilized in efforts to inform public deliberations and government policies regarding poverty reduction, humanizing the welfare system and promoting decent work. Note: Aotearoa New Zealand has been popularized within the everyday lexicon of New Zealanders as a political statement of Indigenous rights for Māori.

In a double‐bind: Time–space distanciation, socioeconomic status, and coping with financial stress in the United States

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2022

Psychological research has shown that lower socioeconomic status (SES) individuals experience higher levels of stress and tend to cope in more present‐oriented ways. While some research in the field has sought to, for instance, increase future‐oriented ways of being among lower SES individuals, we argue that such approaches may come at significant cost. We consider the construct of time–space distanciation (TSD) – the normative way in which time and space are abstracted from one another at cultural and individual levels – as a way to complicate psychological research on social class, stress, and coping. Across four studies, we present research on US geographical regions (Studies 1–2) and US participants (Studies 3–4) suggesting that adopting normative high‐TSD orientations represents a double‐bind for lower SES individuals: it allows one to enact more proactive coping strategies in the face of financial stressors such as debt (Studies 1–3), but it is also a source of disproportionate stress itself (Study 4), given the burdens faced by lower SES individuals trying to navigate time and space in culturally hegemonic ways in spite of precarity and material insecurity. We discuss how TSD offers a means of situating psychological research into precarity within the broader structural context of flexible capitalism.

Antecedents and consequences of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs: A systematic review

Article

Full-text available

Mar 2022

Rationale Belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories can have severe consequences; it is therefore crucial to understand this phenomenon, in its similarities with general conspiracy belief, but also in how it is context-dependent. Objective The aim of this systematic review is to provide a comprehensive overview of the available research on COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and to synthesise this research to make it widely accessible. Methods We present a synthesis of COVID-19 conspiracy belief research from 85 international articles, identified and appraised through a systematic review, in line with contemporary protocols and guidelines for systematic reviews. Results We identify a number of potential antecedents of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs (individual differences, personality traits, demographic variables, attitudes, thinking styles and biases, group identity, trust in authorities, and social media use), their consequences (protective behaviours, self-centred and misguided behaviours such as hoarding and pseudoscientific health practices, vaccination intentions, psychological wellbeing, and other negative social consequences such as discrimination and violence), and the effect sizes of their relations with the conspiracy beliefs. Conclusions We conclude that understanding both the potential antecedents and consequences of conspiracy beliefs and how they are context-dependent is highly important to tackle them, whether in the COVID-19 pandemic or future threats, such as that of climate change.

The Yellow Vests in France: Psychosocial Determinants and Consequences of the Adherence to a Social Movement in a Representative Sample of the Population

Article

Full-text available

Feb 2022

The aim of this research is to identify what social and psychological variables may attract people to a social protest movement, namely the Yellow Vests (YVs) in France, which originated in October 2018. This analysis, albeit correlational, may nevertheless give important hints to identify in an exploratory way what causal factors could lead people (a) to become a sympathizer of the movement and (b) to become a member of that movement, and what psychosocial consequences would derive from (a) and (b). Notably, the role of conspiracy beliefs and anomie will be scrutinized because of their role in fostering non-normative political violence. In this purpose, we analyzed the results of a poll conducted on a representative sample of the French population (N = 1760). This survey explored a range of respondents' attitudes towards social issues and towards the YVs movement. Our analyses showed that adherence to the YVs movement is mainly caused by socioeconomic factors (such as educational level, economic capital) and belonging to political extremes (far left and even more far right), relying on and probably increasing distrust toward authorities and unconventional beliefs (paranormal and conspiracist). Ultimately, adherence to the movement seems triggered by the objective factor of dependency on a car and endorsement of conspiracist beliefs; whereas, simple sympathy is related to a less irrational form of accusation of authorities, low subjective economic capital, and pessimism toward the future. YVs also more often use social media and Youtube, but less often use media websites and newspapers as their first source of information.

Conspiracy mentality and political orientation across 26 countries

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2022
Nat. Hum. Behav.

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (that is, conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation) or amongst both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N = 104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, albeit small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (that is, those deprived of political control). Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control.

Authoritarian Leaders Share Conspiracy Theories to Attack Opponents, Galvanize Followers, Shift Blame, and Undermine Democratic Institutions

Article

Jun 2022

Although many virtuous leaders are guided by the ideal of prioritizing the needs and welfare of their subordinates, others advance their self-interest at the expense of the people they purport to serve. In this article, we discuss conspiracy theories as a tool that leaders use to advance their personal interests. We propose that leaders spread conspiracy theories in service of four primary goals: 1) to attack opponents; 2) to increase support from their ingroup members; 3) to shift blame and responsibility; and 4) to undermine institution that threaten their power. We argue that authoritarian, populist, and conservative leaders are most likely to spread conspiracy theories during periods of instability.

The i-Frame and the s-Frame: How Focusing on the Individual-Level Solutions Has Led Behavioral Public Policy Astray

Article

Jan 2022

“Remember that we suffered!” The effects of historical trauma on anti‐Semitic prejudice

Article

Feb 2022

A history of group traumatization exerts significant influence on group members as well as their outgroup relations. In particular, historical trauma events and their ongoing repercussions may lead to feelings of control deprivation within groups. Members of traumatized groups are prone to believe in conspiracy theories, including ones that are anti‐Semitic in nature, in an attempt to find explanations for their trauma and regain some sense of control. Often, these narratives depict Jews as those who possess control. In our study, we examine how the frequency of thoughts about historical trauma as well as historical trauma symptoms (behavioral, emotional, and depressive tendencies) are related to three forms of antisemitism: traditional antisemitism, secondary antisemitism, and a belief in anti‐Semitic conspiracy theories. The study was conducted in Hungary (N = 350) where traumatic historical events often reverberate in the national narratives. The results indicate that a higher frequency of thoughts about historical trauma is associated with higher prejudice across all three forms of antisemitism. The effects of historical trauma on secondary and conspiracy antisemitism were partly driven by behavioral symptoms of historical trauma. The explanations and implications of these results are discussed.

The heterogeneous price of a vote: Evidence from multiparty systems, 1993–2017

Article

Feb 2022
J PUBLIC ECON

What is the impact of campaign spending on votes? Does it vary across election types, political parties or electoral settings? Estimating these effects requires comprehensive data on spending across candidates, parties and elections, as well as identification strategies that handle the endogenous and strategic nature of campaign spending in multiparty systems. This paper provides novel contributions in both of these areas. We build a new comprehensive dataset of all French legislative and UK general elections over the 1993–2017 period. We propose new empirical specifications, including a new instrument that relies on the fact that candidates are differentially affected by regulation on the source of funding on which they depend the most. We find that an increase in spending per voter consistently improves candidates’ vote share, both at British and French elections, and that the effect is heterogeneous depending on candidates’ party. In particular, we show that spending by radical and extreme parties has much lower returns than spending by mainstream parties, and that this can be partly explained by the social stigma attached to extreme voting. Our findings help reconcile the conflicting results of the existing literature, and improve our understanding of why campaigns matter.

Of precarity and conspiracy: Introducing a socio-functional model of conspiracy beliefs

Abstract

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