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The Re-emergence of China and the Deepening of EU-China Relations
Abstract
Since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms (Spence, 2013), the re-emergence of China has sparked countless debates among International Relations scholars on how best to respond.
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Pendant longtemps, on a pu dire que la Chine, contrairement à la Russie, cherchait davantage à être aimée que crainte ; qu’elle voulait séduire, projeter une image positive d’elle-même dans le monde, susciter l’admiration. Pékin n’a pas renoncé à séduire, à son attractivité et à son ambition de façonner les normes internationales, et il reste essentiel pour le Parti communiste de ne pas « perdre la face ». Mais, en même temps, Pékin assume de plus en plus d’infiltrer et de contraindre : ses opérations d’influence se sont considérablement durcies ces dernières années et ses méthodes ressemblent de plus en plus à celles employées par Moscou. C’est un « moment machiavélien » au sens où le Parti-État semble désormais estimer que, comme l’écrivait Machiavel dans Le Prince, « il est plus sûr d’être craint que d’être aimé ». Ce qui correspond à une « russianisation » des opérations d’influence chinoises.
Ce rapport s’intéresse à cette évolution, avec l’ambition de couvrir tout le spectre de l’influence, de la plus bénigne (diplomatie publique) à la plus maligne, c’est-à-dire l’ingérence (activités clandestines). Pour ce faire, il procède en quatre parties, présentant successivement les principaux concepts ; les acteurs mettant en œuvre ces opérations, notamment la base 311 de l’Armée populaire de libération ; les actions conduites par Pékin à l’égard des diasporas, des médias, de la diplomatie, de l’économie, de la politique, de l’éducation, des think tanks et en termes de manipulations de l’information, entre autres leviers ; et enfin quelques études de cas (Taïwan, Singapour, Suède, Canada, et les opérations ayant visé les manifestants hongkongais en 2019 ou cherché à faire croire à l’origine américaine de la Covid-19 en 2020). La conclusion revient sur cette « russianisation », qui a trois composantes : Pékin s’inspire de Moscou dans plusieurs registres, il subsiste évidemment des différences entre les deux, et il existe aussi un certain degré de coopération. Pour finir, le rapport évalue l’efficacité de cette nouvelle posture chinoise qui peut s’enorgueillir de certains succès tactiques, mais constitue un échec stratégique.
China's meteoric economic rise has precipitated a debate about its growing profile in Europe through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In this context, for some observers Greece serves as an illustration of how China is also translating its economic power into actual political influence over small European states to Brussels' disadvantage. This article challenges such simplistic and state-centric views by considering the role of contingent and domestic factors and the wider strategic environment in which Sino-Greek relations have unfolded. It also highlights the agency of influential actors at the more micro-level of analysis. It argues that although China has achieved some limited political gains, the relationship remains mainly economics-driven at a time when Greece is strengthening strategic ties with its traditional allies.
Since 2009, the time of the European Council on Foreign Relations’ first Power Audit, China has become more present and influential within Europe. This is no longer only about a massive trade surplus; it is also about investment, lending, and financial power which serves China’s public diplomacy. What has not changed is the asymmetry claimed by China as a developing economy, even as it reaches the first rank among global economies. And it explains the increasing quest for reciprocity by Europeans.
China practises “pick and choose” in its relations with the European Union, focusing on its direct interests, and often ignoring EU norms in its proposals. It has vastly increased efforts to strengthen bilateral relations with member states, putting special emphasis on Europe’s periphery. China holds its own summit with central and eastern European nations, the so-called 16+1, and it seized the opportunity of the euro crisis for massive takeovers in southern Europe. Fascinatingly, its offers and their packaging are not very different from those offered to African and other developing nations: a flurry of projects creating competition among recipients, loans at commercial rates, and a strong insistence on identical statements and agreements.
China is now inside Europe. Its soft power diplomacy relies on repetitive and positive messages. There is a gold rush by some European figures, while many companies, media groups, and universities seek to protect their access to the Chinese market.
Notre monde globalisé traverse un moment décisif de son histoire. Non seulement l’internationalisation de la Chine bouleverse les enjeux géopolitiques entre l’UE, les États-Unis et la Chine mais aussi les nombreuses crises économiques, politiques et sociales du monde provoquent un sentiment généralisé d’insécurité et d’impuissance face à la complexité des événements actuels. Cette publication analyse les relations (coopératives, conflictuelles) entre l’UE et la Chine et questionne la pérennité d’un pouvoir – valeurs contre mercantilisme ? Dans notre monde globalisé, ni l’UE, ni la Chine sont des îlots de paradis isolés. Les défis climatiques, la compétition mondiale accrue (ressources naturelles, nourriture, eau…) et surtout le terrorisme international nous obligent à faire face aux réalités, à abandonner des illusions qui motivent les différentes idées (européenne, capitalisme patriotique à la chinoise…), à concilier nos différences et à nous diriger vers une nouvelle gouvernance globale de valeur humaine, vers une vraie « identité de cœur » selon la vision géopolitique de Jacques Ancel.
« C’est le cœur qui vaut, et qu’il faut avant tout considérer. »
Jacques Ancel (1879-1943)
China has experienced a dramatic swing from net capital inflows to large net outflows in recent years. Using balance of payments data, an analysis of the underlying factors that drove China’s recent capital outflows since mid-2014 were (1) corporates adjusting their balance sheets to reduce foreign exchange exposure or to unwind “carry trade”; (2) Chinese corporate and households seeking to diversify assets offshore; (3) Renminbi internationalization push, which facilitated capital outflows and capital flight by encouraging outbound investment; and (4) higher US interest rates and strengthening US dollar all likely further amplified the above factors. The capital exodus to some extent reflects policy difficulties that China’s authorities face in managing economic reforms. In particular, China faces tough challenges in balancing the benefit/risk trade-off from capital account opening and attempting to introduce more flexibility to the currency. To stabilize capital flows and currency expectations, clarity and transparency in communicating policy objectives are essential while the implementation of structural and institutional reforms to correct economic imbalances (such as overcapacity and debt) and improve macroeconomic fundamentals are imperative and particularly pressing.
The Chinese Communist Party’s has openly committed itself to fulfil the “Liang Ge Yibai Nian (Two Centenary) Goals” by years 2021 and 2049. To achieve these ambitious goals, China has to sustain sufficiently high annual growth rates of its economy in the coming years and decades. This endeavour faces serious challenges as China’s economic growth is being pinned down by demographic and structural changes.
The rise of China in Africa is often described as a major challenge to the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) democracy promotion policies. China is accused of providing important volumes of loans, development aid, trade and investments without “political strings” attached, thereby undermining the US and the EU's possibilities to set material incentives for reforms. This article investigates Ethiopia and Angola as two cases where one would expect that the growing presence of China has made it more difficult for the EU and US to support reforms. Empirical findings presented in this article go against this argument. In both countries, the EU and the US face substantial difficulties to make the respective government address governance issues. However, the presence of China has not made it more difficult for the US and the EU to implement their strategies. Instead the empirical analysis suggests that domestic factors in Ethiopia and Angola, notably the level of challenge to regime survival both governments face, influence both governments’ willingness to engage with the EU and US.
A discerning account of simmering conflict in the South China Sea and why the world can’t afford to be indifferent China’s rise has upset the global balance of power, and the first place to feel the strain is Beijing’s back yard: the South China Sea. For decades tensions have smoldered in the region, but today the threat of a direct confrontation among superpowers grows ever more likely. This important book is the first to make clear sense of the South Sea disputes. Bill Hayton, a journalist with extensive experience in the region, examines the high stakes involved for rival nations that include Vietnam, India, Taiwan, the Philippines, and China, as well as the United States, Russia, and others. Hayton also lays out the daunting obstacles that stand in the way of peaceful resolution. Through lively stories of individuals who have shaped current conflicts-businessmen, scientists, shippers, archaeologists, soldiers, diplomats, and more-Hayton makes understandable the complex history and contemporary reality of the South China Sea. He underscores its crucial importance as the passageway for half the world’s merchant shipping and one-third of its oil and gas. Whoever controls these waters controls the access between Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and the Pacific. The author critiques various claims and positions (that China has historic claim to the Sea, for example), overturns conventional wisdoms (such as America’s overblown fears of China’s nationalism and military resurgence), and outlines what the future may hold for this clamorous region of international rivalry.
ESAANZ ESSAY PRIZE WINNERWith China’s Belt and Road Initiative in full swing, this paper identifies a new “Great Game” in the Eurasian heartland. However, rather than the geopolitical chess of the nineteenth century, the new game is wei qi. In a process of gradual encirclement and subtle coercion, China is outplaying the EU on the Eurasian continent while avoiding direct confrontation. Following the logic of wei qi, China has shown a tendency to occupy the spaces that the EU has neglected – namely the Balkans and the East Mediterranean. Yet the game has not been won yet. Recent crises have undermined China’s global image, and hitherto overeager Eastern European countries are now acting with more caution towards Chinese investors. The EU can be an equal player, but it must do more to “bring along” the struggling economies in its periphery, while counterbalancing China’s influence with alternative partnerships in the Middle East and Asia.
China’s Civilian Army tells the story of China’s transformation from an isolated and impoverished communist state to a global superpower from the perspective of its diplomats. In the early days of the People’s Republic, diplomats were highly disciplined, committed communists who feared revealing any weakness to the threatening capitalist world. Remarkably, the model that revolutionary leader Zhou Enlai established continues to this day despite the massive changes the country has undergone in recent decades. Even today, Chinese diplomats work in pairs so that one can always watch the other for signs of ideological impurity. China’s Civilian Army charts the history of China’s diplomatic corps from its earliest days through to the present, drawing on the memoirs of more than a hundred retired diplomats and dozens of interviews.
This book offers the prequel to China's successful implementation of its New Silk Road, the so-called Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The preconditions for the establishment of especially the land route between China and Western Europe have been set decades ago in Central Asia. In the political, security, and economic realms, China had to find arrangements with Russia as well as the Central Asian states. Border disputes had to be resolved, a security architecture and political cooperation was lacking. The key to BRI's success today lies in China's successful diplomacy of the 1990s and 2000s. This book tells the exciting story behind the largest geopolitical infrastructure project of our time.
Tilman Pradt is a geopolitical analyst and consultant based in Berlin. His research focus is on China's foreign policy. He is a supervisor and contributing analyst at the geostrategic analysis and business consultancy, Wikistrat, and works as a senior advisor for companies and business associations. He writes for various international publications and his book, China's New Foreign Policy, was published in 2016.
Since its launch in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has sparked a renewed global interest in infrastructure construction. But after five years, it looks like the BRI has reached its culminating point of success. A mounting wave of domestic and international pushback against the BRI combines discontent about its effects and criticism about its nature. Far from failing to understand and address the gravity of the situation, Beijing is organised and geared for a fine-grained assessment. China's leaders are not only aware of the present grievances, they are also capable of adjustment and adaptation. The recalibration of the BRI's tactics has, in fact, already started.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/143241544213097139/Public-Procurement-in-the-Belt-and-Road-Initiative
This article explores and explains the drivers of the EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation initiative. In order to do so a qualitative assessment was made of how well the various hypotheses flowing from three candidate theories neorealism, institutionalism and the bureaucratic politics model (BPM) fit this policy initiative. It specifically tests them across three distinct stages of the policy cycle, including issue identification, decision-making and policy implementation. Cutting the dependent variable into policy stages allows us to see if the independent variables truly are powerful. This study demonstrates that institutionalism contributes to a better understanding of every distinct stage of the policy process regarding the EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation initiative. Aspects of neorealism illuminate some stages of the policy process as well, while BPM is only applicable to a limited degree.
This book examines the changing dynamics of power in the international arena since the end of the Cold War. Brown engages in analysis of how the United States and the European Union have responded to the so-called rise of China through an examination of how policymakers' perceptions of China have changed over time and influenced their policy choices. This study undertakes rigorous analysis of how these perceptions have evolved between 1989 and 20092016, offering a comparative perspective on the similarities and differences between the policy discourse and behaviour within these two Western powers. Brown argues that 'China's rise' is a contested notion, with varied perceptions of how the implications of China's ascendancy have shaped policy preferences in ways that are inconsistent with concerns over the threat of an impending power-transition. Combining concepts and methods derived from IR and FPA, the book examines the linkages between great power politics and policymakers' competing interpretations of key international actors, and their influence upon foreign policies. The main objective of the study is to illuminate the different ways in which the US and the EU have responded to the rise of China through a close analysis of their decision-making processes and outcomes across a series of key encounters and events, including the transatlantic debate over the EU's proposal to lift its China arms embargo (2003-2005). Undertaking qualitative analysis of the development of American and European policymakers' perceptions of China, this book will be of interest to graduates and scholars of post-Cold War international politics, Foreign Policy Analysis, policymaking, US-China relations and EU-China relations.
This book considers the effect of China’s unprecedented economic growth and more prominent geopolitical role in the twenty-first century. Rising powers considerably alter international relations, leading to the emergence of a multipolar world order that impacts more traditional international players like the European Union (EU). China’s growing economic and diplomatic influence is particularly relevant in Africa, where it presents an alternative to conventional North-South relations and proposes a new type of South-South partnership. Stahl examines the EU’s foreign policy response regarding China’s growing presence in Africa, as well as the EU’s attempts to refocus attention on the African continent. Drawing on a rich body of evidence collected through fieldwork in China and Africa, and extensive expert interviews, the author sheds light on the novel trend of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations. The book offers a new analytical framework for the study of the EU’s foreign policy of engagement with emerging powers and will appeal to graduate students and scholars interested in the EU’s international role, international relations and development, as well as contemporary Chinese and African studies.
This book investigates the expanding involvement of China in security cooperation in Africa. Drawing on leading and emerging scholars in the field, the volume uses a combination of analytical insights and case studies to unpack the complexity of security challenges confronting China and the continent. It interrogates how security considerations impact upon the growing economic and social links China has developed with African states. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018. All rights reserved.
The EU–China Investment Cooperation is still in an incipient stage since it was launched at the EU–China High Level Economic Dialogue in Beijing on 28 September 2015. This chapter briefly reviews both the Silk Road initiative and the European Fund for Strategic Investment. Analysis of these two economic initiatives raises the question of how to align them to identify possible avenues for cooperation. The chapter looks at this new Sino-European investment cooperation. Through examining both economic initiatives and objectives, a number of common sectors can be highlighted, including infrastructure, R&D, pharmaceuticals, clean energy, and education. It then explores a specific field, the digital industry, and particularly the 5G market, which opens a variety of doors regarding the internet of things, big data, clouding, intelligent transport, entertainment, and media.
The EU and China are often characterised as parties whose bilateral political differences still remain too large to bridge, so that they have failed to convert rhetorical promises into tangible results of cooperation, particularly with regards to the field of international security. Yet in terms of their bilateral interaction on security risk management in Africa; EU and Chinese naval officers jointly brought down the number of successful Somali pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and to a lesser extent were jointly involved in seeking a resolution to the lingering conflict in Darfur. This book asks how we can make sense as a whole of this relatively sudden shift in regards to the dealings between their respective officials on the topic of security risk management. It argues that the outcomes of Sino-European bilateral dealings on this topic are above all determined by the ability/inability of these officials to build political trust as a complex and cognitive social phenomenon. Consequently, the book applies an innovative conceptual framework on political trust to explain why EU and Chinese officials bridged their 'endemic' political differences to practically cooperate on Somali piracy but were unable to do so when it came to their interaction on Darfur. To conclude, it examines the longer term impact of this bilateral trust-building process by covering more recent examples of bilateral engagement in Libya and Mali and aims to show that although this trust-building process may be case specific, ramifications may go beyond the realm of their bilateral dealings on security matters in Africa, to impact wider issues of international security. This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of African and Chinese politics, EU politics, security and maritime studies, and more broadly of international relations and to governmental actors.
This chapter investigates China’s growing arms trade, especially with Africa, and the evolution of China’s arms export controls. Like other external powers, Beijing’s involvement in multilateralism and especially peace support is in danger of being compromised by its active pursuit of the arms trade in Africa. Examining how international efforts at reigning in the sale of small arms and other other conventional weapons are addressed by China and whether we are seeing gradual change to Chinese policy forms the core of this study.
This book is about the growth of shadow banking in China and the rise of China’s free markets. Shadow Banking refers to capital that is distributed outside the formal banking system, including everything from Mom and Pop lending shops to online credit to giant state owned banks called Trusts. They have grown from a fraction of the economy ten years ago to nearly half of all China’s annual Rmb 25 trillion ($4.1 trillion) in lending in the economy today.
Shadow Banks are a new aspect of capitalism in China – barely regulated, highly risky, yet tolerated by Beijing. They have been permitted to flourish because many companies cannot get access to formal bank loans. It is the Wild West of banking in China. If we define capitalism as economic activity controlled by the private sector, then Shadow Banking is still in a hybrid stage, a halfway house between the state and the private economic. But it is precisely this divide that makes Shadow Banking an important to the rise of capitalism. How Beijing handles this large free market will say a lot about how the country’s economy will grow – will free markets be granted greater leeway?
China’s Africa policy has affected the EU’s relations with China and Africa. In response, the EU proposed trilateral cooperation to focus on synergies of the EU’s and China’s contribution to Africa’s development. This study conceptualises from an IR perspective this triangular relationship beyond well-known empirical or economic approaches to China’s Africa policy. It looks at what kind of actor China is in Africa, and whether China is in Africa because it is strong or weak and what the trilateral approach of the EU implies for Africa as a player in international relations.
This volume is a report by leading international economic experts on China's economic priorities in the coming years. From various aspects of the domestic and foreign situation, China has now reached a critical juncture in its economic development. Unless China is able to overcome the difficulties in undertaking further reforms in the next ten years, China would be caught in the middle-income trap and be unable to become a modern country. The future course of China's economic development is also of great concern to the rest of the world because the socio-political-economic conditions in China will have significant impact on global economic prosperity and on global political harmony. The book is a product of close collaboration between the School of Economics at Fudan University and the Earth Institute at Columbia University. They cover a new paradigm for growth, short-term demand management, institutional reforms for middle-term growth, and strengthening the fundamentals for long-term growth. © 2012 by Imperial College Press and World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved.
Rarely has the rise of a power been received with such high expectations as when the European Union embraced China’s stellar growth at the turn of the century. Beijing became a beehive for delegations of foreign business leaders and politicians that wanted to catch a glimpse of the new economic miracle. China’s accession to the World Trade Organization was met with the expectation that its market would yield endless opportunities for investors and exporters. “This is a time for optimism about the future,” European Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson stated in 2004:
Chinese membership has been good for the World Trade Organization, and good for China. Tariff rates and non-tariff barriers have plummeted since the nineties. There is further to go in implementation, for example of intellectual property rights. But the changes that have already taken place have created opportunities for European traders and service providers with massive increases in market access
Is China today a “rising great power,” destined to behave like rising European powers of the past, such as Wilhelmine Germany or Napoleonic France? Are China and the East Asia region something unique, and should they be taken on their own terms? Or are there other theoretical approaches that might help us explain and contextualize contemporary East Asia? China’s recent economic and diplomatic dynamism has prompted tremendous speculation about regional and global implications. In academic and policymaking circles, this debate coheres around the question of whether or not East Asia will devolve into a great game of balance of power politics similar to that experienced in Europe. However, although China may be unlikely to follow the path that did European great power aspirants, that clearly does not mean that East Asia as a region is sui generis, and taking East Asia on its own terms rather than as a reflection of Europe does not mean arguing for a unique and unchanging East Asia.
Realist international relations theorists usually would predict that the basic pressures of the international system will force the United States and China into conflict. But properly understood, realism offers grounds for optimism in this case, so long as Washington can avoid exaggerating the risks posed by China's growing power.
The Spratly Islands, known primarily as a rich fishing ground, have turned into an international flashpoint as Chinese leaders insist with increasing truculence that the islands, rocks, and reefs have been China's historical territory since ancient times. As far as the ?jurisprudence evidence? is concerned, the vast majority of international legal experts have concluded that China's claim to historic title over the South China Sea, implying full sovereign authority and consent for other states to transit, is invalid. China's claim to the Spratlys on the basis of history runs aground on the fact that the region's past empires did not exercise sovereignty. Beijing has insisted that these disputes are bilateral in order to place its opponents between the anvil of its revisionist history and the hammer of its growing military power.
The book provides an in-depth analysis of EU-China cooperation mechanisms with a focus on efforts to jointly address global challenges. It zooms in on the cooperation mechanisms for addressing three specific global challenges that rank high on the bilateral agenda: Mitigating climate change, controlling nuclear non-proliferation and addressing the poverty-insecurity nexus. From this empirical analysis, the book assesses the characteristics and challenges of the EU’s emerging "network diplomacy" model of dealing with strategic external relations.
This article asks to what extent the European Union (EU) and its member states actually pursued and implemented comprehensive approaches in relation to crisis management in Africa. It also asks what can explain the lack of full implementation of the comprehensive approach in the cases of South Sudan, Mali and the Central African Republic. It is shown that EU member states saw the added value of the common EU approach while at the same time they pursued national interests at odds with the common goals of the EU. The flaws in implementation of the comprehensive approach are mainly explained by member states' preoccupation with taking care of national interests rather than joining ranks with other member states and the EU institutions. There appears to be an exception to the rule: when Europe's security is perceived as being high on the agenda, the implementation of the comprehensive approach may follow policy declarations more closely. The comprehensive approach nevertheless indicates an emerging Europeanisation norm influencing policy approaches to the sensitive nexuses that link security, development and crisis response. Evidence from country-level interventions reveals that this norm is yet to impact on the member state political will required to Europeanise country-level implementation where important national interests are perceived to be at stake.
The European Union (EU) is a key partner for African regional organizations and a major promoter of economic and political integration in the region. Several studies have interpreted the EU's role in Africa as either a self-interested hegemonic actor or as a value oriented normative power. In this volume, Daniela Sicurelli challenges these views by taking a closer look at Europe's policies towards Sub-Saharan Africa in the area of peacekeeping, trade and development, and environmental protection. Using fresh empirical evidence, including interviews with both European and African officials, she argues that the EU is far from becoming a unitary player in Africa. Lacking a clear strategy and coherent normative framework, the EU should be considered a multi-level actor, where national and supranational institutions have different interests and push forward contrasting views of what role Europe should play in Africa. The ability of single institutions to frame an issue as requiring either intergovernmental or supranational procedures appears crucial for shaping the content of European Africa policies. An original contribution to the growing literature on the EU as an international actor, this book is extremely useful to scholars, researchers and policy-makers demanding critical work in the field of EU-Africa policy.
China’s special economic zones helped the country industrialize by attracting foreign investment. In 2006, Beijing initiated an overseas trade and cooperation zone program, assisting Chinese companies to invest abroad while also building China’s soft power through the transfer of a key component of China’s development success. Little is known about the 19 zones approved so far under this program, or the impact they are likely to have on structural transformation and industrial development in their host countries. This paper identifies the 19 zones and their proposed locations, the process of selection, developers, implementation, and the Chinese incentive regime. It then focuses on the African zones. Using a typology of factors that have proven critical for zone development in the past, the paper evaluates the potential of these zones for fostering structural transformation in Africa.
The risk of conflict escalating from relatively minor events has increased in the South China Sea over the past two years with disputes now less open to negotiation or resolution. Originally, the disputes arose after World War II when the littoral statesChina and three countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, as well as Vietnam which joined laterscrambled to occupy the islands there. Had the issue remained strictly a territorial one, it could have been resolved through Chinese efforts to reach out to ASEAN and forge stronger ties with the region. Around the 1990s, access to the sea's oil and gas reserves as well as fishing and ocean resources began to complicate the claims. As global energy demand has risen, claimants have devised plans to exploit the sea's hydrocarbon reserves with disputes not surprisingly ensuing, particularly between China and Vietnam. Nevertheless, these energy disputes need not result in conflict, as they have been and could continue to be managed through joint or multilateral development regimes, for which there are various precedents although none as complicated as the South China Sea. Now, however, the issue has gone beyond territorial claims and access to energy resources, as the South China Sea has become a focal point for U.S. —China rivalry in the Western Pacific. Since around 2010, the sea has started to become linked with wider strategic issues relating to China's naval
China's reform policies have created economic opportunities, but they have also unleashed political tensions. Some U.S. strategists advocate a containment strategy, yet such a strategy is both undesirable and infeasible. America's fortunes in Asia depend on the evolution of a China that is secure, cohesive, reform-oriented, and open to the world. Failed reform could easily lead to a nationalistic, obstructionist China. In recent years, Washington, while trying to engage the People's Republic, has driven it into a corner over human rights. America must develop a long-term strategy to integrate China into the world community and avert serious damage to this crucial bilateral relationship. And it must begin to do so now.
"International politics is a nasty and dangerous business, and no amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia."
ASEAN and China share a complex relationship in economic terms; while they collaborate in several spheres, conflict of interests is not uncommon either. The proposal for an ASEAN–China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) was floated in 2000, and the agreements covering merchandise trade, services trade and investment collaboration were signed in 2004, 2007 and 2009 respectively. ASEAN countries agreed to consider China as a market economy in the course of the negotiations and the ACFTA has resulted in several benefits for both parties, including tariff reduction on substantial number of product lines, considerable growth in merchandise and services trade volume, deepening of intra-regional production networks, regional cooperation on infrastructural development and so on. However, rapid growth of Chinese imports in ASEAN markets and expanding trade deficit generates apprehension in the grouping over potential domestic restructuring. Subisidies provided by the Chinese government to its domestic players also compound the problem. This article concludes that ASEAN countries need to augment their competitiveness through coordinated efforts on the one hand, and jointly negotiate with China to curb the disruptive effects of the latter’s incentive programmes, on the other.