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The Moral Functioning of Mature Adults and the Possibility of Fair Moral Reasoning
Abstract
Moral notions are foundational questions that have commanded deep reflection since antiquity, reflection that psychological science cannot evade, because the moral formation of children is a central concern of parents, schools, and communities charged with educating the next generation. In this respect there are few domains of study more crucial than moral psychology and few topics of greater importance than the development of moral self-identity, of moral character, and of the moral personality. This edited volume features the expertise of pre-eminent scholars in moral personality, self, and identity, such as moral philosophers, personality theorists, developmental psychologists, moral personality researchers, social psychologists, and neuroscientists. It brings together cutting-edge work in moral psychology that illustrates an impressive diversity of theoretical perspectives and methodologies and simultaneously points the way toward promising integrative possibilities.
... The moral intuitionist approach has been criticized on multiple grounds for oversimplifying and misrepresenting moral functioning (Appiah, 2008;Blasi, 2009;Narvaez, Moral Complexity 9 2008b;Pizarro & Bloom, 2003;Saltztein & Kasachkoff, 2004) and has been defended in response (e.g., Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008b). Here, the critique focuses on how the SIM (a) is imprecise in its definition of intuition when distinctions need to be made; (b) is simplistic when applied to moral functioning generally, overlooking that much of the moral life involves complexities not examined or explained by intuitionism as it is built on simple problems of moral evaluation; (c) overlooks findings about reasoning and deliberation; and (d) equates enculturation with virtue. ...
... Research in the cognitive development tradition shows that, starting at least from the late preschool years, individuals are not surprised when they are asked to reason about moral problems (for reviews see Blasi, 2009;Rest, 1979Rest, , 1983Turiel, 1998Turiel, , 2006). 5 Research into mental preoccupations suggests that individuals deliberate about moral issues, including relational problems, much of the time (Klinger, 1978). ...
... Moral locus of control means having an internalized sense of morality, that is, taking responsibility for oneself and one's behavior-a moral self-commitment. To take responsibility means to own one's thoughts, feelings, and actions and their consequences, possessing them as an agentic self (Blasi, 2009). The individual takes possession of the emotions, desires, and thoughts that arise as well as the actions of which he is the agentic source, understanding that all are under him or her to organize, control, and own (Blasi, 2009). ...
Recently, intuitionist theories have been effective in capturing the academic discourse about morality. Intuitionist theories, like rationalist theories, offer important but only partial understanding of moral functioning. Both can be fallacious and succumb to truthiness: the attachment to one's opinions because they "feel right," potentially leading to harmful action or inaction. Both intuition and reasoning are involved in deliberation and expertise. Both are malleable from environmental and educational influence, making questions of normativity-which intuitions and reasoning skills to foster-of utmost importance. Good intuition and reasoning inform mature moral functioning, which needs to include capacities that promote sustainable human well-being. Individual capacities for habituated empathic concern and moral metacognition-moral locus of control, moral self-regulation, and moral self-reflection-comprise mature moral functioning, which also requires collective capacities for moral dialogue and moral institutions. These capacities underlie moral innovation and are necessary for solving the complex challenges humanity faces.
© The Author(s) 2010.
... The moral intuitionist approach has been criticized on multiple grounds for oversimplifying and misrepresenting moral functioning (Appiah, 2008;Blasi, 2009;Narvaez, 2008b;Pizarro & Bloom, 2003;Saltztein & Kasachkoff, 2004) and has been defended in response (e.g., Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008b). Here, the critique focuses on how the SIM (a) is imprecise in its definition of intuition when distinctions need to be made; (b) is simplistic when applied to moral functioning generally, overlooking that much of the moral life involves complexities not examined or explained by intuitionism as it is built on simple problems of moral evaluation; (c) overlooks findings about reasoning and deliberation; and (d) equates enculturation with virtue. ...
... Findings Regarding Reasoning and Deliberation. Research in the cognitive development tradition shows that, starting at least from the late preschool years, individuals are not surprised when they are asked to reason about moral problems (for reviews see Blasi, 2009;Rest, 1979Rest, , 1983Turiel, 1998Turiel, , 2006. 5 Research into mental preoccupations suggests that individuals deliberate about moral issues, including relational problems, much of the time (Klinger, 1978). Moral philosophical discussions since Kant often have addressed moral decision making. ...
... Moral locus of control means having an internalized sense of morality, that is, taking responsibility for oneself and one's behavior-a moral self-commitment. To take responsibility means to own one's thoughts, feelings, and actions and their consequences, possessing them as an agentic self (Blasi, 2009). The individual takes possession of the emotions, desires, and thoughts that arise as well as the actions of which he is the agentic source, understanding that all are under him or her to organize, control, and own (Blasi, 2009). ...
We review how the construct of the moral self has arisen within moral development theory and discuss the search for integrative linkages with other domains of psychology, including personality. Next, we describe moral personality and then programs and approaches to developing moral identity in children. Moral schema development and moral information‐processing research is outlined, including mapping expert‐novice differences. Finally, we conclude with two emerging integrative theories, one on educational intervention for moral skill development and the other a neurobiological model of moral functioning which draws on evolutionary themes in the development of a moral brain.
... For example, some behavioral ethics researchers bracket thinking and feeling and have explored a deeper approach by examining the brain's use of subconscious mental shortcuts (Gigerenzer 2008;Sunstein 2005). In addition, virtue ethics and moral identity scholars focus on how individuals in organizations develop certain qualities that become central to their identity and motivate their moral behavior, not by focusing on cognition or affect but by focusing on the practice of behavioral habits (Blasi 1993(Blasi , 1995(Blasi , 2009Grant et al. 2018;Martin 2011). Each of these groups of behavioral ethics researchers have moved the discussion of moral development forward using theorizing that rests on different-and often competing-assumptions. ...
... Third, this kind of self-consistency leads to a reliable, constant uniformity between judgment and action (Walker 2004). Blasi (1983Blasi ( , 1984Blasi ( , 1993Blasi ( , 1995Blasi ( , 2004Blasi ( , 2009) and Damon (1992, 1993) posit that people with a moral personality have personal goals that are synonymous with moral values. Blasi's model claims if one acts consistently according to his or her core beliefs, moral values, goals, and actions, then he or she possesses a moral identity or personality. ...
The field of behavioral ethics has seen considerable growth over the last few decades. One of the most significant concerns facing this interdisciplinary field of research is the moral judgment-action gap. The moral judgment-action gap is the inconsistency people display when they know what is right but do what they know is wrong. Much of the research in the field of behavioral ethics is based on (or in response to) early work in moral psychology and American psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg’s foundational cognitive model of moral development. However, Kohlberg’s model of moral development lacks a compelling explanation for the judgment-action gap. Yet, it continues to influence theory, research, teaching, and practice in business ethics today. As such, this paper presents a critical review and analysis of the pertinent literature. This paper also reviews modern theories of ethical decision making in business ethics. Gaps in our current understanding and directions for future research in behavioral business ethics are presented. By providing this important theoretical background information, targeted critical analysis, and directions for future research, this paper assists management scholars as they begin to seek a more unified approach, develop newer models of ethical decision making, and conduct business ethics research that examines the moral judgment-action gap.
... Most work on moral identity is rooted in the social cognitive interpretation of moral selfhood initially proposed by Blasi (1993). Blasi (2009) emphasizes both social and cognitive processes in self-construction and, in particular, the central role of moral reflection in the formation of moral identity. If moral reflective processes are centrally implicated in the development of moral identity, it is likely that as moral identity consolidates, moral reflection becomes routinized. ...
... Given that empathy has long been known to predict prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987) and moral development (Hoffman, 2000), this finding is not surprising. Empathy may provide much of the "content" necessary for the moral reflection that Blasi (2009) postulates as critical to the development of moral identity. Through both perspective-taking and empathic resonance, people learn about how practices and behaviors affect others, insights that are essential to moral development (Turiel, 2014). ...
Researchers have made productive use of Bandura's (1991) construct of moral disengagement (MD) to help explain why sport participants deviate from ethical ideals. In this study of intercollegiate athletes from diverse sports (N = 713), we examined MD in relation to other character-related variables: empathy, moral identity, moral attentiveness, and contesting orientations. We also examined whether moral attentiveness conforms to the pattern of "bracketed morality" found in moral reasoning (Shields & Bredemeier, 1995) and moral behavior (Kavussanu, Boardley, Sagar, & Ring, 2013). Results indicated that MD correlated positively with perceptual moral attentiveness and war contesting orientation; MD correlated negatively with empathy, moral identity, reflective moral attentiveness, and partnership contesting orientation. Results of hierarchical regression demonstrated that gender, contesting orientations, moral identity, and one form of moral attentiveness were significant predictors of MD. Finally, sport participants were found to be less morally attentive in sport than in everyday life.
... Appiah, 2008;20 Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008;Lapsley & Hill, 2008;Wilson, Centerbar, & Brekke, 2002), only a handful of articles consider the issue in any depth (i.e. Blasi, 2009;Graham, Haidt, & Rimm-Kaufman, 2008;Musschenga, 2011;Narvaez, 2010). The apparent reticence on the part of researchers who study moral development and education is especially surprising given that proponents of MFT present its 25 theoretical framework as a necessary corrective to the paradigm that dominated the field in the latter half of the twentieth century and which still holds considerable sway in moral educational circles today--namely, cognitive developmentalism. ...
... However, an alternative view of evolutionary 10 theory is available that better fits a more expansive view of human capacities, aligns with evidence from nomadic foraging societies, and supports the view of cognitive developmentalism. This view is that cooperation is fundamental to human nature (Fry, 2013;Weiss & Buchanan, 2009).The view of humans as inherently selfish, misappropriated from arguments about selfish genes (Dawkins, 15 1976) and promoted by social Darwinism conceptions of society and politics (Bannister, 1987), leads to a lowering of standards and expectations for human capacities for which MFT and SIM may be critiqued (Blasi, 2009). For example, condoning and celebrating intuitions regardless of their source -many can be naive or prejudiced rather than well-educated--is like celebrating children's preference 20 for candy instead of educating their palates to enjoy healthy foods. ...
... Основою функціонування ідентичності особистості, на думку знаного психолога A. Блазі [9], є моральні судження та рефлексія. До того ж, як відзначає автор, вони відіграють центральну роль не лише у становленні особистості, а й у розвитку суспільства. ...
Поняття культури пропонується розглядати як контексту, всередині якого утворюються ідентичності людини, культура наповнює їх змістом. Визначено дві основні функції культури: спадковості та нормативності. Спираємось на визначення культурної ідентифікації як процесу самоототожнення особистості з певною культурою, яке передбачає раціональне усвідомлення своєї причетності до етнокультурної групи та емоційно-ціннісне переживання приналежності до неї. Відзначено, що розв’язання повномасштабної війни росії проти України спричинило активні процеси міграції населення як внутрішні (між регіонами України), так і зовнішні (за кордон, в інші країни). Це загострило низку питань, що стосується регіональних особливостей культурної ідентифікації молоді. В статті представлено модель емпіричного дослідження регіональних особливостей культурної ідентифікації учнівської та студентської молоді як чинника державної освітньої політики, яка презентує психологічні показники, шкали, методи й психологічний інструментарій дослідження. Виокремлено основні параметри дослідження регіональних особливостей культурної ідентифікації молоді як чинника державної освітньої політики: традиційність і нормативність. Визначено психологічні показники культурної ідентифікації студентської та учнівської молоді: 1) ставлення до культурних цінностей (культурної спадщини, мови, національних символів, святинь, території); 2) суб᾽єктивна актуальність національної ідентичності (причетність та підтримка національних звичаїв і традицій), 3) переживання приналежності до спільноти (гордість чи сором, повага чи зневага) та до території проживання нації; 3) ставлення до правил взаємодії та межі прийнятного у взаємодії (локус відповідальності, норми співжиття, способи взаємодії, норми емоційності, моральні норми).
... Hence, as they gain in moral reasoning maturity, bystanders' moral evaluation may change and their role may accordingly shift from reinforcing the bully to defending the victim. However, it is generally accepted that in everyday life the relationship between moral reasoning and evaluation is bidirectional (Blasi, 2009). Elementary school-aged children evaluate bullying as wrong (e.g., Thornberg et al., 2016). ...
This study examined whether and how moral judgment components (moral reasoning and moral value evaluation) combined with self-serving cognitive distortions are related to peer bullying (including associated participant roles) among adolescents. A total of 522 adolescents (49% males) from grades 1 to 4 of three public secondary schools in Spain (Mage = 14.6 years, range 12–18 years) completed questionnaires on moral judgment, self-serving cognitive distortions, and bullying. Bullies and bully-victims showed the lowest levels of moral judgment and the highest levels of self-serving cognitive distortions. In contrast, moral judgment was highest and self-serving cognitive distortions lowest for defenders and bystanders. Self-serving cognitive distortions mediated completely the relationship between moral reasoning and bullying, and partially between moral evaluation and bullying. Multigroup analyses indicated that the strength of the relationships between the moral judgment components and self-serving cognitive distortions varied across adolescents’ role. Anti-bullying intervention programs should include the facilitation of moral reasoning and valuing as well as the reduction of self-serving cognitive distortions.
... Moral reasoning at all levels differs from self-serving rationalization (cf. Blasi, 2009). In other words, SSCDs are not part of a moral developmental theory. ...
Are moral judgement maturity and self-serving cognitive distortions or moral disengagement merely opposites, as recently claimed? Self-serving cognitive distortions and moral disengagement constitute (more or less interchangeable) neutralization techniques; they stem from the same theoretical background and refer to the same cognitive processes. In contrast, a distinct theoretical background provides the context for moral judgement. To examine the empirical relationships between the constructs, a systematic search was conducted, encompassing 17 studies from 8 countries. Moral judgement and self-serving cognitive distortions or moral disengagement related inversely only moderately in studies of offenders (externalizing behavioural disorders) and non-offenders. Moreover, self-serving cognitive distortions and moral disengagement correlated much more strongly with externalizing behavioural disorders than did moral judgement. Also differing were relationships with demographic and other variables such as empathy. We conclude that both moral judgement and self-serving cognitive distortions or moral disengagement should be assessed and utilized in studies and intervention programmes addressing externalizing behaviour.
... Показано также, что люди более склонные к отвращению более 259 консервативны в отношении политических вопросов, таких как разрешение или запрет на однополые браки и аборты (Inbar et al., 2009). Некоторые исследователи, однако, критикуют преувеличение роли интуиции и считают, что основой моральных решений является рассуждение и рефлексия (Blasi, 2009). Эти примеры показывают, что человеческая система морали использует базовые биологические мотивационные и эмоциональные механизмы, но использует их в существенно другом контексте, так же как появление высших когнитивных функций, таких, как язык и мышление, не сопровождалось появлением новых специализированных модулей, а основывалось на модулях, изначально использовавшихся для других функций (Anderson, Penner-Wilger, 2013). ...
What is the meaning of life? What is the nature of the human mind, love, morality? All of these questions tend to be answered and explained in "natural science" terms. Life arose out of inanimate nature by random physical and chemical factors and one should hardly look for any sense in it; man is the product of natural selection and reason, love and morality, are the result of chemical and electrical processes in the brain. Since these questions are among the most important for human beings, due to the unquestionable authority of the natural sciences, the proposed answers can and already do have a major impact on all areas of human life, from economics and politics to mental health and the subjective well-being of the individual. Does this perception of the world and one's place in it make one happy? Sociological studies clearly say no. Adherents of this worldview, however, argue that no matter how unpleasant it may seem, one should have the courage to accept it, because it is consistent with the scientific evidence. But is this true? Does the modern scientific picture of the world really allow for all these far-reaching conclusions? People who are professionally involved in science know that it almost never provides answers to worldview questions. All empirical facts and scientific theories can be interpreted in different ways and the choice of one interpretation or another is largely determined by one's worldview position, not vice versa. Although the book is called "Worldview Problems of Neuroscience", and most of it is indeed devoted to neuroscientific problems and their philosophical interpretation, it deals with a wider range of questions, which form the basis of the worldview of most modern people. Author tries to understand whether the reductionist materialistic worldview that dominates today, especially in the neurosciences, is really capable of plausibly explaining the current evidence about the nature of the relationship between mental processes and the physical world. The book concludes by outlining modern philosophical positions alternative to orthodox physicalism and tries to summarize them in a unified system.
... Studies show that individuals who place moral values and standards central to their self-concept tend to display more prosocial behaviors than those who do not (e.g., Aquino et al., 2009;Jordan et al., 2011). For instance, if an individual acts consistently with his or her moral values (e.g., benevolence, honesty, forgiving, and helpful), rather than pursuing selfinterest values (e.g., achievement, being successful and ambitious), he or she possesses a moral personality (Blasi, 2009). ...
Spirituality continues to exert a strong influence in people’s lives both in work and beyond. However, given that spirituality is often non-formalized and personal, we continue to know little about how moral reasoning is strategized. In this paper, we examine how Buddhist leader-practitioners interpret and operationalize a process of self-decentralization based upon Buddhist emptiness theory as a form of moral reasoning. We find that Buddhist leader-practitioners share a common understanding of a self-decentralized identity and operationalize self-decentralization through two practices in Buddhist philosophy—skillful means and the middle way—to foreground social outcomes. However, we also find that practitioners face tensions and challenges in moral reasoning relates to agency—the ‘re-centering’ of the self as an enlightened self and the use of karmic reasoning to justify (un)ethical behavior—and contextual constraints that lead to feelings of vulnerability and exclusion. We present a model that elaborates these processes and invite further research that examines novel approaches and dynamic interpretations of the self in moral reasoning.
... Therefore, it has long been claimed that moral reasoning is important but insufficient aiming to explain prosocial behaviour (Blasi, 1980). Recent research shows that people do not necessarily need to perceive values as part of their own self, but if they are considered more important than other personal values, they become part of their identity over time (Blasi, 2009). A recently performed meta-analysis of 111 studies on moral identity and moral behaviour substantially confirms the idea that moral identity encourages ethical and prosocial behaviour and inhibits the manifestation of antisocial behaviour (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016) as the adolescent's behaviour reflects their moral decisions, reasoning and internalisation of values. ...
The purpose of the current qualitative cross-sectional design study was to examine relations between the internalisation of moral values and prosocial behaviour as well as tolerance towards antisocial behaviour in adolescence. A total of 385 adolescents (192 girls and 193 boys) aged 13 and 16 years (mean age = 14.6, SD = 1.11) completed the self-reported measures of moral values internalisation, adolescents’ prosocial behaviour, and tolerance towards antisocial behaviour. Girls scored significantly higher than boys on moral values internalisation and such prosocial behaviour types as altruism and help in emergency situations. Girls were significantly less tolerant towards antisocial behaviour. Multiple regression analysis showed that external and introjected value regulations were the significant predictors of altruistic behaviour. Only the identified regulation was a significant predictor of adolescents’ intention to help others in emergency situations. Adolescent tolerance towards antisocial behaviour was predicted by the identified and integrated value regulations. Overall, these findings reflected the importance of personal values, especially moral values for encouraging adolescents’ moral behaviour and intolerance towards antisocial behaviour of peers.
... From the point of view of ecological morality, inconsistency between the heuristics underlying judgments and the purported reasons for these judgments is to be expected. This does not mean that judgments never rely on reasoning processes and that deliberative moral reasoning does not have its place (Blasi, 2009;Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008). Yet we do not consider it helpful to explain the inconsistencies by a dichotomy of moral intuition versus reasoning, as done by dual-process theories (see Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996;Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). ...
Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht, wie Menschen Urteile und Entscheidungen in moralischen Situationen unter Unsicherheit treffen. In theoretischer Hinsicht wird Verhalten in moralischen Situationen aus der Perspektive begrenzter und ökologischer Rationalität analysiert, die das Zusammenspiel zwischen Kognition und der Struktur der Umwelt betont. Empirisch ist das Ziel, moralische Urteile und Verhalten unter epistemischen Bedingungen zu untersuchen, denen Menschen in der realen Welt begegnen. Das erste Projekt diskutiert aus der Perspektive ökologischer Rationalität wie das Zusammenspiel von Heuristiken und Umwelt hilft, moralisches Verhalten zu verstehen, das inkonsistent erscheint, solange es durch Charaktereigenschaften erklärt wird. Aus dieser Perspektive ist es entscheidend, soziale Umwelten zu untersuchen, da Urteile und Verhalten in moralischen Situationen oft nicht durch speziell moralische Regeln sondern durch moralisch neutrale, soziale Heuristiken entstehen können, die den Zusammenhalt sozialer Gruppen fördern. Das zweite Projekt untersucht empirisch Entscheidungen in sozialen Dilemmata. Die Kernfrage ist, wie Kooperation durch den Risikograd geprägt wird, sowie durch die Art, wie Risikoinformationen erworben werden (durch Beschreibung oder Erfahrung), im Vergleich zu nicht-sozialen Situationen mit gleichem Risiko. Kooperation variierte systematisch mit dem Risikograd, aber wie Informationen erworben wurden war nur in den nicht-sozialen Situationen relevant. Prozessdaten und Teilnehmerberichte legen nahe, dass diese Diskrepanz auf Entscheidungsprozessen beruhen könnte, in denen Erwartungen über das Verhaltens anderer sowie die Höhe der Verdienste wichtiger sind als deren Wahrscheinlichkeit. Das dritte Projekt vergleicht Urteile in moralischen Dilemmata, in denen der Verlauf der Ereignisse noch ungewiss ist (Vorschau), mit Situationen, in denen bereits sicher ist, ob negative Nebeneffekte auftreten oder nicht (Rückschau). Die Ergebnisse zeigen einen Rückschaufehler in moralischen Urteilen sowie bei der Wahrscheinlichkeitseinschätzung der Nebeneffekte. Der Unterschied zwischen moralischen Urteilen unter Sicherheit und Unsicherheit wirft die Frage auf, inwieweit sich empirische Ergebnisse generalisieren lassen, die auf den üblicherweise untersuchten moralischen Dilemmata basieren, wie z.B. den „Trolley“-Fällen, in denen alles mit Sicherheit feststeht.
... What are some of these moral intuitions? There are now a number of methodological 228 strategies and systems that seek to identify and classify moral intuitions or ''heuristics'' 229 (Blasi 2009 (Haidt and Joseph 2005). The moral foundations are referred to as Care/ 237 harm (issues related to harm, suffering, and care); Fairness/Reciprocity (equality, fairness, 238 and justice); Ingroup/Loyalty (in-group affiliation and preferential favor); Authority/Respect 239 (hierarchy, authority, and obedience); and Purity/Sanctity (issues related to the purity and 240 sanctity of the human body and ''sacred'' spaces of meaning). ...
Despite widespread pedagogical efforts to modify discrete behaviors in developing physicians, the professionalism movement has generally shied away from essential questions such as what virtues characterize the good physician, and how are those virtues formed? Although there is widespread adoption of medical ethics curricula, there is still no consensus about the primary goals of ethics education. Two prevailing perspectives dominate the literature, constituting what is sometimes referred to as the "virtue/skill dichotomy". The first perspective argues that teaching ethics is a means of providing physicians with a skill set for analyzing and resolving ethical dilemmas. The second perspective suggests that teaching ethics is a means of creating virtuous physicians. The authors argue that this debate about medical ethics education mirrors the Rationalist-Intuitionist debate in contemporary moral psychology. In the following essay, the authors sketch the relevance of the Rationalist-Intuitionist debate to medical ethics and professionalism. They then outline a moral intuitionist model of virtuous caring that derives from but also extends the "social intuitionist model" of moral action and virtue. This moral intuitionist model suggests several practical implications specifically for medical character education but also for health science education in general. This approach proposes that character development is best accomplished by tuning-up (activating) moral intuitions, amplifying (intensifying) moral emotions related to intuitions, and strengthening (expanding) intuition-expressive, emotion-related moral virtues, more than by "learning" explicit ethical rules or principles.
... Les travaux de Blasi (Blasi, , 1984(Blasi, , 1988(Blasi, , 1990(Blasi, , 1995(Blasi, , 1998(Blasi, , 1999(Blasi, , 2004a(Blasi, , 2004b(Blasi, , 2009(Blasi, , 2010Blasi and Glodis, 1995;Blasi and Milton, 1991;Blasi, Noam and Wren, 1993) sont particulièrement pertinents pour l'éthique professionnelle dans le domaine de la santé, et plus spécifiquement en ce qui a trait aux façons dont l'éthique normative (à travers les codes de déontologie, les politiques de santé, les lois sur la santé, les théories éthiques, etc.) s'intériorise et acquiert une valeur personnelle pour le PDS (dans l'identité professionnelle) (Blasi, Noam and Wren, 1993 de la « petite éthique » de , de la théorie du soi et des modes identitaires (Blasi, Noam and Wren, 1993). Ce processus implique trois étapes successives : 1) une mise en perspective de la posture épistémologique particulière du bioéthicien et du PDS assujettis à de hauts standards éthiques en pratique, à la lumière de la L'expérience éthique ne peut être subdivisée en parties. ...
If the competency approach seems to be particularly valorised in Canada and in the United States for orienting the practice of health care professionals (HCP) – and in clinical bioethics – material that could provide with a better understanding of the psychological, ontological and philosophical foundations of these competencies seems rather limited in the bioethical literature. The tools that are generally available can be divided into four main categories: 1) official documents (e.g., code of ethics, institutional policies); 2) the main ethical theories (e.g., virtue ethics, theories of justice, principlism); 3) scientific references (e.g., journals, books); 4) decision-making tools. These documents are important for bioethicists and HCPs, but their disparities and even contradictions, coupled with poor knowledge in professional ethics, may be a significant source of confusion in the decision making process and even lead to behaviour that does not meet the ethical standards of HCP. This thesis is an upstream reflection regarding these tools, whose pragmatic character has the disadvantage of simplifying theoretical reflection at the benefit of more concrete evidence useful for practical decision making. This project aims at developing the foundations for a flexible and inclusive model – a model of deontological reflexivity (MDR) – that will: 1) present the main philosophical, psychological, sociological and deontological landmarks characterising ethical issues encountered in practice; 2) understand, from a psychological and developmental perspective, the personal and professional requirements inherent to the status of the health care professional in the current context of health care. A theoretical enterprise, this project primarily consists in relating, in a dynamic manner, a variety of dimensions (legal, ethical, clinical, psychological) at work in complex ethical situations encountered by HCPs and bioethicists, inspired by the concept of ethical sensitivity, the “petite éthique” of Paul Ricoeur (1990), the self theory along with Blasi's Identity modes (Blasi, 1993). The analysis process will consist in three successive phases: 1) a putting into perspective of the bioethicist's and HCPs’ epistemological posture in light of the “petite éthique” of Paul Ricoeur (1990); 2) an interdisciplinary literature review of “ethical sensitivity” in order to propose a definition of the concept and place it into perspective with other ethical competencies; 3) the development of a framework regarding professional ethics iv and identity (professional ethics identity tendencies, PEIT), inspired both by the self theory and Blasi's Identity modes. These PEITs provide a normative benchmark related to the construction of identity in the health care context and suggest some innovative avenues for professional ethics research and education. This research wish to elaborate the theoretical foundations that will be utilised further in the future to develop the model of deontological reflexivity (MDR).
... In merito a ciò, è bene specificare che non è la competizione in sé a determinare comportamenti antisociali o prosociali, quanto, tra gli altri, la struttura e l'orientamento motivazionale. Nel modello euristico del comportamento prosociale proposto da Eisenberg (1986) e, successivamente, da Eisenberg e colleghi (1999; e da Blasi (2009), infatti, tra le variabili individuali che possono influenzare l'azione morale troviamo gli obiettivi personali e l'identità del sé. Queste due dimensioni poco si discostano dalle componenti di base della struttura del sé, definita da Shields e Bredemeier (1995), come il sistema psicologico attraverso il quale gli individui percepiscono la propria identità e valore, in grado di incidere sull'azione morale attraverso l'influenza sull'intenzione morale. ...
psicologia dello sport Il Giornale Italiano di psicologia dello sport Organo ufficiale dell'ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA PSICOLOGIA DELLO SPORT NUMERO 15 -settembre/dicembre -2012 summary sommario Ricerche Ricerche Ricerche Ricerche Esperienze 3 13 21 27 33 41 L'arbitro come "computer in un'ampolla": analisi discorsiva dell'identità professionale Praticare ginnastica artistica in adolescenza: fattore di rischio o di protezione per l'immagine corporea? Comportamento dell'allenatore e burnout degli atleti: uno studio esplorativo Equilibrio dinamico misurato con l'Eight Balance Test: relazioni con BMI ed età reale nella media fanciullezza Comportamenti prosociali e antisociali in ambito sportivo e orientamento motivazionale di giovani atleti Analisi di un intervento scolastico con strumenti di psicologia dello sport a favore della motivazione allo studio e della concentrazione di adolescenti Ricerche
Moral identity theorists argue that moral action is explained by the centrality of moral values to a person’s identity. Moral identity theorists refer to moral integration as both the process by which moral values become central to a person’s identity and the state an individual is in when a given moral value is central to their identity. While moral identity theorists appeal to autobiographical narratives to determine the state of moral integration in an individual, they have little to say about the role of autobiographical narratives in articulating the process of moral integration. The aim of this paper is to argue that appealing to autobiographical narratives supports the view that moral integration is a learning process the outcome of which is the acquisition of an understanding of moral concepts that is exercised in moral deliberation. Since moral identity theorists argue that moral integration is empirically correlated to a sustained commitment to moral action, the upshot of the argument of this paper is an account that elucidates the relationship between moral identity, moral action and moral deliberation.
This foundational text was one of the first books to integrate work from moral philosophy, developmental/moral psychology, applied psychology, political and social economy, and political science, as well as business scholarship. Twenty years on, this third edition utilizes ideas from the first two to provide readers with a practical model for ethical decision making and includes examples from I-O research and practice, as well as current business events. The book incorporates diverse perspectives into a "framework for taking moral action" based on learning points from each chapter. Examples and references have been updated throughout, and sections on moral psychology, economic justice, the "replicability crisis," and open science have been expanded and the "radical behavioral challenge" to ethical decision-making is critiqued. In fifteen clearly structured and theory-based chapters, the author also presents a variety of ethical incidents reported by practicing I-O psychologists. This is the ideal resource for Ethics and I-O courses at the graduate and doctoral level. Academics in Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management will also benefit from this book, as well as anyone interested in Ethics in Psychology and Business.
Background: Moral behavior was defined as a set of socially accepted behaviors that may be either internal or external. Studies have reported on the effect of social cognitive training to improvement moral, also, coaching by empowering effect on this behavior. However, compares the effect these trainings in girl students of high/secondary school has been overlooked.
Aims: The present study conducted to compare the effect of social cognitive training & coaching on moral behavior in girl students of high/secondary school.
Methods: Research method was quasi-experimental with pre-test, post- test, three-month follow-up with control group. The statistical population consist of girl students of high/secondary school resident in second district of Tehran city in 1400 years. Sampling method was Convenience Sampling. 45 available students selected (fifteen in each experimental group) and replaced randomly in experimental group 1 (social cognitive training) and experimental group 2 (coaching training). Fifteen other student placed in control group and did not receive any training. The moral behavior Inventory (Sabet, Delavar, Pashasharifi & Khoshnevisan, 1394) was administered pre-test, post-test and follow-up. The training packages were social cognitive training package (Ann Vernon, 1395) and coaching training package (bazarqan, 1397). Social cognitive training and coaching training applied on experimental groups (ninety minutes each session) weekly and the control group did not receive any training. The data analyzed by mixed analysis variance.
Results: Results showed that both of Social cognitive training and coaching training were affected the same on increasing to moral behavior in girl students of high/secondary school (p
In this article, we introduce the four component model (FCM), which describes both the internal processes that play distinct roles in the production of moral behavior and their associated sets of relevant, teachable skills. We use this model as an analytic framework to examine college students’ moral character experiences reported in the Wabash National Study. We also examine whether the skills they used were related to their progress toward self-authorship. We report which FCM skills were used most frequently and that participants who were more self-authored used different sets of skills than their counterparts who held less complex meaning-making assumptions. We conclude by discussing the complexity of moral character and the implications of using the FCM for practitioners and researchers working in this domain.
Gratitude is considered to be a moral emotion with a variety of relationships with moral functions. The evolution of gratitude in human development occurs in stages and these stages are discussed while drawing parallels to the origins of morality and moral development in children. Distinctions between moral cognition and affect are related to the role of gratitude as a moral function. Gratitude finds a home with other moral emotions such as shame, guilt, pride, and awe, all of which perform important functions as motivations of human behavior. Finally, the role of transcendent gratitude to moral communities is discussed.
We propose a three-way interaction model based on substitutes for leadership theory to explore the relationship among ethical leadership, moral personality, and moral ideology (i.e., idealism and relativism) on two types of employee voluntary behaviors (i.e., organizational citizenship behavior and workplace deviant behavior). Results from a sample of 218 supervisor–subordinate dyads indicate that moral personality attenuates the relationship between ethical leadership and employee voluntary behaviors. Idealism serves as the boundary condition for the moderating effect of moral personality. However, relativism only serves as the boundary condition for the moderating effect of moral personality when predicting workplace deviant behavior.
While much of the existing research regarding moral exemplarity has focused on living individuals, examination of the lives of historical figures can also prove invaluable in understanding moral motivation. Consequently, this paper sought to apply Frimer and Walker's (2009) reconciliation model and methodology in examining themes of agency and communion in the motivation of Miep Gies. Frimer and Walker's (2009) Self-Understanding Interview and the VEiN coding method (Frimer, Walker, and Dunlop, 2009) served as guides for examining published and audio-recorded interviews, biographical and autobiographical information, as well as video-recorded speeches given by Gies. Aspects of an integrated moral identity appeared evident in the personality of Miep Gies as indicated in statements reflecting an overlap of both agency and communion. The study was limited in its reliance on publically available documents about or by Gies. Further, reliance on these documents, as opposed to a "live" interview, limited the ability of the author to identify responses to all questions included in Frimer and Walker's (2009) interview or fully utilize the VEiN coding method (Frimer et al., 2009). Exploration of life narratives of historical figures can provide insight into an integrated moral identity as well as examples of developmental crossroads Frimer and Walker (2009) cited as essential in their reconciliation model. Comprehension of this reconciliation process is critical to understanding what lies at the heart of moral motivation and action as well as the ability to promote such growth in the lives of others. Copyright © 2015 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
Moral exemplars provide us with important case studies of optimal moral flourishing. Although most historians rate Abraham Lincoln as the most moral American president, their analyses do not utilize the perspective of moral development theory or research. This project asked whether such a perspective could contribute to a better understanding of Lincoln's abundantly well-examined self and actions. This study examined the moral self of U.S. President Abraham Lincoln through close textual analysis of his brief autobiographical writings and his ethical turning point, his 1854 Peoria Speech attacking the morality of slavery. Even the limited sample of one major speech and three brief writings about life events provided evidence for the usefulness of McAdams' method of examining life narratives for central themes and textual elements and for Colby and Damon's (1992) method of interviewing exemplars and identifying common traits. Our methods allowed for no carefully constructed interview or clarification questions but rather relied on historical texts constructed for political goals. Major figures in the exploration of moral selves suggest that the centrality of morality to people's sense of self lies at the heart of moral motivation and action. Studies of historical moral exemplars provide individuals and organizations with powerful role models for optimal ethical functioning and highlight the importance of fostering the centrality of morality in organizational leaders. Copyright © 2015 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
In behavioral ethics today, there is debate as to which theory of moral development is the best for understanding ethical decision making, thereby facilitating ethical behavior. This debate between behavioral ethicists has been profoundly influenced by the field of moral psychology. Unfortunately, in the course of this marriage between moral psychology and business ethics and subsequent internal debate, a simple but critical understanding of human being in the field of management has been obscured; i.e., that morality is not a secondary phenomenon arising out of something else. Therefore, in this paper, we will argue that there is a need in behavioral ethics to shift our understanding away from the influence of contemporary moral psychology and back to management theorist Ghoshal’s (Acad Manag Learn Educ 4(1):75-91, 2005) view of what it means to be human in which the moral is fundamental. To assist in this labor, we will build on the philosophical work of Emmanuel Levinas who sees ethics, regardless of the setting, as a metaphysical concern. What this means is that Levinas sees the essential moral character of human life and the reality of human agency as ontologically fundamental, or constitutive of human nature itself. In other words, the ethical is the “first cause” in regard to understanding the nature and action of the individual, including within organizations. Thus, morality in any sphere of human endeavor, including in business, is not merely epiphenomenal to some more fundamental reality.
Moral foundations theory chastises cognitive developmental theory for having foisted on moral psychology a restrictive conception of the moral domain which involves arbitrarily elevating the values of justice and caring. The account of this negative influence on moral psychology, referred to in the moral foundations theory literature as the ‘great narrowing’, involves several interrelated claims concerning the scope of the moral domain construct in cognitive moral developmentalism, the procedure by which it was initially elaborated, its empirical grounds and the influence of this conception of the moral domain on research in moral psychology. Examining these claims in light of key theoretical writings on the moral domain concept in cognitive moral developmentalism, the paper shows that the ‘great narrowing’ narrative is misinformed, superficial and historically inaccurate. On the basis of this critical analysis, we conclude that the primary heuristic value of the ‘great narrowing narrative’ is as a case lesson in the deep specificity of competing conceptions of the moral domain to the theoretical frameworks in which they are devised.
This article analyzes the moral and political implications of strong moral character for political action. The treatment provides reason to hold that strong moral character should play a role in a robust normative account of political leadership. The case is supported by empirical findings on character dispositions and the political viability of the account’s normative prescriptions.
Moral intelligence is grounded in emotion and reason. Neuroscientific and clinical research illustrate how early life co-regulation with caregivers influences emotion, cognition, and moral character. Triune ethics theory (Narvaez, 2008) integrates neuroscientific, evolutionary, and developmental findings to explain differences in moral functioning, identifying security, engagement, and imagination ethics that can be dispositionally fostered by experience during sensitive periods, but also situationally triggered. Mature moral functioning relies on the integration of emotion, intuition, and reasoning, which come together in adaptive ethical expertise. Moral expertise can be cultivated in organizations using the integrative ethical education model.
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