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Beleid in sluipende crisistijd: het Belgische relaas van COVID-19- gedreven beleidsleren
Abstract
COVID-19 bracht ons land in een sluipende beleidscrisis. Het virus kwam in golven, liet zich voelen op tal van vlakken en zette aan tot maatschappelijke discussie en conflict. Overheidsbeleid errond was van meet af aan cruciaal, maar zeker niet evident. En dat maakte beleidsleren tijdens de voorbije twee jaren tot een belangrijke must. Inzicht in dat beleidsleren is er vandaag al wel. Maar tot heden is er nog relatief weinig over bekend in crisistijd. In deze bijdrage exploreren we twee types beleidsleren. Enerzijds is er instrumenteel leren dat zich operationeel uit in aanpassingen van beleidsinstrumenten die de overheid inzet. Anderzijds is er de meer fundamentele variant van sociaal leren die zich toont ingeval paradigma’s en beleidsdoelen wijzigen. Kwamen deze types beleidsleren echt voor tijdens het Belgische COVID-19-beleid? En zo ja, wanneer dan? We exploreren hun voorkomen en hun dynamiek via een uitgebreide documentenanalyse. En dit laat ons toe om het Belgische COVID-19-beleid van 2020 en 2021 te reconstrueren aan de hand van drie episodes. Het nationaal gevoerde beleid kende eerst een crisiscontrolerende episode tot medio 2020 waarin vooral instrumenteel leren de boventoon voerde. Daarop volgde, tot het eind van dat eerste crisisjaar, een periode met veel sociaal leren en zoeken naar meer beleidslegitimiteit. En die episode ging over in één die zich tot eind 2021 kenmerkte door wederom vooral instrumenteel leren en een crisisbeleid dat een duidelijk verbredende turn had genomen. Dit unieke relaas van COVID-19-gedreven beleidsleren zet aan tot denken over beleid(sleren) in crisistijd. Zijn er nog andere leertrajecten te spotten? Hoe gaan beleidsmakers er (best) mee om? En wat is de status van onze learning governance? Er zijn tal van vragen en issues voor beleidsonderzoek en -praktijk. Enkele ervan leggen we op basis van onze verkennende studie voor.
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Policy learning is an increasingly salient concept in public policy research and practice. With growing theoretical advancements, it offers substantial value for policy analysis. However, the field's conceptual state calls for refinement, and its burgeoning literature calls for a much-needed synthesis. We address these calls by conducting a systematic literature review of empirical policy learning articles with a focus on synthesizing a growing, yet relatively fragmented, body of research and addressing inherent conceptual clarity issues. In total, 147 articles were analyzed and integrated into an overarching framework offering a background conceptualization of policy learning that complements and supplements existing conceptual approaches. This conceptualization is centered on understanding the interplay between policy issues, information and knowledge, systems and structures, and context. In conclusion, an extensive research agenda on policy learning is proposed to help advance public policy theory, research, and practice.
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought forward myriad challenges to public policy, central of which is understanding the different contextual factors that can influence the effectiveness of policy responses across different systems. In this article, we explore how trust in government can influence the ability of COVID-19 policy responses to curb excess mortality during the pandemic. Our findings indicate that stringent policy responses play a central role in curbing excess mortality. They also indicate that such relationship is not only influenced by systematic and structural factors, but also by citizens' trust in government. We leverage our findings to propose a set of recommendations for policy-makers on how to enhance crisis policymaking and strengthen the designs of the widely used underlying policy learning processes.
Like many Western European countries, Belgium and the Netherlands have been strongly hit by COVID-19. Almost simultaneously, the virus spread, caused a relatively high number of infections and severe lockdown measures were imposed; however, at the same time, the crisis management response has been sufficiently different to justify a systematic comparative analysis. We start with the premise that decisions made on the basis of incomplete information show the true nature of governments’ response to a crisis, which is conditioned by legacies arising from the past and organizational cultures, existing and new governance structures, and strategies used by specific actors. We show that the difference in crisis management echoes the countries’ different types of consociationalism, though also that Belgian federalism and Dutch decentralism impeded a truly coherent response. The cost of coordinating different government levels made a uniform approach difficult too. Actor strategies attempting to exploit the crisis seem to have influenced the response the least but did have an impact on perceptions of the response.
Points for practitioners
The article unravels how the governments in the Low Countries responded to the COVID-19 challenge in the first half of 2020. It allows practitioners to better understand that under circumstances of an imminent crisis, specific governance structures matter. It also reveals that the cost of coordination between the federated and the federal level turned out to be quite high in Belgium. In the Netherlands, a lot of autonomy was left to federated and local authorities. This too impeded a more coherent approach. COVID-19 certainly offers possibilities for policymakers to exploit the crisis but opportunities are not always taken.
COVID‐19 presented Europe with an, in many respects, unprecedented challenge. While the virus proved itself to be transnational in nature, not taking heed of borders, government responses were largely national. Still, governments soon found themselves engaged in complex multi‐level policy cooperation at the national, subnational, and supranational levels. This paper looks at the crisis response in the Low Countries (Belgium and the Netherlands) to understand the impact of this process on the political system. We argue that efficient multi‐level policy cooperation in both countries has run up against the limits of existing institutions, leading to significant political grievances. In Belgium, slow negotiation between the central and regional governments has put the federal system in question. In the Netherlands, meanwhile, the absence of European institutions tasked with fiscal policy coordination has increased the salience of the EU fiscal sphere once again.
In this article, we explain how the COVID-19 wicked crisis context influences the quality of critically needed epistemic policy learning and undermines policy effectiveness. We explore those influences on two main dimensions: Vertically (pertaining to the selection of core scientific advice) and horizontally (pertaining to managing scientific interdisciplinarity). We apply the concept using COVID-19 policy responses from England and Belgium, offer an explanatory framework, and provide recommendations for policymakers, including (i) Crafting a policy-science-public narrative maintaining independence, openness, and trust. (ii) Outlining the limitations of science and public expectation setting. (iii) Enhancing interdisciplinarity in policy formulation by utilizing boundary and discipline-spanning structures, and systems thinking mechanisms for dynamic problem synthesis. ARTICLE HISTORY
This paper discusses the corona virus crisis legislation in Belgium, against the background of a political crisis. It raises the questions how a minority government could find legitimacy to take drastic measures that impact upon fundamental rights and how the political crisis impacted the position of Parliament. This is examined from the viewpoint of input, throughput and output legitimacy, and with a comparison to the position of Parliament in Belgium during earlier crises and in the federated entities. The conclusions point to the increased importance of expert advice, an over-use of ministerial police powers, but also to a more important role for Parliament than what we could have expected under the reign of a majority government. While the political crisis did not hinder firm intervention in an initial phase, it is, however, problematic to deal with the effects of the crisis over the longer term.
This paper uses a systematic review of the main literature in the field to shed light on different operationalizations of the main classifications of policy instruments. Although the literature offers a large number of instrument taxonomies, many of them act as theoretical guidelines rather than operational concepts that can help to disentangle the different features of governing actions. This paper provides a review of the most frequently used policy instrument typologies and, through a meta‐analysis, analyses how instrument typologies have been differentially adopted to explain real‐world phenomena. The results are a high degree of heterogeneity in citation frequency, the polyhedral nature of the concept of policy instruments, a divide between typologies focused on governmental resources and those focused on drivers of expected behaviour, and “labellism”. Thus, what emerges is the urgency of a process of convergence towards a common framework.
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en The COVID‐19 crisis is a stark reminder that modern society is vulnerable to a special species of trouble: the creeping crisis. The creeping crisis poses a deep challenge to both academics and practitioners. In the crisis literature, it remains ill‐defined and understudied. It is even harder to manage. As a threat, it carries a potential for societal disruption—but that potential is not fully understood. An accumulation of these creeping crises can erode public trust in institutions. This paper proposes a definition of a creeping crisis, formulates research questions, and identifies the most relevant theoretical approaches. It provides the building blocks for the systematic study of creeping crises.
摘要
zh 2019新型冠状病毒(COVID‐19)是一个严峻提示: 现代社会在慢性危机这一特殊困难面前是脆弱的。慢性危机为学术界和从业人员都造成了一个巨大挑战。在相关文献中, 慢性危机的定义并不清晰且缺乏研究。管理慢性危机更为困难。作为一种威胁, 它具备扰乱社会的潜能, 但这种潜能目前没有被完全理解。这类慢性危机的累积能削弱公众对政府机构的信任。本文提出了对慢性危机的定义, 制定了研究问题, 并识别了最为相关的理论措施。本文为有关慢性危机的系统性研究提供了基础。
Resumen
es La crisis de COVID‐19 es un claro recordatorio de que la sociedad moderna es vulnerable a una especie especial de problemas: la crisis progresiva. La progresiva crisis plantea un profundo desafío tanto para los académicos como para los profesionales. En la literatura, permanece mal definida y poco estudiada. Es aún más difícil de manejar. Como amenaza, conlleva un potencial de disrupción social, pero ese potencial no se comprende completamente. La acumulación de estas crisis progresivas puede erosionar la confianza pública en las instituciones. Este artículo propone una definición de crisis progresiva, formula preguntas de investigación e identifica los enfoques teóricos más relevantes. Proporciona los componentes básicos para el estudio sistemático de las crisis progresivas.
It seems paradoxical to suggest that theories of learning might be used to explain policy failure. Yet the Brexit fiasco connects with recent approaches linking varieties of policy learning to policy pathologies. This article sets out to explain the UK government’s (mis)management of the Brexit process from June 2016 to May 2019 from a policy learning perspective. Drawing on interviews with UK policy-makers and stakeholders, we ask how did the UK government seek to learn during the Brexit negotiations? We consider four modes of learning: reflexivity, epistemic, hierarchical, and bargaining. By empirically tracing the policy process and scope conditions for each of these, we argue that learning through the first three modes proved highly dysfunctional. This forced the government to rely on bargaining between competing factions, producing a highly political form of learning which stymied the development of a coherent Brexit strategy. We argue that the analysis of Brexit as a policy process – rather than a political event – reveals how policy dynamics play an important role in shaping the political context within which they are located. The article concludes that public policy analysis can, therefore, add significant value to our understanding of Brexit by endogenising accounts of macro political developments.
Whilst the literature classifies policy learning in terms of types or ontological approaches (reflexive and social constructivist learning versus rational up-dating of priors), we offer a three-dimensional approach to explore the relationships between individual learning, learning in groups and the macro-dimension. Our contribution maps most (although not all) lively debates in the field on a multidimensional space and explores the logic of causality from micro to macro. To achieve these two aims, we draw on Coleman’s ‘bath-tub’. We map learning in the bath-tub by considering prominent studies on learning but also, in some cases, by exploring and drawing lessons from political science and behavioural sciences. By integrating findings in an eclectic way, we explain the logic of learning using a single template and suggest methods for empirical analysis. This is not a literature review but an original attempt to capture the causal architecture of the field, contributing to learning theory with findings from mainstream political and behavioural sciences.
This paper investigates the question whether different forms of policy learning influence each other. The focus is on relationships between different forms of policy learning, which are explored on the basis of case study research in the field of research, technology and innovation policy-making in Austria. Methods utilised are expert interviews and document analysis besides literature and media recherché. With the goal to better understand the mechanisms behind learning processes, different forms of knowledge utilisation are linked to organisation types. The analysis suggests that the introduction of radical policy innovations was possible because different forms of learning were mutually beneficial and enabled actors to reach their goals. Learning about how to obtain political goals provided opportunities to increase the leverage of learning on policy instruments and goals, whilst insights into policies from other countries were also utilised for political learning.
The new orthodoxy in studies of policy dynamics is that policy change occurs through a homeostatic process. “Perturbations” occurring outside of an institutionalized policy subsystem, often characterized as some type of societal or political upheaval or learning, are critical for explaining the development of profound and durable policy changes which are otherwise limited by “endogenous” institutional stability. These homeostatic assumptions, while useful for assessing many cases of policy change, do not adequately capture the historical patterns of policy development found in many sectors. The roots of this problem are traced back to the origins of the new orthodoxy in comparative policy research whereby different levels (orders) of policy making have been incorrectly juxtaposed, providing a parsimonious, but sometimes empirically incorrect, view of policy change. Revising existing taxonomies of policy levels provides a superior identification of the processes of change, and uncovers more than one mechanism through which significant policy change can occur. Three of these alternative mechanisms – a “neo-homeostatic” one in which paradigmatic changes occur through endogenous shifts in goals; a “quasi-homeostatic” in which exogenous factors influence changes in objectives and settings; and a “thermostatic” one in which durable policy objectives require that settings adapt to exogenous changes – are discussed.
Several different explanations of policy change based on notions of learning have emerged in the policy literature to challenge conventional conflict-oriented theories. These include notions of political-learning developed by Heclo, policy-oriented learning developed by Sabatier, lesson-drawing analyzed by Rose, social learning discussed by Hall and government learning identified by Etheredge. These different concepts identify different actors and different effects with each different type of learning. Some elements of these theories are compatible, while others are not. This article examines each approach in terms of who learns, what they learn, and the effects of learning on subsequent policies. The conclusion is that three distinct types of learning have often been incorrectly juxtaposed. Certain conceptual, theoretical and methodological difficulties attend any attempt to attribute policy change to policy learning, but this does not detract from the important reorientation of policy analysis that this approach represents.
The growing technical uncertainties and complexities of problems of global concern have made international policy coordination not only increasingly necessary but also increasingly difficult. If decision makers are unfamiliar with the technical aspects of a specific problem, how do they define state interests and develop viable solutions? What factors shape their behavior? Under conditions of uncertainty, what are the origins of international institutions? And how can we best study the processes through which international policy coordination and order emerge? While a variety of analytic approaches have been used to address the problems of international cooperation, the approaches have yielded only fragmentary insights. At its core, the study of policy coordination among states involves arguments about determinism versus free will and about the ways in which the international system is maintained and transformed. Among the overlapping topics of debate are whether national behavior is determined or broadly conditioned by system-level factors, unit-level factors, or some complex interplay between the two; whether state policymakers can identify national interests and behave independently of pressures from the social groups they nominally represent; and whether states respond consistently to opportunities to create, defend, or expand their own wealth and power, to enhance collective material benefits, or to promote nonmaterial values.' A related question of
IMPACT
Policy-makers face significant challenges responding to technically complex, multidimensional, large-scale, and socially-embedded crises such as Covid-19. In this article, the authors call for policy-makers to expand the horizon on expertise at the policy design table. This is by including public management experts and practitioners as policy co-designers. With their in-field experience, situated knowledge of social contexts and public administration capacities, public management experts can provide critical insights into the design of crisis policy responses. This approach entails setting management and co-ordination frameworks that ensure the functional integration of insights from a range of multi-disciplinary experts into the policy learning process.
This article explores how policy learning can improve comparative policy analysis by focusing on causality in learning processes. After summarizing the comparative credentials of the policy learning literature, the article outlines a framework of four learning modes, relating it to three approaches of causality: deterministic, probabilistic, and set-theoretic. It then builds on this to explore different approaches to causation and learning in relation to: policy change, political contexts, and, finally, the temporal and spatial dimensions of comparative policy analysis. The article concludes by showing how these challenges are addressed and suggesting implications for further research.
The COVID‐19 crisis has shown that European countries still remain poorly prepared for dealing and coping with health crises and for responding in a coordinated way to a severe influenza pandemic. Within the EU, the response to the COVID‐19 virus has a striking diversity in its approach. By focusing on Belgium, France, Germany and Italy, four countries which represent different models of administrative systems in Europe, the analysis shows that major similarities and convergences have become apparent from a cross‐countries perspective. Moreover, coping with the crises has been first and foremost an issue of the national states whereas the European voice has been weak. Hence, the countries' immediate responses has appeared to be Corona‐nationalistic, which we label as Coronationalism.
The paper shows to what extent the four countries adopted different crisis management strategies and which factors explain this variance, with a special focus on their institutional settings and administrative systems.
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In the Covid‐19 crisis, society pins its hope on science to play an authoritative role in reducing uncertainty and ambiguity. But is science up to the task? We argue that this far from self‐evident. The demands on science in times of crisis run counter to the values of good, normal science. Crisis science needs to be fast, univocal, personalized and direct, while normal science is slow, contentious, collective and sensitive to complexity. Science can only play its atypical role if it is staged in the public arena. Some patterns of staging stand out; personalisation, visualisation and the connection to lived experiences. So far, the staging of science has been successful but is fragile. The Covid‐19 crisis shows the potential of well‐staged forms of alliance between science and policy, but when the general assumption is that scientists will ‘solve’ societal ‘problems’, the staging of science has gone too far.
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This article fills a gap in the literature on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) by examining the role that epistemic communities play in the policy. It follows an interdisciplinary approach for categorising their role in the ENP and the use of their knowledge by policymakers. Based on the examination of two key areas of the ENP, anti-corruption and rural development, the study challenges one-dimensional assumptions, which claim that expertise and knowledge improve the technical-economic efficiency of EU policies. The findings of this research suggest that the knowledge of epistemic communities takes three different forms for policymakers: political/symbolic, instrumental and conceptual.
Although learning in networks is key to transitions, the literature has juxtaposed the different actors involved. Based on a conceptual review, we posit that four distinct collective actors engage in learning in transitions: technology constituencies, epistemic communities, instrument constituencies, and advocacy coalitions. Technology constituencies promote the adoption of specific socio-technical alternatives by citizens, businesses, or governments. Epistemic communities shed light on sustainability issues at the science-policy interface. Instrument constituencies promote the creation and diffusion of specific governance arrangements. Advocacy coalitions compete politically to implement their policy preferences. These collective actors are responsible for facilitating technological learning, sustainability problem learning, policy instrumental learning, and political learning, respectively, which are in turn necessary for niche development, regime destabilization, overcoming path dependence, and political change. Consequently, the alignment of these distinct, albeit potentially overlapping, collective actors can have a profound impact on learning in transitions and the emergence of transition pathways.
What is the causal relationship between crisis, learning and change? How has did causality unfold in the key years of 2009–2010 when the European Union had to face the most formidable attacks to the single currency and responded with substantial reforms of the euro area? We question the conventional identification of the cause-and-effect relationship provided by theories of crisis management, integration and policy learning. Drawing on models of contingent learning developed within psychology and behavioural economics, we theorize that surprise produces behavioural change via a fast-paced associative mechanism and that policy learning follows change. We then run our exercise in causal identification through a plausibility probe. We show that our argument passes the plausibility probe. Our conclusions on cognition and situational effects on learning during crises suggest a new research agenda, more sensitive to how individuals behave in the real world and more robust in its micro-foundations.
The concept of policy paradigm, which was developed by Peter Hall in 1993, has given rise to an abundance of literature on ideas and policy dynamics. Despite its theoretical value, however, the original concept was insufficiently specified and has been used in problematic ways by many policy scholars, thereby undermining the validity of their descriptive and causal inferences. The main argument defended in this article is that scholars studying policy paradigms should devote as much attention to the ideas of policy makers as to the policies they adopt, while distinguishing between the two constructs as much as possible. This article reviews these issues and puts forward seven guidelines that aim to better circumscribe the concept of policy paradigm and improve research on ideas and policy dynamics.
The field of policy learning is characterised by concept stretching and a lack of systematic findings. To systematise them, we combine the classic Sartorian approach to classification with the more recent insights on explanatory typologies, distinguishing between the genus and the different species within it. By drawing on the technique of explanatory typologies to introduce a basic model of policy learning, we identify four major genera in the literature. We then generate variation within each cell by using rigorous concepts drawn from adult education research. By looking at learning through the lenses of knowledge utilisation, we show that the basic model can be expanded to reveal sixteen different species. These types are all conceptually possible, but are not all empirically established in the literature. Our reconstruction of the field sheds light on mechanisms and relations associated with alternative operationalisations of learning and the role of actors in the process of knowledge construction and utilisation. By providing a comprehensive typology, we mitigate concept-stretching problems and lay the foundations for the systematic comparison across and within cases of policy learning.
This article examines the model of social learning often believed to confirm the autonomy of the state from social pressures, tests it against recent cases of change in British economic policies, and offers a fuller analysis of the role of ideas in policymaking, based on the concept of policy paradigms. A conventional model of social learning is found to fit some types of changes in policy well but not the movement from Keynesian to monetarist modes of policymaking. In cases of paradigm shift, policy responds to a wider social debate bound up with electoral competition that demands a reformulation of traditional conceptions of state-society relations.
Multiple knowledges are available for utilisation in policy choice. The rank ordering of knowledges for use in decisionmaking is thus a fundamental predecision. This article shows how this predecision necessarily constrains the processes associated with a politics of ideas, using cases from American international commodity policy. Even when the supposed preconditions of this sort of politics are present, policy change did not occur when the proposed ideas arose from a knowledge accorded secondary status in policymaking circles. Several implications are discussed for the influence and the study of ideational politics. Ultimately, the politics of ideas, so often portrayed through cases of innovation, may be quite conservative, contained by knowledge hierarchies which reflect prior politicaxl circumstances.
This article investigates the role played by formal international institutions in the broader process of international efforts to respond to and manage global and transboundary environmental risks. Because few international institutions are designed to deal with the broad nature of environmental risks, it focuses on institutional learning. By analyzing the experiences of the United Nations Environment Program, World Meteorological Organization, and other international institutions involved with global warming, this article identifies institutional properties (or functions) that encourage or inhibit social learning in the management of global environmental risks by international institutions, and that influence the adoption of such lessons by their constituent members.
Discussions of policy transfer have primarily focused on official actors and networks. The non-governmental mode of policy transfer via foundations, think tanks and non-governmental organizations is a relatively neglected dimension. Accordingly, this paper addresses the role of think tanks in promoting the spread of policy ideas about privatization. The importance of think tanks to policy transfer is their ability to diffuse ideas by (1) acting as a clearing-house for information; (2) their involvement in the advocacy of ideas; (3) their involvement in domestic and transnational policy networks; and (4) their intellectual and scholarly base providing expertise on specialized policy issues. Concepts from comparative public policy and international relations such as “social learning” and “epistemic communities” are used to outline the way think tanks advocate innovative policy ideas. However, not only have think tanks been effective in promoting the transfer of policy ideas, the international spread of think tanks also exhibits organizationaltransfer.
Comprehensive land claims agreements are important tools for empowering Aboriginal peoples. A crucial part of these treaties is the certainty provision, which deals with the nature of Aboriginal rights and title once a treaty is signed. Up until 1986, the Crown insisted on one certainty formula for all treaties. After 1986, however, Aboriginal groups were able to negotiate alternatives to the original certainty provision. This paper seeks to explain why alternatives to the original certainty provision emerged after 1986. It suggests that government perceptions of policy failure, generated by Aboriginal opposition to the extinguishment clause, resulted in the Crown engaging in instrumental learning.
Environmental policy integration (EPI) has been advanced as a guiding policy principle in Europe to ensure that environmental concerns are considered across all areas of policymaking. EPI can be treated analytically as a process of policy learning. The author analyses EPI and other types of learning in Swedish energy policy from the late 1980s up to today. A systematic tracing of agendas, arguments, and policy change indicates that learning processes and partial EPI have occurred. Changing actor configurations and increasing resource dependencies have facilitated learning and EPI, driven in turn by the European deregulation processes, global policy agendas, and the development of the Nordic electricity market. However, learning and EPI has been slow, indirect, and partial -- constrained by how policymaking is organised in central government. Further measures are needed to advance EPI in national sector policy, including the development of policy-level strategic assessments and stronger sector accountabilities.
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