No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Murdoch on ethical formation in a changing world
Abstract
In the past few years, we have seen emerging new work that brings into focus the role of historical change and its moral implications in Iris Murdoch's philosophy. This paper strengthens this reading of her work and investigates the implications of this aspect of Murdoch's thinking for education in general and for moral education in particular. It resituates the Platonic imagery of the individual's ascent towards the true and the good in a framework where our conceptions of the true and the good are in a process of historical reconfiguration.
Defenders of two Rationality Views of love—the Qualities View and the Personhood View—have drawn on Iris Murdoch's philosophical writings to highlight a connection between love and a “realistic” perspective on the beloved. Murdoch does not inform the basic structure of these views—she is rather introduced as a supplement who shows that in love, we pay accurate, nuanced, unguarded, and unflinching attention to the other. In this paper, I contend that these authors have failed to see that Murdoch offers a distinct view of love and is inappropriate to enlist as an ally. This is in large part because they have missed the full sense of what Murdoch means by connecting love and realism. I contend that for Murdoch, to love someone means seeing them in light of a realistic vision of what it means to be human; this includes an appreciation of the limits of freedom, the formative influence of personal history, and the nature and extent of our differences from one another. This helps us to see why Murdoch variously describes loving attention as realistic, compassionate, tolerant, and extremely difficult. It also sheds light on some important and familiar ways that we criticize one another's grounds for love.
Iris Murdoch's famous case of M and D illustrates the moral importance of learning to see others in a more favourable light through renewed attention. Yet if we do not read this case in the wider context of Murdoch's work, we are liable to overlook the attitudes and transformations involved in coming to change one's mind as M does. Stanley Cavell offers one such reading and denies that the case represents a change in M's sense of herself or the possibilities for her world of the kind exemplified by Nora in Ibsen's A Doll's House. In this essay, I challenge Cavell's reading, suggesting that the case, while it may not be an exemplar of the perfectionist outlook as described by Cavell, can and should be interpreted in perfectionist terms. To see this, I reflect on Murdoch's views on the endless perfectibility of language, the importance of humility, and the role of love and attention in moral learning. I conclude that Murdoch's work uniquely sheds light on how we might cultivate a perfectionist outlook in ourselves and others, and describes the distinctive role that some novels can play in moral education.
In Chapter 18 of Murdoch’s Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals the concept of ‘void’ is offered as a label for a fourth dimension of moral thought, after ‘axioms, duties and Eros’ in the preceding chapter. Void, unlike the others, does not provide a mode of structuring a normative conception of some area or aspect of the moral life. It is rather described as a ‘tract of experience’—of evil, darkness, desolation, hopelessness, pain—offered as an antidote to overly optimistic readings of her ethics of Eros. Murdoch draws heavily on Simone Weil’s work here, but a closer look at the chapter discloses a dissonance in her use of ‘void’, which in turn reveals a difference between these two thinkers.
This paper considers the style of moral philosophy that emerged in the mid‐1970s in the writings of John McDowell and David Wiggins and examines its implications for moral education. After characterising the position, I examine whether it broadens or narrows the horizons of moral philosophy. Though McDowell's notorious quietism might suggest the latter, I argue that Wiggins offers a more expansive vision. I then explore how the view might be developed—drawing, for example, on the work of Jonathan Dancy and Alice Crary—before turning to a discussion of moral education informed by Iris Murdoch's conception of the cultivation of moral vision. The outcome, I hope, exemplifies the ‘meet’ between philosophical reflection and moral life to which Wiggins aspires.
Assuming that there is moral progress, and assuming that the abolition of slavery is an example of it, how does moral progress occur? Is it mainly driven by specific individuals who have gained new moral insights, or by changes in the socio‐economic and epistemic conditions in which agents morally judge the norms and practices of their society, and act upon these judgements? In this paper, I argue that moral progress is a complex process in which changes at the level of belief and changes at the level of institutions and social practices are deeply intertwined, and that changes in the socio‐economic the abolition of and epistemic conditions of moral agency constitute the main motor of moral progress. I develop my view of moral progress by way of grappling with Michelle Moody‐Adams’ prominent philosophical account of it. My view is less intellectualistic and individualistic than hers, does not presuppose meta‐ethical moral realism, and blurs her distinction between moral progress in beliefs and moral progress in social practices. I point out the limits of humans to progress morally, which are partly grounded in our evolutionary history, and argue that moral progress is always of a ‘local’ nature.
This book reviews Iris Murdoch’s thought as a whole. It surveys the breadth of her thinking, taking account of her philosophical works, her novels and her letters. It shows how she explored many aspects of experience and brought together apparently contradictory concepts such as truth and love. The volume deals with her notions of truth, love, language, morality, politics and her life. It shows how she offers a challenging provocative way of seeing things which is related to but distinct from standard forms of analytical philosophy and Continental thought. Unlike so many philosophers she does offer a philosophy to live by and unlike many novelists she has reflected deeply on the kind of novels she aimed to write. The upshot is that her novels and her philosophy can be read together productively as contributions to how we can see others and the world.
This chapter brings together Murdoch’s thoughts about language with other central aspects of her thought such as love, attention, perfectionism and morality. By making clear how Murdoch’s variety of linguistic philosophy differs from contemporary philosophy of language, this paper also shows that Murdoch’s philosophy contains the seeds for a fruitful form of philosophizing which brings the moral and aesthetic dimensions of language into view. “Taking the linguistic method seriously” means making clear the ways in which all concepts belong to a fabric that is changing on a personal level as well as an historical one. One of the things that Murdoch can help us see is that one problem with contemporary philosophy of language, is that it does not take the linguistic method seriously enough.
Higher education as a personal, intellectual and moral cultivation is a longstanding ideal that is constantly challenged by the view that education is merely the development of specific skills for vocational and personal success. Much research argues that the latter understanding makes education a technical affair that creates an egocentric emphasis on the individual students’ ambitions and desires. This article joins in the defence of the former ideal by enquiring into the moral dimensions of education. This is done by turning to Iris Murdoch's idea of moral transformation, with a specific focus on the idea of unselfing. The main argument is that unselfing is a transformative process characterised by a growing attunement to the surrounding world, and the interconnectedness of goal and process is emphasised. Also, to gain a deeper understanding of what unselfing entails I turn to the idea of attention. It is understood as having a specific direction, outward from the egocentric, and as enabling unselfing. The article concludes by suggesting that unselfing can offer a challenge to (higher) education as it entails a moment of letting go of plans and narratives, and of surrendering to the influence of an existence that exceeds the individual. This moment is of relevance to education as it is crucial to the possibility of growing as a moral being as it cultivates a moral manner of relating to others.
The wish to found action on perfect insight means to nip it in the bud. Politics are action, always built on inadequate survey. But a world-view, too, is action; embracing the manifold universe is an anticipation of unpredictable efforts. In the end all our thinking depends on such inadequacies. We must advance, even without certainty! The only question is whether we are aware of it or not.
In her book Iris Murdoch, Gender and Philosophy, Sabina Lovibond argues that Iris Murdoch's philosophical and literary work is covertly dedicated to an ideology of female subordination. The most central and interesting aspect of her multifaceted argument concerns Murdoch's focus on the individual person's moral self-scrutiny and transformation of consciousness. Lovibond suggests that this focus is antithetical to the kind of communal and structural criticism of society that has been essential for the advance of feminism. She further reads Murdoch's dismissal of “structuralism” as proof of Murdoch's alleged conservatism and neglect of feminist concerns. In this article I will argue that this line of argument—though not completely off-base concerning the awkwardness of Murdoch's relation to feminism—(1) gives a misleading picture of Murdoch's philosophical and ideological position, and (2) establishes a problematic (though not unusual) antagonism between moral self-scrutiny and social criticism, which a closer look at Murdoch's work can help us overcome.
The aim of this paper is to present a perspective on Iris Murdoch conception of metaphysics, starting from her puzzling contention that she could describe herself as a ‘Wittgensteinian Neo-Platonist’. I argue that this statement is a central clue to the nature both of her philosophical method which is strongly reminiscent of Wittgenstein's, and of her Platonism, which in its emphasis on the everyday and metaphorical aspects of his work differs starkly from received modern interpretations. Placing Murdoch between Plato and Wittgenstein can help us to understand the nature of her metaphysics as a complex, continuous, pictorial activity, which shows a deep awareness of and is compatible with the late twentieth century and contemporary distrust of large metaphysical systems or explanations.
This book represents the summation of Murdoch's work as a philosopher. It surveys the development of Western philosophy, from Plato to Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein, and takes issue with new trends such as structuralism, arguing the case for a moral view in metaphysical argument. Iris Murdoch has written a number of short philosophical works including "The Fire and the Sun" and "Sartre: Romantic Rationalist".
This paper shows that moral progress is a substantive and plausible idea. Moral progress in belief involves deepening our grasp of existing moral concepts, while moral progress in practices involves realizing deepened moral understandings in behavior or social institutions. Moral insights could not be assimilated or widely disseminated if they involved devising and applying totally new moral concepts. Thus, it is argued, moral failures of past societies cannot be explained by appeal to ignorance of new moral ideas, but must be understood as resulting from refusals to subject social practices to critical scrutiny. Moral philosophy is not the main vehicle for disseminating morally progressive insights, though it has an important role in processes that lead to moral progress. Yet we have grounds for cautious optimism, since progressive moral insights can be disseminated and can, sometimes, have constructive social effects.
Why Iris Murdoch matters
- G. Browning
Iris Murdoch: history woman
- Browning
Review of G. Browning (Ed.), Murdoch on truth and love
- Fine
Language lost and found
- N. Forsberg
Iris Murdoch, philosopher
- M. Holland
Foucault and his interlocutors
- M. Foucault
Literature and moral theory
- N. Hämäläinen
Iris Murdoch's ethics: a consideration of her romantic vision
- M. Laverty
Iris Murdoch and the search for human goodness
- C. Taylor
Everything important is to do with passion
- K. Larsson
Existentialists and mystics
- I. Murdoch
What is a Wittgensteinian neo-Platonist?
- Hämäläinen