The al-Qaeda Franchise: The Expansion of al-Qaeda and Its Consequences
... Armed groups can pledge allegiance to other armed groups, for example AQ or IS. Allegiance comes with the acceptance of the prerogatives of a new external leadership, which can determine a group's new tactical and strategic objectives (Mendelsohn, 2015) and improve their organizational abilities (Bacon, 2018). Although these relations are characterized by a principle-agent problem caused by diverging interests and understandings (Shapiro, 2013), which mean that they cannot systematically be understood as a full subordination, external allegiance constrains a group's autonomy. ...
... The four features characterizing jihadi groups' institutionalization are not mutually exclusive. For example, subordination to a foreign state or another group can facilitate a jihadi group's reification, systemness, and value infusion by externally imposing a certain set of norms and frames of reference (e.g., Mendelsohn, 2015;Bacon, 2018). But a stronger internal institutionalization (systemness and value infusion) can also be used to assert a group's independence vis-à-vis other actors since more disciplined groups can enjoy more leeway vis-à-vis foreign sponsors. ...
... Applied to jihadi groups' strategies, historical institutionalism recognizes that these groups' objectives and preferences are subject to substantial change overtime whereas rational choice institutionalism predicates narrow political preferences. In contrast with studies of armed violence that examine jihadi groups' organizational dilemmas, information asymmetries, and tradeoffs drawn from rational choice paradigms (Shapiro, 2013;Mendelsohn, 2015), I contend that jihadi group's objectives and preferences are not pre-determined but shaped by evolving organizational dynamics, interactions with other groups and movements, and changing state policies in the contentious politics research agenda. ...
Institutionalizing Violence offers a detailed focus on the two most influential Egyptian jihadi groups—al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad. From the killing of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981 to their partial association with al-Qaeda in the 1990s, the two groups illustrate the range of choices that jihadis make overtime including creating political parties. Jerome Drevon argues that these groups’ comparative trajectories show that jihadis embracing the same ideology can make very different strategic decisions in similar environments. Drevon’s analysis of these groups’ histories over the past four decades illustrates the evolution of jihadism in Egypt and beyond. Institutionalizing Violence develops an institutional approach to radicalization to compare the two Egyptian groups’ trajectories based on ethnographic field research and hundreds of interviews with jihadi leaders and militants in Egypt. Drevon provides a unique perspective on how jihadi groups make and implement new strategic decisions in changing environments, as well as the evolution of their approaches to violence and non-violence.
... In recent times, scholars have narrowed their lenses on how the internal dynamics of various terrorist groups contributed to their growth and lethality. These include fragmentation into various cell-structures, formation of linkages among other terrorist groups, exploitation of porous borders, branching-out strategies or formation of franchises, and manipulation of clannism and ethnicity (Mendelsohn 2017;Hansen 2016;Weeraratne 2015;Hoffman 2013Hoffman , 1995Zenn 2013;Oftedal 2013). ...
... Earlier discourses on the emergence and rise of terrorism were traced to religion, the US Foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa, and poverty (Juergensmeyer 2001;Mamdani 2004;Obi 2005;Bah 2017). Recently, scholarship on the growth of terrorism has been traced to the internal workings of various terrorist groups based on the organizational and operational strategies of group leaders (Mendelsohn 2017;Hansen 2016;Weeraratne 2015). In this section, I examine the diverse factors behind the emergence and growth of terrorism, notably in Nigeria. ...
... One notable example is the establishment of franchises. For example, Mendelsohn (2017) argues that Al Qaeda leadership adopted a branching-out strategy that entails the establishment of various franchises in different parts of the world, such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Algeria, and Somalia. Al Qaeda leadership also established a franchise in the Indian sub-continent, known as Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), covering countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. ...
How can neo-patrimonialism aid our understanding
of the materiality of counterterrorism and the expansion
of terrorism? While previous works on the growth of terrorism
have focused on issues such as the spread of radical religious ideology, US foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA), and poverty, recent works have examined factors such
as the formation of linkages with other terrorist groups, fragmentation
into cell-structures, forming of franchises, and exploitation
of clannism and ethnicity. However, studies that interrogate
the rentier nature of African and MENA region security institutions
and its implications for the rise of terrorism are yet to
be accounted for. This article draws from field research done in
Nigeria between 2015 and 2019. It traced the expansion of
terrorism in Nigeria to the neo-patrimonial systems inherent in
security and political institutions, which are engaged in corrupt
financial practices that breed a counterterrorism economy.
... Zawahiri's unimportance among today's jihadis reflects his problematic legacy. The movement that he and Osama bin-Laden (OBL) created in 1998 (known as Al Qaeda-AQ) is fractured and dysfunctional (Celso, 2014;Mendelsohn, 2016). ...
... Having rejected IS' claim of leadership over the jihadist movement, Zawahiri attempted to reassert dominance over his damaged network. Hoping to derail IS's momentum, AQ's emir announced a new regional branch (Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent-AQIS) and attempted to guide his remaining organization to the correct jihadist path (Mendelsohn, 2016 Having to overcome these obstacles proved untenable. JN's July 2016 rebranding into Jabhat Fath al-Sham (JFS) where it announced its dealignment with AQ was interpreted as an organizational ruse (al-Tamimi, 2017). ...
This article addresses the factors leading to Al Qaeda’s continued fragmentation and the collapse of its efforts to create a jihadi state in the Levant. It does so in two parts. First, we look at Al Qaeda’s development of its far enemy strategy that deviated from past jihadi warfare strategies. Second, we examine Al Qaeda’s dysfunctional response to the Arab Spring. The protests untethering of Mideast states and its inflammation of sectarian tensions accelerated Al Qaeda’s transformation into a fractured network committed to localized (increasingly sectarian) insurgencies. After bin Laden’s 2011 killing, Zawahiri in September 2013 released his General Guidelines for the Work of Jihad to tie Al Qaeda’s branches localized insurgencies to a wider struggle against the Zionist-Crusader dominated world order.1 He failed to do so. Upon exploring jihadism’s splintering into three discordant factions represented by Al Qaeda’s far enemy focus, ISIS sectarianism and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) localized insurgencies, this article concludes that this development has led to an ineffective but dangerously resilient global jihadi movement.
Key words: Jihadism, extremism, sectarianism, insurgency
Received: 2022-12-17
Revised: 2023-01-15
... However, despite increased counterterrorism pressure against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, there have not been significant changes in Al-Qaeda's alliance formations. 38 Other work has explored Al-Qaeda's 'branching out' strategy 39 ; according to Mendelsohn (2015), Al-Qaeda's branching out strategy in 2003 was based on a two-tier structure comprised of a central command with branches responsible for specific geographic regions. Arguably, Islamic State's affiliates in South, Central and Southeast Asia, or in Africa also appear to follow a similar pattern, where local branches subscribe to Islamic State-Central's overarching goals and ideology but have localized narratives and operational strategies. ...
... However, despite increased counterterrorism pressure against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, there have not been significant changes in Al-Qaeda's alliance formations. 38 Other work has explored Al-Qaeda's 'branching out' strategy 39 ; according to Mendelsohn (2015), Al-Qaeda's branching out strategy in 2003 was based on a two-tier structure comprised of a central command with branches responsible for specific geographic regions. Arguably, Islamic State's affiliates in South, Central and Southeast Asia, or in Africa also appear to follow a similar pattern, where local branches subscribe to Islamic State-Central's overarching goals and ideology but have localized narratives and operational strategies. ...
Transnational jihadist organizations, such as the Islamic State, have sought to reinforce their reputations by establishing new global affiliates. Islamic State affiliates, in particular, have leveraged preexisting militant infrastructures in new locations to create strategic partnerships with some militant organizations, while delegitimizing and attacking others as rivals. In this context, we pose the following question: what factors explain whether local groups will cooperate with an emergent transnational affiliate, or engage in a rivalry? We present a theoretical framework, which depicts how state sponsorship of militant groups, and the persistent rivalry between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, can combine to influence new inter-group relationships. Applying our typology to the case of Islamic State Khorasan in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, we demonstrate that the more adversarial a local militant group’s relationship with the Pakistani state, and the weaker its historical relational proximity to Al-Qaeda, the more likely the group is to cooperate with ISK.
... Trust also plays a crucial role in fostering closer cooperation and collaboration between groups. Empirical evidence suggests that mutual benefits are a motivating factor for different groups to form alliances. Mendelsohn (2016) examined Al Qaeda's strategy of creating alliances with other terrorist groups, finding that the organization sought alliances as a response to its decline. Similarly, Byman (2014) discovered that Al Qaeda's strategy of developing alliances enabled the organization to expand the scope and scale of its operations, gain local expertise, disseminate innovations more effectively, and, most importantly, enhance its legitimacy and mission. ...
... The present study addresses this lacuna in the peace and conflict literature, by constituting the first large-N analysis of the determinants of transnational jihadist involvement in intrastate armed conflict. Theoretically, I build upon the work by scholars of terrorism, who have generated insights into AQ's and IS's relationship with their affiliate organizations (Byman 2014;Mendelsohn 2015;Moghadam 2017;Bacon 2018). One key contribution of the present study is thus to bridge the divide between the works of these scholars and the empirical peace and conflict literature. ...
What explains the emergence of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as parties in civil wars? This study provides the first large-N analysis of this question, studying a sample of states in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, 2003–2020, contributing to ongoing debates among peace and conflict scholars about jihadist rebels in civil war. Theoretically, it is argued that higher levels of state repression and states’ military capabilities should impact the preferences of local groups and increase the likelihood of a ‘transnationalization’. On the other hand, it is hypothesized that increases in bureaucratic state capacity should reduce the risk of such transnationalization. A series of penalized logistic regressions yield support for the hypotheses regarding state repression and bureaucratic capacity, but not military state capacity. The findings point towards the importance of bureaucratic capacity building as well as the potentially adverse consequences of excessively repressive counterterrorism strategies.
... A separate mention should be made of the involvement in this study of publications, statements, and video messages of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, which address a wide range of theoretical and practical jihad issues [Al-Zawahiri, 2001, 2011, 2009, 2007. The works of American and European authors including Grenshaw, Mendelsohn, Hoffman, and Zelin analyze the theoretical content and practical implementation of the ideas of Islamist fundamentalism [Grenshaw, 2017;Mendelsohn, 2016;Hoffman, 2018;Zelin, 2017]. ...
... Local groups franchise the brand of either al-Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS), and franchising has thereby been the key mechanism for the networks' expansion. 1 Building on preexisting societal cleavages, these networks can effectively establish grounds on the local level. For example, after seemingly being defeated in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State has been able to diffuse and establish itself successfully elsewhere. ...
Trans-national jihadist groups have established themselves across many contexts. However, we have limited knowledge about the larger picture of how such groups tap into various inter-religious, sectarian, or ethnic divisions. To address this research gap, we explore: How do trans-national jihadist groups mobilize on the basis of different forms of identity cleavages? Our empirical analysis focuses on all trans-national jihadist groups who have challenged governments in civil wars. We find that mobilization along ethnic divisions is the most common cleavage, and is increasing most over time. We also find that sectarian mobilization is rare, but associated with significant escalation of violence.
... AQ's franchising strategies, 3 its practicality, 4 and limits. 5 Global jihad is associated with the resort to foreign fighters 6 that contribute to new conflict framing, 7 repertoires of violence such as suicide bombing, 8 stronger organizational cohesion, 9 and longer conflict duration and recurrence. ...
The globalization of jihad has proceeded in several stages from the mobilization against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s to Islamic State’s current campaign. The end of global jihad is nonetheless less understood, including the conditions in which jihadi groups could reject al-Qaeda (AQ) or Islamic State (IS). This article examines this question through the trajectory of a former AQ franchise, jabhat al-nusra (JaN), that became hay’at tahrir al-sham (HTS) in 2017. This article argues that global jihad is not absolute. Global jihad exists on a spectrum of four inter-connected dimensions that can be disaggregated. In Syria, JaN was only partially globalist when it emerged. JaN’s rejection of IS and AQ resulted from its opposition to their strategic objectives against the backdrop of the evolution of the Syrian conflict, which eroded JaN’s globalism and made it particularly costly. This article is based on extensive field research and interviews with HTS’s leadership in Idlib and other insurgents that have interacted with the group over the years.
... These authors posit that third-party state supporters can mitigate commitment problems in alliance formation, thus facilitating the inclusion of weak organizations in ideologically compatible alliances. However, due to lack of data on rebel groups' ideologies, Bapat and Bond (2012) do not test that part of the argument, focusing instead on the balance of power and the influence of external supporters. 1 More recent studies, however, identify a positive association between shared ideology and rebel alliances, in line with the longstanding emphasis on ideology in the related field of terrorist alliances (Karmon 2005;Mendelsohn 2015;Asal et al. 2016;Moghadam 2017;Bacon 2018). In particular, find ideologically proximate rebel groups in Syria's civil war to be more likely to ally, while Blair et al. (2021) show that militant organizations (including terrorist and rebel groups) sharing an ideology are more likely to sustain cooperation in the face of government repression. ...
Challenging influential perspectives that downplay the role of shared rebel constituencies, we argue that they represent important causes of rebel alliances. Yet, we theorize distinct effects for different types of constituency. While compatible political aspirations push both organizations with a common ideological constituency and those with a common ethnic constituency to ally, for co-ethnic organizations this cooperation-inducing effect is offset by a cooperation-suppressing effect due to their higher risk of inter-rebel war. Leveraging a novel dataset of alliances in multiparty civil wars (1946–2015), we find support for our theoretical expectations. Shared ideological constituencies have a larger and more robust positive effect on the probability of alliances than shared ethnic constituencies. Furthermore, we find that co-ethnic rebel organizations tend to establish informal alliances only, while organizations sharing an ideological constituency are drawn to formal alliances.
... Although al-Qaeda, as an umbrella organization of jihadi individuals and groups, is different from the AQA, many scholars trace back the organizational and ideological origins of al-Qaeda to AQA (e.g., Jalata 2016, 198;Mendelsohn 2016;Wright 2006, 153). Organizationally, AQA did not have a formal structure with a core strategy-making layer at its head (Palmer and Palmer 2008, 148;Zimmerman 2013, 1). ...
Following the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, DC, there has been an increasing interest among scholars, students, and the interested public to study and learn about the Islamist-oriented terrorist organizations called Jihadi Salafi Groups (JSGs). Considering that these organizations emerged in highly fragile states, S. Yaqub Ibrahimi asks: how and why is state fragility linked to the emergence of JSGs? Ibrahimi bases his study on three events: the establishment of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in 1998, the rise of Islamic State in the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, and the failed al-Qaeda effort to establish a base in Saudi Arabia in 2003. These case studies contain major aspects and features of the rise of JSGs and, together, explain the contribution of state fragility to the process of the formation and expansion of these terrorist organizations. International Security in a World of Fragile States stands out as a pivotal work on the interconnection between the root causes of JSGs and state fragility conditions and their amalgamated role in the formation and evolution of these organizations. It contributes to IR and international security debates by developing a comprehensive but readily understandable narrative of the rise of JSGs in Islamic countries, and examining them in an analytical framework in which their root causes are categorized on individual, group, and international levels.
... These studies are important to trace the evolution of this ideological trend in general and specific cases. They cover an array of issues ranging from these groups' franchising strategies, governance, leadership, organisational dilemmas, resort to foreign fighters and suicide bombings (Bacon 2018;Byman 2019;Lia 2015;Mendelsohn 2015;Moghadam 2008Moghadam , 2017Revkin 2020). The emphasis on Salafi jihadi radicalism is common in empirical studies of Syria and their extensive coverage of al-Qaeda (AQ) and Islamic State (IS) (Cafarella 2014;Hassan 2018;Hamming 2020;Kaválek 2015;Lister 2016aLister , 2016b. ...
Most research on jihadi groups examines their violent radicalisation. Insurgents that politicise in civil wars and become more pragmatic without renouncing violence are less understood. This article defines jihadi groups' politicisation as the development of realistic tactical and strategic objectives, durable alliances with other actors including foreign states and non-state armed groups, and normal-isation of their interactions with the population. This article argues that politicisation is not merely the outcome of armed groups' independent ideological revisions. Politicisation results from a combination of several factors that restrain jihadi insurgents in civil wars. In Syria, the empirical analysis of Ahrar al-Sham demonstrates that the group was restrained by (1) its decentralised orga-nisational structures and (2) interactions with other actors including other insurgents, the population, and foreign states. This article is based on extensive field research conducted in Syria and Turkey with Syrian insurgents across the spectrum.
... A substantial number of independent Salafi armed groups emerged after 2011. 1 This remarkable development contrasts with the affiliation of most Salafi-jihadi groups to al-Qaida in the 2000s. 2 The most widely covered case was the Islamic State (IS), which emancipated from al-Qaida and claimed to revive the caliphate with uninhibited violence. 3 But Islamic State only represents the most extreme trajectory. ...
The Syrian Salafi armed group Ahrar al-Sham epitomises the most prominent case of politicisation. By 2014, Ahrar al-Sham was the leading insurgent group in Syria, with the largest number of soldiers, presence throughout Syrian opposition-held areas, and relatively strong ties with foreign countries including Turkey and Qatar. Ahrar al-Sham explicitly rejected al-Qaida’s legacy and developed a more inclusive approach to other groups and the population. This chapter traces the group’s emergence and development to demonstrate how pre-war developments and a de-centralised alliance-based expansion underpinned its politicisation over the years. This case study also contends that politicisation was sustained by the group’s internal institutionalisation, which ultimately explains its successes and failures during the conflict. This chapter is based on extensive field research interviews in Turkey and north-west Syria in 2019 with an array of leaders and members of Ahrar al-Sham, armed opposition groups, and independent Syrian Islamists.
... Perhaps the best-known example is the al-Qaeda of the 1990s and early 2000s, although one may question how much control its central leadership actually had over its various branches and cells. 30 Unlike militant jihadists, the revolutionary right has had few safe havens or conflict zones to operate from. 31 Consequently, the cell system has never really been implemented in its purest form. ...
This article begins by outlining four post-WWII strategies of right-wing revolutionary resistance: vanguardism; the cell system; leaderless resistance; and metapolitics. Next, the article argues that metapolitics became a preferred strategy for many right-wing revolutionaries during the 2000s and early 2010s, and proposes three conditions that may help explain this metapolitical turn: limited opportunities for armed resistance; a subcultural style shift; and new opportunities for promoting alternative worldviews online. Finally, the article theorizes about the types of threats that may emerge in the wake of this metapolitical turn, and speculates about the likelihood of a new and more violent turn in the near future.
... The restored caliphate will be ruled in accordance to sharia law and will cover all the current and former Muslim lands that stretch from Southeast Asia to Western Europe. Ultimately, the caliph will serve as the platform from which the whole world will be brought to Islam (Mendelsohn, 2016). ...
... Many contemporary jihadist groups are part of this movement in which they exchange ideas, resources and fighters (Hafez, 2003;Hegghammer, 2010;Moghadam, 2008). Although there are internal differences and disagreements, some commonalities exist within the movement regarding, for instance, the legitimization of violence and the principles of governance as based on strict sharia law (Crenshaw, 2017;Gerges, 2005;Mendelsohn, 2016). ...
Research has shown the potential of nonviolent civil resistance in challenging autocratic state regimes (e.g. Sharp, 1973; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Yet, little is known about its applicability in jihadist proto-states, that is, territories governed by militant jihadist groups. We argue that civil resistance is more likely to occur when jihadists impose a rule that local populations perceive as alien and when organizational structures capable of collective nonviolent mobilization are activated. We develop this argument through a comparative analysis of three jihadist proto-states: one in which manifest and organized civil resistance occurred (Islamic Emirate of Azawad in Mali in 2012), and two in which it did not: the Islamic State of Iraq (2006–2008) and the Islamic Principality of al-Mukalla in Yemen (2015–2016). Whereas the former was met with mainly armed resistance (the Sunni Awakening campaign), the latter saw neither armed nor unarmed organized and collective resistance by locals under its rule. We demonstrate how variation in the jihadists’ governing strategies (especially the degree of adaptation to local conditions) as well as in the social structures for mobilization (i.e. whether opposition was channeled through civil society networks or tribal networks) created different conditions for civil resistance. This study adds to a growing research discussion on civil resistance against rebel governance (e.g. Arjona, 2015; Kaplan, 2017). More broadly, our study is an innovative first attempt to bridge research on terrorism, rebel governance, and civil resistance, three fields that have been siloed in previous research.
... When the civil war broke out in Syria, AQ had a Syrian branch with the name Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN). 37 At around the same time, the leader of AQI, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, wanted to take advantage of both the Syrian conflict and the Sunni-Shia confrontation in Iraq to expand its organization to Syria. 38 Tensions had existed between its sub-organization and AQC since Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had begun a reorganization of AQI in 2006, after which it was renamed the Islamic State of Iraq, 39 but it was nonetheless still affiliated with AQ. ...
... 8 The central command has been unable to control the behaviour of its regional branches; as evidenced by ISIS" (The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) expulsion by Al Qaeda in 2014 for not militarily disengaging from Syria. 9 Jihadi groups in the Maghreb, Somalia, Central Asia and Yemen joined Al Qaeda"s network to enhance their global status and gain support to combat local and sectarian enemies. Al Qaeda"s branch in Yemen Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is currently at war with the U.S. far enemy, Shi"ite Houthi rebels and apostate Sunni forces. ...
The essay presents this jihadi ideological evolution in four parts. Firstly, it provides an overview of jihadism"s three major adversaries the near (Muslim apostate), far (Western and other non-Muslim civilizations) and sectarian (Shi"ite and other heterodox Muslims) enemies. Secondly, the paper examines why jihadi groups prioritized attacks against the near enemy during the Cold War only to see most Islamist insurgencies beaten back by Muslim apostate regimes. Thirdly, the paper analyses how these failures invited debate within the jihadist movement leading to a refocus on fighting the non-Muslim far enemy. Fourthly, having failed to weaken near and far enemies, the paper argues that the global jihadi movement has radicalized further by resorting to conspiratorial and eschatological arguments that link near, far and sectarian enemies.
... 40 Significantly the brothers had to borrow funds from a friend to mount the Charlie Hebdo attack belying Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula"s claim of having directed the assault. 41 Europe is however not featured in AQ"s ideology that concentrates on striking the United States and Muslim apostate regimes. Having spawned a new generation of jihadi entrepreneurs across the old continent AQ has curiously ceded ground to more radical splinter movements like the Islamic State. ...
This article examines the Post 9-11 radicalization of the global jihadist movement by comparing the far enemy strategy of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. It argues that the jihadi movement has pursued a total war strategy that fuses near, far and sectarian enemies. This is seen dramatically in the Islamic State's Eurocentric far enemy strategy that is part of a comprehensive war strategy
... When the civil war broke out in Syria, AQ had a Syrian branch with the name Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN). 37 At around the same time, the leader of AQI, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, wanted to take advantage of both the Syrian conflict and the Sunni-Shia confrontation in Iraq to expand its organization to Syria. 38 Tensions had existed between its sub-organization and AQC since Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had begun a reorganization of AQI in 2006, after which it was renamed the Islamic State of Iraq, 39 but it was nonetheless still affiliated with AQ. ...
Drawing on Tilly’s notion of “repertoire of action,” this article shows how the evolution of the global jihadist movement’s communicative action repertoire has increased the potential resonance of its discourse. It foresees the construction of the global jihadist movement’s discourse of mobilization as the result of the evolution of its network of actors, the context in which its communications are undertaken, and its adaptation to new communication technologies. Accordingly, it argues that the decentralization of the global jihadist movement has led to a widening of its communicative action repertoire and a diversification of its discourse offering.
... At this point al-Qaida had started to establish local branches across the Middle East and North Africa -a phenomenon later referred to as al-Qaida's "franchise strategy. " [9] Al-Qaida's most important, and for a time, most successful branch, was established in Iraq in 2004, when the Jordanian guerrilla leader Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi declared his allegiance to bin Laden. Al-Qaida in Iraq suffered severe setbacks from 2007, partly because of a U.S. troop surge and partly because local Sunni Muslim tribes turned against the local al-Qaida affiliate. ...
This article presents a framework for understanding al-Qaida, based on a new reading of its thirty-year history. Al-Qaida today is commonly labelled a 'global insurgency' or 'global franchise.' However, these labels are not sufficient if we want to understand what kind of threat al-Qaida poses to the West. Al-Qaida is better described as a revolutionary vanguard, engaged in a perpetual struggle to further its Salafi-jihadi ideology. Its strategy is flexible and opportunistic, and the organization uses a range of tools associated with both state and non-state actors. In the future al-Qaida is likely to treat international terrorist planning, and support to local insurgencies in the Muslim world, as two separate activities. International terrorism is currently not a prioritised strategy of al-Qaida, but it is likely to be so in the future, given that it manages to re-build its external operations capability.
... AQ exploited the aftermath of 9/11 to recruit previously unaffiliated youths in the Middle East, gather extensive financial support, and eventually impose its hegemony over the Salafi jihadi trend through its franchising strategy. [20] After 9/11, jihadi Salafism became virtually indistinguishable from AQ as bin Laden's organisation exploited American ill-fated choices to become the new social movement hegemon. ...
This article analyses the evolution of the jihadi social movement (JSM) in changing environmental and factional circumstances. The author argues that internationalist groups like al-Qaida and Islamic State seek to become hegemonic in the JSM vis-à-vis nationally focused jihadis. Yet hegemony is associated with changing modes of organisation that can weaken centralised organisational control and exacerbate internal divisions. Moreover, the post-2011 expansion of Islamist local governance presents new expectations that jihadi groups set up local structures of governance, which can alter their internal dynamics and cannot endure as long as their allegiance to internationalist groups remains. This analysis illustrates the prospective choices of the components of the JSM after 2017.
In the past decade, the North African states have become the site of activities for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State organisation (IS), and other terrorist groups linked to them. Although the governments of the mentioned countries have made serious efforts to eliminate the activities of terrorist groups, they have achieved only limited results. Moreover, the terrorist groups have carried out several successful attacks against various targets, and thousands of their militants have fought in Syria, Iraq, or Libya on the side of the Islamic State and other terrorist groups. It is becoming more and more apparent that it is not possible to eliminate terrorist groups only with military and law enforcement tools, since their supply is constantly ensured. Therefore, in the past period, not only the North African states, but also the international community, have put more and more emphasis on revealing the reasons that promote the violent radicalisation of certain groups and individuals. Several studies have been published in this regard, the results of which are being used in the course of de-radicalisation. For this, it is not only necessary to provide significant financial resources, but also to create stability and predictability in the respective countries. However, this was jeopardised in several ways due to the Ukrainian conflict that broke out in February 2022. In my study, I examine how the Ukrainian conflict affects North African countries and how it contributes to the radicalisation of the people there.
This chapter applies the ethical analysis in the previous two chapters to post-Cold War proxy conflicts. In Africa, great power proxy conflict, as experienced in the Cold War, has so far not happened. While there is certainly a race for influence, Russia, China, and the United States are not trying to influence the same actors for the same things. Proxy conflict among African states has proliferated, suggesting the need for better control. The Middle East has seen a proliferation of proxy conflict as Iran employs proxies as a key element of its security strategy. In response, the United States works “by, with, and through” regional partners who also employ proxies of their own. The result is protracted conflict in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and most recently Israel. While non-state actors are frequently proxies, the current world order has seen an increase of non-state actors, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and ISIS, playing the role of sponsor. This too has resulted in protracted conflicts. Resolving these challenges does not necessarily mean avoiding such relationships; however, it does suggest the urgency to establish, promulgate, and follow norms that respect partners, align interests with the greater good, and reduce the suffering wars inevitably bring.
This chapter delves into the complex dilemma of drones, focusing on targeted states. Building upon previous chapters’ analyses of drone impact under successive US administrations post-9/11, it investigates drone strike consequences in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The four main impacts—blowback effect, civilian casualties, terrorist retaliation/violence, and the counterterrorism paradox—are examined to discern how drone operations impact or impede US strategic objectives. Afghanistan and Pakistan are chosen due to their extensive history of post-9/11 drone strikes, and available data for impact assessment. While other case studies exist, this chapter centres on Afghanistan and Pakistan for their robust datasets.
The ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’, or Da’esh, claimed territorial control and declared itself a state and Caliphate, but scholars disagree on the quality of these claims. Some argue that Da’esh really was a state, others reject this as propaganda of a non-state actor, and still others highlight that Da’esh challenged the international order as a whole. This article combines the notions of the ‘territory effect’ and ‘inter-territory’ to explain why the (self-)presentation of Da’esh appeared as a challenge to the (non-)state dichotomy of the modern international and its territorial underpinnings. While contesting the inter-territorial compartmentalisation of the state system, Da’esh projected a counter-territoriality beyond this system. The resulting horror vacui and collective campaign against Da’esh in turn shed light on an inter-territory effect of assuming and re-enacting contiguous state territories in a globally encompassing system of states, which thus locates and contains – but also enables – violence within states.
Ideological and operational credibility are essential to the success of transnational terrorist organizations. We demonstrate that militant groups can leverage large alliance networks to bolster their ideological and operational reputations. Organizations can draw on operational capabilities and successes to build international networks that bolster their ideological credibility. Conversely, organizations with reputations for ideological authority can lend it to affiliates, who offer reach into active conflicts, bolstering claims to operational capacity. This logic of comparative advantage suggests that militant alliances can be a strategic response to underlying material or ideological deficits. We illustrate these dynamics through data-driven case studies of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State's cooperative networks.
Al Qaeda is a transnational terror organization. As a threat, this chapter explores how al Qaeda is using cyber operations to weaken the United States.
Purpose
This study is not intended to be a prescriptive blueprint for any nation or region to fight terrorism, but rather it aims to analyze the development of policies supporting terrorism and their impact on regional as well as international relations. It is an examination of relevant facts, which might hopefully benefit policy makers and practitioners who diligently work on reducing or eliminating terrorist activities.
Design/methodology/approach
In order to achieve the objectives of the paper and in light of the pool of the available literature and data, the study adopts the system-analysis method in analyzing the impact of policies supporting terrorism and the countermeasures to apply based on the inputs, outputs and conversions associated with the phenomenon of terrorism.
Findings
Policies supporting terrorism differ from a state to another starting from providing safe haven to terrorist groups to providing direct finance and armaments to directly intervening militarily in a targeting country. Or deter such policies. This raised the concerns of many States in the region regarding the domination tendency of Turkey and called for a firm and pragmatic international, regional and Arab stand beyond verbal condemnation to deter Turkey from pursuing such policies.
Originality/value
The importance of the academic study stems from the importance of addressing one of the central issues in the field of regional and international relations, which is the policies some states adopt to support terrorism, not only by financing terrorism but also by incubating terrorism. Most studies on terrorism focus on the concept and situations and not on policies that support terrorism and their impact on regional and international relations and the means of encountering terrorism.
Pledging allegiance to a larger terrorist group is assumed to increase activities of religious terrorist groups because of cooperative relationships and further support. In a competing theory, a pledge to another group is viewed as symbolic to motivate a group’s supporters. Taking Al-Shabaab terrorism as a case, the current study tests the extent to which those competing theories are valid for frequencies of bombings and relevant fatalities. Even though Al-Shabaab pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda since 2012, the literature lacks an empirical test of whether or not a significant change occurred in Al-Shabaab’s attacks after the pledge. Drawing on data from the Global Terrorism Database results from our vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis indicate that the frequency and lethality of Al-Shabaab’s bombing attacks and fatalities did not change significantly in the post-pledge period. The contributions of our findings to the terrorism literature are discussed and policy implications for counterterrorism efforts are considered.
This article provides a new perspective on the logic of violence of the JNIM in the context of the Malian civil war. After a critical review of the literature on the Malian conflict, this article will apply Benjamin Lessing’s model on the logic of violence in criminal wars to JNIM. Through the adoption of Lessing’s model, this article will demonstrate how JNIM’s insurgency can be considered as a case of violent corruption in the context of a war of constraint. Combining qualitative and quantitative methods, this paper will show firstly, how the Malian civil war should be conceived as a war of constraint rather than a war of conquest; secondly, how JNIM is using violence in order to restrict the implementation of the rule of law in some regions which are strategic also for its financing activities. By adopting this new framework, it will be possible to overcome some conundrums characterising the debate on the Malian insurgency and to highlight some relevant topics for future research.
One of the most frustrating features of modern jihadist insurgencies is their ability to endure and resurge, even after seeming defeats. What explains this jihadist resilience? In this paper, I present a new “boom–bust” economic theory for why jihadist groups can withstand serious losses, survive periods of decline, and then reclaim power. Using new evidence from Somalia, I demonstrate that jihadists learn how to adapt to fluctuations in their degree of territorial control, so that they can survive—and even thrive—during periods of decline. During a “boom” period, when jihadists enjoy a monopoly on force, they tax and govern as a proto-state. However, during a “bust,” when they are pushed out of power, jihadists shift their efforts to illicit business activities and insurgent warfare. When pressure abates, they again shift back to taxing and governing as a proto-state. This cyclical and long-term approach to order-making allows jihadists to adapt to changing battlefield conditions and survive serious setbacks. Jihadists establish their proto-states to varying degrees, governing in pockets and coves wherever and whenever the opportunities present themselves. They are as orderly as they can afford to be.
The Global War on Terror has consumed a great deal of American resources since 2001. Operating within Iraq and Afghanistan for almost two decades, the US has failed so far to put together a plan for war termination in the Middle East. This raises the question of whether, or not, al Qaeda’s – along with associated movements’ – strategy and related operations have been successful since war was declared on the United States. To respond to the question, we compared elements of al Qaeda’s plans and actions with Mao Zedong’s theory on how to carry out a protracted war in three stages. By doing so, it sounded reasonable to state that al Qaeda, although fairly successful in implementing its stage 1, failed to evolve its own army-like to deal with stages 2 and 3. It was also observed that neither al Qaeda nor al Qaeda in Iraq have timely reassessed their failing strategy.
The article employs collective action framing theory to explore Egyptian violent Islamist group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis’s (ABM’s) frames, which altered when it became Islamic State’s Sinai Province (IS-SP), Wilayat Sinai (WS). Using data from 40 videos and audio recordings released by the group in all three of its forms (al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad/TWJ, ABM, and WS), along with additional material disseminated by Islamic State Central, the article identifies transformations in the group’s frames in response to changes in the political environment and need for external support. When ABM became WS, it mimicked IS’s aggressive and transnational approach to framing and tactics.
Der Antisemitismus hat wieder Konjunktur und scheinbar überwunden geglaubte antisemitische Verschwörungstheorien drängen zurück in die politische Arena: die „Protokolle der Weisen von Zion“ als Erzählung vom „großen Austausch“, völkische Kapitalismuskritik in Form von Hetzkampagnen gegen George Soros oder sogenannte „Globalisten“. Rechte Agitatoren und Neonazis spüren in diesem Klima Aufwind und schreiten zur Tat. Auch linker Antisemitismus artikuliert sich zunehmend unverstellt und findet neue Bündnispartner – als hätte es eine diesbezügliche innerlinke Kritik niemals gegeben. Und der in Europa beheimatete islamistische Terrorismus hat Jüdinnen und Juden sowie jüdische Einrichtungen zu bevorzugten Zielen seiner Gewaltexzesse erkoren. Eine Herausforderung besteht zudem auch in dem weitverbreiteten Unvermögen, den modernisierten und sich wandelnden Antisemitismus überhaupt als Antisemitismus zu erkennen. Dieser Sammelband vereint Beiträge, die sich in diesem Sinne den Fragen und Problemstellungen des zeitgenössischen Antisemitismus aus unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln annähern.
Mit Beiträgen von Wolfram Stender, Günther Jikeli, Gerhard Scheit, Daniel Rickenbacher, Michel Wyss, Michael Fischer, Soma Assad, Alexandra Preitschopf, Georg Lauss, Stefan Schmid-Heher und Enno Stünkel.
The phenomenon of outbidding, in which terrorist groups escalate their attacks in response to competition from other groups, has long been studied in a domestic terrorism context. If groups exist in the same state, they may compete with one another for the same resources from civilians of that state. This article argues this outbidding logic also exists in a transnational context. Leveraging a sample of Salafi-jihadist groups that are in competition for resources based on shared ideology, this article explores the full effects of this competition on the quantity and severity of groups’ attacks. Building on this outbidding logic as a theoretical lens, Salafi-jihadist groups adjust their attack profiles in response to competition from other groups following this same ideology. This effect is particularly evident among groups that pledge allegiance to al-Qaeda or ISIS. Once pledged, affiliates must now compete with other affiliates for the additional potential resources and recruits who follow the ‘brand’ of al-Qaeda or ISIS. Consistent with this theory, after examining the attacks of all Salafi-jihadist groups from 2001 to 2014, this article finds increased competition among groups results in more attacks and a selection of more severe targets and types of attacks. Affiliate groups respond to competition to the greatest degree.
Sammendrag
En rekke såkalte fremmedkrigere har blitt dømt de siste årene
etter relativt nye terrorbestemmelser i norsk strafferett. Disse
personene har blitt domfelt etter opphold i Syria hvor de skal ha
vært i kontakt med grupper som er oppført på FNs lister over terrororganisasjoner.
I denne artikkelen stilles det spørsmål ved om norsk terrorlovgivning
i det hele tatt bør anvendes mot personer som har vært involvert
i en uoversiktlig og brutal borgerkrig, hvor ingen av partene går
fri fra anklager om overgrep og krigsforbrytelser. Det argumenteres
for at dette innebærer en problematisk preaktiv rettspraksis
med fare for svekket rettssikkerhet.
Al Qaeda following 9-11 experienced a period of stagnation which it sought to remedy through a project of re-branding. Critical of this approach, Islamic State claimed that al Qaeda was an elitist organization that had facilitated the stagnation of the Salafi Jihadist project. In an attempted to claim dominance over the jihad, Islamic State’s endeavored to discredit al Qaeda through a process it presented as ideological correction, linked to Islamic eschatology, sectarian agitation, permissive violence, and the caliphate. Following Islamic State’s acquisition of vast territory in Iraq and Syria, arguments proliferated that Islamic State had surpassed al Qaeda. As the caliphate has collapsed what effects will this have on al Qaeda’s fortunes and strategy? It is argued that Islamic State has provided al Qaeda’s strategic approach with renewed vigour to help ensure its survival and pursue resurgence. Al Qaeda acting in concert with the meta-strategy for survival concept, has altered an existential threat into an advantage through disavowing Islamic State’s methods, continuing to engage with localism, and pursuing rebranding by positioning itself as a moderate alternative. The cases of al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, Syria, West Africa, and South Asia are instructive in assessing the effectiveness of al Qaeda’s resurgence.
Seventeen years after the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda has survived, due in large part to a deliberate strategy focused on gaining the support of the masses by “going local.” Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the youngest affiliate of al-Qaeda, is in many ways the realization of that new strategy. Western counterterrorism circles are slowly recognizing the viability of al-Qaeda’s reach into South Asia, as AQIS appears to be building its capabilities throughout the region as other terrorist groups, including the Islamic State’s regional affiliate, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), bear the brunt of global counter-terrorism operations. This paper takes a fresh look at the emergence of AQIS— its leadership, funding sources, and future role as a dominant actor in the global jihadist movement. Moreover, this paper assesses the group’s ability to target the U.S. homeland and its assets abroad.
This paper considers the origins of separatist conflicts by examining the Arab uprisings of 2011. Given the internal fractionalization of Arab polities and the artificiality of their borders, many anticipated that Arab states would disintegrate. In fact, separatist conflicts only arose in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen. The paper combines fuzzy set/qualitative comparative analysis (FS/QCA) and within-case process tracing of individual cases to identify the key causal factors that generated these conflicts. It finds that separatist conflicts occurred when there was a conjunction of two conditions: (1) severe crisis during the uprising; and (2) the prior existence of failed state-building efforts and defunct states since the end of the First World War. It also shows that oil production enhances state cohesion at some times but at others motivates and catalyzes separatist gambits. This finding suggests that current conflicts are not about primordial identities or ancient hatred. Rather, they represent efforts to reinstate forms of self-rule and independence lost during the 20th century. This emphasizes the need for a macro-social, institutional approach to civil wars that can explain how historical legacies constrain or impel actors to pursue different strategies and mount different claims on the state.
Why do insurgents target certain groups for extermination? Despite a great deal of attention to the targeting of civilian ethnic minorities, comparatively little scholarship exists on insurgent violence against sexual minorities (lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transsexual individuals). This article maintains that the decision to target sexual minorities follows three distinct logics: two strategic and one ideological. First, insurgents face an incentive to outbid rivals by targeting sexual minorities when homophobic violence is politically and socially legitimated. Second, territorial control creates an incentive for insurgents to signal their ability to selectively punish, which they can accomplish through homophobic violence. Third, revolutionary ideologies provide legitimation for exclusionary violence in the pursuit of transforming society. Statistical analysis of insurgent violence against sexual minorities from 1985 to 2015 lends strong support for these arguments. Process tracing of the spread of violence against sexual minorities in Iraq and Syria clarifies the strategic causal mechanisms. When progovernment militias targeted perceived homosexuals with impunity, antigay violence was adopted by insurgent groups seeking to legitimize their claims to power; violence then quickly spread to competing insurgents. Two additional cases from Latin America demonstrate that ideology plays an important role in influencing which groups embrace homophobic violence even under these strategic constraints.
Kurzfassung
Das Terrornetzwerk al-Qaida hat in den vergangenen Jahren einen Wandel durchlaufen und gewinnt wieder an Stärke. Während die Kernorganisation an Einfluss verloren hat, haben sich ihre regionalen Ableger verselbstständigt. Der Zusammenbruch von Staatlichkeit in Teilen des Nahen Ostens und Nordafrikas als Folge des Arabischen Frühlings hat den Dschihadisten weitreichende Handlungsmöglichkeiten eröffnet. Wo politische Instabilität eine effektive Terrorismusbekämpfung verhindert, eröffnen sie neue Fronten, rekrutieren neue Kämpfer und vergrößern ihren Einfluss. Von Terroroperationen im Ausland und damit von Osama bin Ladens globalen Dschihad gegen den Westen nehmen sie hingegen Abstand, um ihre bisherigen Erfolge in der eigenen Heimat nicht durch Vergeltungsschläge des Westens zu gefährden.
Insurgencies have proven to be highly adaptive movements that exploit their environments and change and mutate in order to survive. States and international actors have long grappled with ways to thwart such adaptations. In this respect, disengagement initiatives that offer insurgents opportunities for alternative livelihood seem to present a viable mechanism for weakening insurgencies. Analyzing the case of the North Caucasus insurgency, this article examines the interrelation between such variables as insurgent crises, government disengagement programs, and foreign attempts to co-opt the insurgency. It is argued that disengagement programs implemented during the second Chechen conflict prevented the insurgent command from pledging allegiance to Al-Qaeda because insurgents had to preserve their local orientation to compete for their bases of support. In 2014, however, the North Caucasus insurgents pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria as no viable disengagement opportunities existed at the time and their only route for survival was to join a global insurgency.
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