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Corisk Report Series No 3 Progress in American and European trade reductions vs Russia by July 2022

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Abstract and Figures

The report investigates in detail the development of Western sanctions against Russia up until July 2022, with a focus on trade, exports and imports, and parallel imports. We investigate the background and nature of sanctions, their detailed makeup, and the political development leading to great variations in trade between on the one side the USA, Canada and the United Kingdom, and on the other side continental EU member states. The report reveals how some countries have captured market share on the Russian market, at the expense of other Western countries. . The report contains country-by-country trade data and detailed queries for key commodity groups.
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Corisk Report Series No 3, 2022
Progress in American and
European trade reductions
vs Russia by July 2022
Erlend Bollman Bjørtvedt
October 4, 2022
Revised version, October 25, 2022
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Disclaimer
This report is an intellectual property work of the author, published by Corisk AS. The report and its content
represent the viewpoints and positions of the author. The report may have been produced in consultation with
others, but the responsibility for all content, facts and positions rests solely with the author.
The Corisk Report Series, including this report, is for free use by private media, individuals and academic
institutions, provided that any presentation, replication or re-use of data or text is to be thus credited:
Bollman Bjørtvedt, Erlend (2022): “Progress in American and European trade reductions vs Russia by July
2022”, Corisk Report Series, No. 3, October 2022.
The revised and final version of this report as of October 25, has been supplemented with data for the
Netherlands and updated graphics.
Media should credit data and graphics in the following way:
Source: Corisk.
This report is non-commissioned, and no funding or financial support has been provided for its production.
The author has no commercial interest, or conflicts of interest, in the issues discussed in the report.
The author is an experienced economics scientist and analyst with 25 years of experience from international
business and research. He has published corporate R&D papers and peer-reviewed articles in scientific journals.
He is a former advisor at Hill+Knowlton, and VP Country Risk at Telenor Group, Norway’s 2nd largest company.
Mr Jon Samuelsen has assisted data collection and quality control for this report.
The Corisk Report Series, including this report, is not for free use, distribution, or commercial utilisation by
corporate or other commercial entities including their subdivisions and representatives. Such use must be
cleared with the author, and is otherwise limited by the right of citation regulated under Norwegian Law.
© 2022: Corisk AS.
Corisk AS is a country risk analysis and consulting company registered in Norway.
Website: www.corisk.no
E - mail: ebb@corisk.no
Phone: +47 9225 9227
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Contents
Executive summary .............................................................................................................................. 4
Summary Infographics: Total trade .................................................................................................. 8
Summary Infographics: Exports ...................................................................................................... 10
Summary Infographics: Imports ...................................................................................................... 12
1. Background on sanctions .............................................................................................................. 15
1.1. Early and clear intent of wide economic sanctions ..................................................................... 15
1.2. Divergence between USA and Europe ....................................................................................... 16
1.3. The nature of economic sanctions .............................................................................................. 18
2. Methodology and data selection .................................................................................................. 22
3. Exports: Large reductions, but not everywhere ......................................................................... 23
4. Imports: Reductions from a record high level ............................................................................ 27
5. The 80 billion Euro trade with Russia since March ................................................................... 30
5.1. American and European exports of chemicals to Russia ........................................................... 31
5.2. American and European purchases of Russian oil and gas ....................................................... 33
5.3. The port ban and imports of fish to Europe ................................................................................ 34
5.4. American and European exports of cars and trucks ................................................................... 35
5.5. Quarterly effect of sanctions after the Russian invasion of Ukraine ........................................... 37
6. Detailed trade values per country ................................................................................................ 38
6.2. France monthly total trade with Russia .................................................................................... 38
6.3. Germany trade with Russia by commodity class ..................................................................... 39
6.3.1. German exports of cars to Russia and neighbouring countries ........................................... 40
6.4. The Netherlands trade with Russia by commodity class ......................................................... 42
6.5. United Kingdom trade with Russia by commodity class .......................................................... 43
6.6. Ireland trade with Russia by commodity class ......................................................................... 44
6.7. Denmark trade with Russia by commodity class ..................................................................... 45
6.8. Finland trade with Russia by commodity group ........................................................................ 46
6.9. Norway trade with Russia by commodity class ....................................................................... 47
6.10. Sweden trade with Russia by commodity class ..................................................................... 48
6.11. Estonia trade with Russia by commodity class ...................................................................... 49
6.12. Latvia trade with Russia by commodity class ........................................................................ 50
6.13. Poland trade with Russia by commodity class ...................................................................... 51
6.14. Czechia trade with Russia by commodity class ..................................................................... 52
6.15. Hungary trade with Russia by commodity class .................................................................... 53
6.16. USA trade with Russia by commodity class .......................................................................... 54
6.17. Canada monthly trade with Russia selected commodity groups ........................................... 55
Trade statistics sources ..................................................................................................................... 56
References ........................................................................................................................................... 57
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Executive summary
By July 2022, it is evident that Western countries approach economic sanctions in different ways.
One group of countries, including the United States, Canada, United Kingdom and Sweden, saw
immediate and substantial reduction in trade after Russia’s attack on Ukraine, taking effect across
several industries already from March 2022. These countries have especially cut imports of oil and
petroleum products, but they have also reduced exports of machinery and cars, telecom equipment,
and (more variably) chemicals. The countries have reduced trade in clear excess of EU regulations,
for example by almost virtually stopping all imports of Russian oil and exports of cars to Russia.
A middle group of Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Lithuania have reduced trade with Russia but less
than the first group, and kept sanction-heavy trades in chemicals, metals, machinery and car tyres.
Still, these countries have clearly cut oil imports and reduced trade much more than the next group.
A final group include Germany, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Norway, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Estonia, Latvia and Serbia. They seem less impacted by economic sanctions, continuing oil and gas
purchases and other imports from Russia unabated. These countries also witness a continuation of
the exports of sanction-heavy goods groups such as chemicals, machinery, digital equipment, and
cars. Germany and Poland have again increased car sales to Russia since May, and Germany has
dramatically increased car exports to Russia’s close neighbours Belarus, Georgia and Armenia.
Norway has kept ports open to Russian fisheries, facilitating Russian oligarchs’ exports to Europe.
Altogether, US and British firms reduce trade with Russia much more than the EU countries do.
Since war started, 18 Western countries have traded 80 billion Euro (84 bn USD) with Russia.
Exports dropped strongly in March and April but resumed somewhat in May and June, and many
countries also increased exports in July. However, the European Union’s ban on several exports of
chemicals from July 10 seems universally to have had intended effect on exporting behaviour.
Germany and Central Europe gained market shares in exports to Russia, at the expense of US firms.
Imports had before the war risen to unprecedentedly high levels due to the surge in oil and gas
prices, and the decline from March only brought purchases from Russia down to their “normal”
levels. In July, there was a new increase in oil and gas imports, while general imports kept falling. This
attests to a possible hoarding of Russian oil during the ongoing grace period until December. Only US
and UK firms reduced imports from Russia after the attack on Ukraine, compared to 2021.
Continued trade provides crucial funding of the Russian war effort via imports, and the excessive
decline in exports versus improves has upheld much of the large Russian trade surplus in 2022.
Identification of trade does not imply any indication or allegation that individual countries or
enterprises violate the economic sanctions. Data are analysed solely to understand actual trade.
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This report investigates developments in European trade with Russia, since the release of Corisk
Report Series No 1 Progress in European-Russian trade reductions by May 2022, and Corisk Report
Series No 2 Progress in European-Russian trade reductions by June 2022. The combined reports
explore the progress of trade reductions in view of the ongoing economic sanctions of Russia. The
reports explore trade reductions irrespectively of the exact liabilities pertaining to each commodity.
Notwithstanding the legal liabilities of companies to adhere with sanctions, there is a strong political
and moral sentiment for isolating and punishing Russia after its attack and war crimes in Ukraine.
America and Europe expand sanctions to exert real economic effect on the war capability of Russia.
1
After the attack and invasion started February 24, 2022, sanctions were rapidly enacted and several
countries sharply reduced trade with Russia already during March. The United States, the United
Kingdom, Singapore, and Ireland reduced imports substantially already in March and April. Many
trades were banned, and many companies voluntarily withdrew from the Russian market.
This report investigates trade statistics of 18 Western countries. Based on data comparisons
(Chapters 3-6), the countries are here presented in descending order of sanction performance:
1. Canada. Reduced both exports and imports by 90 %, including non-sanctioned goods.
2. USA. American companies have strongly reduced trade, including non-sanctioned goods.
3. United Kingdom. The UK has consistently reduced all kinds of trade with Russia.
4. Sweden. The Swedish exports and imports have been strongly and consistently reduced.
5. Denmark. Danish trade has been more than halved, along all compared time perspectives.
6. Lithuania. The best performing of the countries bordering Russia, all trade flows reduced.
7. Ireland. Exports are long-term unchanged, but imports have been strongly cut since April.
8. Finland. Modest export cuts and clear import cuts, but oil and metal imports increase.
9. France. Clear reductions in most trade in 2022, but imports are still at high historic levels.
10. Poland. Modest reductions in both exports and imports for this country bordering Russia.
11. Norway. Increased exports since April, no visible ambitions to cut imports of fish or oil.
12. Netherlands. Hardly reduced exports and imports, and is a substantial importer of oil.
13. Germany. Modest trade reductions in 2022, expands several trades and wins market share.
14. Latvia. Clear increase in exports, modest import cuts with strong growth in oil purchases.
15. Estonia. Increased exports, and stable imports due to strong growth in imports of Russian oil.
16. Hungary. Cutting exports, but persistent growth in purchases of oil, gas and chemicals.
17. Czechia. Clearly reduced exports, but imports have been trebled by record oil purchases.
18. Serbia. Refuses to sanction Russia, consistent increases in trade along all time periods.
As Corisk Report Series No 2 revealed, trade reductions progressed well initially, but were partially
reverted in May and June. This report analyses detailed trade data for July, and investigates four
markets in particular depth due to their relevance to the EU Fifth and Sixth Packages: Chemicals
exports, oil imports, port traffic, and German car sales. Because trade varies by month and trends
depend on periods of comparison, the report compares sanction progress over several time periods.
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Chapter 1 provides a background on sanctions, with emphasis on the “packages” of EU sanctions
announced since late February. The sanctions have a set of legal provisions, but also embody a wider
political intent of curbing the Russian economy. Initial Western concert was replaced by a visible rift
in approach to Russia between the USA on one side, and Germany with other European powers on
the other side. Disagreements have concerned the sanctioning of banks, oil and gas, and oil tanker
shipping. EU states have yielded to pressure for coal and oil sanctions, but with a grace period so that
import bans enter into force first in December for coal and oil, and March next year for petroleum
products. It is unclear whether Europe will bow to American demands regarding insurance of oil
cargo. The following chapters will analyse specifically the effect of EU sanctions on actual trade.
Chapter 2 explains methodology and data selection, including imports data and goods classification.
Chapter 3 explores the 18 Western countries’ exports to Russia. It reveals how exports from Europe
first plummeted by more than 60 % through March and April, but in May and June exports climbed
back almost to their lower levels of 2020-21. In July, Europe’s exports again fell back to the March
level, at about half the “normal” historic level. This new decline may have been caused by the Fifth
and Sixth Packages of EU sanctions, since all EU sanction countries except Netherlands and Lithuania
saw exports drop in July. Since February, the USA and Canada has seen stronger reductions in their
exports to Russia than any European country. North American and UK firms took the largest burdens
of exports cuts - while Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Estonia and Latvia gained market share.
For example, US firms only retain 2 % of February’s car exports, while German firms retain 11-20 %.
Chapter 4 explores the 18 Western countries’ imports from Russia. It observes a strong decline by 40
% since Russia’s attack, but from very high levels inherited from the 2021 surge in oil and gas prices.
Given the extension of import bans in the Fifth Package of EU sanctions, mostly entering into force by
early July, the added decline in imports in July was hardly noticeable. Non-fuel commodities saw a
strong decline in line with sanctions, but the imports of Russian gas, oil and petroleum products
increased considerably, so the net effect was one of overall stabilisation. Germany, the Netherlands
and Czech Republic import more from Russia than at the same time in 2021. Only North American
and British firms have cut their imports from Russia down to levels below levels seen 2019-2021.
Chapter 5 explores the total trade of 18 Western countries with Russia, which over the five months
since March has amounted to 80 billion Euros, or almost 84 billion US dollars. The chapter observes
that total trade (exports + imports) compared to the same months in 2021 witnessed a massive
decline in the United States, UK, Canada and Sweden, while the year-on-year trade with Russia
stabilised in key economies such as Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Norway. There was an
overall y-o-y increase in trade with Russia for both the sanction sceptics Hungary and Serbia, and for
the Czech Republic. Imports expose the clear division between “strict” countries lead by the USA, and
historic sanction sceptics including Germany and East-Central European states. Reliance on natural
gas is part of the explanation, but many other trades also continue unabated in the group of sceptics.
As a consequence, Germany represents 30 % of the 18 countries total trade with Russia, followed by
the Netherlands which has replaced USA from the second position, and Poland on current third place
in market share. Germany, the Netherlands and Poland make up 56 % of the trade with Russia, up
from 46 % in the same period in 2021. The United Kingdom has transited from fifth to tenth position.
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The chapter explores four particular trades, in chemicals, oil and gas, cars, and the fishery imports
into European fishery port and terminals. The Fifth and Sixth Packages of EU sanctions added large
groups of widely traded chemicals to the export ban, effective from July. While the USA reduced
these exports immediately and lastingly from March, countries in Europe were largely unaffected or
even increased exports, until July when there was a near universal decline in Europe’s chemicals
sales to Russia. An exception Is Germany where sanctions have no visible effect on export behaviour.
The imports of Russian oil and gas declined in most countries in March and April, and stabilised at
very low or zero levels in North America, UK, Ireland, Denmark and Sweden. Again, Germany saw an
almost unaffected trade, due to its reliance on Russian energy fuels. With the European 6-8 months
grace period on oil imports approved in early June, oil and petroleum imports saw sharp increases in
several countries, including Finland, Norway, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, and even Sweden and
the UK. This accentuates the question of hoarding during the grace period.
The sales of motor vehicles and parts to Russia and Belarus is partly banned, and all countries have
strongly reduced these exports. Exports to Russia and Belarus are totally abandoned by the USA, UK
and the Netherlands. But Germany has increased these sales since May, and increased sales to
Russia’s neighbouring trading partners by 160-340 percent, indicating possible shadow trade by
parallel imports. These anomalies in German car exports cannot be explained by price movements.
The purchase of Russian fish is not sanctioned, but the Fifth Package banned Russian vessels from
European ports from April 16, and imports of seafoods from July 10. While the USA is the single
largest importer of Russian fish among the 18 countries, European imports face specific regulatory
uncertainties and is dominated by Germany, Denmark and Norway. Norway has a specific exception
from the ports ban, and specialises in re-exporting Russian white fish to the EU market.
Altogether, it seems that EU sanctions have a clear effect on trade behaviour, witnessed by the near
universal declines in European non-fuel trade with Russia after the Fifth and Sixth Packages. Due to
the long-term stronger reduction in exports than in imports, Russia has retained most of its trade
surplus with 18 Western countries since the attack on Ukraine, compared to the “normal” balance
during 2019-2021. The stabilisation of above-historic imports provides Russia with almost unaltered.
Trade increases in April-June and reductions in June-July have created a wave-pattern in Europe’s
trade with Russia, which may have several explanations: There is probably a combination of price
movements, seasonal or logistics issues, Russian counter-measures, and possibly a first initial “shock”
among compliant companies which may have been followed by a subsequent better corporate
acquaintance with rules and higher ability to utilise them for renewed trade efforts.
Chapter 6 goes in detail on groups of commodities traded by each country. Goods are grouped by
SITC classification, with conversion from CN and other systems as needed. France, Finland, Lithuania
and Serbia do not provide goods-level data. Apart from studying five standard commodity groups,
there is indication for many countries on their trade with sanction-intensive goods such as fish and
seafood, coal and oil, chemicals, metals, and machinery, including telecom and digital technology.
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Summary Infographics: Total trade
After attack, EU sanction countries trade more with Russia than ever before
Sanctions bring trade with Russia down, but from record high level
Germany and Netherlands alone represent 46% of trade with Russia
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Many European nations trade just as USA and close allies decimate trade,
much with Russia as they did in 2021 Central Europe continues as before
Germany increased its share of 18 countries’ total trade to 29.5 %
US firms have reduced their share of trade from 16 % to only 3 %
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Summary Infographics: Exports
Exports to Russia have been reduced from all countries that follow sanctions
Countries under EU sanctions (dotted line) have cut exports compared to 2021
Sanctions bring exports to Russia down, US and UK sales almost fully stopped
Most countries have reduced exports, but US and UK firms more than EU firms
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Exports clearly lower than 2019-2021
Norway increased most in 2022
Central Europe win market share at expense of French and US firms
US firms decreased their Russia export market share from 8 % to 3 %
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Summary Infographics: Imports
Record high imports uphold Russian finances and big trade surplus
14 EU sanction countries import more than ever before from Russia
Sanctions bring total imports down, but Central Europe has increased imports
Five EU members take 71 % of the 18 Western countries’ imports from Russia
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Many imports higher than in 2019-2021 Putin friends increased in 2022
,
Germany and key EU countries uphold the Russian revenue stream
Strongest growth in Czech Republic, most reduction in the US and UK
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More oil and gas being bought from Russia, but less other goods
Five Western countries now totally dominate Russian fuel sales
Germany, Netherlands, Czechia, Poland, Hungary buy 96 % of oil & gas *
* Among the 18 Western countries surveyed. Note that South European countries are not included.
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1. Background on sanctions
After the Russian attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the European Union enacted a fourth
round of economic and trade sanctions against Russian citizens and entities, starting with sanctions
against Russian banks and Russian participation in SWIFT from February 22-25. This was followed by
the freezing of Russian overseas reserves and targeted EU sanctions against individuals enacted
during the early days of February 24-28. The EU enacted its first sanctions against Belarus on March
2, and expressed on March 15 intentions to obstruct the country’s WTO accession.
2
The sanctions on
Russia expand existing (2014-) sanctions covered largely by EU Directives 833/2014 and 269/2014.
Sanctions were triggered by the Russian recognition of independence of the two Donbass counties of
Ukraine, and the illegal military attack on Ukraine. The sanctions intend to punish state-owned and
state-linked individuals and companies from upholding the economic basis for the Russian war effort.
Following the invasion of Ukraine, a large number of European companies voluntarily withdrew from
the Russian market and announced their intent to abstain from trade and transactions.
3
The February 28 Fourth Package of sanctions from the EU included a wide range of export controls
on IT components, military and strategic goods, goods for use in oil refining, aerospace and aviation.
4
It also banned or restricted financial transactions, loans and credits, IPOs and equity instruments
including to EU subsidiaries of Russian majority-owned companies.
5
On March 4, foreign ministers of
EU countries agreed to secure implementation and close any loopholes to the sanctions.
6
On March 11, the EU, USA, UK, Canada, and Japan agreed to remove the Most Favoured Nation
(MFN) status of Russia under the WTO framework.
7
This opened up a legitimate pathway to impose
tariffs, restrictions, quotas, and further bans in trade with Russia. Jointly, the EU and USA agreed to
block Russia’s access to reserves, gold, and other assets abroad which may help fund the war effort.
8
On March 17, the EU expanded sanctions to cover imports of iron and steel, exports or transactions
in the energy and luxury goods sectors in addition to specific individual and company sanctions
targeting iron and steel, aviation, machine building, dual-purpose equipment, energy, and banking.
9
Sanctions from March 17 included Gazprom, Rosneft, and other major energy companies.
10
This first
comprehensive EU sanctions package was enacted via the EEA as Norwegian Law by March 18.
1.1. Early and clear intent of wide economic sanctions
The overwhelming number of EU sanctions had already been enacted by April. Already in March, the
writing on the wall was clear and most large companies including European car makers abandoned
the Russian market. The EU started an open process to ban imports of Russian coal on April 5, and
made clear the intent to ban oil imports.
11
European airspace and roads were closed for Russian
aircraft and road traffic from March. European ports were closed off for Russian registered ships
from April 16.
12
By April it was evident that all Western powers intended on comprehensive and
punitive sanctions of Russia, that that the existing sanctions would be successively expanded, and
that the remaining trade, first of all in natural gas, was to be intentionally phased out in exchange for
other sources. At this time, countries like the UK had also already sharply reduced trade with Russia.
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On May 31, the EU Commission announced the last major commodity sanction, on oil imports.
13
On
that day, the EU Council ministers also agreed to secure “fair competition and level playing-field
among member states” during implementation of sanctions.
14
This was a clear calling that variable or
diverging implementation which may hurt fair competition, would not be tolerated.
Thereby, April 2022 can be regarded as the time when it was clear to all that the EU and nation states
were enacting ever-expanding sanctions on trade with Russia. At this time there existed a shared
moral, public expectation on businesses, and NATO member states were supplying armament to the
Ukraine from February onwards. Accordingly, this report will evaluate the actual progress on trade
reduction and phase-out against the normal trade volumes of previous years from April onwards.
The sanctions have a wide purpose to “cripple the Russian economy and curtail its ability to raise
funds for its military”.
15
As Russia attacked Ukraine, EU President Ursula von der Leyen vowed to
cripple Russia’s ability to fund warfare and “weaken Russia’s economic base and its capacity to
modernise.”
16
Alas, the intent of sanctions from the start were wider than just targeted punishment
of certain individuals or entities. EU sanction regulations were thus amended in April 2022:
Article 3i. It shall be prohibited to purchase, import, or transfer, directly or indirectly, goods which
generate significant revenues for Russia thereby enabling its actions destabilising the situation in
Ukraine, as listed in Annex XXI into the Union if they originate in Russia or are exported from Russia.
17
Notwithstanding the continuous legal liability of firms to avoid certain goods and trading partners,
the repeated reference to curb the Russian economy serves as a compass to further tightening of
sanctions. Sanctions will always be initiated stepwise in order to allow escalation, but the wider
political and moral intent of the European legislator has been clearly, and repeatedly stated. Any
trade with Russian partners contributes to the Russian state via duties, taxes, or direct income.
The clarity of sanction intents is also seen from the explicit listing of non-sanctioned items, which the
European Commission and Council have repeatedly stressed. Transactions are to be allowed to
facilitate humanitarian and emergency co-operation and relief, life-saving at sea, etc. The EU has
deliberately allowed imports of Russian food, fish, fodder, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, medical
products, aluminium, copper, iron ore, iron and steel scrap, nickel, palladium, and titanium. As a
general rule of thumb, all other items are politically scorned and in scope for stepwise escalation.
1.2. Divergence between USA and Europe
On March 8, the USA announced a ban on imports of Russian oil and gas, with rapid effect on ports
and refineries in the USA, UK, Ireland, Denmark and Sweden, which started to phase out imports of
Russian oil, gas, and petroleum products. The organisation Business Europe asked for sanctions that
were clear and co-ordinated with the United States.
18
And indeed, the EU Commission on March 11
stated its intent of reducing European imports of natural gas from Russia by two thirds during 2022.
However, EU sanction require unanimity among member states, and Germany demanded two major
exceptions from sanctions the imports of oil and gas, and the operation of Russian bank branches
in Europe.
19
In the same EU process, Greece apparently secured support for allowing EU registered
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ships to carry Russian oil and oil products.
20
The United States put pressure on European states to
deepen sanctions at the March 23 meeting of the G7, but with little immediate success.
As a result, Europe allowed Russian banks to operate in Europe, and continued importing and
shipping massive quantities of Russian fuel, contrary to the situation in the United States, United
Kingdom, and a handful of EU countries.
21
On April 5, EU President Ursula von der Leyen expressed
intent to sanction Russian oil, while proposing a ban on imports of Russian coal, wood, cement,
seafood and liquor.
22
The same day, Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orban expressed opposition to
include in sanctions oil and gas, which Hungary depends upon and represents a “red line”.
23
The EU
still remained the largest buyer of Russian oil, despite reductions in gas imports and partial replace-
ment with coal from elsewhere.
24
As the war ensued, Russia experienced increasing fossil fuel
revenues, as crude oil compensated for the partial loss of revenues from pipeline gas to Europe.
25
The EU Council approved a ban on coal imports with the Fifth Package of Sanctions on April 8, but
with a 4 months grace period until August 10.
26
This induced a clear risk of hoarding. Throughout
May, the ending of gas supplies to several EU states by Gazprom attracted much energy and focus
from the EU Commission and Council, but by late May they summoned to agree on the further status
of oil imports. US and internal pressure on the EU and Germany continued, and the EU Parliament
supported the call for strong sanctions on oil and gas in full co-ordination across the Atlantic.
27
Divergences were discussed between the USA, United Kingdom, and Germany through the G7. By
late May, EU member states accepted sanctioning Russian oil and petroleum products, approved on
June 3 with a grace period for crude oil until December 3, and for petroleum products until February
3, 2023. Via the EEA liabilities, these provisions were also enacted into Norwegian Law on June 17.
The grace period allows 6-8 months of imports after the June 3 decision, and seems to have induced
widespread hoarding of Russian oil.
28
Trade data reveal increased imports starting in June 2022 in
Germany, Poland, Finland, Norway, and the Czech Republic. Even Sweden and the United Kingdom
saw some minor imports after having totally cut such imports in May. In Europe, only Denmark and
Ireland have totally abstained from oil or petroleum imports from Russia after the June 3 declaration.
Since the war started, Russia has increased its crude oil exports by 17 % over the same period in
2021, despite exports to the EU falling by 21 % in the same period.
29
The Russian share in EU crude
imports is down from the traditional 20 % to only 11 % by August, but climbed in September to 12 %.
There are seasonal peaks in oil exports during summer and winter. For the EU ban to materialise on
December 5, the speed of import reductions must double.
30
For petroleum products (gasoline, diesel,
gasoil), the situation is reverse: Russian total exports have decreased by 5.5 % since the same period
in 2021, but EU imports from Russia increased by 12 %. Refineries and tankers have long planning
horizons, so imports will need to be replaced before December.
While the G7 meeting on June 26-28 achieved little, the United States finally succeeded in pushing
through a new tightening of fuel sanctions at the next G7 meeting on September 7. But US officials
raised concerns that too rapid cut-off of Russian oil may dramatically raise global oil prices.
31
To allow
oil to flow and still initiate the EU embargo, the G7 agreed on the price cap on freights to third
countries, and changed a planned insurance ban so that maritime P&I insurers can still serve oil
cargos destined for third countries within the price cap.
32
Even insurers located in non-EU states UK
and Norway, depend fully on EU-registered reinsurers that are under EU regulation.
33
However, these
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changes will need unanimous support among EU member states for revision of the Sixth Package of
sanctions, in order to avoid conflict with G7 rules. Russian and third-party tankers will still be able to
carry oil above the price cap level, in competition with European, British, and Norwegian tankers.
Another industry which untouched by sanctions is the atomic industry, including uranium imports.
34
A key risk pertaining to companies from all industries and countries, is the risk of parallel imports,
which is potentially a criminal offence for original producers. The Russian Government on March 29
issued a decree legalising a specified list among 50 groups of commodities, sanctioned by the Russian
parliament by the end of June.
35
This means that Russian importers can lawfully (in Russia) import
the specified brands and items from third countries, without the permission of the original producer.
The list contains virtually all major brands of major commodity groups, including thousands of
products and parts produced in the United States, Japan, Korea, United Kingdom, Switzerland,
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Czechia, and the Nordic countries. In addition, companies
distributing any of the listed items will stand at risk of facilitating parallel exports.
1.3. The nature of economic sanctions
After the Russian-controlled “referenda” in four Ukrainian regions in September, the EU enacted the
Eight Package of sanctions to “isolate and hit Russia’s economy even more”.
36
Sanctions added many
imports, exports of specific chemicals, and certain aviation and electronic items. More importantly, it
made deterrence provisions to list and sanction individuals who circumvent the sanctions: for
example, if they buy goods in the European Union, bring them to third countries and then to Russia,
this would be a circumvention of our sanctions, and those individuals could be listed.”
37
Countries and entities officially imposing sanctions against transactions and trade with Russia include
the European Union, Norway, Switzerland, the USA, Canada, Japan, Korea, Australia, and Singapore,
representing half of the world’s GDP. Countries officially abstaining from taking part in sanctions,
include Serbia, China, India, Mexico, and Brazil. The sanctions are not multilateral, which means that
countries abstaining from implementing them cannot be secondarily held responsible or pursued in
any way.
38
Otherwise, sanctions and their implementation are national responsibilities.
The 2022 EU and US sanctions are extensions of the post-2014 sanctions, which focused on financial
services, banking, defence programs, and critical technology. During 2014-2022 sanctions were
gradually widened to include more Russian individuals and entities, until President Joe Biden called
an emergency in relations with Russia in April 2021.
39
As 2022 approached, there was scepticism and
critique against sanctions in France, Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Greece.
A detailed overview of the sanction regimes is available from Correctiv (www.correctiv.org) and Open
Sanctions (www.opensanctions.org). A total 7,369 sanctions have been approved since February 22
by the EU, USA, UK, Switzerland, and Japan, targeting 5,818 individuals and 1,234 companies.
40
Of
these 7,369 sanctions, a total of 1,019 were already introduced by end of February, and another
2,274 during March, bringing the total before April up to 3,293, or 45 % of all current sanctions.
The EU has enacted to date (October 2) a total of 1,433 sanctions since February 2022:
41
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Approved
Action
Main restrictions
February
475 new sanctions
23
Donetsk,
Luhansk 42
In effect from February 24, for six months:
Import ban on goods from the area.
Export ban on certain goods and technologies.
Investing in certain economic sectors and projects.
Providing tourism services.
24, 25
Sanctions 43
Banning Russian access to EU capital and financial markets.
Providing several financial transactions, IPOs, loans, credits.
Banning transactions with the Russian Central Bank.
Banning Russian use of crypto currency to facilitate transactions.
Importing key items of Russian iron and steel.
Exporting military goods, dual-purpose goods.
Exporting key items for aerospace, aviation, IT, oil refining, gas liquification.
Exporting luxury cars, luxury goods.
Asset freezes of individual assets of listed individuals.
28
Sanctions 44
Banning Russian airflights over EU airspace, access to EU airports.
March
212 new sanctions
2
SWIFT 45
Banning dealings with Russian Direct Investment Fund.
Providing or selling Euro banknotes to Russia or Russians.
Banning 7 Russian banks from utilising SWIFT for transactions:
Bank Okritie, Novikombank, Promsvjazbank, Rossija Bank, Sovkombank,
Vneshekonombank (VEB), VTB Bank.
2
Belarus 46
Trading with goods related to mineral fuels, oil and gas, iron and steel,
cement, rubber, wood products, tobacco production.
Trading with military and dual-use items and technology.
9
Belarus 47
Providing several financial services, IPOs, share issues.
Banning dealings with the Central Bank of Belarus.
Providing or selling Euro banknotes to Belarus.
Banning 3 Belarussian banks from utilising SWIFT for transactions:
Belagroprombank, Bank Dabrabyt, Development Bank of Belarus.
9
Russia
Exporting maritime navigation / radio communication technology.
15
Fourth Package: 48
Providing credit rating services to Russian entities or individuals.
Trading with entities in aviation, military and dual use items, shipbuilding, machine building.
Investing in the Russian energy sector.
April
62 new sanctions
8
Fifth Package: 49
In effect from April 16:
Bans on Russian vessels entering EU ports. Exception for fishing vessels at Norwegian ports.
Bans on Russian and Belarussian road transport on EU territory.
Full transaction bans on 4 Russian banks:
In effect from July 10:
Importing wood, charcoal, wood pulp, fertilizers, cement (Portland, aluminous, slag,
supersulphate, hydraulic), potassium, hydrazine, hydroxylamine, phosphates, cyclic
hydrocarbons, phenols, potassium-chloride, polymers.
Importing silver, aluminium plates > 0,2 mm, unwrought lead
Importing glass, including glass fibres, carboys, bottles, flasks, jars, pots, etc.
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Importing new pneumatic tyres of rubber.
Importing seafood (crustaceans, caviar), liquor.
Exporting construction materials, prefabricated buildings of wood, office wooden furniture,
building elements of plaster, mica, tiles, rooftiles, etc.
Exporting engines and motors, transformers, batteries and cells, accumulators, turbojets,
steam turbines, furnace burners, centrifuges, pumps, valves, air-conditioning, bakery ovens,
fire distinguishers, elevators, lifting frames, hoists, bulldozers, shovels, dumpers, building
machines, industrial robots, tunnelling machinery, moulding machinery, railway equipment or
signalling items, semi-trailers, road tractors for semi-trailers, fire-fighting vehicles, industrial
and agricultural vehicles, arc lamps, cathode ray tubes, paper industry machinery, printers,
glass or stone industry machinery, looms, spindles, machines for drying, washing, ironing,
threading, shaping, planning, or tanning.
Exporting jet fuel, kerosene, oxidation inhibitors, asphalt, coal tar pitch, etc.
Exporting flower bulbs, tubers, live plants or roots, Rhododendrons, Roses.
Exporting wood of cherry (Prunus), beech (Fagus), aspen or poplar (Populus), fibreboard,
plywood, wood laminate, pulp, casks, barrels, floor panels, corks.
Exporting knives, keys, locks, boilers, paper, kraft paper, filter paper, paperboard, pulp,
cellulose, plastic tubes or pipes, plastic film or sheets, plastic doors or windows, textile wall-
coverings, synthetic yarn or fabric, hemp yarn, wool yarn, cotton yarn, cotton fabrics, rock-
wool, metallic yarn, rubber or products of rubber, photographic equipment, surveying
equipment.
Exporting finishing agents, thinners, organic tans, organic colouring matters, prepared pig-
ments and colours, polymer paints, resin salts, plasticisers, ink, film, photographic paper,
steatite, destrins, xylol, pitch coke, petroleum jelly or wax, mastics, butane, octanol, sterol,
phenol, acetone, esters, aniline, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, chlorides, chlorates, hydrogen
peroxide, polymers, polyamides, styrene, vinyl acetate, vinyl chloride, nickel sulphate, sulph-
ites, alums, nitrites, silicon, arsenic, toluene, carbon, caustic soda, aluminium hydroxide, etc.
Exporting gold, silver, nickel, tin, molybdenum, cobalt, tungsten, zirconium, high number of
products and appliances made of iron, steel, copper. aluminium, lead or zinc, raw or refined
marble, alabaster, wolframates, ferro-vanadium, kieselguhr, kieserite, diatomite, dolomite,
magnesite, clays, chalk, gypsum, limestone, lime, mica powder, tiles, millstones, grindstones,
ultramarine, etc.
In effect from August 10:
Importing coal, coke, briquettes, tar oil, peat, etc.
May
No new sanctions
June
79 new sanctions
May 30
- June 3
Sixth Package: 50
Officially adopted on June 3. 51
Banning 3 Russian and 1 Belarusian banks from utilising SWIFT for transactions:
Sberbank, credit Bank of Moscow, Russian Agricultural Bank, Belarusian Bank for Development
and Reconstruction.
Providing services to Russia within accounting, public relations, or consulting.
Exporting to Russia of another 80 chemicals that can be utilised for chemical weapons.
In effect from December 3:
Importing Russian crude oil from ships with temporary exceptions for oil via pipelines.
Exemptions for Bulgaria and Croatia’s imports of sea-borne crude oil and vacuum gas oil.
In effect from February 3, 2023:
Importing Russian refined oil products, gasoline, benzene, diesel oil, etc.
Providing insurance and other services to oil exports (conflict with G7 rules from September)
20
Crimea
In effect from June 20, for six months:
Extended sanctions relating to Crimea and Sevastopol:
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Import ban on goods from the area.
Export ban on certain goods and technologies.
Investing in certain economic sectors and projects.
Providing tourism services.
30
Punitive 52
Violation of sanctions proposed by EU Council to list of “EU crimes” in Article
83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, to overcome differing
national legal definitions and establish minimum rules. Based on proposal
from the EU Commission as of May 25.
July
59 new sanctions
21
Seventh (Maintenance and Alignment) Package: 53
Importing Russian-origin gold and jewellery.
Clarifies several issues relating to public procurement, aviation, and justice.
Extends the existing port access of Russian vessels to locks.
Extends and reinforces list of items for dual use and military applications.
August
4 new sanctions
September
542 new sanctions
9
Visa 54
EU suspends visa facilitation agreement with Russia.
28
Commission
55
EU Commission prepares proposal for Eight Package, after Russian
“referenda” in four Ukrainian provinces.
Extension of sanctions relating to Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea, to also enter
into force for all Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine.
Confirming legally the price cap on Russian oil to third countries.
Import bans on another large group of products, amounting to 7 bn EUR.
Additional items connected with aviation (tyres, brakes), electronics
components (including semiconductors), and chemicals.
Providing knowledge services to Russia, probably to include legal services.56
Listing of individuals who circumvent or violate sanctions.
List of sanctioned individuals and entities:
EUR-Lex - 02014R0269-20220721 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)
Lists over sanctioned goods, items and services:
EUR-Lex - 02014R0833-20220316 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)
EUR-Lex - 32022R0576 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)
List of dual-use items:
EUR-Lex - 32021R0821 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)
List of UK sanction and asset freeze targets:
Financial sanctions targets: list of all asset freeze targets - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)
Technical lists regulating sanctions at product level contain hundreds of pages, and the telecom and
digital equipment regulations alone cover 253 pages. Not surprisingly, many companies choose to
de-risk by abandoning the Russian market altogether.
57
A comprehensive analysis of risks involved in business operations in, or business relations with
Russia, is available from Corisk. Our company also provides a comprehensive analysis and diagnostic
of the risk and prevalence of parallel imports at product and brand level.
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2. Methodology and data selection
This report focuses on trade in goods, as these are most easily measured and monitored by public
authorities. The report seeks to establish to which degree European countries have made progress
on sanctions by checking how actual trade has developed since 2019, with a focus on the sanction
regime period from April 2022. The analysis does not implicate or allege violations of sanctions.
To assess the progress of sanctions and trade reduction, the report focuses on trade with Russia from
March to June 2022, compared to similar periods during 2019, 2020, and 2021. The year 2019 serves
as a reference point for pre-pandemic trade levels, while the development within 2022 is a good
reference to check the magnitude of immediate change following proclamations of sanctions.
Import data are sought by country of origin (not consignment) where that exists, and export data
include non-border-crossing sales when available. Data have been retrieved manually from national
statistical offices’ open services and databases. Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Serbia publish data in
Euro, which have been utilised here. For Denmark, Norway, Sweden and UK, data reported in local
currency units (LUCs) have been converted to Euro at normalised currency rates from xe.com:
EURO
2020
2022
2022 July
USD
0.880
0.915
0.980
CAD
0.650
0.750
0.750
GBP
1.120
1.180
1.180
DKK
0.134
0.134
0.134
NOK
0.090
0.100
0.100
SEK
0.093
0.096
0.096
Data for July 2022 exist for all the 18 countries: Canada, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Sweden, UK, USA.
The 16 European countries represent a GDP of 13 trillion USD in 2022, more than half of Europe’s
total GDP of 20 tn USD. Canada and USA represent a combined GDP of 23 tn USD. In total, about half
of the world’s GDP is represented by the 18 countries studied in this report. The study contains
complete data for 4 out of the 6 largest economies globally, and the 3 largest economies of Europe.
The analysis spans all Western countries bordering Russia. The countries are highly integrated and
have had substantial trade with Russia, ranging from 1-10 percent of total trade. They represent
large economies (France, Germany, UK, USA), open economies (Denmark, Estonia, Norway, Sweden),
sanction sceptics (Germany, Hungary, Serbia), gas importers (Czechia, Germany, Hungary), and
countries that purchase very little oil or gas from Russia (Canada, Sweden, UK).
Belgium, Italy and Spain do not provide accessible monthly trade data. France and Finland provide
trade data but not at commodity level. Austria charges payment for trade data, and is omitted.
With the exception of Denmark, exports and imports of goods in the report include also goods that
do not cross the border which are typically oil and gas products sold to aircraft abroad or ships at
high seas. All data per commodity class use SITC data when available, while any use of CN data will be
“translated” into SITC by use of conversion tables. The exception is again Denmark, which issues data
in split SITC classes, and Danish data at commodity level will include slightly other goods. For
example, food trade data for Denmark will also include beverages, beer, tobacco goods, etc.
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3. Exports: Large reductions, but not everywhere
Figure 1 shows the monthly development of total exports to Russia from the six largest studied
countries, measured in million Euros (for scale, Germany’s data are here divided by 10). Russia’s
attack on Ukraine in late February is marked with a red dot and arrow. All countries clearly reduced
exports to Russia in March and April, but all except the USA and UK increased exports since May:
The full exports picture over the three and a half years until July 2022 is sorted in Figure 2 between
the 18 countries surveyed. The Russian invasion is here marked with a black vertical line:
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Exports from the 18 countries declined sharply early on, from 6.49 billion Euros in February to 3.12
billion Euros in March 2022, a drop by 52 percent, and a decline by 55 percent from March 2021. The
decline continued in April with exports falling to 2.4 billion Euros, a third of the “natural” level. In
May 2022, total exports from the countries increased somewhat to 3.0 billion Euros, still well below
previous years’ levels. But in June, the exports rose to 3.61 billion Euros, which is 1.2 bn Euros or 50
percent above April levels. In July, exports again fell to 3.23 billion Euros, slightly above export levels
in March. The most modest relative fall in exports is seen in East-Central Europe and the Baltics.
The fall is hardly seasonal, as in July 2020 and 2021 half of the countries reduced, and half increased
exports. This attests to a real trending decline, in line with the intent of sanctions. It is reasonable to
at least partially interpret developments as a result of the Fifth Package of sanctions from the EU,
with export bans on important, valuable groups of goods within machinery, vehicles, materials, and
chemicals entering into effect from July 10. But in total, the biggest reductions in exports are seen in
North America and the United Kingdom, reductions in clear excess of what is seen in most EU states.
The same picture is evident in the Nordics, where Figure 3 reveals a clear recovery of exports in May
and June, and an ensuing decline in July everywhere except Lithuania. Exports from the Baltics are
now at fully “normal” levels, while Sweden and Finland see strong decreases in exports in July:
After the introduction of sanctions, and
especially given the tightening of EU
export rules from July 10, countries saw
variable development, as seen in Figure
4 (right). It shows the change in exports
to Russia from February to July 2022.
Countries with blue bars have reduced
exports since February, headed by
Canada (down 97 %), the USA (- 83 %),
Sweden (-/ 80 %), UK (- 75 %), Finland (-
70 %), and France and Czechia (- 69 %).
Detailed data are available in Chapter 6.
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As the war started, USA saw exports becoming more than halved from 262 mio USD in February
2022, down to 108 mio in March. Against “normal” levels of 400-600 mio USD in monthly exports, US
firms exported only 58 mio in June, marginally climbing to 83 mio USD in July. Compared to February
levels, US firms lost 83% or 397 million USD (350 mio EUR) of monthly exports by July 2022.
Canada reduced exports from monthly 55 mio CAD in October-January, down to just 3.9 million CAD
in March and exactly the same in July . This is the strongest average fall (- 93%) in the survey. From
February’s 130 mio CAD, Canada lost 97% (126 mio CAD, 90 mio EUR) of monthly exports by July.
The United Kingdom saw a swift and strong reduction in exports from 256 mio GBP in February 2022
to only 108 mio GBP in March. Exports then further dropped to 33 mio in April, stabilising at 63 mio
GBP in July, significantly below any levels before April. British firms lost 75% or exactly 193 mio GBP
(225 mio EUR) of monthly exports from by July the fourth strongest toll among the 18 countries.
For France, “normal” monthly exports of 300-700 mio EUR sharply declined after the attack, from
596 mio in February 2022, to only 196 mio in March, and 121 mio in April. Exports were 184 mio EUR
in July and 173 mio in August. French firms lost 69% of monthly exports (412 mio EUR) February-July.
In Germany, the general decline in exports to Russia has been less marked than in the UK and France,
as German exports were halved in March compared to normal monthly levels of 2 billion Euros.
Exports of 2.12 billion in February fell to 1.02 bn in March, stabilising at exactly the same amount in
July. Thereby, German firms lost 52% (1,102 million EUR) of monthly exports from February to July.
The Netherlands first saw a clear reduction from normal-level exports of 508 mio Euros in February
down to only 184 mio in March. But then followed a significant increase in exports to 279 mio in
May, stabilising at 285 mio in June, and jumping strongly to 345 mio Euros in July. Thus, Dutch firms
are among the few in Europe to increase exports under the entry into force of the Fifth Package of
EU sanctions in July. Since February, Dutch firms lost 32% of monthly exports (163 mio EUR).
From Poland, exports gradually increased from a level of 500-600 mio Euros in 2019, to 600-750 mio
through 2020 and 2021. Exports to Russia at 664 mio in February 2022, fell to 353 mio in March and
210 mio in April. Exports increased again to 269 mio Euros in May, and jumped to 404 mio in June,
stabilising at 371 mio by July. Thereby, Polish firms exports clearly more than in March-May, and
have lost 44% or around 393 million EUR of monthly exports to Russia from February to July.
In Sweden, exports fell from 2,001 mio SEK in February down to 608 mio SEK in March, and reached
as low as 377 mio in May and 405 mio in July. Occasional monthly spikes up to around 900 mio SEK
after the war started, are caused by excessive exports of chemicals. Compared to February, Swedish
firms had taken the third strongest toll and lost 80% or 153 million EUR of monthly exports by July.
For Finland, which has the longest border with Russia of all the 18 nations, normal monthly exports
have been 200-400 million Euros, with an increasing trend into 2021. Exports of 324 mio Euros in
February dropped to 184 mio in March, but reaching 237 mio in June. As the Fifth Package was
enforced in July exports to Russia were more than halved to only 96 mio Euro, the lowest level ever
recorded during the three years. Finnish firms lost 71% or 228 mio EUR of monthly exports by July.
For Denmark, exports dropped from “normal” levels of 580 mio DKK in February down to 405 mio in
March, 175 mio in May, and 319 mio DKK in June. Exports fell to 206 mio DKK in July, and further to
145 mio in August. Danish firms lost 64% or 50 mio EUR in monthly exports from February to July.
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Countries with orange bars in Figure 4 had by July increased exports from February. Total exports
increased in 4 countries: Serbia (up 95.5 %), Latvia (+ 26 %), Estonia (+ 12 %), and Norway (+ 3.4 %).
For Norway, exports to Russia decreased significantly already in January 2022, which at 131 mio NOK
was the lowest level recorded since before 2019. Thereafter, Norwegian exports rose to 199 mio in
February and 165 million in March, then reaching 220 mio NOK in April, 202 mio in May, and 214 mio
in June. The “normal” monthly level is 150 - 500 million NOK. Exports stabilised at 206 mio NOK in
July, plus 3%. Exports increased further to 233 mio NOK in August, the highest level since December
2021. Thereby, Norwegian firms gained 17% (3 million EUR) of exports from February to August.
Latvia saw a unique development as exports to Russia fell robustly in late 2021, and then increased
steadily from February 2022. Exports to Russia have expanded during sanctions and was record high
in June with 134 mio Euros, dropping to 101 mio Euro which is the normal pre-war monthly level.
From February, Latvian firms had gained 26% of exports to Russia (21 mio EUR) by July.
In Estonia, exports to Russia were at fully normal level at 61 million Euros in February, hardly falling
at all towards 50-51 mio in April and May, but climbing back to 78 mio in June and 569 mio in July.
Despite the marginal fall in exports witnessed as the Fifth Package was enforced in July, altogether
Estonian firms had by then gained 12% in monthly exports to Russia from February.
For Serbia, which does not take part in sanctions against Russia, exports have increased steadily. The
July 2022 level at 147 mio Euros represents by far the highest exports to Russia on record during the
three years. But exports fell sharply to 54 mio Euro in August, close to “normal” levels of 60-80 mio.
In Figure 5 (below), the total exports are presented for 18 countries against exports in July last year.
The biggest exporters are at the top of the figure, with export values descending downwards from
Germany with the largest export values, to Canada having the smallest exports. There was a fall in
exports over the last year in all countries except Estonia, Latvia, and Serbia.
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4. Imports: Reductions from a record high level
Figure 6 shows monthly imports from Russia to six large economies, in million Euros (Germany’s data
are divided by 10 for scale). Russia’s attack in February is marked with red dot and arrow. These large
countries increased imports from early 2020 when oil and gas prices reached a historic low. After
February, imports have fallen in all the main countries, and this continues in July for all the major
economies except Poland and the UK. But in the longer run, by July 2022 only US and UK imports are
below their 2020 bottom level. France has released August data which reveal substantial increase.
This general picture is clear from Figure 7, summing the total imports to the 18 countries in a three
and a half years period until July 2022. Russia’s attack on Ukraine is marked with black vertical line:
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Total imports from 18 Western countries saw significant decline from 18.1 billion Euros in February
and 19.6 billion in March, down to 12.6 billion in May and 11.22 billion in June. The drop from March
to June was thus 8.2 billion Euros or 43 percent, despite that gas prices were actually higher in June
than in March.
58
Total imports from Russia to 18 countries fell somewhat to 10.63 billion Euros in
July, stabilising at levels that are as high as during the highest monthly peaks of 2019 and 2020.
Considering that the EU Fifth Package of sanctions entered into force with a wide array of new
import bans from July 10, the reduction in imports that month is noticeable, but hardly impressive.
New import bans included chemicals, cement, certain fertilizers, rubber, glass, and seafood. Perhaps
some importers may have seen the regulation coming and reduced those imports before July.
The change in imports from Russia during
February-July 2022 is presented in Figure 8.
We see how most countries have clearly
reduced imports, many of whom do not
import Russian gas (USA, Canada, UK,
Ireland, Sweden). The decline in imports is
quite universal with increases only in
Czechia, Serbia, Latvia, and Estonia.
Norway, Germany and the Netherlands still
present modest reductions in this trade,
which is further analysed in Chapters 5-6.
In the USA, monthly imports are normally 2-3 billion USD. They increased slightly to 2.7 bn in March,
but then fell markedly and continuously towards the current level at 485 mio USD in July. That was
84 % below July 2021, and 5-months imports in March-July were 47 % below the same period 2021.
Canada saw even stronger imports decline from a “normal” 101 million CAD in February, to 90 mio in
March and 38 mio in April, falling further to only 5.5 mio CAD in July 2022 (about 3 mio EUR). This
was 88 % below July 2021, and March-July imports were 43 % below the same period in 2021.
In France, imports declined in May, June, and again in July to a level 54 % below February. At 827 mio
EUR imports were still 7 % above July 2021, and the five-months imports of March-July were 68 %
above the corresponding 2021 level. French imports in August climbed further to 1,083 mio EUR.
In Germany, imports increased steadily from May 2021, and reached a record high level at 4.4 billion
Euros in March 2022. Thereafter, imports have declined by 22 % despite volatile prices of natural gas.
There is a clear reduction in imports in July, down to levels not seen since September 2021. But
imports are 10 % above July 2021, and imports in the March-July period are almost as high as 2021.
In the Netherlands, imports from Russia increased steadily from January 2021, followed by modest
declines since April. The declining trend continues in July 2022 when imports reached 1.63 bn Euros.
Sweden has had occasional imports of oil after the invasion, but total imports fell strongly from 2,324
mio SEK in February to only 204 mio in June, down 91 %. Imports jumped slightly to 280 mio in July.
In Denmark, imports from Russia significantly fell from 1,024 mio DKK January 2022, down to 961
mio by February and 510 mio in March. Levels in May and June 2022 were only half those of January,
and then almost halved again to 331 mio DKK in July, and fell to only 291 mio DKK in August.
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In Norway, imports were already in decline from January 2022. There was a spike in imports with a
doubling in March, due to a shipment of Russian crude oil that month. Since then, months with oil
shipments have seen repeated increases in total imports, which almost doubled in July.
In the Baltic states and Poland, there were noteworthy declines in imports from Russia through the
spring of 2022. Least decline was seen in Estonia and Latvia, while Lithuania and Poland more than
halved imports, with the decisive decline appearing in May, and stabilisation in June and July.
In Serbia and Czechia, imports
increased through the winter and
continued to do so during the
spring of 2022 including May and
July. They have increased imports
since February by 102 % and 146 %.
Figure 9 presents the imports to 18
countries over the latest year, from
July 2021 to July 2022. Imports
were reduced many places, but key
countries like Germany and Czechia
imported more than a year ago.
Are import movements mostly determined by purchases of Russian oil and gas? To answer this,
Figure 10 separates all coal, oil and gas (fuel) from the total imports data of eight key European
countries - Germany, the UK, Poland, Ireland, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Czechia, and Hungary.
The figure shows clearly how total fuel imports (blue) and non-fuel imports (black) fell after the
Russian attack on Ukraine (red line). Non-fuel imports continued to fall in July, while oil and gas
imports went the other way with a clear expansion from June to July:
Imports from Russia were clearly reduced after the invasion, but from a record high level. July saw
a shift where non-fuel imports continued to decline with the enforcement of new sanctions, while
oil and gas imports clearly increased and now carry the bulk of the sustained imports.
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5. The 80 billion Euro trade with Russia since March
Export and import trade with Russia during five months from March to July 2022, sum up to a total
trade of 79.6 billion Euros, or almost 84 billion USD. Imports have declined more than imports in
absolute value, so that total Russian trade surpluses with the Western countries was reduced from
11.6 bn Euro in February to 7.4 bn Euro in July. But in relative terms exports declined most, and high
and increasing fuel imports now provide Russia with comfortable surpluses that help fund warfare.
Figure 11 presents the total trade of each country during the post-war months of March-July
(coloured bars), as against the total trade during the same months in 2021 (grey). The figure reveals
clearly how trade has either stabilised or increased in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Central
Europe, Estonia and Latvia. Conversely, there has been substantially reduced trade with Russia in the
United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Lithuania, and the Nordics except Norway.
There is dramatic divergence in trade during sanctions. Germany and Continental countries have
not reduced trade with Russia since last year, and this includes countries that are not dependant
on Russian oil or gas, such as France and the Netherlands. Conversely, the United States, United
Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark have massively reduced total trade with Russia over the last year.
There seems to be hoarding of Russian oil and petroleum products during the EU grace period. But
Central Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas explains only parts of the great divergence. Many
European countries have upheld trade with chemicals, metals and other materials unabated, and
in June and July there was a partial resumption of the exports of machinery and cars to Russia.
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For 2022, data for Norway and Sweden are converted to Euros at a flat 0.1 and 0.096 rate, respectively. Data
for Denmark are converted at the 0.134 rate, while British data are converted at a flat rate of 1.18, American
data at a 0.915 rate, and Canadian at a 0.75 rate. Errors from applying constant currency rates are marginal,
since the time of payment for trade will often deviate from the time of consignment and custom clarence. Exact
conversion would have limited value unless very detailed shipment and payments data are investigated.
Figure 12 (above) presents each country’s percentage share of 18 countries’ total trade with Russia.
Oil, gas, chemicals, metals and machinery dominate the trade. The figure reveals how Germany’s
trade with Russia has jumped to 29.5% of the total trade of the 18 countries. Germany, Poland and
the Netherlands together make up for 57 % of the 80 billion Euros of trade with Russia. The inner
circle presents the same trade in 2021, revealing how the three countries have gained market share.
5.1. American and European exports of chemicals to Russia
Chemicals are an important part of US sanctions and the Fifth and Sixth Packages of EU sanctions,
due to their usability in chemical weapons, arms and munitions. Both the USA and Europe have now
added a vast number of chemicals to sanctions. The European Union’s Fifth Package from April added
a high number of common and widespread chemicals to the export ban list with effect from July 10
(see Chapter 1). The Sixth EU Package approved on June 3 added another 80 chemical compounds.
As the list of chemicals banned from export in USA and Europe is comprehensive and contains some
of the most commonly used compounds, it is reasonable to assume that each countries export
contains both banned and non-banned items. For large producers such as Germany, United States,
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Poland and the Netherlands, it would be more than unlikely that the pre-war exports included none
of the banned items, or that the pre-war exports contained only banned items. It is reasonable to
assume that the banning of 100-200 chemicals compounds will at least have considerable a priori
effect on total chemicals exports, with consequent reductions in sales unless production portfolios
can be rapidly altered, or unless Russia suddenly demands much more of the non-banned items.
As a highly reasonable starting point, we must expect that full compliance with the Fifth and Sixth
Packages of sanctions against chemical products should visibly impact on the exports data.
Figure 13 presents the exports of
chemicals to Russia from 10
European countries since January
2022 - Germany, United Kingdom,
Poland, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark,
Norway, Czech Republic, Estonia,
and Latvia. There was a decline in
these exports in March and April
(Fourth Package), followed by
strong resumption in May and June.
As the Sixth Package was approved
in June and the Fifth entered into
force in July, there was again decline
in these exports, everywhere except
Germany and Czechia.
Figure 14 reveals how chemical exports
to Russia changed in countries with
substantial production in connection
with the approval and announcement
of the Fifth Package in April, approval
of the Sixth Package with new items
announced in June, and with the entry
into force of the Fifth package in July.
The USA (blue) saw immediate decline
in chemical exports to Russia, attesting
to the behavioural effect of actual US
sanctions. From the blue line, we get
an indication of the considerable amounts of banned items in US exports. In Europe, the immediate
restrictive effect of sanctions is also seen in March and April, albeit with less effect. But the entry into
force of a vast number of export bans in July seem to induce various responses. Germany saw little
clear behavioural effect from the sanctions. In market value, exports continue more or less unabated,
which could of course be partly masking price hikes on the items. However, general price hikes on
chemicals should have impacted on other countries’ exports as well, including the US trade. In the
Netherlands, Poland and Czech Republic, June and July pass with more or less the same level of
trade as before the war, contrary to the more substantial effects in the United States and Denmark.
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5.2. American and European purchases of Russian oil and gas
As referred in Chapter 1, the European Union approved a ban on importing sea-borne Russian oil and
gasoline products in June, with effect from early December 2022 and March 2023, leaving natural gas
and oil imports via pipelines aside for later legislation. Oil traders of the large trading houses (Vitol,
Shell, etc) purchase oil and petroleum products in spot markets and direct the cargos to various
refineries or terminals in Europe. Shell apparently abandoned Russian oil in March, after criticism.
59
After Russia’s attack, oil imports from Russia were more or less totally abandoned in the United
States, Canada, UK, Ireland, Sweden and Denmark. Despite marginal resumption in the UK in July
with a 60 mio Euro cargo arriving, and a 9 mio Euro shipment to Sweden, these countries have all but
closed down Russia’s exports. After the EU declared a 4 months grace period on coal imports and 6-8
months on oil grades, purchases increased markedly in other countries. The Netherlands started to
import coal in January, and witnessed strong increases in oil imports after the Russian attack. Estonia
and Latvia have also strongly increased imports in July, while Poland and Hungary have upheld
Russian oil and gas imports at the same level as in previous years. There are limited data for Finland,
but they increased these imports in July after a lower inflow of Russian oil in June.
Imports of Russian fuel, oil and gas to Germany was 2.17 billion Euros in June, an increase from May
and in line with levels before the war. Last year, imports of Russian oil and gas to Germany in June
was 1.87 billion Euros, which implies that imports have indeed increased. In July, Germany imported
oil and gas worth 2.19 billion Euros, much more than in July 2019, 2020, or 2021. Imports to Czechia
are high and continuously increased in 2022. The “normal” monthly level 2019-2021 was 200-400
mio Euros. Import was 373 mio Euros in January, 437 mio in February, 896 mio in March, 1,277 mio
in April. 1,344 mio in May, 999 mio in June 1,295 mio Euros in July.
There were strong increases in oil imports in Norway, up from 43 million Euros in May and 3 million
Euros in June, to 94 million Euros in July the exact same level of oil imports as in March and the
highest on record over the three years studied. Esso Norway have received 7 shiploads of Russian
diesel oil and other vehicle gasoline products to its terminal, referring to the legality of the imports.
60
Fuels imports from Russia to different countries after the attack (black line) appears in Figure 15:
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Figure 15 includes both oil, gasoline, diesel, and natural gas of which the latter is presumedly the
largest single kind of fuel in the diagram. But the most revealing fact is how large US imports (blue)
and UK imports (pale blue) were, and how they totally vanished from the visible pool of imports.
The middle strata of Nordic countries include from the bottom Denmark (green), Sweden (pale
green), and Norway (red), all relatively marginal in the European imports of Russian fuel. However,
by July 2022, Norway’s imports of Russian oil products exceed the combined fuel imports of the USA,
UK, Ireland, Sweden and Denmark. In July, Poland, Hungary, Czechia, the Netherlands and Germany
stand out as the major buyers of Russian oil and gas, with stable or increasing import volumes.
Figure 16 presents how
imports of Russian fuels (coal,
oil, gas) sharply declined in
the USA, UK, Denmark and
Sweden, but remained
unaltered by the war in
Germany, Poland, Czechia,
Latvia and the Netherlands.
After the announcement of
the “oil ban” in the Sixth
Package, imports increased in
Norway, Czechia, Poland,
Estonia, Latvia, Hungary,
Finland, and even in Sweden
and the United Kingdom.
5.3. The port ban and imports of fish to Europe
Food, fish and fodder are not covered by sanctions, and their trade with Russia includes large
quantities imported by the United States and other sanctioning partners. But the Fifth Package of
April 8 included a general ban on Russian vessels from entering European ports. These provisions
entered into force on April 16, and were enacted in Norwegian Law on April 17. However, Norway
obtained an exemption from the port ban, allowing Russian fishing vessels to traffic Norwegian ports.
The government cited concerns over management of the vulnerable North Atlantic cod stock, with
allowance for Russian vessels to land fish for re-export to Europe. The Fifth Package also contained
provisions against imports of Russian seafood (crustaceans and caviar) with effect from July 10.
In June, media revealed that fishing bait was sold to Russian fishers involved in illegal fisheries.
61
In
August and September, it was revealed how Russian fishery conglomerate Norebo, controlled by
oligarch Vitalij Orlov, dominated this landing, packaging and re-export business. It was revealed that
Orlov’s company brings Russian fish from Asia and the Pacific for packaging in Norway, re-selling the
fish to the EU market.
62
If fish is prepared, packaged or salted in Norway, it will be regarded as
Norwegian and exported to Europe at lower excise duties.
63
The seasonal Russian export of fish via
Norway is c. 150-200 million Euros annually. After the collapse of the Rubel, exports via Norway
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yields higher revenues for Russian fishery magnates.
64
Re-exporting via Norway also reduces customs
duties from 7.5 % down to 0.9 %, and avoids third-party phytosanitary inspection.
65
Figure 17 presents the
development of
European imports of fish
and seafood from Russia.
The largest importer is
the USA, but in Europe
the big importers include
Germany and even large
fishery nations like
Norway (red) and
Denmark (green).
Prepared Russian fish
may be re-exported by
the first importer.
Figure 17 reveals how Germany and Denmark have upheld fish imports from Russia in July, but in
August Denmark cut fish imports drastically from 35 mio DKK and down to only 7 mio DKK. In
contrast, Norway doubled fish imports from 20 mio NOK in July to 37 mio NOK in August. The trade is
seasonal and there will be a natural decline through the fall. As the imports of seafood from Russia is
prohibited effective from July 10, several countries may find themselves vulnerable to possible
violations of sanctions in this particular area. Transparency on origin is especially advised here.
5.4. American and European exports of cars and trucks
Western countries export cars, trucks and buses (“land vehicles”) to Russia, led by Germany, USA, the
UK and Sweden, and some exports from the Netherlands, Canada, Poland, and elsewhere (mostly
buses). This chapter investigates road vehicle exports to Russia and its neighbouring countries in
comparison, while chapter 6.3.1 on page 38 goes into detail on German car exports. Figure 18 and
Figure 19 present the sales to Russia (left), and to Belarus, Georgia and Armenia combined (right):
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Figure 18 shows that car exports to Russia dropped dramatically after the invasion, whereby the USA,
Canada, UK, Netherlands and Sweden totally ceased to export cars, trucks, buses and car parts to
Russia. US carmakers had by July retained only 2 % of their February exports of cars and other road
vehicles to Russia, while British carmakers have retained only 1 %. On the other side, Germany car-
makers have stepped up direct exports to Russia, retaining 11 % of that trade by July. Poland has also
increased exports to Russia recently, even though the sales are rather marginal.
In March, Russia’s parliament voted to allow lawful parallel imports, whereby a list of “legal” import
goods was set up and trade channels established.
66
The list contained several car brands (BMW,
Mercedes Benz, Tesla, etc), car parts, and engines (Volkswagen, Volvo, Nissan, etc). This made it
relevant for Russian importers and car producers to explore imports from neighbouring countries.
Figure 19 shows the total exports of road vehicles to Belarus, Georgia and Armenia, of which exports
from everywhere except Germany and the United States is so marginal that it is hardly visible in the
data. Parts of the exports to Belarus have been sanctioned since April. THE USA, UK and Netherlands
totally these sales, and did not increase sales to Georgia or Armenia above normal” levels. Sweden
continued exporting to Belarus, but did not much expand exports to Georgia or Armenia.
Germany has strongly increased exports to all the three countries. German exports of vehicles and
parts February-July fell by 89 % to Russia, but increased by 210 % to Belarus, 161 % to Georgia, and
by 251 % to Armenia. Compared to the average of July 2019-2021, sales to Armenia increased 338 %.
Germany increased car sales to the three countries by 20 mio Euros, an increase which is equal to
almost 10 % of the February car exports to Russia. When exports jump three-fold and four-fold in a
few months, the question of shadow exports arises and indicates a German retention of maybe 20 %
of exports to Russia. This does not imply that German exporters violate any laws, but enhanced
transparency and disclosure by the German car industry and partners is advised.
In general, sanctions have instigated a round of trade reductions in March and April (Fourth EU
Sanction Package), followed by a general increase trade in May, and again a clear reduction in
trade in June-July (Fifth EU Package). These wave-patterns in trade with Russia may have many
explanations, including price movements, seasonal or logistics issues, Russian ,counter-measures,
or an initial “shock” among compliant companies followed by a subsequent better acquaintance
with rules and ability to utilise them for renewed trade efforts.
It seems that EU sanctions have clear effects on behaviour, despite deficient data and time to fully
understand these developments. But the entry into force of the Fifth package in July seems to have
universally subdued exports of chemicals. Similarly, the announcement of the Sixth Package with
its “oil ban” and grace period may have impacted on the subsequent spike in oil imports in several
countries, indicating a possible event of hoarding.
Whether seen against previous years or against January and February 2022, Western countries’
trade with Russia after its attack on Ukraine has not been very much reduced, especially in
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Poland, East-Central Europe, Estonia, Latvia, and Norway.
Other countries have strongly reduced trade almost to the level of eradication, including the
United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland, and Sweden. Strong declines are also seen in
Finland, Denmark, and Lithuania.
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5.5. Quarterly effect of sanctions after the Russian invasion of Ukraine
In chapters 3 and 4, developments of trade by July 2022 were discussed. But single months can have
variable trade and for a more certain picture of developments, quarterly data will smooth out
coincidental monthly movements. Looking at development from the first quarter of 2022 to the
second quarter, will both capture the effects of sanctions, and reduce the impact of random monthly
changes. The broad reduction in trade with Russia between the first quarter (before the war) and the
second quarter of 2022 (with sanctions) is seen for total trade in Figure 20:
Below, the same data are broken down between exports (Figure 21) and imports (Figure 22):
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6. Detailed trade values per country
This chapter brakes imports and exports down to groups of goods, to analyse the deeper nature of
trade. Product group data are retrieved based on the SITC international classification standard where
possible, alternatively the European Union’s Combined Nomenclature (CN). Finland, France,
Lithuania and Serbia do not release monthly trade data at trade partner and commodity group level.
The five SITC commodity classes of interest that will be inquired below, are:
0. (CN: 01-11) Food and live animals (including grain, cereals, fish, fishery products)
3. (CN: 25-27) Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (including coal, coke, oil and gas)
5. (CN: 28-38) Chemicals and related products
6. (CN: 39-83) Manufactured goods, by material (including of iron, metals, wood, paper)
7. (CN: 84-89) Machinery and transport equipment (including cars, machines, equipment)
6.2. France monthly total trade with Russia
France does not release monthly trade statistics by commodity groups, but there are monthly trade
statistics available sorted by trade partner.
The monthly trade over the last year is detailed in Table 2, below.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
We see below that France has reduced exports during 2022, both in the longer perspective from
previous years, and compared to 2021. But in May 2022, exports again resume towards “normal”
levels from the previous years. Exports to Russia in June 2022 is about half the level it was in June
2019 and June 2020, but clearly below levels from June 2021.
French imports from Russia have not been reduced similarly, on the contrary this trade has been
increasing during 2021 in line with higher prices on oil and gas, and the imports have dropped less
than exports have. In June 2022 there is a continued decrease in imports compared to April and May,
but the imports are still much higher than in previous years.
The total quarterly imports during the second quarter of 2022 were 4.2 billion EUR, much higher than
the 2.46 billion EUR of imports during the second quarter of 2021. Year-on-year, thereby, France
struggles to cut trade and instead seems to uphold its economic reliance on Russia.
Table 2 Trade with Russia by month FRANCE
Trade, mio EUR
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Monthly exports
439
417
772
506
596
196
121
224
210
184
Monthly imports
519
518
888
1 522
1 813
1 816
1 743
1 368
1 191
827
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6.3. Germany trade with Russia by commodity class
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 3, below.
Specific commodity groups are reported along the SITC and German WA classifications.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
In July 2022, exports to Russia fall marginally to a level equal to March, after having bottomed during
April. There is a reduction in exports of materials and metals, and machinery and equipment.
Exceptions include cars (land vehicles) and telecom and digital equipment, which saw drastic declines
in imports until April but have since then again increased their sales to Russia. There are bans against
selling luxury cars and a high number of telecom and digital items, but some may be legally exported.
Germany imports mainly oil and gas, metals and paper products, and chemical products from Russia.
Imports are by July still lower than in January, February and March, but levels are above July imports
in previous years. Imports of coal are still at a normal historic level. There has been a reduction in the
purchases of Russian gas, but a slight increase in German purchases of oil and petroleum products,
perhaps utilising the 4, 6, and 8 months grace periods on coal, oil and oil products, respectively.
Table 3 Trade with Russia by commodity class GERMANY
Trade, mio EUR
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Total exports
2 465,5.
2 011,1
2 361,4
2 137,2
2 120,7
1 019,0
828,2
1 123,3
1 184,9.
1 019,3.
0. Food, fish, etc
67,9.
53,0
60,5
69,6
66,5
60,2
45,2
55,9
57,1.
66,7.
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
12,3.
13,6
12,9
12,4
14,8
4,2
4,9
7,2
9,1.
14,1.
5. Chemical products
558,8.
339,0
510,4
522,3
525,0
468,3
313,1
433,0
423,0.
424,7.
6. Materials, metals, paper
229,5.
204,2
210,7
201,6
209,0
105,9
79,8
110,4
112,8.
78,6.
7. Machinery, instruments
1 278,3.
1 123,4
1 296,8
1 073,1
1 059,6
252,2
274,1
383,2
435,8.
284,5.
75-76. Telecom, TV, digital
57,3.
53,3
49,7
48,8
38,4
1,4
1,6
2,9
3,2.
3,1.
78. Motor vehicles
404,9.
289,9
313,5
294,5
237,4
23,9
7,8
13,2
27,6.
33,6.
Total imports
2 378,0.
1 453,8
2 605,1
3 998,4
3 701,2
4 416,5
3 704,4
3 316,2
3 475,7.
2 871,4.
0. Food, fish, etc
24,0.
25,1
35,1
25,1
27,9
42,8
26,6
34,1
35,6.
40,7-
03. Fish, shellfish, seafood
6,3
10,3
15,2
7,8
12,8
18,5.
15,8.
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
1 803,7.
1 077,6
1 830,0
3 192,6
2 922,8
3 292,0
3 062,5
2 599,6
2 712,4.
2 191,8.
WA2701-02 Coal
99,4.
48,9
159,2
332,5
346,6
342,8
394,1
573,5
445,3.
325,8.
WA2709 Crude oil
888,5.
582,9
652,2
1 465,9
1 327,2
1 426,7
1 068,6
941,6
1 092,7.
1 018,0.
WA2710 Refined oil, prod
316,5.
167,8
305,1
185,2
334,4
505,0
439,8
310,2
522,7.
480,6.
GP19-0620 Natural gas
493,2.
274,0
701,9
1 156,3
870,2
953,4
1 093,2
928,6
648,0.
357,8.
5. Chemical products
58,3.
58,7
70,4
97,3
71,6
73,1
65,0
48,1
54,4.
63,6.
6. Materials, metals, paper
331,9.
183,9
474,1
405,6
472,8
746,3
368,0
362,8
468,3.
372,0.
WA 72 Iron and steel
41.4.
20.8
58.8
32.6
10.6
5.8.
2.8.
7. Machinery, instruments
45,8.
29,9
35,7
28,1
48,4
33,1
13,3
27,1
22,1.
15,7.
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6.3.1. German exports of cars to Russia and neighbouring countries
To assess the full picture of German exports of cars to Russians, German trade with Belarus, Armenia
and Georgia has been analysed. Total trade with Armenia and Georgia is particularly high for the
season and rapidly growing, maybe partly due to the increased global prices of many goods.
At first, Table 3a presents German car exports to all countries, for comparison.
Table 3a Exports of land motor vehicles from GERMANY to ALL MARKETS
Exports, billion EUR
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
WA87. Motor vehicles
18,942.
16,882
16,662
16,695
19,863
19,528
17,665
21,024
21,117.
19,557
Tables 3b-3d reveal in detail Germany’s trade with Belarus, and car sales to Georgia and Armenia:
Table 3b Trade with Belarus by commodity class GERMANY
Trade, mio EUR
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Total exports
149,2.
113,7
135,4
91,7
111,8
72,0
50,1
73,3
79,9.
106,9.
0. Food, fish, etc
3,4.
3,0
4,5
4,2
5,4
6,8
4,1
3,6
3,5.
5,1.
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
2.0.
1,6
2,4
1,5
1,4
0,6
0,7
1,8
2,2.
3,2.
5. Chemical products
30,9.
23,8
31,8
26,9
31,6
22,1
20,0
21,0
25,4.
25,5.
6. Materials, metals, paper
12,6
12,8
11,8
9,5
11,6
6,6
3,5
5,6
5,8.
7,4.
7. Machinery, instruments
82,7
59,7
73,5
40,7
52,4
23,0
17,8
32,3
34,9.
55,4.
WA87. Motor vehicles
21,33.
13,09.
21,31
14,71
17,34
4,61
6,04
12,63
26,39.
45,55.
Total imports
55,1.
44,4
63,9
65,5
58,7
61,6
29,0
37,0
26,1.
28,7.
0. Food, fish, etc
4,6.
4,5
2,9
1,1
1,5
4,3
4,7
1,5
0,7.
2,7.
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,0.
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,1.
0,0.
5. Chemical products
1,7.
1,0
3,4
1,5
1,7
0,7
1,0
0,6
1,5.
1,6.
6. Materials, metals, paper
26,0.
17,2
25,6
26,2
22,7
17,9
7,9
10,4
3,9.
5,2.
7. Machinery, instruments
4,1.
3,8
4,1
8,4
6,6
10,6
3,3
7,3
9,8.
7,5.
Table 3d Trade with Georgia by commodity class GERMANY
Trade, mio EUR
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Total exports
36,68.
28,32
30,81
27,43
32,59
36,85
41,32
35,28
42,93
48,68.
WA87. Motor vehicles
6,83.
4,54
6,77
6,37
8,89
7,64
5,39
8,68.
13,23.
16,64.
Table 3c Trade with Armenia by commodity class GERMANY
Trade, mio EUR
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Total exports
13,0.
30,2
17,2
11,0
16,5
24,3
19,1
30,9
39,2.
38,7.
WA87. Motor vehicles
1,54.
1,52
1,93
2,08
2,92
4,13
3,58
4,63
9,88
7,29.
We notice the strong increase in sales of motor vehicles (cars, trucks, buses) to all these neighbours
of Russia from May. By May or June all countries saw the imports of German cars doubled, and by
July all sales had almost trebled or even quadrupled. The development in Belarus is extraordinary,
including a very strong decline until March, followed by a ten times (10 x) increase from that level.
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Below, Table 3e illustrates the development of German car exports globally is contrasted to the
development for Russia, Belarus, Armenia and Georgia:
Table 3e
Exports of motor vehicles from GERMANY
German exports of
motor vehicles to…
Total export, mio EUR
Change in July 2022,
over January 2022
Change in July 2022,
over average of July in
2019, 2020, and 2021
Jan 2022
July 2022
%
%
WORLD
16,695
19,557
+ 17,1 %
+ 11,8 %
Russia
294,5
33,6
- 88,6 %
- 90,0 %
Belarus
14,7
45,6
+ 209,7 %
+ 145,2 %
Armenia
2,1
7,3
+ 250,5 %
+ 338,3 %
Georgia
6,4
16,6
+ 161,2 %
+ 175,2 %
SUM 4 markets
317,7
103,1
- 67,5 %
- 71,6 %
These data reveal certain anomalies in the exports of German cars and other land motor vehicles to
Belarus, Armenia and Georgia and most particularly to Belarus and Armenia. There are no known
reasons for a sudden growth of 160 340 percent in German car exports to these small countries. As
global sales data show, price changes cannot explain these substantial increases in car exports.
The analysis and data above do not indicate violations of trade sanctions in itself. Some car exports
are legal, it is mainly the exports of the more expensive cars (above 50,000 EUR value) to Russia and
Belarus that are banned. But the public trade statistics, together with the known legalisation of
parallel imports of German car brands into Russia, calls for internal investigation, transparency and
disclosure on behalf of the German car industry.
Trade data for Turkey were also analysed, yielding no visible inherent anomalies.
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6.4. The Netherlands trade with Russia by commodity class
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 4, below.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
The Netherlands imports first of all oil and substantial amounts of metals and other semi-finished
products. Netherlands has not traditionally purchased Russian fertilizers. The imports of natural gas
and chemical products are historically marginal. The Netherlands has traditionally imported small
quantities of coal, but abandoned this import in June 2020. However, importers in the Netherlands
started to buy Russian coal again in January, and the imports have rapidly increased through 2022.
From February to June 2022, exports were reduced towards half the “normal” level for the season,
but there was a marked resumption of exports in May and June, led by chemicals sales. In July,
exports further increased, substantially driven by expanded chemicals exports
It is obvious that the Netherlands had not reduced imports substantially by June 2022, all product
classes were imported at an equal or higher amount than a year before. Especially, the imports of oil
and gas and petroleum products seems to continue more or less unaltered after the invasion.
Table 4 Trade with Russia by commodity class NETHERLANDS
Trade, mio EUR
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Total exports
564
546
508.
478.
508
184
194
279
285
345
0. Food, fish, etc
41
43
34.
39.
43
26
28
37
31
29
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
8
5
6.
7.
6.
3
2
2
2
2
32. Coal, coke, briquettes
1
1
0.
0.
0.
1
1
0
0
0
33. Oil, oil products
7
4
6.
7.
6.
1
1
2
2
0
5. Chemical products
163
127
167
119
117
65
75
134
114
156
6. Materials, metals, paper
19
23
24
20.
27
9
7
10
7
10
7. Machinery, instruments
208
237
191
192.
179
25
23
26
42
35
78. Road vehicles
16
19
18.
36.
34.
1
0
0
0
0
Total imports
1 355
597
1 420.
2 300.
1 954
2 806
2 465
1 939
1 711
1 634
0. Food, fish, etc
9
9
9.
10.
10
11
8
9
8
10
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
1 219
495
1 173.
1 922.
1 713
2 388
2 159
1 623
1 554
1 439
32. Coal, coke, briquettes
0
0
0.
91.
68
122
92
126
99
94
33. Oil, oil products
943
416
873.
1 345.
1 103
1 452
1 338
1 119
1 380
732
5. Chemical products
19
13
21
81
25
26
16
11
44
13
562. Fertilizers
1
0
2.
1.
3.
3
4
5
5
3
6. Materials, metals, paper
69
53
184.
269.
164
328
221
253
115
142
67. Iron and steel
74
18
20
45
3
1
12
7. Machinery, instruments
20
12
7.
3.
3
3
1
2
3
1
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6.5. United Kingdom trade with Russia by commodity class
The UK historically imports oil and petroleum products from Russia, while other commodity classes
are marginal. The imports from SITC class 3 normally make up 50-70 % of all imports. Traditional
exports to Russia are totally dominated by chemicals and machinery.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 5, below.
Note that the data are presented in million British Pounds (GBP = 1.18 EUR).
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
The United Kingdom exports first of all chemicals, machinery and vehicles to Russia, and these
exports have radically dropped during 2022. But exports of chemicals still increase gradually.
The United Kingdom has strongly reduced both exports and imports from Russia. The transition was
immediate and almost complete by end of March 2022 already in April import amounts were down
to 15-25 % of the normal historical level. Imports in June were again strongly reduced. First of all, the
reduction came as a result of totally abandoning oil imports that month.
The UK statistics service has published a specific analysis of the country’s trade with Russia:
Table 5 Trade with Russia by commodity class UNITED KINGDOM
Trade, mio GBP
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Total exports
254,0
195,0
234,0
181,0
256,0
108,0
33,0
55,0
83,0
63,0
0. Food, fish, etc
7,9
5,9
12,2
4,5
11,8
8,3
3,2
4,7
4,4
6,3
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,8
0,6
0,4
0,3
0,7
0,1
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
5. Chemical products
55,6
0,1
60,5
44,0
76,1
52,6
21,3
39,7
61,6
41,0
6. Materials, metals, paper
12,6
7,9
10,8
10,3
10,0
3,3
1,4
0,9
1,6
1,4
7. Machinery, instruments
128,5
121,6
117,2
96,3
112,3
26,8
2,1
4,3
11,2
6,6
76. Telecom & sound eq
3,8
3,4
2,2
2,2
2,1
0,5
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,1
78. Cars, road vehicles
52,7
29,1
37,2
29,6
29,5
2,8
0,0
0,4
0,3
0,4
Total imports
676,0
564,0
1 057,0
1 840,0
1 878,0
645,0
245,0
201,0
33,0
165,0
0. Food, fish, etc
7,9
15,1
3,5
6,1
11,9
3,4
1,0
0,4
0,3
1,2
03. Fish, shellfish, seafood
3,7
9,7
0,2
0,7
0,2
0,6
0,0
0,0
0,1
0,0
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
533,9
229,9
300,4
953,6
632,3
481,9
210,3
160,5
0,0
51,3
32. Coal, coke, briquettes
9,1
3,3
13,3
32,3
26,7
11,9
8,9
47,4
0,0
51,3
330. Crude oil
173,5
115,9
83,7
248,7
99,5
0
58,7
0
0
0
33R. Oil products, refined
341,8
109,7
178,7
383,8
422,3
392,9
142,7
113,2
0,0
0,0
34. Natural gas
9,5
1,0
24,7
288,8
83,8
77,2
0
0
0
0
5. Chemical products
14,5
36,3
45,4
24,9
41,3
5,3
7,0
1,2
0,6
1,0
6. Materials, metals, paper
60,9
211,4
187,8
47,1
54,8
45,9
18,8
8,3
13,4
11,0
7. Machinery, instruments
30,9
12,4
26,6
21,9
11,6
100,0
1,2
27,7
16,0
98,8
793. Ships
0,1
0,1
0,1
4,6
0,0
95,7
0,0
0,0
0,0
98,5
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6.6. Ireland trade with Russia by commodity class
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 6, below.
The Central Statistics Office of Ireland (CSO) groups trade data in 89 commodity groups, and in the
table below SITC class 0 includes their groups 00-08, while SITC class 7 in the table below combines
Irish groups 70-79 and 87-89. The other classes are identical to those of other reporting countries.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
Ireland’s imports from Russia historically include occasional and variable imports of coke, oil and oil
products, and at times considerable imports of fertilizers. Traditional exports to Russia include
chemical products and machinery. Besides, there is occasionally exports of scrap metal which are
part of total exports below, but not visible in the presented SITC sub-classes (they belong to class 2).
The residual difference between total export values and the sum of group values in the table below,
will normally almost fully be comprised of exports of scrap metals to Russia.
The Irish exports and imports both considerably dropped in April 2022, but rebound somewhat in
May and June. In June 2022, exports were back on higher levels than the historical normal, while
imports were almost back on the same levels as in June 2019-2021. But trade declined again
considerably in July, with the entry into force of the Fifth Packet of EU sanctions.
Table 6 Trade with Russia by commodity class IRELAND
Trade, mio EUR
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Total exports
56,4
36,0
48,3
61,9
61,8
71,6
44,9
24,1
51,3
47,4
0. Food, fish, etc
1,8
2,9
3,8
0,9
1,9
1,2
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,1
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
5. Chemical products
15,1
3,7
6,1
21,8
28,2
47,9
2,8
8,1
22,8
15,9
6. Materials, metals, paper
1,0
1,1
0,7
0,5
0,3
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
7. Machinery, instruments
11,9
7,5
9,1
15,9
20,5
4,8
2,1
1,9
0,2
5,1
75-76. Telecom, TV, digital
3,2
1,2
3,2
1,9
6,2
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
Total imports
24,5
11,1
34,1
130,2
55,8
83,8
7,7
20,3
17,7
10,9
0. Food, fish, etc
1,0
5,0
2,8
2,4
5,6
14,6
2,3
8,1
5,9
3,4
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
16,0
0,6
20,1
69,7
23,8
40,1
1,8
0,0
0,0
0,0
32 Coke, coal, briquettes
0,3
0,2
19,1
49,0
0,2
0,1
0,2
0,0
0,0
0,0
33. Oil, petroleum prod
15,8
0,4
1,0
20,6
23,5
39,9
1,6
0,0
0,0
0,0
5. Chemical products
5,6
3,6
9,5
48,9
23,6
27,4
0,2
8,7
0,0
5,5
6. Materials, metals, paper
0,4
0,4
0,8
7,7
0,7
1,1
0,5
0,4
8,2
0,2
67. Iron and steel
0,1
0,0
0,6
7,0
0,0
0,1
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
7. Machinery, instruments
0,5
0,6
0,6
0,6
0,8
0,1
0,4
0,6
1,0
0,7
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6.7. Denmark trade with Russia by commodity class
The monthly trade over the last year is detailed in Table 7, below.
Note that numbers are in million DKK (DKK = 0.134 EUR).
Class 0 and Class 6 have been changed since previous reports, whereby items from classes 1 and 2
have been removed, and the classes 0 and 6 are now similar to those of the other countries.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
Danish exports to Russia have been substantially reduced, sales of chemicals have long remained at
pre-war levels, but fell clearly in July with the entry into force of the Fifth Packet of EU sanctions.
Exports of machinery are clearly reduced, and sales of telecom and digital equipment have stopped.
Denmark imports first of all oil, petroleum products, coal, metals, chemicals, and food from Russia.
Purchases of Russian coal, oil and other fuels have totally stopped, and all import groups are clearly
reduced except the imports of iron and steel, which must comply with highly complex regulations.
Data by August reveal that exports and imports fell consistently, including the imports of fish.
Table 7 Trade with Russia by commodity class DENMARK
Trade, mio DKK
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
2022-8
Total exports
686,7
480,7
505,6
601,8
579,8
405,0
216,0
175,3
319,0
206,3
144,9
0. Food, fish, beverage etc
78,2
111,9
97,2
80,0
86,6
70,6
14,1
14,8
21,4
21,8
21,7
03. Fish, crustaceans, prod
10,4
31,5
28,1
38,9
50,5
15,3
6,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,4
0,7
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
5. Chemical products
227,3
98,3
133,2
154,0
155,4
224,9
160,4
104,0
195,4
85,9
50,6
6. Materials, metals, paper
28,7
26,5
31,1
30,2
36,2
14,5
1,7
1,9
5,1
4,9
3,5
7. Machinery, instruments
282,9
181,0
184,8
223,6
214,3
58,4
23,2
25,2
60,4
66,6
43,3
75-76. Telecom, digital eqp
11,5
10,0
8,8
4,0
7,7
5,8
0,2
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
Total imports
810,1
502,2
1351,0
1035,5
960,6
964,7
510,5
524,5
595,7
331,3
290,5
0. Food, fish, beverage etc
89,0
91,4
68,8
74,4
147,2
106,9
61,5
57,6
49,4
36,7
8,6
03. Fish, crustaceans, prod
18,0
18,0
11,1
5,4
21,4
19,6
21,5
44,9
33,6
35,3
7,0
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
433,1
227,6
420,7
298,6
249,9
283,1
32,8
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
32. Coal, coke, briquettes
68,4
68,3
0,0
181,5
68,1
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
33. Crude oil, oil products
364,7
159,3
420,7
128,1
181,9
283,1
32,8
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
5. Chemical products
31,3
38,4
75,3
79,6
107,2
20,1
24,4
20,9
13,2
1,7
2,9
6. Materials, metals, paper
172,8
98,3
732,0
471,4
365,3
456,9
303,0
382,1
505,9
288,6
278,2
67. Iron and steel
159,5
86,9
704,2
447,1
331,7
440,1
296,9
371,9
495,9
287,3
278,1
7. Machinery, instruments
3,9
0,7
1,0
1,7
1,7
3,3
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,1
0,0
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6.8. Finland trade with Russia by commodity group
In September 2022, Finland for the first time released CN-level trade data for May-July.
The monthly trade over the last year is detailed in Table 8, below.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
We see that Finland reduced exports to Russia in 2022, both compared to previous years and within
2022. There was a spike in June, but exports fell back again in July to below historic levels. Large
traditional exports of copper mattes (metal), machinery and instruments were reduced in July.
Finnish imports from Russia have gradually dropped during 2022, bottoming at a third of the historic
levels in June, and modestly increasing in July. We see that Finland totally stopped imports of coal,
natural gas and electricity during the summer of 2022, while from June oil and petroleum imports
clearly resumed, during the EU grace period period for oil imports which lasts 6-8 months from June.
Finland traditionally imports rubber tyres from Russia, which are under EU sanctions.
Table 8 Trade with Russia by month FINLAND
Trade, mio EUR
2019-6
2020-6
/2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Monthly exports
295
248
330
312
324
184
141
171,5
243,5
95,6
01-24 Food, fish, fodder, etc
5,2
12,2
12,3
25-27 Coal, oil, gas, energy
4,0
5,2
5,9
28-38 Chemicals, fertilizers
13,8
19,2
11,0
47-79 Pulp, paper, cardboard
8,0
7,8
1,6
72-83 Non-precious metals
67,1
57,1
17,9
84-85 Machines, instruments
53,3
103,5
26,8
86-89 Transport equipment
1,3
1,6
1,6
90-92 Optical, medical equip
1,3
15,0
3,8
Monthly imports
651
949
581
1015
974
1001
528
453,8
329,4
424,4
01-24 Food, fish, fodder, etc
8,0
3,4
0,1
25-27 Coal, oil, gas, energy
294,1
168,4
213,3
2701 Coal (anthracite)
25,5
55,0
3,9
2709 Crude oil
0,0
73,3
114,6
2710 Oil products, fuels
99,6
24,1
82,4
2711 Natural gas
135,6
0,0
0,.0
28-38 Chemicals, fertilizers
33,4
25,9
25,1
31 Fertilizers
0,4
0,0
0,0
39-40 Plastic, rubber prod
10,3
23,5
14,0
4011 New car tyres, rubber
8,5
16,9
12,4
72-83 Non-precious metals
65,7
83,1
161,2
72-73 Iron, steel, products
12,9
14,9
1,3
75 Nickel, nickel products
42,9
59,0
159,6
84-85 Machines, instruments
21,9
4,1
2,5
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6.9. Norway trade with Russia by commodity class
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 9, below.
Note that numbers are in million NOK (NOK = 0.1 EUR) and include August (right column).
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
Norway was slow to enact sanctions, and the last among the 18 countries to reduce trade.
Norway’s exports to Russia are largely unchanged by sanctions, and is dominated by fish, fodder,
machinery and instruments. Compared to January and February, exports have gradually increased.
Norway’s imports from Russia have historically been dominated by raw fish, which is being re-
exported to Europe from Norwegian ports. There is also an increasing import of crude oil, chemical
products including fertilizers, and metal ores and products, count almost equally much as oil and gas.
We notice the clear increase in oil and fuels imports during the EU grace period announced in June.
As revealed in Chapter 2, Esso Norway has continuously imported petroleum products through 2022,
with shipments at almost 100 million Euros in July. Another substantial trade involves the cod
preservation program between Norway and Russia. Both countries sell fish and fodder, and Norway
re-exports almost all the Russian codfish landed in sanction-exempted Norwegian ports.
Table 9 Trade with Russia by commodity class NORWAY
Trade, mio NOK
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
2022-8
Total exports
354,4
213,4
363,8
131,2
199,0
165,2
220,3.
202,3
213,9
205,7
232,7
0. Food, fish, etc
86,8
90,3
123,6
18,1
39,9
57,9
149,9.
135,2
150,3
143,4
153,5
03. Fish, crustaceans, prod
29,8
26,4
41,8
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0.
107,1
40,9
36,8
42,2
08. Animal fodder, ex grain
55,5
61,1
81,8
16,8
39,9
53,9
141,4.
26,8
102,4
106,6
111,2
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,1
0,0
0,9
0,9
1,3
0,9
0,2.
0,5
1,5
0,4
1,9
33. Crude oil, oil products
0,1
0,0
0,9
0,9
1,3
0,9
0,2.
0,5
1,5
0,4
1,8
5. Chemical products
21,8
31,1
26,3
26,2
27,1
18,2
10,7.
5,6
13,4
6,6
3,4
6. Materials, metals, paper
67,5
34,0
38,1
37,3
37,9
40,9
29,2.
31,3
31,9
37,4
24,9
7. Machinery, instruments
127,5
37,4
156,4
32,0
74,5
34,4
21,5.
16,9
13,5
12,7
36,7
76. Telecom, digital equip
2,8
1,4
1,5
1,2
1,7
0,1
0,1.
0,6
0,0
0,0
0,1
Total imports
1 270,2
899,6
2 183,4
2 062,5
1 691,4
3 098,8
1 748,7.
1 319,1
951,9
1 679,8
1 184,5
0. Food, fish, etc
116,5
81,4
250,7
237,5
114,1
314,6
105,2.
364,6
125,9
275,5
176,6
03. Fish, crustaceans, prod
69,2
18,9
30,5
40,9
61,4
111,7
46,3.
73,2
24,4
19,9
37,4
08. Animal fodder, ex grain
36,6
42,7
178,3
165,5
47,2
175,1
57,2.
261,9
98,4
236,2
138,9
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
519,5
154,1
670,0
678,2
487,8
935,6
453,1.
426,1
29,8
935,3
393,7
32. Coal, coke, briquettes
39,6
24,6
36,9
81,0
43,0
65,9
48,7.
26,2
19,1
13,7
5,6
33. Crude oil, oil products
479,4
127,1
624,0
581,8
429,4
856,5
347,8.
361,3
0,0
890,8
388,2
5. Chemical products
101,0
230,8
374,4
196,8
172,5
607,5
205,8 .
85,1
93,4
8,3
5,0
6. Materials, metals, paper
244,8
101,9
454,5
546,2
523,3
884,7
722,9 .
269,2
430,1
339,9
397,0
67. Iron and steel
13,0
11,4
29,0
17,4
1,7
31,0
0,3.
2,0
2,6
0,0
0,5
7. Machinery, instruments
9,9
17,0
10,2
19,8
14,1
18,0
8,2 .
430,1
13,9
8,8
8,3
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6.10. Sweden trade with Russia by commodity class
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 10, below.
Note that numbers are in million SEK (SEK = 0.096 EUR).
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
By May 2022, Sweden had sharply reduced exports to Russia, led by a significant decline in the sales
of cars and other machinery and transport equipment. There was also a substantial reduction in the
exports of metals and materials, paper products, and chemical products (from May). Still, the export
of chemicals was higher than in May 2019, and not much lower than in the two years before the war.
Then in June 2022, exports of chemicals trebled from May, reaching all-time-high for 2022 with a
very strong increase of 440 million SEK in exports of organic chemicals (CN Group 29) which includes
hydrocarbons, aldehydes, alcohols, phenols, ethers, ketones, carboxylic acids, etc.
Sweden historically imports oil and petroleum products, chemicals, metal. paper and paper products
from Russia. Imports of fuels are not particularly high, equal to Norway’s levels. Sweden has strongly
reduced imports from Russia after the invasion, and all product groups except metal and paper
products and machinery have seen imports radically decline. In May 2022, the imports of fuels, oil
and gas products had totally vanished. Imports again increased considerably in June but to a level
still far below “normal” volumes during the last three years. In July, imports further expanded due to
increasing imports of oil and petroleum products also in Sweden.
Table 10 Trade with Russia by commodity class SWEDEN
Trade, mio SEK
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Total exports
1 689,4
1 451,1
1 533,7
1 930,0
2 001,0
608,0
893,0
377,0
986,4
405,3
1-11 Food, fish, etc
4,8
1,7
1,8
2,9
1,0
3,5
6,0
9,0
4,3
4,7
25-27 Mineral fuel, oil, gas
13,1
23,6
14,0
6,5
4,3
0,0
0,4
0,0
0,0
0,0
28-38 Chemical products
315,6
302,8
204,0
246,5
517,4
418,3
811,1
264,8
762,2
281,2
6. Materials, metals, paper
292,7
236,3
317,6
343,5
340,2
70,6
17,6
33,4
33,0
30,5
7. Machinery, instruments
925,4
799,6
849,9
1 179,9
991,3
89,9
56,6
50,9
130,0
62,6
78. Road vehicles, parts
251.0
106.2
162.2
353.1
228.5
0
0
0
0
0.2
Total imports
4 039,8
884,5
2 431,5
2 230,5
2 323,5
1 185.2
125,3
137,9
205,6
280,8
1-11 Food, fish, etc
0,1
3,2
2,6
6,9
0,1
1,2
1,7
1,2
0,6
1,0
25-27 Mineral fuel, oil, gas
3 613,7
401,0
1 552,3
1 729,2
1 838,5
658,6
29,8
3,1
39,7
97,9
28-38 Chemical products
192,8
310,9
515,4
185,7
190,0
215,2
3.6
3,1
1,6
22,1
6. Materials, metals, paper
175,6
119,1
199,5
157,7
152,2
186,3
67,3
114,5
169,5
146,6
7. Machinery, instruments
8,8
7.9
13,7
21,3
15,6
135,6
6,2
12,7
10,8
9,1
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6.11. Estonia trade with Russia by commodity class
The monthly trade with Russia over the last year is detailed in Table 11, below.
Estonia’s Statistical Office (STAT) provides detailed data under the SITC, CN and BEC classifications.
SITC class 5 (Chemicals) is here composed of CN groups 28-39 (i.e., including plastics). The sum of
STAT’s goods-grouped commodity imports exceeds stand-alone data by 5-10%.
Note that imports data concern imports by country of consignment, not country of origin.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
Estonia exports oil, wood and wood products, metals, industrial machinery, and electrical equipment
including TV equipment. Exports of chemicals, machinery and instruments increased until June 2022,
but thereafter substantially fell in July when the Fifth Package of EU sanctions entered into force.
Imports from Russia consist first of all of petroleum products, fertilizers, food and fish, metals, raw
materials, and various manufactured products. There are increasing imports of coal and oil products
also in Estonia, while all other main commodity groups experience reduced imports towards July.
Table 11 Trade with Russia by commodity class ESTONIA
Trade, mio EUR
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-
7
Total exports
25,0
33,2
19,1
54,1
61,5
59,0
50,3
51,9
72,3
68,9
0-1. Food, all groups
6,3
4,5
1,9
4,0
3,9
3,5
5,5
4,5
6,3
10,3
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
0,1
0,1
0,1
3,5
3,6
3,4
5,4
4,4
6,3
0,0
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,6
0,3
0,0
1,3
0,1
0,2
0,7
1,7
2,1
0,0
5. Chemical products
7,1
7,9
6,7
9,6
11,1
10,9
13,5
13,0
14,8
2,4
6. Materials, metals, paper
7,2
6,8
5,2
7,0
6,3
5,9
6,7
7,5
10,2
5,4
7. Machinery, instruments
8,2
16,4
6,1
23,8
31,3
29,3
18,2
19,7
36,0
9,1
75. Office, data equipment
76. Telecom, TV, digital eq
0,4
0,3
0,3
0,4
0,4
0,4
0,1
0,1
0,3
0,1
Total imports
134,3
121,3
225,8
222,2
174,9
216,9
208,4
189,7
193,6
184,9
0. Food, fish, animals. Etc
0,7
1,2
0,9
1,7
1,6
2,4
2,4
1,5
1,2
0,7
CN 030 Fish and seafood
0,6
0,6
0,6
0,3
0,6
0,7
0,3
0,8
0,4
0,4
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
61,7
69,1
118,8
117,5
89,1
110,9
124,2
119,5
111,9
145,1
2701-08 Coal and coke
24,7
27,8
64,3
53,2
65,8
2709-15 Oil, petroleum pr
36,8
41,3
54,5
66,3
79,3
5. Chemical products
16,7
8,0
9,2
41,2
33,1
34,8
16,1
7,6
8,1
9,7
56. Fertilizers
9,9
3,7
5,9
30,3
25,6
18,4
2,5
0,0
1,0
0,2
6. Materials, metals, paper
21,0
18,2
40,2
36,6
18,6
29,0
26,0
26,5
39,7
15,6
7. Machinery, instruments
13,6
6,5
11,0
2,7
3,5
2,4
3,5
2,5
2,9
3,1
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6.12. Latvia trade with Russia by commodity class
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 12, below.
Latvia’s statistical agency releases trade data per country broken down into CN commodity groups,
where this report combines SITC class 0 from groups 0-10, class 3 from groups 25-27, class 5 from
groups 28-39, class 6 from groups 48-83, and class 7 from groups 84-93.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
Exports consists first of all of boilers and other industrial appliances, electrical machinery, chemical
products, and various manufactures made of paper and metals. By July, Latvia maintained overall
exports and exported all commodity groups more or less unabated at pre-war levels. Still, there was
a strong decrease in the previously expanding exports of machinery, instruments and equipment.
The imports of food and fish, salt and stone, fertilizers and pharmaceutical products have been
reduced. But many imports have continued unabated, resulting in more or less stable imports from
Russia in, but Latvia is yet another country increasing imports of oil and other fuels in June and July,
in line with expectation that the European Union’s June 3 decision to allow continued petroleum
imports until December may result in hoarding and increased imports.
Table 12 Trade with Russia by commodity class LATVIA
Trade, mio EUR
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Total exports
102,1
89,9
99,6
91,6
78,3
89,4
63,3
69, 8
133,6
101,0
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
0,8
0,7
1,3
2,1
4,6
2,2
3,0
5,0
5,8
5,2
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,1
0,0
0,1
3,4
1,5
0,1
0,3
0,2
0,0
0,1
5. Chemical products
11,6
3,3
9,3
14,4
12,6
19,1
16,8
16,6
22,2
19,6
6. Materials, metals, paper
13,8
15,4
18,0
17,9
16,1
19,4
18,4
10,6
12,6
24,8
7. Machinery, instruments
38,3
37,5
31,8
24,2
22,7
23,9
14,7
18,0
64,8
14,7
Total imports
113,3
99,6
237,6
192,8
139,4
167,8
173,2
107,8
116,4
154,3
0. Food, fish, animals. Etc
2,2
1,2
1,9
3,1
12,3
32,6
8,8
10,0
1,1
2,8
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
48,5
29,7
94,8
47,0
52,6
61,1
94,8
32,7
54,3
115,6
5. Chemical products
15,7
11,1
12,3
27,3
17,3
13,5
5,7
6,0
7,6
3,1
6. Materials, metals, paper
26,0
38,8
97,3
88,5
27,5
14,2
17,8
10,9
10,6
19,1
7. Machinery, instruments
3,4
3,1
2,4
2,8
2,9
4,9
2,4
2,1
2,6
1,7
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6.13. Poland trade with Russia by commodity class
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 13, below.
Detailed data are provided under the BEC classification, and the sum of sub-groups fuels and
lubricants BEC 07-08 exceed the data for SITC 3 (mineral fuels, lubricants, etc) most probably
because the BEC groups also contains items from the chemical industry and agriculture.
Note that the data are presented in Euros (EUR), and not in Polish Zloty.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
Poland historically has broad and substantial imports from Russia, including oil and gas, petroleum
products, raw materials, metal and paper products, various manufactured products, and artwork.
By May 2022, Poland’s exports to Russia were clearly reduced, towards magnitudes half the “normal”
levels for the season. Especially, the exports of metals and materials, machinery, vehicles and
equipment were sharply reduced, while the exports of chemicals largely remained unaltered. But
exports increased again substantially in June and July, led by chemicals, materials and machinery.
Poland had not by May reduced imports very much, all commodity classes except machinery were
being imported at the same, or higher levels than one year ago. There was a spike in oil imports
during winter due to higher oil and gas prices, and these imports have stabilised at typical historic
levels in June and July. There are little indications of oil or petroleum hoarding in Poland. Imports of
chemicals and materials fell markedly in July, as the Fifth Package of EU sanctions entered into force.
Table 13 Trade with Russia by commodity class POLAND
Trade, mio EUR
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Total exports
627,1
608,7
698,4
631,5
664,4
353,1
209,5
268,6
403,5
370,7.
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
38,2
36,2
39,4
40,1
46,6
37,5
20,0
18,3
25,9
34,2.
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
2,8
1,7
3,8
3,8
3,5
2,0
0,4
2,7
1,5
3,0.
5. Chemical products
128,2
111,0
118,2
123,5
121,7
115,6
70,3
96,3
165,5
109,2.
6. Materials, metals, paper
108,6
96,7
117,8
101,9
116,8
61,6
42,4
48,2
60,8
57,3.
7. Machinery, instruments
251,4
267,2
313,3
257,0
269,1
78,5
41,6
63,3
97,7
98,7.
BEC18 Passenger cars
2,0
2,1
1,0
1,2
0,4
0,1
0,0
0,15
0,2
0,7.
Total imports
1 125,7
868,2
1 494,3
1 643,2
2 116,4
2 719,4
2 012,0
1 037,6
1 097,2
1 091,9.
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
13,3
14,7
15,3
20,0
25,9
30,6
22,0
23,5
26,0
24,6.
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
665,8
573,2
835,0
922,1
989,4
1 462,2
860,3
738,3
796,6
851,8.
BEC07 Raw fuels, lubricant
704,0
539,5
834,7
998,3
1 445,0
1 715,9
1 393,1
439,8
581,8
649,9.
BEC08 Refined fuels, lubric
143,9
92,7
247,2
212,6
217,1
545,3
259,1
176,4
209,5
196,0.
5. Chemical products
82,9
64,1
127,2
160,7
173,3
178,3
122,5
109,1
107,8
91,9.
6. Materials, metals, paper
128,4
107,2
206,8
170,0
172,4
148,1
151,5
129,4
108,2
74,8.
7. Machinery, instruments
16,2
14,2
9,7
15,3
18,8
14,8
12,7
5,6
6,3
8,6.
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6.14. Czechia trade with Russia by commodity class
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 14, below.
Note that the data are presented in Euros (EUR), and not in Czech koruna.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
Czechia historically has substantial imports from Russia, including first of all oil and gas, petroleum
products, metal and paper products, and artwork. Exports are less substantial, focused on machinery.
By June 2022, Czechia’s exports to Russia were clearly reduced, towards magnitudes at a third of the
“normal” levels for the season. This trend of export decline continued in July. The exports of metals
and materials, machinery, vehicles and equipment have been strongly reduced since March 2022,
with an only temporary rebound in June. However, the exports of chemicals to Russia have largely
remained unabated at pre-war levels, despite the July enforcement of expanded export restrictions.
On the other hand, exports of telecom and digital equipment are drastically reduced since March.
Czechia has continuously increased imports from Russia throughout the latest sanction period and
the war in Ukraine. Only imports of machinery and vehicles have dropped, whereas all other imports
have either remained stable or increased considerably. Imports of oil and gas (i.e., mainly natural
gas) has grossly increased continuously since the price bottom in June 2020. In July 2022, there was
again a strong increase in imports of oil and petroleum products, but not in other groups of goods.
Table 14 Trade with Russia by commodity class CZECHIA (CZECH REPUBLIC)
Trade, mio EUR
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Total exports
323,2
357,2
293,1
316,1
261,7
85,4
68,4
81,6
118,4
80,8
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
7,4
5,7
4,3
4,0
5,5
5,8
5,3
4,5
5,0
5,8
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
1,0
0.1
0,1
0,4
0,2
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,1
0,00
5. Chemical products
26,8
22,1
28,3
21,7
21,1
17,5
17,7
20,7
34,6
25,7
6. Materials, metals, paper
32,2
32,4
32,9
34,8
36,1
13,9
9,5
13,2
15,4
12,8
7. Machinery, instruments
221,4
256,6
194,6
222,9
163,8
40,2
30,4
36,0
54,1
28,3
75-76 Telecom, digital eq
44,5
36,6
34,4
57,1
30,5
1,6
1,4
3,4
1,4
3,0
Total imports
303,8
219,0
444,6
491,6
561,6
1045,4
1382,8
1437,8
1107,8
1 379,1
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
1,5
1,1
3,4
5,0
4,3
5,0
2,6
3,4
3,3
3,2
03. Fish, seafood
0,2
0,4
0,2
0,6
0,6
0,8
0,6
0,1
0,7
0,5
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
200,4
149,8
333,5
372,7
436,6
896,2
1277,1
1344,3
999,0
1 295,5
5. Chemical products
26,3
16,9
27,8
29,1
32,2
30,9
30,2
30,4
29,0
29,3
6. Materials, metals, paper
35,8
29,8
55,5
58,3
49,8
71,0
48,6
37,9
57,4
35,6
7. Machinery, instruments
29,1
6,0
5,7
8,3
15,0
25,4
9,5
11,0
4,8
4,4
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6.15. Hungary trade with Russia by commodity class
The monthly trade over the last year is detailed in Table 15, below.
Note that the data are presented in Euros (EUR), and not in Hungarian Forints.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
Hungary traditionally exports chemicals, machinery and materials to Russia, and imports gas, oil and
chemicals. A Russian pipeline enters Hungary via the Ukraine. It is noteworthy that the main land
transportation route between Hungary and Russia runs via Ukraine, which may potentially create
difficulties with organising directly routed trade in goods.
Hungary has reduced exports during 2022, both in the longer perspective compared to previous
years, and during the first five months of 2022. All exports except chemicals and materials have been
consistently reduced after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but Hungarian exports of food and
machinery have since rebounded. However, the exports of telecom and digital equipment has not
regained momentum after the drastic reduction in March.
Imports from Russia to Hungary have increased in 2022, and are also much higher than previous
years. Hungary receives oil and gas for heating and electricity generation from Russia. In June and
July, the imports of gas declined while imports of oil and petroleum products increased strongly.
Other commodity groups have largely seen little change in imports, which continue more or less
unabated at pre-war levels.
Table 15 Trade with Russia by commodity class HUNGARY
Trade, mio EUR
2019-7
2020-7
2021-7
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Monthly exports
142,3
105,8
131,3
152,0
145,1
91,3
54,4
69,5
107,9
88,7
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
8,6
7,4
8,6
27,1
15,5
22,8
7,7
6,6
9,1
11,9
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,9
0,3
0,4
0,7
0,7
0,1
0,3
0,4
0,8
1,0
5. Chemical products (28-40)
43,4
23,6
39,7
42,4
44,5
41,1
26,5
41,0
57,4
39,2
6. Materials, metals, paper
21,2
16,8
19,1
20,1
16,6
9,3
5,2
6,4
12,6
16,9
7. Machinery, instruments
60,2
50,0
54,5
44,0
55,8
6,4
7,5
11,6
18,1
14,6
75-76. Telecom, digital eqp
10,4
7,7
9,4
6.8
6.2
0,4
0,1
0,1
0,2
0,2
Monthly imports
385,0
201,8
381,6
275,4
746,3
681,3
614,4
798,3
706,3
675,8
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
0,3
0,6
0,6
0,4
0,1
0,2
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,03
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
345,8
177,6
341,7
225,3
698,8
645,0
555,8
775,8
674,4
649,4
32-33. Coal, coke, oil, petrol
175,0
44,1
190,3
203,3
231,0
314,6
231,0
266,9
462,3
364,5
34. Natural and refined gas
170,8
33,5
150,4
22,0
467,8
330,4
324,8
508,9
412,1
284,9
5. Chemical products (28-40)
16,7
8,5
18,2
32,1
27,6
22,9
21,9
16,1
22,4
8,7
6. Materials, metals, paper
4,3
3,9
5,6
5,4
7,5
4,1
3,7
2,8
3,8
4,0
7. Machinery, instruments
4,3
2,5
4,9
9,0