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91
Resumo
Desde , a província moçambicana de Cabo Delgado tem testemunhado um nível de vio-
lência sem precedentes atribuído aos movimentos jihadistas. A ameaça à segurança, a instabi-
lidade e a deterioração da situação humanitária na área atraíram a atenção de atores regionais
e internacionais. O presente artigo tem duplo objetivo. Por um lado, analisa a resposta aos
movimentos jihadistas na Somália e no Mali para explicar e contextualizar as intervenções
externas em Moçambique. Por outro lado, explora a dimensão das lições aprendidas com
base nas evidências da Somália e do Mali. Especicamente, considera como tais intervenções
podem contribuir para esclarecer a origem e evolução do movimento jihadista de base mo-
çambicana e as possíveis respostas de atores externos. Os argumentos são guiados por uma
abordagem pós-liberal. No entanto, partindo da teoria da privação relativa, o artigo centra-se
também na exclusão económica e social vivida na província de Cabo Delgado e destaca as
possíveis causas subjacentes à atual situação. Como conclusão principal, as lições aprendidas
com as intervenções de estabilização e de contrainsurgência na Somália e no Mali devem ser
parte integrante das respostas ao conito em Moçambique.
Palavras-chave: intervenções externas; movimentos jihadistas; Mali; Moçambique; pós-li-
beral; Somália
Response to the Somali and Malian Jihadist
Movements: What Lessons for Mozambique?
Resposta aos Movimentos Jihadistas Somali e Mali:
Que Lições para Moçambique?
Ana Carina S. Franco *
Miguel Mbiavanga Ajú **
* Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais (IPRI-NOVA), Portugal; anacarina.sfranco@gmail.com
** Centro de Estudos Internacionais (CEI), IUL-ISCTE, Portugal; mmaua@iscte-iul.pt
Portuguese Journal of Political Science | Revista Portug uesa de Ciência Política
ISSN: 1647-4090 | ISSN-e: 2184-2078 | 2022, Número 17, Páginas 91-105
DOI: 10.33167/2184-2078.RPCP2022.17/pp.91-105
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1. Introduction
This article discusses external interventions, specically in response to the activities
of jihadist movements, in Sub-Saharan Africa. The scope of the article is broadly
focused on the assessment whether stabilization and counterinsurgency actions led
by external actors have contributed to tackle the activities of jihadist movements in
Somalia and in Mali. A secondary focus is an attempt to investigate the more recent
case of the conict in northern Mozambique. The arguments made are anchored
in the post-liberal approach and the relative deprivation theory, as they apply to the
three cases under examination.
More specically, the aim of this article is twofold. On the one hand, it contextu-
alizes the extent to which evidence from Somalia and Mali shades light and contrib-
utes towards an understanding of the origin and evolution of Mozambican-based ji-
hadist movement, and possible responses from external partners. On the other hand,
it explores the extent of lessons-learned based on the evidence from the two distinc-
tive case studies belonging to dierent security complexes in the Horn of Africa and
the Sahel regions.
The article begins by explaining the origin and evolution of jihadist movements
in Somalia (Horn of Africa) and Mali (Sahel) as two pertinent case studies that have
received wide scholarship attention in recent times. The analysis includes an assess-
ment of domestic origins of the movements, state-society relations, cleavages, and
mapping of those movements. This is followed by the study of responses to their ac-
tivity by regional and international actors, along with a comparative analysis of both
movements and responses. Finally, we attempt to comprehend what the main lessons
Abstract
Since , Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province has witnessed an unprecedented level of
violence attributed to jihadist movements. The security threat, instability and deteriorating
humanitarian situation in the area has attracted the attention of regional and international
actors. The aim of this article is twofold. On the one hand, it discusses the response to jihadist
movements in Somalia and Mali in order to explain and contextualize external interventions
in Mozambique. On the other hand, it explores the extent of lessons-learned based on the
evidence from Somalia and Mali. Specically, it considers how such interventions may help
shade light towards a better understanding of the origin and evolution of Mozambican-based
jihadist movement and the possible responses from external actors. The arguments are
guided by a post-liberal approach. However, drawing from the relative deprivation theory,
the article also focuses on the economic and social exclusion experienced in Cabo Delgado
province and highlights the possible underlying root-causes of the current situation. As a
main conclusion, lessons learned from stabilization and counterinsurgency interventions in
Somalia and Mali must be an integral part of the responses to the Mozambique conict.
Keywords: external inter ventions; jihadist movements; Mali; Mozambique; post-liberal; So-
malia
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Response to the somali and malian Jihadist movements:
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for Mozambique (Southern Africa) are, particularly considering the surge of the ac-
tivities of jihadist movements in the northeast province of Cabo Delgado since .
The research is based on a combination of analysis of secondary data (existing
literature and policy documents from external actors), as well as primary data col-
lection involving semi-structured and open interviews including direct observation
and remote communication between and . Security and Covid- related
travel restrictions prevented the collection of primary data which could have enabled
the analysis of societal perspectives from community members in Somalia, Mali, and
Mozambique. Yet, the article beneted from the observer participant perspective of
the authors as a result of their medium to longer-term presence in the Horn of Africa
and in the Sahel, including in Somalia (-) and in Mali (-). Partic-
ipants in the semi-structured interviews included key informants who are knowl-
edgeable with conict and security dynamics in both regions. These included former
and current diplomats, United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) ocials,
as well as academics and civil society members. All key informants took part in a
personal capacity, thus no direct references to individuals are provided in the text.
2. Origins and Expansion of Jihadist Movements in Somalia and Mali
The external intervention of neighboring Ethiopia in was a response to the
emergence and transformation of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Hitherto re-
stricted to the administration of the capital Mogadishu, the ICU became a national
movement extending to the southern region of Somalia. As a matter of fact, in the
face of instability created by inter-clan rivalry, only religion, Islam, would have sur-
vived as guarantor of a credible social order (Clapham, ). As it happened, the
Ethiopian occupation of the capital in December triggered further instability
across the country, accompanied by the promotion of Somalian nationalism by Is-
lamist groups, with enhanced leadership of the then-young al-Shabaab militia. Al-
though formalized as an organization in -, al-Shabaab would only move
from a clandestine network to an organization accepted within the framework of the
unication process of the ICU in . Already presented as an export product of the
al-Qaeda ideology in Somalia, it did not formalize its aliation with the organiza-
tion before (Hansen , ).
In the post-Djibouti agreement in , with the withdrawal of the prolonged
presence of Ethiopian and the election of the new president of Somalia in , al-
Shabaab was transformed temporarily into a state-owned entity — until the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)’s oensive in large urban centers. It gained ca-
pacity to act in ICU-controlled areas and attracted various clan leaders, controlling
the central areas of Somalia within dened but unrecognized territorial borders
(Hansen, ; De Waal, ). Nowadays, al-Shabaab controls most of the country-
side in central and southern Somalia, constituting a proto state.
For its part, the self-proclaimed Islamic State was formed on the periphery in the
context of dissent processes in relation to al-Shabaab, giving rise to the Islamic State
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in Somalia (with a presence restricted to the Somali autonomous region of Puntland)
and the East African Front (also including Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda). Both
movements do not have signicant territorial expression (Schmidt, ; Hansen,
). In fact, the Islamic State insurgent capability is almost entirely restricted to
infrequent attacks in the Bari region of Puntland. Most attacks have been directed
against troops and police check points in the two main port towns of Qandala and
Bosaso (EIP, ). There is no immediate indication that the Islamic State-aliated
will expand outside of its current area of operations.
Meanwhile, in the Sahel region, the alliance between the Malian and the United
States of America (USA) governments, notably in the context of the USA-led Global
War on Terror (GWOT) initiatives against terrorism in the region in the s,
would exacerbate tensions between Bamako and the Tuareg population in northern
Mali (Gegout, ). In fact, the Tuareg rebellion in had both secular and na-
tionalist features. Associated with the impact caused by the fall of the Gadda regime
following the popular uprising in Libya in and subsequent Western-led inter-
vention, the movement would eventually contribute to the military coup d’ état
that led to the Malian political crisis. This crisis enabled the proliferation of regional
cross-border phenomena, such as smuggling, human tracking and radical Islam
(Schmidt, ; Harmon, ).
The Sahelian and West African countries have been exposed to the expansion
of local al-Qaeda and the Islamic State aliates (from the s and s respec-
tively). They operate mostly along the border areas of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso
(Liptako-Gourma area). Among them is Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
with a presence practically restricted to the Timbuktu area in Mali, and until ,
the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). According to Skret-
ting (), at the origin of the creation of MUJWA is the reluctance of the AQIM’s
leadership to take advantage of the political-military crisis in Mali to expand beyond
the Algerian border. However, the trans-nationalization of AQIM became inevitable
with the increased possibility of recruiting militants in the Sahelian region. On the
other hand, Nasr () highlights the involvement of AQIM in Algerian and Malian
local causes, as well the al-Qaeda aliate’s capacity to recruit amongst the most di-
verse ethnic communities, including the Dogon - besides others (Arab, Tuareg, and
Fulani) integrating also Jama’at Nusrat Al-Islam Wa Al-Muslimeen (JNIM).
MUJWA recruitment focused mainly on communities, including Fulani (from
both Mali and Niger), hostile to the hegemony exerted by the Tuareg (Raineri, ).
Some important recent developments include the integration in of the (until
then relatively independent) Ansar Dine in the JNIM coalition along with al-Mour-
abitoun (fractured since , with members divided between support for Islamic
State and al-Qaeda) and the Macina Liberation Front or Macina Katibat. In the gen-
esis of this liberation movement — formed by Fulani from central Mali in — is
the aspiration to change the political and social order of that part of the country.
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Response to the somali and malian Jihadist movements:
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This has, in eect, guaranteed JNIM a certain degree of control of the Niger river’s
inland delta.
Moreover, the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (ISGS)’s mobilization capacity
can be explained less by personal material gains than by prestige that local youth
believe to achieve by integrating jihadist-armed factions (Raineri, ). As it is the
case in the Horn and East African region, ISGS has survived “on the periphery of the
periphery”, without signicant territorial expression (Hansen, ). Yet, the move-
ment is active in the Liptako-Gourma area, alongside JNIM (Thurston, ). The
shi of France-led military intervention from targeting the ISGS to targeting JNIM
in that area contributed to ISGS’s oensive, and increased confrontation with JNIM.
It is worthwhile to note that while ISGS was not able to override JNIM, it did —in
combination with the French intervention codenamed as Operation Barkhane—
manage to weaken its rival (Nasr, ).
Whereas in the north a modus vivendi has since been achieved between the two
rival coalitions following the signature of Peace and Reconciliation Accord,
there was an increase in violence between communities in the central Mali (Boute-
llis, ; Van der Lijn et al, ). The region is characterized by greater ethnic
pluralism and polycentric conict dynamics spreading across the Malian southern
borderlands (Franco, ). The activity of jihadist movements along with retalia-
tion by state security forces promoted the proliferation of self-defense groups. This
constitutes a privatization of a state or public service — security. Furthermore, other
public services have been fullled by non-state actors, including traditional authori-
ties and jihadist movements.
The ramication of the movements in the region cannot be understated. To a
lesser extent, another tri-border area, between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivo-
ire, has also been object of their expansion — likely of JNIM’s members such as
Macina Katibat. Aer the attacks in Grand Bassam on the south coast of Ivory
Coast, border posts in the north of the country have been the target of sporadic at-
tacks, mostly since . Moreover, Benin and Togo witnessed the intensication of
attacks perpetrated by jihadist groups, in particular along the northern border areas
with Mali and Burkina Faso (Kwarkye, ).
3. Responses to the Activities of the Jihadist Movements in Somalia and Mali
In Somalia, from the s onwards, external assistance began to focus not only
on the implementation of specic programs in a post-conict context, including se-
curity sector reform (SSR) and the promotion of the rule of law, but above all on
strengthening the capacities of the (central) state to prevent and manage security, in
particular jihadist movements, such as al-Shabaab and the self-proclaimed Islamic
State. AMISOM has been a counterinsurgency operation since its establishment in
. The AU mission was originally foreseen as a short-term operation in prepara-
tion for the establishment of a UN-led peacekeeping operation in Somalia, which
did not materialize due to diculties in guaranteeing security conditions for de-
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ployment (Williams et al ). Integrating military, police, and civil components,
AMISOM assumed a stabilization role from while being supported logistically
by the United Nations Support Oce in Somalia (UNSOS), and in assistance to the
Federal Government of Somalia (Williams , Lotze & Williams , De Waal
).
In contrast with south-central Somalia, Puntland does not receive security assis-
tance from AMISOM forces or from the Somali National Army (SNA). As a result,
the security infrastructure is derived from locally recruited personnel and dependent
on international support to fund and train security and police elements. Al-Shabaab
had established a presence in Puntland when AMISOM operations pushed them
out from central Somalia into the Galgala hills. Sponsored by the United States of
America (USA), Puntland security forces carried out raids in . Yet not only did
the operation fail to drive al-Shabaab out, but it also drove the militant group into a
temporary alliance with Puntland pirates (Felbab-Brown, ).
Unlike AMISOM, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali
(AFISMA), established in late by the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) with the endorsement of the UN Security Council through Reso-
lution , did not obtain the UN’s logistical and nancial support. It was an initial
solution sought by France and the USA, favoring ECOWAS over the AU (Gegout
; Williams & Boutellis ). It would be a unilateral military action, carried
out by France in , Operation Serval, to continue the external intervention period
in Mali with the proviso to be followed by an UN stabilization mission (likely to
secure more funding than AFISMA). The Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des
Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA) was initially deployed with
a stabilization objective centered in its mediation role to secure a political agreement,
which would then materialize in the form of the Peace Accord signed in Al-
ger. Furthermore, the UN integrates regional coalitions in its peace operations with
the aim of combating armed and terrorist groups. In this context, MINUSMA has
been collaborating, namely by the provision of logistics support, with the Joint Force
G Sahel (authorized by the AU and composed of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad,
Mauritania) and Barkhane operations in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
eorts (Charbonneau ).
Until , French interventionism focused mainly on Mali despite its growing
regional scope — which also informed EU’s regionalization process of its Common
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). CSDP civilian and military missions in the
Sahel/Mali and the Gulf of Aden/Somalia reect the centrality of Security Sector
Reform (SSR) within EU’s approach to stabilization in general and state-building
in particular. Viewed from a military perspective, both the EU and the USA sup-
port regional and continental actors in a proxy security provision logic (Olsen, ;
Gegout, ). This is the case of EU’s support to the G Sahel Joint Force and AM-
ISOM which benet from substantial EU funding within the operationalization of
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Response to the somali and malian Jihadist movements:
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the African Peace and Security Architecture – APSA [1] (Marsh et al, ; Williams,
; Vines, ; Desgrais & Le Gouriellec, ).
As a point of interest, the European military intervention in the Sahel corre-
sponded, above all, to that of one Member State - France. France also launched Op-
eration Hydre in the Gourma region in and in led to establishment of the
Takuba Task Force, with contributions from several EU Member States aimed at re-
inforcing Operation Barkhane. However, French interventionism in Mali — and by
extension the EU’s — was suspended in in the aermath of the and
Malian coups d’état. [2]
It is, therefore, not surprising that the relevance and eectiveness of CSDP train-
ing missions, such as EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali, are oen questioned. [3] In
view of the challenges inherent to the conditions of the Somali and Malian armed
forces, the EU military missions are characterized by the frequent rotations of mis-
sion personnel deployed by dierent EU Member States. This prevented the estab-
lishment of relationships with local actors, including with high-ranking ocials, and
the adaptation of trainees to the dierent activities. A lack of post-training coun-
seling and eld mentoring for trainees was also evident.
Recent plans for the redistribution of the French and EU presence to the coun-
tries of the Gulf of Guinea (EC ) reect the concern of cross-border insecurity
resulting from the regionalization of what once seemed like a country-specic phe-
nomena. To further illustrate, in the Sahel, cross border security programs under
the Accra Initiative led by states in the region have been put in place since with
the intent of tackling transnational crime, including terrorism. Even though it is not
recognized by the African Union (AU), the Initiative led to military operations, such
as Operation Koudanlgou II in , carried out by Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and
Ghana (Mali had observer status) in southern and western Burkina Faso.
On the other hand, al-Shabaab’s activities continue to pose a major threat to the
Horn and East African countries. Several violent incidents in the past years under-
score the proliferation of the activities of the Somali jihadist movement in the region,
1. Established by AU member states in , APSA has as key component the relationship between the AU
and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conict Prevention, Management
and Resolution (RECs/RMs), including inter alia ECOWAS, the East African Community (EAC) and the
Southern African Development Community (SADC).
. Amid t he severing of relations between Mali a nd France in early , which included the expulsion of the
France’s ambassador to Mali, the milita ry cooperation agreement between the two countries wa s annulled
by the Malian military junta. There is a clear preference for non-traditional security assistance partners,
such as Russia, who do not require compliance with e.g., electoral calendars.
. See for instance, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Background Papers for as-
sessments of the EU military training missions in Somalia and in Mali (Williams & Ali, ; Baudais &
Maiga, ).
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including in Uganda in (Hugon, ), but mostly in Kenya’s capital, coast, and
tri-border region with Somalia and Ethiopia. [4]
In that context, the external response to the activities of the jihadist movement
in Somalia continues to be led and coordinated by the AU. AMISOM’s mandate of-
cially ended in March aer een years giving way to a newly established Af-
rican Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) which came into eect in April
. In March alone, al-Shabaab launched a twin suicide attack on an election
venue in Hirshabelle state’s Beledweyne city and breached the highly fortied Mog-
adishu’s Halane Airport perimeter for the rst time since . Thus, AMISOM’s
replacement comes at a critical time as al-Shabaab remains potent inside Somalia
and the region (Ajú, ).
4. The Mozambican Insurgency
The causes of the insurgency in the northeast province of Cabo Delgado in Mo-
zambique are contested, or at least diverse (Morier-Genoud, ). They range from
religion to poverty and marginalization in an area rich in natural resources where
state’s legitimacy — rather than its legality — also tends to be absent.
Mozambican insurgency gained visibility rst aer the attacks in in Mocím-
boa da Praia and the complex attack in the town of Palma and coastal Macomia
in March . Despite an appropriation of the term al-Shabaab by what was con-
sidered a local sect dating at least from , the movement pledged allegiance to
the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in . Hence, it
integrates, at least formally, the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP). The
adoption of the name Al-Sunnah Wal-Jamâa by the movement failed, prompting it
to re-appropriate the name al-Shabaab, by which it has been locally known (ibid).
Furthermore, there are signs indicating that the phenomenon is transnational with
possible growing linkages with the ISIL and its local branch in the Democratic Re-
public of Congo (DRC).
Inspired by Wahabism, members of the Mozambican radical group are mainly
young local people who reject the secular state and advocate for a sharia-based po-
litical order, thus showing close ties with the movements in Tanzania and Somalia.
There are reportedly elements originating from Central and East African neighbor-
ing countries, namely the DRC, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya (Matsinhe & Valoi,
; Habibe et al, ). Although disputed, the link between the Mozambican in-
surgency and ISIL in Somalia has been established by the UN, allegedly through a
suggestion of the Mozambican local branch (along with DRC’s) being commanded
. Al-Shabaab-led incidents in Kenya include inter alia: the high-prole siege of the Westgate shopping
center in Nairobi in , killings in the coastal areas of Mpeketoni, Majembeni and Poromoko in ,
in Mandera in , on the campus of Garissa University College in , the Dusit hotel attack of In
Nairobi, and against the US military base in Lamu in (Campbell, ).
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Response to the somali and malian Jihadist movements:
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by the Puntland center. [5] Nevertheless, unlike ISIL or al-Shabaab in Somalia, there
is no clear evidence of Mozambican Islamist movement having a political agenda of
its own.
Given that there is a clear indication that the movement appears to be transna-
tional, is or may become transregional, external intervention would normally be ex-
pected from the region itself within the framework of AU’s APSA, via the SADC, pos-
sibly in coordination with EAC. Delaying the start of a foreign intervention period,
the Mozambican government prioritized the request for EU’s assistance, mostly in
the form of training of special forces, towards its counterterrorism eorts, like the
bilateral support being provided by the USA and Portugal. Nonetheless, the second
half of was marked by the establishment and deployment of dierent exter-
nal military interventions, from neighboring Rwanda, from SADC Mission in Mo-
zambique (SAMIM), and from the EU in the form a new training mission (EUTM
Mozambique, similar to the CSDP military training missions deployed in countries
such as Somalia, Mali or the Central African Republic). Moreover, the revised EU
strategy for the Horn of Africa released in May has a broader maritime dimen-
sion, expanding from the Red Sea to the Western Indian Ocean, in order to include
the Mozambican coast (EC, ).
Whereas similarities with the Somali and Malian case tend to be overstated, the
current domestic counterinsurgency logic in northern Mozambique may follow the
same pattern as the one pursued in Somalia, and in the Sahelian borderlands, most
notably in Liptako-Gourma, with or without the active participation of external
actors. For instance, recent developments include the internal ramication of the
conict to the northwestern province of Niassa, as well as the establishment of the
so-called “local forces”, a form of non-state/self-defense groups, operating in Cabo
Delgado province.
5. Causes of Violent Conicts and the Post-Liberal Approach
Regardless of who perpetrate them, violent conicts have multiple causes with dier-
ent sets of causes from each other, rooted in specic histories and processes of polit-
ical economy. Further, during violent conicts, the impact and dynamics of violence
are complex given that they vary spatially, socially, and temporally, oen at highly
disaggregated levels. This perspective suggests that no conict is an island which is
why external actors or donors cannot read o best practice guidelines from a general
blueprint for conict analysis and response (Cramer, ).
Thus, in a causal chain leading to conict, the idea of linking the unfolding ex-
treme violence in northern Mozambique, as well as in Somalia and Mali, to poverty,
socio-economic exclusion and generalized frustration is not farfetched. As matter of
fact, Gurr’s relative deprivation theory explains that political violence is the result
. This information provided in the report of the Secretary-General to the UN Security Council dated
Februar y is questioned by authors such as Almeida dos Santos ().
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of collective discontent arising from a discrepancy between expected and achieved
welfare. Gurr’s argument may also serve as a possible explanation for what motivates
individuals to commit terrorist attacks (cited by Richardson, ). At the core of
Gurr’s theory, there are two mechanisms by which poverty might be claimed to op-
erate as a signicant cause of conict. First, poverty may generate bitterness and rage
which, in turn, may cause poor people to protest. Protest may provoke repression and
tensions may escalate into open armed conict, completing the causal mechanisms
of a frustration-aggression nexus (Guur, ). Second, poverty may cause conict
because violence is simply cost free, especially where there are incentives to engage in
conict. Put dierently, because the poor have a comparative advantage in violence
or simply because the opportunity cost of violence is low for the poor, they are likely
to make conict more likely. If poverty provokes violent resentment, then surely ex-
treme poverty will intensify frustration and tip the balance even more easily towards
conict (Cramer, ).
Poverty is obviously not the sole factor that explains the conicts in Somalia,
Mali, and Mozambique. In both Somalia and Mali, contested state formation and
lack of commitment to the federal projects jeopardize the state legitimacy, oen
along ethnical or clan lines with regional ramications. This resulted in the privat-
ization of state functions and generalized grievances. At the same time, external ac-
tors tend to prioritize state governance to the detriment of other forms of governance
or informal social contract.
Likewise, in Mozambique, several factors contributed towards exacerbating the
tensions which existed for decades owing to engrained local perceptions of inequal-
ities and injustices, along with complex ethnic, domestic, and regional issues. Those
include religion, illicit trade, and narco-trac, as well as the discovery and extrac-
tion of natural resources, such as oil and gas, without regard to the local context.
To further illustrate, research carried out by Nelson () points out that a trian-
gle of vulnerability for illicit tracking is emerging as a key geographic space along
Africa’s seaboard — the Swahili coast. At one apex of this triangle is Zanzibar which
has been a major hub for illicit trade for decades, but one that is currently assum-
ing greater importance. Further south, another apex is northern Mozambique which
is experiencing signicant conict and instability and is increasingly considered as
a key through route for illicit tracking of heroin into the continent and wildlife
products from the interior. The nal apex of the triangle is out to sea: the Comoros
islands. These three apexes are linked by illicit economies and trade routes which
take little heed of modern political boundaries.
In a recent report, the International Crisis Group (ICG) noted that a security
response to stem the insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province was
needed but the government and its allies also needed to think carefully about how
they could address the grievances underpinning a rapidly expanding challenge that
in essence started as a local revolt (ICG ). At the heart of this assertion lies the
question of the post-liberal approach to addressing violent conicts.
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Response to the somali and malian Jihadist movements:
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In the post-liberal context, there is a noticeable tendency for external actors to
undercut other alternative forms of conict resolutions, resorting instead to the pri-
oritization of state governance. This eectively undermines the bottom-up approach
which is crucial in order to deal with the root causes of violent conict regardless of
whether it involves state or non-state actors. This view is supported by Finkenbusch
() when he argued that post-liberal approaches demand that peacebuilding
should begin from the local, the everyday.
More importantly, in their attempt to make the local and even the far deeper
local-local the starting point of peacebuilding, ‘post-liberals’ encounter a very con-
crete problem: ‘Who is the “local” and where is the “everyday”?’. While post-liberal
peacebuilders acknowledge that peace must be negotiated locally, it is equally clear to
them that this process must be prompted externally. Hence, identifying genuinely lo-
cal counterparts becomes a top priority. For post-liberal peacebuilders, this involves
overcoming a double obstacle. Their methodological challenge is to confront the ed-
ice of Western ontological assumptions and, at the same time, the epistemologies
without resorting to new metanarratives of peace (Ibid.)
6. Conclusion
The violent conict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province which emerged rst as
a revolt by the local population due to long held grievances caused by socio-economic
exclusion and prevailing inequalities, is now overtaken by radical Islamist insurgents
with possible — albeit contested — links to international terrorist networks such as
ISIL and the Somali-based group al-Shabaab. Like Somalia and Mali where jihadist
movements expanded over the last decade, the situation in northern Mozambique
attracted international attention and has galvanized both regional and international
partners who are supporting the government of Mozambique in its response to the
threat posed by the movement.
As it turned out, the Somalia and Mali case have revealed that any external in-
tervention cannot be isolated from socio-political and economic considerations in-
cluding endemic poverty, nor from transborder security governance issues. In the
specic case of Mozambique, the tri-border area of Mozambique-Tanzania-DRC
and its maritime dimension, may require further support from France and South
Africa (as the only African naval power) through a holistic approach. The need for
this approach is that it facilitates the linking of protection of civilians, security, and
socio-economic development (particularly, targeting the youth) along with engage-
ment in a political dialogue that promotes state-society relations and the state’s legit-
imate authority.
An eective response by the government and its regional and international part-
ners requires also a bottom-up strategy, while simultaneously recognizing the local
dynamics and the transborder nature of the conict. Failure to do so may render the
external intervention by SADC, Rwanda, EU and indeed the AU, including other
bilateral partners, as futile. Therefore, it is vital that the lessons learned from Soma-
102
POLITICAL OBSERVER
PORTUGUESE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE | REVISTA PORTUGUESA DE CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA
lia and Mali’s stabilization and counterinsurgency interventions become an integral
part of the attempts being made to address the ongoing conict in northern Mozam-
bique.
Data de receção: //
Data de aprovação: //
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Sobre os autores
. é doutoranda na Universidade Nova de Lisboa (UNL) e investiga-
dora do Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais (bolsa UIDP//), bem como
avaliadora independente da ação externa da União Europeia em paz, conito, e segurança.
Tem uma vasta experiência em cenários de conito e pós-conito, principalmente na África
Subsaariana. É Mestre em Relações Internacionais pela Université Catholique de Louvain e
licenciada em Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais pela UNL. Encontra-se atualmente a
realizar investigação sobre intervenções externas, construção da paz e do Estado e dinâmicas
de conito com foco na África Ocidental e Oriental.
[ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/---]
. é investigador do Centro de Estudos Internacionais (CEI) do Instituto Uni-
versitário de Lisboa (IUL-ISCTE), Portugal. As suas áreas de interesse incluem dinâmicas de
segurança no Corno de África, operações regionais de manutenção da paz e política inter-
nacional. Possui uma Pós-Graduação Avançada e um Doutoramento em Ciência Política e
Relações Internacionais pelo Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (IUL-ISCTE), Portugal. Tem
uma vasta experiência em cenários de conito e pós-conito, principalmente em operações
de manutenção da paz. Encontra-se atualmente a realizar investigação sobre a interseção do
Médio Oriente e da África Oriental.
[ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/---]
About the authors
. is a PhD candidate at Universidade Nova de Lisboa (UNL) and re-
searcher at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations (fellowship UIDP//),
as well an independent evaluator of European Union’s external action in peace, conict,
and security. She has extensive experience in conict and post-conict settings, mainly in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Ana Carina holds a Research Master’s Degree in International Relations
from the Université Catholique de Louvain and a degree in Political Science and Interna-
tional Relations from UNL. She is currently researching on external interventions, peace-
and state-building and conict dynamics with a focus on West and East Africa.
[ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/---]
. is a researcher at the Centre for International Studies (CEI) of the University
Institute of Lisbon (IUL-ISCTE), Portugal. His areas of interest include security dynamics in
the Horn of Africa, regional peacekeeping operations and international politics. He holds an
Advanced Post-Graduate Diploma and PhD in Political Science and International Relations
from the University Institute of Lisbon (IUL-ISCTE), Portugal. He has extensive experience
in conict and post-conict settings mostly in peacekeeping operations. He is currently re-
searching on Middle East and Eastern Africa intersection.
[ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/---]
