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Nail in the Coffin or Lifeline? Evaluating the Electoral Impact of COVID-19 on President Trump in the 2020 Election

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From the onset of the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in January 2020 to Election Day in November, the United States experienced over 9,400,000 cases and 232,000 deaths. This crisis largely defined the campaign between former Vice President Joe Biden and President Donald Trump, centering on the Trump administration's efforts in mitigating the number of cases and deaths. While conventional wisdom suggested that Trump and his party would lose support due to the severity of COVID-19 across the country, such an effect is hotly debated empirically and theoretically. In this research, we evaluate the extent to which the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic influenced support for President Trump in the 2020 election. Across differing modeling strategies and a variety of data sources, we find evidence that President Trump gained support in counties with higher COVID-19 deaths. We provide an explanation for this finding by showing that voters concerned about the economic impacts of pandemic-related restrictions on activity were more likely to support Trump and that local COVID-19 severity was predictive of these economic concerns. While COVID-19 likely contributed to Trump's loss in 2020, our analysis demonstrates that he gained support among voters in localities worst affected by the pandemic. Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-022-09826-x.
Relationship between public health concern & political support for president Trump. The discrete marginal effects articulated in Fig. 4 specified with 90% and 95% confidence intervals from district-clustered robust standard errors. Darker shaded point estimates significant at ρ<0.10\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\rho < 0.10$$\end{document}. Models control for local COVID-19 context, education, race, gender, ideology, economic evaluations, COVID-19 infection proximity, and age. Δ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\Delta $$\end{document} change in electoral choice models also control for change in partisanship and 2016 Republican presidential vote. Fig. 4 articulates N = 8 unified baseline additive models (one for each panel wave-outcome variable interest articulated in the panel) 8 unified interactive models (one for each panel wave-outcome variable interest articulated in the panel) for a total of N = 16 models. Heterogeneous effects of attitudes across partisanship estimated from multiplicative model interacting context and partisanship. All models fitted with wave-specific survey weights
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Vol.:(0123456789)
Political Behavior (2024) 46:277–305
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-022-09826-x
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ORIGINAL PAPER
Nail intheCoffin orLifeline? Evaluating theElectoral
Impact ofCOVID‑19 onPresident Trump inthe2020
Election
CarlosAlgara2 · SharifAmlani1· SamuelCollitt1· IsaacHale3·
SaraKazemian1
Accepted: 14 September 2022 / Published online: 23 October 2022
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature
2022
Abstract
From the onset of the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in January 2020 to Election
Day in November, the United States experienced over 9,400,000 cases and 232,000
deaths. This crisis largely defined the campaign between former Vice President Joe
Biden and President Donald Trump, centering on the Trump administrations efforts
in mitigating the number of cases and deaths. While conventional wisdom suggested
that Trump and his party would lose support due to the severity of COVID-19 across
the country, such an effect is hotly debated empirically and theoretically. In this
research, we evaluate the extent to which the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic
influenced support for President Trump in the 2020 election. Across differing mod-
eling strategies and a variety of data sources, we find evidence that President Trump
gained support in counties with higher COVID-19 deaths. We provide an explana-
tion for this finding by showing that voters concerned about the economic impacts
of pandemic-related restrictions on activity were more likely to support Trump and
that local COVID-19 severity was predictive of these economic concerns. While
COVID-19 likely contributed to Trump’s loss in 2020, our analysis demonstrates
that he gained support among voters in localities worst affected by the pandemic.
Keywords COVID-19 pandemic· 2020 US presidential election· Donald Trump·
Rally-’round-the-flag· Retrospective voting
COVID‑19 intheContext ofthe2020 U.S. Election
Conventional wisdom holds that the COVID-19 pandemic directly and seri-
ously damaged Donald Trump’s reelection effort in 2020. The depth of the cri-
sis during 2020 is hard to overstate: from the onset of the first confirmed case of
* Carlos Algara
carlos.algara@cgu.edu
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
... Several studies have studied performance accountability on Covid. They examine whether voters punished Trump for Covid infections or deaths at the local level (Baccini et al. 2021;Warshaw et al. 2020;Sides et al. 2022;Algara et al. 2024). These studies have produced mixed results. ...
... These studies have produced mixed results. Sides et al. (2022) and Algara et al. (2024) find that Trump actually did better in counties that experienced more cumulative deaths from Covid compared to counties that experienced fewer deaths-possibly because some Republican voters, taking Trump's cue, took the pandemic less seriously. Of course, voters tend to be nationally focused when it comes to presidential elections, so punishment may only have occurred at the national level. ...
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... No conclusion is made concerning whether this effect cost Trump the election. Algara et al. (2022) find, perhaps counterintuitively, that Trump gained support in counties with higher rates of COVID deaths. The authors believe this result shows that in these counties, the voters were concerned their locale would suffer from a greater economic loss from COVID and that this concern translated into support for Trump as the candidate who was more likely to keep markets open and the economy growing. ...
... The authors believe this result shows that in these counties, the voters were concerned their locale would suffer from a greater economic loss from COVID and that this concern translated into support for Trump as the candidate who was more likely to keep markets open and the economy growing. Baccini et al. (2021) use COVID exposure (not deaths) to present results that seem to contradict Algara et al. (2022). Baccini, Brodeur, and Weymouth (2021) find that more COVID cases in a county hurt Trump's support. ...
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... 7a may correspond to partisan differences in public support (or discontent) and discourse surrounding COVID-19 measures. In the days leading up to the 2020 Presidential Election on November 3rd, a pillar of President Trump's campaign messaging on the pandemic characterized lockdowns as tyranny and economic repression [38]. For example, on November 1 st , 2020, the date of the second-largest peak, Trump made a highly controversial claim by stating that the election was a choice between implementing deadly lockdown measures supported by Biden or an efficient end to the COVID-19 crisis with a safe vaccine [39]. ...
... There will be NO LOCKDOWNS. The great American Comeback is underway!!!" [38]. Next, contentious debates related to masks were found coincident with peaks in polarization, as shown in fig. ...
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Public health measures were among the most polarizing topics debated online during the COVID-19 pandemic. Much of the discussion surrounded specific events, such as when and which particular interventions came into practise. In this work, we develop and apply an approach to measure subnational and event-driven variation of partisan polarization and explore how these dynamics varied both across and within countries. We apply our measure to a dataset of over 50 million tweets posted during late 2020, a salient period of polarizing discourse in the early phase of the pandemic. In particular, we examine regional variations in both the United States and Canada, focusing on three specific health interventions: lockdowns, masks, and vaccines. We find that more politically conservative regions had higher levels of partisan polarization in both countries, especially in the US where a strong negative correlation exists between regional vaccination rates and degree of polarization in vaccine related discussions. We then analyze the timing, context, and profile of spikes in polarization, linking them to specific events discussed on social media across different regions in both countries. These typically last only a few days in duration, suggesting that online discussions reflect and could even drive changes in public opinion, which in the context of pandemic response impacts public health outcomes across different regions and over time.
... According to sources that include quantitative (Gaviria-Mendoza et al., 2022;Makowska et al., 2020) and qualitative studies (Kaggwa et al., 2021), self-medication became a major factor in the immediate response of the general public to the pandemic lockdown. The lack of coherent information from leadership (Algara et al., 2022) led to many people around the world turning to alternative sources for information about selftreatment. It has been found that people turned to social media for information about self-treating for COVID-19, and gravitated towards things such as over-the-counter pain medications, as well as cannabis for self-treatment of other chronic neurological and self-perceived mental health conditions, while hospitals and clinics focused on providing treatment and resources exclusively to those in immediate need (Brenneke et al., 2022). ...
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Introduction: College students demonstrated changes in levels of mental wellbeing as they and the world experienced new levels of stress and anxiety due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As access to healthcare became limited, students turned to alternative methods of coping, which included cannabis use. Objective: To determine if an association between cannabis use and self-perceived mental wellbeing during the pandemic among college students exists. Method: A paired samples t-Test was used to compare self-reported mental wellbeing at different times during the pandemic, a one-way ANOVA to compare self-reported mental health between respondents' cannabis use status, and a Tukey-Kramer post-hoc analysis was used to determine between group significance. All data collected were from participants at a single time point (retrospective self-report during April 2022). Results: Of 103 self-reported college students, the most significant differences in mental wellbeing were reported prior to and during the pandemic. Consistent significant differences were observed between each of the college student groups derived from those students who entirely avoided cannabis use or cessation of use (highest rating), p = .018, as compared to those who initiated cannabis use prior to and during the pandemic (lowest rating) p = .045. Post pandemic mental wellbeing demonstrated a higher level of mental wellbeing among those who had some exposure to cannabis compared to those who avoided cannabis entirely. Conclusions: It cannot be concluded that mental wellbeing was lower due to cannabis use. However, it is possible those with lower self-perceived mental wellbeing turned to cannabis use.
... I use mortality and infection rates to measure local COVID-19 prevalence. Past works have used infection and mortality rates to measure local prevalence, with the former referring to the number of COVID-19 infections and the latter to the number of deaths that have occurred due to the coronavirus (e.g., Algara et al. 2022;Baccini et al. 2021). The infection rate may be less accurate than the mortality rate, as some people who contracted the disease were not diagnosed and recorded. ...
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