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From nationalism to educational divide? Party positions and voters’ profiles on welfare state issues in Estonia and Latvia in the 2010s

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This article contributes to the scant knowledge about what people believe to be the economic, moral, social and migration consequences of the welfare state. Data from a 2006 Dutch survey show, first, that in the eyes of most Dutch people the positive social consequences of the welfare state outweigh the negative economic and moral consequences. Second, the personal interests that people may have in the provisions made by the welfare state, for instance arising from the level of their income, play a minor role in understanding differences in perceptions. Instead, a set of idea-tional determinants proved to be more important. Consequence perceptions are consistently influ-enced by people's political stance, perceptions of the deservingness of welfare target groups and their attitudes towards the role of government.
Book
The analysis in this book disputes entrenched interpretations of the comparative political economy of industrialized democracies. It questions, in particular, the widely-held assumption that social democratic governments will defend the interests of labor. The evidence shows that labor has become split into two clearly differentiated constituencies: those with secure employment (insiders) and those without (outsiders). The book focuses on three policy areas: employment protection (representing the main concern of insiders), and active and passive labor market policies (the main concern of outsiders). The main thrust of the argument is that the goals of social democratic parties are often best served by pursuing policies that benefit only insiders. The implication of the book's insider-outsider model is that social democratic government is associated with higher levels of employment protection legislation but not with labor market policy. The book also argues that there are factors can reduce insider-outsider differences and weaken their influence on social democratic governments. These hypotheses are explored through the triangulation of different methodologies. The book provides an analysis of surveys and macrodata, and a detailed comparison of three case-studies: Spain, the UK and the Netherlands. Its reinterpretation of the challenges facing social democracy will represent a significant contribution to the comparative politics and political economy literatures.
Article
Changes in Western European political parties in general have attracted considerable scholarly interest, whereas changes in party competition have been almost overlooked in an otherwise extensive literature. Using the party manifesto data set, this article documents that party competition in Western Europe is increasingly characterised by issue competition, i.e. competition for the content of the party political agenda.What should be the most salient issues for voters: unemployment, the environment, refugees and immigrants, law and order, the welfare state or foreign policy? This change is crucial because it raises a question about the factors determining the outcome of issue competition. Is it the structure of party competition itself or more unpredictable factors, such as media attention, focusing events or skilful political communication? The two answers to this question have very different implications for the understanding of the role of political parties in today's Western European democracies.
Political Choice Matters: Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross National Perspective
  • R Bakker
  • S Hobolt
Bakker, R., & Hobolt, S. (2013). Measuring Party Positions. In G. Evans and N.D. de Graaf (eds.), Political Choice Matters: Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross National Perspective, Oxford University Press, 27-45.
The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe
  • P Ehin
  • T Saarts
  • M L Jakobson
Ehin, P., Saarts, T. & Jakobson, M.L. (2020) Estonia. In V. Hloušek and P. Kaniok P. (eds.), The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9_5.
Issue Salience and Political Decisions
  • P Moniz
  • C Wlezien
Moniz, P. & Wlezien, C. (2020). Issue Salience and Political Decisions. Oxford Research Encylopedias. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1361
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian post-communist development in the comparative perspective
  • Z Norkus
Norkus, Z. (2011). Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian post-communist development in the comparative perspective. In Baltic way(s) of human development: twenty years on. Eesti Koostöö Kogu, 22-30. https://kogu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/ eia_eng_2011.pdf