“Be rational!” Epistemic aims and socio-cognitive tension in argumentation about dietary choices

Abstract

Argumentation is a social practice that can lead to epistemic outcomes, that is, to the construction of knowledge. Recent research in collaborative learning has pointed out the significance of affective and motivational aspects, as well as the influence of socio-relational concerns, which have been found to frequently take priority over epistemic ones. Our research objective is to investigate how the epistemic and socio-relational dimensions of students' argumentative interactions are intertwined. We apply discourse analysis to examine the interactions in a small group of four 11th-graders evaluating the nutritional acceptability of omnivorous and vegetarian diets. The epistemic dimension is analyzed in terms of the aims pursued by the participants and the epistemic outcomes achieved. The socio-relational dimension is analyzed in terms of fluctuations of interpersonal tensions and their relaxations. The results show a convergence of participants' epistemic aims and the epistemic statuses of the options. Most of the epistemic outcomes are produced in sequences in which socio-cognitive tension arises and then relaxes. Enduring high socio-cognitive tension and overcoming conflict seem to have encouraged the adoption of epistemic aims. Moreover, our findings suggest that driven by epistemic aims in high socio-cognitive tensed contexts, students can refine the conditions by which they engage in argumentation. These results call for further investigating on what constitutes an appropriate or productive level of interpersonal tension for learning. Educational implications are related to the design of argumentative learning environments promoting epistemic aims and outcomes through the encouragement of suitable socio-cognitive climates leading to them.

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TYPE Original Research
PUBLISHED 11 October 2022
DOI 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.933062
OPEN ACCESS
EDITED BY
Antonio Bova,
Catholic University of the Sacred
Heart, Italy
REVIEWED BY
Josephine Convertini,
University of Applied Sciences and Arts
of Southern Switzerland
(SUPSI), Switzerland
Fabrizio Macagno,
Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, Portugal
*CORRESPONDENCE
Pablo Brocos
pablo.brocos@usc.es
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This article was submitted to
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a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
RECEIVED 30 April 2022
ACCEPTED 01 August 2022
PUBLISHED 11 October 2022
CITATION
Brocos P, Jiménez-Aleixandre MP and
Baker MJ (2022) “Be rational!”
Epistemic aims and socio-cognitive
tension in argumentation about dietary
choices. Front. Psychol. 13:933062.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.933062
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©2022 Brocos, Jiménez-Aleixandre
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“Be rational!” Epistemic aims and
socio-cognitive tension in
argumentation about dietary
choices
Pablo Brocos1*, María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre1and
Michael J. Baker2
1Departamento de Didácticas Aplicadas, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, Santiago de
Compostela, Spain, 2Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UMR 9217 i3, Télécom Paris,
Paris, France
Argumentation is a social practice that can lead to epistemic outcomes, that
is, to the construction of knowledge. Recent research in collaborative learning
has pointed out the significance of aective and motivational aspects, as
well as the influence of socio-relational concerns, which have been found
to frequently take priority over epistemic ones. Our research objective is to
investigate how the epistemic and socio-relational dimensions of students’
argumentative interactions are intertwined. We apply discourse analysis to
examine the interactions in a small group of four 11th-graders evaluating the
nutritional acceptability of omnivorous and vegetarian diets. The epistemic
dimension is analyzed in terms of the aims pursued by the participants and the
epistemic outcomes achieved. The socio-relational dimension is analyzed in
terms of fluctuations of interpersonal tensions and their relaxations. The results
show a convergence of participants’ epistemic aims and the epistemic statuses
of the options. Most of the epistemic outcomes are produced in sequences
in which socio-cognitive tension arises and then relaxes. Enduring high
socio-cognitive tension and overcoming conflict seem to have encouraged
the adoption of epistemic aims. Moreover, our findings suggest that driven by
epistemic aims in high socio-cognitive tensed contexts, students can refine
the conditions by which they engage in argumentation. These results call for
further investigating on what constitutes an appropriate or productive level of
interpersonal tension for learning. Educational implications are related to the
design of argumentative learning environments promoting epistemic aims and
outcomes through the encouragement of suitable socio-cognitive climates
leading to them.
KEYWORDS
epistemic cognition, argumentation, classroom discourse, socio-cognitive conflict,
collaborative learning
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Introduction
Research on epistemic cognition (EC), that is, on knowledge
about how knowledge is constructed and justified, has developed
in recent years (Chinn et al., 2014;Greene et al., 2016a), showing
that it is situation-specific and pointing out the need for further
examination of patterns across specific practices and contexts.
There has been a shift from conceptualizing EC as essentially
individual toward a consideration of its social nature (Goldman,
1999;Ludvigsen, 2009;Chinn and Rinehart, 2016). However, its
social aspects, such as how individual practices aggregate at the
level of groups, are still understudied (Asterhan, 2013;Chinn
et al., 2014;Clément, 2016).
Argumentation has a range of meanings, and several
types of argumentative dialogue have been described in the
literature (Walton, 1990). In relation to EC, argumentation
can be defined as an epistemic and social practice in which
interlocutors attempt to modify the intersubjectively agreed
degree of acceptability, or, more generally, the epistemic status
of proposals (claims, views, ideas, or solutions) through joint
engagement in reasoning (Asterhan, 2013). Being an inherently
social practice taking place in the interplay between people,
argumentation is a suitable context for studying the social
aspects of EC. Given the appropriate conditions, argumentation
can lead to epistemic ends, outcomes, or achievements, that is,
to the construction of new knowledge. This newly acquired
understanding may be achieved through the modification of
the epistemic statuses of the ideas in discussion (that is, the
intelligibility, plausibility, or acceptability of those ideas, from
the point of view of each participant) when interlocutors publicly
present their ideas and resolve discrepancies. Indeed, research
has shown that argumentation can be an effective way of
learning and refining understanding (Nussbaum and Sinatra,
2003;Clark and Sampson, 2008;Felton et al., 2009;Yeh and
She, 2010). However, there is a need for further research on how
argumentation produces specific changes in the consideration
of ideas in their epistemic statuses. Research shows that it
can do so, although not always (Asterhan and Schwarz, 2007;
Goldman et al., 2016), and clear changes in position (e.g., from
being in favor to being against a proposal) are, in fact, a rare
finding, especially in socio-scientific debates involving systems
of values (Simonneaux, 2001;Yu and Yore, 2013). Another
kind of knowledge, besides the one specifically related to the
epistemic status of the ideas in discussion, may be constructed
as a result of argumentation: knowledge about the knowledge-
building processes themselves. While it has been shown that
engagement in argumentation supports the development of
epistemic understanding (Kuhn et al., 2013;Iordanou and
Constantinou, 2015), that is, meta-level understanding of the
construction of knowledge, further research is required to
address the complexity of the interconnections between the
emergence of this kind of epistemic achievements and the
engagement in argumentation (Iordanou et al., 2016).
Two areas of research are relevant for understanding why
argumentative interactions do or do not consistently produce
epistemic achievements. Both involve the acknowledgment
of the “hot” nature of learning and cognition (Bendixen
and Rule, 2004;Sinatra, 2005) encompassing affective and
motivational components (Chen and Barger, 2016;Brocos and
Jiménez-Aleixandre, 2021). The first area concerns the goals
and motivation behind EC, exploring the question of why
individuals would want to engage in thinking about knowledge
and knowing. In this regard, the interest in the AIR model
of EC developed by Chinn et al. (2011,2014) has been
emphasized (Chen and Barger, 2016). This model, described
below, incorporates as one of its essential components epistemic
aims, which are goals that individuals may adopt in relation
to knowledge. Thus, this model incorporates motivational
constructs into EC (Chen and Barger, 2016). As the relevance of
epistemic aims in knowledge construction has been recognized,
they are likely to play an important role in determining
the extent to which epistemic outcomes are achieved in
argumentative exchanges. Since collaborative engagement is
not the mere sum of the individual’s motivation levels, being
influenced by group dynamics (Mullins et al., 2013), epistemic
aims are arguably subjected to the particularities of how the
social interaction unfolds, and as such, they should be examined.
The second research area of interest to our research
purposes concerns the social aspects of argumentation. While
much attention has been paid to the cognitive and epistemic
dimensions of argumentation, the socio-relational dynamics
on which these dimensions are dependent have been largely
understudied (Andriessen et al., 2011;Asterhan, 2013). While
engaged in argumentation, participants are not only concerned
with epistemic matters related to the issue under discussion, but
also with aspects related to social belongingness, interpersonal
relations, and social perceptions (Hijzen et al., 2007;Asterhan,
2013). It has been pointed out that these socio-relational aspects
often take priority over epistemic ones (Andriessen et al.,
2011;Asterhan, 2013;Isohätälä et al., 2018), demonstrating
that emotional tension frames the construction of arguments
(Brocos and Jiménez-Aleixandre, 2021). Research has yet to
further clarify how engaging in productive argumentation while
regulating socio-emotional processes occurs and intertwines
in students’ interactions (Baker et al., 2007). In this regard,
examining the patterns of socio-cognitive tension and its
relaxation in argumentative interactions has been proposed
as a potentially insightful approach to better understanding
whether and how learning occurs in argumentative exchanges
(Andriessen et al., 2011). Thus, we incorporate the analysis of
socio-cognitive tensions in our study.
In sum, our research objective is to investigate how
the epistemic and socio-relational dimensions of students’
argumentative interactions are intertwined. In particular:
To examine in which ways enduring socio-cognitive tension
and overcoming conflict in group argumentation encourages or
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inhibits the adoption of epistemic aims and the achievement of
epistemic outcomes.
The epistemic dimension is analyzed in terms of the
epistemic or non-epistemic aims pursued by the participants,
and in terms of the epistemic outcomes achieved. The socio-
relational dimension is analyzed in terms of fluctuations of
interpersonal tensions and their relaxations.
We pursue this objective through a case study, examining
the social interactions of a group of four 11th-grade students
participating in a socio-scientific argumentation task involving
the evaluation of dietary options. This group was selected since
an analysis of their argumentative exchanges suggested that they
achieved sophisticated epistemic outcomes, both in terms of
deepening the knowledge about the matter at stake, as well as
in terms of meta-level understanding, as they engaged in explicit
regulation of the argumentative and decision-making processes.
We examined the evolution of the epistemic status of their
proposals relating to dietary choices (vegetarian, omnivorous)
throughout the debate, in relation to the epistemic aims
of the participants, the patterns of socio-cognitive tension,
and the regulation of epistemic processes. We outlined the
possible interactions among these dimensions, delving into
the specific ways in which these may be interconnected. We
did so by analyzing excerpts of the participants’ discourse,
which marked the progression of the discussion toward the
outcome of the task. In so doing, we intended to shed some
light on how the interrelation of participants’ epistemic aims
and the particularities of the socio-cognitive climate may
interrelate and influence the epistemic outcomes achieved in
argumentative exchanges.
Theoretical framework
The framework is drawn from the literature on epistemic
cognition and research on socio-relational aspects of
argumentation and collaborative learning.
Argumentation as a social
epistemic practice
EC is an interdisciplinary research area that addresses
how people acquire, understand, justify, change, and use
knowledge, having its roots in psychology, sociology of science,
and philosophy (Greene et al., 2016b). EC has also been
presented as a theory of personal epistemology (Hofer and
Pintrich, 2002), epistemological resources (Hammer and Elby,
2002), or of the nature of science (Osborne et al., 2003).
Perspectives on how knowledge is produced are shifting from
an individual focus toward a social one (Ludvigsen, 2009;
Chinn and Rinehart, 2016;Clément, 2016). Simultaneously,
the field has expanded from personally held beliefs about
knowledge to a broad spectrum of cognitive processes (Chen
and Barger, 2016). In recent years, new models for EC have
been developed, aiming at a better understanding of how beliefs
change. These models are potentially helpful for researching and
explaining the role of social, affective, and motivational aspects
of EC that have been traditionally neglected (Asterhan, 2013).
Chen and Barger (2016) model of epistemic change comprises
three components: epistemic doubt (being skeptical of one’s
beliefs), epistemic volition (related to motivational aspects), and
resolution strategies such as reflection, social support, and social
interaction. The latter two components deconstruct the roles of
motivational and social aspects of EC, where, as these authors
emphasized in earlier studies, the role of peers and emotions in
epistemic change needs to be further elucidated.
More recently, Chinn et al. (2014) developed the AIR
model of EC, which includes three components: Aims, epistemic
goals or objectives that individuals set to pursue epistemic
ends; Ideals, standards used to evaluate whether epistemic
ends have been achieved; and Reliable epistemic processes,
procedures, and strategies to achieve epistemic ends. The notion
of epistemic ends, also termed epistemic products, outcomes,
or achievements, refers to the new knowledge or understanding
that is being constructed in each situation. According to this
model, when processing information, individuals may adopt
epistemic aims; for instance, they may set goals for developing a
representation of how the world is (Chinn and Rinehart, 2016).
Conversely, and perhaps simultaneously, they might adopt non-
epistemic aims that are not specifically related to knowledge
and may be diverse in nature, for instance, concerning personal
pleasure or self-image. Chen and Barger (2016) illustrated the
differences between both kinds of aims with the following
example: students can be oriented to understand the biases of
the author of a text to better understand the complexity of the
issue (an epistemic aim) or to be esteemed by their peers for
finding an interesting insight (a non-epistemic aim). We can
map the other two elements of the AIR model onto the same
example: students could use certain epistemic ideals as criteria
for deciding what constitutes a bias, and enact specific epistemic
processes, such as systematically consulting a range of sources
to acquire information about the author and hence gain a better
understanding of the author’s biases.
Epistemic and non-epistemic aims interact, and it has been
argued that people are often driven by a mix of the two
(Kawasaki et al., 2014), given that, in group work, they must
simultaneously manage problem-solving and social interaction.
The notion of epistemic aims involves both motivational and
social aspects of EC. Thus, the AIR model incorporates goal-
orientation constructs traditionally studied in the motivation
literature (Maehr and Zusho, 2009) into EC, further expanding
them by including not only features related to what motivates
people, but also what people value when dealing with epistemic
matters (Chen and Barger, 2016). The AIR model highlights
that EC is social and contextualized and that it is centered on
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practices rather than formal beliefs (Chinn and Rinehart, 2016).
In this study, we aim to contribute to research on EC by studying
the epistemic practice of argumentation in a socio-scientific
context, exploring how the epistemic and non-epistemic aims
of participants might be related to socio-relational aspects and
the epistemic outcomes are potentially achieved because of
argumentative exchanges.
Argumentation in science education is conceptualized as an
epistemic practice that involves the evaluation of knowledge. It
has the potential to broaden, deepen, and refine understanding,
as it may foster justification, negotiation of meaning, and
opinion (epistemic status) change (Baker, 2009). We should
clarify that we use the term epistemic status as it is understood
within EC, referring to the status of ideas from a participant’s
point of view, and it should not be mistaken with the use
of the same term in the conversation analysis discipline,
in which it is generally utilized to characterize the relative
position of speakers in a gradient of knowledge about the
domain in discussion (Heritage, 2012;Lindwall et al., 2016). In
argumentative situations, proposals will have different epistemic
statuses from the participants’ points of view. The aim of the
argumentative interaction is to try to make epistemic statuses
evolve so that agreement is reached on what should be mutually
accepted (Baker, 2002), so the epistemic status of the ideas in
discussion from each participant’s point of view is better aligned.
We argue that the term epistemic status has a range of meanings
in diverse argumentative contexts. In developing explanations,
it refers to the plausibility and explanatory power of alternative
models, and, in decision-making, to the degree of acceptability
of options. It is worth mentioning that, as Kolstø (2005)
argues, decision-making is not solely based on knowledge,
but a result of the interaction between knowledge and values,
the latter being necessary for assessing the desirability of the
different potential consequences of alternative decisions. In
these contexts, argumentative interactions have the potential to
modify the epistemic statuses associated with the alternative
options (that is, their acceptability for each participant), in
terms of their consistency with other conceptions and values
(individually or socially accepted), their consistency with
evidence, or their potential to successfully address several
dimensions of the dilemma and achieve something that is
considered of value. We further explore the differences between
the shifting of epistemic statuses in the context of scientific
explanations and socio-scientific decision-making in another
study (Jiménez-Aleixandre and Brocos, 2018).
Thus, epistemic statuses may be modified as an outcome
of argumentation, so the argumentative interactions can
be characterized as discursive moves aimed at triggering
acceptability changes, or as attempts to decide on alternative
solutions by transforming attitudes toward them (Baker, 2009).
When students express information and reasoning relating to
a problem, they potentially change the degrees of acceptability
of the options being discussed and they presumably construct
new knowledge (Baker, 2009). Viewed thus, not only is the
interactive epistemic process (argumentation) social in nature,
but the epistemic ends achieved by argumentative means
(understanding) are social as well.
Argumentation may be a reliable process for achieving
epistemic ends. However, as Chinn et al. (2014) point out,
its reliability depends on certain conditions. We argue that
these conditions are closely related to what Baker (2009) has
termed the argumentative rules of the dialogue game. Some of
these rules are logical, such as the requirement for coherence
(e.g., invalidating an argumentative position if it has incurred
a contradiction), while others relate to the collaborative nature
of argumentation (e.g., dismissing a party who argues in circles,
allowing no evolution of the debate, or the obligation of
defending one’s position when it is criticized). In the pragma-
dialectical perspective, the “ten commandments” for a critical
discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992) can be
considered as a set of rules for engaging in argumentation
in a reliable way. Chinn et al. (2011) point out that people
may have ideas about the conditions, generally tacit (Baker,
2009), that must be met in small-group procedures to reliably
produce epistemic outcomes. By engaging in practices such
as argumentation, individuals may develop these ideas, and
hence a better understanding of the procedures themselves.
So, by practicing argumentation, individuals may achieve not
only epistemic ends about what is being argued but also about
the argumentation process itself. Indeed, it has been shown
that engagement in argumentation supports the development
of meta-level knowledge (Kuhn et al., 2013;Iordanou and
Constantinou, 2015), and research on students’ metatalk (talk
about the discourse, distinguished from talk about the topic)
sheds some light on the rules that govern argumentative
exchanges, showing that, over sustained periods, students’
discourses become more explicit regarding norms (Kuhn et al.,
2008,2013). Further research is required to address the
complexity of the interconnections between the development
of meta-level knowledge and engagement in argumentation
(Iordanou et al., 2016). In our study, we address how the
development of this kind of knowledge might relate to socio-
relational dynamics.
The socio-relational dimension
of argumentation
It should be noted that co-construction of knowledge in
argumentation does not necessarily emerge from an initial
disagreement, and all that is required is a diversity of proposals
and epistemic statuses ascribed to them. However, research
shows that conceptual gains are primarily predicted by the
presence of critical aspects of argumentative discourse, such
as contradiction or rebuttals, and less so by purely consensual
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reasoning moves (Asterhan and Schwarz, 2007,2009a;Howe,
2009). Asterhan (2013) argues that for argumentation to
be conducive to learning, it should be both critical and
constructive, coining the notion of co-constructive critical
argumentation (Asterhan and Schwarz, 2009b), related
to “deliberative argumentation” (Asterhan and Schwarz,
2016), “exploratory talk” (Mercer, 1996), or “collaborative
argumentation” (Nussbaum, 2008). Asterhan (2013) points out
that co-constructive critical argumentation includes features
such as (a) willingness to listen and critically examine the
different ideas and alternatives proposed; (b) willingness to
make concessions; (c) competition between ideas, rather than
individuals; and (d) a collaborative and respectful atmosphere.
These features, we argue, are largely dependent on the balance
between epistemic and non-epistemic aims of interlocutors,
their motivations, goals, and willingness. Indeed, Asterhan
(2013), discussing why this kind of productive argumentation
might be so difficult to elicit in educational contexts, points to
the relevance of conflicts between different goals, indicating that
concerns about interpersonal relations and social perceptions
may cause students to primarily focus on the social dimension
on the conflict, rather than on the epistemic one. We must
consider, then, the inherent socio-relational aspects of
argumentative interactions.
Labov and Fanshel (1977) argue that the kind of
conversational actions with the greatest social impact is
those in connection with the status of participants and their
changing social relationships. When argumentation arises
from disagreement, it is potentially a face-threatening activity
(Grimshaw, 1990) where criticism of a person’s views can carry
with it an element of indirect criticism of the person proposing
them. However, according to Muntigl and Turnbull (1998),
arguing does not necessarily damage social relations, as it can
also strengthen group bonds. They propose that, as facework
concerns potentially both positive and negative social relations,
it may play an important role in how argumentative exchanges
are conducted.
Productive interaction in argumentation requires a balance
between engaging in high-level cognitive processes, which
are potentially critical and confrontational while sustaining
favorable socio-emotional processes (Isohätälä et al., 2018), as
students require a workable relationship with their partners
(Andriessen et al., 2011). The greater the difference in
interlocutors’ knowledge and intentions, the greater the socio-
cognitive tension in the working relationship, but also the
more potential mutual gain (Andriessen et al., 2011). Avoiding
confrontation and tension altogether does not provide grounds
for high-level critical discussion which may imply missing
learning opportunities (Isohätälä et al., 2018). Thus, socio-
relational concerns may divert students’ attention away from the
epistemic dimensions, resulting in argumentative discourse that
can be too critical on an interpersonal level, and uncooperative,
or else too consensual, and hence devoid of the criticism
needed for co-construction of knowledge (Asterhan, 2013).
If arguers can deal with the interpersonal aspect, they may
develop their ideas whereby tuning at the epistemic level may
be related to tuning at the socio-cognitive level (Andriessen et
al., 2011). It has been found in certain cases that socio-relational
aspects are prioritized over epistemic concerns (Andriessen et
al., 2011;Asterhan, 2013), but further research is needed to
understand how students deal with socio-cognitive tension, and
for uncovering how and under what conditions this tension may
allow or facilitate the construction of knowledge.
Methods
Research design
This study adopts a qualitative methods approach, seeking
to analyze educational cases through expressions and actions
in their local contexts (Denzin and Lincoln, 2013). We present
a case study examining interactions in a group of four 11th-
graders. Data collection included written products and video
recordings, through immersion of the first author in the
classroom during 22 sessions of the project. For our study,
the data corpus comprises one small group’s written evaluation
and video recordings of two sessions. This micro-analytic
approach is appropriate given the need for fine-grained analysis
for exploring EC in the context of social interaction in situ
(Bendixen and Rule, 2004;Chen and Barger, 2016;Iordanou
et al., 2016), in which measures need to be context, task, and even
case-specific (Bendixen and Rule, 2004;Chen and Barger, 2016;
Isohätälä et al., 2018).
Participants
Participants were drawn from an interdisciplinary project
on food choices, carried out with the complete cohort of 11th-
grade students in a high school, aged 16–18 years, during a
school year. They were 35 students (22 girls and 13 boys),
from sciences and humanities, divided into eight small groups.
The case study examined interactions in one group of four
11th-graders (two girls and two boys), participating in a task
as part of the final phase of the project. The participants,
identified by pseudonyms, were already familiar with each other.
This particular small group was selected for micro-analysis
based on the following criteria: (a) diversity and changes in
the group members’ epistemic and non-epistemic aims; (b)
fluctuating socio-cognitive environment in terms of tension-
relaxation; and (c) abundance of epistemic outcomes achieved.
These outcomes included explicit modifications of the scoring
of the options at stake (different dietary choices), argumentative
broadening and deepening of the notions discussed, as well
as regulation of the epistemic processes of argumentation and
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decision-making. It should be noted that this group was not
meant to be representative, particularly due to the higher
density and diversity of the epistemic outcomes achieved in their
interactions, which was mainly noticeable in the sequence of
161 turns selected for our in-depth analysis. We were primarily
interested in unraveling what specifically happened in this group
that led to sophisticated epistemic outcomes, and in doing
so, we hoped to refine our understanding of the conditions
under which these outcomes were achieved in argumentative
interactions. Following the aforementioned criteria for group
selection, we believed that the analysis of the selected group
held the potential for answering our research questions and
allowing us to explore whether and how epistemic outcomes that
were achieved in argumentative exchanges might relate to the
interlocutors’ epistemic aims and the socio-cognitive climate.
Context: Project on healthy and
sustainable food choices
The project on healthy and sustainable food choices was
carried out in a high school in a small town where the
main activity is agriculture and livestock breeding, including
a milk factory. Its aim was two-fold: (a) to promote
students’ development of the practice of argumentation, and
(b) to encourage critical and informed decision-making on
dietary options (vegetarian, omnivorous) based on five criteria
including nutritional, environmental, economic, ethnic, and
cultural/personal. The project design aimed at promoting the
understanding of the environmental impact of different diets,
which has been recently researched and emphasized in the
sustainability literature (Stehfest et al., 2009;Tilman and Clark,
2014). The results of the participants’ consideration of the
environmental impact of diets and their use of environmental
data are addressed in another paper (Brocos and Jiménez-
Aleixandre, 2020a). The project consisted of three phases: (1)
practicing argumentation and identifying criteria for an optimal
diet, (2) searching for information and discussing the criteria,
and (3) undertaking the argumentation task on diets carried
out in three 50-minute sessions, which is the focus of this
paper. This teaching sequence is further detailed in Brocos and
Jiménez-Aleixandre (2020b).
The task was designed according to the optimization
strategy (Papadouris, 2012), which provides a framework for
the evaluation of options. The students were asked to use the
information gathered during the second phase of the project
pertaining to the five criteria to discuss within the group and
jointly evaluate omnivorous and vegetarian diets. They had to
score (0–10) on each criterion and provide a written justification
for each score. This paper is focused on the discussion around
the nutrition criteria. The group was engaged in this task in
the first session for 50 mins and an additional 20 mins in the
second session. The turns cited from the second session are
preceded by “S2-”.
Data analysis
We employed the microgenetic approach, which involves a
close examination of the participants’ discursive interchanges
during practice, focusing on moment-to-moment interaction.
Researchers have recommended this method to obtain a
comprehensive understanding of epistemic development
(Iordanou and Constantinou, 2015;Iordanou et al., 2016) as
it can provide insight into the processes of change (Sandoval,
2014). Analysis of the categories was constructed iteratively,
analyzing the data in several cycles and in interaction with
the literature.
First, the sessions were transcribed. The coding was
conducted using the transcripts in the two languages in which
the discourse was originally produced, Spanish and Galician,
and it was mainly carried out by the first two authors, who
are bilingual and hence fully proficient in both languages.
The third author worked with English translations. The unit
of analysis was the speech turn. Turns were grouped into
episodes, defined as one or several turns of speech related to
the same topic or action (Gee, 2014). Transcriptions and written
productions were analyzed through prolonged immersion in the
data. Initial repertoires of categories were elaborated, drawing
from the literature, and independently assigning a tentative code
to each unit. The codes were compared and the differences were
resolved. Then the categories were refined. Using these revised
categories, data were subjected to several cycles of analysis.
Selected fragments translated to English are reproduced to
illustrate the analysis.
In this manner, the first session was divided into 12
episodes. We focused on the analysis of episodes one to five
from turns 1–161 as they corresponded to the sequences
in which we found a higher density of epistemic outcomes,
both in terms of changes in epistemic statuses, refinement
of the conceptual notions discussed, and regulation of
epistemic processes; these were obtained within a fluctuating
socio-cognitive environment.
Analysis of epistemic outcomes
We analyzed three kinds of epistemic outcomes. Firstly,
outcomes related to the modification of the epistemic statuses
of the options at stake. As discussed, argumentation can be
interpreted as a practice in which the participants attempt
to modify the epistemic status of ideas in the discussion. In
decision-making contexts, the ideas at stake are the specific
options or decisions being considered. The epistemic statuses
of those options correspond to their acceptability, that is, the
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degree to which they are considered adequate, viable, and
desirable in the context of the specific issue being debated. The
task demanded that participants score each criterion according
to its adequacy, so the scores publicly manifested by each
participant during the debate can be considered as an indicator
of the acceptability of that option for that participant, i.e., the
epistemic status of that option at that time for that participant.
Thus, we examined the evolution of the epistemic statuses by
tracking the scores publicly proposed and accepted throughout
the discussion, as they indicated the degrees of acceptability of
each option for the participants who proposed or accepted such
scores at a given time in the debate.
Secondly, epistemic outcomes related to the constructed
arguments and what has been termed broadening and deepening
of the space of debate (Baker et al., 2007). These outcomes
are constructed by producing an argument, or a counter-
argument, or by discussing argumentative links, or the meaning
of key notions that a given argument is built on discursive
operations such as reformulation, conceptual dissociation,
association, or elaboration. In our analysis, we represent the
constructed arguments and the argumentative operations in a
diagrammatic form.
Thirdly, we analyzed the epistemic outcomes related to the
regulation of the conditions under which the argumentation and
decision-making practices were carried out. In particular, we
focused on how the rules of debate were established during
the discussion and how the legitimacy of argumentative moves
was regulated. We identified these rules when students pointed
out that from their point of view a peer had violated the rule.
The rules included those related to the requirement of logical
consistency, the cooperative nature of argumentation, and the
delimitation of the scope of the debate (i.e. what is or is not
relevant to the debate).
Analysis of epistemic and non-epistemic aims
To access the epistemic aims adopted by the participants,
which require inferring underlying intentions from their
discursive moves, the data were examined by fine-grained
discourse analysis in an interpretive process that requires
elucidation within the sequence context, rather than
consideration of separate, individual turns. From the theoretical
grounds established in the AIR model developed by Chinn
et al. (2011), and in interaction with the data analyzed,
we built a non-comprehensive coding scheme (Table 1)
for characterizing the participants’ aims expressed through
their interactions in the debate. We coded as epistemic the
utterances signaling aims directed at cognitive representational
TABLE 1 Coding categories for epistemic and non-epistemic aims and students’ performances indicative of them.
Aims Description Examples of performances indicative
of epistemic/non-epistemic aims
Instances from the students’
discourse
Epistemic aims Considering relevant evidence Manifesting disposition to consider additional
evidence
47 Elena: But no, look, for example, it says...
where we can find it [zinc in food]
Achieving a properly justified claim Providing justifications for the score proposed 75 Elisa: I would give it a 7 [. . . ]It supplies
everything, but [.. . ] it can lead to
cardiovascular diseases
Interpreting the information
accurately
Detecting errors in the data handout S2-158 Santiago: Here there is an incongruity!
Achieving collective
understandings
Asking questions to understand a peer’s reasoning
or to clarify the meaning of a concept
49 Elena: You mean like mixing lentils with
rice and all that...?
Engaging in reliable epistemic
processes
Encouraging a peer to follow the proper rules to
reliably engage in epistemic processes
114 Alfonso: Come on, man, speak right, I’m
speaking right, dude
Non-epistemic aims Finishing the task as soon as
possible
Restricting the amount or quality of the evidence
considered
35 Alfonso: What difference does it make... let’s
move on, let’s not stop at that
Preserving a positive self-image Preventing the modification of the epistemic status
of preconceived ideas with personal implications
58 Santiago: But no, look, each one of us gives
a score, and then we do the average
Prioritizing lack of effort over the
quality of the result
Making decisions or proposals based on how easy
they are to be justified
316 Santiago: Let’s see, meh.. . explaining a 10
is easier. Put a 10
Achieving high scores in the
subject
Expressing concerns about the relevance of the
task for the subject scores
196 Alfonso: This is taken into account for our
scores. It is important
Enjoying oneself Engaging in activities unrelated to the task such as
making jokes or playing games
S3-239 Elisa: You have white hair on the ear!
Uncodifiable Utterances that are not indicative of either
epistemic or non-epistemic aims
38 Elisa: Mine is here
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goals. The non-epistemic aims category encapsulated aims of
diverse nature unrelated to the construction of knowledge,
including utterances that suggest pragmatic goals such
as finishing the task as soon as possible or preserving
a positive self-image. As we cannot directly access the
participants’ aims, we identify them by analyzing participants’
engagement in certain epistemic performances revealed
in their discourse. Table 1 summarizes the coding scheme
for the analysis of the epistemic and non-epistemic aims,
including a non-exhaustive list of performances indicative
of them. It must be noted that the analyses of epistemic
outcomes, epistemic aims, and socio-cognitive tension are
not mutually exclusive. For instance, a specific utterance in
which a participant regulates the rules of debate implies the
achievement of epistemic outcomes related to the regulation
of the argumentation practice, but it is also considered an
epistemic performance, and hence, interpreted as indicative
of epistemic aims. Alternatively, certain utterances signaling
non-epistemic aims might as well be considered discursive
moves increasing socio-cognitive tension. The analysis of the
participants’ aims was independently conducted by the first two
authors, showing an agreement of 93% and a Cohen’s kappa
value of 0.88.
Analysis of socio-cognitive tension
Drawing from Andriessen et al. (2011,2013), we examined
socio-cognitive tension as arising from argumentation and
disagreement-in-discourse. We analyzed the potential of a broad
inventory of discursive moves to negotiate face and increase
or decrease socio-cognitive tension, which is summarized in
Table 2. This repertoire builds on the work of Andriessen et al.
(2011), adapted to the particularities of our data, and ranged
from metatalk utterances (Kuhn et al., 2013), such as meta-
directive statements, to more traditional argumentative moves,
like counterarguments or concessions, as well as discursive
moves involving affection, such as the use of displayed emotions
(Plantin, 2011), humor, or irony. These are used to estimate
the evolution of the tension-relaxation pattern throughout the
argumentative exchanges, which, at a given point in the debate, is
quantified as the number of tensed utterances minus the number
of relaxed responses. This quantification is a simplification and
represents the general direction of tension increase or decrease.
It should be noted that: (a) the socio-cognitive potential of
certain utterances is highly context-dependent, for instance,
humor can be used in either a playful manner, reducing tension,
or in a hurtful manner, increasing it (b) certain utterances
might include elements that may simultaneously increase and
relax the tension and in our data, these were coded as both,
and hence their net effect in the overall tension pattern was
quantified as zero (c) the overall contribution of each utterance
was analyzed against the general emotional “climate,” but some
interventions may increase the tension for some members while
decreasing it for others; for instance, agreeing with one partner
who disagrees with another, and (d) different kinds of utterances
might have a different power to influence tension and relaxation;
for instance, personal attacks might hold greater potential
to increase tension than counterclaims but in our analysis,
they are quantified in the same way. These methodological
considerations notwithstanding, we argue that this analysis
provides a way of creating a simple visualization of the overall
direction of the socio-cognitive tension-relaxation patterns that
might emerge in argumentative exchanges, which is useful for
our research purposes. The analysis, independently conducted
by the first two authors, showed an agreement of 95% and a
Cohen’s kappa value of 0.9.
Results
To explore how the epistemic outcomes achieved in
argumentative exchanges relate to interlocutors’ epistemic
aims and the socio-cognitive climate sustained, first,
we examined how the epistemic status of both options
changed throughout the debate. Then, we addressed
the characterization of the epistemic and non-epistemic
aims of the participants, and their evolution. Finally,
we examined the emerging socio-cognitive tension-
relaxation patterns and their relationship with the epistemic
outcomes achieved.
Evolution of the epistemic status of the
options and participants’ epistemic aims
We analyzed the modification of the epistemic statuses
(i.e., their acceptability) of both diets (omnivorous vs.
vegetarian) throughout the debate regarding the nutritional
criterion by tracking the scores for each diet proposed by
each participant, as displayed in Figure 1. The horizontal
axis includes only the turns in which a new score was
proposed or changed by any participant, and their
representation is not linear to improve readability. The
group average scores (in blue) are only represented after
all group members had already proposed or agreed to a
specific score.
From Figure 1, it is apparent that the student whose
opinions/scorings changed the most was Santiago, as discussed
below. The final group score was the same for both diets, seven.
However, the process for arriving at it differs. The acceptability
of the omnivorous diet was higher at the beginning of the debate
for two students, Santiago and Alfonso. It did not change for
Elisa and was initially lower for Elena. So the group average
decreased through the debate. The opposite happened for the
vegetarian diet where its acceptability was initially lower for
Elena and particularly for Santiago and it did not change for
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Alfonso and Elisa; the group average increases slightly. This
trend was particularly noticeable in Santiago’s scores for both
diets, which were initially outliers, but converged toward the
group average as the debate moved forward.
We studied the students’ aims to better understand the
scores proposed and their modifications in the debate. The
results of the analysis of the performances indicating epistemic
or non-epistemic aims for each participant are summarized
in Table 3.
Elena, Elisa, and Alfonso showed a clear predominance
of epistemic over non-epistemic aims. However, Santiago’s
performances were indicative of non-epistemic aims and were
more frequent than those indicative of epistemic ones. To better
understand the characterization of the epistemic aims for each
student, Figure 2 illustrates how the ratio between epistemic and
non-epistemic aims changed throughout the debate. Specifically,
it showed the percentage of performances indicative of epistemic
aims relative to the sum of performances indicative of both
aims identified for each student up to each represented turn.
To exclude initial sharp fluctuations, the starting point for
each student’s ratio corresponded with the turn in which seven
of their performances had been coded as either indicative of
epistemic or non-epistemic aims.
As seen in Figure 2, most of Elena and Elisa’s utterances
were consistently indicative of epistemic aims, since for most
of the debate they signaled a commitment to attain a better
understanding of the issue and achieving scores that are properly
justified. This engagement is illustrated with this fragment:
Performances
(E: epistemic;
NE: non-epistemic;
U: uncodifiable)
30 Elena: [Reading from the
handout] “It is considered
balanced the following
nutritional distribution
regarding the caloric content of
a diet”... this is wrong. [.. . ]
E: Detecting potential
errors in the handout
33 Elisa: No, it’s right. Lipids...
lipids 60, proteins 10... and fat
30...
E: Challenging a peer’s
understanding
34 Elena: It is not 50, it’s 60...
that’s what I studied.
E: Challenging a peer’s
understanding
35 Alfonso: What difference
does it make... let’s move on, let’s
not stop at that.
NE: Restricting the amount
or quality of the evidence
considered
36 Elena: [keeps reading the
handout aloud] [. . . ]
U
45 Alfonso: Nothing, that... read
in which foods is present, to
know the diets and...
NE: Restricting the amount
or quality of the evidence
considered
TABLE 2 Coding categories for the analysis of the socio-cognitive tension/relaxation patterns (adapted from Andriessen et al.,2011).
Tension–Relaxation Sub-categories Instances from the students’ discourse
Tension (increase) Counterclaims 65 Elena: But almost no one consumes a balanced omnivorous diet
Taking stance, persisting 75 Elena: I would give it a 7
Requests for justification or clarification 146 Santiago: Is it for the score?
Personal attacks, accusations 82 Elisa: Shut your mouth, boy
Sarcasm, exasperation 114 Alfonso: I give less to the vegetarian, but... but a 10 for compensating,
right? No way, no way
Interrupting 133 Santiago: [simultaneously] I give it a 5, I know, I know what we are
talking about!
Showing opposition, ignoring, irrelevancy 142 Alfonso: No, it’s not like that
Giving directives 147 Elena: Be rational
Relaxation Building 78 Elena: [nods] And other diseases
(decrease of tension) Compromise, concession 89 Elena: We have to do an average if we can’t agree
Humor 84 Alfonso: It is so tasty
Focusing, change of focus 109 Elena: And what about the vegetarian one?
Clarification 14 Elena: No, for instance, the omnivorous diet... maybe you don’t cut so
many trees and it’s less... it leads to... is better for the environment
Showing agreement or approval,
encouragement, confirmation
55 Elisa: Exactly. Especially with meat
Following up, Giving a turn 96 Santiago: So ten, plus four, divided into 2... equals 7
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46 Elisa: Meh, it’s all the same,
but...
NE: Restricting the
amount or quality of
the evidence
considered
47 Elena: But no, look, for
example, mine about zinc, it
says... where we can find it
E: Providing relevant
evidence
and... ok, but, look, why is that
important? [. . . ] So that is the
problem with the vegetarian
people, because... in the animals
[minerals] are better
bioavailable. [.. . ] That’s the
problem.
48 Elisa: I believe that... there
are some [nutrients] that are in
food from animals, where if you
have to mix them to obtain
them, then you have to be very
careful, and...
E: Sharing individual
understandings with
the group
49 Elena: You mean like mixing
lentils with rice and all that...?
E: Asking questions to
understand a peer’s
reasoning or to clarify
the meaning of a
concept
Alfonso’s utterances suggest the predominance of the non-
epistemic aim of finishing the task as soon as possible (35, 45),
as he actively tries to stop Elena and Elisa from discussing and
evaluating the available information. However, soon afterward,
he also engages in an epistemic talk (analyzed below) discussing
the problem definition with Elena and Elisa, agreeing with them
about the assignment of a justified nutritional score of seven to
the omnivorous diet. From this point on, Alfonso’s interventions
are consistently indicative of epistemic aims, as illustrated by the
steady upwards trend in Figure 2. He adopts a central role in the
debate, particularly in his interactions with Santiago, discussed
below (see turns 90–97 and 116–156).
In contrast, most of Santiago’s utterances can be interpreted
as indicative of non-epistemic aims, particularly at the beginning
of the debate, as represented in Figure 2. He interrupts the
teacher’s explanation, assigning an unjustified ten score to the
omnivorous diet as early as turn two. He does not participate in
evidence evaluation (30–50) and in turn 58 he suggests a voting
and averaging strategy, which, as discussed later, potentially
discourages epistemic talk. Later, he continues to engage in non-
epistemic performances when he disregards others’ arguments
and does not provide justifications for his scores (120: But I give
it a 2), or even when he provides them on his peer’s insistence
they are based on non-evidence or pseudo evidence (Kuhn, 1991)
such as in turn 99 (But I g ive it a 9. Because that. . . I still
count it. . . as a 9) or turn 129 (Because it seems. . . wrong to
me). However, Santiago’s epistemic performances undergo an
increase in frequency, from 14% in turn 85 to 41% in turn 159,
which suggests a shift toward the adoption of epistemic aims.
His later interventions in the following session when discussing
other criteria support this interpretation as he then engages in
epistemic performances such as asking questions to clarify the
meaning of a concept (234: Teacher, what is the gross added
value?), providing relevant evidence (s2-33: People working in the
primary sector only cover 4% of the total population), or detecting
errors on the informational handout (s2-158 Santiago: Here there
is an incongruity!).
We may summarize the evolution of the epistemic status
of both options as a convergent process. The participants who
showed a predominance of epistemic aims proposed similar,
consistent scores. This convergence of scores was concurrent
with a convergent progression in the balance between epistemic
and non-epistemic aims, noticeable in the increase of epistemic
aims for the participants that did not show a predominance of
FIGURE 1
Evolution of the proposed scores for the nutritional acceptability of omnivorous and vegetarian diets throughout the debate.
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epistemic aims from the beginning. For instance, Alfonso, and
particularly Santiago, whose proposed scores experienced the
most dramatic changes throughout the debate.
Socio-cognitive tension-relaxation
patterns and epistemic outcomes
Next, we examined the patterns of socio-cognitive tension-
relaxation that emerged during the debate, exploring their
relationship with the epistemic outcomes achieved and with the
shifts in participants’ epistemic aims.
Figure 3 displays the changes in the tension-relaxation
pattern throughout the debate, quantified as the number of
TABLE 3 Participants’ performances indicative of epistemic (E) aims
and non-epistemic (NE) aims.
Participant Performances
indicative of E
aims
Performances
indicative of NE
aims
Uncodifiable
Alfonso 29 4 12
Elena 21 2 8
Elisa 13 2 12
Santiago 12 17 8
Total 75 25 40
tensed statements minus the number of relaxed statements
identified in each turn.
The first significant instance of tension increase arises in
turns 58–70 during an argumentative conflict led by Elena
and Alfonso:
58 Santiago: But no, look, each
one of us gives a score, and then
we do the average.
NE T
59 Elena: So I would give it a 6,
a “C”, because... lots of people
that eat meat are having a lot of
cardiovascular issues.
E T
60 Alfonso: But we are talking
about, I mean, about a
balanced diet.
E T
61 Elena: Sure, ok, but... uh...
almost no one eats like that...
almost no one consumes a
balanced omnivorous diet
E R/T
62 Alfonso: If you follow a
balanced omnivorous diet...
E
63 Elisa: It’s alright E R
64 Alfonso: It’s great. E R
65 Elena: But almost no one
consumes a balanced
omnivorous diet.
E T
66 Alfonso: I know, but we have
to include that case, right?
E T
FIGURE 2
Evolution of performances indicative of epistemic aims through the debate for each participant.
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FIGURE 3
The pattern of socio-cognitive tension-relaxation during the debate.
67 Santiago: Well, we need to think
that...
U T/R
68 Elisa: No, you have to include every
case...
E T
69 Elena: Every one. E R
70 Alfonso: In general? E T
71 Elisa: Of course. E R
72 Alfonso: Ok [nods] U R
The argumentative structure of this episode, in which there
is a predominance of epistemic performances, is represented
in diagrammatic form in Figure 4. The diagram represents
a reconstruction (van Eemeren et al., 1993;van Rees,
2001) of the structure of the main arguments and theses
expressed. As van Rees (2001) points out, reconstructing
argumentation involves identifying the implicit and indirect
meaning of the discourse according to the elements of
a particular model of argumentation. In this case, the
model combines elements of Toulmin (1958) structures and
speech acts in argumentative discussions (van Eemeren and
Grootendorst, 1984). In addition to argument structures,
the diagram shows operations of elaboration of theses,
for example, when the “omnivorous diet” option is made
more precise or restricted (Naess, 1966) as a “balanced
omnivorous diet”.
In diagrams of the kind shown in Figure 4 (see also
Figure 5), the line of the transcript that is reconstructed
argumentatively is shown above the thesis boxes. For
example, T1′, “balanced omnivorous diet” corresponds
to line 60, “But we are talking about, I mean, about a
balanced diet.” In other cases, a reconstructed argument
may span several turns. Argumentative relations are rarely
explicitly made by arguers and thus need to be understood
in context.
The main thesis discussed (T1) is the omnivorous (O) diet.
Elena claims that it should have a score of 6, not higher,
providing the supporting argument (+) that it involves eating
meat, and many meat-eaters have cardiovascular problems.
Alfonso engages in the negotiation of the meaning: T1, O,
should be understood as a balanced O (T1′). This constitutes
his argument against Arg1: an O diet does not necessarily
cause cardiovascular problems if it is balanced. Elena (61)
criticizes the argumentative relation rather than T1′argument
itself: O diet is not generally balanced. Alfonso (Arg3, 66)
replies that the balanced O diet must nevertheless be taken into
consideration. Elisa and Elena accept contemplating this case,
but not exclusively: it must be considered in the context of how
the O diet is generally carried out, which is not in a balanced
way, to which Alfonso finally agrees. Conflict is solved and
the students align their epistemic statuses: Elena has succeeded
in defending her claim of the score of six for the O diet and
in countering Alfonso’s counterarguments, but there is some
co-construction as well because they agree in considering the
balanced O diet or, in Elisa’s words, that they have to “include
every case”.
In this exchange we observe several epistemic outcomes:
arguments and counterarguments constructed, links established
and questioned, elaboration of theses, and dissociation of O
diets into balanced and not balanced. Simultaneously they are
regulating their engagement in argumentation: they discuss
which form of the options should be evaluated, whether an ideal
balanced O diet or one that would be representative of how
this diet is currently being followed by the general population.
This negotiation of the problem definition has implications
for how they should tackle the task, scope, and strategy for
their evaluation, which is further operationalized later (92–96
and 148–150). This episode in which conflict is solved and
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FIGURE 4
Argument diagram of turns 59–72. Boxes with thick lines are claims, that become theses (T1, T2) once argued; boxes with simple lines are
(counter-) arguments; “+” and “–” are arguments for or against; dotted arrows represent elaborations of theses, noted T′.
epistemic outcomes are co-constructed seems to be a turning
point for Alfonso, who up to this point showed a predominance
of non-epistemic aims, which are not identified thereafter (see
Figure 2).
Tension decreases shortly after an agreement is reached
among Alfonso, Elena, and Elisa. They concur in scoring the
O diet with a seven, collectively co-constructing a justification
for it (73–80, omitted). However, Santiago does not participate
nor criticize it, proposing instead an independent score (81),
enacting the voting and averaging strategy that he had previously
proposed (58). In this context, we interpret the proposal for
this strategy as a way of preemptively avoiding engagement
in epistemic talk, preventing the modification of the epistemic
status of the options. After Santiago’s lack of participation
in evidence evaluation (30–50) and in the co-constructed
justifications for a seven score, his unjustified nine score for the
O diet is heavily rejected, especially by Elisa: tension rises until
turn 87.
81 Santiago: I’m giving it a 9. NE T
82 Elisa: Shut your mouth, boy. U T
83 Santiago: For me... I think the
omnivorous diet... it is ideal. [. . . ]
NE R
88 Teacher: Well, if you cannot agree on
a mark, so use an average.
U R
89 Elena: We have to do an average if
we can’t agree.
NE R
90 Alfonso: Ok, look, I’m explaining to
you, the omnivorous diet is very good, I
already said so, if it’s balanced, if it’s
balanced is a 10, you get everything, you
eat everything, it’s awesome.
E T
91 Elisa: It is perfect. E R
92 Alfonso: But it’s not always balanced,
so you have to include every case, what
it deserves. And in every case, if we eat a
lot of meat, you are getting...
E T
93 Elisa: Obesity. E R
94 Santiago: But then it’s not a 7, it’s a 5
or a 4.
E R
95 Alfonso: So that’s what I’m saying,
that we have to put ourselves... in the
average.
E R/T
96 Santiago: So 10, plus 4, divided by
2... equals 7.
E R
97 Alfonso: Alright! Seven! There you
go.
U R
98 Elisa: [Applauds]. U R
Possibly induced by the perception of excessive socio-
cognitive tension at this point, and perhaps also in the interest
of time, the teacher accepts the validity of the averaging strategy,
suggesting its implementation in turn 88, which could relax the
tension, but also restrict potential epistemic outcomes developed
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in a further attempt to reach consensus. Santiago’s proposal for
this strategy had remained unaddressed, but after the teacher’s
recommendation, Elena accepts its adoption (89). However,
Alfonso and Elisa do not follow up by casting their votes
as they still apparently aim to solve the disagreement and
reach a consensus. Through dialogue (90–93) they reconstruct
their argument, explicitly considering what they had agreed
upon, which was that they should consider balanced and
“unbalanced” O diets. This agreement is seemingly appropriated
by Santiago (94–96), in interaction with Alfonso. Specifically,
they operationalized the problem by separately considering
both extreme cases (idealized-balanced and realistic-unbalanced
diets) and estimating an average score. Santiago follows
Alfonso’s argument, reaching the same conclusion as they did
with a score of seven for the O diet. Alfonso and Elisa (97–98)
give him encouraging feedback. The socio-cognitive climate has
relaxed from turn 88 to 98. Agreement (and thus, alignment
of epistemic statuses) is reached, without resorting to the
voting strategy.
Immediately thereafter, Santiago retracts his score,
advocating a nine with no valid justification, resulting in
tensions flaring up again.
99 Santiago: But I give it a 9. Because
that... I still count it... as a 9.
NE T
100 Elisa: Fuck, Santiago. U T
101 Alfonso: Ok, I give it a 5, and there
we go [laughs].
U T
102 Elena: Only because it’s tasty? E T
103 Santiago: What are you saying,
dude? No... a 9 because... it’s true. It
gives you everything.
E T
104 Elena: We have to do the average
among us, seven... three sevens and one
nine...
NE R
105 Alfonso: No, no. You and she gave it
a 7, he, a 9, and me, a 5. It equals 7.
There we go.
U T
106 Elena: Ok [laughs]. So that’s it. U R
107 Santiago: Put a 7! NE T/R
108 Alfonso: It is indeed a 7. E T
Santiago’s discursive move is strongly rejected by Elisa.
Alfonso seemingly desists from addressing Santiago’s unjustified
position and artificially changes his score to render Santiago’s
without effect by way of dismissing him and raising the
tension. Our interpretation is that Santiago is implicitly being
accused of violating the rules of debate in two senses: lacking
argumentative coherence, and hindering progress, repeating
an argumentative move with no further justification. Elena
(102), arguably driven by epistemic aims, persists in her
effort to uncover the reasoning behind Santiago’s position,
pointing to gastronomic preferences. Her discursive move
may be interpreted as yet another accusation of violating
a rule, namely overstepping the scope of the debate, which
should be restricted to the nutritional criterion. Santiago rejects
her accusation and Elena desists, moving the debate forward
by implementing the averaging strategy. She then reiterates
all the proposed scores, not taking Alfonso’s (101) tweaked
score seriously. Alfonso, however, stands by it, which is then
accepted by Elena. Santiago, perhaps due to excessive pressure,
exasperatedly concedes (107), but it is a forced, disinterested
concession, with no real agreement: they change the focus,
moving forward. The tension is sustained and the disagreement
is not solved nor carried further until its ultimate consequences.
At this point, the participants have tried but failed to align
their epistemic status and agree on the regulation of the rules
of debate.
A similar event takes place immediately thereafter when they
evaluate the vegetarian (V) diet, and Santiago proposes a low
score with no justification:
109 Elena: And what about the
vegetarian one?
U R
110 Santiago: A 2 [the other group
members laugh, Santiago shrugs]
NE T
114 Alfonso: [laughing] I give it less to
the vegetarian one, but. . . a 10 to
compensate, right? No way, no way. I
give it. . . . come on, man, speak right,
I’m speaking right, dude.
U T/R
115 Santiago: Ok, ok. U R
116 Alfonso: [. . . ] don’t you g ive it a 2...
an organized vegetarian diet can cover...
E T/R
117 Santiago: Also the omnivorous one. E T/R
118 Alfonso: That’s it! U R
119 Elena and Elisa: Ah! [They pound
the table]
U R
The group rejects Santiago’s unjustified score, by displaying
emotions (sarcastic laughter), thereby increasing the tension.
Alfonso then acknowledges that he does not consider the V
diet as nutritionally adequate as the O one, and yet, he shows
a disposition to fake his vote again to balance what might
be considered an unreasonably low score. In other words,
he uses humor about “tweaking” the score for increasing the
pressure on Santiago, which continues from their previous
exchange. Alfonso also exhorts Santiago to “speak right” as
he is doing, interpreted as an encouragement to follow the
rules of debate, which is, this time, seemingly accepted by
Santiago (115), de-escalating the tension. Then, Alfonso points
out that a V diet could cover all nutritional needs, which is
implicitly accepted by Santiago (117). The rest of the group
reacts by displaying enthusiastic emotions, relaxing the tension,
as they presumably consider that, once Santiago acknowledged
Alfonso’s statement, he would accordingly modify his score to
avoid a lack of coherence. However, Santiago insists on his
unjustified score:
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Brocos et al. 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.933062
120 Santiago: But I give it a 2. NE T
121 Alfonso: Why? E T
122 Santiago: Because, because it
doesn’t seem... balanced to me.
E T
123 Elisa: Really, hu? U T
124 Alfonso: But it can be balanced
sometimes, dude!
E T
[. . . ]
127 Santiago: If the thing is balanced... I
give it a 5.
E T
128 Alfonso: Because you don’t like it. E T
129 Santiago: Because it seems... wrong
to me.
NE T
130 Alfonso: But we are not talking
about the food, we are talking... [about
nutrients]
E T
133 Santiago: I give it a 5, I know, I
know what we are talking about!
NE T
Tension progressively increases during turns 120–134, as
disagreement is not solved. Alfonso demands a justification for
Santiago’s score, and upon getting an unsatisfactory answer,
prompts additional exclamations from Elisa. This can be
interpreted as an implicit denouncing of Santiago’s failure to
comply with the rules for coherence and for a valid defense of
a standpoint when challenged. Alfonso suggests, as Elena did
in turn 102, that Santiago might be influenced by preferences
beyond the space of debate on nutrition, which is again denied
by Santiago.
134 Alfonso: But what you are saying
doesn’t make sense.
E T
135 Santiago: Ok... so put a 7. NE R
136 Alfonso: But listen, you are saying
that the omnivorous diet is a 9, because
it has all the nutrients, but a vegetable
diet that has all the nutrients is a 5
because it’s vegetable.
E T
137 Santiago: It’s a 5 because it’s
vegetable, for sure.
E R
138 Alfonso: But that doesn’t make
sense! [Elisa and Elena laugh]
E T
139 Santiago: Ok, so then give it a 7! NE T/R
140 Alfonso: No. We have to engage in
argumentation, it’s not that way...
E T
145 Alfonso: But no... God! Come on,
listen.
U T
146 Santiago: Is it for the score? NE T
147 Elena: Be rational. E T
Alfonso (134, 138) keeps pointing out Santiago’s lack
of coherence in his evaluation of balanced O and V diets,
reconstructing (136) his implicit argument to point out a
contradiction: if the criterion for nutritional adequacy is
the capacity to supply all necessary nutrients, and if they
are comparing “balanced” versions of both O and V diets,
which provide all nutrients, it is not legitimate to give them
different scores. This critique is supported by Elisa and Elena’s
laughter and answered by Santiago’s disinterested concession
(139) for the sake of finishing the discussion as a mean to
reduce tension.
In this sequence (120–147) we observe a sustained
increase of tension, which arguably reaches its highest peak,
followed by Santiago’s attempt to relax it by means of a
disinterested concession, as he did earlier when discussing
the O diet. Interestingly, this time, Alfonso explicitly rejects
it, stating that “we have to engage in argumentation,” and
alongside Elena, keeps exerting pressure and encouraging
Santiago to “be rational,” to follow the rules of the debate,
and thus to adopt a sounder epistemic stance. This might
also be interpreted as a manifestation of the belief that a
decision achieved through disinterested concessions would
not be reliable. At this point we identify Alfonso’s clearest
declaration of epistemic aims: they have to argue properly
even if that implies a high level of socio-cognitive tension; in
other words, the epistemic dimension must take precedence.
Santiago even inquires on the motives for sustaining such
tension: “is it for the score?” (146), implicitly suggesting
that, if what is really at stake is a task-oriented goal (i.e.,
the score), he is ready to concede to prioritize the socio-
relational dimension. However, Alfonso’s refusal to accept such
disinterested concession and his disposition to keep the tension
(140, 145) suggests that he is not driven by task-oriented goals,
but by knowledge-oriented, epistemic ones: they must reach a
collective agreement, for the right reasons, and according to the
proper rules of debate.
This episode is summarized in an argument diagram
(Figure 5) that highlights the argumentative and conceptual
operations involved (i.e., the epistemic outcomes).
Figure 5 illustrates two main characteristics of the
argumentative sequence on the acceptability of the vegetarian
diet. Firstly, the sequence turns on a classical move in
argumentation, that of “dissociation” (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1958;Baker, 2002); in this case, the concept of
“vegetarian diet” is dissociated into two possible sub-concepts,
“balanced” and “unbalanced.” This distinction is introduced by
Santiago to support his low score of two, for the purportedly
unbalanced V diet. The other students maintain the existence
of the opposite, a balanced version of the diet. The second
characteristic is the diversity of ways in which Santiago’s claims
are shown as invalid: (i) his ‘argument’ against any form of V
diet in terms of his simple dislike for it is claimed by Alfonso
to be an unacceptable argument, and irrelevant given that the
issue here is nutritional value; (ii) Alfonso shows that Santiago’s
views are internally contradictory since for “balanced” diets, O
or V, he gives very different scores (9 and 5, respectively); (iii)
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Brocos et al. 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.933062
FIGURE 5
Argument diagram of the episode on scoring vegetarian diet. Boxes with thick lines are claims, that become theses (T1, T2) once argued; boxes
with simple lines are (counter-) arguments; “+” and “–” are arguments for or against; dotted arrows represent elaborations of theses (rather than
arguments), noted T′. The bi-directional arrow expresses that the boxes it links are mutually contradictory, each being an argument against the
other.
Santiago’s quick change of score for the balanced vegetarian
diet from 5 to 7 when faced with criticism of his view is
not motivated in epistemic terms and contradicts himself
but (as the diagram shows) his new score has no argument
in its favor.
At the end of this episode, Alfonso, in discussion
with Elena, reconstructs their argument once
again, the validity of which is finally accepted by
Santiago (153):
148 Alfonso: Listen, look. We are
assessing... the capacity of the diet for
getting all the necessary nutrients, so, for
the omnivorous diet, it is easy to reach
the nutrients, but it is also easy to go too
far, so then you need to do the average.
E T/R
149 Santiago: An average that is 7, yes. U R
150 Alfonso: Ok, so in the vegetarian
diet you have to do the same, assessing...
it’s difficult to end up having all the
necessary nutrients with a vegetarian
diet, you have to balance it very well.
E R
151 Elena: But it’s not impossible. E R
152 Alfonso: But you can do it. You
have to take that into account.
E R/T
153 Santiago: Ok. So here I gave it... E R
154 Alfonso: It’s not a 2, dude. U T
155 Santiago: Then I give a 6 for the
vegetarian...
E R
156 Alfonso: Ok, that makes sense. Ok, I
give it a 6 also.
E R
Santiago accepts it this time, changes his score accordingly,
and proposes a 6, which converges toward the group average.
This move is acknowledged by Alfonso, who legitimizes
Santiago’s shift, providing positive feedback (156). Thus, after a
prolonged sequence of high tension, the socio-cognitive climate
has finally relaxed, even before the turn in which Santiago finally
concurs with the rest of the group. He revises his position
and consequently rectifies his scores. Epistemic statuses are
seemingly aligned, and agreement is finally reached.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes the interplay between epistemic
and socio-cognitive dimensions in argumentation in a case
study. While not generalizable, we believe that our findings
can shed some light on certain critical aspects of the
interconnections among epistemic aims, the patterns of socio-
relational climate sustained, and the epistemic outcomes
achieved in argumentative interactions.
The results indicate that epistemic aims predominate for
three of the four students, which suggests that, overall, the
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Brocos et al. 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.933062
task design and implementation were successful in enabling
their epistemic aims and performances. The scores proposed
by them were similar and largely consistent with the literature
about the nutritional adequacy of V and O diets (Leitzmann,
2014;Sabaté and Soret, 2014), which differs from public
consideration of O diets being nutritionally better than V
ones (de Bakker and Dagevos, 2012;Pohjolainen et al., 2015).
The contributions of the fourth member, however, are mainly
indicative of non-epistemic aims for the greater part of the
debate, corresponding with the proposal of scores that are
outliers in comparison to those of other members. Thus, there
seems to be a correspondence between the epistemic status of the
options and the epistemic aims adopted by the participants. The
balance between epistemic and non-epistemic aims is dynamic,
involving changes throughout the debate. In our data, we
observed a convergence of both participants’ epistemic aims
and of the epistemic statuses of the options; a gradual adoption
of epistemic aims coincides with scores converging toward the
group average.
The analysis of the socio-cognitive patterns of tension-
relaxation might help us understand how these convergent
processes and epistemic outcomes were developed. Most of
the epistemic outcomes identified were produced in sequences
with the following socio-cognitive pattern: tension arises, and
relaxation follows. This suggests that the group was successful
in combining critical and co-constructive discursive moves
(Asterhan, 2013) in a fluctuating socio-cognitive climate, and
supports the idea that tuning at the cognitive level is related to
tuning at the socio-cognitive level (Andriessen et al., 2011).
Our findings suggest that these tuning processes are yet
related to another one: the tuning of participants’ aims. The
changes in epistemic aims are noticeable for two participants:
Alfonso and Santiago, but there are differences in how they
change and their relation to the socio-cognitive climate. Alfonso
showed some instances of non-epistemic aims at the beginning
of the debate, but after the first socio-cognitive conflict, which
was successfully resolved (and the climate, thus, relaxed),
his performances were consistently indicative of epistemic
aims: the change is drastic. This suggests that, rather than
being necessarily in conflict with epistemic matters, the socio-
relational dimension, when it is successfully dealt with, could be
related to the promotion of epistemic aims. It must be noted that
in the case of Alfonso, part of his initial position is integrated
into the group’s agreement, which might have facilitated his
transition toward epistemic aims.
The case of Santiago is different: his discrepancies with
the rest of the group are much more pervasive, becoming
a source of conflict and tension throughout the debate. His
position is not integrated into the group agreement as the
others do not accept the validity of his arguments. Despite
prolonged increases in socio-cognitive tension, in the end, the
group manages to reach an agreement. Santiago concurs with
his partners and shows a gradual increase of epistemic aims
throughout the debate. Our interpretation is that these changes
in epistemic status and epistemic aims might have happened
not despite the high tension sustained, but rather because of it.
Had the students prioritized a favorable socio-emotional climate,
particularly after a reasonable exploration of their irreconcilable
differences, the final agreement would have not presumably been
reached, implicit premises might have remained misaligned,
and Santiago’s position would have not shifted. That is what
seems to have happened at the end of the discussion about
the omnivorous diet as they give up their efforts to explore a
mutual understanding and choose to dismiss Santiago’s position.
At that point they are not fully prioritizing epistemic aims:
they choose to decrease the tension by moving forward, even
if the conflict remains unresolved. But later, when a similar
situation unfolds discussing the vegetarian diet, they instead
keep their epistemic aims until their ultimate consequences,
deeply pushing the levels of tension. They then prioritize the
epistemic dimension over the socio-relational one, and, in doing
so, they reach a mutual agreement.
The rejection of the validity of Santiago’s arguments, and
thereby the refusal to integrate them into the group consensus,
might be explained by the consideration that, in the eyes of
the other members, his discursive moves violate the norms
for reliably engaging in argumentation and decision-making.
The others explicitly point out these norms and criteria,
commending him to properly follow them. Thus, there seems to
be yet another process involved where the tuning of the enacted
epistemic processes and the ideals and conditions should be met
to reliably produce epistemic outcomes. Our findings suggest
that, when driven by epistemic aims, participants engaging
in argumentation can refine the conditions by which they
carry out this practice. They also suggest a development in
the participants’ epistemic understanding of the norms and
rules governing the argumentative discourse, in alignment
with Kuhn et al. (2013) findings. In the literature, the
beliefs about the conditions to be met to reliably perform
processes such as argumentation are considered generally tacit
(Baker, 2009;Chinn et al., 2011), but in our study, we
identified several instances of negotiation of these conditions
in contexts of increasing socio-cognitive tension, such as
requirements for argumentative coherence, beliefs about the
reliability of voting vs. consensus-seeking, or the invalidity of
disinterested concessions.
Overall, our findings highlight some of the complex
relationships that may stem from the interplay among the
participants’ aims, the socio-cognitive climate, and the epistemic
outcomes achieved. In light of our results, we argue that
particular epistemic and non-epistemic aims (and the balance
between them) that were adopted by each participant are
likely to evolve because of the socio-cognitive climate and the
influence of the group epistemic outcomes achieved, particularly
the arguments built and their persuasiveness. This, in turn,
potentially affects the epistemic processes enacted by each
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participant, which influence how the rest of the debate is
carried out, in an iterative, back-and-forth manner, in which
participants can engage in the regulation of the norms and
criteria to enact epistemic processes and further adopt epistemic
aims. In the group analyzed, this dynamic results in an
increasingly convergent trend of shared epistemic aims and
processes, which appears to be related to the convergence of the
proposed scores (i.e., epistemic statuses). Overcoming conflict
seems to encourage the adoption of epistemic aims, as illustrated
in the case of Alfonso.
The value of this case study, we believe, emanates not
only from the illustration of this complex interplay but from
the fact that, in this particular case, the students attained
sophisticated epistemic outcomes, including self-regulation,
while sustaining a high degree of socio-cognitive tension.
When faced with the challenge of balancing the epistemic
and socio-relational dimensions, they prioritize the epistemic
dimension. Our findings potentially challenge the consideration
of socio-relational concerns as rather an obstacle to knowledge
construction. In this regard, authors such as Thiebach et al.
(2016) have pointed out that socio-cognitive conflict often needs
to be further stimulated. Stewart and D’Mello (2018) have found
negative correlations between positive perceptions of groups’
agreeableness and their learning outcomes,