Content uploaded by Mehul Singh Gill
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Mehul Singh Gill on Oct 19, 2022
Content may be subject to copyright.
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
2
Introduction
he 21st century has mostly been characterised by low-intensity conflicts, with major
world powers mostly focusing on dealing with terrorist groups around the world.
However, with the reduction in power of most terrorist groups around the world (with
the notable exception of the Taliban), militaries around the world are re-orienting
themselves to focus more on conventional and large-scale operations, with the world now
heading away from the age of a unipolar world headed by the USA, and instead heading into a
multipolar world, with alliances such as NATO, AUKUS and the QUAD opposing the rise of
the Russia-China Nexus, with both countries being increasingly expansionist in the face of their
new-found power.
This, combined with the massive technological changes brought about in the 21st century,
especially in the spheres of information technology, has resulted in what is being described as
a ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, with militaries around the world engaging in ambitious
modernisation programs, while introducing the use of new technologies to the military sphere,
and combining it with new doctrines, focusing on concepts such as integration, combined arms
warfare and information warfare, in an attempt to achieve their goals in a swift manner, with
as little time and collateral damage as possible.
It is in this backdrop that China has embarked on its latest and most ambitious military reforms
in 2016, which aims, in three stages, to transform the conscript-based army resembling the
soviet army of the 1980s, and aims to transform the PLA, in the short term, into a fully
professional force capable of fighting a Modern 21st century conflict, one that would even be
capable to protect Chinese interests overseas, should the need to do so arise. The PLA aims to
first achieve by 2020 what it calls as mechanisation, where all its equipment would be
integrated into a joint communications network to make full use of informationised warfare. In
the second stage, it aims to modernise its forces and achieve integration and maturity in
conducting joint operations by the year 2035. In the long term, these reforms are supposed to
transform the PLA into a truly world-class force, capable of conducting operations almost
T
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
3
anywhere in the world, and capable of rivalling the USA, if not overtaking it, by the year 2049,
the centenary of the People’s Republic of China, and the year by which Xi Jinping aims for the
‘National Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’.
1
To that end, the Chinese have focused on a wide variety of reforms, from organisational, to
operational and doctrinal, changing training practices to fit new requirements, to the
implementation of new concepts and cutting-edge equipment developed by the Chinese
industries. The Chinese have also relied heavily on western experiences while forming their
new doctrine, and have utilised aspects of both the Western and Russian military reforms while
reforming the PLA.
This paper aims to present the changes that have taken place in the PLA, and will analyse
developments in all the arms of the PLA, the Central Military Commission, Technological
developments and fields the Chinese have tried to focus on, and the changes made to PLA
doctrine and training in order to help it better execute the objectives its political masters would
set for it.
Organisational Changes
The pre-existing command structure of the PLA had a very complex Military-Region system,
like that of the Soviet era. Here, the units would come under the command of their respective
service HQs, but would be commanded by the commanders of the military regions in wartime.
This was an unwieldy and complicated system, which necessitated a change in the entire
command structure in times of war.
2
Perhaps one of the most important changes was the abolishment of the 7 Military Regions,
which would go on to be replaced by the 5 new Theatre Commands.
3
Here, unlike the previous
military region system, the Theatre commander retained control over all his assets during both
1
McCauley, Kevin (2018), The PLA Accelerates Modernization Plans, China Brief Volume 18 Issue 1, Jamestown
Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/pla-accelerates-modernization-plans/
2
Gill, M.S (2021), Theatre Commands: Pros and Cons, Issue Brief, Centre For Security Studies, O.P Jindal Global
University. https://www.cssjsia.com/_files/ugd/348fae_78047eb2b946460894c305c6b154640f.pdf
3
Allen, Blasko & Corbett (2016), The PLA’s New Organisational Structure: What is Known, Unknown and Speculation,
China Brief, Volume 16. https://jamestown.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Updated_The_PLA_s_New_Organizational_Structure_-
_What_is_Known__Unknown_and_Speculation_Parts_1_and_2.pdf?x12383
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
4
war and peace, and had full leeway to command, train and deploy his units. The role of the
three services was restricted mostly to administration and capability development.
The reforms announced included a reduction of 300,000 troops, mostly non-combatant units
and those equipped with old weapons (although this wasn’t an actual reduction in size, these
units were mostly just turned over to the People’s Armed Police). The CCP also announced the
formation of a Joint Operations command authority under the CMC, and a reform of all military
colleges.
The Second Artillery Corps of the PLA, which was in effect totally autonomous, described as
‘an independent branch treated as a service’, was now formally upgraded as a full service with
its own insignia to become the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force. However, there was
no change in the ranks and grade of its commander as those were already on par with the other
services.
4
Another important change that took part was the Abolishment of the 4 very powerful General
departments within the PLA (General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department
(GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), and General Armament Department (GAD),
which had been plagued by corruption and extreme centralisation of power. These were instead
replaced by 15 sections, including 7 new departments, 3 commissions and 5 offices, which are
all directly subordinate to the CMC. The GSD has particularly lost out a lot, especially the EW
capabilities it had access to, which have now gone on to the new PLASSF. The GLD has also
been replaced by the CMC’s Joint Logistics Support Force.
5
There has also been talk of reform in China’s rank and grade system. In the PLA, it is not just
the rank that determines an officer’s seniority, but the grade as well. Oftentimes, the grade is
given far more importance than rank, and the grade usually corresponds to the command held
by the officer (e.g., company leader, battalion leader etc). There is also a disparity between
grades and ranks, as rank promotions happen less often than grade promotions, and there are
often multiple ranks at the same grade. In some cases, this even results in officers junior in rank
but senior in grade being senior to another officer who may be senior in rank. Similarly,
4
Ibid
5
Ibid
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
5
retirement ages in the PLA are set by grade, not by rank, along with other pay related benefits
etc.
6
Unlike western armies, the first general officer rank starts at Major General, who has one star,
then Lt Gens with Two and Full Generals with three. This sometimes leads to issues regarding
protocol, particularly on foreign exchanges and visits, along with prestige issues. There has,
therefore, been a proposal to convert the Senior Colonel rank to that of Brigadier General,
giving the rank one star, and adding another star to the other general officer ranks. However,
an analysis of recent photographs of the PLA suggest that this rank reform has not yet taken
place, and the old rank insignia is still being used.
Along with these reforms, there is also talk of reducing the influence of the grade system, and
even some suggestions of abolition of the grade system completely, and using only rank as a
measure of seniority, like in the West. However, there does not seem to be much progress on
that front, particularly as officers continue to wear their grade ribbons as part of their uniform.
PLA ARMY
Organised as a separate service with its separate headquarters post the 2015-2016 reforms, the
PLA Army is the largest of all the services in the PLA, with 975,000 active-duty members, and
is the primary ground force. The PLA Army has been tasked with transitioning from regional
defence operations to focusing on developing capabilities to fight multi-domain, trans-theatre
operations.
7
The PLA Army is divided into the 5 theatre armies, with the Xinjiang Military District and
Tibet Military district, while being part of the WTC, still maintain limited operational
autonomy due to the requirements of these ‘separatist’ regions. Consisting of 13 ‘Group
Armies’ (which can be equated to Corps level formations in the Indian Army), which consist
of roughly 78 combined-arms brigades between them. Even though China has taken heavy
inspiration from Russia while converting its regiment and divisional structure to a NATO-like
6
Allen, Kenneth (2017), China Announces Reform of Military Ranks, China Brief, Issue 17, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/china-announces-reform-military-ranks/
7
Chinese defence white paper 2019. https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/07/full-text-of-defense-white-paper-chinas-
national-defense-in-the-new-era-english-chinese-versions/
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
6
brigade structure, it still maintains some independent divisions for special cases in sensitive
areas such as Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong.
8
While the PLAA has been rapidly modernising, there is still a way to go, with the US
Department of Defense estimating that roughly 40% of the PLA’s MBT force is 20-40 years
old. The PLA has also understood the importance of Army Aviation and SOF units in modern
warfare, and aims to assign at least one brigade of each to every Group Army. The PLAA is
reported to have more than 1000 helicopters in service,
9
and aims to have even more in the
future. Here, it must be noted that the PLA’s shift from the conscripted infantry army of the
past to a modern mechanised and professional army would result in further defence spending,
something that China seems more than capable of, and willing to spend in.
The PLA Army has massively ramped up training programs, be they within the service, or joint
operations, and even including foreign exercises, most notably those with Russia. There has
been a particular focus on Amphibious operations, and High-Altitude warfare, as a focus on a
Taiwan situation or a confrontation with India.
PLA NAVY
The People’s Liberation Army Navy is now the world’s largest Navy, consisting of more than
350 vessels, including around 150 major surface combatants. Of all the services within the
PLA, the PLAN is the most modern, consisting mostly of modern weapons systems.
10
The 2015-16 reforms removed PLAN HQ from the decision-making process giving commands
to the HQs of the respective Theatre commands. The 2019 Defence white paper reflects China’s
growing confidence in its navy, where it directed the Navy to covert from area-defence to
actively becoming a Blue-Water navy, and to carry out missions in the high seas. The PLAN
has been gaining valuable experience from Anti-piracy operations, most notably off the coast
of Africa and Aden.
8
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2021.
9
Blasko, Dennis J (2017), Recent Developments in the Chinese Army’s Helicpoter Force, China Brief Volume 17,
Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/recent-developments-chinese-armys-helicopter-force/
10
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2021
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
7
The PLAN has a robust shipbuilding industry to support it, producing all sorts of ships from
Destroyers, Corvettes, Aircraft Carriers and Landing Helicopter Decks, Amphibious Assault
craft, to Anti-Submarine Warfare craft. This has resulted in force projections of up to 420 ships
by 2025 and 460 ships by 2030. Most of this increase is expected to be in major surface
combatants, along with a modernisation of its submarine force, by replacing the old Russian
Kilo class submarines it operates with newer homegrown submarine designs.
Here the PLAN’s lack of experience in maritime operations must be noted. While the PLAN
has conducted anti-piracy operations, these are nowhere near simulating actual combat against
an adversary’s navy. The PLAN is a force that has not yet matured, and is still feeling its way,
by slowly and surely improving its capabilities. The best example of this can be the PLAN’s
ZHANLAN 2020A exercise, where it has been speculated that the PLAN simulated an attack
on Hawaii, and now had capabilities to conduct offensive operations outside the first island
chain, the region it had typically focused on conducting area defence.
11
Another interesting trend to be noted is the increasingly aggressive use of the Chinese Maritime
Militia, a network of privately owned fishing vessels, which try to be seen as engaged mostly
in commercial fishing operations, thus giving the PRC plausible deniability, but in fact
cooperate closely with PLA Authorities in obstructing the activities of other countries within
China’s Nine-Dash line claim. Over the years, this militia has been involved in dangerous
manoeuvres to threaten ships, along with operations aimed at taking control of disputed islands.
PLAN- MARINE CORPS
The PLAN’s land combat arm, the Marine corps had not been focused on, with only light
capabilities, and amphibious operations were still part of the Army’s mandate, with army
amphibious units getting heavier equipment. Till the last round of reforms, the Marines
consisted only of 2 brigades.
12
However, this round of reforms saw an announcement that the
Marine corps would now be increased to 8 brigades.
13
11
Lee, Roderick (2018), The PLA Navy’s ZHANLAN Training Series: Supporting offensive strike on the High Seas,
China Brief Volume 21, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/the-pla-navys-zhanlan-training-series-
supporting-offensive-strike-on-the-high-seas/
12
Blasko, Dennis J (2010), China’s Marines: Less is More, China Brief, Volume 10, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-marines-less-is-more/
13
Blasko, Lee(2019), The Chinese Navy’s Marine Corps, Part 1: Expansion and Reorganisation, China Brief Volume 19,
Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/the-chinese-navys-marine-corps-part-1-expansion-and-
reorganization/
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
8
These reforms saw an addition of 4 more combined-arms brigades to the Marines, along with
the addition of the PLAN’s SOF brigade and an aviation Brigade. Here an interesting thing to
note is that none of the brigades transferred to the marines from the Army were amphibious
units, and the PLAA continues to operate amphibious brigades. This shows that the leadership
does not want an immediate increase in amphibious capabilities, as training these new units in
amphibious warfare and letting them mature would take time.
The pattern of Marine Corps deployments suggest that these units will not fall under the
command of the Theatres, but are in fact under the MCHQ, which seems to maintain
independent command. The PLANMC has also sent units to the Gulf of Aden to support the
PLAN’s counter-piracy operations, as well as garrisoning facilities in disputed territories in the
South China Sea.
14
The PLANMC has also conducted exercises in not only amphibious operations, but has focused
on areas such as rapid movement from different theatres, to training in different terrain types,
such as cold weather training, jungle, desert and plateau warfare and conducting operations far
from home.
15
PLANMC units also garrison the PLAN base at Djibouti. PLA statements also
point to the PLANMC intended to be unit with High-readiness ready to leave to protect Chinese
interests around the world. All these also point to the fact that the PLA intends for the
PLANMC to be an expeditionary corps, similar in tasks and capacity to the US Marine Corps.
In the case of an invasion of Taiwan, the Marine corps are intended to be the first ones ashore,
however with their light equipment, their main task would be to take the beaches and form a
bridgehead from where the heavier and more numerous Army amphibious units would take
over and break Taiwanese lines in a major offensive.
16
PLA AIR FORCE
The 1990s saw the PLAAF invest in a program to upgrade its old fighters and acquire more
modern 4th gen fighters. By 2015, more than 51 percent of the PLAAF’s fighter fleet was 4th
14
Lin, Ying Yu (2020), New Wine into New Wineskins: The Evolving Role of the PLAN MC in Amphibious Warfare
and Other Mission Areas, China Brief, Volume 20, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/new-wine-into-
new-wineskins-the-evolving-role-of-the-pla-navy-marine-corps-in-amphibious-warfare-and-other-mission-areas/
15
Blasko, Lee, The Chinese Navy’s Marine Corps, Part 2: Chain of Command Reforms and Evolving Training, China
Brief Volume 19, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/the-chinese-navys-marine-corps-part-2-chain-of-
command-reforms-and-evolving-training/
16
Ling (2020) Ibid.
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
9
gen or above, and in the last 7 years the number has only gone up, with old antiquated cold war
era designs and soviet copies being replaced by modern 4th gen fighters such as the home-
grown J-10, J11s and J-15s, Chinese copies of the Flanker series. China has also developed its
own 5th gen fighter, which is already in active service, in larger numbers than even Russia.
17
The PLAAF has also focused on building up its transport and helicopter fleet. It has achieved
great successes in its transport fleet, with the Y-20 proving to be a reliable workhorse for the
PLAAF, and increased PLAAF confidence in the aircraft resulting in it being used to ferry men
and equipment to foreign exercises as well, and to supply aid to other countries etc.
18
However, one issue the PLAAF has had to contend with is the lack of talented and well-trained
pilots. A study conducted showed that PLA pilots had issues in training, with them not being
able to react to new situations, discipline being very lax and a lack of tactical acumen. PLAAF
pilots constantly rely on ground control for orders and fail to show initiative.
19
However, to
counter this, the PLAAF has established a network of Youth Aviation schools. These youth
aviation schools are very tough to get into, only the crème de la crème get into these schools.
However, these schools have had a very good success rate, with a lot of its students being
accepted into both military and civil aviation programs, and those who did not make it into
aviation still joining other branches of the military.
20
In addition to cultivating talent from a young age, there are also attempts being made to
improve pilot training. In particular, the PLAAF has focused on training fighter pilots under
actual-combat conditions. This is done by making training scenarios as realistic as possible by
adding conditions such as night training, electromagnetic training, geographical peculiarities
and combined arms training including SAMs and AAA systems.
21
The PLAAF, thus, aims to make itself into what is defined as a strategic air force,
22
that enables
it to project power across continents, and make it an integral part of the PLA’s capabilities. The
17
Bommakanti, Shivamurthy (2021), China’s Military Modernisation: Recent Trends, Observer Research Foundation.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/chinas-military-modernisation-recent-trends-2/
18
Van Oudenaren, John S. (2022), Military Operations Other than War: Antidote to the PLA’s Peace Disease?, China
Brief, Volume 22, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/military-operations-other-than-war-antidote-to-
the-plas-peace-disease/
19
Morris, Heginbotham (2016), China’s PLAAF pilot training program undergoes major overhaul, The National Interest
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-plaaf-pilot-training-program-undergoes-major-overhaul-18205
20
Jensen, Aaron (2018), A look at the PLA’s Youth Aviation Programs, China Brief , Volume 18, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/pla-air-force-and-navy-air-force-developing-youth-aviation-programs/
21
Morris, Heginbotham (2016) Ibid.
22
Chase, Garafola (2015), China’s Search for a Strategic Air Force, China Brief, Volume 15, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-search-for-a-strategic-air-force/
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
10
PLA’s SAM systems and air defence systems are amongst the best in the world, with a
combination of both Russian-made and Chinese-made S-400s and S-300s, along with layers of
fighters and interceptors ensuring a robust air-defence system.
PLA ROCKET FORCE
Known earlier as the Second Artillery Force, an autonomous force within the Army, the PLA
Rocket Force was formally made a separate service at the end of 2015, as a part of the wide-
sweeping reforms of 2015-2016. The establishment of the PLARF has been seen as a sign of
the increasing importance of missiles, both conventional and nuclear, to China’s overall
strategy and doctrine.
23
The establishment of the PLARF can be attributed to multiple reasons, for bureaucratic reasons:
first, as the Second Artillery operated in effect as an independent service; second, to recognise
the importance of missile forces; third and most importantly, to make it better aligned to the
formation of the theatre commands, which would give operational control of assets to the
theatre commanders, and leave the service with duties such as training and force development.
While the new service has the same core mission of strategic deterrence and nuclear
counterattack, along with precision missile strikes, the elevation of the Second Artillery as a
service has made the PLARF’s role far more expansive than that of its predecessor, including
preparing for and carrying out a range of both deterrence and wartime operations, giving it
even more autonomy, but putting on it higher requirements for the construction of Chinese
missile forces and capabilities, and having to develop a full spectrum of all kinds of missile
capabilities, including new technologies, supporting Doctrine, intelligence, communications
etc.
24
However, the PLARF has had its fair share of issues. One of these is Command and Control
structures, especially when the PLARF get more and more assets, and these are further
dispersed across the countryside, creating a strain on C&C mechanisms. Furthermore, it is also
plagued by a lack of experience and real-world combat training, something that seems to plague
the other services of the PLA as well.
23
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2021.
24
Ibid.
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
11
A major issue being faced by the PLARF is a lack of a good human talent pool, especially
because the PLARF needs the highest proportion of high-quality and well-educated operators,
officers, commanders, scientists and technicians due to the extremely complex nature of the
task. Adding to the lack of talent is the extremely harsh working conditions of the PLARF,
where soldiers have to spend extended amounts of time in underground bunkers and on
extremely low rations during exercises. This has resulted in soldiers of the PLARF having the
worst mental health of all the services within the PLA.
25
PLA STRATEGIC SUPPORT FORCE
Established in late 2015 as part of the major reforms announced at the time, this young
organisation has been described as a ‘new-type combat force’, which can be seen as an attempt
to leverage new technologies and capabilities such as Space, EMS and network capabilities as
key enablers to fight joint operations across multiple domains.
Simply put, the SSF is the new information umbrella of the PLA, providing it with information
on warfare capabilities and the capability to leverage and aid in identification and growth of
new technologies. It has two main missions, wherein the first is to provide the PLA information
through various means including space and network capabilities, including navigations,
communications, intelligence, surveillance and protection of Military information. Secondly,
it is to conduct operations against the enemy, in the realms of space, EMS, cyber, psychological
ops etc., and undermine the enemy in any way.
The PLASSF, thus, becomes the inheritor of all the PLA’s information capabilities, which were
earlier split amongst the four general departments. The creation of a force dedicated to
information warfare is a clear demonstration of the importance of information warfare, and the
so called ‘strategic frontiers’ of space, EMS and cyberspace to Chinese military Strategists.
26
25
Zi Yang (2019), Assessing Mental Health Challenges in the People’s Liberation Army, Part 2: Physical Operational
Environments and Their Impacts on PLA Service Members, China Brief, Volume 19, Jamestown foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/assessing-mental-health-challenges-in-the-peoples-liberation-army-part-2-physical-
operational-environments-and-their-impacts-on-pla-service-members/
26
Ni, Gill (2019), The People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force: Update 2019, China Brief, Volume 19,
Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/the-peoples-liberation-army-strategic-support-force-update-2019/
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
12
Technological Developments
Over the years, PRC strategists have realised that the technological lead of the USA was far
ahead of the curve, and that a blind chase for technological superiority would not see them win
out against the USA. Therefore, Chinese planners aim to incubate the growth of technology
and innovation in such a way as to cut down the differences between the two, and allow the
PRC to fight an asymmetric conflict. The PRC feels that the primary way to do this is via
economic growth. After all, it is the ability to throw around money that has resulted in its
military and diplomatic strength.
One field that the PRC has particularly focused on is Military-Civil Fusion,
27
which seeks to
bind together the civilian and military sectors, by funding private companies that develop
technologies with military applications etc., which are also called as Dual Use technologies.
China has also made heavy use of its civilian companies to invest in the US economy and gain
patents and technology which could then be modified to suit military needs, most notable of
which is the PLA’s use of U.S. Satellite technology.
28
China has also spent resources on developing what it calls as ‘New-concept weapons’,
29
which
encompass technologies such as ASAT weapons, directed energy weapons such as LASER and
Microwave, new atomic weapons such as anti-matter bombs, stealth weapons, hypersonic
kinetic weapons etc. The US DoD notes that China already leads the world when it comes to
hypersonic missile technology. However, the huge costs of these NCWs means that Chinese
research in this area is extremely careful and frugal to avoid any faux-pas of the kind quite
common in the USA wasting huge sums of money.
PRC research has constantly focused on methods to improve communications. PLA strategists
place a very important role for communication and coordination in any military operation,
especially in an asymmetric conflict while facing a superior foe. Thus, they have made efforts
to improve communications by making them faster and more secure. This has led to a push in
27
Levesque, Greg (2019), Military-Civil Fusion: Beijing’s ‘Guns AND Butter’ Strategy to become a technological
superpower, China Brief, Volume 19, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/military-civil-fusion-
beijings-guns-and-butter-strategy-to-become-a-technological-superpower/
28
Haver, Zachary (2021), China’s use of U.S Satellite Communications technology in the South China Sea, China Brief,
Volume 21, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-use-of-u-s-satellite-communications-
technology-in-the-south-china-sea/
29
Clay, Marcus (2021), New Concept Weapons: China explores new mechanisms to win war, China Brief, Volume 21,
Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/new-concept-weapons-china-explores-new-mechanisms-to-win-
war/
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
13
research in quantum communications. The PRC has also announced its intention to launch its
own Satellite internet megaconstellation, similar to the Starlink network operated by SpaceX.
30
There have also been attempts to leverage blockchain to manage communication and
administrative networks.
31
AI has been an area where the PLA has spent considerable time and effort, and to great results
as well. AI and Machine learning help commanders notice patterns which they might not, and
speed up the decision-making process considerably. If AI were to get developed well enough
and were to mature, it could one day become a virtual staff officer, and free up officers for
other tasks. AI has also been considerably used in wargaming, and to give PLA commanders
tougher and more realistic battle scenarios to contend with. AI has proven to be so effective
that it beat human commanders 7 to 1 at a wargaming exercise in 2017.
32
The PLA has also started focusing on renewable energy to power its facilities in remote areas
such as the South China Sea islands and in Tibet, to ensure an adequate energy supply to these
regions, to ensure self-sufficiency in the critical energy sector and to power military equipment
in these areas. This becomes particularly important when it is noted that China relies mostly
on fossil fuels for its energy needs, the supply of which could easily be cut off in the event of
a conflict. There has also been widespread cooperation between the civilian-military complex
in the field, with a lot of major renewable energy companies getting funding from the PLA
and/or having business ties with them.
33
3D printing is a technology that the PLA has moved rapidly to make full use of, and is one of
the most critical technologies under MCF.
34
Chinese publications note that 3D printing can
revolutionise warfare by bringing in immense changes in logistics to armaments to
manufacturing and to conducting complex repairs in a short time with complex parts being
manufactured quickly in the field.
30
Waidelich, Brian (2021), A Chinese Starlink? PRC Views on building an internet satellite megaconstellation, China
Brief, Volume 21, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/a-chinese-starlink-prc-views-on-building-a-
satellite-internet-megaconstellation/
31
VornDick, Wilson (2018), Beyond Bitcoin: Could China Embrace Blockchain for Defence and Security Applications?
China Brief, Volume 18, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/beyond-bitcoin-china-embrace-
blockchain-defense-security-applications/
32
Kania, Elsa (2019), Learning without fighting: New developments in PLA Artificial Intelligence War-Gaming, China
Brief, Volume 19, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/learning-without-fighting-new-developments-
in-pla-artificial-intelligence-war-gaming/
33
VornDick, Wilson (2017), Renewable Energy and the PLA’s next generation of self-sufficiency, Parts 1 & 2, China
Brief, Volume 17, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/renewable-energy-plas-next-generation-self-
sufficiency-part-1/
34
VornDick, Wilson (2018), An instant PLA: Just add 3D printing, China Brief, Volume 18, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/an-instant-pla-just-add-3d-printing/
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
14
Nanotechnology is a field which could totally revolutionise warfare. Simply put,
nanotechnology aims to make things as small as possible. What this would result in is electronic
equipment and computers becoming smaller, and even faster, with uniforms being thinner and
stronger, with protective gear lighter and stronger and so on. China has been making major
strides in the field, and is one of the world leaders in nanotechnology.
Biotechnology is another field the PRC is working on,
35
and is an excellent example of MCF
in the PRC. China has always thought of bioweapons as a suitable weapon, something a lot of
people have realised since the COVID-19 Pandemic, which is most probably a bioweapon that
was leaked from a Chinese lab in Wuhan. Other than spreading viruses and diseases, other uses
of bio-technology could be genetic altering to create stronger and smarter humans as soldiers
etc., something that has raised serious concerns in the west.
Training and Doctrine
A critical weakness of the PLA that cannot be solved by just throwing money around is its lack
of real-world combat experience, and its lack of realistic training scenarios. PLA strategists
have realised this, and are making efforts to try and reform the training structures and regimen
for officers and men alike.
The two conflict areas that the PLAA is currently focusing on is an amphibious invasion of
Taiwan and a border war against India. Therefore, it has been training heavily on amphibious
assault tactics and mountain warfare tactics. However, the PLA as a whole is also focusing on
maturing its theatre commands by taking part in large scale joint manoeuvres using its
combined arms brigades along with air and sea power.
The PLAAF, as mentioned earlier, is now focusing on addressing multiple issues that it faces,
including lax discipline amongst its pilots, a lack of tactical acumen and a lack of realistic
training. To that end, the PLAAF has also started using EMS training, along with training
against SAM units etc.
The PLAN has carried out anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden which have helped it gain
experience operating far from home, and have given it more confidence. Furthermore, the
35
Kania, VornDick, (2019), China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Revolution
in Military Affairs, China Brief, Volume 19, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-
biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
15
PLAN’s ZHANLAN exercises have evolved in scope over the years, increasing the distance it
has travelled and the scope of its actions, evolving from A2AD to offensive action on the high
seas.
The PLA has also engaged more and more with foreign militaries, particularly the Russian and
Thai forces, in an attempt to get more foreign exposure and gain much needed expertise by
conducting exercises with them.
Of particular note is the PLA’s Stride Red-Blue exercises,
36
as is done in most western armies.
However, unlike western armies where the blue force is friendly and red the enemy, here it is
the opposite. This is an attempt to move from the PLA exercises of the past, which were
accused to being too overly scripted and unrealistic, where the focus was only on winning and
propaganda, rather than testing the operational readiness of troops.
These exercises are conducted at Zhurihe military facility at Inner Mongolia, where the PLA’s
195th Mech Inf. Brigade has been formed as a dedicated Blue-Force. The use of American
military doctrine by this unit has been noted. These exercises have had good effects, with more
and more improvisation and innovation being noted in these exercises, such as the use of
computer codes being written in the battlefield itself to counter electromagnetic interference,
or the use of fireworks to create smokescreens when their smoke grenades did not work.
There were a lot of breaks from exercises of the past. For example, units were earlier
recommended by superior commands, however at Stride they were picked at random. Over
time, red forces have gone from being assigned only offensive to being assigned defensive
roles as well. There was also heavy use of SOFs, technology, aircraft and EMS warfare.
This break from being scripted and the push towards realism has shown the true state of the
PLA, where in 2014 the red forces suffered at the hands of blue forces, where the blue forces
had a win ratio of 6:1 against red forces, and red forces suffered 70% casualties. However,
there has been limited progress, when in 201, the red forces managed to score a simulated kill
on the blue force commander, although that wasn’t enough to win the battle for the reds. One
particular interesting incident occurred, when the extremely low success rate of red Forces had
given rise to a battle cry of capturing the blue-force commander to rally the troops!
36
Logan, David C. (2017), The Evolution of the PLA’s Red-Blue Excercises, China Brief, Volume 17, Jamestown
Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/evolution-plas-red-blue-exercises/
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
16
These red-blue exercises also help other countries understand what kind of threats China
anticipates to find in the future, as can be seen in the composition of the blue-force that they
face and the tactics used the by the blue force. While there is still a long way to go for the PLA
to sufficiently adding realism to its training, the PLA seems to be on the right track. However,
just one blue force will not do, it needs more blue forces, perhaps one for every theatre
command to be better able to exercise and give its men experience on countering its adversaries.
The PLA has also noticed that its officers have mostly been in the same career streams, and
therefore, lack cross-service exposure and training, something which can prove to be very
detrimental in modern day combined arms warfare. The PLA has noticed that its academies
still teach outdated concepts and courses, with poor planning in these academies and corruption
plaguing the system.
PLA thinkers feel that the next revolution in military affairs will be centred around
intelligentised warfare, and as such they feel that there should be more focus on intelligent
technologies in the classroom.
The PLA also seeks to implement and perfect the ‘Triad’ military education reforms,
37
which
focuses on three areas: military academy education, unit training practice and military
professional education. While these areas were already taught in academies, the new reforms
aim to fuse all these systems to show the relation between them and to create synergy. This is
critically important for the PLA, which feels that it is the human factor that is the most decisive
on the battlefield, and seeks to cultivate its human talent as much as it can, especially the talent
in the field of joint warfare.
To that end, the PLA has also re-invented its Academy of Military Sciences, and the National
Defence University, two of its premier military academies, which now offer joint courses to its
officers. These academies have also started focusing on science and technology,
38
and have
been actively supporting new research and development in both military and civilian fields and
have been contributing heavily to MCF. The PLA also aims to create a virtual staff college for
its officers with MOOCs. Theatre commands have also initiated on the job training for joint
37
McCauley, Kevin (2019), ‘Triad’ Military Education and Training Reforms: The PLA’s cultivation of talent for
integrated joint operations, China Brief, Volume 19, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/triad-military-
education-and-training-reforms-the-plas-cultivation-of-talent-for-integrated-joint-operations/
38
Kania, Elsa (2018), Incubating Innovation? New directions for the PLA Academy of Military Science, Battlefield
Singularity https://www.battlefieldsingularity.com/post/incubating-innovation-new-directions-for-the-pla-academy-of-
military-science
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
17
officers. There is also a focus on developing what the Chinese have described as a ‘systems of
systems’ operations capability, putting network centric joint-warfare at the forefront.
39
While
these reforms seem to be successful on the face of it, the fact remains that all other educational
reforms in the last two decades failed, and only time will tell if these reforms have been
successful or not.
Conclusion & Implications for India
The major organisational changes and force restructuring announced in 2015-16 is, at least on
paper, complete. However, a lot of these newly created formations, be they land or air
formations, either lack equipment, or field old equipment. Large amounts of modern equipment
still need to be fielded to bring them up to strength.
The PLA has made substantial progress towards the reforms, with the PRC Defence ministry
announcing in November 2020 that the PLA had basically achieved mechanisation. Here
mechanisation means that equipment would be able to be integrated into modern
communications networks, and make full use of modern informationised and intelligentised
warfare. However, according to the US DoD, separate statements indicating that the final stages
of PLA mechanisation would occur in either 2021 or 2022 make it appear that the PLA has not
been able to meet its 2020 deadline to mechanise its forces. However, the reference to either
2021 or 2022 means that the PRC is just a year or two behind its timeline, and is more or less
on track in its long-term modernisation goals.
40
The PLA has also moved far ahead of other countries in the technological sphere, and is on the
cutting edge of scientific innovations and breakthroughs, being competitive to the US and even
surpassing it in some fields. The PLASSF has been particularly instrumental in incubating
innovation and research in related fields, and PRC’s development strategies such as MCF
appear to be paying off.
39
Wuthnow, Joel (2019), China’s “New” Academy of Military Science: A revolution in theoretical affairs? China Brief,
Volume 19, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-new-academy-of-military-science-a-revolution-
in-theoretical-affairs/
40
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2021.
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
18
The PLA must be credited for recognising its weaknesses, and working to improve upon them.
The PLA has had a focus on professionalising its armed forces, and has sought to include
realism as much as it can, though it still has a long way to go. This issue can only be solved
with time and effort, but the PLA does seem to be on the right track in doing so. However, the
PLA must get rid of conscription if it has to further professionalise its resources, as it relies
upon almost 200,000 conscripts every year, who only serve for 2 years, and therefore, also cost
a lot to the government for relatively less gains.
The PLA has also worked hard to develop new theories and doctrine and are determined to be
one of the first countries to initiate the new revolution in military affairs, instead of just being
a follower into the reforms. The PLA is making substantial progress, and at this time looks
poised to meet its 2035 deadline of fully modernising its armed forces and maturing its joint
networks.
For India, this situation is utterly critical. India has been lagging far far behind in its own
military reforms, facing constant issues from slow beauracracy, politicians and the old school
nature of the armed forces, who have refused to evolve and adapt to the changing times. The
signs are simple, India must act, and act fast, devoting more resources to its armed forces, and
pushing through the long-stalled reforms it so badly needs. India has also had constant issues
with integration and joint warfare, despite trying to set up tri-services commands, and there is
still bitter rivalry amongst the three services.
India would do good to follow the Chinese lead in organising and modernising both its
economy and therefore, its armed forces. The use of dual-use technologies and MCF can prove
to be extremely helpful, as was seen during the COVID-19 crisis where the oxygen systems
developed for the Indian Tejas LCA was used in making cheap oxygen systems for the public.
Similarly, Indian planners must study Chinese experiences in military reforms to help them
better cope with issues while reforming their own armed forces. India must also strengthen its
alliances, particularly with the West. While India has still been wary of getting very close to
the west because of Russia, India cannot continue doing so, and must come to terms with the
fact that sooner or later, it will have to cosy up to the west, and that Russia may have been a
great alky in the past, but it does not and will not serve any purpose in the future.
Simply put, India is a whole generation behind the Chinese PLA, and if the Indian Govt. and
the Armed Forces do not get their act together, then a modernised PLA by the late 2030s would
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
19
easily smash through Indian forces if a war were to occur. While India has used the bravery of
its troops as a talking point, bravery did not win India the 1962 war, and in the 21st century,
where warfare is mostly non-contact, in the electromagnetic sphere, or at the touch of a button,
the bravery of the soldier will mean nothing against 21st century technology if the Indian
soldier is not well equipped or if the Indian commander does not know how to fight a modern
war.
*****
Mehul Singh Gill is an undergraduate student at the Jindal School of International Affairs and is
Research Assistant at the Centre for Security Studies, JSIA. All views expressed in this publication
belong to the author and do not reflect the opinions or positions of the Centre for Security Studies.
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
20
APPENDIX 1
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
21
APPENDIX 2
PLA OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND
Source: Jamestown Foundation
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
22
APPENDIX 4
PLASSF ORGANISATION
Source: Jamestown Foundation
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
23
ABBREVIATIONS
A2AD- Anti-Access/ Area Denial
AAA- Anti Aircraft Artillery
AI- Artificial Intelligence
C4ISR- Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance
CCP- Chinese Communist Party
CMC- Central Military Commission
DoD- Department of Defense (US)
EMS- Electromagnetic Spectrum
EW- Electronic Warfare
GAD- General Armament Department
GLD- General Logistics Department
GPD- General Political Department
GSD- General Staff Department
LCA- Light Combat Aircraft
MBT- Main Battle Tank
MR- Military Region
PRC- People’s Republic of China
PLA- People’s Liberation Army
PLAA- People’s Liberation Army Army
PLAAF- People’s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN- People’s Liberation Army Navy
PLAN-MC- People’s Liberation Army Navy- Marine Corps
PLARF- People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force
PLASSF- People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force
RMA- Revolution in Military Affairs
SAM- Surface to Air Missile
TC- Theatre Command
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
24
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chase, Garafola (2018), China’s Search for a “Strategic Air Force”, China Brief, Volume 15,
Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-search-for-a-strategic-air-force/
Blasko, Dennis J (2010), China’s Marines: Less is More, China Brief, Volume 10, Jamestown
Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-marines-less-is-more/
Blasko, Dennis J (2013), The “Two Incompatibles” and PLA Self-Assessments of Military
Capability, China Brief, Volume 13, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/the-two-incompatibles-and-pla-self-assessments-of-military-
capability/
Solen, Derek (2021), The PLA Air Force’s Efforts Toward Agile Combat Employment, China
Brief, Volume 21, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/the-pla-air-forces-
efforts-toward-agile-combat-employment/
Barker, Alex (2021), Giving Precision Munitions ‘Eyes’ and a ‘Brain’: The State of PLA
Research on Military Target Recognition, China Brief, Volume 21, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/giving-precision-munitions-eyes-and-a-brain-the-state-of-pla-
research-on-military-target-recognition/
Wuthnow, Joel (2021), What I Learned From the PLA’s Latest Strategy Textbook, China Brief,
Volume 21, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/what-i-learned-from-the-
plas-latest-strategy-textbook/
Tirk, Green (2021), Sustaining China’s Sovereignty Claims: The PLA’s Embrace of
Unmanned Logistics, China Brief, Volume 21, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/sustaining-chinas-sovereignty-claims-the-plas-embrace-of-
unmanned-logistics/
Kania, Elsa (2016), The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares, China Brief,
Volume 16, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/the-plas-latest-strategic-
thinking-on-the-three-warfares/
Hart, Glaser, Funaiole (2021), China’s 2027 Goal Marks the PLA’s Centennial, Not an
Expedited Military Modernization, Volume 21, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-2027-goal-marks-the-plas-centennial-not-an-
expedited-military-modernization/
Lowsen, Ben (2021), China’s Updated National Defense Law: Going for Broke, Volume 21,
Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-updated-national-defense-law-
going-for-broke/
McCauley, Kevin (2020), People’s Liberation Army: Army Campaign Doctrine in Transition,
Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S Army https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-
g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/351019#
Clay, Marcus (2020), The PLA’s Pursuit of Terahertz: Facts and Fallacies, China Brief,
Volume 20, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/pla-pursuit-terahertz-facts-
and-fallacies/
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
25
Beauchamp-Mustafaga (2019), Cognitive Domain Operations: The PLA’s New Holistic
Concept for Influence Operations, China Brief, Volume 19, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/cognitive-domain-operations-the-plas-new-holistic-concept-
for-influence-operations/
Yang, Zi (2019), Assessing Mental Health Challenges in the People’s Liberation Army, Part
1, China Brief, Volume 19, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/assessing-
mental-health-challenges-in-the-peoples-liberation-army-part-1-psychological-factors-
affecting-service-members-and-the-leadership-response/
Yang, Zi (2019), Assessing Mental Health Challenges in the People’s Liberation Army, Part
2, China Brief, Volume 19, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/assessing-
mental-health-challenges-in-the-peoples-liberation-army-part-2-physical-operational-
environments-and-their-impacts-on-pla-service-members/
Kania, Wood (2019), Major Themes in China’s 2019 National Defense White Paper, China
Brief, Volume 19, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/major-themes-in-
chinas-2019-national-defense-white-paper/
Kennedy, Conor (2019), Strategic Strong Points and Chinese Naval Strategy, China Brief,
Volume 19, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/strategic-strong-points-
and-chinese-naval-strategy/
McCauley, Kevin (2017), PLA System of Systems Operations: Enabling Joint Operations,
Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/System-of-
Systems-Enabling-Joint-Operations.pdf?x15224
Eastwood, Brent M (2019), A Smarter Battlefield?: PLA Concepts for “Intelligent Operations”
Begin to Take Shape, China Brief, Volume 19, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/a-smarter-battlefield-pla-concepts-for-intelligent-operations-
begin-to-take-shape/
Ynag, Zi (2018), Blinding the Enemy: How the PRC Prepares for Radar Countermeasures,
China Brief, Volume 18, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/blinding-the-
enemy-how-the-prc-prepares-for-radar-countermeasures/
Chase, Michael S (2018), Chinese Views on the 2108 Nuclear Posture Review, and their
Implications, China Brief, Volume 18, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/chinese-views-on-2018-npr/
Li, Nan (2018), Party Congress Reshuffle Strengthens Xi’s Hold on Central Military
Commission, China Brief, Volume 18, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/party-congress-reshuffle-strengthens-xis-hold-central-
military-commission/
McCauley, Kevin (2018), Amphibious Operations: Lessons of Past Campaigns for Today’s
PLA, China Brief, Volume 18, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/amphibious-operations-lessons-past-campaigns-todays-pla/
Li, Nan (2018), China’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy: Will China Drop “No First Use”? China
Brief, Volume 18, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-evolving-
nuclear-strategy-will-china-drop-no-first-use/
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
26
McCauley, Kevin (2018), The PLA Accelerates Modernization Plans, China Brief, Volume 18,
Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/pla-accelerates-modernization-plans/
The Takshashila PLA Insight, Takshashila Institute https://us20.campaign-
archive.com/home/?u=258ac083050b43234ceebe676&id=b93ef2a589
Grossman, Chase (2017), Xi’s Consolidation of Power at the 19th Party Congress: Implications
for PLA Aerospace Forces, China Brief, Volume 17, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/xis-consolidation-power-19th-party-congress-implications-
pla-aerospace-forces/
Blasko, Kania & Armitage (2017), The PLA at 90: On the Road to Becoming a World-Class
Military? China Brief, Volume 17, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/the-
pla-at-90-on-the-road-to-becoming-a-world-class-military/
Shinn, David (2017), China’s Power Projection in the Western Indian Ocean, China Brief,
Volume 17, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-power-projection-
western-indian-ocean/
Wood, Peter (2017), 20,000 Li Over the Sea: China Sends Troops to First Permanent Base in
Djibouti, China Brief, Volume 17, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/20000-li-over-the-sea-chinas-sends-troops-to-first-permanent-
base-in-djibouti/
VornDick, Wilson (2017), Renewable Energy and the PLA’s Next Generation of Self-
Sufficiency, Part 1, China Brief, Volume 17, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/renewable-energy-plas-next-generation-self-sufficiency-part-
1/
VornDick, Wilson (2017), Renewable Energy and the PLA’s Next Generation of Self-
Sufficiency, Part 2, China Brief, Volume 17, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/renewable-energy-plas-next-generation-self-sufficiency-part-
2/
Logan, David C (2017), The Evolution of the PLA’s Red-Blue Exercises, China Brief, Volume
17, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/evolution-plas-red-blue-exercises/
Allen, Kenneth (2017), China Announces Reform of Military Ranks, China Brief, Volume 17,
Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/china-announces-reform-military-
ranks/
Sautin, Yevgen (2016), The Influence of Russian Military Reform on PLA Reorganisation,
China Brief, Volume 16, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/the-influence-
of-russian-military-reform-on-pla-reorganization/
McCauley, Kevin (2017), Snapshot: China’s Western Theatre Command, China Brief, Volume
17, Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/snapshot-chinas-western-theater-
command/
Van Oudenaren, John S (2022), Military Operations Other than War: Antidote to the PLA’s
“Peace Disease”? https://jamestown.org/program/military-operations-other-than-war-
antidote-to-the-plas-peace-disease/
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES March 2022
27
Allen, Blasko & Corbett (20160, The PLA’s New Organisational Structure: What is Known,
Unknown and Speculation, Parts 1 and 2, China Brief, Volume 16, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/The_PLA_s_New_Organizational_Structure_Parts_1_and_2_01.pdf
?x12383
Blasko, Dennis J (2017), What is Known and Unkown about Changes to the PLA’s Ground
Combat Units, China Brief, Volume 17, Jamestown Foundation
https://jamestown.org/program/known-unknown-changes-plas-ground-combat-units/
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021
China National Defence White Paper 2019
China National Defence White Paper, China’s Military Strategy 2015
Science of Military Strategy 2015, National Defense University, Beijing.
Poling, Mallory & Pretat (2021), Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia, Centre
for Advanced Defence Studies (C4ADS), Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/211118_Poling_Maritime_Militia.pdf?Y5iaJ4NT8eITSlAKTr.TWxtDHuL
Iq7wR