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International Journal of Social Sciences and Management Review
Volume: 05, Issue: 05 “September - October 2022”
ISSN 2582-0176
www.ijssmr.org Copyright © IJSSMR 2022, All right reserved Page 88
SECURITY FROM THE FIRST PHASES OF 5IRECHAIN LIFE CYCLE
1Md AHBAB, 2VILMA MATTILA & 3JATINDER ARORA
15irechain, Dubai Silicon Oasis, United Arab Emirates
25irechain, Dubai Silicon Oasis, United Arab Emirates
3Narre Warren South State VIC 3805, Australia
https://doi.org/10.37602/IJSSMR.2022.5507
ABSTRACT
The security of blockchain technology is more than ever in the point of view. Attacks on
DLTs (Distributed Ledger Technology), including blockchain, which highlight the need to
reinforce their security. The use of security reference architectures (SRA) has proven useful
in addressing safety in the early phases of development facilitating the definition of security
requirements and helping to implement security policies that allow us to protect a system
throughout the life cycle. This article presents an SRA for the technology Blockchain defined
through models and checking its application through an example of use.
Keywords: Blockchain, 5ire, SRA, reference architecture
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Since the appearance of Bitcoin in 2008, blockchain technology has not stopped add
followers. Proof of this interest is the growing investment being made on blockchain in both
industry and academia. This growing investment can be seen reflected in the
MarketsandMarkets study, in which it is estimated that the use of blockchain will go from
258 million dollars in 2020 to 2,409 million dollars in 2026, with an average annual growth
rate of 45.1%. In addition, the results of the 2020 global annual survey on blockchain
conducted by Deloitte revealed that 53% of organizations consider blockchain to be one of its
five strategic priorities. Even though blockchain technology is presented as a ledger
technology of tamper-proof transactions, it is a reality that blockchain networks they are not
immune to cyberattacks and fraud. In fact, it is estimated that during the first quarter of 2019
saw the loss of more than 356 million dollars in blockchain networks due to security- related
issues. Some concrete examples of these actions are the loss of 13 million dollars of EOS and
6 million of dollars in Ripple only during the month of March 2019. Also, a new report from
cryptocurrency forensics and blockchain threat intelligence firm Ciphertrace shows that $100
million has been stolen from distributed networks only in 2020, which reinforces the
importance of security being present in any blockchain solution. There are many variables to
consider when designing a security solution. In general, security threats fall into three main
categories: Endpoint vulnerabilities, untested code, and risk in your own ecosystem or third
parties. First of all, endpoint vulnerabilities are presented as the most direct and potentially
easier to attack over any technological solution such as digital wallets, devices, or
applications. If one of these points is compromised and a malicious actor gains access to an
account, unless additional security protections are put in place, it is possible that a fraudulent
action without producing any external alarm or behavioral abnormal signal. Second, the
International Journal of Social Sciences and Management Review
Volume: 05, Issue: 05 “September - October 2022”
ISSN 2582-0176
www.ijssmr.org Copyright © IJSSMR 2022, All right reserved Page 89
untested code is a reflection of how as new technologies enter the market, developers are
incentivized to be the first to submit a solution, often at the risk of deploying code
insufficiently tested on active blockchains. A well-known example is an attack on the
decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) of the Ethereum network in 2016, where code
and smart contracts were developed in which vulnerabilities existed in the code. This led to
the exploitation of a vulnerability that had the ability to manipulate smart contracts to extract
money due to a mistake in a recursive call with which it was possible to divert nearly 60
million dollars. As the last threat, it highlights the risk inherent in the ecosystem of
applications that use blockchain which may include association with vendors or third parties.
Poor ecosystem security or flawed code can expose user credentials and blockchain data to
unauthorized persons. To deal with security threats, security must be addressed from of high-
level policies that can be transferred to lower levels. The Architectures Reference Models
(RA) provides an abstract model that supports one or more domains and has no
implementation features thus allowing them to be reusable, scalable, and configurable.
Incorporating a set of elements that facilitate the definition of security requirements and
allow a better understanding of security, policies, threats, and vulnerabilities, we get a
Security Reference Architecture (SRA), that is, the architecture of a high level that can be
used to describe a conceptual security model of a system. In this work we have defined an
SRA for blockchain, based on the different proposals from the scientific community, the
different proposals from the industry, and the usual implementation of multiple blockchain
systems abstracting their components and based on the main attacks that make a blockchain
system vulnerable to identify the elements of the architecture that are most vulnerable and on
which the implementation of a security solution should be focused. Our study presents an
architecture that serves as a basis for the development of a blockchain system, whether for
academic purposes or in industry, considering the security from system design integrated into
the technology stack blockchain to prevent it from being considered only at launch, or as
something that surrounds an application once it has been developed. We organize the content
of the manuscript as follows: first, existing related works are presented; Second, we present
our SRA proposal for blockchain which we will use in 5irechain; Third, we compare our
architecture with a real case study showing how the different components can be instantiated
that are involved in their approach. Finally, we include a section in which conclusions and
future work are discussed.
2.0 RELATED WORKS
The standardization of blockchain technology is an important step toward a concept common,
interoperability, scaling, auditing, and possible subsequent regulation of technology.
Although there are several initiatives to define norms and standards for the development and
maintenance of the blockchain, they are in a very preliminary phase, this being an obstacle to
the settlement of the technology. There are multiple initiatives of organizations that are
working on documents of standardization. NIST (National Institute of Standards and
Technology which is a physical sciences laboratory and a non-regulatory agency of the
United States Department of Commerce) published in 2018 NISTIR 8202 - Blockchain
Technology Overview. The document addresses the functionalities and fundamental
components of a system blockchain as well as cybersecurity concerns and the general
applicability of blockchain in organizations. The purpose of this document is solely to serve
as an entry point to blockchain technology, as it explains the structure and models, consensus
International Journal of Social Sciences and Management Review
Volume: 05, Issue: 05 “September - October 2022”
ISSN 2582-0176
www.ijssmr.org Copyright © IJSSMR 2022, All right reserved Page 90
mechanisms, and known examples of it, as well as a series of questions and considerations
specific to the blockchain without going into depth in the technical elements. ANSI SCX9
(American National Standards Institute is a private non-profit organization that oversees the
development of voluntary consensus standards) also published in 2018 the report of its study
group on DLT and blockchain. In this study, they worked together with experts from various
fields and evaluated what types of standardization efforts would be both necessary and
beneficial especially for the financial sector, but also for other industries, as well as to
increase the adoption of DLT. The biggest part of the document focuses on blockchain
security needs and issues which he deals with mainly by focusing on the financial field. To
facilitate understanding of the key components of blockchain systems, the high-level
reference architecture is included in the appendix to provide an overview of the operation of a
DLT system. The UNE 71307-1 standard defines a generic reference framework for the
management of identities of individuals or organizations, allowing control of your own
digital identity in a self-managed way in a blockchain system. ISO/TR 23455:2019 offers an
extensive discussion of smart contracts within a blockchain system/DTL and its operation. It
is also possible to appreciate the interest in addressing security by design, the standard DIN
SPEC 4997 Privacy by Blockchain Design describes a standardized model for the processing
of personal data through blockchain taking into account the Regulation General Data
Protection (GDPR) of the EU. The document presents an overview of the risks and
mitigations of data protection principles with a clear focus on privacy by design, as well as a
privacy architecture project by the design of blockchain. Homoliak proposes a specific
version-based architecture for the blockchain of the ISO/IEC 15408 threat risk assessment
standard by adaptation of a customized version of the presented four-layer stacked model in
the work of Wang et al. This proposal differs from this work, which focuses solely on risk
without considering business objectives or orchestration of security policies. Despite the
growing interest in the standardization of blockchain systems, it is not Studies have been
carried out that have defined security architectures in which address the implementation of its
different components. In this article, we studied an SRA sketch for 5irechain where the
components of the blockchain are specified technology as well as the relationships between
the different components and subcomponents. Different security concepts are also integrated
to ensure the protection of these types of systems.
3.0 SECURITY REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE FOR BLOCKCHAIN
In this work we have analyzed the functionalities and fundamental components of a
blockchain system that have been proposed by NIST (National Institute of Standards and
Technology), as well as the concerns of cybersecurity and the general applicability of
blockchain. Also they have been considered the main implementations of blockchain in the
market focusing on in Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Hyperledger for being the most consolidated
technologies today and its main components have been abstracted to create our architecture.
We have defined our SRA through UML diagrams as we found a lack of proposals that
precisely define the relationships between the different components and subcomponents.
Likewise, it is a language widely accepted that facilitates the understanding of the
relationships between the different components. A layered model has been used since it offers
us simplicity in the implementation and maintenance, flexibility and scalability.
International Journal of Social Sciences and Management Review
Volume: 05, Issue: 05 “September - October 2022”
ISSN 2582-0176
www.ijssmr.org Copyright © IJSSMR 2022, All right reserved Page 91
The architecture is divided into six different components that interact with each other with
different objectives: business layer, orchestration layer, application layer, service layer,
platform layer, and network layer.
3.1. Business layer
The purpose of the business layer is to define the business rules that collect the functionalities
that the blockchain network must offer. Due to the characteristics of this layer, related
security activities are generally focused on defining of security policies from the
orchestration layer, described in the next section, and how to implement and monitor them.
The blockchain system must satisfy the objective for which it has been created by fulfilling
with the objectives while staying aligned with the different objectives business and company
policies. In this sense, the role of the manager security is crucial to ensure compliance with
security requirements. These safety requirements must comply with the regulations that affect
each context of the ecosystem and will be defined in the next layer.
3.2. Orchestration layer
The orchestration layer aims to address the different requirements that must be fulfilling the
blockchain ecosystem. According to Biktimirov, technology requirements blockchain can be
divided into the following groups:
—
Structural requirements on the availability of certain types of data in blockchain links
to ensure the technology works.
—
Business requirements related to enforced policies, such as standards of international
cryptography, as well as national or institutional standards in the areas of application:
taxation, voting technologies, the workflow of internal documents, etc. These
requirements must be aligned with the objectives of the business process to fulfill the
function for which they have been defined.
—
Technological requirements on the reliability of block storage, using the technology
proposed by Zitsev to maintain the parameters of reliability and availability of link
storage.
—
Reliability requirements with a clear blockchain structure, technologies regulated link
processing and an interface for link operations. All applied interfaces must be
available with source code to ensure a high level of trust.
Security requirements can be satisfied by different security solutions that follow the
company's security policies and aim to address threats to control vulnerabilities. The
definition of these security solutions can be guided by the use of security patterns, which can
be defined as a solution to recurring problems that indicate how to defend against a threat, or
a set of threats, concisely and reusable.
3.3. Application Layer
The application layer contains solutions for the end user and applications that are built on the
blockchain network; therefore, security threats are specific for each application. This layer
may exist totally or partially outside the network [19]. One of the core elements of the
application layer are Applications. Decentralized or DApps. These are software applications
International Journal of Social Sciences and Management Review
Volume: 05, Issue: 05 “September - October 2022”
ISSN 2582-0176
www.ijssmr.org Copyright © IJSSMR 2022, All right reserved Page 92
that run on a network. A decentralized peer-to-peer network is usually a blockchain network.
DApps usually include a user interface running on another system (centralized or
decentralized). DApps also include blockchain explorers, monitoring tools, and other
business intelligence tools. Browsers implemented on a blockchain network are the most
common way of retrieving information, the trusted parties usually being centralized. In the
case of monitoring tools, they facilitate the management of multiple networks, the
identification of problems and the general maintenance of the health of the network of the
block chain. Business intelligence tools also provide a platform for tracking records held in
your database encrypted ledger-based.
Since developers are allowed to develop their own DApps with contracts custom smart apps
are highly vulnerable to attack. In some cases, it is common for an attack to occur in the
information transfer phase of the node. Apply a specific security solution based on how the
application works will reduce their impact.
3.4. Service layer
The service layer makes it possible to make the blockchain more accessible, in particular for
businesses, reducing the costs and overhead of technology adoption. The precise nature of a
SaaS (Software as a Service) implementation will depend on the service provider, application
specifications and objectives of the client. This layer integrates asset managers, blockchain
events. Asset management aims to ensure the management of the assets of the platform layer,
with assets stored on the blockchain being the reason principal of the chain's existence. The
digital asset can be monetary units or of another type, on which an organization wants to
interact. Asset management can be integrated with business management systems through
external interfaces using APIs, libraries and common techniques. A connection directly with
the blockchain core allows the correct functioning of these tools. In addition to deployment
and configuration capabilities, it is important that there are possibilities to manage events
such as failure notification of software, performance management, security management,
integration with other business software and historical analysis tools. These events can be
generated through these common APIs, libraries and techniques.
In the case of blockchain, the use of offchains and oracles stands out for the management of
events. Offchain transactions, which occur outside the chain, are won popularity due to its
zero/low cost. Off-chain transactions offer many advantages: they can be executed instantly,
they do not usually have a commission per transaction, since nothing happens within the
blockchain, and they offer more security and anonymity to the participants, since the details
are not transmitted publicly, which makes it impossible to partially ascertain the identity of a
participant by studying the transaction patterns. Oracles offer an external service to the chain
that is called to provide information from an external source, for example, a rate of change or
the result of a mathematical calculation. Oracles are a safe bridge between smart contracts
and real-world information sources.
Identity management is essential for the management of cryptographic private keys that are
associated with a user's account. Blockchain clients often choose to offer local management
of user credentials, such as system and wallet keys. These facilities can also be applied
outside the scope of a client.
International Journal of Social Sciences and Management Review
Volume: 05, Issue: 05 “September - October 2022”
ISSN 2582-0176
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The security solution in this layer acquires relevance as it is composed of sensitive items.
Policies should be implemented to prevent improper exploitation protecting that all
transactions are legitimate and that asset management and identities is not exploited by
adulterating assets.
3.5. Platform Layer
It is the core of the architecture and is responsible for the execution of the network logic; it
contains the necessary elements for the publication of each block. In function of the
implementation of this component, there is the possibility of creating and managing third-
party part of cloud-based networks for construction companies of blockchain. The platform
layer security solution aims to mitigate the damage that can be caused to a blockchain
network by exploiting vulnerabilities identified, and protecting the digital assets contained in
the chain. All the infrastructure of the blockchain platform can be understood as a
Blockchain-as-a-Service (BaaS) that allows the creation and management by third parties of
networks cloud-based for companies dedicated to building blockchain applications.
This is beginning to be a growing trend and is one of the main reasons to separate the
platform layer from the service layer. The underlying idea is to get a function similar to that
of a web host. That is, run the operation from the backend of an application.
Blockchain technology works in such a way that each block stores a number of valid
registrations or transactions, information related to that block its link with the previous and
next block through the hash of each block. Each block is linked to the previous block by
means of a cryptographic hash. All transactions must be encrypted with public-key
infrastructure (PKI) to prevent it from being compromised by unwanted parties. The multi-
signature function will be available for sensitive transactions on the blockchain. The blocks
also contain information regarding the smart contracts in which the clauses are collected and
information about any physical contract in the form of a code and that must be fulfilled to
publish a new block.
3.6. Network layer
The network layer is the foundation on which blockchain technology is built. Basically,
blockchain networks are networks that overlay other networks; therefore they inherit the
security and privacy issues of the underlying networks. The network layer is therefore, one of
the bases on which this architecture is based, being crucial to have with security solutions that
can cover network problems. The main services provided by the network layer in blockchain
technology are peer-to-peer management and discovery, which are based on the operation of
the underlying network, such as domain name resolution (DNS) or network routing (for
example, LAN routing for IP, routing WAN as BGP). Network layer security issues are one
of the research topics most popular in the field of blockchain security. Between the different
attacks, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Likewise, the attacks eclipses are also
very popular. These attacks disable the connection of a network node with the rest of the
nodes that are used by the attacker.
4.0 APPLICATION OF THE SRA
International Journal of Social Sciences and Management Review
Volume: 05, Issue: 05 “September - October 2022”
ISSN 2582-0176
www.ijssmr.org Copyright © IJSSMR 2022, All right reserved Page 94
A real case has been used to analyze the applicability of the proposed architecture. We have
used the case proposed by Sladic et al. where they present the implementation of a notary on
the blockchain network that supports the transactions carried out in the Serbian cadastre. The
system stores the legal link between the properties and their owners, as well as the cadastral
map containing the geometric data and the topographic attributes of the soil. Figure below
details the correlation of the case of study with the proposed architecture. For a better
understanding of the proposed case, the elements that correlate with our architecture have
been highlighted, leaving in gray those that are not used in the proposal. In the business layer,
it is proposed to use a hybrid block chain that allows consultation of the cadastre by the
population, but that guarantees that the property registries are always carried out by a notary.
In this case, the business layer fully maps with the architecture proposed in this study.
Figure: Architecture of the case proposed by Sladic et al.
Through the orchestration layer, we ensure compliance with one of the main system security
requirements that all users are able to consult the data of the cadastre, but they can only be
modified by the figure of a notary. To this end, it is proposed that users can only access using
International Journal of Social Sciences and Management Review
Volume: 05, Issue: 05 “September - October 2022”
ISSN 2582-0176
www.ijssmr.org Copyright © IJSSMR 2022, All right reserved Page 95
their digital certificates, digital documents that link the key public of the user with the
identity of this, and the certification authority that verified the content of the certificate. The
use of digital certificates allows for controlling the risks of unwanted access is a widely used
identification security pattern extended. On the other hand, the requirements of the chain
must comply with the regulation that exists. In this sense, it must be governed by the
Electronic Document Law, electronic identification, and trust services in electronic
commerce.
Likewise, in the application layer, the cadastre information remains accessible for all users
through a DApp consisting of a web front end that allows access to data stored on the chain.
The DApp frontend uses a standard web for frontend development, i.e. HTML, CSS, and
JavaScript to render a page and retrieve details directly from the backend. On the other hand,
a second DApp is presented that allows notaries to store the keys hashes of documents during
rights transfer activities. Despite that security measures are not specified for both DApps,
they must be considered taking into account the technology used. The service layer is aimed
at making the blockchain more accessible than it differs with the objective of the proposed
architecture. The incorporation of elements of this layer will depend on whether it is intended
to carry out an implementation-oriented to obtain multi- user shared services that save social
resources and achieve a larger scale. The identity management component offers the
possibility to centralize identity management since it is not expected that just anyone can
generate transactions, but only a selected group of users. The identity manager contains the
information related to the user since in the access controls they include the verification that
the user can make changes.
The platform of the proposed system comprises alphanumeric data on rights of property, the
holders of the rights and the attributes of the properties, like the surface; and geospatial data
(cadastral map) as a result of the activities topographical. These data comprise our assets and
may be subject to a transaction on the blockchain. The transaction constitutes an input of data
that is stored in a block, belonging to the distributed ledger, and containing the transaction
information, i.e. user ID, unique ID of a property, change number, type of change, and
description of the change.
In addition, the transaction is completed with transaction details about the change that has
occurred (change number, type of change, description, date, etc). The result of the execution
is also stored in the block when performing a transaction. Finally, the chain of blocks
contains the information of the users who have made the transaction. Users have two keys: a
private key that only the user knows and a public key shared with the entire network. The
user who made the change digitally signs the transaction with your private key. Once created,
the transaction is inserted into a newly created block and after being verified by the network,
the block is added to the chain. The architecture of this case study makes use of the P2P
network to support the rest of the layers of architecture. At this point, there is no difference
between the components of architecture and our MRS. As mentioned above, an SRA aims to
offer architecture with a high level of abstraction that allows covering any implementation
scenario in a blockchain system, applying the implementation of some or other components
depending on the need of the blockchain chain itself. If we look at the ingredients proposed
by Sladic it can therefore be concluded that the case is aligned with the SRA proposed in this
document, allowing us to validate the applicability of the proposal.
International Journal of Social Sciences and Management Review
Volume: 05, Issue: 05 “September - October 2022”
ISSN 2582-0176
www.ijssmr.org Copyright © IJSSMR 2022, All right reserved Page 96
5.0 CONCLUSION
In this work, an SRA has been presented that serves as a basis for the development of
blockchain systems and integration security from the first phases of the life cycle of this
technology. We have defined our SRA through UML diagrams, a widely accepted language
that facilitates the understanding of the relationships between the different components. In
addition, the use of UML has allowed us to precisely define the relationships between the
different components and subcomponents. In this article, we studied an SRA sketch for
5irechain where the components of the blockchain are specified technology as well as the
relationships between the different components and subcomponents. Finally, the applicability
of our outline has been shown through the realization of a real example demonstrating how to
fit effectively and incorporate all the necessary elements for the implementation of the
system. In future work intends to carry out a complete case study that allows us to validate
and refine our proposal.
5.1 Acknowledgment
The authors would like to acknowledge a research grant from “Innovation and Research of
5irechain”
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