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8 Myanmar: Hybrid presidentialism and democratic
breakdown
Marco Bünte
Orcid-No.: 0000-0002-4182-3332
Accepted for publication in:
Marco Bünte and Mark R. Thompson: Presidentialism and Democracy in East and Southeast
Asia, Routledge 2023.
Summary
This chapter discusses the institutional foundations of democratic erosion and breakdown in
Myanmar. The military coup of February 2021 ended a decade of power-sharing between the
military and the National League for Democracy (NLD). This chapter argues that Myanmar´s
special form of hybrid presidentialism, which was created by the 2008 constitution, conditioned
the transition to civilian rule but also provided the basis for later military dissatisfaction,
ultimately leading to a military coup. Since the constitution was never carried by an
overarching elite compromise and key actors could not agree on the rules of the political game,
power-sharing between the military and the civilian arms of the government became
increasingly precarious after 2015. Perilous not in the Linzean sense of an increasing
polarization between executive and legislature, and not as increased conflict between political
parties, but as growing antagonism between the civilian and military arms of the government.
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD increasingly used informal mechanisms to govern, which not
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only eroded the constitutional framework imposed by the 2008 constitution, but also led to
growing dissatisfaction on the part of the military.
Introduction
In the early morning hours of February 1, 2021, military officers detained State Counsellor
Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other leading figures of the National League for
Democracy (NLD). They cut off phones and the Internet and arrested some of the most active
members of civil society. Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing seized state power, made
General Myint Swe the acting president, and declared a one-year state of emergency. The move
came just one day before the newly elected parliament was about to convene for the first time
following the November 2020 elections, in which the NLD had won an overwhelming
majority, as it had five years previously in the 2015 elections. Commander-in-Chief Min Aung
Hlaing, who claimed there had been major election irregularities, blamed the NLD-appointed
Union Election Commission (UEC) for failing to conduct free and fair elections and demanded
an investigation into the possibility of election fraud.
It mattered little that all of these allegations had been dismissed by the UEC, the government,
and local and international election observers. One day after the coup, the military once again
repeated its narrative of electoral fraud and stressed the military’s duty to intervene. At the
same time, Min Aung Hlaing promised to hold multiparty elections within one year—although
he later extended this period to two years. Unlike the case for the previous coup in 1988, the
military did not tear apart the constitution, but instead claimed that the military coup was
carried out in conformity with, and indeed in defense of, the country’s 2008 constitution (Bünte
2021a; Crouch 2021). Myanmar’s coup can consequently be characterized as a “promissory
coup”—a coup that is framed as a defense of democratic legality and that includes a public
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promise to restore democracy—a form of coup that is much more common today than the
traditional “open-ended coup” (Bermeo 2016, 8).
The coup has not gone unanswered, as the people of Myanmar have not bought into the rhetoric
of electoral fraud. It has triggered a huge wave of resistance within the country, including a
civil disobedience movement and a protest movement on the part of the younger generation:
(“Generation Z”). After the brutal suppression of some of these protests and a surge in COVID-
19 cases, ad hoc protests continue at the time of writing, though at a much lower intensity than
in February or March 2021. While army chief Min Aung Hlaing has established an interim
government and taken up the position of prime minister, elected NLD parliamentarians and
ethnic minority groups have formed an exile government, the so-called National Unity
Government (NUG). While the military wants to move on as usual and return to a “disciplined
democracy” based on the 2008 constitution, the NUG and ethnic groups have promised a new
federal charter.
Myanmar’s military coup on February 1 ended a decade of power-sharing between Myanmar’s
long-term ruling military class and the civilian opposition under the leadership of NLD leader
Aung San Suu Kyi. The power-sharing agreement lasted for only two administrations, during
which three presidents ruled: In 2011, an ex-general and member of the former ruling military
council (State Peace and Development Council—SPDC), Thein Sein, was elected the country’s
first president after more than 20 years of continuous direct military rule. In 2016, the first
civilian assumed office, when the NLD voted Aung San Suu Kyi’s ally Htin Kyaw into office.
He resigned for health reasons in 2018 and was replaced by Win Myint, another confidant of
Aung San Suu Kyi. The reasons for the coup and the end of the power-sharing arrangement
have been debated extensively (Ardeth 2021; Bünte 2021b; Croissant 2021; Steinberg 2021).
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While some commentators have highlighted intra-military dynamics and the personal interests
of the Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, others have pointed to the weak election
management institutions, the lack of confidence between the military and the NLD, and the
inadequate state capacity to conduct free and fair elections. Others have stressed the personal
rivalries between Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing and NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
How did the country’s institutional framework and its unique form of presidentialism impact
the democratic breakdown and the disruption of power-sharing? Is the coup following the
playbook Juan J. Linz had in mind when lamenting the “perils of presidentialism”?
This chapter argues that the special form of hybrid presidentialism created by Myanmar’s 2008
constitution conditioned the transition to civilian rule but was also the basis for later military
dissatisfaction, which ultimately led to a military coup. Since the constitution was never carried
by an overarching elite compromise and key actors could not agree on the rules of the political
game, power-sharing between the military and civilian arms of the government became
increasingly perilous after 2015. The NLD started to use informal mechanisms of rule, slowly
eroding the confidence of the military. When the military proxy party, the Union Solidarity and
Development Party (USDP), failed repeatedly to attract support at the ballot box, Commander-
in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing saw the military’s dominance threatened. His desire to become
president after the end of his career in the armed forces provided a strong incentive for the coup
and made a compromise with the NLD difficult.
Due to the particular nature of the first-past-the-post election system, elections developed into
mini-referendums, which provided massive electoral legitimacy to Aung San Suu Kyi. In light
of the personalized nature of Burmese politics, power-sharing became extremely difficult. Both
personalities repeatedly clashed, making the civil-military collaboration extremely unstable
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and dangerous. Since a normal takeover of power due to a “national emergency” was
impossible, the commander-in-chief needed to create the fairy tale of the NLD’s electoral fraud
and the military’s moral obligation to step in to safeguard “disciplined democracy.” Power-
sharing became much more conflict ridden after the NLD was elected in 2016—not in the
Linzian sense of an increasing polarization between executive and legislature, and not as
increasing conflict between political parties, but rather as a growing antagonism between the
civilian and military arms of government. Conflicts erupted in all institutions in which the
constitution envisaged power-sharing. Presidentialism was therefore not the prime source of
instability and breakdown, although it created a path to executive aggrandizement.
This chapter proceeds in three steps: First, it analyzes the formal institutions of Myanmar based
on the 2008 constitution and the evolution of an (informal) elite consensus and power-sharing
agreement. Second, it traces back the developments that eroded the elite consensus and the
informal guardrails previously put in place by the military. The chapter is based on several
rounds of fieldwork in Myanmar between 2014 and 2020, including interviews with
parliamentarians in Naypidaw in 2015 and 2016.
Myanmar’s unique presidential system as defined in the 2008 constitution
Myanmar represents a special case for an analysis of executive-legislative relations. Although
presidential in name, the system is a unique blend of the “hierarchical delegation” mode of
parliamentarism and the “transactional relationship” of presidentialism (see further
Bünte/Thompson 2022). Myanmar does not fulfill Satori’s “defining condition” of pure
presidentialism: the direct or direct-like election of the president. Instead, the electoral college
that appoints the president consists of three groups: members of parliament (MPs) from the
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lower house, MPs from the upper house, and the appointed members of the armed forces, which
make up 25 percent of both houses. Each group proposes one candidate, and the electoral
college chooses the president. The losing candidates become vice presidents (Constitution of
Myanmar, Article 60). With this route to the presidency, the military ensured that the candidate
nominated by the military would become at least vice president, if not president (Clapp 2017).
The system also appears to have been inspired by former Indonesian ruler Suharto’s “New
Order,” in which the military played a pivotal role in balancing political forces and securing
regime legitimacy. The Burmese generals led several delegations to Jakarta in the early 1990s
in order to study how the political role of the armed forces had been translated into the
constitution (Sundhaussen 1995)
This highlights another characteristic that makes the case of Myanmar exceptional, if not
unique: the permeation of the entire political system with military checks on executive (and
legislative) power. The heads of the most important government ministries—Home Affairs,
Borders and Defence—are appointed by the commander-in-chief. The commander-in-chief
also appoints 25 percent of the country’s legislatures. Furthermore, the minister of home affairs
directs the General Administrative Department (GAD), which oversees public administration
all the way down to the grassroots level. The overwhelming majority of the GAD is staffed
with former military officers, and most senior staff within the administration have a military
background. Hence, it is fair to say that the entire territorial administration remains heavily
militarized (Wade 2015) and the commander-in-chief is at least as powerful as the president,
if not more powerful. The executive does not have any power or control over the Tatmadaw.
Another element of military influence is the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC),
which includes some of the most important military, legislative, and executive actors; is
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responsible for security matters; and has the power to declare a state of emergency. Although
the NDSC is chaired by the president, the military has a 6 to 5 majority over civilians. All these
provisions grant the military a role as “partner in government.” Furthermore, since the military
guards the constitution and technically oversees the political system, these constitutional
provisions have been called the foundational elements of the “tutelary regime” (Bünte, 2021b;
Bünte 2021c) or the “military-state” (Crouch 2019).
The military-drafted constitution also sets out certain requirements for presidential candidates.
A presidential candidate must be at least 45 years old, demonstrate loyalty to the Union and to
its people, and meet the citizenship requirements. Furthermore, presidential candidates must
have lived continuously in Myanmar for the previous 20 years and have experience in political,
economic, and military issues. These requirements technically limit the field of candidates to
retired or serving military officers, though these stipulations have not been fully implemented
in practice in the past decade (see Crouch 2019). Htin Kyaw, director of Aung San Suu Kyi’s
Daw Khin Kyi foundation and her former driver, was not a military officer, nor can he claim
familiarity with military affairs. Yet he was elected president in 2016—largely because another
selection criterion has been enforced quite consistently: The “notorious” Article 59 (f) bars
those candidates from the presidency whose spouse or children have foreign citizenship (see
Crouch 2019, 106). Consequently, Aung San Suu Kyi could not take up the position of
president (since her late husband and her children all had British citizenship).
While the military presides over all state institutions, the role of the president vis-à-vis the
parliament is not properly spelled out, particularly in the areas of impeachment and control.
The president is both head of the executive and the head of the Union. Myanmar’s president
serves for five years, with a chance of one time reelection. He is recognized as the
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constitutionally superior and preeminent figure in the country and can be dismissed only by
what Arend Lijphart calls the “highly unusual and exceptional process of impeachment”
(Lijphart 1994, 92). However, the constitution does not link the president’s impeachment to
criminal activities only, such as high treason and unconstitutional behavior. The impeachment
process can also result from political actions, such as “misconduct” and “inefficient discharge
of duties assigned by law” (Art 71), which resonates with a parliamentary system. Admittedly,
the hurdles for impeachment are high: the motion needs to be brought by one-quarter of the
members of the upper or lower house, and two-thirds of elected parliamentarians need to
support it. Yet the exact wording of Art. 71 opens the impeachment process up to political
maneuvers on the part of parliamentary majorities that are not satisfied with the president’s
performance.
There is a formal separation of powers between the executive and legislative. Once appointed,
the president and vice presidents must vacate their legislative seats; no member of the executive
can simultaneously be a member of the legislature (Articles 62, 232). The constitution even
goes a step further by stipulating that presidents and vice presidents shall not be active in party
politics (Art 63). This constitutional stipulation, which highlights the military drafters’ aversion
to party politics, has been contested in practice in the past decade. President Thein Sein kept
his position as chairperson of the USDP even after he was elected president. He only vacated
his position in May 2013 to make room at the helm of the party for then speaker Shwe Mann.
Under the NLD government, Aung San Suu Kyi held several executive positions, though she
never gave up her position as chairperson of the NLD. In 2015, the legislature debated whether
to abolish this constitutional clause altogether. USDP members were inclined to delete these
provisions, whereas the Tatmadaw indicated that they would vote against the proposal and
expressed concern that it would violate the basic principle of the constitution (Crouch 2019,
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105). Since the Tatmadaw is the final guardian of the constitution, the USDP did not dare to
change the constitution.
The constitution provides for a president with strong executive power but weak legislative
powers (Crouch 2019, 106). The president’s central executive power includes that of
appointment and oversight. In terms of territorial administration, the president appoints the
heads (chief ministers) of the 14 regions, which are also accountable to him. This form of
“coercive centralism” not only limits future forms of federalism and decentralization, it also
gives the president enormous power over the civilian arm of the territorial administration
(Crouch 2021; Bünte 2021c). Furthermore, the president determines the number and shape of
ministries: all ministries answer directly to the president (Crouch 2019, 107). In terms of
appointment powers, the president is responsible for selecting the Union Election Commission
(UEC) and three of the nine members of the Constitutional Tribunal—the other six are selected
by the upper and lower houses of parliament (Art. 321). The president also controls the
appointment and removal of the judges on the Supreme Court (Art. 299 and 302) and the chief
justices of the high courts of the regions and states (Art. 308b). Many other executive and
judicial agencies are directly responsible to the president, such as the Attorney General, the
Auditor General, the Financial Commission and the Union Civil Service Board (Crouch 2019,
p. 107). The president also has some weak legislative powers. He submits the Union Budget
Bill to parliament and is required to approve all legislation, although he does not have a veto
right. He can return a bill to parliament with recommendations, but the parliament is under no
obligation to incorporate these suggestions. Even without presidential approval, the bill will
come into effect within 14 days (Crouch 2019, 108; Holliday and Su Mon Thazin Aung 2017).
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It can be concluded that Myanmar’s 2008 constitution established a governmental system that
cannot be easily classified according to the existing typologies and thus must be categorized as
a “special case.” It is a hybrid between presidentialism and parliamentarism that provides for
a powerful president, who is indirectly elected by both houses of parliament and by the military.
Although there is formal separation of powers, the lines of accountability are blurred. This
might not come as a surprise, as the constitution grants extensive powers to the armed forces,
which act as guardians of the constitution. The commander-in-chief of the armed forces has
equal powers to the president, appoints three important ministries, and controls a quarter of the
country’s legislatures. This is an indication of power-sharing between civilian politicians and
the military after long decades of military rule. The military has also installed softer
constitutional requirements intended to exclude the country’s main opposition figure, Aung
San Suu Kyi, from taking over the presidency. The next section discusses how Myanmar’s
presidential system has evolved and how it has been designed as a tool for power-sharing
between the military and civilians, ultimately leading to the coup in February 2021.
Presidentialism and the failure of power-sharing in Myanmar
The evolution of Myanmar’s special form of presidentialism bears the imprint of the “transition
from above” (Stokke and Myint 2019) orchestrated by the military regime in the first decade
of the twenty-first century. Myanmar’s armed forces were not coerced into reforms by
oppositional forces, nor did the regime break down due to the consequences of civil war or
internal rebellion (Callahan 2012). Instead, the military imposed the tutelary regime from a
position of strength. The military was able to control the entire process of drafting the 2008
constitution: it defined the basic principles of the constitution and dominated the discussions
in the National Convention (1993–1996; 2003–2007), in which handpicked military delegates
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formed the majority. The “praetorian constitution of 2008” consequently not only “reflects the
military’s view of how civilianized rule should work once direct military rule is ended”
(Egreteau 2017a, 122), but was also designed to be a permanent and lasting framework that
conditions and limits politics and makes it extremely risky for political actors to bring about
constitutional change – it has thus become an “authoritarian straitjacket” (Crouch 2020).
The oppositional NLD and some ethnic parties suffered a high degree of repression under direct
military rule: a significant number of political activists (and members of the NLD) were
imprisoned for years or had to flee the country. Consequently, the NLD rejected the 2008
constitution, particularly the strong role of the president and the heavy influence of the military
in politics (Than 2004). Since the military made support for the 2008 constitution a
precondition for participating in the 2010 elections and Aung San Suu Kyi was still under house
arrest, the NLD decided to boycott these elections, which were won by the USDP, a military
proxy party launched shortly before. To safeguard his personal interests and the corporate
interests of the military after stepping down, SPDC strongman Than Shwe also handpicked the
key protagonists of the new administration himself (Callahan 2012, 122; Kyaw 2012): Thein
Sein, a loyal and long-time member of the junta, who had chaired the National Convention to
draft the constitution and served as prime minister since 2007, became the first president in
2011; four-star general Thura Shwe Mann, former joint chief of staff of the military and third-
highest member of the military hierarchy, was made speaker of the lower house. Than Shwe
also picked Min Aung Hlaing as commander-in-chief. The balancing of former members of the
military regime aimed to prevent the concentration of power in the president’s hands. It
protected the military’s core interests and made reforms that might endanger the military’s
dominant position highly unlikely (Callahan 2012, 125). It was only after the inclusion of the
NLD in the political system and after the 2015 elections that the tutelary regime became more
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fragile, as Aung San Suu Kyi’s government disrupted the power-sharing agreement by relying
more on informal modes of governing.
The promise of reform and the inclusion of the NLD
In 2011, President Thein Sein initiated a reconciliation process that convinced Aung San Suu
Kyi, released from house arrest shortly after the elections in 2010, to join mainstream politics.
President Thein Sein also started liberalizing the regime within the framework of the 2008
constitution. This undermined some of the core foundations of authoritarianism, though not the
dominant position of the military (Bünte 2016; Huang 2015). The trust-building exercise was
accompanied by legal changes that allowed the NLD to become integrated into the political
system (Than 2013). A number of laws were liberalized, whereas the overall dominance of the
military remained untouched. As a consequence, a large number of exiles returned to
Myanmar; together with former political prisoners they became active in politics, either in the
country’s nascent civil society, in the blossoming media sector, or in party politics (Duell 2014;
Gruß 2018). The NLD won the April 2012 by-elections in a landslide, securing 43 out of
possible 44 seats. This was of limited political importance for the real balance of power under
President Thein Sein, but an important test of the credibility of the quasi-military government’s
will to reform.
Having secured parliamentary representation, the NLD no longer acted as an anti-system
opposition party. Although still quite critical of the government, it supported President Thein
Sein’s reform agenda in parliament. The NLD changed from a pure opposition party to a
“transition seeking party,” willing to legitimize the system by participating in institutions
agreed to by the authoritarians, but only to the end of reforming them from within (Bünte 2016).
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It acted as government in waiting, which it eventually became after the landslide election
victory in 2015. To take up this position, it had to accept the constitutional framework imposed
by the military—at least rhetorically. Power-sharing therefore brought together highly unequal
partners and was based on the military’s dominance in the political system and the promise of
reform.
Liberalization and a maturing parliament under President Thein Sein (2011–2015)
During Thein Sein’s presidency, political institutions were still in their infancy and dominated
by the most important characters of the former military regime. President Thein Sein tried to
convince some of the hardliners within his party of his reform agenda, seeking consensus on a
number of contentious issues within the framework of the 2008 constitution (Kyaw 2012). He
established several committees to discuss controversial issues such as the release of political
prisoners, press liberalization, or religious violence. His reliance on technocrats and his inner
circle enabled him to dissociate himself from party politics and overcome the USDP’s
resistance to the reform agenda (Bünte 2018a, 8).
Although dubbed the “15-minute parliament” in the beginning, the legislature under Thura
Shwe Mann also became an important actor in the early years of the reform era, supporting a
series of important reforms such as the authorization of labor unions, the Peaceful Assembly
Law, and laws related to foreign investment (Fink 2015, pp. 327-329). Over time, parliament
grew more assertive. It began to hold the government accountable and voice the grievances of
the citizenry (Keane 2012; Fink 2015). Even USDP lawmakers started to question the
government over its performance, in order not to be seen as obstructing the reform process.
Parliament also played a crucial role in the peace process that was initiated under President
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Thein Sein in 2011 and led to a nationwide ceasefire agreement in October 2015 (Chit Win
2016).
The deeper reasons for the growing assertiveness of parliament, in which the USPD held a
majority, lay in the personal ambitions of house speaker Thura Shwe Mann. He felt frustrated
that he had not been named president although he was of higher military rank than Thein Sein.
He therefore put his energy into turning the legislature into a much more powerful and
independent body than envisaged by the constitution (Fink 2015, pp. 336). Thura Shwe Mann
also steered parliament towards a collision course with President Thein Sein—for instance,
through the impeachment of the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal in 2012 or the
introduction of a development fund for parliamentarians, to which Thein Sein objected. Thura
Shwe Mann also reached an agreement with Aung San Suu Kyi and attempted to transform the
USDP into a professional party not dominated by military officers. However, these plans failed
and led to his deposition as party leader in an “internal party coup” in 2015 (Min Zin 2016).
During the Thein Sein presidency, the USDP and the NLD did not act as government and
opposition in parliament. There was not a clear division between authoritarians and democrats;
both parties often supported the same liberalization initiatives. This resulted in an unusual
dearth of party divisions and verbal conflict (Kean 2012). Shwe Mann discouraged MPs from
using the word “opposition” in parliamentary debates. In parliament, military delegates tried
to act as moderators (Egreteau 2017b) and increasingly as veto actors. They successfully
blocked the NLD’s attempts to change the constitution. For instance, in June 2015, military
representatives blocked constitutional changes that would have lowered the 75 percent
threshold for constitutional change to 70 percent, which would have undermined the military’s
veto power. The military bloc also prevented the reform of Article 59(f), which bars Aung San
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Suu Kyi from the presidency due to her sons’ nationality, and the NLD’s attempts to move the
political system in a more parliamentary direction by bringing cabinet positions back to
parliament and allowing ministers to retain their status as members of a political party. The
NLD also wanted to limit the presidential term to five years. These efforts to change the
constitution failed. Instead of opening up greater social and political spaces, they reinforced
limits on democratic reform and brought great personal risks for the individuals involved
(Crouch 2021, 273).
At the same time, the USDP and the military refrained from changing the electoral system and
kept the first-past-the-post system intact, even though it had produced electoral landslides for
the NLD in the past. Surprisingly, they did not craft the system to their own advantage when
they had the chance to do so. They either did not comprehend the consequences of their choice
or did not want to be seen as discriminating against ethnic political parties and the NLD in
order not to undermine their own efforts to attract foreign investment and gain international
prestige (Dukalkis and Raymond 2018).
At this stage, Myanmar’s hybrid form of presidentialism was not confronted with any of the
perils associated with the other, “purer” forms of presidentialism. Although there were conflicts
between the executive and the legislature, they did not escalate into long periods of stalemate
or gridlock between the two sides. Neither did we see any form of polarization that played out
in the streets at this stage. Although the campaign to change the constitution that took off in
2014 included mass rallies organized by the NLD, these did not lead to instability or turmoil.
Conflicts were primarily rooted in the personal rivalry between the main protagonists (Bünte
2018). But crucially, these rivalries did not endanger the power-sharing agreement imposed by
the military. The NLD appeared to accept the agreement and attempted to go through the
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“arduous constitutional amendment requirements” set out in the 2008 constitution in order to
reform the system (Crouch 2020, 269). This began to change only after the 2015 elections and
the NLD’s electoral landslide, which established the first NLD government in the country’s
history. Power was increasingly centralized in the NLD’s hands and in the person of Aung San
Suu Kyi. Power-sharing became much more conflict ridden and precarious.
Perilous power-sharing under the NLD (2016–2021)
When the military was not willing to change the constitution and let Aung San Suu Kyi take
over the government, the NLD leader began to rely more on informal means to govern. Shortly
after the elections, Aung San Suu Kyi met with Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing and
former junta chief Senior General Than Shwe in order to assure them that the new NLD
government would not seek retribution for the past. They also discussed the practical aspects
of power-sharing. Although Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing congratulated her on the
NLD’s election victory, negotiations about a change to Art. 59f brought no results, preventing
her from running for president (Fuller 2015). How seriously the elections had challenged the
balance of power, however, became clear a couple of weeks later, when Aung San Suu Kyi
initiated a major change in the configuration of government. Even before the 2015 elections,
she had declared that in the event of an NLD victory, she would be “above the president.” She
chose Htin Kyaw, a close friend and veteran of the democracy struggle, to become “proxy
president.” He received 360 out of 652 votes in the electoral college. Myint Swe, a hardliner
nominated by the military, received 213 votes and became one of the vice presidents. A few
days after Htin Kyaw’s inauguration, the NLD-dominated parliament pushed through the State
Counsellor Law, specifically engineered to allow Aung San Suu Kyi to serve as de facto leader
of the NLD government. The State Counsellor Law created an additional position, which was
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designed to be accountable to the legislature and to communicate with cabinet members,
government departments, organizations, associations, and individuals.
The military delegates in parliament refused to cast ballots and stood up to show their resistance
to the law, which they considered unconstitutional. Brig General Maung Maung, a spokesman
for military lawmakers, called the approval of the new law “democratic bullying of the
majority” or “tyranny of the majority” (Myoe 2018; Bünte 2017). The law has been interpreted
as an informal way of changing the constitution (Crouch 2021), as having “no constitutional
foundation” (Holliday and Su Mon Thazin Aung 2016; for a legal analysis see also Crouch
2019), or as moving the country a step in a “semi-presidential direction” by introducing the
position of a de facto prime minister (Bünte 2018). It helped concentrate executive power in
Aung San Suu Kyi’s hands. She took over four ministerial positions: foreign affairs (to be
included in the NDSC), the minister of the president’s office, electricity, and energy and
education. The president’s role became much more symbolic and ceremonial under the NLD:
he was virtually downgraded to the role of figurehead. After the 2015 elections the NLD had a
huge majority in both houses of parliament, whereas the USDP suffered a huge defeat and had
only 41 seats in both houses of parliament—a reduction from 342 before the election.
The military’s opposition to the State Counsellor Law made it clear that it perceived the law as
a breach of the 2008 constitution, though it never challenged the law before the Constitutional
Tribunal—which might have been futile anyhow given the fact that the nine members were all
appointed by the NLD. Coup rumors were rife immediately after the passage of the State
Counsellor Law. Since the Tatmadaw saw its main role as safeguarding the constitution,
comments by the commander-in-chief at the National Defence College in November 2016 were
interpreted as a warning sign that the military could take over power in case of a national
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emergency (Callahan 2016; Myoe 2018). Though the military did not initiate a coup before
February 2021, the NLD paid a high price for the creation of the Office of the State Counsellor:
in January 2017 the mastermind behind the law, U Ko Ni, a prominent Muslim lawyer and
legal adviser to the NLD, was assassinated by former military officers. The brutal murder sent
shockwaves through the country and highlighted the danger democratic reformers lived in.
Power-sharing became much more conflict ridden afterwards—not in the Linzian sense of an
increasing polarization between executive and legislature, and not as increasing conflict
between political parties, but as a growing antagonism between the civilian and military arms
of government. Conflicts erupted in all institutions in which the constitution envisaged power-
sharing. Although the civilian government formally upheld the rhetoric of national
reconciliation, Aung Suu Kyi did not convene the National Defence and Security Council
(NDSC), the body designed by the 2008 constitution for discussions between the civilian and
military arms of government on security issues. Aung San Suu Kyi appointed her own security
advisers to avoid cooperation with the military in the security sphere. Army chief Min Aung
Hlaing repeatedly called on the president to convene the body to discuss issues of national
security (Bünte 2018).
It also became evident in parliament that the military was dissatisfied with the NLD’s
dominance. Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing assigned more senior military
representatives to parliament to be more efficient in moderating political and legislative
debates. In line with their self-conception as guardians of the “disciplined democracy,” military
delegates opposed a series of laws that in their view endangered the security of state and nation.
Military delegates also protested in parliament whenever they felt the Tatmadaw’s reputation
had been damaged by parliamentarians. For instance, in 2016 an NLD politician criticized local
19
authorities for misconduct in the Letpadaung copper mine case, a project in which military
companies were heavily involved. In response, military delegates in the lower house stood up
and protested against defamation (Egreteau 2016). In 2019, military delegates systematically
highlighted Aung San Suu Kyi’s ostensible lack of leadership qualities and the NLD
administration’s failure to solve the “national crisis.”
The military and the USDP also formed an unholy alliance with the ethnonationalist movement
led by the ultranationalist Buddhist monk Wirathu (Bünte 2018c). They repeatedly warned of
the dangers of foreign interference, including that of “mixed blood people,” in the internal
affairs of the country (Myoe 2018, 204). The USDP lobbied for a continued role of the military
and mobilized its supporters in the streets in favor of military action in Rakhine state. However,
while the military proxy party served as an extended arm of the military in parliament after
2015, it failed to develop into a strong party organization and performed dismally in both the
2015 and 2020 elections.
When the NLD tried to change the 2008 constitution and formed a committee to keep the
promises made in the 2015 election campaign, military delegates and military-aligned parties
vehemently objected and sent a letter of complaint to the parliamentary speaker. At the same
time, they submitted their own proposals to parliament. The proposed legal amendments were
rather narrow in scope and intended to empower regional parliaments to elect their own chief
minister. This has been interpreted as a tactical move by the USDP (and the military) to retain
control over some regions in the event of another NLD landslide in the 2020 elections (IDEAS
2020, 6).
20
All in all, we can say that the relationship between the NLD and the military grew increasingly
hostile. Power-sharing became conflict ridden, a “marriage of inconvenience” (Bünte 2021c).
The conflicts were rooted in the disagreement over the 2008 constitution and the NLD’s
inability to change the rigid constitutional framework. At the core, however, lay a lack of trust
between the central actors. Neither side saw the other as the legitimate leader. Min Aung Hlaing
viewed Aung San Suu Kyi’s role as unconstitutional since it was not provided for by the 2008
constitution; Aung San Suu Kyi did not trust Min Aung Hlaing since he was not elected. Both
sides rarely met, and the last personal meeting between the two was reportedly in 2018.
Increasing personalization and executive aggrandizement
Although some observers had slight hopes of democratization after the relatively free and fair
elections in 2015, there was increasing personalization and executive aggrandizement after the
NLD came to power. First, the overwhelming NLD majority in both houses undermined the
separation of power. With the increased centralization of NLD party structures (Roewer 2020)
and Aung San Suu Kyi requiring absolute personal loyalty and the last word in decision
making, the NLD leader became the epicenter of politics. NLD party discipline resembled
Leninist standards, and lawmakers had hardly any room for maneuver and had to clear their
questions with party leaders first. Criticism remained taboo (Barani 2018, 7). The military
became the only viable “opposition” in the political system, guarding “disciplined
democracy”—that is, the rules of the 2008 constitution and the tutelary regime it had
established—but blatantly disregarding liberal freedoms and minority rights (David and
Holliday 2018; Bünte 2021c). Although political freedoms expanded before the 2015 elections,
it is generally acknowledged that under the NLD government the space for certain forms of
political action began to narrow again (Bünte 2018b). For instance, the NLD decided not to
repeal repressive legislation such as Article 66(d) of the Telecommunication Law or the
21
Official Secrets Act (OSA), which were frequently used to silence critics. The most prominent
case concerned two Reuters journalists sentenced in September 2018 to seven years in prison
for violating the Official Secrets Act. The reporters were investigating a 2017 massacre of
Rohingya in Inn Din village in Rakhine state. Yet, this was only the tip of the iceberg.
According to a local human rights group, the number of prosecutions for criticizing the
government, the military, parliamentarians, and other officials increased every year after the
NLD assumed office in 2016. From 2016 to 2020, more than 1,051 people faced criminal
charges, most commonly under the Telecommunication Law or the Peaceful Assembly Law
(Athan 2020). Here, the NLD acted together with the military and the USDP.
Second, although (to the dismay of the generals) Aung San Suu Kyi appointed her own security
advisers, the NLD did not challenge the military’s autonomy in the security arena. Here, the
military demonstrated a “preference for military solutions to political problems” (David and
Holliday 2018, 80), particularly regarding the ethnic and religious tensions in Kachin and Shan
states. This had devastating humanitarian effects and severe human rights implications. In
Rakhine state, the NLD supported the military’s scorched-earth response to the attack on border
police posts, which the UN labeled “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (Cumming-Bruce
2017). Aung San Suu Kyi even defended the generals at the International Criminal Court in
the Hague in December 2019. The civil-military power-sharing arrangement consequently had
serious effects on democracy and human rights.
Third, the joint rule of the NLD and military also closed spaces for civil society involvement.
Although the opening up under President Thein Sein brought an end to state repression and
increased civil society activism and political advocacy (Wells and Aung 2014; Bünte 2018),
the NGO community under Aung San Suu complained about the NLD’s lack of openness and
22
limited input into the policy-making process. Such constraints, combined with the fragmented
character of civil society, meant that although civil society organizations played important roles
in society, they did not provide viable alternative channels for popular representation (Stokke
and Aung 2019). Furthermore, the outbreak of sectarian violence between Buddhist and
Muslim communities in Rakhine state in 2012 catalyzed the growth of an ultranationalist
Buddhist movement, which was used by the military and the USDP to mobilize in the streets
against the elected democratic government. This led to demonstrations supporting Aung San
Suu Kyi in the streets as well. Society was never completely polarized, since large parts of the
population supported Aung San Suu Kyi, while only a minority of the population took the side
of the military and the religious hardliners.
We can conclude that after 2015 there was considerable executive aggrandizement by Aung
San Suu Kyi, which was visible in the growing concentration of power in the hands of the civil-
military coalition and a deterioration of civil liberties and the rule of law (Bünte 2021c). Chow
and Easley (2021) have correctly argued that Myanmar’s democratic backsliding stems from
unfinished nation-building, as minority and civil rights, as well as civil-military relations,
remain deeply mired in identity-based conflict.
The coup in February 2021 and the end of power-sharing
The coup of February 2021 ended a decade of power-sharing. The military seized power,
announced a state of emergency, and transferred all power to Commander-in-Chief Min Aung
Hlaing. However, unlike in 1962 and 1988, the military did not abolish the 2008 constitution.
Instead, referring to articles 417 and 418(a) of the constitution, it claimed to be adhering to its
mission of safeguarding a “discipline-flourishing democracy” and attempted to justify its
actions as a legitimate means of upholding the rule of law. In his first statement after the coup,
23
Min Aung Hlaing blamed the Election Commission for failing to conduct free and fair elections
and announced new multiparty elections after the end of a one-year emergency—though this
period was later extended. Both local and international election observers rejected the
accusations of election manipulation and demanded that power be returned to the elected
government.
The disruptions in, if not the end of, Myanmar’s tutelary regime were the result of an interplay
of personal and corporate grievances within the military (Bünte 2021c). They reflect the
political ambitions and personal motivations of Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, who
would have reached retirement age in July 2021. He is said to have approached the NLD
repeatedly after the November 2020 elections and asked to be made president in a future
government, since he felt too young to retire. At the same time, the NLD’s landslide victory
and the dismal performance of the USDP meant that even with the 25 percent reserved for
military officers, Min Aung Hlaing had no chance of becoming president. Some analysts have
also highlighted the scenario that his retirement would have left him open to prosecution in
international courts in relation to the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya minority (Simpson
2021).
These personal motivations were reinforced by a strong corporate interest on the part of the
military. Min Aung Hlaing’s successor would have been the first to be selected by an elected
NLD president in consultation with the NDSC. This would have been unprecedented and
illustrated the waning power of the military. It would have allowed Aung San Suu Kyi to
appoint a reformist army general and would have opened the door for the NLD to reign in the
Tatmadaw for the very first time. Since the Tatmadaw never learned to accept the dominance
of civilian politicians and share power with them, this was unacceptable. In the view of the
24
military, power-sharing needed to place the Tatmadaw at least in control of a significant part
of the government and the economy. Here, the military’s dissatisfaction with the government
seems to have pushed the military to action. The Tatmadaw was proud of having established a
“discipline-flourishing democracy,” which provided a “leading role” for the armed forces and
a degree of reconciliation with the NLD. After five years of power-sharing under the leadership
of Aung San Suu Kyi, the military felt deeply humiliated that the NLD had deviated from the
path envisaged by the military. The lack of an overall elite consensus proved quite costly.
Whither Myanmar? The future of power-sharing
The return of direct military rule has thrown the country into a political quagmire. In the
aftermath of the coup, the key political players are miles away from reaching a political
compromise that establishes a foundation for the country’s future. The military is keeping Aung
San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint imprisoned in a secret location, and the coup has led to
further dynamics that make a compromise highly unlikely. Power-sharing arrangements, which
have been imposed by the military in the past, do not appear to be a recipe for the future. The
new junta and its election commission have repeatedly indicated that they intend to change the
election system from a first-past-the-post system into a more proportional system to prevent
large majorities and be better able to manage a fractured legislature. The new strongman Min
Aung Hlaing and the new junta might push forward these steps after sidelining Aung San Suu
Kyi and the NLD.
The military leaders appear to have been surprised by the overall reaction to the coup, which
gave birth to a massive countrywide protest movement that encompassed all walks of life. The
movement has been particularly driven by the younger generation, who felt robbed of their
democratic future and alienated by Min Aung Hlaing’s ruthless behavior. Fuelled by social
25
media activism, the first wave of demonstrations was lauded as peaceful and innovative. It also
bridged social cleavages and ethnic divides in the country. The security forces responded to
the widespread protest movement against the military with brutal violence against
demonstrators and the civilian population at large. The crackdown was effective in driving the
protest movement underground, with mass protests replaced by flash mobs, which disperse
before the police can intervene, and strikes, boycotts, and other forms of civil disobedience. A
huge civil disobedience movement of state employees, including a strike by doctors, nurses,
clerks, and university professors, brought the state to the verge of collapse. The country is now
increasingly descending into chaos. The brutality of the security forces—from February to the
end of October the security forces killed 1,222 people and arrested 7,000—has helped
radicalize part of the movement, which has formed militias, aligned with armed ethnic
organizations, and started an armed struggle (ICG 2021). On September 7, the newly formed
People’s Defence Forces declared the People’s Defence War, which is ongoing at the time of
the writing.
After going underground, some of the NLD politicians elected to parliament in the November
2020 polls formed a legislative body, the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
(CRPH), and an executive body, the National Unity Government (NUG). Under the framework
of the National Unity Consultative Council, the NUG is working with diverse civil society
organizations, the civil disobedience movement, activist networks, and ethnic minority parties.
It is allegedly the most inclusive political dialogue forum in the country’s history (Chan and
Ford 2021). Although this movement has abolished the 2008 constitution drafted by the
military and pledged to create a new federal union with a parliamentary system under
“collective leadership,” distrust remains among the various partners of the multi-ethnic
coalition. All in all, 10 months after the coup, neither the military nor the opposition is showing
26
an inclination towards dialogue as a way out of the crisis. Since coalition building in
Myanmar’s society is extremely difficult due to the lack of trust between the various parties
(Bünte 2020), it will be a Herculean task to build up institutions that are supported by both
military and civilian actors. Although the coup has united oppositional forces for the time
being, an agreement on the rules of the political game that is supported by all ethnic groups is
currently out of reach.
Conclusion
Myanmar’s 2008 constitution was designed as a tool for power-sharing between the long-term
military rulers, the NLD, and the ethnic parties. Imposed by the military, the 2008 constitution
created a tutelary regime and a unique form of presidentialism, both of which were initially
rejected by the NLD opposition due to a lack of consultation and the hegemonic position
granted to the military. However, during the early phase of the country’s nascent transition
from direct military rule, the opposition decided to support the liberalization initiative and
accept the 2008 constitution as a temporary framework. When it tried to amend it, the military
used its veto power to block any form of change.
In the absence of an overarching elite compromise guiding Myanmar’s transition from direct
military rule, presidentialism proved increasingly fragile after the oppositional NLD won the
2015 elections and made Aung San Suu Kyi the dominant figure in the new government. She
spoiled the military’s plans for continued dominance, as it did not foresee her becoming
informal head of the government despite being banned from the presidency. Although the
military had installed several guardrails to protect its interests, including a strong presence in
the country’s parliaments, the executive, and the administration, Aung San Suu Kyi began to
27
make informal changes that challenged the military’s power: She appointed her own security
advisers and avoided convening the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), the
institution designed for power-sharing in the 2008 constitution. She also transferred the
General Administrative Department, which forms the backbone of the country’s administration
and extends down to the village level, from the military-controlled Ministry of Interior to the
Office of the President. The NLD government also supported a number of initiatives aimed at
creating greater transparency in government affairs, which challenged some of the military’s
business interests.
As the architect of the 2008 constitution and the tutelary regime, the military increasingly
opposed Aung San Suu Kyi’s policies. In parliament, military representatives tried to check
the NLD; out in the streets, the military formed an unholy alliance with nationalist monks and
supporters of the military party and protested against Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership qualities.
But Myanmar’s presidentialism proved precarious in other ways as well, leading to executive
aggrandizement. After Aung San Suu Ky was made state counsellor, she concentrated political
power in her own hands, constraining the fledgling civil society’s room for maneuver and
questioning civil society organizations’ legitimacy and support among the population. Since
she was seen as only person to counter the strong influence of the military, the population at
large supported this and provided her with another electoral landslide, as it had done in all
elections since 2012. The failure of the military and the USDP to change the election system
before 2015 proved disastrous for the generals’ power-sharing plans. Confronted with another
NLD landslide in the 2020 elections, the military pulled the plug on the democratic experiment.
28
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