Favor Theory – Theory of Social Capital

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to formulate a theory of social capital, which has the potential to reconcile many of the contradictions and problems that exist today in this field of knowledge. The proposed conceptualization has the potential to resolve the following problems: 1) The impossibility of reducing the rational and irrational aspects of social capital to one denominator; 2) Lack of connection between micro and macro analysis; 3) tautology of definition, when social capital is defined by its effects; 4) the inability to reduce the manifestations of social capital to a single basis; 5) biased positivity; and others. First, the author proposes to define social capital through the concept of willingness to do a favor (favor willingness), which is meant to be the basis of social capital (social resource). Next the topic of the sources of this willingness is explored, which, according to the author, are liking for and trust in a social unit (person, group, company, etc.). Next, the concept of social capital infrastructure is introduced, the role of which is to allow for the accumulation of social capital and its transfer between network members. The infrastructure consists of two levels – the social network as a whole and interpersonal relations in particular. At the first level, general liking and trust are accumulated, at the second – personal liking and trust. Next the issue of extracting benefits from social capital (activation, use) is highlighted. After that, examples of the compatibility of this theory with already existing concepts are given. The author concludes that the proposed concept well resolves some key contradictions and problems in the science of social capital.

Full text

Originally published in Science. Culture. Society. Vol. 28. No. 3. Pp. 68-80, Moscow, Russia.
Publication date: 9/30/2022
DOI 10.19181/nko.2022.28.3.5
Note: This is a provisional and unprofessional translation, it may contain errors.
D. Mond1
1 Independent researcher. Moscow, Russia.
FAVOR THEORY – THEORY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
Abstract: The purpose of this article is to formulate a theory of social capital, which has the potential to
reconcile many of the contradictions and problems that exist today in this field of knowledge. The proposed
conceptualization has the potential to resolve the following problems: 1) The impossibility of reducing the
rational and irrational aspects of social capital to one denominator; 2) Lack of connection between micro and
macro analysis; 3) tautology of definition, when social capital is defined by its effects; 4) the inability to reduce
the manifestations of social capital to a single basis; 5) biased positivity; and others. First, the author proposes
to define social capital through the concept of willingness to do a favor (favor willingness), which is meant to
be the basis of social capital (social resource). Next the topic of the sources of this willingness is explored,
which, according to the author, are liking for and trust in a social unit (person, group, company, etc.). Next,
the concept of social capital infrastructure is introduced, the role of which is to allow for the accumulation of
social capital and its transfer between network members. The infrastructure consists of two levels – the social
network as a whole and interpersonal relations in particular. At the first level, general liking and trust are
accumulated, at the second – personal liking and trust. Next the issue of extracting benefits from social capital
(activation, use) is highlighted. After that, examples of the compatibility of this theory with already existing
concepts are given. The author concludes that the proposed concept well resolves some key contradictions and
problems in the science of social capital.
Keywords: social capital, theory, concept, problems, sources, definition, activation, trust, liking, favor
willingness.
For citation: Mond D. (2022) Favor theory – theory of social capital. Science. Culture. Society. Vol. 28. No.
3. Pp. 68-80. DOI 10.19181/nko.2022.28.3.5
Contradictions and problems of the science of Social Capital
After several decades of close attention to social capital (hereinafter SC), we still do not have
a single definition of this phenomenon. More than that, the difference in the approaches of different

thinkers is not minor – the existing concepts differ radically. It suffices to consider several definitions
of social capital in order to see that:
– “...features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.” (Putnam, 1995, p. 67).
– “…is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and
recognition—or in other words, to membership in a group —which provides each of its members with
the backing of the collectively-owned capital…” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 21).
– “…is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having
two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate
certain actions of individuals who are within the structure.” (Coleman, 1988, p. 302).
– “...the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in one’s social networks.”
(Woolcock, 1998, p. 153).
– “...friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities
to use your financial and human capital.” (Burt, 1992, p. 9).
– “...the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and
derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit.” (Nahapiet and
Ghoshal, 1998, p. 243).
– “...is an instantiated informal norm that promotes co-operation between two or more
individuals.” (Fukuyama, 2001, p. 7).
These discrepancies at the conceptual level lead to the fact that the theoretical and empirical
research of different authors go in different directions, which ultimately brings the entire field of
knowledge into a state of disunity.
One of the key contradictions is the issue of causation. Some see SC rather as a prerequisite
for others to make our life better by certain actions (Putnam, 1995; Fukuyama, 2001), while for others
it is these actions themselves (or resources) (Bourdieu, 1986). Still others do not draw a clear
boundary at all (Granovetter, 1992; Burt, 2005; Lin, 2004).
There is no unanimity as to what is the reserve of SC. Some believe that it accumulates at the
interpersonal level (the relationship between two personally familiar people) (Schmid, 2002), while
others point to the level of social network as a whole (the relationship between many people, not
necessarily familiar) (Putnam, 1995; Coleman, 1988). Still others support compromise (Fukuyama,
2001) or ambiguous (Bourdieu, 1986) approaches.
Another source of contradiction is the need to reconcile rational and irrational principles
within the framework of one concept. Coleman and his followers looked at SC largely through the
prism of Rational choice theory, which by definition excludes or at least cannot explain all the benefits

that come into our lives on a disinterested basis. For example, the norm of helping the homeless is a
manifestation of social capital, but it is difficult to explain it in terms of personal gain. This was also
indirectly noted by Bourdieu (1986, pp. 15-16). At the same time, it was clear that reason and
calculation were also part of SC – in short, the prisoner's dilemma.
Speaking about the weaknesses of the modern understanding of SC, Claridge (2018) writes:
The main criticisms of social capital theory are that it is not social, not capital, and not a
theory. ... In addition it has been claimed that it is impossible to measure, that problems of
circularity make it a tautology, and that the possibility for positive or negative outcomes make
it context dependent. Some aspects are objective, but others are subjective. Some are
cognitive, but others are pre-cognitive. Social capital can be rational, pre-rational, or even
non-rational. This suggests social capital is more of an umbrella concept than a functioning
theory.
This article is aimed at solving exactly this problem – conceptualization.
Definition
In the author's understanding, social capital is a prerequisite for action (cause), and the action
itself is only its embodiment in reality (consequence). In other words, social capital can be compared
with the potential that is realized through concrete actions. If our neighbor is willing to lend us a car,
we already have SC. If he lent it to us, our SC was realized.
As for the second contradiction – the reserve of SC – we can accumulate it both at the
interpersonal level and at the level of a social network. In other words, the prerequisite for a certain
positive action of a person towards us can be both the high quality of our personal relationships and
the high quality of the social network to which we both belong. In the second case, this person may
not even know us personally and nevertheless do us something good.
The contradiction of rationality is resolved through the introduction of the concept of favor
willingness which can be both calculated and disinterested. If a person is willing to do us a
disinterested favor, we are dealing with the irrational part of SC. If he or she is willing to do us a
calculated favor (that is, in one’s own interests), then we are dealing with the rational component.
Taking all this into account, the definition takes the following form:
Social capital of a social unit (a person, group, company, country, etc.) is the accumulated at
the level of either a common social network or personal relationships willingness of other

social units to do the social unit a calculated or disinterested favor.
1
The arguments in favor of such an understanding of SC are given below.
Note: The word favor should be understood in the broadest possible sense – “to do good”,
whatever it means in different contexts. A favor can take the form of a compliment, sharing a car, a
gift, a transfer of experience, help, forgiveness, submission, patronage, etc.
Relation to other types of capital
One of the sources of disagreement was the very concept of capital. Initially, it was a metaphor
popularized by Putnam (1995), and only over time many saw grounds for a direct analogy, but not
all. A number of researchers are wondering to what extent the term capital is appropriate in the case
of SC (Field, 2003, p. 137).
According to the author, there are good reasons to draw parallels between SC and other types
of capital – physical and human. In all three cases, we are dealing with a certain resource that we can
accumulate and then benefit from it within the framework of social interaction (in particular,
conversion to other forms of capital and making a profit, while not spending the asset in full).
In the case of physical capital, the resource is any material object that can be involved in the
production of goods or services (in this article, for convenience, the author also includes here their
equivalent – money). In the case of human capital, the resource is knowledge, skills, upbringing, time,
health of the body and spirit, and other immediate attributes of a person. And the resource of SC is
the willingness to do a favor or favor willingness (hereinafter referred to as a social resource or FW),
which, among other things, means the willingness to transfer physical and human resources.
At the same time, it is not money itself that makes our life better, but what we buy with it.
The same applies to knowledge or skills – until we find a use for them, our lives will not get better.
The same goes for the willingness of others to do us a favor. There may be thousands of people around
us with the highest willingness to help us in one way or another, but they simply may not know that
we need help. Or they know it, but they do not have a convenient opportunity to do it. Simply put, it
is not enough to accumulate social capital, we still need to be able to use it, exactly as in the case of
the other types of capital.
For these reasons, the author considers the parallel with the conventional forms of capital
reasonable and useful.
2
1
Later, the author simplified the definition to "Social capital of a social unit is the aggregate willingness of
other social units to do it a favor."
2
It turns out that, strictly speaking, the above definition of the SC is the definition of only the social resource
at its core, and the definition of the SC itself should be broader and include the dimension of process,

Sources of willingness to do a favor
According to the author, people can be ready to do a favor only for two reasons – liking and
expected benefit.
3
If a person likes us, he will be willing to do us a disinterested favor. If we can offer
a person something valuable in return, she will be willing to do us a calculated favor (mutually
beneficial exchange).
Liking. From whom do we usually receive the most disinterested and unconditional help? Our
parents. They voluntarily bear the costs, helping us in every possible way, because they love us.
Exactly for the same reason, our loved ones, brothers, sisters, and children help us. Moreover, for the
same reason, friends and fans help us, however, in these cases, instead of love, we talk about
solidarity, respect, admiration and the like. But in essence, all these are different facets and different
degrees of one and the same feeling – liking. These people like us, that’s why they are willing to do
us a disinterested favor.
To avoid ambiguity, liking must be defined. Due to its intuitive nature, this phenomenon does
not have a unanimous definition, but its basic idea is quite obvious. In essence, “being liked” means
to give pleasure, to be pleasant. Therefore, liking is a response to pleasure. The stronger the pleasure,
the stronger the liking. This applies both to social units (person, company) and to objects, phenomena
(armchair, weather).
Although the sources of liking (causes) are not the immediate topic of this article, it will be
useful to provide a number of examples. The first source is the homophily effect, which is long known
and well studied (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, Cook, 2001). People tend to like those who are similar
to them in some way – age, appearance, beliefs, etc. Usually this kind of liking is called solidarity.
For example, it has long been noted that friendships form more quickly between children who are
similar in demographic characteristics (ibid., p. 416).
The second source is the norm of reciprocity. There is every reason to believe that natural
selection has instilled in us a subconscious norm, according to which we tend to like those who
disinterestedly do something good for us (altruism) (Trivers, 1971). Apparently, it is this irrational
liking that mediates the receipt of good and its return (reciprocity), even when it does not make sense
from the point of view of expected benefit. We usually call this gratitude, which the author considers
a kind of liking. A case in point is the personalized gift, which Bourdieu described as an example of
an investment that can bring a return in the form of money or in another form in the future (1986, p.
namely, the extraction of profit (benefit) from the social resource in the course of social interactions. The
author deliberately went for this simplification so as not to make it difficult to compare with the traditional
definitions of the SC, which essentially describe a social resource, but call it social capital.
3
Later, the author expanded the list of these reasons. For example, it can apparently also include a sense of
guilt, a sense of duty, and so on.

25).
The next type can be called aesthetic. An obvious example is the appearance of a person,
which can serve as a source of liking (Langlois, Kalakanis, Rubenstein, 2000; Hosoda, Stone-
Romero, Coats, 2003). These are only a few examples.
As for the connection between the presence of liking for the object and the willingness to do
him or her a disinterested favor, it is often explained by the unconscious desire of the subject to
contribute to the survival and spread of either his or her own genotype or a similar one (Trivers,
1971).
4
For example, it was found that the genotypes of friends (people that sometimes sacrifice their
lives for each other even though they are not related by blood) match at the level of fourth cousins
(Christakis, Fowler, 2014). But this only explains favors to people, not to social units in general. A
broader and more intuitive explanation boils down to the desire to preserve or bring closer the source
of pleasure. If we like a person or a company, we will make sure not to harm them (care, protection,
forgiveness) and/or do something good in the hope of maximizing pleasure (compliment,
recommendation, help, etc.). Therefore, strictly speaking, favors based on liking are not disinterested.
The difference from purely calculated favors is only in the level of awareness.
Liking (and disinterested help based on it) has long been recognized as an important element
of SC. For example, Granovetter introduces the concept of relational embeddedness, among other
things, in order to include an emotional component in the analysis (1992, p. 34). Burt points to the
difference between a tie and its content, meaning that it is not only the tie that matters, but also its
quality (2005, p. 50). Apparently, through the introduction of the concepts of expressive action (Lin,
2004, p. 244) and relational rationality (ibid., p. 155) Lin also tried to build an element of selfless
help into his theory. And Bourdieu spoke directly about subjectively felt obligations like gratitude,
respect, friendship (1986, p. 22).
Schmid (2002, p. 750) came closest to the author’s understanding of the role of liking. He
writes that SC
is a person's or group's sympathy toward another person that may produce a potential benefit,
advantage, and preferential treatment for another person or group beyond that expected in
an exchange relationship. … For example, caring makes it possible for a person to derive
utility from the welfare of others, from regard given by others… [sometimes without giving
anything in return]
4
After the publication of the article, the author discovered an unfortunate logical error in this auxiliary
argument, which, however, does not affect the main provisions of the theory. The subject’s desire to
contribute to the survival and spread of either his or her own genotype or a similar one may explain liking for
a person, while the author erroneously argued that it can explain the connection between liking and FW.

However, within the framework of the present theory, SC is defined more broadly than
sympathy (i.e. liking) alone.
The connection between liking and FW has been experimentally revealed more than once.
Schmid (2002, p. 751) cites his own study:
...asked people for the price they would be willing to sell a used car for to a set of buyers who
were presumed to vary in the degree of social capital they held vis-a-vis the seller based on
the seller's affinity for them. The selling price increased as the buyers ranged from a family
member to a friend to a neighbor to a nasty neighbor.
Burt (2005, p. 54), in turn, noticed: “Early promotion [in a firm] was associated with
brokerage in networks of personal relations (socialize, discuss personal matters, discuss exit). There
was no association in the authority network (supervision and essential sources of buy-in) [i.e.
relations based on calculation].” An analysis of populism reveals the importance of the vox populi
effect in garnering political support. Candidates not only raise topics of concern to the electorate, but
also use the language familiar to the target audience, which causes solidarity, which leads to a
disinterested favor in the form of a vote (although voting is often a calculated favor) (Mudde and
Kaltwasser, 2017). The management literature also contains examples of how perceived similarity
between a leader and a subordinate predicts the quality of their interaction, and hence the professional
success of both (Erdogan and Bauer, 2014, p. 412). With regard to liking for other social units, we
can give an example of a brand (company image). Research shows that brand love leads to word of
mouth recommendations, brand loyalty, willingness to pay a premium price, and forgiveness for
company mistakes (Batra, Ahuvia, Bagozzi, 2012). At the same time, not only customers can be loyal
to the company, but also its employees. Countries also evoke liking of different strengths, both from
their citizens (patriotism) and from foreigners (the country's brand in the world), which in theory
would explain the difference in the volume of disinterested favors in relation to them.
It can be concluded that liking for a social unit leads to an increase in the willingness of the
subject to do it a disinterested favor.
Note: It is important to note that liking has an opposite – disliking or antipathy (enmity,
hatred), which is expressed in a willingness to harm. It's not the dark side of SC, which means, roughly
speaking, the bad consequences of a good relationship, but a bad relationship, which probably also
has a bright side. In one paper on the subject, antipathy was conceptualized as a liability as opposed
to SC, which is often described as an asset (Labianca and Brass, 2006). That is, the presence of
enemies is understood not as negative SC, but as a kind of its opposite – Social Liability. This related
topic is less studied.

Trust. Why does an employer pay us a salary? Why does a chef prepare delicious food for
us? Why does a colleague help us with a project? Expected benefit. The cook receives money from
us, the employer receives the completed task, and the colleague receives help in return. It turns out
that if we have some valuable resource (money, knowledge, etc.), then others will be willing to do us
a calculated favor – that is, to engage in a mutually beneficial exchange with us (from here, calculated
favor and mutually beneficial exchange will be used synonymously). Sounds logical, but it's actually
not that simple. If we dig deeper, we will find that such an exchange is possible only if both parties
are confident that it will actually take place and yield expected returns. In other words, it is not enough
to have valuable resources, you also need to inspire confidence in the other side that you will not
deceive or let down.
And strictly speaking, our resources here do not matter at all – the willingness to do us a
calculated favor depends only on trust in us. For example, if we are incompetent, but at the same time
we have convinced the employer that we have the necessary knowledge, he or she will be willing to
give us an advance payment, that is, to do us a calculated favor. However, if, on the contrary, we are
competent, but the employer does not believe in us, he or she will not be willing to cooperate with
us. Therefore, the key condition for willingness to do a calculated favor is trust. Bourdieu perfectly
illustrated this idea with the example of an autodidact who needs to prove his knowledge all the time,
since he does not have a diploma (1986, pp. 20-21). Note that for Bourdieu a diploma is an
institutionalized cultural capital, and for the author it is an example of a general SC (details below).
Trust, similarly to liking, is an intuitive and broad concept, which often includes many sub-
ideas, so the concepts differ (Nahapiet, Ghoshal, 1998, p. 254; Burt, 2005, p. 93; Lin, 2004, p. 147;
Möllering, 2001). Within the framework of this article, trust is understood as the confidence that an
object will not harm (do bad), no matter what harm may mean in different contexts. This broad
definition makes it possible to include in the analysis not only people, but also social units like
companies.
For example, if we leave the doors of our house open, then we are sure that our neighbors will
not steal or spoil anything, they will not tell third parties about it, etc. We trust them. If we take an
important guest to a certain restaurant, we are sure that the chef will not disappoint us. We trust him.
If we give an advance payment to a company, we are sure that the quality of its service will not be
worse than our expectations. We trust it.
It must be emphasized that trust is inconceivable out of context. Trusting the same person in
different contexts implies different expectations. For example, if our neighbor works as a cook, we
can trust him as a neighbor (won't steal), but not trust him as a cook (may disappoint with dinner).
Trust is also subjective – in the same context, different people will have different expectations.

As for the sources of trust, this is not the main topic of the article, so the author will limit
himself to a couple of examples here and a few further down the text. The main source of trust in a
social unit is the history of interaction, which makes it possible to predict its behavior (Burt, 2005, p.
99). A recommendation (a form of social proof) also contributes to trust.
The relationship between trust and FW is explained as follows. Before a party agrees to a
mutually beneficial exchange, it must be sure that it will receive what was promised in return. The
higher this confidence to receive an expected benefit, the higher will be the desire to exchange (to do
a calculated favor). This extremely simple idea is not new. Many authors include trust (and
cooperation) in their concepts of SC. Lin mentions reputation (2004, p. 150), Granovetter – relational
embeddedness (1992), Coleman – credit slips (1988), etc.
The literature is replete with empirical evidence. For example, a tendency has been described
“for Hong Kong companies entering China to more quickly decide between alternative venture
partners when their information comes from family or close friends rather than casual friends or
acquaintances.” (Burt, 2005, p. 100). Joint ventures survive longer if the firms have had other business
together, contracts between organizations become more flexible over time (Burt, 2005, p. 101).
“There are also computer simulations showing how trust between two people might build across
repeated exchange.” (ibid.).
A familiar example is bank loans. The higher the credit rating (i.e. trust) of a social unit, the
higher the bank's willingness to issue a loan (do a favor), which is reflected in a lower rate. If a
company is trusted, people will be more willing to give it money in exchange for its goods and
services (do it a calculated favor) (Chaudhuri and Holbrook, 2001). Other things being equal, we will
buy a ticket to a concert of a more famous pianist, because there is less chance of being disappointed
(not getting the expected benefit). We can safely conclude that trust in the object increases the
willingness to do it a calculated favor.
Note: The opposite of trust is suspicion that reduces or eliminates willingness to cooperate. It
is important to separate it from distrust, which can be understood as lack of trust, but not necessarily
suspicion. Together with antipathy, suspicion constitutes social liability.
Concluding thoughts for the section. The magnitude of FW depends only on these two
variables – liking and trust.
5
If a social unit possesses the first, people will be willing to do it a
disinterested favor, if the second – calculated one. The more people like and trust social unit and the
higher these liking and trust, the higher its SC. It is worth noting that the totality of resources in the
possession of all these people is not related to SC, as Bourdieu writes about it (1986, p. 21). SC opens
access to the resources of others, but their volume is a separate issue.
5
As already noted, there are other variables.

But how do we explain coercion? After all, power – the ability of the subject to impose his or
her will – also increases the willingness of the object to do a favor, calculated or disinterested. If we
think about it, the essence of coercion is in the promise either to do something unpleasant (threat), or
to stop doing it. If the object does not believe in the promise, it will not make sense for him or her to
do a favor (to obey). If the author does not miss anything, then coercion is well explained in terms of
a calculated favor.
Does a car, for example, have SC? After all, it can be beautiful and reliable, that is, be likable
and trustworthy in the eyes of its owner. The answer is no. Capital is not resources, but the way they
are used. The machine has liking and trust (social resources), but it cannot use them, which means
that one cannot speak of SC. Similarly, a gold coin itself is only a physical resource, and it is certain
actions of its owner that turn it into capital. But animals in this sense can use their trustworthiness
and likability when interacting with people, which means that we can refer to SC.
Note: The author uses the concepts of liking and trust as synonymous with "willingness to do
a favor". Simply put, all three are called social resources. But this is only a concession to practicality
– liking and trust are much more tangible and convenient – but, strictly speaking, they are not the
social resource, but its sources.
Social capital infrastructure
Traditionally, a social network is mentioned as a key component of SC. Structural
embeddedness (Granovetter, 1992), structural SC (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), structural holes
(Burt, 1992). This is absolutely understandable, because one of the key intuitions about SC is that our
lives are enriched by others, which by definition happens through social connections. Within the
framework of the present theory, a social network as a whole and individual connections (or ties) in
particular are not SC itself, but only its infrastructure. It is at the same time a logical prerequisite of
SC (liking and trust, in principle, do not exist outside the connections) and the factor that either favors
the accumulation of social resources by members of the network, or prevents it due to its properties
(the interconnectedness of the network, its size, position of ego in it, the presence of associations,
hierarchies, etc.)
The issue of SC levels, that is, its reserve (interpersonal relationships or network), belongs to
the infrastructure section. It was noted above that different concepts have different attitudes to this
issue. According to the author, SC accumulates not only at the level of personal relationships, but
also at the level of social networks. If an individual is willing to do us a favor because he or she likes
us or trusts us personally, then we are dealing with the interpersonal level. The author calls the SC
accumulated here personal. If this person does not know us personally, but nevertheless is willing to
do us a calculated or disinterested favor, we owe this to the SC accumulated at the level of social

network to which we both belong. The author calls it general SC.
Personal liking and trust were described above, below we will consider the same liking and
trust, but not to a specific (personally familiar) social unit, but to a faceless member of a social
network.
General trust (GT). One of the two components of the general SC is general trust. The best
illustration of its action are diplomas, degrees and certificates, which are designed to confirm that a
person has certain knowledge to all those who do not have a personal history of interaction with this
person. This is an example of trusting a stranger. The employer will be ready to do this person a
calculated favor (hiring), not because he or she trusts him as a person, but because he or she trusts the
institution of education that has developed in the social network to which both belong.
6
If there is no
general trust, it is more difficult and expensive for strangers to interact, which makes the social
network poorer in every sense, because we can know well as individuals a fairly small number of
people. As a guide, the Dunbar number (Dunbar, 1992).
GT accumulates unevenly in the social network, thus forming areas with higher and lower SC.
Lin touched upon this idea when describing institutional fields (2004, p. 187), Burt – populations
(2005, p. 11), Bourdieu – a group (1986, p. 22) and partly fields (champs) (ibid.), Fukuyama – radius
of trust (2001, p. 8). Coleman (1988) described the example of a family that moved to the city that
was safer for children. In this article, the author calls this idea a collective, putting the broadest
possible meaning into the term. It can take the form of a family, teams in sports or business,
townspeople, citizens of a country, and even such associations as the Republic of Letters.
Different phenomena can serve as sources of general trust in a collective. Burt describes how
network closure enhances trust by increasing the chances of being punished for wrongdoing (2005,
p. 7). In other words, peer pressure. Lin describes the institutions that impose general "rules of the
game" and punish those who violate them (2004, p. 187). Fukuyama points to the importance of
culture (collectivism, individualism) (2001, p. 14). Field notes the ethnic homogeneity/heterogeneity
of a society (2003, pp. 77-78). The author will add the importance of a common cultural field (a
common understanding of good and evil, common norms and traditions).
It is this aspect of SC that attracted, perhaps, the greatest attention of researchers, that is why,
today, GT is one of the most studied areas of our discipline.
Research shows that where relationships are characterized by a high level of trust, people are
more willing to exchange and cooperate (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, p. 254). For example, during
the 12th and 13th centuries, the position of podestà (a neutral third-party city manager) was developed
in Genoa, which led the city to its "golden age". Podestà played the role of an institution that provided
6
Later, the author conceptualized the diploma as a personal SC, namely, as a personal recommendation
from an accrediting institution. Details will be given in the article on trust in the context of SC.

the general rules of the game by preventing the monopoly (and arbitrariness) of any one elite faction
(Burt, 2005, p. 73-74). In this sense, the globalization of the last decades seems to be a good example
of how cultural, legal and technological unification has contributed to international cooperation
through the creation of GT.
General liking (GL). As for the GL, apparently it too can accumulate at the collective level.
In other words, liking for strangers can be of different strengths in different groups. But the author
admits that GL is the weakest part of the present theory. A good illustration is patriotic solidarity,
which is especially pronounced during the struggle with another collective. People like each other
simply because they belong to the same collective. Yet one must be careful with this example, since
the effect of patriotism can be explained by personal liking (homophily).
The sources of GL can be the traditions of the collective (a smile to passers-by), culture
(collectivism), religion (love of neighbor), ethnic homogeneity, low mobility in social networks
(awareness of a common destiny), etc.
The author is familiar with one experiment in which the level of voluntary return of a lost
wallet to its owner was studied. Results from different countries showed a variation from 21 to 100%
returns. Those who returned the wallets cited sympathy and religious principles as reasons (Schmid,
2002, p. 749). It is also interesting that the 100% result was obtained in Norway, which is
distinguished by high ethnic homogeneity. It is possible that the ethnic composition of a society
(collective) affects not only GT (Field, 2003, pp. 77-78), but also GL. Another experiment showed
that a subject who received help from one participant in the experiment tends to help another (Trivers,
1971, p. 53). That is, the subject does not thank his benefactor, but a third person (indirect reciprocity
or "pay it forward"). This can probably be extrapolated to the scale of society.
Concluding thoughts for the section. It can be concluded that SC accumulates not only at the
interpersonal level, but also at the collective one. The trusting aspect already has a solid empirical
and conceptual foundation
7
, while that of liking is only a hypothesis.
Is it possible to explain traditional privileges (favors) like Indian castes in terms of SC? The
author thinks so. A person may be ready to give a compliment to a representative of the highest caste
sincerely, due to the acquired cultural norm (manifestation of Bourdieu’s habitus), or out of
calculation, due to the belief that the absence of a compliment will entail negative consequences. In
the first case, we are dealing with irrational personal liking, reminiscent of aesthetic one, in the second
– with a mutually beneficial exchange (action in exchange for inaction), which is based on general
trust arising, for example, from peer pressure or the law.
8
7
Details of the author's concept of general trust will be given in the article on trust in the context of SC.
8
This is a dubious example of general trust, and possibly incorrect.

Realization of SC
Liking and trust do not make our lives better automatically. This is a potential that still needs
to be realized. How can we turn to our advantage the fact that a person likes us or trusts us? We need
to directly or indirectly induce him or her to do us a favor, calculated or disinterested. If we are liked,
then we can count on a disinterested favor. If we are only trusted, without liking, then we can count
on a calculated favor, which is better than nothing at all.
Possible favors can be divided into two types – sharing of resources and provision of an
ultimate good. As for resources, the author identifies three types of them – physical, human and social
ones. All of them can be transferred in one way or another. First, we can share money, movable and
immovable property. Secondly, knowledge, experience, etc. Thirdly, prestige and reputation
(accumulated liking and trust of others, respectively) – to recommend us to someone, to vouch for us,
to bring us closer to oneself. It is also possible to transfer the social resource by awarding a medal,
conferring a title, or admission to the circle of the elite (for example, to an elite family), since in these
cases the recipient acquires liking or trust in the eyes of others. Bourdieu's idea of the voluntary
delegation of representative status to one or more members of the collective (the head of the family
or the aristocracy) can be seen as a favor to them.
9
They enjoy the liking and / or trust of the collective,
so the latter gives them privileges, including the patrimonization of the resources of the collective
and power over themselves (1986, p. 23).
As for the ultimate good, a person can satisfy any of our needs, or in other words, give us
pleasure. A massage, sex, quenching hunger or thirst, curing illness – all these are examples of
physical good. A joke, a song, or a movie are intellectual goods. A compliment, a hug, a heart-to-
heart conversation is an emotional good. All these things are consumed only once, that is why they
are ultimate goods.
10
If a person likes us, then we can get all these things from her or him for free. If we are dealing
with a calculated favor, then in return we can give something of the above – some resource or an
ultimate good.
Compatibility with other concepts
The present theory complements many already existing concepts well, or allows them to be
incorporated in itself, which was demonstrated by references throughout the text. The author will now
describe compatibility with two of the most well-known conceptualizations.
Bonding, bridging and linking (vertical) social capital. First, the concept of three types of
social capital, namely bonding, bridging and linking ones. The bonding SC is described, on the one
9
This is a bad example, since the mechanics of this process are much more complex and multifaceted.
10
Of course, a joke is also a human resource (knowledge).

hand, in network terms (geographical proximity, similarity of nodes, frequency of contact, etc.)
(Woolcock, 2001), on the other hand, in terms of liking and norms of reciprocity (for example,
solidarity), and thirdly, in terms of benefit (emotional support, redundant resources, etc.). Simply put,
three ideas are united under one concept – structural closeness, emotional closeness and the benefit
of the latter – which the author refers to the infrastructure of SC, to the SC itself and to the realization
of SC, respectively.
The same logic applies to the bridging SC, which includes the ideas of structural and
emotional remoteness, as well as non-redundant resources as a benefit (Burt, 1992; Granovetter,
1973). The conceptualization of linking SC is similar to the bridging one, but includes the idea of
inequality of the parties in one sense or another. That is, the concept of three types of SC and the
author's theory analyze the same elements, but at different angles.
Structural, cognitive, and relational social capital. Another well-known conceptualization
of SC introduces its division into three types – structural, cognitive and relational SC (Nahapiet and
Ghoshal, 1998). In short, structural SC refers to the character of social network as a whole and the
position of ego in it (structural embeddedness according to Granovetter), cognitive SC – to cultural
similarity of people or a common worldview, relational SC – to the quality of relationships, including
trust (relational embeddedness according to Granovetter). The author relates the structural element to
the infrastructure, the relational element to the SC itself, and the cognitive element to the general SC
(general liking and trust).
Conclusion
The ideas listed above have long been familiar to SC researchers, with the exception of one –
the concept of favor willingness. The introduction of this common denominator made it possible to
unite in one concept the rational and irrational facets of SC (calculated and disinterested favors), as
well as to link micro- and macroanalysis (personal and general SC). The present theory appears
concise, which, together with its compatibility with existing concepts, is a good sign. In addition, it
resolves some of the old problems of SC, such as tautology in the definition, biased positivity, and
the inability to reduce various aspects of the SC to a single foundation. The tautology is resolved by
the introduction of the concept of the willingness to do a favor, which at its core has tangible trust
and liking. The presence of this basis breaks the tautological circle. The issue of biased positivity is
resolved by drawing a parallel with other types of capital – money and knowledge can be used both
for good and for evil, but in themselves they are neutral resources. So the willingness of others to
help can be used both for the good of society and for evil. And finally, the problem of the impossibility
of reducing everything to a single basis is resolved by introducing the same concept of favor
willingness, which is the basic resource of SC. It can be accumulated, exchanged, lost, invested, etc.

It can be concluded that many problems and contradictions that exist today in the science of SC are
resolvable and reconcilable.
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The article was submitted on July 15, 2022.
Accepted on August 19, 2022.
Translated from Russian by the author.
Information about the author:
Denis Mond, independent researcher. Moscow, Russia.
e-mail: socapital.mond@yandex.ru
ORCID: 0000-0003-1663-8300