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Die Afrikanische Union und internationale Politik

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Die Afrikanische Union (AU) ist eine intergouvernementale Organisation, der alle Staaten Afrikas angehören und die vor allem in der Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik aber auch in der Wirtschafts-, Handels-, Entwicklungs-, Gesundheits-, Klima- und Wissenschaftspolitik sowie der Förderung von Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Menschenrechten aktiv ist. Die AU-Mitgliedstaaten zeigen sich zwar kooperationswillig und haben der Organisation ein weitreichendes Mandat zur Intervention in Krisen gegeben, das diese auch nutzt. Gleichzeitig sind die Mitglieder jedoch zurückhaltend, Souveränität zu Gunsten der AU abzugeben. Deshalb und weil ihr die finanzielle Basis und die personelle Ausstattung fehlen, kann die AU nicht alle selbstgesteckten Ziele erfüllen.

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This article provides an overview of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in the context of Africa’s current economic and governance crises, the attempt to establish an Africa Union, and the interest in Africa displayed by the G8 leadership and in particular by the UK’s prime minister Tony Blair. NEPAD has to be seen simultaneously as a ‘big idea’, a new way of doing business, and a comprehensive development framework. The ‘big idea’ is to put Africa’s concerns on the table of the G8 and seek a much better deal for Africa in terms of international aid, debt relief and access to markets. The new way of doing business is a new form of ‘enhanced’ development partnership that makes both donor and recipient mutually accountable for development outcomes. The development framework is a long—and expanding—list of programmes and projects, akin to those that have been tried before. The heart of NEPAD is a commitment to good governance, operationalized through a radical plan for ‘peer review’ of governance performance. This promises a radical new approach to development partnership, but it also faces political hazards. The governance component is also analysed in the context of the pan–Africa institutions envisaged by the African Union. There is a need for coordinating and rationalizing peace and security initiatives. NEPAD may unlock additional financing for development, but it should not be seen as a cash cow. The challenges for NEPAD include opening up the process to make it more participatory, including greater focus on HIV/AIDS. NEPAD faces the real danger of being over–sold and of raising unrealistic expectations among Africans. It is, nevertheless, an outstanding opportunity for Africa’s development.
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This article employs the concepts of security culture and norm localization to explore some of the cultural dimensions of the African Union's (AU) security policies. After providing an overview of constructivist accounts of norm socialization in international relations, I use these insights to analyse the origins and development of the AU's security culture. The final two sections explore the ongoing process of norm localization in relation to the two most recent tenets of the AU's security culture: intolerance of unconstitutional changes of government and the responsibility to protect principle. An awareness of the uneven and contested nature of this process helps account for the fact that although these two transnational norms have been institutionalized in the AU Charter and endorsed by the United Nations, they have been internalized unevenly by the AU's member states. External advocates of these two norms would thus do well to help the continent's norm entrepreneurs build congruence between these norms and the AU's security culture.
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No Plagued by bloody wars and armed conflicts, political instability, communal violence and displaced persons, and at the mercy of natural catastrophes such as drought and famine, it is not surprising that the Western press has long dismissed Africa as the 'hopeless continent'. In the face of these challenges, Africa today is faced with a stark choice: either unite or perish. The debate on why and how the continent should unite in terms of co-operative peace, security and development is more urgent than at any other time in Africa's post-colonial history. Moving forward from the failure of the earlier, typically idealistic Africa unity project, David Francis demonstrates how peace and security challenges have created the imperative for change. He argues that a series of regional peace and security systems are emerging, and that states that have participated in practical experiments in regional peacekeeping, peace support operations, conflict stabilization/management and preventive diplomacy are building de facto systems of peace and security that could be institutionalized and extended.