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The agency of secondary states in order transition in the Indo-Pacific
Abstract
The liberal international order (LIO) is now in a complex crisis. Its legitimacy and sustainability are put to the test with the growth of deglobalization forces, the rise of emerging powers dissatisfied with the LIO designed by the US, and climate change and the global pandemic. The crisis of the LIO is particularly salient in the Indo-Pacific, the epicenter of the US-China strategic competition, and secondary states in this region are increasingly concerned about its geopolitical consequences. However, I argue that secondary states often treated as the pawns of great powers can turn this circumstance to their advantage by adopting various strategies that maximize their leverage. We should take seriously the possibility that secondary states, by which I denote all states that are weaker or smaller than the hegemonic state and the rising power, can shape the contours of the US-China strategic competition and the newly emerging international order in the Indo-Pacific region. Preoccupied with great power politics, the existing literature on order transition has neglected the fact that secondary states can develop and exercise their own agency. Moreover, it remains vague what agency means in IR and how secondary states enact it. Against this backdrop, I propose an analytical framework that unpacks various types of agency along three dimensions—the motivation of agency, the type of mobilized resources, and the availability of partners. It will help us explain how weaker and smaller states participate and make their voice in reshaping international order in the Indo-Pacific.
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Small states are crucial actors in world politics. Yet, they have been relegated to a second tier of International Relations scholarship. In A Small State's Guide to Influence in World Politics, Tom Long shows how small states can identify opportunities and shape effective strategies to achieve their foreign policy goals. To do so, Long puts small states' relationships at the center of his approach. Although small states are defined by their position as materially weaker actors vis-a-vis large states, Long argues that this condition does not condemn them to impotence or irrelevance. Drawing on typological theory, Long builds an explanation of when and how small states might achieve their goals. The book assesses a global range of cases-both successes and failures-and offers a set of tools for scholars and policymakers to understand how varying international conditions shape small states' opportunities for influence.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) currently faces a series of major, historically unprecedented, challenges. Perhaps the most consequential of these new threats is the intensifying strategic, economic, and even institutional competition between the United States and China. ASEAN's rather predictable response to this geopolitical contest has been to “hedge” and avoid choosing between the two great powers. While this strategy may be understandable, it threatens to undermine ASEAN's much vaunted “centrality” and the geopolitical and diplomatic relevance of the organization as a whole. This article explores the background to these developments and Southeast Asia's relationship with both the United States and China. I argue that the limited impact of ASEAN-style multilateralism helps to explain why great powers are creating alternative forums or simply paying lip service to the notion of ASEAN centrality.
This introductory article provides rationales and contextual background for the special issue which examines how weak states in Asia actualise and exercise their agency in the twenty-first century regional or global environments. The article opens with a consideration of why attention is drawn to the agency of the weak. Weak states are often treated as ‘objects’ of international politics rather than ‘subjects’, and their foreign policy actions are commonly taken to be ‘reflexive’ of external constraints, such as fluctuations in the balance of power in the international system. We disagree with this view. We argue that weak actors can demonstrate varieties of agency regardless of their position in the international system in terms of material capabilities. To clarify this point, the article reflects on the changed and changing global and regional environments and order. Rather than seeing them through the lens of great power politics and its signature concept of ‘polarity’, the article offers an alternative notion, namely a ‘multiplex’ world, and identifies the key nature of order therein: multiplicity and fluidity. Both material and normative power have already and continue to become fragmented, decentralised, and dispersed within and across states. While emphasising that such a multifaceted and fluid world opens up a wide avenue of agency for weak actors, this article also notes that the weak has varieties of agency as potentials.
For decades, globalization and the liberal international order evolved side by side. Recently, however, deglobalizing forces have been on the rise and the liberal international order has come to be increasingly beleaguered. The special issue ‘Deglobalization? The future of the liberal international order’ examines the interconnectedness of globalization and deglobalization processes on the one hand and the trajectory of the liberal international order on the other. This introduction provides a conceptual frame for the articles to follow. It discusses globalization and deglobalization processes, compares how they have been intertwined with the liberal international order in the past and presently, and explores how these differences are likely to affect the future of world politics. The special issue makes three important contributions. First, we examine globalization and deglobalization processes systematically. Second, we break new ground in studying the future of international order. Third, we generate novel insights into epochal change.
This article examines how the ASEAN is managing the quintessential security challenges of the 21st century, particularly China’s emergence as a regional power, its expansive territorial claim in the South China Sea, and the US–China strategic rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region. As an organization tackling these security concerns, the ASEAN lacks the essential mechanism for conflict resolution, operates through informal diplomacy and moral suasion, and relies on consensus in making decisions. As a result, China has effectively divided the association during the talks on the peaceful settlement of the South China Sea dispute. China is currently formulating with the ASEAN a Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. All the same, China has made sure that any future agreement with the ASEAN imposes no constraints on its expansionist moves in the contested waters, and contains provisions that benefit its interests in the long run. Meanwhile, US–China strategic competition has prompted the ASEAN to think of ways to deal with this potential security threat. However, the association has failed to come up with a common strategy. In conclusion, this article argues that China’s emergence as a regional power, its maritime expansion into the South China Sea, and the US–China geopolitical contest are testing both the capacity and the limits of the ASEAN in resolving these security issues.
Revisionism is an important concept in international relations discourse, and it is especially prevalent in discussions about relations between China and the United States in the context of a possible power transition. Yet, this concept has until recently not received the systematic research attention that it deserves. We present in this essay different strategies that a revisionist state may pursue. It builds on recent scholarship by other colleagues and is drawn from a larger project of ours to study revisionism historically and develop it conceptually. We argue that military conquest and subversion—or in our terminology, hard revisionism—have become less likely in today’s world compared to the past. Instead, different approaches of soft revisionism intended to advance institutional changes should be given more attention. We provide a typology of these soft revisionist strategies and offer examples from recent Chinese and US conduct to illustrate them.
The Liberal International Order (LIO) is currently being undermined not only by states such as Russia but also by voters in the West. We argue that both veins of discontent are driven by resentment towards the LIO's status hierarchy, rather than just economic grievances. Approaching discontent historically and sociologically, we show that there are two strains of recognition struggles against the LIO: one in the core of the West, driven by populist politicians and their voters, and one on the semi-periphery, fuelled by competitively authoritarian governments and their supporters. At this particular moment in history, these struggles are digitally, ideologically and organisationally interconnected in their criticism of LIO institutions, amplifying each other. The LIO is thus being hollowed out from within at a time when it is also facing some of its greatest external challenges.
This chapter provides an overview of research on small state politics and discusses the dilemmas, challenges and opportunities of small states. The chapter discusses definitions of small states focusing on small states as non-great powers, as defined by the material capabilities and as political constructs. Baldacchino and Wivel present a pragmatic working definition identifying two characteristics of small states: 1) small states are states that are characterized by the limited capacity of their political, economic and administrative systems, and 2) small states typically find themselves as the weaker part in asymmetric relationships and unable to change power configuration and its institutional expression. They start from this definition to draw the contours of the political space inhabited by small states by identifying three dilemmas of small state politics in order to briefly identify some of the challenges that these states share because they are small. They explain the structure of the book and sum up the major findings and draw lessons from the analyses of the book to identify a number of promising future research trajectories on the politics of small states before the chapter is concluded. The chapter is available for download at the homepage of the publisher Edward Elgar https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781788112925/9781788112925.xml
Japan's primary objective of the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy is to shape and consolidate regional order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing rules-based international order. The concept initially aimed to achieve two different objectives—shaping a regional order in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the defence of Japan; however, Japan has gradually shifted its strategic focus onto the former, separating national defence from the FOIP concept, which reflects a change in the degree of its commitment to the two objectives. On the one hand, as its overall security strategy, Japan has determined to steadily enhance its national defence by increasing its own defence capabilities and strengthening the US–Japan alliance, while transforming its partnerships with like-minded states, such as Australia and India, into a diplomatic, and potentially military, alignment. This has been brought about by shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. On the other hand, as part of its FOIP strategy, Japan's attempts to build a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific region aim to defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from challengers, particularly China. Yet, given the strategic uncertainty over Japan's international coalition-building efforts to create a new regional order, Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states' responses, understand their perspectives, and change its strategic emphases accordingly—so-called ‘tactical hedging’. Japan has pursued similar means to achieve the two key objectives. Nevertheless, the country's core interest, the defence of Japan, is more imperative than building a regional order in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan faces different types of challenges in the future.
Although the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has become popular in the foreign policy discourse of some countries, we have yet to see any significant institution-building in the Indo-Pacific region. Borrowing insights from functional institutionalism and political leadership studies of international regimes, we introduce a ‘leadership–institution’ model to explore the problems and prospects of institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific. Through a comparative case study of the institutionalization of the Asia–Pacific vs the Indo-Pacific, we argue that two crucial factors contributed to the slow institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific as a regional system in world politics: the lack of ideational leadership from an epistemic community and the weak executive leadership from a powerful state. While ideational leaders can help states identify and expand common interests in cooperation, executive leadership will facilitate states to overcome operational obstacles in cooperation, such as the ‘collective action’ problem and the ‘relative gains’ concern. The future of institution-building in the Indo-Pacific will depend on whether and how these two leadership roles are played by scholars and states in the region. In the conclusion, we discuss the challenges of institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific and highlight China as a wild card in the future of Indo-Pacific regionalism.
The future of Taiwan, a flourishing liberal democracy and vibrant economy, is anything but secure. China, regarding it as a renegade province, has not renounced the use of military force to resolve the standoff. Taiwan must deter China’s aggression, taking steps to convince Chinese leaders that the costs of waging war on Taiwan will outweigh any possible benefits. In a new monograph, “A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture,” a team of researchers at George Mason University and the University of Waterloo examine a holistic strategy that Taiwan can use to enhance its conventional deterrence posture. Their conclusions are simple but radical: Taiwan must intensely prepare an asymmetric deterrence and challenge orthodoxies in its strategic thinking.
Neoclassical realism is an important new approach to international relations. Focusing on the interaction of the international system and the internal dynamics of states, neoclassical realism seeks to explain the grand strategies of individual states as opposed to recurrent patterns of international outcomes. This book offers the first systematic survey of the neoclassical realist approach. The editors lead a group of senior and emerging scholars in presenting a variety of neoclassical realist approaches to states' grand strategies. They examine the central role of the 'state' and seek to explain why, how, and under what conditions the internal characteristics of states intervene between their leaders' assessments of international threats and opportunities, and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies those leaders are likely to pursue.
The agent-structure problem is a much discussed issue in the field of international relations. In his comprehensive 2006 analysis of this problem, Colin Wight deconstructs the accounts of structure and agency embedded within differing IR theories and, on the basis of this analysis, explores the implications of ontology - the metaphysical study of existence and reality. Wight argues that there are many gaps in IR theory that can only be understood by focusing on the ontological differences that construct the theoretical landscape. By integrating the treatment of the agent-structure problem in IR theory with that in social theory, Wight makes a positive contribution to the problem as an issue of concern to the wider human sciences. At the most fundamental level politics is concerned with competing visions of how the world is and how it should be, thus politics is ontology.
This article revisits the conceptualisation of (regional) order in International Relations (IR) theory to illuminate key aspects of Japan’s order-building role in the Indo-Pacific. The framework is based upon a multi-dimensional understanding of regional order-building allowing for an examination of Japan’s vision for a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) policy ‘vision’, the challenges it faces as a secondary power, and its conduct as an emerging entrepreneurial power in the Indo-Pacific. The article’s central argument is that Japan’s order-building should be understood in the context of the country’s deeper strategic situation and, in particular, its position as a secondary, but still highly influential, power. This has implications for understanding Japan’s approach to international order and how it might deploy norm entrepreneurship in shaping the new Indo-Pacific order.
By way of introduction, the chapter discusses how the Indo-Pacific has emerged as the world’s economic and strategic centre of gravity, where increasing competition between established and rising powers co-exists with the process of deepening globalisation. The re-casting of the Asia–Pacific as the Indo-Pacific reflects the rise of geo-political and geo-economic rivalry in the region during the early twenty-first century. These new dynamics converge with a growing number of problems that do not respect borders. Given this complex context, the chapter also discusses what diplomacy means, how it relates to foreign policy, and how it has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, the chapter introduces the contributions to the volume which brings together a unique combination of scholars and seasoned practitioners from within and beyond the region. In their contributions they analyse and discuss how interests, institutions, and issues affect, and are affected by, the transition from Asia–Pacific to Indo-Pacific.
In response to a rapidly changing Asia–Pacific, Japan has formulated a number of foreign policy strategies over the past two decades. Particular focus is given to Tokyo’s ‘value-oriented diplomacy’ and ‘proactive pacifism’ that became a central element in the first and the current second Abe Administration’s foreign policy strategies, respectively. While these strategic initiatives aimed at strengthening Japan’s influence by fostering a closer co-operation based on shared ‘universal values’ with like-minded countries, they are best understood in the context of an increasingly complex economic-security architecture across the Asia–Pacific that has seen a growingly assertive China and a declining US influence. This chapter’s conclusion addresses whether Tokyo’s strategies might imply a paradigm shift in Japanese diplomacy going forward.
This article elaborates on the following two questions and their implications. First, how can we as analysts offer compelling explanations for weak states’ agency and behaviours in the current global political and economic environments marked by multiplicity and fluidity? Second, what are the major causal factors that enable or influence weak actors’ agency, and under what conditions is their agency facilitated or constrained? Although an extensive literature in the discipline of International Relations (IR) confirms that today’s world is highly complex and diverse in terms of who or what matters in global politics, the subject of weak states and their agency is still not adequately discussed. Furthermore, the issues of methodology and theorising for the subject remain uncharted territory. By reflecting upon the main arguments and empirical findings of our special issue, this concluding article makes a case for ‘open-ended’ analytic eclecticism as an alternative methodological/analytical scheme, and lays preliminary ground for theorising weak states’ agency in the changed and changing global environments in the twenty-first century.
Current discourse on International Relations conflates international order and the interstate distribution of power. Many studies fail to clarify the concept of international order or to provide systematic empirical analysis that compares states' conduct in relation to this order. The prevailing tendency relies instead on rhetorical assertion or definitional fiat to attribute revisionist and status-quo motivations to different countries. For example, power-transition theory claims that rising states are typically revisionist, whereas established states are committed to the status quo. This article presents a contrarian view, arguing that the dominant or established state can be a revisionist. This state is not forever committed to those rules and institutions of international order that it has played a decisive role in fostering. Conversely, a rising state is not inevitably bent on challenging the order that has enabled its ascendance. Revisionism is thus not unique to a rising power; moreover, this state is not destined to be a challenger to international order and an instigator of systemic war as typically depicted in the current literature. I advance these propositions in the context of recent conduct by China and the US, suggesting that whereas China has become less revisionist over time (even while its power has increased), the US has become more so especially during the Trump administration. The major impetus challenging the liberal international order has come more from domestic sources in the West than from China.
Donald Trump’s presidency and his “America First” approach to world affairs have shaken US relations with China, Japan, Russia, Australia, India, and other Indo-Pacific countries, generating public expressions of concern, anxiety, and confusion on the part of regional powers. Washington’s inconsistent and contradictory pronouncements and demands have forced other states to struggle to adjust their foreign, trade, and security policies. This chapter examines Japan’s responses to the Trump presidency in the economic-trade and political-security policy areas, eclectically drawing on elements of realism, liberalism, and constructivism. On the one hand, Tokyo steadfastly defended Japan’s economic interests against the threats of tariffs in bilateral trade talks and played a leading role in trade and investment liberalization through multilateral institutions, most prominently in promoting the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and WTO reforms. On the other hand, the Abe administration endorsed US summit diplomacy with North Korea and accepted Washington’s call for greater sharing of defense and international security roles on the part of Japan and other US allies in the region. Moreover, Abe launched the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) initiative for promoting the establishment of a rules-based order to govern international relations in the region, in part as a hedging move to counter the rising power of China and in part to keep the United States engaged in regional affairs. Also, Abe actively promoted the Quadrilateral Dialogue Partnership (the “Quad”) as a minilateral regional framework, also designed to check China’s influence and ensure US’s commitment to ensuring regional security. Thus, Japan defended its economic interests bilaterally and multilaterally while retaining its identity as a junior partner in the security alliance with the United States. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the likely direction the new Biden administration will go in its engagement in the region..
This paper examines how the economic growth imperative not only drives climate change and created the conditions for the development and spread of the COVID-19 pandemic but is also the context for climate change inaction and ineffective responses to the pandemic. Focusing on the United States, the paper identifies pretenses for collective inaction on COVID-19 that are similar in content to familiar justifications for delay in climate action: (1) denialism, (2) individualism, and (3) techno-optimism. These justifications must be identified as strategies to maintain the status-quo and benefit the wealthy few while allowing avoidable human suffering and loss. Adequately addressing climate change and future pandemics requires overcoming these false narratives and transitioning to social conditions that are resilient, healthy, and sustainable – specifically conditions where social and ecological well-being are prioritized over economic growth for the sake of profit maximization.
As International Organization commemorates its seventy-fifth anniversary, the Liberal International Order (LIO) that authors in this journal have long analyzed is under challenge, perhaps as never before. The articles in this issue explore the nature of these challenges by examining how the Westphalian order and the LIO have co-constituted one another over time; how both political and economic dynamics internal to the LIO threaten its core aspects; and how external threats combine with these internal dynamics to render the LIO more fragile than ever before. This introduction begins by defining and clarifying what is “liberal,” “international,” and “orderly” about the LIO. It then discusses some central challenges to the LIO, illustrated by the contributors to this issue as well as other sources. Finally, we reflect on the analytical lessons we have learned—or should learn—as the study of the LIO, represented by scholarship in International Organization , has sometimes overlooked or marginalized dynamics that now appear central to the functioning, and dysfunction, of the order itself.
The idea of liberal international order as a world order is understood to be constituted as a result of disproportionate Anglo-American influences. This is in line with much of international relations (IR) theory, which typically characterizes the emergence of order as resulting from the diffusion or imposition of norms and institutions from the world's centers of power. This article argues otherwise, its premise being that the international order founded on sovereign equal nation-states was co-constituted as well by the influence of relatively weak actors through decentralized processes of contestation over core international norms. Drawing on international relations, history, and law, this article outlines a framework to interpret the actions and mechanisms by which supposedly weak actors shaped international order. It concisely traces the constitution of order as based on its fundamental norms and assesses the implications of the argument for the current crisis of liberal order, as well as IR theory more broadly, laying out a research agenda for the future.
With the future of liberal internationalism in question, how will China's growing power and influence reshape world politics? We argue that views of the Liberal International Order (LIO) as integrative and resilient have been too optimistic for two reasons. First, China's ability to profit from within the system has shaken the domestic consensus in the United States on preserving the existing LIO. Second, features of Chinese Communist Party rule chafe against many of the fundamental principles of the LIO, but could coexist with a return to Westphalian principles and markets that are embedded in domestic systems of control. How, then, do authoritarian states like China pick and choose how to engage with key institutions and norms within the LIO? We propose a framework that highlights two domestic variables—centrality and heterogeneity—and their implications for China's international behavior. We illustrate the framework with examples from China's approach to climate change, trade and exchange rates, Internet governance, territorial sovereignty, arms control, and humanitarian intervention. Finally, we conclude by considering what alternative versions of international order might emerge as China's influence grows.
The Trump administration has worked to restrict the People's Republic of China's ability to manufacture and acquire semiconductor chips since 2018. Caught in the crossfire of this burgeoning tech war is Taiwan, which is home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world's largest semiconductor chip manufacturer. With the United States banning companies that use U.S. technology in their chip manufacturing process from doing business with Huawei, TSMC can no longer do business with the Chinese tech company, one of its most important clients. Until the Trump administration announced the license restriction on Huawei, TSMC had managed to walk the fine line of doing business with both China and the United States, without riling either. This article argues that the TSMC example is indicative of how great power competition between the two countries will play out for the foreseeable future. TSMC has announced that it will build a new factory in Arizona as it faces Chinese firms poaching its employees and Chinese actors hacking its systems and code for trade secrets—all actions demonstrating how great power competition will play out for tech dominance. Avoiding direct live-fire conflict, China and the United States will work to restrict the other's actions and development by forcing important tech companies, such as TSMC, into picking a side.
Recent scholarship suggests that the thawing of diplomatic relations between China and Japan has caused a readjustment of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative and Tokyo's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision towards an emerging complementarity. Through careful process-tracking, elite interviews, and analysis of Chinese and Japanese primary sources, this article instead demonstrates how, outside of the East Asian spotlight, Sino-Japanese geo-economic competition continues in South Asia and the Mekong subregion, fueled by power politics and a mutual distrust of each other's initiatives. On the basis of this evidence, this article qualifies Sino-Japanese interactions as a quest and denial for spheres of influence, whereas the Japanese government aims at denying Chinese spheres of influence. In doing so, this article highlights how Japanese proactivism from Sri Lanka to Thailand, via infrastructure and government financing, has become a driver of growing non-traditional security cooperation with India, the U.S., and Australia.
The rise of and increasing assertiveness by China presents a significant structural challenge in the Indo-Pacific region (IPR). In an effort to retain the status quo, a number of states have signed-up to the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP). In support of FOIP, operational mechanisms have emerged—most importantly the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The United States, Japan, Australia and India have come together in this informal format to exchange views on current security challenges and coordinate their strategic approaches. This article analyses both form and function of Quad and argues that both the diplomatic and military arrangements between Quad members are a direct response to ever-increasing Chinese assertiveness. Alongside a detailed empirical analysis of Quad, this paper addresses the question why Quad 2.0 will thrive although previous attempts at security networks failed. Balance of threat theory will illuminate why informal quasi-alliances vis-à-vis China are going to be the structural new normal for the IPR.
This article examines the new prominence accorded to the “Indo-Pacific” (IP) concept in the strategic narratives championed by the US and its closest allies, (Japan and Australia), and then juxtaposes this with the responses of other key regional powers. To this purpose, Part I distils a concise conceptual model encompassing three interlocking facets – mental maps, political/ideological drivers, and visions of regional order – designed to structure the following empirical analyses. Part II then accesses this model to reveal how these facets are reflected in the discursive and policy-making practices of the US and its close allies, as embodied in their (combined) regional strategies. Next, Part III considers how a cross-section of major states in the region – India, South Korea, and China - have responded to this enterprise, to determine the degree to which they have adopted, accommodated or opposed the IP concept, or otherwise propose national alternatives to the US-centered project. It concludes that the IP concept is not simply an objective geopolitical descriptor, but rather a controversial and contested discursive field, subject to multiple interpretations. Such a polarizing concept will likely contribute to further sharpening of strategic mistrust and geopolitical competition amongst the region’s major powers.
The Covid-19 pandemic has undermined many of our everyday certainties to such an extent that we should expect significant changes in the functioning of our societies from here onward. Increasingly, it is hoped that in this process of transformation the challenges of climate change will be addressed even if, to date, they have been considered with much less urgency than the pandemic. Here it is proposed that, despite certain important differences, the Covid-19 pandemic and climate change both follow a pattern from causal factors to effects that may be typical of the Anthropocene. Given these parallels, it is suggested that, on the basis of the increasing and cumulative impacts of climate change on planetary life conditions, we have as much or more reason to take quick and effective action on this challenge as on the Covid-19 pandemic.
The strategic values of the South China Sea had long been recognized. More recently, the South China Sea has once again become an international flashpoint, as disputes take place in the context of a rising and perceived more assertive People’s Republic of China (China) vis-à-vis a relatively declining US that seeks to retain its influence and interests in East Asia. This paper tries to illustrate the growing strategic role of international law in the geopolitics of the South China Sea at play — a subject matter that has so far been less explored — and to assess how the intensified legal maneuvers, or “lawfare” between China on the one hand, and other South China Sea claimants as well as the US on the other, reflect China’s attitude toward the South China Sea dispute and may impact upon the peace and security in the region. It concludes that the “lawfare” since 2009, especially the South China Sea arbitration proceedings initiated by the Philippines, may have not only increased the uncertainties of China’s behavior and China–US relations, but also made the situations in both East and South China seas more complicated. Moreover, China’s responses in the “lawfare” also suggest that China has become more “rule-of-law oriented” as well as hegemonic. The dual images of China raise some uncertainty as to how the South China Sea disputes might eventually be resolved.
War and Change in World Politics introduces the reader to an important new theory of international political change. Arguing that the fundamental nature of international relations has not changed over the millennia, Professor Gilpin uses history, sociology, and economic theory to identify the forces causing change in the world order. The discussion focuses on the differential growth of power in the international system and the result of this unevenness. A shift in the balance of power - economic or military - weakens the foundations of the existing system, because those gaining power see the increasing benefits and the decreasing cost of changing the system. The result, maintains Gilpin, is that actors seek to alter the system through territorial, political, or economic expansion until the marginal costs of continuing change are greater than the marginal benefits. When states develop the power to change the system according to their interests they will strive to do so- either by increasing economic efficiency and maximizing mutual gain, or by redistributing wealth and power in their own favour.
This article examines whether the Asia-Pacific region’s geopolitical vicissitudes are causing Japan to ‘hedge’ against deepening uncertainty and risk through major strategic realignments or diversification of security and economic ties, as the original hedging literature would expect. It examines trends since 2009 in three domains fundamental to identifying whether shifts are underway in Japan’s strategic orientation vis-à-vis China: security policy (primary), trade/investment, and public opinion. Despite deepening uncertainty (and volatility), especially in ‘the Trump era’, this study finds negligible evidence of hedging behavior: e.g., realigning toward Beijing or adopting a ‘middle position’, much less developing any meaningful security ties with China. Rather, contemporary trends point in the opposite direction: Japan’s China strategy primarily centers on strengthening indigenous deterrence capabilities, bolstering the US–Japan alliance, and diversifying regional security ties beyond Beijing. Even the latter, somewhat paradoxically, aims to deepen ties with Washington and to keep it actively engaged in regional affairs.
Unlike the common view that sees FOIP as a containment strategy against China, this article argues that Japan’s FOIP vision seeks to maintain an open and inclusive regional order that incorporates all regional countries into a common framework. To realize such a vision, Japan has strengthened its regional order-building efforts with other regional like-minded countries. However, such efforts have limitations in terms of the resource shortage, legal constraints, and the lack of regional consensus. Unless Japan can address these challenges, the FOIP would end up being a mere utopian dream, rather than a meaningful vision or strategy that can prevent the emergence of a Cold War and maintain an inclusive and rules-based order in the region.
In the twenty-first century, the Indo-Pacific region has become the new centre of the world. The concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’’, though still under construction, is a potentially pivotal site, where various institutions and intellectuals of statecraft are seeking common ground on which to anchor new regional coalitions, alliances, and allies to better serve their respective national agendas. This book explores the Indo-Pacific as an ambiguous and hotly contested regional security construction. It critically examines the major drivers behind the revival of classical geopolitical concepts and their deployment through different national lenses. The book also analyses the presence of India and the US in the Indo-Pacific, and the manner in which China has reacted to their positions in the Indo-Pacific to date. It suggests that national constructions of the Indo-Pacific region are more informed by domestic political realities, anti-Chinese bigotries, distinctive properties of twenty-first century US hegemony, and narrow nation-statist sentiments rather than genuine pan-regional aspirations. The book argues that the spouting of contested depictions of the Indo-Pacific region depend on the fixed geostrategic lenses of nation-states, but what is also important is the re-emergence of older ideas—a classical conceptual revival—based on early to mid-twentieth century geopolitical ideas in many of these countries. The book deliberately raises the issue of the sea and constructions of ‘nature’, as these symbols are indispensable parts of many of these Indo-Pacific regional narratives.
This article assesses how south-east Asian countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have responded to the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategies promoted by the United States and the other countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the ‘Quad’: US, Japan, Australia and India). Their nuanced ripostes imply a persistent commitment to hedging and shifting limited alignments in the face of growing great rivalry and the lack of a clear FOIP vision among Quad members. In the face of external pressure to take sides, the ASEAN states are likely to keep hedging through working selectively with China and the United States. Given the United States' apparent preference to balance China and Trump's disregard for multilateralism, ASEAN's ability to maintain its centrality in the evolving regional architecture is in doubt—despite the Quad countries' (belated) accommodation of ASEAN in their FOIP strategies. However, the success of the US strategy depends on Washington's ability to build and sustain the requisite coalition to balance Beijing. ASEAN has undertaken efforts to enhance bilateral security collaboration with China and the United States respectively. In doing so, ASEAN is arguably seeking to informally redefine its centrality in an era of Great Power discord and its ramifications for multilateralism.
This research offers a policy analysis of the post‐Arbitration geopolitics in the South China Sea (SCS). It aims, first, to lay out the particular internal and external factors that have led to noticeable changes in the Philippines and Vietnam's SCS policies, and, second, to explore the implications of the ongoing shift in the regional politics for the East Asian strategic landscape. In this regard, two distinct tendencies with respect to geopolitical transformations are highlighted: while some actors are observed to put more emphasis on security and seek strategic diversification, others appear to put more emphasis on development and seek economic diversification.
en This article investigates the Philippines' puzzling reversal of its position against China following its victory in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on maritime claims in the South China Sea. Instead of asserting its de jure sovereign rights, which were reaffirmed by the PCA's decision, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte instead opted to build stronger relations with China. Proposing a burden sharing analytical approach, the article argues that the Philippines is using China as leverage in its alliance with the United States. By exploiting the “China Card” and downplaying the arbitration case, the Philippines has extracted concessions from Beijing and Washington. In capitalizing on the Sino‐American rivalry, Manila has reaffirmed its strategic value within the U.S.‒Philippines alliance while benefitting more visibly from Chinese foreign aid and investment pledges. However, the Philippines’ policy posture vis‐à‐vis China reflects short‐term diplomatic and economic tactics rather than an enduring strategic reorientation away from the United States.
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战略重心偏向中国：一项关于菲律宾南海政策转变的批判分析
本研究审视了常设仲裁法院（PCA）就南海海事主张判决菲律宾赢得胜利后，菲方在反对中国立场上出现的令人困惑的反转局势。与宣称其法定主权（由PCA判决再次确认）相反的是，菲律宾总统罗德里戈·杜特尔特选择与中国建立更强的外交关系。本文就压力分担提出一种分析法，主张菲律宾通过中国对其与美国的联盟关系施加影响。通过利用“中国这张牌”，同时对仲裁案加以轻视，菲律宾已从北京方面和华盛顿方面获取了让步。通过利用中美之间的对抗，马尼拉方面已再次确认了其在美菲联盟中的战略价值，同时从中国的外交援助和投资承诺中获得更多可见的利益。然而，菲律宾对待中国的政策态势反映了短期的外交策略和经济策略，而不是持久的战略调整（远离美国）。
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El giro hacia China: Un análisis crítico del cambio de política de Filipinas con respecto al mar del sur de China
Este estudio investiga el desconcertante cambio de posición de Filipinas contra China luego de su victoria en la Corte Permanente de Arbitraje (PCA) sobre reclamos marítimos en el Mar Meridional de China. En lugar de afirmar sus derechos soberanos de jure, que fueron reafirmados por la decisión de la PCA, el presidente filipino Rodrigo Duterte optó por construir relaciones más fuertes con China. Al proponer un enfoque analítico para compartir la carga, argumenta que Filipinas está utilizando a China como palanca en su alianza con los Estados Unidos (EE. UU.). Al explotar la "Tarjeta China" y minimizar el caso de arbitraje, Filipinas ha obtenido concesiones de Beijing y Washington. Al capitalizar la rivalidad chino‐estadounidense, Manila ha reafirmado su valor estratégico dentro de la alianza entre Estados Unidos y Filipinas, mientras se beneficia más visiblemente de la ayuda exterior china y las promesas de inversión. Sin embargo, la postura política de Filipinas frente a China refleja tácticas diplomáticas y económicas a corto plazo en lugar de una reorientación estratégica duradera fuera de los Estados Unidos.
The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) is the most important feature of Japan’s foreign policy under the Abe Administration. One of the most important questions is whether this vision aims to contain a rapidly rising China. Along with the amelioration of the relationship between Japan and China, this diplomatic strategy has been evolved from the quadrilateral security cooperation among leading democracies in this region, namely the US, Japan, Australia, and India, to a more comprehensive regional cooperation. This article regards the latter diplomatic strategic as the “FOIP 2.0” and that there emerges a possible harmony between Japan’s FOIP and China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Does the rule of law matter to maritime security? One way into the question is to examine whether states show a discursive commitment that maritime security practices must comply with international law. International law thus provides tools for argument for or against the validity of certain practices. The proposition is thus not only that international law matters to maritime security, but legal argument does too. In this article, these claims will be explored in relation to the South China Sea dispute. The dispute involves Chinese claims to enjoy special rights within the ‘nine-dash line’ on official maps which appears to lay claim to much of the South China Sea. Within this area sovereignty remains disputed over numerous islands and other maritime features. Many of the claimant states have engaged in island-building activities, although none on the scale of China. Ideas matter in such contests, affecting perceptions of reality and of what is possible. International law provides one such set of ideas. Law may be a useful tool in consolidating gains or defeating a rival's claims. For China, law is a key domain in which it is seeking to consolidate control over the South China Sea. The article places the relevant Chinese legal arguments in the context of China's historic engagement with the law of the sea. It argues that the flaw in China's approach has been to underestimate the extent to which it impinges on other states' national interests in the maritime domain, interests they conceptualize in legal terms.
Unimensional accounts of revisionism – those that align states along a single continuum from supporting the status quo to seeking a complete overhaul of the international system – miss important variation between a desire to alter the balance of military power and a desire to alter other elements of international order. We propose a two-dimensional property space that generates four ideal types: status-quo actors, who are satisfied with both order and the distribution of power; reformist actors, who are fine with the current distribution of power but seek to change elements of order; positionalist actors, who see no reason to alter the international order but do aim to shift the distribution of power; and revolutionary actors, who want to overturn both international order and the distribution of capabilities. This framework helps make sense of a number of important debates about hegemony and international order, such as the possibility of revisionist hegemonic powers, controversies over the concept of ‘soft balancing’, and broader dynamics of international goods substitution during power transitions.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has preferred to avoid entanglement in Great Power competition since its inception in 1967. The 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration captured ASEAN’s aspiration to keep Southeast Asia neutral and free of external interference. ZOPFAN accommodated divergent strategic outlooks within ASEAN while avoiding the legalities associated with the concept of neutrality. While no consensus was ever reached on ZOPFAN’s specific application, neutrality is continually mentioned as a critical factor in ASEAN’s success. The article argues that ASEAN neutrality is defined by impartiality and autonomy, and that this concept has evolved over time as its specific meaning has changed due to shifting geopolitical circumstances. At the organization’s inception, and during the bipolarity of the Cold War, ASEAN’s focus was on autonomy. However, since the early 2000s, the emphasis has evolved to impartiality due to increasing multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific region. The concept of neutrality has been tested in recent years with the intensification of the South China Sea dispute.
International Relations literature often refers to states’ motivations as revisionist or status-quo oriented. Such attributions are especially prevalent in discourse on the power-transition theory, suggesting that the danger of war rises when a revisionist China catches up to a status-quo US. Such attributions, however, are rarely supported by systematic evidence providing a direct comparison of Chinese and US conduct. We undertake an analysis of how these countries have behaved differently over time according to their policy pronouncements, their participation in international institutions and agreements, and their voting in the United Nations. Our analysis challenges the conventional wisdom that a rising power tends to be revisionist whereas an incumbent hegemon is invariably committed to the defense of the international order.