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Analyzing the effect of customer demands on supply chain profit in a dual-channel pricing model (Persian Language)

Authors:

Abstract

Pricing is one of the most important decisions made in the supply chain that has a significant impact on the profit of the entire Supply chain. In order to increase the market share and attract more customers, most of the organizations use other channels to present their products and services besides the traditional supply. For a supply chain with more than one sales channel, product pricing for each channel is an important decision-making process. In the upcoming research provided a pricing model between retail and chain channels, taking into account the discount in the chain channel and the revenue sharing contract between the chain stores and the supplier, with the aim of maximizing the supplier profit. In the following, while presenting a numerical example and obtaining each of the values of the decision variables using GAMS software, the results will be analyzed. The sensitivity analysis performed on some parameters of the problem also shows the high impact of the potential demand of the retail channel compared to other parameters on the profit.
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أثبأا
پ
1
،
2
1
آاااا،ا،،ا،
@gmail.com1990parisa.hm
2
ااا،ا،،ا،
.ac.irlzahra@agrnasiri
*
ئ:

ات،اأاأااا
بااا،ئااااتتا
ااأ،آاتا
پآااا
آااأااأااائاا
اااآئااااپآا،اا
اپتاأ
اپا
:ت
ا،،،،،أا
Analyzing the effect of customer demands on supply chain profit in a dual-
channel pricing model
Parisa Haghimotlagh
1
, Gholam Reza Nasiri
2
1Industrial Engineering Department, Faculty of Engineering, Alzahra University;
(parisa.hm1990@gmail.com)
2Industrial Engineering Department, Faculty of Engineering, Alzahra University;
(grnasiri@alzahra.ac.ir)
*Corresponding author: Gholam Reza Nasiri
Pricing is one of the most important decisions made in the supply chain that has a significant impact on
the profit of the entire Supply chain. In order to increase the market share and attract more customers,
most of the organizations use other channels to present their products and services besides the traditional
supply. For a supply chain with more than one sales channel, product pricing for each channel is an
important decision-making process. In the upcoming research provided a pricing model between retail
and chain channels, taking into account the discount in the chain channel and the revenue sharing
contract between the chain stores and the supplier, with the aim of maximizing the supplier profit. In
the following, while presenting a numerical example and obtaining each of the values of the decision
variables using
GAMS
software, the results will be analyzed. The sensitivity analysis performed on
some parameters of the problem also shows the high impact of the potential demand of the retail channel
compared to other parameters on the profit.
Keywords: Pricing, Customer Demand, Discount, Retailer, Dual-Channel Supply Chain, Chain
Store
1-
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پاا،تاااا
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ااااپ،اا
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ئ،اآپاا،ئااتا
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با،ااااااا
ااپاااا
ات،اتآاائااپا
اتت
ااااااپ
]
4
[

،تاات
اا،-ا
اپتا
]
5
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اااا
اااپاااا
ئااأا
]
6
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اااااا
ااأآااا
اتتاااأ
ا
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7
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تااتاا
ااآااپااااأ
اءااا
]
8
[
اپأ
ااااپا
]
9
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اا
ااااأااآاا
ااپئپااأ
ا
]
10
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ا
تااا
،ت،پاااتا،اا
]
11
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ااااتاا
(IWO)(اCAائا)أ
اآ،ااااائاا
]
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[
اتااااا
أاپ
]
13
[
اااا
ً،پتاائااا،
اآ،پاااا
اابااا
ااپ،
2-ئب
أپاأ،،اا
ااتاأا
396
أ
اااااپا
اپااا
1-2-ت
üاا
üأاااا
üااتا
üتاااا،ا
اا
üا
üاأا،ا-
اا
2-2-ئ
:
i:
i = 1,2,…,I
c:اc = 1,2,…,C
oاا:أاo =1,2,…,O
aتا:اa = 1,2,…,A
:اپ 
:ااأi
:
ااأاc
:
اأ
0 <
< 1
:
اأا
0 <
< 1
:
ااأاا
0 <
< 1
:
ا
0 <
< 1
:
ااا
0 <
< 1
:
i :
ا c  :

پا :

ا 

پاا :

اا
:ا پاااا
0 <
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ااااا
0 <
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:ا
0 < < 1
:
ااا
:

پااo
0 < 

< 1
:

اا
0 < 

< 1
:
اا
0 <
< 1

0 < < 1
397
:
اااأ
0 <
< 1
ااااپ ااأ اااأ اأ
:
:اپأ
:اپأا :
ااc
0 <
< 1
:2
اااcأ)ا( :

ااcاأAاo :
oا
0 <
< 1
:

اااc Aاo1تا0 :
iاأ :
اcاأ :
ااc
:

اأاا
c

A
ا
3-2-ئ
.pc.3
.
.
.
.
.

.


 

=
=
=

=
3
2
∑
=
∑ 

=
=




=
=
=



=
=
=
2

=
=
أاااآاات
آاااآ،اا،ا،ا
اأااأاتااآ
Subject to:


∀.
=
ا2اااأااا
اا


 

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 
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∀
ا34پاپاااا
،أا،اپا
ا،ااااتا
اا
≤ 
 ε
∀.
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398
ا5؛ااا
اأا
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∀..
ا67اپا،ا
اا
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∀.
ا8ااا
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ا9اائااپأااا،،
اآاأاا
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 γ ∀
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ا10ا12،،اااآا
اتγ 
ااا
اتاآاااا
ااا،ا
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∀
ت،ا
ااا13اا
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 3
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اااا،ا
ااااااا
اااا14اآ
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∀
ا15ا،ا16ااا
ا17اااا
آ
.pc.2
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.
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0.

0.1
ا18ا
3-
اآااا،اBaronاا
ااااپ4،2،ا3ا
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
399
ت3اپ،ئااااآ
ا12ا
أا(ا

ا)أاا
(

ا)
1
2ااأاا
1-3-ئ
اپأااااا،
اپ.
 1.2.3.4.5اپاااااپ3پ
ئااتآااااپ،3پ
ااپ4ائااآآا
3اپپا
4اااتآ
-
تب

644.490847.490530.490704.490
تب

-
0.167
0.157

1001.858
1010.277

1169.302
1169.302
300
237

-
0.03
0.05

.

(100-100)
1
(100-100)
1
(100-100)
1
(100-100)
1
(137-137)
2
-
اپ
1
2
3
0.65
0.75
0.80
0.001
0.002
0.004
0.75
0.85
0.90
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.75
0.80
0.85
آ
با
آ
با
آ
با
1
3087781
10
2646588
19
2449468
2
3078542
11
2638851
20
2442572
400
ااآ اSN باپاا
،اتآ5اااپآا
پ،ااا6ا
5باپ
6پاآ
اااپااپاااپا
،أاا،ا؛ا
5،10،1520آاااپا
ااآ1ا4ااپاتاا
1-تااتاا
2-تااتاا
3
3069302
12
2631113
21
2435676
4
2959845
13
2576742
22
2616677
5
2950887
14
2569459
23
2609254
6
2941970
15
2562259
24
2601860
7
2906992
16
2764312
25
2499905
8
2898017
17
2756041
26
2492996
9
2889042
18
2747771
27
2486114
اپ
ب
1
3
1
3
1
با



پ
2633762.457
935.441
841.897
1169.302
681.740
134.250

3115904.433
1022.222
920
1277.778
720.352
147.317

15.47%
8.48%
8.48%
8.48%
5.36%
8.87%
3214307
3189706
3165105
3140505
3115904
3091303
3066702
3042102
3017501
2900000
2950000
3000000
3050000
3100000
3150000
3200000
3250000
20%- 15%- 10%- 5% - پ 5% + 10%+ 15%+ 20%+

2200463 2414544
2642448 2875969
3115904 3355956
3596009 3836061
4076114
2000000
2500000
3000000
3500000
4000000
4500000
20%- 15%- 10%- 5% - پ 5% + 10%+ 15%+ 20%+

3118229
3117648
3117066
3116485
3115904
3115323
3114742
3114161
3113580
3000000
3030000
3060000
3090000
3120000
3150000
3180000
3210000
3240000
3083848
3091862
3099876
3107890
3115904
3123918
3131932
3139346
3147960
2900000
2940000
2980000
3020000
3060000
3100000
3140000
3180000
3220000
401
3-تااتاااااپ
4-تااتاااپ
ا1اا5،آأ،
0.7%ا2اا5ا،
أااا7%اااااآ3اا،5
،0.01%أآأاااا4
(اااپأ
اا،آ)5،آ0.2%ااا
5-اتااپا
ااااأااااا
ا
7اپاأ
7اپاأ)اا(
بااپ
Z = 2955624 + 381620 landac1
1
اا
Z = 2955624 + 410975 landac2
2
Z = 3127527 - 193701 gamma

Z = -1594370 + 3521.0 popi1
1

Z = -1594370 + 3057.7 popi2
2
Z = -1594370 + 3848.4 popi3
3
Z = -1594370 + 3370.1 popi4
4
بااپ
Z = 3607920 - 5347.99 TCi1
1

Z = 3607920 - 2226.31 TCi2
2
2000000
2150000
2300000
2450000
2600000
2750000
2900000
3050000
3200000
3350000
3500000
3650000
3800000
3950000
4100000
20%- 15%- 10%- 5% - پ 5% + 10%+ 15%+ 20%+

TC popi
λc
γ
402
4-
اپاأاات
اااااا
ااا،
أاأاا
،اأائاا ،ا ت  
أااااپا
أائااااا
أآاااااآا،
ااأاپئا
ااااائاااااا
ا
بتااا،اپا
 اپ(اا اپ ،   ،
)،
اأاأ،آاپ
(اااپ،
)اااأا
،، اا
أاا،
ااابا،ااا
،أ
اتئا
اثآتا
ا
]1[،،ا،،،،(،،1398)ااباااا
-،پ،79-55
]2[ا،،(،،ا1393)اأپا،
،RIEEM01_109
]3[،،،،،(،1395،)ئااا
اا،،اIIEC13_289
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Article
Full-text available
With the improvement of social environmental awareness, the dual-channel green product sales mode has been widely used by many manufacturing firms. In this paper, we consider a dual-channel green supply chain where one manufacturer produces a green product and sells it through one retail channel and its own direct channel. Consumers in the two channels have different perceptions of the product energy efficiency level due to different purchasing experiences. The product energy efficiency level evolves over time and is characterized as a dynamic variable. By developing and solving the Stackelberg differential game problems under the dynamic and static wholesale pricing strategies, respectively, we obtain the main results in this paper. First, the manufacturer has more incentives to invest in green innovation when more consumers buy the green product through the direct channel. Second, the manufacturer prefers to adopt the dynamic wholesale pricing strategy in most cases and prefers the static one only when the consumers in both channels have relatively high energy efficiency perceptions. By introducing the transfer payment contract, we show that the static wholesale pricing strategy may be the better choice, which leads to a win-win outcome for both members. Finally, sensitivity analysis further provides some managerial insights and verifies the robustness of the results.
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In view of the mushroom growth of e-commerce and green production, some enterprises have shifted to provide environment friendly products and made full use of the online sales channel to enhance competitiveness. This paper investigates a dynamic pricing strategy and greening issues for a two-stage dual-channel supply chain containing a manufacturer and a retailer. Furthermore, we discuss pricing and green strategies for members under decentralized and centralized decision scenario. In decentralized decision scenario, two decision strategies are studied and compared. To improve supply chain performance, a cost-sharing contract is proposed. We find the market demand is concave by selling price and the market demand reaches the largest value when selling price equals to reference price. This result shows that the manufacturer should strategically decide the current selling price with respect to the price in the previous period. Sensitivity of consumers to the greening levels, the basic selling price and the greening levels have a positive influence on the performance of the supply chain. Moreover, the products in the centralized decision enjoy higher greening levels than that in decentralized decision scenario. In this study, we contribute to explore the effect of reference price in a dual-channel supply chain management and suggest a two-stage decision strategies to improve supply chain performance with a contract. The limitations and potential future directions are also provided to conclude the study.
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Nowadays, by increasing the sensitivity of governments to the issue of the environment, green supply chain design has become very significant. This paper presents a mathematical model based on a dual-channel system for designing a green supply chain. The first sales channel is based on the traditional retail purchasing system, while in the second channel the customers purchase the products from the plants directly. In the proposed model, decisions on location, products transfer and pricing are determined. Furthermore, the decision on the kind of manufacturing technology in each plant to be established is considered as well. Any kind of technology leads to a specific level of the greenness of the products in each plant. A product with a higher green level has a lower greenhouse gas emission but higher costs. In order to encourage managers to produce green products, government subsidy policies are in place. Besides, because of the uncertain nature of some parameters, a robust possibilistic optimization approach has been used. As the proposed mixed integer nonlinear model is complicated to solve, an Invasive Weed Optimization Algorithm (IWO) is proposed to obtain efficient solutions. Due to the nonlinear type of the developed model and due to there is no benchmark available in the related literature to validate the results, Cultural Algorithm (CA) and Genetic Algorithm (GA) are utilized. The results indicate that IWO performs better than others.
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The deterioration of the ecological environment has prompted new requirements for the development of the supply chain. People urgently need to solve the problems of building a green supply chain and formulating reasonable environmental policies. This research considers a green supply chain management problem that includes both retail and direct channels. The government sets a product green standard and offers an environmental subsidy to the manufacturer. Only when the product satisfies the standard can the manufacturer obtain an eco-label. In this study, we focus on two types of green products with different green technologies. This paper is dedicated to revealing the impact that this eco-label policy has on different products. Using game theory and mathematical programming methods, we obtain the optimal prices in the two channels, as well as the optimal green standard and subsidy. By analyzing the results, we find that a growing green standard can increase the environmental benefits of development-intensive green products continuously. However, it is not always good to set increasing green standards for marginal cost-intensive green products. Therefore, the performances of the two types of products are different. These findings allow the manufacturer and the retailer to design suitable strategies for different products. Moreover, these findings also provide guidance to the government when implementing an eco-label policy.
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In a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), the products are sold online and offline in the forward channel, while the retailer provides reverse-channel service to recycle used products for remanufacturing in the offline channel. The problem of forward channel conflicts and improving the quality of reverse-channel recycling products have become important issues that need to be addressed urgently. Therefore, we combine the revenue-sharing contract in the forward channel with the channel investment cost-sharing contract, and introduce the Stackelberg game to investigate the contract coordination mechanism. Furthermore, we try to mitigate the problem of poor-quality recycling due to information asymmetry in the recycling channel by grading collection. The results show that the proposed contract can increase the profits of supply chain members in both the online and the offline channel by properly setting the revenue-sharing ratio and cost-sharing ratio. In addition, the revenue-sharing–cost-sharing mechanism in the dual-channel CLSC can increase the retailer's efforts regarding servicing and recycling. Finally, the strategy of grading collection promotes the efficiency of recycling.
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This study investigates the strategic effect of return policies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which a manufacturer can sell products directly to end customers and indirectly via an independent retailer. The manufacturer decides whether to implement a return policy in either the direct or indirect channel, or in both channels. When the return policy is provided, the cost of returned products has to be covered by the corresponding channel. We consider four possible strategies, including full refund in the direct channel only, full refund in the indirect channel only, full refund in both channels, and no refund in both channels. Given the equilibrium pricing strategies of firms, the preferences of firms over different strategies are determined by comparisons between the anticipated return rate of customers and their perceived value of the return policy. The manufacturer prefers the full-refund policy in both channels when the return rate of the customer is low. Otherwise, the dominant strategy for the manufacturer is the no-refund policy in both channels. The retailer benefits more from the full-refund policy in the indirect channel alone when the return rate is low; otherwise, the retailer prefers the full-refund policy in the direct channel only.