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10. Eco-social mobilization at the
supranational level? The case of ‘The
Right to Energy for All Europeans’
coalition1
Matteo Jessoula and Matteo Mandelli
INTRODUCTION
With social and environmental challenges ranking increasingly high on politi-
cal agendas, ‘sustainability’ has become a key concept to address these issues
in an integrated way. Significantly, political dynamics are shaping the more or
less effective integration between social, environmental and economic goals.
Since political elites at the supranational level have primarily conceived
the European project as a plan for economic integration, the political arena
is crowded with a dense network of business-oriented pressure groups,
animated by (economic) growth-enhancing goals. In this context, pursuing
a sustainable combination of economic, social and environmental policies
may prove to be a difficult task, since it would require the partial unlocking
of entrenched political relations, positions of power and related policymaking
patterns. Nevertheless, different actors with diverse interests and views can
take action to prompt a transition towards a better balance between economic,
environmental and social aims in Europe. On the one hand, the European
Commission aims to expand the scope of supranational governance, while the
Council expresses member states’ preferences and goals. On the other hand,
European political parties articulate the political offer in the field, whereas
interest and pressure groups represent socio-political demands. In particular,
the mobilization of supranational non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and trade unions is likely to play a key role in the European Union’s (EU)
ability to deliver on ‘eco-social’ issues – that is, political challenges that have
both social and ecological implications – especially when ‘green’ and ‘red’
(social) organizations mobilize jointly. Nevertheless, (joint) mobilization can
be constrained by potentially conflicting goals, different working methods,
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Eco-social mobilization at the supranational level?
diverse relationships with ranks and files, and, ultimately, coordination costs
among the various interest groups.
Against this backdrop, in this chapter we aim to answer the following
overarching questions. What potential is there for eco-social mobilization at
the supranational level? What is the likelihood that European green and social
NGOs, as well as trade unions, will work together to address eco-social chal-
lenges? More specifically, we ask: what reasons or considerations may push
European interest groups to cooperate on eco-social challenges? What factors
may hinder cooperation? How do ‘eco-social’ coalitions work? What goals do
‘green’ and ‘red’ interest groups pursue through cooperation? How and related
to which issues and positions do they conflict and/or agree?
In order to assess the potential for ‘green’ and ‘red’ European interest
groups to mobilize jointly promoting synergies between environmental and
social goals and driving bottom-up policy change at the EU level, this chapter
focuses on the mobilization around the ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’
package. Created in 2017, a supranational advocacy alliance – the Right to
Energy for All Europeans – bringing together social and green NGOs, as
well as trade unions, has aimed to steer the ‘package’ towards the eradication
of energy poverty in Europe. Indeed, one may consider energy poverty as
an eco-social challenge. Energy poverty ‘lies at the intersection of different
issues: a warming world that puts people and planet at risk, increasing social
inequality, and an unjust energy system. These multiple dimensions of energy
poverty call for a holistic political approach, to jointly tackle its causes and
consequences’ (Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition, 2018).
The coalition is an interesting case to analyze because it represents an
example of ‘eco-social’ – that is ecological and social – mobilization, in light
of both its composition and political objectives. Since the analysis builds
on a case study, our findings do not allow generalization. Yet, they provide
insights about the limits as well as potential for cross-sector bottom-up mobi-
lization at the EU level. The research method is qualitative: in addition to
a literature review and the analysis of official, as well as non-institutional doc-
uments, we rely on eight semi-structured interviews with coalition members
and other key informants. We have updated the data we present in the chapter
to December 2018.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the next section we first
present briefly the underpinning analytical framework. The third section then
analyzes the policy dimension of eco-social challenges, by focusing on the
EU and, in particular, on the ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ package. The
fourth section illustrates the case study, presenting the Right to Energy for All
Europeans coalition, whereas the fifth section investigates how eco-social
mobilization unfolded within the coalition itself. The final section concludes.
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222 Towards sustainable welfare states in Europe
FRAMING THE ISSUE
The ‘eco-social-growth trilemma’ represents the underlying analytical frame-
work for this chapter (see Chapter 1). It conceptualizes the existence of three
different spheres, or systems: economic, social and environmental – or eco-
logical. These spheres are separate, yet highly interconnected, organizational
forms, each relying on its own principles and striving for the maximization
of specific goals (O’Connor, 2007). While the economic system promotes
the maximization of growth, the ultimate social imperative is to redistribute
resources and opportunities properly through the institutional arrangements of
the welfare states and the environmental sphere aims to preserve the dynamic
structures at the basis of natural activities. The reconciliation of social, envi-
ronmental and economic issues can be seen as a ‘wicked problem’ (Brown et
al., 2010), due to the interdependencies, synergies and potential trade-offs that
such reconciliation involves. The ‘eco-social-growth’ trilemma refers to the
challenge that policymakers face when they have to choose any two of three
goals, that is, economic growth, social redistribution and ecological sustain-
ability. Such choices include those concerning ‘eco-social’ policies (Gough,
2013).
NGOs and trade unions, acting as advocacy organizations, pressure groups
or interest groups, are the subjects of the present research. The organizations
considered in this chapter aim to influence EU policymaking by representing
the instances of their networks. This chapter puts the spotlight on social and
environmental organizations’ potential for cooperation and joint mobilization.
There are many similarities between interest groups operating in the same
policy area: they rely on similar financial resources, they are ideologically
close and they work within the same institutional context. These organizations
are likely to be aware of one another and they sometimes establish alliances
(Geyer, 2001), despite being potential competitors with respect to recruitment,
public attention and funding. Interest groups operating in different policy
fields and willing to cooperate might have to deal with additional challenges,
for instance contrasting priorities and lack of familiarity and mutual trust.
Thus, we expect European lobbies’ cross-sectoral mobilization to be rather
rare, especially considering that forming coalitions appears to be a difficult
exercise even within the same policy sub-system. Studying the potential for
eco-social mobilization therefore means analyzing under which circumstances
green and red organizations, despite difficulties, form coalitions to take joint
actions.
We identify a set of analytical dimensions through which it is possible to
assess the potential for eco-social mobilization at the EU level, hence address-
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Eco-social mobilization at the supranational level?
ing the creation and the maintenance of cross-sectoral coalitions between
NGOs and trade unions.
The first dimension refers to the rationale behind coalition-building, that is,
the mechanisms pushing interest groups of different natures to work together
on cross-sectoral issues. In general, forming a coalition is an efficient strat-
egy to maximize the impact or the legitimacy of interest groups’ activities
(Yanacopulos, 2005). Building alliances tends to strengthen policy impact
since it provides opportunities to share – and hence increase – overall resources,
thus reducing individual costs and exploiting the economies of scale arising
from coordination. Legitimacy is reinforced through cooperation because, by
putting together their members’ constituencies, coalitions can ensure wider
grassroots support for their demands. Either way, coalition-building is primar-
ily a strategic move. For mobilization to occur, the strategic benefits of working
in alliances should enable the actors involved to overcome the costs. However,
it is not sufficient to assess strategic costs and benefits. For coalition-building
to happen, this should not only be convenient, but also desirable. Investigating
interest groups’ willingness to take part in cross-sectoral mobilizations means
unveiling the principles and values that they promote as a group and that, as
such, glue them together. Shared normative and value frameworks are nec-
essary for alliances to build a common agenda and work together, especially
when value heterogeneity across coalition members is high.
With respect to the potential for maintaining an alliance, a second dimension
to consider is the internal management of coalitions. In this respect, some
studies (e.g. Pijnenburg, 1998) have distinguished inter-organizational col-
laborations according to two dimensions: the degree of formalization and the
degree of individual autonomy that each organization retains. The only nec-
essary requisite for inter-organizational collaborations one should consider to
frame them as coalitions is a high degree of autonomy for the involved entities.
Hence, assuming that full unification does not happen, one can distinguish alli-
ances according to the degree of formalization. This means assessing whether
structures for managing common activities are rigid or loose and whether
decision-making procedures are horizontal or vertical. Full ‘coordination’
can only be reached through durable and formalized structures, as it occurs
when the degree of autonomy and formalization are both high. By contrast, the
characteristics of ‘cooperation’ involve little (or no) formalization, horizontal
structures and are, usually, of a limited duration.
The third and final dimension considered pertains to coalitions’ external
activities. It implies assessing a coalition’s objectives and its strategies to
achieve them. The more salient and detailed the common goals are, the harder
it might be for alliance members to sign up to them, without running the risk of
compromising their core values and undermining their autonomy. In general,
conflicts between interest groups that join alliances may be frequent. Key in
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224 Towards sustainable welfare states in Europe
this respect is addressing the mechanisms set up to solve controversies and
conflicts, as well as those needed to reach agreement. Coalitions’ strategies
vary according to both their scope and time span. The means to achieve
common goals can be more or less specific and targeted. On the two opposite
sides of a hypothetic analytical continuum, there are single-issue thematic alli-
ances – that is, ad hoc coalitions with a mandate that is supposed to be limited
to a specific advocacy campaign – and broad coordinated structures that are
more durable and less circumscribed to a specific issue.
We use the three dimensions described above to assess the likelihood for
eco-social mobilization to both occur and endure. We therefore apply them
to the case of the Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition with the aim to
identify which factors may boost – or rather constrain – the potential for joint
mobilization.
ECO-SOCIAL CHALLENGES AT THE EU LEVEL:
THE ‘CLEAN ENERGY FOR ALL EUROPEANS’
LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE AND ENERGY POVERTY
The EU is the delimiting space for this research and it involves a number of
contradictory elements with respect to finding a potentially positive solution
for the eco-social-growth trilemma (see Chapter 1).
On the positive side, the EU has long made the coherence and consistency
of policies across different sectors – that is, policy integration – an explicit
objective of its ‘grand strategies’. At the discursive level, EU institutions
have been championing the ‘sustainable development’ paradigm (European
Commission, 2016b).
However, by accounting for environmental objectives only insofar as they
do not contradict economic imperatives and by giving limited attention to
welfare goals, the EU seems to be actually following the so-called ‘green
growth’ paradigm (Koch, 2018; Chapter 1 in this volume). Moreover, frame-
works like ‘Europe 2020’ rarely specify how to solve the many possible
contradictions between their different goals, thus failing to implement their
purposes in a truly integrated fashion (Pochet, 2010).
On the same note, actors trying to promote social and environmental goals
at the supranational level may easily face constraints related to both the EU’s
lack of full competences in these fields and the fact that such goals have largely
been framed in the context of the Union’s economic policy. It is common
to characterize the two sectors as having had asymmetrical progresses in
recent decades – with the core of social protection policies remaining largely
a competence of member states (Ferrera, 2008), in contrast with the blooming
of the EU’s environmental legislation (Fu, 2008). However, both social and
environmental policies are actually matters of shared competence between the
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EU and its member states. Moreover, the EU’s policy measures in both sectors
have mainly aimed to sustain economic efficiency, regulating the – positive
and negative – externalities generated by the construction and maintenance of
the internal market (Daly, 2006; Kelemen, 2010).
Against this ambivalent backdrop, analyzing a binding piece of legislation
such as the ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ package is an effective way to
assess how the EU, concretely, deals with the ‘eco-social-growth trilemma’
and if ‘green growth’ is actually to be seen as its driving policy approach.
Launched on 30 November 2016, the package contains over 4500 pages,
comprising eight legislative measures – four regulations and four direc-
tives – as well as communications and documents of other nature (European
Commission, 2016a). The European Commission has highlighted that the
package shall pursue three main goals: ‘putting energy efficiency first’,
‘achieving global leadership in renewable energies’ and ‘providing a fair deal
for consumers’ (European Commission, 2016a: 3).
As indicated by the title, the ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ package is
primarily an energy-related initiative. Nonetheless, by design, the package
was meant to be a cross-sector proposal. This is evident by looking at the
objectives of the package itself and the manifested intentions of the European
Commission. It was thought to not only benefit the energy market in the EU,
but also to spill positive effects over to the economy – in terms of job creation
and GDP growth – as well as to the environmental and the social spheres. The
proposals in the package indeed promote an energy transition that shall be
clean, that is, ‘embracing renewables and other new and innovative technolo-
gies’ (European Commission, 2017), as well as just, meaning positive for all
consumers, especially the vulnerable ones (European Commission, 2017). In
line with the EU’s integrated strategies, the ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’
package thus seems to address the ‘eco-social-growth trilemma’ in a sustaina-
ble way – that is, by recognizing several policy dimensions and prescribing the
simultaneous maximization of different goals.
However, besides the stated objectives of the package, we are interested
in its concrete applications. The package indeed seeks to reconcile social and
ecological policy goals also in practical terms: notably, by tackling energy
poverty. ‘Energy poverty’ may be defined as a level of energy consumption
that is not sufficient for customers to meet their basic social and material
needs, or to live a decent and healthy life (Okushima, 2017). It undoubtedly
constitutes a pressing challenge since it is estimated to affect between 50 and
125 million people in the EU (EPEE, 2009).
One may also view energy poverty as an eco-social challenge, since, given
its multifaceted implications, it simultaneously raises claims for the optimiza-
tion of social and environmental goals (Bouzarovski, 2014; González-Eguino,
2015). On the social side, the lack of energy services could provoke negative
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226 Towards sustainable welfare states in Europe
downturns on educational and employment performances, as well as on social
inclusion, while a strong driver of energy poverty is poverty itself, combined
with rising prices in the energy market. On the environmental side, energy
poverty has considerable impacts due to the excessive use of biofuels by
low-income households and to the fact that people who cannot afford ther-
mally efficient dwellings often pollute more in heating their homes than would
otherwise be necessary.
The competence for dealing with energy poverty at the EU level belongs
to member states. However, since 2009, pushed by the need to stimulate
cross-country upward convergence in this policy field, the EU has developed
its interest for vulnerable energy consumers (Bouzarovski et al., 2012).
The ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ package represents the most prom-
inent recent EU initiative addressing energy poverty. The package explicitly
recognizes this kind of poverty, identifying it as an issue to be tackled. It sets
out a framework to target energy-poor households, by making member states
responsible for identifying, empowering, better informing and protecting
them (European Commission, 2016a). States are also encouraged to prioritize
vulnerable energy consumers in national strategies for building renovations,
energy efficiency and renewable energy transition. Against the backdrop
of many national governments’ reluctant attitudes, this policy progress was
made possible by the joint commitment of the European Commission, which
launched the initiative, and the European Parliament, which further strength-
ened the language initially used by the Commission (Interview nos. 6 and 8).
Despite the package representing significant progress relative to previous
legislation, when it comes to alleviating energy poverty, the EU has not agreed
on a common definition. Moreover, there is no target, nor any binding obli-
gation with which member states shall comply. The EU urges governments
to take actions, yet these are left free to monitor, report on and address the
situation of energy poverty in their countries. Governments that lack political
willingness can still decide not to do anything at all. Since they still perceive
the matter mainly as a social challenge, many European countries are reluctant
to allow the EU to legislate on it (Interview nos. 6 and 8). Nevertheless, at the
supranational level energy poverty is presented as a salient issue prompting
– as we will see in the next subsection – joint cross-sectoral mobilization by
several interest groups.
The Right to Energy for All Europeans Coalition: A Peculiar Case of
Eco-Social Mobilization
Established in June 2017, the Right to Energy for All Europeans (REAE) is
a coalition ‘committed to join efforts to fight energy poverty and defend the
right to renewable energy for all’ (EAPN et al., 2017). The coalition is heter-
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ogeneous, bringing together organizations of different natures, including and
balancing different social and ecological interests. The REAE defines itself as
a ‘European coalition, uniting trade unions, anti-poverty organisations, social
housing providers, environmental organisations and energy cooperatives’
(Right to Energy for All Europeans coalition, 2018). Thus, based on both
its composition and aims, we can see the coalition as a case of eco-social
mobilization.
Following the analytical dimensions outlined in the second section, we first
address the formation and, second, the actual maintenance of the coalition,
both in terms of internal management and external activities.
First, when it comes to coalition-building, the immediate pretext for estab-
lishing the REAE was the publication of the ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’
package. The year 2017 was a crucial and unique moment for the redefinition
of energy poverty policies in the EU. This gave the opportunity – if not the
need – for NGOs and trade unions to influence legislation (Interview nos. 1
and 2).
The original idea was to create a political momentum around the package,
by finding synergies between the demands of social NGOs, trade unions and
environmental NGOs (Interview no. 5). There are at least two reasons why
the members of the REAE decided to join forces and work on energy poverty
together instead of doing it alone. A first justification voiced by interviewees
relates to capacity and resources. Some organizations lack resources to work
on energy poverty on their own, despite considering it as an area of interest
(Interview nos. 1 and 3). Sharing responsibilities is a way to minimize efforts
while still managing to exert political influence. Sometimes, especially for
organizations with less formalized networks, coalition-building is a rather
top-down choice. Given that lobbying through coalitions is less costly, the
high-level administrative branches of an interest group might take the oppor-
tunity to join an alliance, even in the absence of a specific mandate to do so,
which is what Housing Europe did in this case (Interview no. 1). The second
reason to affiliate with the REAE relates to political influence. NGOs and trade
unions know that acting through the coalition renders advocacy more effective
than it would have been if carried out individually (Interview nos. 3, 4 and 5).
Unlike many of its members, the REAE has the resources and the willingness
to exert influence on the ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ package. Moreover,
building the coalition became even more attractive when it was evident that
this initiative was receiving positive external feedback. Our interviewees pre-
sented the broad, inclusive and heterogeneous composition of the REAE as an
added value for policymakers (Interview nos. 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6).
However, when one analyses the conditions for creating a cross-sectoral
coalition, it is not enough to take the strategic benefits of cooperation into
account. In addition, one should pay attention to the overarching shared
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228 Towards sustainable welfare states in Europe
value frameworks underpinning cooperation. Both social and environmental
pressure groups are devoted to the promotion of some peculiar principles and
values, in accordance with the different interests they represent. However,
when it comes to cooperation, there has to be a common ground to formu-
late shared objectives. Many European trade unions and NGOs have long
been committed, at least in principle, to promote an overarching sustainable
development agenda, balancing social, environmental and economic claims
(Interview nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6). Nonetheless, disagreement between social
and environmental actors is frequent (Interview no. 2) and it may occur at any
time that their priorities clash.
Although sustainable development is an all-encompassing paradigm, it may
imply some trade-offs, especially when it comes to the ambiguous role of
economic growth (see Chapters 1 and 2). Whereas social organizations tend to
question an economic model that fosters unregulated growth and laissez-faire
markets, this is not always the case for environmental organizations (Interview
nos. 3 and 5). The interviewed European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN)
representative indeed believes that, while this is not true for all environmental
NGOs, ‘some of [them] do not have problems at all with [economic] growth,
they just want it to be green, … or they see nothing wrong with inequality,
[they just push for] making it green’ (Interview no. 3).
More recently, however, this pattern seems to be shifting, at least at the EU
level, with increased awareness of the links between social and environmental
issues (Interview no. 6). In fact, most European social NGOs, trade unions
and green NGOs have increasingly endorsed the concept of ‘just transition’
(Chapter 1) as a guiding principle for their activities (Interview nos. 5, 6 and
7). In the words of the European Public Service Union (EPSU), ‘the biggest
green NGOs in Brussels – WWF, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, Climate
Action Network – are much more on the “just transition” paradigm than on
the “green growth” one’ (Interview no. 5). This has allowed such organiza-
tions to go beyond the classical socio-environmental divide, leading them to
argue instead for a common paradigm that could be simultaneously socially
and environmentally just and sustainable (Interview no. 6), hence making it
a ‘win-win’ scenario (Interview no. 5). Another implication of endorsing this
approach is that social and environmental groups are progressively sharing
the same view with respect to the economic sphere. ‘Just transition’ requires
adjusting the current neoliberal economic model to correct social inequalities
and the negative environmental externalities that this model creates (Interview
nos. 5 and 6). ‘Just transition’ questions production and consumption patterns
that are structurally wasteful and hurting the planet and societies (Interview no.
6), trying to shift the focus on the negative repercussions of growth, without
necessarily abandoning growth itself as paradigm for wellbeing.
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Eco-social mobilization at the supranational level?
Once a coalition is established, maintaining it is crucial for sustained
eco-social mobilization. Since the beginning, the REAE has functioned
through ad hoc, transparent horizontal structures (Interview nos. 1, 3 and 5).
Within the coalition, member organizations decide informally on the division
of responsibilities and tasks: whoever can and wants to contribute volunteers to
do so (Interview no. 3). Informality also applies to decision-making (Interview
no. 4), voting – which occurs by consensus (Interview no. 5) – and admission
of organizations wishing to join, which would only have to subscribe to the
coalition’s demands (Interview no. 5). The result of this approach is that some
actors have ended up being more active than others. Even though EAPN and
EPSU initially created the coalition, over time, Friends of the Earth Europe
(FoEE) has taken a leading role alongside EPSU (Interview nos. 1, 3, 4, 5
and 6). The prominence of FoEE increased even more when one of its staff
members became responsible for coordination of the coalition’s activity
(Interview nos. 5 and 6). Environmental organizations’ commitment to the
coalition was fundamental to deliver on the common agenda, whereas social
NGOs have contributed relatively less to the alliance’s activities (Interview
nos. 4 and 6) perhaps due to lack of resources (Interview no. 3).
While still maintaining informal internal management, cooperation has
gradually become less ad hoc over time. A major change occurred in March
2018, when the REAE received funding. On that occasion, coalition partners
agreed to establish a more stable and durable EU-wide grassroots movement,
involving national networks (Interview no. 6). They also enlarged the scope of
their activity and put forward a document specifying the mandate, the require-
ments for membership and the division of roles and responsibilities (Interview
nos. 5 and 6).
Finally, the case study brought to light some interesting elements regarding
the external activities of the REAE, that is, concerning objectives and strate-
gies. The coalition’s actions before December 2018 have mostly been concen-
trated on the ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ package, since the latter ‘will
define the EU’s energy policy for the next crucial decade’ (Interview no. 2).
Organizations joined forces to raise awareness on the issue of energy poverty
in the package and to make sure that policymakers would design appropriate
measures to alleviate it (Interview nos. 2 and 4). All the organizations coa-
lesced around seven key policy demands (Interview no. 5). These were general
cross-sectoral demands for EU policymakers about energy poverty and each of
them concerned a specific piece of legislation within the package:
1. ‘Provide a definition of energy poverty’;
2. ‘Ban disconnections’;
3. ‘A binding 40% energy efficiency target to ramp up renovation efforts’;
4. ‘Target vulnerable consumers in renovation efforts’;
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230 Towards sustainable welfare states in Europe
5. ‘Ensure a minimum provision of energy for all’;
6. ‘Support community energy initiatives in the fight against energy poverty’;
7. ‘Recognize energy as a basic human right’ (Right to Energy for All
Europeans coalition, 2017).
These seven demands represented the common ground between the REAE
coalition members, that is, those claims that they have all been able to jointly
promote (Interview nos. 2 and 4). They are crosscutting proposals (Interview
nos. 3, 4 and 5), aiming to push policymakers to recognize both the social and
environmental implications of energy policies (Interview nos. 2 and 6).
Formulating these seven demands was the first step in the REAE’s strategy.
Besides mapping what the coalition was able to agree upon, for our analysis
it is particularly interesting to identify eventual sources of disagreement and
means for conflict resolution. Disputes may indeed be seen as a representation
of the barriers to joint mobilization. The REAE’s coalition partners have con-
flicted on some key aspects related to energy poverty, perhaps the most salient
one being energy prices. In fact, social organizations and trade unions are
supportive of regulated prices in the energy market, as they believe in fighting
liberalization, as a tool to make energy services more affordable and more
accessible for low-income people (Interview no. 6). By contrast, green NGOs
have reservations when it comes to recognizing regulated prices as an appropri-
ate solution to alleviate energy poverty. In their opinion, regulated prices could
hinder the development of small-scale renewable energy projects (Interview
no. 4) and could end up boosting polluting forms of energy (Interview no.
6). EAPN hypothesizes that green NGOs are reluctant to support pricing
regulation because that would result in an increase in energy consumption that
would ultimately foster environmental degradation (Interview no. 3). Conflict
resolution within the REAE happens through dialogue, in an ad hoc way. They
consider each issue separately, without following precise rules (Interview no.
3). By opening spaces for discussion about potential points of disagreement
(Interview nos. 3 and 4), each organization is given the possibility to present
its points of view, while at the same time acknowledging those of the others.
When a common understanding is too hard to reach, as was the case with
regulated prices, the coalition withdraws the contested topic from its platform
(Interview nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6). However, the members of the REAE do not
seem to give much relevance to disagreements. Conversely, many perceive
a cooperative atmosphere (Interview nos. 1 and 6) and major conflicts have not
emerged since the initial period.
With respect to the actual activities put in place to deliver on its strategy, the
REAE alliance opted for a classic advocacy campaign (Interview no. 5). On
the one hand, it has carried out lobbying activities, including bilateral meet-
ings and exchanges of policy deliverables – such as letters or briefings – with
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policymakers (Interview no. 5). Through lobbying, the coalition has attempted
to get relevant information from decision-makers and, at the same time, to
feed its policy preferences into the legislative process (Interview no. 4). On
the other hand, the strategy also focused on raising public awareness about the
coalition’s demands. This second set of actions has mainly taken the shape of
public events, usually held in institutional venues and co-organized with legis-
lators. Finally, the communication activity of the coalition, acting through its
social media accounts, its website and a series of publications, has supported
the advocacy strategy (Interview no. 5).
THE POTENTIAL FOR AND BARRIERS TO
ECO-SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AT THE EU LEVEL
Our case study shows that, under certain conditions, eco-social mobilization
may not only occur, but it can also persist over time, in spite of the various con-
straints on cross-sector mobilization at the EU level. We will first outline these
constraints, before turning to show how, despite differences in cultural and
organizational features between EU social and environmental NGOs and trade
unions, these organizations have found ways to establish and subsequently
manage the REAE.
The analysis of the REAE coalition seems to confirm the hypotheses that
some scholars have developed on interest representation. According to these
hypotheses, coordination and cooperation are difficult to develop and maintain
for several reasons. First, pressure groups – especially non-business ones – are
often constrained by limited budgets, which cause them to lobby less than what
they would consider desirable (Gullberg, 2008) and prevent them from allocat-
ing due resources to side-activities, like alliances. Interest groups also operate
in a non-regulated environment, built on the principle of free competition
among different interests (Svendsen, 2011), meaning that they are naturally
pushed to compete for financial resources and political influence. Furthermore,
most organizations host a complex set of interests and this complexity could
easily hinder cooperation (Geyer, 2001). Of course, bringing together different
interests in an alliance might also be problematic because of the trade-offs
that might occur between such interests, which could result in imbalances and
biased decision-making. If left unaddressed, internal conflicts may end up
breaking coalitions apart, ultimately discouraging interest groups from joining
alliances, or from staying in for a long time.
To sum up, pressure groups’ divergent interests and structural constraints
(such as limited resources and the complex environment they operate in) may
undermine their cooperative impetus. Stable cooperation is hard to achieve and
it is rather limited when in place. In spite of this, non-business interest groups
are often aware of the benefits of cooperation and, generally, they would want
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232 Towards sustainable welfare states in Europe
to enhance coordination (Geyer, 2001). In the case of the REAE coalition, the
prevalence of immediate interests and structural complexities might explain
the informal structure of alliances, the lack of detailed common positions and
the weak ability to solve internal conflicts.
On top of the usual limits to interest groups’ joint mobilization, the REAE
also faced further constraints related to its heterogeneous composition. One
might hypothesize that cross-sectoral mobilization would be even more
unlikely than an inter-sectoral one. The compartmentalization of EU policy-
making gives rise to ‘silos’ and contributes to creating two ‘opposite cultures’
(Interview no. 3) between the social and environmental policy areas, making
stable cross-sectoral mobilization difficult to achieve. Of course, red and green
organizations share some characteristics. They all have underlying networks
of members to coordinate and they all work to influence EU policymaking.
Nevertheless, to various degrees, several interviewees pointed to differences in
the ways social and environmental interest groups work (Interview nos. 3 and
4), that is, in their means and expertise (Interview no. 4), with one even saying
that the two ‘are like Venus and Mars’ (Interview no. 3).
A first element to consider is that environmental organizations have devel-
oped advanced skills in lobbying binding pieces of legislation, having mostly
left behind the work on soft-law measures and coordinated strategies, which
social NGOs are usually highly involved with (Interview nos. 3 and 6). This
could also explain why green actors have more stable and solid connections
with members of the European Parliament, who hold proper legislative
powers, while social actors are more accustomed to work with the European
Commission (Interview no. 3). Another source of difference is funding. Some
social lobbies receive funding directly from the European Commission.
Environmental NGOs rely more on donations, crowd-funding initiatives and
contributions from their members (Interview no. 3). Finally, social interest
groups are normally more member-driven than environmental NGOs. The
social groups usually aim to work for and alongside their members, focusing
a lot on participation and the involvement of underrepresented groups of
people in policymaking (Interview no. 3). Conversely, in the environmental
sector, interest groups are less dependent on their members. They rely on
global networks of subscribers, external funders and activists (Interview no. 4).
Consequently, environmental organizations’ secretariats are often more free
to develop and carry out their own agenda. Compared to social actors, green
NGOs are more interested in the public resonance of their activities, as they
tend to concentrate a lot of resources on influencing public opinion (Interview
no. 3), making use of campaigning techniques (Interview no. 4). That is
perhaps the reason why green NGOs are also relatively more skilled with new
technologies and social media (Interview no. 3).
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Eco-social mobilization at the supranational level?
In this context, we have presented social NGOs and trade unions as similar
entities, since they both work mainly on social issues. However, several
differences exist even in this case. Trade unions are normally part of a more
institutionalized system than social NGOs are. The social partners (employer
organizations and trade unions) have stronger links to the system of public pol-
icymaking than organized civil society (Interview no. 5). The social partners
have access to larger networks and complex internal structures, which often
bind them to strict and highly formalized mandates (Interview no. 5). Finally,
trade unions tend to work not only with social and employment policies, but
also with several other policy areas, such as taxes or energy (Interview no. 5),
which is not as common among NGOs.
All these differences separate social and environmental organizations,
but also, to some extent, NGOs and trade unions. When intending to work
together, these interest groups need to build mutual trust and understanding
(Interview no. 4), as well as to find appropriate and effective working methods
and decision-making procedures to facilitate the reconciliation of their dif-
ferences (Interview no. 6). The REAE was able to develop a viable working
method, formulating and putting forward common demands, relying on
a strong willingness to cooperate, which was not only strategic, but also based
on a common vision for the eco-social future of the EU, the ‘just transition’
framework.
We now turn to the rationale behind joining forces and the solutions found
to overcome the barriers to joint mobilization. For our informants, joining
a coalition was primarily a strategic move. NGOs and trade unions find it
convenient to work in coalitions, since this strategy increases the effectiveness
and/or the potential impact of their advocacy activities (Interview nos. 1, 3, 4
and 5). However, strategic thinking is not per se sufficient for organizations to
form alliances. Shared values and visions are needed to build a common polit-
ical agenda and act together. The diffusion of the ‘just transition’ discourse
provided red and green European interest groups with a common eco-social
vision. This created an incentive for these organizations to mobilize jointly: by
creating public acceptance for policies that tackle environmental degradation
without disproportionally reducing the welfare of the population or the labour
force, the environmental transition may take place more quickly (Interview no.
5). In this view, the majority of the population would not resist the transition
but rather see it as fair (Interview no. 6). This explains the positive attitude that
the members of the REAE display towards cooperation, which contributed not
only to the creation, but also to the stabilization of the coalition itself.
In spite of this positive finding, full durable and formalized coordination
between NGOs and trade unions has not occurred even in the case of the
REAE, which instead appears to be a lighter form of cooperation. The REAE
adopted an informal structure and horizontal procedures for decision-making.
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234 Towards sustainable welfare states in Europe
However, this finding does not automatically represent a limitation or a weak-
ness with respect to eco-social mobilization. Informality and horizontality are
justified as effective ways to address the differentials in members’ organiza-
tional capabilities (Interview no. 3), or to make proceedings timely and smooth
(Interview no. 1). The key actors involved see informality as an incentive for
interest groups to join forces, because they can rely on the fact that some coali-
tion partners will carry out most of the work effectively on behalf of the whole
group, hence minimizing individual labour and financial costs (Interview nos.
1, 5 and 7).
Informality has also allowed the alliance to host open and democratic
discussions, through which coalition partners were able to accommodate
major conflicts in a smooth way, while focusing on what was consensual.
Thus, informal management helps the alliance to deliver efficiently on its
agenda, while making sure not to undermine the specificity of the various
organizations’ values, missions and natures, when they subscribe to common
demands (Interview nos. 5 and 7). More formalized structures would have
forced coalition members to deal with their differences of opinions, possibly
threatening cooperation. Nonetheless, the more informal internal management
and decision-making are, the harder it is for the coalition to broaden its scope
and to stabilize cooperation. Thus, the final result is still somehow puzzling.
Analyzing the mechanisms through which the REAE dealt with disagree-
ments and ultimately reached an agreement also helps us understand the poten-
tial for full cross-sectoral coordination to happen. The seven key demands put
forward by the REAE coalition are the manifestation of what the members
were able to agree on. Such demands are multidimensional and generic in
order to accommodate the heterogeneous interests involved. Collective pri-
orities do not necessarily coincide with individual ones. However, because
pressure groups can never trade off their core interests, the coalition’s demands
cannot be in conflict with any organization’s own claims (Interview no. 1), but
have to be shared unanimously.
Normally, interest groups tend to consider the implications of any political
issue from their perspective (Interview no. 1). Thus, different organizations
have different priorities when it comes to energy poverty. For environmental
interest groups, this mainly means ‘to fight energy poverty with renewable
energy and with ownership of electricity production by the people’ (Interview
no. 4), whereas for trade unions and social NGOs, it means prioritizing vul-
nerable energy consumers. While working in an alliance, pressure groups
attempt to bring their expertise and interests to the discussion, hoping – or
even pushing – for their partners to accept their claims. To ensure consensus,
the REAE’s demands were made both concrete (Interview no. 7), that is,
applicable to the ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ package and to the issue
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235
Eco-social mobilization at the supranational level?
of energy poverty, and universal (Interview no. 1), that is, general and valid
beyond a specific context.
The following example might clarify this statement. Initially, EAPN and
EPSU drafted detailed amendments targeting the legislative texts in the
package. When they decided to widen the coalition, they did not put forward
these amendments. Going into legislative details could have proven to be hard
and time-consuming, because details have different implications – in terms
of costs and benefits – for different interest groups (Interview no. 1). That
is, this way of proceeding would have required a wide and heterogeneous set
of lobbies to compromise the interests they represent to reach an agreement.
Instead, the interviewees underline how the result did not ‘water down’ the
various organizations’ proposals (Interview no. 1). Ultimately, the REAE
issued a set of targeted, yet generic, demands, then allowing each organization
‘to speak separately’ (Interview no. 3).
The example of the disagreement around regulated prices suggests that
social and environmental organizations might hold different beliefs, with the
latter being more market-oriented and neoliberal than the former (Interview
no. 3). However, this does not seem to be necessarily the case. European
social NGOs, trade unions and environmental organizations agree on a vision
for a just and sustainable transition (Interview nos. 5, 6 and 7). The divide on
regulated prices seems to be more a debate about short-term tactics to alleviate
energy poverty than on long-term strategies and values. The European Trade
Union Confederation (ETUC), for instance, conceives it as an ad hoc instru-
ment that ‘might help public authorities to cope with the urgent situations
where electricity prices, for any reasons, suddenly skyrocket’ (Interview no.
7). Thus, this conflict appears to be more at the level of policy measures than
at a normative level. Overall, this example demonstrates that divergent inter-
ests could actually lead to disagreement. However, what is important for joint
mobilization is that all the actors share the ultimate goal. Every member in the
REAE agrees that conflicts on policy instruments are not enough to undermine
cooperation. The shared opinion is that joint mobilization is desirable and
instrumental to achieve certain objectives. The informal architecture of the
coalition allows its members to avoid conflicts, without compromising their
willingness to cooperate. Informality prevents full coordination to blossom
from a lighter form of cooperation, but, at the same time, it increases the likeli-
hood that eco-social mobilization will not break apart as soon as disagreements
arise.
CONCLUSIONS
Analyzing the experience of the REAE coalition allowed us to shed light
on the potentials and the limits of eco-social mobilization at the EU level.
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236 Towards sustainable welfare states in Europe
Through this case study, we have addressed the likelihood that European green
and social NGOs, as well as trade unions, will work together on eco-social
challenges. We have shown how, under certain circumstances, this kind of
mobilization may not only occur, but also endure.
Our starting point was that the prevalence of potentially divergent inter-
ests, the complex and competitive structures in which European trade unions
and NGOs operate, as well as their lack of resources, normally prevent full
coordination from happening. In addition, forming an alliance is even more
complicated when it is supposed to build a bridge between the social and
the environmental spheres. Not only do the organizations operating in these
two spheres represent different interests, but they also have different cul-
tures, which might be hard to reconcile when they intend to work together.
Addressing eco-social issues appears to require strong cooperation among
interest groups. This chapter has asked whether a looser coalition between civil
society and trade unions can overcome current constraints.
The case of the REAE coalition demonstrates that a generally positive
attitude towards eco-social mobilization exists at the EU level. In this case,
green and red interest groups reached their collaborative potential through
the means that they adopted to manage their internal and external activities.
When presented with the opportunity of influencing policymaking, these
actors saw the forming of a coalition as a convenient strategy, allowing them
to minimize costs, while ensuring effectiveness and legitimacy for their
claims. Once formed, the REAE coalition has had a mostly ad hoc mandate
and informal-horizontal structures. Informality allowed coalition members
to shape and deliver on their main strategy, that is, lobbying policymakers
to highlight the issue of energy poverty within the ‘Clean Energy for All
Europeans’ package. Less formalized structures also gave NGOs and trade
unions the possibility to come up with common positions – as well as to deal
with controversies on an ad hoc basis.
However, for eco-social mobilization to go beyond its traditional con-
straints, a strong motivation is also necessary. One requires ideal constructs
and visions to guide eco-social alliances in their efforts to reconcile social,
environmental and economic priorities. Unlike EU institutions, social and
green interest groups seem to have moved beyond the ‘green growth’ ideal
construct already by the end of 2018, as they are increasingly endorsing
the ‘just transition’ paradigm, which provides a framework to deliver on
eco-social sustainability. Through ‘just transition’, green and social pressure
groups have become more aware of eco-social challenges and they have
been able to find a common ground, beyond the traditional ‘silos’ logic. By
reinforcing each other’s demands, they seem willing to build a cross-sectoral
consensus for a developmental model that should favour social justice and
cohesion, while also attempting to reverse environmental degradation and
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Eco-social mobilization at the supranational level?
the climate catastrophe. The key aspect is that ‘just transition’ questions the
rationale of unbounded economic growth and pure neoliberalism by aiming
to compensate for negative externalities. The ‘just transition’ paradigm has
prompted NGOs and trade unions to cooperate in the REAE coalition. Perhaps
these interest groups have realized that, against the backdrop of pressing and
potentially catastrophic eco-social challenges, they cannot keep focusing
solely on their own core interests. Trade unions and social actors realize that
climate shocks and environmental degradation are already affecting people in
increasingly adverse ways. Green organizations are realizing that they would
not be able to reach an ecologically sustainable transition if most people – and
workers – are resisting it.
When it comes to concretely specifying and putting into practice the
ideal paradigm of ‘just transition’, conflicts might still emerge. The issue
of regulated prices that emerged within the REAE coalition is indicative of
the fragility of cross-sectoral cooperation. Even when the participants of the
coalition are able to find a common ground with respect to the objectives, they
might still disagree about the means to achieve it. Many environmental NGOs
appear more market-oriented than the social organizations are. This may limit
the scope for durable eco-social coordination, as there is always a risk that
coalitions break apart because of disagreements and conflicts. However, our
case study has clearly shown how eco-social alliances at the EU level could
potentially influence the restructuring (at least partly) of established power
relationships and policymaking ‘silos’ to reach sustainable combinations
between social and ecological goals.
INTERVIEWS
1. Senior officer, Housing Europe, 23 January 2018, telephone
2. Climate Justice and Energy Campaigner, Friends of the Earth Europe
(FoEE), 2 February 2018, written response to a questionnaire sent by
email
3. Policy Coordinator, European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN), 6 February
2018, telephone
4. Representative of an international environmental NGO, 9 February 2018,
telephone
5. Policy Staff Member, European Public Service Union (EPSU), 15 October
2018, Brussels
6. Climate Justice and Energy Campaigner, Friends of the Earth Europe
(FoEE), 16 October 2018, Brussels
7. Policy Advisor, European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), 17
October 2018, Brussels
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238 Towards sustainable welfare states in Europe
8. Policy Advisor to Member of the European Parliament Claude Turmes,
The Greens Group, 24 October 2018, telephone
NOTE
1. The research work behind this chapter was completed in early 2020.
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